Political State of the Region Report

2012

Dilemmas and Coherence in the Baltic Sea Region Political State of the Region Report

Editors Bernd Henningsen and Tobias Etzold

Authors Hans Brask, Kimmo Elo, Tobias Etzold, Stefan Gänzle, Bernd Henningsen, Pertii Joenniemi, Tapani Kaakkuriniemi, Peer Krumrey, Lidia Puka, Christian Rebhan, Alexander Sergunin

Published by Baltic Development Forum Nytorv 3, 1st fl o o r DK-1450 Copenhagen K Denmark Telephone +45 70 20 93 94 Fax +45 70 20 93 95 [email protected] www.bdforum.org

Language editing: Peter Dowdy Layout: Bitdesign / Leena Närhi, Finland Printing: InPrint / Laura Breimane Photo credits: Page 16: Istockphoto Page 21: Johannes Jansson/ norden.org Page 27: Istockphoto Page 30: Johannes Jansson/ norden.org Page 35: Johannes Jansson/ norden.org Page 41: Istockphoto Page 47: Johannes Jansson/ norden.org Page 50: Johannes Jansson/ norden.org Page 56: Istockphoto Page 59: Istockphoto Page 66: Istockphoto

2 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Deeper Regional Integration Needed

I would like to congratulate the think tank for novative ideas to enable businesses in the region to the Baltic Sea Region on their second thought- compete within and outside the region, producing provoking Political State of the Region Report. high-value added products. We have to nurture Our region is marked by constant dynam- an entrepreneurial climate, while at the same time ics, in terms of political developments, economic guaranteeing the necessary environmental protec- growth, and increasing networking. It has been tion of the sea and the whole region. widely acknowledged that the Baltic Sea Region I therefore welcome progress on the European today is one of the most integrated and dynami- macro-regional strategy for the Baltic Sea Re- cally developing regions in Europe, which showed gion, a method of European co-operation which considerable economic stability even in these may, in fact, help to tackle acute environmental recent times of economic and fi nancial crisis. problems more eff ectively, to enhance prosperity It is my strong belief that only deeper Europe- of this part of the EU, and to speed up important an integration and intensive regional co-operation strategic energy projects to end this region’s isola- can keep the region on the top of global ratings as tion. In order to address cross-border challenges, the most environmentally sustainable, economi- primarily environmental ones, we should continue cally stable, industrially innovative, advanced, to employ numerous regional organisations to dynamic, and society friendly part of the world. their fullest capacity, such as Northern Dimen- In my mind, our primary target should be deeper sion, or Council of the Baltic Sea States, chaired regional integration on all levels, be it culture or now by Germany, to increase co-operation with infrastructure. We have to enhance regional mar- our neighbouring non-EU countries. kets, especially in the energy sector, to develop in-

June 2012

Audronius Ažubalis Minister of Foreign Aff airs of Lithuania

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 3 Editors’ Foreword

For some time, recognised experts in the newly the report contains assessments of coherence in established DeepWater think tank have been BSR co-operation and of right-wing populism with dealing with questions concerning the Baltic Sea certain regards to Northern Europe. Th e end of Region, preparing to give advice and to initiate, the reporting period was May 2012. Th e chapters develop and follow up on political processes. Ex- of this report primarily refl ect the views of the pert knowledge is there; steady scientifi c observa- individual authors, and not necessarily those of the tion and judgement on the region’s developments editors and sponsors. is necessary. In October 2011, we launched the We would like to thank the authors of the fi rst Political State of the Baltic Sea Region Report chapters of this report for their valuable contribu- in Gdansk. We are glad to be able to present the tions, input and eff orts. We are indebted to Peter second Report of this kind only nine months later. Dowdy for the language editing and Nelli Nok- We are convinced, as we wrote in our fi rst kala and Peer Krumrey for their help. In the name report, that the exemplary political, economic, of everyone who has contributed to this report, and cultural transformation of the region since we would also like to express our gratitude for the 1989-90 was a necessary condition for this concen- support of the Baltic Development Forum, espe- tration on and selection of the Baltic Sea Region cially Malgorzata Dzieza and Hans Brask, the (BSR): since then, it has again become possible to Nordic Council of Ministers, the Konrad Adenau- view the BSR, separated for over 40 years by the er Foundation (Riga/Berlin), especially Andreas Iron Curtain, as an undivided entity. Th e region’s Klein, and the Department of Northern European doings and dealings have, since then, come under Studies at Humboldt University (Berlin). We hope practically no restrictions. Mobility over the sea that this report proves persuasive to responsible has achieved previously undreamed-of levels, and persons and decision makers, and creates the pos- political and cultural co-operation have lead to the sibility of future work. Baltic Sea being called the ‘Sea of Possibilities’. Th e BSR has become a ‘laboratory of modernity’, could Berlin, in June 2012 be a European example for other, to some extent not yet defi ned, regions. Th e regionalisation of Europe will thus continue. Th e structure of this report diff ers from that of the fi rst report. Th is time, we are dealing more extensively with three countries, namely Russia, Iceland and Norway – the latter two having not been dealt with in our fi rst report – with special focus on these countries’ policies towards the BSR. Th e region of Kaliningrad also receives special at- tention. Besides these country and region reports, Bernd Henningsen and Tobias Etzold

4 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Sponsors’ Foreword

Th ese years, co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region of the report. Over the years, BDF has worked is changing in many ways. Th e EU Strategy for the together with NCM on the older sister report, the Baltic Sea Region is introducing new forms of co- State of the Region Report, which Baltic Develop- operation and many new projects. Th e EU and the ment Forum publishes mainly on economic issues European Commission are becoming much more together with Dr. Christian Ketels. We appreciate strongly involved in the region. As the Council of that NCM is now sponsoring this new initiative, the Baltic Sea Region (CBSS) is celebrating its 20th which hopefully will achieve a similar high status. anniversary in 2012 during the German CBSS We are also very pleased that Secretary General Presidency, it makes good sense to take stock. Halldór Ásgrímsson will participate when this It is important that stakeholders, on all levels, report is launched at the 14th BDF Summit in be part of the exercise and should take active part Copenhagen. in the debates about these new dynamics and the BDF is also very thankful to Konrad Adenau- priorities for the region’s next 20 years. Th e many er Stiftung for continuously sponsoring the meet- civil society networks that have characterised the ings of the research network that made the report Baltic Sea Region co-operation and cross-border – the DeepWater think tank. Th ese meetings are contacts throughout the last 20 years must be very important for establishing the network and included. introducing new researchers. Th e Political State of the Region Report and the We are equally grateful to the many institu- research network behind it can play an important tions which have supported our work and acted as role in reaching out to all parts of the region by hosts for conferences on the report and regional stimulating debate and presenting articles and aff airs. Th is year they include, in particular, the views on diff erent subject matters. We need re- Polish Institute of International Aff airs, University searchers and experts to provide new information, of Vilnius, the German Institute for International as well as to evaluate, challenge and even provoke and Security Aff airs (SWP), University of Latvia, our understanding of the region and the social- Humboldt University, Berlin, and the Danish economic conditions in its member countries. Institute of International Studies. Baltic Development Forum (BDF) is very Last but not least, we appreciate the contribu- proud to be working together with the Nordic tions from the diff erent authors, and especially the Council of Ministers (NCM) – the biggest and hard work of Dr. Tobias Etzold, the co-ordinator strongest regional organisation in the Baltic Sea of this report, and Prof. Bernd Henningsen, who area – as the main sponsor of the 2nd edition is chairing the DeepWater think tank.

