ISIS: Changing the Face of Warfare and State-Building

SAMECSAMEC Perspective Series February 2015 NO: 9 Perspective Series ORMER SAMEC February 2015, NO: 9 ISIS: Changing the Face of Warfare and State-Building

Mattıe Lanz

hen one thinks of traditional which to leverage themselves mili- Mattie Lanz completed weapons of war, it is not com- tarily and as a method of social out- her BA in Political Wmon that dams or rivers are the first reach to gain support in two coun- Science and French Language at the State to come to our mind. The idea of wa- tries whose water infrastructures University of New ter being a weapon of war might at have been heavily damaged by years York at Binghamton in first seem absurd, as it is not a weap- of conflict. This strategy has been, in 2009. She is currently working on her Master’s on in the traditional sense. However, the writer’s opinion, the key to their Degree at Middle East water can and has been used suc- success. They have utilized one of the Technical University cessfully as a weapon of war, as will region’s most precious resources in a in Ankara in Middle Eastern Studies. Her be discussed in this report detailing multi-faceted strategy to build a state Master’s thesis is titled, the strategy employed by ISIS in its that will endure in a region divided “Violent non- quest for a Sunni-Islamic State in the by sectarian and ethnic conflicts. state actors and water Middle East. as a tool for leverage: A Water as a Weapon of War comparative study of the ISIS, known by many names (Islamic PYD, the Islamic State, State, ISIL, Da’esh, Islamic State ISIS has completely changed the face and Hezbollah”. Organization), is a Salafi-militant of warfare with their use of water group operating within their self- and water infrastructure as a way to created “caliphate” which exists in achieve submission and bully oppo- the states of Iraq and Syria. They be- sition forces. They realized early on gan to make a serious bid for power that whoever controls the region’s in the summer of 2014 and success- scarce water resources controls both fully utilized water as a weapon with the cities and the countryside, giving ISIS: Changing the Face of Warfare and State-Building

unbelievable power to its holder. ISIS targeted the Mosul Dam4, the largest ISIS has completely took advantage of the fact that Iraq’s dam in Iraq. The dam is an incred- changed the infrastructure was not rebuilt follow- ibly unstable structure, having been face of warfare ing the 2003 U.S. invasion, making built upon deposits of gypsum5, an- with their use of any further damage to water infra- hydrite, marl and limestone, which water and water structure difficult to repair. They also are all water-soluble and since the infrastructure as correctly recognized a similar situa- dam’s construction have been slowly a way to achieve tion in Syria, where after three years deteriorating as a result of seepage. submission and of civil war, the water infrastructure Controlling this dam would be a ma- bully opposition in many cities was crumbling or al- jor victory for ISIS as its destruction forces. They ready unusable. As Loretta Napoleoni would put Mosul under water and realized early says in her new book The Islamist send a wave as high as twenty meters Phoenix: The Islamic State and the all the way to Baghdad6, destroying on that whoever 1 controls the Redrawing of the Middle East , “ISIS towns and villages along the way. ISIS’ sensed, before most others had, that inability to properly maintain the region’s scarce joint foreign intervention of the sort dam7 could pose an additional securi- water resources that occurred in Libya and Iraq would ty threat. ISIS was only able to control controls both the not be possible in Syria.” It was taking the dam for a few weeks in August cities and the this into account that ISIS began its before Coalition airstrikes helped the countryside, giving Anbar Offensive, starting in Syria and Peshmerga retake the dam, and has unbelievable power working its way down the Euphrates been working to retake it ever since. to its holder. River, into Iraq. Thus far, ISIS has been unable to sur- The first use of water as a weapon per- pass Baghdad to make its way into the petrated by ISIS was at the Nuaymiyah Shi’a south. To win Baghdad is part Dam2 near Fallujah. Militants took of their goal to restore the Baghdad the dam from Iraqi forces and divert- Caliphate as it was before it was de- ed large amounts of water by closing stroyed by the Mongols. If ISIS were the dam’s floodgates. This uprooted to take Baghdad, their promulga- the armed forces located upstream tion of sectarianism would naturally of their location, forcing them and lead them to attempt to cleanse the If ISIS were to civilians out of the city of Fallujah. south8 of its Shi’a population, begin- take Baghdad, There was such intense flooding up- ning by depriving them of their water their promulgation stream that around 60,000 civilians3 resources. In order to achieve this, of sectarianism lost their livelihoods, forced to aban- ISIS militants have feverishly worked would naturally don their homes, crops, and animals. to take the Haditha Dam, the second lead them to Additionally, by diverting water from largest dam in Iraq, seen as the key attempt to cleanse the dam, the Shi’a population to the to cutting off all water flow to the the south of its south was deprived of their water south. It is within the same context supply. Additionally, parliamentary that speculation has arisen that ISIS Shi’a population, elections that were taking place at will eventually try to take the Ramadi beginning by the time were interrupted, with only Dam, located upstream of Fallujah depriving them one-third of polling stations in the and downstream of the Haditha Dam. of their water Anbar Province able to open due to This dam provides water specifically resources. the flooding. to the holy Shi’a city of Kerbela. ISIS militants have also continually In the Diyala Province, ISIS con-