Copenhagen June 2012

Hans Brask Director, Baltic Development Forum

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 5 Grußwort der Staatsministerin im Auswärtigen Amt

In den beiden zurückliegenden Jahrzehnten sind Herausforderungen wie beispielweise die Ener- die Länder um die Ostsee weiter zusammenge- giesicherheit, den demografi schen Wandel und die wachsen. Damit prägen nahezu 20 Jahre erfolgre- Verschmutzung der Ostsee Lösungen zu fi nden. iche Zusammenarbeit das politische und gesells- Dazu müssen alle Ostseeanrainer wirkungsvoll chaftliche Leben in der Ostseeregion. Geistiger und eng zusammenarbeiten. Ihr Bericht mit und historischer Vorläufer dieser beispielhaften Empfehlungen und Hinweisen für politisches Kooperation ist die Hanse. Die Prinzipien einer Handeln leistet hierzu einen wertvollen und un- guten Nachbarschaft werden in einer Vielzahl von verzichtbaren Beitrag. Vereinigungen und Kooperationen von unten her gelebt, sind selbstbestimmt und selbstgestaltet. Die Ostseeregion ist heute eine der am stärksten entwickelten und integrierten Regionen Europas. Das bestehende Netzwerk der unterschiedlichen Akteure ist beispielhaft und einmalig in Europa. Der Ostseerat, dessen 20-jähriges Jubiläum wir im Rahmen der deutschen Präsidentschaft mit einem außerordentlichen Außenministertref- fen auf Schloss Plön gefeiert haben, hat einen unverzichtbaren Beitrag für das Zusammen- wachsen der Ostseeregion geleistet. Er ist das verbindende Gremium auf Regierungsebene auch zu den Nicht-EU-Mitgliedstaaten Norwe- gen, Island und Russland. Eine neue, tragende Cornelia Pieper Säule in der Ostseekooperation ist seit 2009 die Minister of State of the Foreign Federal Offi ce of EU-Ostseestrategie, die als erste makroregionale Germany Strategie von der EU ins Leben gerufen wurde. Mit ihr werden zahlreichen Kooperationen im Ostseeraum gestärkt und die Zusammenarbeit von nationalstaatlichen, regionalen und lokalen Kräften optimiert. Es ist erfreulich, dass es über den Ostseerat zunehmend gelingt, auch die re- gionale Zusammenarbeit der EU mit Drittstaaten wie Russland voranzubringen. Ein Musterbeispiel dafür ist die Modern- isierungsinitiative für den südöstlichen Ostse- eraum, deren Schwerpunkt zunächst der Region Kaliningrad und seiner Nachbarschaft gilt. Sie ist einerseits Priorität der bisherigen deutschen und künftigen russischen Ostseerats-Präsidentschaft. Sie wird darüber hinaus auch im Rahmen der EU-Ostseestrategie unterstützt werden. Damit ist eine nachhaltige Entwicklung dieser Initia- tive gewährleistet. Gemeinsam gilt es, für große

6 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 List of Acronyms

AC Arctic Council NDEP Northern Dimension Environmental BALREPA Baltic Sea Region Rotating Energy Partnership Planning Academy NDI Northern Dimension Initiative BASREC Baltic Sea Region Energy NDPHS Northern Dimension Partnership for Cooperation Health and Social Wellbeing BDF Baltic Development Forum NDPTL Northern Dimension Partnership on BEAC Barents-Euro-Arctic Council Transport and Logistics BSAP Baltic Sea Action Plan NEFCO Nordic Environment Finance BSC Baltic Sea Cooperation Corporation BSPC Baltic Sea Parliamentary NGO Non-Governmental Organization Conference OMC Open Method of Coordination BSR Baltic Sea Region PfM Partnership for Modernization BSSSC Baltic Sea States Subregional Co- SEBA South Eastern Baltic operation SEC Special Economic Zone CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States SEK Swedish Kronor CFSP Common Foreign and Security SOGC Senior Offi cials Group for Culture Policy UBC Union of Baltic Cities EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction WTO World Trade Organization and Development EEA European Economic Area EEC European Energy Charter EGNRS Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety ENP European Neighbourhood Policy EU European Union EUSBSR European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region FDI Foreign Direct Investment GDP Gross Domestic Product HELCOM Helsinki Commission KR Kaliningrad Region LNG Liquefi ed Natural Gas MEP Member of the European Parliament MFA Ministry of Foreign Aff airs MP Member of Parliament NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NB6 Nordic-Baltic 6 NB8 Nordic-Baltic 8 NC Nordic Council NCM Nordic Council of Ministers ND Northern Dimension NDCP Northern Dimension Cultural Partnership NDDC Northern Dimension Development Center

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 7 Executive Summary, Introduction and Overview of Regional Developments

a follow-up and supplement to last year’s report. Th e idea is to cover topics, which had not been a primary focus in the previous report. Th e 2012 Political State of the Region Report focuses on Russian Baltic Sea region policies, the development of the Russian Baltic Sea exclave Hans Brask, Tobias Etzold, Bernd Henningsen, Kaliningrad, and two countries outside the core Peer Krumrey region that were not covered in the fi rst report – Norway and Iceland – and their relationship to Executive Summary and the BSR and BSR policies. Th e article on Rus- sia deals with the involvement of the country in Introduction to Report regional co-operation, the attempts of the other countries of the region and the EU to involve In what state is the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) Russia, and related diffi culties. Th e chapter on in 2012? What are the current priorities of its the Kaliningrad area draws an up-to-date sketch countries? What are the main challenges for the of the situation of this Russian Baltic Sea exclave, region, and what are the sensitivities? Since 2012 providing an overview of progress, relevant issue marks the anniversaries of several of the main areas and remaining challenges, risks and diffi cul- structures of regional co-operation, most notably ties. Norway and Iceland have a special relation- the 20th anniversary of the Council of the Baltic ship with the BSR, as they are geographically Sea States (CBSS), one should also ask what has not part of the region, but participate in most of been achieved in the last 20 years of regional the regional co-operation arrangements. As for co-operation in the Baltic Sea area, and what these countries, the most interesting questions are still needs to be done and achieved in the years whether they are still real outsiders in the region to come. or have become a kind of insider or semi-insider. Th e outline of the second Political State of If they are considered to be in, the next question the Region Report is diff erent from the fi rst one is whether they are in for real, whether they have that was launched at the 13th Baltic Develop- a genuine interest in the region or whether the ment Forum Summit in Gdansk in October 2011. interest and engagement is rather half-hearted and While the scope of that report was rather broad symbolic only. and covered current political developments in all Th e report also analyses the possibilities for the littoral states of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) creating a coherent framework of regional co- and a considerable number of issue areas mainly operation in the BSR, which has been one of the connected to the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea priorities of the 2011/12 German CBSS Presiden- Region (EUSBSR), this year’s report contains a cy. Th e chapter therefore provides an up-to-date smaller number of articles. It should be seen as overview of institutions and structures of regional

8 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 co-operation, institutional developments, and Overview of major domestic the relevant issue areas of regional co-operation, and regional developments focusing on coherence. Right-wing populism is a wide-spread phenomenon in all the countries of in the BSR the BSR. Th erefore, the report deals with current developments in this regard, especially post- Th is introductory chapter provides a brief over- Utøya/Oslo, with a particular emphasis on the view of a selection of major events and develop- Nordic countries. Strengthening the democratic ments in the BSR and its countries and, together systems and citizens’ participation in the political with the report’s concluding remarks and outlook, process in all the countries of the region, perhaps an evaluation of the current situation of the BSR. involving some form of dialogue on this and co- Th e second Political State of the Region Report operation between the countries, could be a pos- covers the period following the 2011 report, from sible way forward dealing with this phenomenon. August 2011 to May 2012.1 Although this report deals with a smaller number of issues and countries, it still refl ects a number of general developments the entire region 1. Domestic developments is facing, including issues that have a wider impact on the region. Th e involvement of Russia, includ- Th is executive overview of domestic political de- ing the Kaliningrad area, is crucial for the devel- velopments in the BSR focuses on those countries opment of the region as a whole, and for settling that held national elections within the applicable still ongoing challenges and problems. In order to time frame. Th is report’s chapters on Norwegian make progress in tackling regional challenges as and Icelandic Baltic Sea policies by Lidia Puka well as to utilise the opportunities and chances the and Christian Rebhan also refl ect some of the region has to off er, creating an eff ective, effi cient domestic developments in Norway and Iceland. and coherent framework for regional co-operation seems greatly important. Currently, the overall interest in the BSR of Denmark most of its countries’ central governments does On 15 September 2011, approximately four mil- not seem particularly intense (in contrast to a lion Danish voters were called to general elections. fairly strong interest at lower levels). Th e trend is In a fairly close run, the incumbent centre-right obviously the issues and political processes that coalition, which had governed the country in a are currently perceived, by the central govern- minority government tolerated by the populist ments, as more relevant from a wider European/ Danish People’s Party for the last ten years, was EU perspective currently prevailing over regional forced to resign. Prime Minister Lars Løkke Ras- issues. A certain misbalance between the EU and mussen was replaced by Helle Th orning-Schmidt, regional levels, for example in terms of funding, Denmark’s fi rst female Prime Minister, and her political commitment and prioritisation, becomes centre-left government. Although the centre-left obvious. Nonetheless, from a broader European opposition had enjoyed continuing majorities point of view, the EU countries in the BSR, in in opinion polls since late 2009, the fi nal result fact, have a lot to off er and have a chance to posi- was somewhat fuzzy. While the biggest party in tion themselves as the Top of Europe, revitalis- the incumbent centre-right coalition, Rasmus- ing a slogan of a few years ago. Th e challenge for sen’s Liberal Party, managed to gain slightly those that really care about the BSR will thus be in votes, the leading party in the oppositional to preserve the interest of all relevant actors in group, Th orning-Schmidt’s Social Democrats, lost the region and to reverse the trend of creating ground relative to 2007, thus having the party’s a certain misbalance. It might be dangerous to worst outcome ever. Th e change in government neglect the political, environmental and economic was therefore caused by the smaller partners’ par- developments of a key European region such as ticularly severe losses of the Conservative People’s the BSR, which could off er some solutions to Party and gains of the Social Liberal Party respec- Europe’s general problems. 1 We are grateful to Joakim Ekman (regional developments), Kari Liuhto and Hanna Mäkinen (energy) and Lidia Puka (Poland and regional developments) for their input.