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trolled the Adhaim Dam until The dams controlled by ISIS are im- November 2014 when it was recap- portant to another tactic that they By controlling the tured by Iraqi and Shi’a forces. This often employ: utilizing their control dams, ISIS has the dam is important to the province be- over water resources to alter the sup- power to bend the cause it regulates the most important ply available to surrounding towns will of the cities tributary originating in Iraq. It is also and villages. This includes cutting off relying upon them strategically important as the moun- water and electricity and poisoning for water and tains where the river originates are the water supply. This has been an ef- power. a natural border with the Kurdistan fective method of persuasion for ISIS Region, bringing ISIS closer to in their advance. These water cut- Kurdish territory9. Kurdish forces offs have severely damaged Iraq and have also been battling ISIS for con- Syria’s agricultural resources, leaving trol of the Hemrin Dam and protect- people with little choice but to com- ing the Samarra Dam downstream of ply with ISIS’ demands. In addition to the Adhaim Dam. controlling the water resources that Throughout the course of the Anbar dictate Iraq’s food production, the Offense, upwards of 56 bridges10 have land that ISIS has claimed for its ca- been destroyed in the Diyala, Anbar, liphate is a large part of five of Iraq’s Salahaddin and Nineveh provinces. most fertile provinces which produce The bridges have either been pur- approximately 40% of Iraq’s wheat12, posefully destroyed by ISIS or indi- the country’s staple crop, giving ISIS rectly destroyed during clashes be- control of a substantial amount of tween the Iraqi Army and ISIS. The Iraq’s virtual water13. This means that bridges were destroyed in order to ISIS controls important parts of Iraq prevent the Iraqi Army from cross- and Syria’s agricultural production. ing rivers that would bring them For example, they have seized all nine closer to ISIS positions, specifically grain silos14 in the Nineveh Province on the road to Mosul. According to and seven other silos in other prov- the Iraqi Minister of Housing and inces. In addition to the water cut- Reconstruction, ISIS has caused more offs, there have been several instances than $6 million in damage to Iraq’s in- where ISIS poisoned the main water frastructure. supplies of towns and villages. For In Syria, ISIS controls the Tishrin instance, in the northern district of and Taqba Dams11, both upstream of Balad, south of Tikrit in Iraq, ISIS re- Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor. These dams portedly poisoned the water supply 15 are important, but for different rea- with crude oil , rendering it undrink- sons than those in Iraq. They are not able. seen as potential weapons in the same It is with these methods that ISIS has way as Iraqi dams. Instead, their pro- successfully transformed the face of vision of water and electricity to the warfare in arid regions. The threat surrounding area is what makes them of flooding, water cut-offs, and wa- important. By controlling the dams, ter poisoning helps them to weaken ISIS has the power to bend the will of and seize control of different areas the cities relying upon them for water which they then add to their growing and power. ‘caliphate’. The use of such a precious

3 ISIS: Changing the Face of Warfare and State-Building

resource as a weapon gives them with their desire to cut off all water The reliance upon water great leverage over their opponents. resources to the Shi’a south of Iraq. as a weapon of war If ISIS were to control the Tigris and ISIS has achieved great recognition to this extent is rare Euphrates Rivers as it hopes to, they from the international community, and the already scarce would control Baghdad16. There are not just for the violence of their ac- water resources of many who do not wish to see any more tions, but for the success they have the region force the water infrastructure destroyed, crops achieved. The reliance upon water as international community and homes flooded, or friends and a weapon of war to this extent is rare to recognize ISIS and its family poisoned in the fight against and the already scarce water resourc- efficiency. ISIS. It is with this power that ISIS is es of the region force the international able to force towns, villages, and op- community to recognize ISIS and its position forces into submission. efficiency. This recognition increases Regionally, ISIS has taken up the yoke the impact that ISIS has not only in as the defender of the Sunni World the territory within which it is act- in order to stop the take-over of Shi’a ing, but on a global scale. Seemingly regimes. When Nouri al-Maliki was overnight, ISIS became a household elected president, a new belt formed name, terrifying many with the rapid- across the Middle East of Shi’a domi- ity of its advance. It is with these tac- nated governments—from Iran to tics that ISIS was able to quickly take Syria. ISIS’s goal is to counter this new over large swaths of land while simul- threat and seize an area large enough taneously making a name for itself. to create a purely Sunni-Islamic state. Who Controls the Dams in By taking up this fight in the name Iraq and Syria? of the Sunni population, they have gained a great number of followers * Indicates that ISIS is trying to take from a population with few options. this dam from Iraqi/Peshmerga forces They have shown their great dedica- ** There have been coalition air- tion to the promulgation of sectarian strikes around this dam to help the conflict through their acts of spec- Iraqi Armed Forces to repel ISIS as tacular violence and more specifically they try to take the dam.

Peshmerga/Iraqi Army/Shi’a ISIS Militias

• Nuaimiyah (Fallujah) • Haditha** • Tishrin Dam (Syria) • Ramadi* • Taqba Dam (Syria) • Samarra* • Ba’ath Dam (Syria) • Hemrin • Adhaim* • Mosul* • Dibis • Dukan • Darbandikhan

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Water as a Method of reach19 include building a new souk Social Outreach in Raqqa, installing new power lines, As a part of this fixing potholes, offering transporta- governance system, The use of water as a weapon has ISIS has worked been the key hard power approach for tion to its citizens, constructing new hard to construct ISIS in its land-grab. Conversely, they hospitals, and opening a post office. strong institutions are implementing a soft power ap- One of the branches of this social out- proach to water and state-building by reach program is in charge of provid- and infrastructure ing stable water and electricity to the implementing a well-planned social within its new residents of the “Islamic State”. Raqqa, outreach program and governance territory, the capital of the so-called caliphate, structure which includes a cabinet of implementing a was the first city in which this pro- ministers, Shari’a courts, and a mo- sophisticated social gram was implemented and where it rality police17. This system is meant to outreach program. has become the most entrenched20. build their credibility and legitimize Previous to ISIS militants taking up their brutal tactics, demonstrating residence in the city, residents report- that they have not only power enough edly had only one hour of electric- to win battles, but the intellect and ity per day and water was not easy strategy it takes to govern a state. to come by. Once ISIS established This governance structure is led by themselves in the city, they began to the “khalifa”, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, implement their social outreach plan. who has appointed various advisors, This included digging wells for local ministers, and military command- 21 tribes at their own expense in order ers to administer to his caliphate in a to show them that they were there to carefully structured governance sys- care for them. They also began run- tem. Under Baghdadi, there are two ning the Tishrin and Taqba dams deputies, each of whom is responsible at top capacity22 and draining Lake for either Iraq or Syria. Baghdadi also Assad of its water in order to provide has a cabinet of ministers in charge water and electricity for their new of the treasury, transport, security, capital city of Raqqa. The use of these prisoners, war, and foreign fighters as dams at this capacity without proper 18 well as an independent judiciary . As maintenance will eventually render a part of this governance system, ISIS them useless unless they are properly has worked hard to construct strong maintained, something that ISIS is institutions and infrastructure within incapable of doing. While it has been its new territory, implementing a so- brought to ISIS’s attention that Lake phisticated social outreach program. Assad’s water levels are rapidly drop- This program is intensive in its scope, ping, ISIS has pointed the finger at working to win the hearts and minds the Turkish government for the lack of its new citizens with the provision of water, blaming the Southeastern of healthcare, education, and polic- Anatolian Dam Project (GAP). This ing services, albeit only to the extent Project has long been a topic of con- acceptable by ISIS. For example, the troversy as the Ataturk Dam, one of religious schools established by ISIS the project’s largest dams, has caused have many restrictions in terms of an enormous drop in the Euphrates curriculum. Examples of social out- River’s water flow into Syria and Iraq