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 9 tively. Worth mentioning is the comparatively for the dissolution of the Saeima won suffi cient stable support for the Danish People’s Party, which popular support in July. For the fi rst time, the theoretically could have suff ered more signifi - Harmony Centre, a party, which gets most of its cantly from a desire for change and the incidents support from the Russian speaking minority, of Oslo and Utøya in neighbouring Norway two came in fi rst, but was unable to form a govern- months earlier. Obviously, there was not a clear ment coalition. Instead, centre-right Prime Min- link between this incident and the elections. ister Valdis Dombrovskis remained in power in spite of his party losing severely at the polls. His third cabinet rests mainly upon the Reform Party Finland of former President Valdis Zatlers, who had, as After two terms in offi ce, Finnish president Tarja then-president, called for the dissolution referen- Halonen was ineligible for re-election. Instead, dum and whose newcomer party came in second conservative candidate Sauli Niinistö, who had in the elections. already been Halonen’s opponent in the second round of 2006 presidential election, was elected, ending a 30 year era of social democratic presi- Poland dents in Finland. While Niinistö’s win was widely Th e parliamentary elections of 9 October 2012 expected, fi erce competition between Pekka resulted in a second term for the government Haavisto (Green Party) and Paavo Väyrynen coalition of the centre-right Civic Platform with (Centre Party) developed over who was going to the centrist, agrarian Polish People’s Party. For the take the second spot in a run-off . Sidelining both fi rst time in the country’s post cold-war history, Social democratic former Prime Minister Paavo although with a narrow margin, the government Lipponen and populist True Finn Timo Soini, all was re-elected, providing prospects for greater three candidates indicated, with their rather civic stability for fi nancial markets. Th e turnout was background towards EU attitudes and social is- below 50%. Surprisingly, a new party, the social- sues, a watershed for the election campaign. liberal Palikot’s Movement of Support, gained 10% of the votes and came in third place, largely at the expense of the left-wing Democratic Left Alliance. Germany Based on anti-clerical and populist argumenta- After being heavily criticised for his demeanour tion, the success of Palikot’s Movement of Support in offi ce, German president Christian Wulff has indicated the social changes in the society decided to resign on 17 February 2012. Although moving to a more liberal and secular direction. the accusation of corruption during his prior Since re-election, the government has introduced service as Prime Minister of Lower Saxony hung various measures aiming at increasing the coun- in the air, Wulff primary lost support due to his try’s competitiveness, such as a pension reform. public crisis management. After the resignation of Horst Köhler in May 2010, Germany lost its second president prior to the end of a presidential Russia term within only two years. On 18 March 2012, On 4 December 2011, parliamentary elections Rostock-born Joachim Gauck, a protestant vicar were held in Russia. Despite losing a fourth of its and independent civil-rights activist who had been 2007 share of votes, the governing party United Wulff ’s main contender in 2010, was elected to Russia managed to secure an absolute majority, become the fi rst East German president by an but had to give up its former constitutional major- informal unique four party coalition (CDU/CSU, ity of two-thirds of the seats in the State Duma. SPD, FDP and Green Party). Many voters switched to the established Commu- nist Party, Just Russia, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party. Th e elections have Latvia provoked varying assessments abroad. Looking Only two days after the Danes, the Latvians had inwards, Moscow has seen the biggest protest to vote for a new parliament after a referendum since 1990s in the aftermath of the election, and

10 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 opponents’ of the government began denouncing Kaliningrad, striving for modernisation through Vladimir Putin and his government and what co-operation. Also, the ability of the CBSS and they believed were fl awed elections. Th is, however, its secretariat to design and implement concrete did not have a perceptible eff ect on the presiden- projects was to be further developed. Germany tial elections on 4 March 2012. Prime Minister intended to make the CBSS strong and fi t for the Vladimir Putin, who had already been in offi ce future so that it will be able to remain “a pioneer two terms between 2000 and 2008, won almost of regional co-operation” and a “symbol of the two thirds of the valid votes, thereby outpacing regional identity”. Another priority of the German communist opponent Gennady Zyuganov by CBSS Presidency was the creation of a “coherent almost 50%. He thus successfully switched offi ces framework for co-operation” in the region, linking with former President Dmitry Medvedev, who as- the various structures of Baltic Sea co-operation sumed Putin’s offi ce as Prime Minister, which he more closely together. Tobias Etzold and Stefan had been in charge of before. In this report, two Gänzle deal with this issue in detail in this report. articles deal with Russia’s BSR, EU and foreign Th e fi rst highlight of the German Presidency policies, by Kimmo Elo and Tapani Kaakkurinie- was a festive get-together, celebrating CBSS’s 20th mi, and the current situation of the Russian Baltic anniversary, linked with an extra-ordinary meet- Sea exclave Kaliningrad, by Pertti Joenniemi and ing of CBSS foreign ministers at Plön Castle in Alexander Sergunin. Th ese articles also refl ect Schleswig-Holstein on 5 February 2012. Th e Ger- some domestic political developments in Russia. man Foreign Minister, Dr. Guido Westerwelle, hosted the event. Th e foreign ministers from most BSR countries and even the former foreign min- 2. Regional developments isters of Germany and Denmark, and founding fathers of the CBSS, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and A number of issues have been raised in 2011/2012 Uff e Ellemann-Jensen, were present. In September within the region, concerning the BSR as a whole. 2011, Baltic Sea cultural co-operation within the Th e overview given here is far from complete and framework of Ars Baltica also celebrated its 20th exhaustive. Yet it attempts to provide information anniversary at Plön Castle in Schleswig-Holstein. on a selection of events and developments. Another highlight were the Baltic Sea Days in Berlin on 23-25 April 2012, organised by the Ger- man Presidency. Th e Baltic Sea Days entailed an A) Institutional developments and major impressive number of meetings and conferences; regional events among them were the Baltic Sea NGO Forum, a On 1 July 2011, Germany assumed the Presidency BSR business forum, a climate change adaption of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) for policy forum, the Baltic Sea Youth Session, and the second time since 2000/2001. Simultaneously, several high-level meetings of the various BSR co- the CBSS celebrated its 20th anniversary in spring operation structures, attracting hundreds of stake- 2012. In a series of special festive events and meet- holders from the entire BSR and even high-level ings, its inauguration on 6 March 1992 was com- participation. Th e Baltic Sea Days were a strong memorated. Germany was fairly active and (co-) manifestation of the fact that many Germans are organised an impressive number of conferences, engaged in regional aff airs. Th ey also proved the meetings and workshops on all sorts of themes existence of the potential to increase the awareness relevant for the BSR. of the region among the German public and me- Th e priorities of the German Presidency cov- dia. More than 1,000 guests attended a festivity ered the fi ve long-term priority areas of the CBSS, in the Federal Foreign Offi ce, in which the speech as decided during the CBBS reform summit in of the newly elected President Joachim Gauck was Riga in 2008: economic development, environ- the undisputed highlight. President Gauck praised ment and sustainability; energy; education and Baltic Sea regional co-operation, drawing also culture; and civil security and the human dimen- from his personal experiences from his childhood sion. Additionally, Germany put an emphasis and youth in Rostock. Th is was followed by the on the southeastern Baltic Sea region, including Baltic Sea States Summit of Heads of government

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 11 in Stralsund on 30 and 31 May 2012). Th e Sum- nication was issued at the encouragement of the mit discussed primarily energy (see below) and the Danish Presidency of the EU Council in the fi rst vital topic of demographic development. half of 2012, refl ecting that Denmark was con- From 1 July 2011 to 31 December 2012, scious of its responsibility to create momentum Poland has been in charge of the Presidency of for the strategy. Th e Danish Presidency intends to the Council for the EU of the very fi rst time. Its adopt fresh Council conclusions on the strategy in agenda was largely shaped by external conditions, June 2012. e.g. like the fi nancial debt crisis of some of the Th us, overall it seems that the European Eurozone countries, which caused a necessity for institutions and the Baltic Sea EU member states a rapid response. Nonetheless, the Presidency has are still dealing with the strategy and issuing also conducted the fi rst revision of the EU Strat- papers and reports. On the other hand, two and egy of the Baltic Sea Region and co-hosted the 2nd a half years into its implementation, its outcomes Annual Forum for the EUSBSR, jointly with the are still not too obvious or tangible. In some areas Baltic Development Forum Summit in Gdansk in within the strategy, at least, concrete project-based October 2011. Th e review has focused on techni- activities seem to be evolving. A concrete achieve- cal improvements of the strategy and has been ment, at least on the organisational side, is that in continued by the consecutive Danish Presidency. all the states of the BSR, national contact points Th e review was adopted in the form of conclu- have been established that assist the implemen- sions of the Council of the EU. Th e conclusion ac- tation of the strategy at the national level by knowledged “the need to make the strategy more autumn 2011 (European Commission 2011: 5). eff ective and result oriented for further attaining the Strategy objectives” (Council of the EU: 2). Internally, the revision resulted in improving B) Developments in issue areas: energy regional networking, better communication be- Energy is probably one of those issue areas in the tween the Polish local and central government ac- BSR that attracts most attention and therefore tors, and a defi nition of Poland’s national interests could be seen as a kind of driving force in the in the region. It has also triggered increased devel- BSR and its regional co-operation. Th e energy opment of the long-neglected northern dimension sector in the BSR has seen a number of recent of Polish foreign policy. To give another example relevant developments. Th e fi rst line of the Nord of a Baltic Sea littoral country’s interest in the Stream pipeline became operational in November EUSBSR, the Swedish government confi rmed 2011, and the construction of the second line pro- its commitment to the EUSBSR, focussing on gressed, scheduled to pick up stream in late 2012. protecting the environment, promoting integra- Poland is currently building a LNG terminal in tion, and increasing wealth in the region. Th e fi rst Świnoujście, which is planned to be ready in 2014. results of the Swedish government’s involvement Lithuania has ordered a LNG fl oating storage and in the EUSBSR were, for example, Mona Lisa, a re-gasifi cation unit in Klaipeda, which is planned “Motorways of the Sea” project, aiming at mak- to be operational in 2014. Latvia has similar ing a concrete contribution to effi cient, safe and ambitions to build a LNG terminal. Th is issue has environmentally friendly maritime transport. become a bone of contention because the diff erent Th e European Commission issued a Commis- projects are competing, since, from an economic sion Staff Working Paper on the implementation point of view, there does not seem to be room for of the strategy in September 2011, and a Commu- two. Th e Ust-Luga oil terminal has opened, and nication to the European Parliament, the Council, the fi rst oil tanker was loaded in March 2012. the European Economic and Social Committee, Plans to build a nuclear power plant in Visaginas, and the Committee of the Regions on 23 March Lithuania, are progressing a concession agreement 2012. Th e latter stressed that the results of the between the Lithuanian government and Hitachi strategy need to be clearer and more visible both Ltd. was concluded in March 2012. Th e exten- at the national and the EU level in order to main- sion of the underwater electricity transmission tain high-level political commitment (European cable between Finland and Sweden, Fenno-Skan Commission 2012: 3). Th e Commission Commu- 2, became operational. It reinforces the integra-

12 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 tion of the Nordic electricity market. On both diff erent. Norwegian politics and society were the national and the regional political agendas, encouraged to remain open, transparent and energy, especially energy security and effi ciency, liberal. Th ere has been no debate on the merits occupies a prominent position. Th e chapters on of strengthening the executive. Jens Stoltenberg coherence, Kaliningrad, and Norway in this showed with his reaction that, in that society, the report give proof of that. Th e foreign ministers of values of democracy and human dignity could be the CBSS member states adopted a declaration expressed through emotions. In extreme situa- on energy security and even the heads of govern- tions, a society sustains itself not only through ment discussed energy during the Baltic Sea States words but also through its traditions. Th e bound- Summit in Stralsund on 30 and 31 May 2012. less sadness of the nation found a home in the per- Th ey believe that the CBSS could still play an son of the head of government, who, by collecting important political role in this for all the countries this despair, very literally stabilised the situation. of the region’s area. In this report, Bernd Henningsen will focus on the issue of right-wing populism in some of the countries of the BSR. C) The problem of right-wing populism Th e most horrible incident in Northern Europe since World War II occurred on 22 July 2011, 3. Final Remark when more than 70 people in Oslo and the small island of Utøya, where the youth movement of the Obviously, the 2012 Political State of the Region Social Democratic party held its annual summer Report is not able to address every issue, coun- camp, were massacred. In many countries, the try, and current development of the Baltic Sea appearance of right-wing radicals and right-wing Region, but has to focus on a subset of those. populists and their eff ects on politics and society Nonetheless, the report tries to refl ect at least a has been seen as an executive problem – laws part of the current reality of the BSR. Th e fi nal become harsher, the police and security forces remarks and conclusions of this report will take receive strengthened search and seizure powers. up some of the issues and questions mentioned Th e reaction of the Norwegian Prime Minister here and will provide a brief outlook on the Jens Stoltenberg to the bombing in Oslo and the future development of the BSR. Massacre on Utøya on 22 July 2011 was rather

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 13 Russia’s Baltic Sea Policies and the EU’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: Squaring the Circle?

brings together the Baltic Sea EU member states and Russia, thus off ering a possible forum for cross-border political co-operation. Additionally, the rotating CBSS presidency off ers each member state the possibility for agenda-setting. Against this background, it will be interest- Kimmo Elo & Tapani Kaakkuriniemi ing to see whether Russia is seeking to exploit its CBSS presidency for pushing its own Baltic Sea agenda or for promoting (also) objectives and in- 1 Introduction terests manifested in the EUSBSR. Moreover, due to its complex federal structure, it might be pos- On 1 July 2012, Russia will assume the Presiden- sible that alongside Moscow, the northwest federal cy of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). district may also emphasise interests of its own. Th e Russian CBSS presidency is of importance Understanding Russia’s agenda for its CBSS presi- for the future of co-operation in the Baltic Sea dency might help understand Russia’s perception Region because it is the fi rst presidency of the of Baltic Sea Region co-operation in general, but most important non-EU actor in the region since also its attitude toward the EUSBSR in particu- the adoption of the European Union Strategy for lar. Such an analysis could also help grasping the the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) in 2009. Th us, possibilities and challenges the EU is facing when the Russian presidency of the CBSS could provide trying to promote macro-regional frameworks useful information about the EUSBSR’s capabili- and strategies requiring Russia’s involvement and ties to steer and foster cross-border co-operation commitment. in a macro-region consisting of EU and non-EU Th e general focus of this article lies on the member states. question of how Russia’s foreign political priorities Th e EUSBSR should be considered to be one are manifested in Russia’s policy for the Baltic Sea step on the long path toward sustainable politi- Region in general, and in Russia’s agenda for its cal co-operation and co-ordination in the Baltic upcoming Presidency of the CBSS in particular. Sea Region. One of the most important aims Th is analysis will be embedded into a macro- of the EUSBSR is to strengthen the EU’s voice regional framework of the EUSBSR on the one in the region by defi ning objectives for future hand, and of the Northern Dimension (ND) co-operation. Since the EUSBSR creates no new initiative on the other, both of them seeking to institutions, the strategy should be carried out by establish a framework for fostering co-operation the existing ones and is, consequently, depend- in the Baltic Sea Region. Russian stances towards ent on commitment from the diff erent Baltic Sea these two programmatic frameworks, and Rus- actors to the strategy. As an intergovernmental sian goal-setting in its foreign policy in general are organisation, the CBSS in the Baltic Sea Region portrayed from the point of view of Putin’s third