5 ISIS: Changing the Face of Warfare and State-Building

and subsequent drought-like condi- they are selling the resources they tions in both countries. In an effort have stolen at very cheap prices to the to reverse the water loss from Lake citizens of their Caliphate26. Assad, ISIS has been rationing elec- ISIS is not the first militant group to tricity23 from the Taqba Dam by cut- provide social services to the people ting off electricity to Aleppo for 16 to within its territory. However, ISIS 20 hours a day being different from most militant This method of social outreach ini- groups in its quest to form its own tially brought them grassroots sup- state, it is important for them to pro- port in a Raqqa, long-neglected by its vide these services. If they are unable government in the midst of a brutal to do so, this will bring their legiti- war. ISIS was able to find success due macy into question, making it very to the fact that they had something difficult to consolidate their state. to offer in a region left to fend for it- Additionally, the more that ISIS em- self. While this brought them initial beds itself in the civilian population, success in Raqqa, their governance the more difficult it will be for op- in Raqqa and other cities has since position and coalition members to taken a turn for the worse. Raqqa has differentiate between citizens and returned to its original state, with militants, specifically with coalition scarce water resources and electric- airstrikes. This may make it difficult 27 24 to avoid civilian casualties , limiting ity available for just a few hours a the coalition’s ability to achieve its day. Mosul is also in the midst of a military and policy goals. It may also severe water shortage, its water sup- lead to a situation similar to what we ply contaminated25 due to the neglect experienced when American troops of water treatment stations. With no withdrew from Iraq. When U.S. way to access fresh water, residents troops withdrew, the Iraqi state failed have taken to digging their own wells, to provide the necessary services to putting themselves at risk of illness in its people, leaving them searching for order to survive. The number of pa- anyone willing to provide for them, tients admitted to hospitals as a re- one of the major reasons the Iraqi in- sult of water poisoning continues to surgency was able to grow. If ISIS is increase and there has been no clear ISIS is not the first eliminated, a similar power vacuum plan presented by ISIS or another will occur, potentially opening the militant group to party to counter this problem. provide social services space for another group to take its The one aspect in which they have to the people within its place and continuing the cycle of vio- been successful with their social out- lence28. territory. However, ISIS reach is their use of the virtual wa- being different from ter resources they control to provide What Can We Expect? most militant groups in for the population of their caliph- As ISIS continues to utilize the in- its quest to form its own ate. ISIS’s ability to provide food to frastructure of Syria and Iraq as a state, it is important for people who have largely been forgot- weapon, they are knowingly sending them to provide these ten by their respective governments the region into greater peril. There services. has proven to be a great way to gain are already severe humanitarian cri- support and legitimacy. Additionally, ses in both Syria and Iraq and the