14 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 term as the President. Th e article argues that fos- goal-settings of the ENP (Whitman & Wolff tering co-operation with Russia mainly by exploit- 2010, 3). However, the ENP is also an attempt ing the EU’s own frameworks and policies might, to strengthen the Union’s infl uence by applying as Hiski Haukkala recently pointed out, increase conditionality more strongly also to EU-Russia “the Union’s regional normative hegemony” and, relations. In order to benefi t from closer economic thus, result in a growing rejection of the EU’s and political co-operation with the EU, Russia policies in the Baltic Sea Region (Haukkala 2010, should agree on shared values defi ned by the EU. 171). From this perspective, Russia’s Presidency Russia views this demand as an encroachment on of the CBSS might provide valuable information Russia’s sovereignty, not only making Russia the about Russia’s ideas that could challenge the EU’s EU’s junior partner in Europe, but also degrad- power in the Baltic Sea Region. ing Russia to the same level of the other ENP countries, like Morocco, Moldova or the Caucasus states. (Haukkala 2010, 165ff .) 2 The Baltic Sea Region as an EU In order to reduce the risk of confl icts of inland Sea, and the Problem of interest with Russia in the Baltic Sea Region Getting Russia Involved caused by the very concept of the ENP, the EU launched two new concepts tailored to the Baltic For centuries, the Baltic Sea Region has been Sea Region. Th e fi rst one, the renewed ND policy, a place of geopolitical, political, economic and was launched in 2006, and is now carried out by cultural clashes between Europe and Russia (see the EU’s External Action Service. It serves as an e.g. Bengtsson, 2000, 372; Musiał, 2009, 287). instrument for promoting the EU’s (global) values Th e end of the Cold War and the developments and norms (Haglund-Morrissey, 2008, 203; cf. thereafter have widened the defi nition of the Browning and Joenniemi, 2004, 237). Once European North, step by step, to revolve (geo-) again, Russia is expected to adapt itself or, like politically, economically, and culturally around in the ENP, “resist that adaptation without being the Baltic Sea (Labarre, 2001; Smith & Timmins, able to aff ect the essential content of these norms 2001; Vandeveer & Dabelko, 2001; Steinbock, in any signifi cant way” (Haukkala 2010, 172). 2008). Additionally, the Nord Stream gas pipeline Th e second framework tailored to foster- project has also caused quite severe distortions in ing co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region is the the Baltic Sea Region, mainly along the historico- EUSBSR. Th is strategy was initiated in 2006, political fault lines between the East and West, as adopted in 2009 and has been implemented since well as between large and small states (e.g. Tim- 2010. Geographically speaking, the EUSBSR mis, 2006; Bengtsson, 2010, 113ff .). bringing together all eight Baltic rim countries However, the Baltic Sea Region has changed – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, its status not only due to the EU enlargements of Lithuania, Poland and Sweden – widely overlaps 1995, when Finland and Sweden joined the EU, with the renewed ND. Th e notable exception and 2004, when the Baltic southern rim states is that Russia is excluded from the EUSBSR as joined the EU, but also due to the development a non-EU state. Conceptually, the underlying of a dense network of sub-regional, regional and idea of creating a steering framework for a more macro-regional institutions that are more or less sustainable, deeper and closer co-operation in the “European” in nature. Th e past two decades Baltic Sea Region links the EUSBSR both with have, fi rst and foremost, supported the idea of the the ENP and the renewed ND (Roggeri, 2012). Baltic Sea as an imagined EU inland sea (see also For two obvious reasons, the EUSBSR has Larsen, 2008). notable, yet virtual linkages with the wider frame- Today, the Baltic Sea Region is conceptualised work of the ENP. First, by admitting “that some as a region covering an area from Northern Ger- of the problems cannot be solved on [a] national many to Northwest Russia. Although not formal- level and, thus, have to be addressed on a regional ly being part of the EU’s neighbourhood policy level” (Rostoks, 2010, 9), the strategy is clearly (ENP), by focusing e.g. on security, economy and intended to strengthen, steer and develop exist- co-operation, the EUSBSR shares several stated ing regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 15 (Roggeri 2012). Similar objectives can be found into account, the future success of the EU’s Baltic in the ENP as well. Th e second point is that the Sea policies to some extent depend on Russia’s EUSBSR is an internal EU project, thus refl ect- willingness to co-operate. If the main reason for ing and promoting the EU’s norms and values Russia to reject co-operation in the Baltic Sea as the basis for co-operation. It is a bit confusing Region is the external pressure on Russia to adapt that the EUSBSR is promoted as a macro-regional its policies to suit the EU’s policies that Russia strategy for the Baltic Sea Region but excludes one has no or only limited possibilities to infl uence, regional player, Russia. In the EUSBSR, the Baltic granting Russia possibilities to co-shape the Baltic Sea is understood roughly as an inland sea of the Sea agenda could diminish Russia’s willingness EU, while the existence and interests of Russia are to reject co-operation. However, joint EU-Russia neglected. Th is might increase the risk of being policies in the Baltic Sea Region are only possible rejected by Russia (Rostoks, 2010, 33; Bengtsson, when grounds for common policies exist. Th us, 2012). we will next turn to the question of what grounds Th e existence of two at least partly overlap- Russian foreign policy off ers for common Baltic ping concepts in the Baltic Sea Region raises the Sea Region policies. question of their interdependence. Th e renewed ND is included in the EUSBSR as its external arm (Rostoks, 2010, 30). On the one hand, this ar- 3 The Baltic Sea Region and rangement seems reasonable, since it links the ND Russia’s Foreign Policy with the EUSBSR and, thus, might help the EU to achieve better co-ordination of its Baltic Sea As the political system of Russia is highly presi- Region policies, as both frameworks should work dential, the changes of presidential power from for the same goals. On the other hand, however, Vladimir Putin to Dmitri Medvedev, and again making the agenda of the renewed ND dependent back to Putin, have also brought about changes on the EUSBSR might increase Russia’s unwill- in the foreign policy attitudes. While Medvedev ingness for future co-operation. Th is is because as the President activated Russia’s participation in the EUSBSR as an internal EU strategy might multilateral international co-operation, it is very arouse Russia’s suspicions that the EU is seeking probable that Putin, in his third term, will con- to dilute Russia’s power in the Baltic Sea Region. tinue the great power building process and abstain Since the EU-Russian interface in the Baltic Sea from constructive multilateral action. Region is, as Bengtsson (2010, 129) has recently Boris Yeltsin, at the end of his fi rst term, pointed out, characterised by “a fundamental, and challenged Russian intelligentsia to formulate a growing, gap in perspectives and values”, imple- new national “grand strategy” that would make menting unilateral projects bears the risk of creat- Russia a great power (See e.g. Pastukhov 1996). ing new dividing lines (See also Haukkala, 2010, Th is project failed mainly due to the deteriorat- 172; Rostoks, 2010, 32-33). ing economy and unstable power structures. Th e In sum, refl ected against the ENP as the gen- goal of the policy was and still is to return Russia eral policy framework for co-operation between to the negotiating table, where other great pow- the EU and non-EU states, the renewed ND and the EUSBSR as the most important regional and cross-border frameworks, and with the dense network of regional and sub-regional actors, the EU-Russia interface in the Baltic Sea Region is well institutionalised and the co-operation relatively well formalised (see also Bengtsson, 2010, 108). Th is institutional arrangement also underlines and strengthens the EU’s dominant role in shaping Baltic Sea policies. Taking Rus- sia’s antipathy, even hostility towards the EU’s (or any other actor’s) dominance vis-à-vis Russia