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destruction of important infrastruc- true believer, while the nonbelievers, In order to maintain ture, as if it is nothing more than a who refused to heed the warnings of what legitimacy it grenade from their arsenal, will only a man, perished. Meant as a refer- has established, exacerbate these crises. ISIS’ goal is to ence to the Qur’an, the images used ISIS should be able establish its legitimacy and consoli- in the issue also offer a visual of what to provide the date its hold on the land it has while it might be like to find oneself on the continuing to expand its territory. In receiving end of one of ISIS’s artificial services of a state, order to maintain what legitimacy it floods. as it has promised has established, ISIS should be able 30 to do. In her new book , Loretta Napoleoni to provide the services of a state, as it appropriately calls ISIS the “Islamist has promised to do. Being unable to Phoenix”. Taking into account the rise provide non-essential services such of ISIS, from the ashes of Iraq and as transport might have little effect Syria to become one of, if not the, on their ability to establish them- most feared terrorist organizations selves. However, if ISIS is unable to in the world, Ms. Napoleoni is quite provide water to those living within right in her decision to equate ISIS its territory, that would be the nail on the coffin in their efforts for a state. with a bird that is repeatedly reborn While their utilization of water has from the ashes of its predecessor. ISIS proven effective in their land grab, realized that controlling water allows ISIS realized that the current situation within the so- them to control not only agriculture controlling water called “Islamic State” is unsustainable and electricity, but the economy and allows them to and if it does not improve, will end in important infrastructure, such as control not only its demise. sanitation. Their recognition of the agriculture and In the second issue29 of its publica- importance water plays in the region electricity, but tion, Dabiq, ISIS gives its readers a has provided them the military power the economy choice: “It’s either the Islamic State or necessary to establish themselves as a and important the flood”. This threat is a reference contender in the region, rising from infrastructure, such to the story of Noah who was saved a previous unknown to a household as sanitation. from the giant flood because he was a name in a matter of days.

7 ISIS: Changing the Face of Warfare and State-Building

ENDNOTES

1 Napoleoni, Loretta, The Islamist Phoenix: The Islamic State and the Redrawing of the Middle East, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2014. 2 https://medium.com/war-is-boring/dam-warfare-3da6ee24518a 3 http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/trUploads/OrtadoguBulteni/2014620_orsamwaterbulletin184. pdf 4 http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2014727_2014726_policybrief6.pdf 5 http://www.wsj.com/articles/mosul-dams-takeover-by-isis-raises-risk-of-flooding-1407799954 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/22046 9 http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2014727_2014726_policybrief6.pdf 10 http://basnews.com/en/economy/2014/12/07/iraqi-ministry-islamic-state-has-cost-iraq- 6-million/ 11 http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2014727_2014726_policybrief6.pdf 12 http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-has-two-major-weapons-in-iraq-2014-8 13 Virtual Water:The water used in the production process of an agricultural or industrial product is the ‘virtual water’ contained in the product. For example, for producing 1 kilo- gram of grain, we need for instance 1000-2000 kg of water.( http://www.waterfootprint.org/ Reports/Report12.pdf) 14 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/30/isis-wheat-iraq_n_5905560.html 15 http://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/isis-poisons-drinking-water-crude-oil-balad-district/ 16 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/02/water-key-conflict-iraq-syria-isis 17 http://www.clarionproject.org/factsheet/islamic-state-isis-isil 18 Ibid. 19 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-isis-guide-to-building-an- islamic-state/372769/ 20 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-isis-guide-to-building-an- islamic-state/372769/ 21 http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/isis-using-two-pronged-approach-to-subdue-sunni-mus- lim-tribes-1.2854978 22 http://e360.yale.edu/feature/mideast_water_wars_in_iraq_a_battle_for_control_of_wa- ter/2796/ 23 Ibid. 24 http://e360.yale.edu/feature/mideast_water_wars_in_iraq_a_battle_for_control_of_wa- ter/2796/ 25 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29600573 26 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/30/isis-wheat-iraq_n_5905560.html 27 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/07/whats-so-new- about-the-islamic-states-governance/ 28 Ibid. 29 http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-2-the- flood.pdf 30 Napoleoni, Loretta, The Islamist Phoenix: The Islamic State and the Redrawing of the Middle East, New York: Seven Stories Press, 2014.

ORMER SAMEC

Center for Middle Eastern Studies (SAMEC) of Sakarya University is founded in 2014 and has set the national pace in introducing and developing an interdisiplinary approach to the historical and contemporary study of the Middle East. It seeks to move beyond area-specific frameworks of research by fostering an inter-regional, multi-disciplinary and critical approach to the regional affairs with more than 25 staff working at 15 country offices and thematic divisions including state-building, power, society and idendity. SAMEC offers different courses, graduate programs and events. It has organized number of international conferences, workshops and academic gatherings. Sakarya University Esentepe Kampüsü 54187 Serdivan / SAKARYA / TÜRKİYE +90 264 295 3602 [email protected] 8 8