16 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 ers adopt decisions in political, economic and partners. Th is is why Russia still has a lukewarm military issues. Russia has seemingly been embar- attitude towards acting with the EU and why it rassed by the fact that contemporary strong states prefers bilateral co-operation over multilateral. In are negotiating over its head without off ering it the 1990s, the Union behaved like the 19th cen- a decent opportunity to come along. Vladimir tury colonial powers toward their colonies, saying Putin, in his last day as Prime Minister, presented they would bring democracy and market economy a strategic programme for the development of to the CIS countries, even without their con- the country (Putin 1999). He posed a question: sent (European Commission’s Tacis Programme “What place can Russia occupy in the interna- 1991–2006, p. 5). Besides, Russia felt it would tional community in the 21st century?” He actu- somehow be degraded to the category of the small ally did not provide an answer for it. He did not ex-socialist countries through a similar agree- even mention the EU. ment, and this of course has hurt Russia’s sensitive Since then, Russia has regarded the EU as national self-esteem. too diff use a negotiation partner, and so it has One answer of the EU to the reluctance of favoured bilateral relations and agreements. Here, Russia has been the regionalist approach. In- Germany has enjoyed a role as the closest and stead of bilateral or sectoral action programmes, most important co-operation partner in diff erent regional policies have been introduced, such as the times. ENP and the ND. But, as mentioned above, the As well, the EU has changed its preferences problem with these programmes is that the EU concerning co-operation with Russia, and the demands participating states to follow its meticu- Union has turned its overcoat inside out, when lous norms. Flenley (2008, 194) notes that Russia current trends seem to foster it. After 2006, the fi rst delayed signing the agreement and thus EU adopted a positive view of the development of rejected involvement in the ENP largely because its eastern relations, but as Russia did not refor- of the need to accept conditions laid down by the mulate its basic assumptions, the Union remained EU as the price for engagement. Flenley suggests cautious in developing new forms of co-operation. that regionalism would off er co-operation on an Now that Russia is a member of the WTO, the equal basis. Union could have a new opportunity for a more In June 2008, negotiations on a new EU- profound co-operation. Russia agreement were launched at the Khanty- Russia and the EU have mostly negotiated Mansyisk Summit, but after it, negotiations have about practical issues, such as lifting the visa been frustratingly slow, even for Russia. Th e EU regime or guaranteeing the supply of natural would like to draw up a rather detailed, sectoral gas to Central European countries. At large, the document like the existing one. It should include EUSBSR would be an appropriate apparatus for not only general principles, but also a detailed this kind of practical issues, which by no means programme for co-operation in diff erent spheres. touches issues that would challenge or threaten Unlike the EU, Russia sees that too detailed an their vital interests or principal values. agreement would be diffi cult to negotiate in a reasonable time-frame, and that this kind of an agreement would soon become outdated. Th us, Basis of Russia – EU relations the ideal for Russia would be a compact document Th e Partnership and Co-operation Agreement that on the one hand would list new facts and be (PCA) of the EU and Russia entered into force in aimed at deepening the partnership, and on the 1997 (see Agreement 1997). Its idea was similar to other hand would give partners suffi cient fl exibil- the “Europe agreements”, which the EU con- ity in its practical realisation (Danilov 2008). cluded with the newly independent Central and According to Fraser Cameron (2011), the di- Eastern European states. Th e agreements listed rector of the EU-Russia Centre in Brussels, major general principles of the EU, such as respect for diff erences deal with some issues concerning trade democracy, the principles of international law and policy, energy, investments and visas. One pretext, human rights, as well as the establishment of an expressed by Cameron, was Russian indecisive- arena for bilateral political dialogue between the ness on WTO accession. However, the delay was

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 17 surely mainly caused by the WTO itself, when it question was now of energy or ecology only, not let Russia wait for 18 years until it was accepted as of politics. Th e Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Sergei a full member, after other countries, like Vietnam, Lavrov, warned not to mix ecology with politics, Tonga, and Ukraine. and said to eliminate double standards. Th erefore, In the manner of great powers, Russia defi nes ‘we’ should refrain from using ecology for political its policies through offi cially declared “doctrines” goals (Voropaev 2009). Th e message was aimed and “concepts”. Having entered the offi ce of the at Estonia and Latvia, who could not condone a President, Dmitry Medvedev renewed the For- gas pipeline being drawn near their coastal waters. eign Policy Concept (2008) and the Military and In Russian programmes, the Baltic Sea Region Nuclear Doctrines (2010). Th e fi nal clause of the almost disappeared, giving way to the Baltic Foreign Policy Concept has been formulated in Sea basin itself, and very often the government the spirit of the EU, as it states: “Th e consistent spokesmen referred to concrete details related to execution of Russia’s foreign policy is called upon the building of the gas pipeline. to create favourable conditions for the realisation In May 2010, the foreign ministers of Ger- of the historic choice of the peoples of the Russian many and Russia published an article that was Federation in favour of rule of law, a democratic humming with the satisfaction of a fruitful society and socially-oriented market economy” mutual co-operation. Th e Russian version was (Th e Foreign Policy Concept, 2008, chapter V.). entitled with the proverb, “what is good for us, is On the day of his inauguration, 7 May good for Germans, too” (Westerwelle & Lawrow 2012, Putin enacted a Presidential Decree on the 2010). Th e clue of the article was the joint deci- Measures to Implement the Course of the Foreign sion to establish a German-Russian development Policy of Russia. It stresses the importance of the programme “Partnership for Modernisation”. global rule of law through the UN, emphasizes According to the ministers, Germany and Russia the role of the BRIC, G-20 and G-8 as well as of run a close co-operation in the sphere of global se- the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, moving curity. Th e common goal was said to be extensive, to the problems of the CIS countries, and express- indivisible and co-operative security, stability and ing a will to develop the statehood of Abkhazia welfare. Nord Stream created a favourable atmos- and South Ossetia. Only after that come relations phere for a new, deeper co-operation programme, with the EU, the Asian-Pacifi c Region and the and the Partnership of Modernisation was to serve US. Th e Baltic Sea Region is too small to even be this function. mentioned in this kind of a normative act. (Ukaz Th is partnership programme did not bring 2012, Chapter 1, paragraphs b to k.) about pomp, although Russia offi cially confi rmed it in several contexts. Still, the EU was praised, too. Th e representative of Russia in the EU, V. Pragmatic and de-ideologised A. Chizhov (2010) stated that the EU is their foreign policy “most important commercial contractor, near- While there was no progress toward a new co-op- est neighbour, the powerful centre of science and eration agreement between the EU and Russia to technologies, and an ever more serious player on be seen, Russia developed bilateral relations, pri- the world political scene”. He was also convinced marily with Germany, in the fi eld of energy. Th us, that the EU was a source of modernisation due to the political sphere of co-operation withdrew its highly developed working life and the benefi ts to the background and foreign policy adopted a granted to employees (Chizhov, 2010). pragmatist and de-ideologised style (Putin 2007). However, despite its “pragmatic and de- Approximately in 2005-2011, the Nord Stream ideologised” policy, Russia was not idle: in 2011 project occupied the lion’s share of Russia’s atten- it adopted a conciliatory policy towards Poland tion in the Baltic Sea Region. Suddenly, all Baltic and signed a protocol with Ukraine, extending the Sea policy was at the same time energy policy, and right of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to use Sevastopol very few activities in the Baltic Sea Region that as a base. Moreover, Russia signed an agreement did not have a connection to energy transfer. Be- with Norway on the division of the gas- and oil- sides, Russia in some contexts emphasised that the rich seabed of the Barents Sea.

18 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Russia’s eye on the Baltic Sea Region to seven corridors (Itogovaya resolucija 2010, 1). Th e fi rst visit to the west by President Medvedev Th e conference paid attention to the increasing was a visit to Berlin. He followed the rule of law volume of sea transportation in the Baltic Sea. in both domestic and international aff airs, “and Th e foundations of this growth, according to the … having all countries, above all the big powers, fi nal resolution, are the growing global economy respect international law” (Medvedev 2008). He accompanied by deepening worldwide specialisa- also stated that Russia was willing to establish a tion, co-operation and integration of produc- regional pact “based, naturally, on the principles tion, but also increasing consumption of energy of the UN Charter and clearly defi ning the im- resources, especially hydrocarbons. portance of force as [a] factor in relations within According to Liuhto (2007, 7), the growth the Euro-Atlantic community”. of the foreign direct investments stock in Kalin- A new pact has not been on the agenda for the ingrad was notably faster than elsewhere in the EU and Germany. Perhaps the hidden message Baltic Sea Region by 2004, but still, the FDI of the President was that, when speaking about a stock per capita in Kaliningrad is nonexistent new pact, he ignored the EUSBSR. When prepar- when compared to nearby countries, and even ing the EUSBSR, the EU did not ask Russia to modest when compared to other Russian regions. participate in the process, but it is probable that Th e development of the tourism branch must take Russia did not intrude, either. However, it did place together with a strong presence for the mili- not react negatively to the EUSBSR: the Russian tary. From the Soviet period, the city inherited the media, loyal to the authorities, proved that Russia main headquarters of the Baltic Sea navy. In fact, takes the challenge seriously, committing to the Russia’s naval doctrine (2001) does not even men- challenges that are to be faced. tion the Baltic Sea Region nor its navy. In sum, As the EUSBSR focuses on environment, ‘Europe’ is mentioned only once, and only in a economy, accessibility and security and aims at secondary context. Th e main emphasis lies on the the co-ordination of regional authorities and at oceans (Morskaya doktrina 2001). regional development, Russia surely shares these Before 2008, the Baltic Sea Region was interests. Th e policy paper of the St. Petersburg- interesting for Moscow mainly because of the Ka- based Northern Dimension Development Center liningrad enclave, with its problems and success (NDDC) defi nitely takes a positive stance on the factors, and because of the Russophone minori- willingness of Russia in promoting these goals and ties in Estonia and Latvia (See e.g. Steen 2010, emphasises the importance of joining the exer- 205–206). Due to the special economic area, tions of both Russia and the EU for solving the Kaliningrad has been a unique area for Russia: common problems of the region. It leans on the Western investments there have been successful. regional development strategy of the northwestern Th is specifi city is not limited into economy and federal district, adopted by the government of business, as Kaliningrad has also been able to cre- Russia in November 2011 for the period up to the ate a more Western academic image, since it was year 2020. the fi rst region of Russia where the CBSS ran its In the transport sector, Russia’s major con- Eurofaculty project in 2001–2007 (For the goals cerns are its underdeveloped international trans- of the project, see Gromadzki & Wilk 2001. For port corridors and the low quality of the road net- the outcomes, see Askeland 2009.) work. In the sphere of ecology and environment, A development on a far larger scale takes place the main problem is the growth of human-based in St. Petersburg and in the Leningrad oblast. Th e strain on the eco-system and the unsustainable recently built oil harbour in Primorsk and another use of natural resources (NDDC 2012). brand new harbour in Ust-Luga prove that the oil Th e role of the Baltic Sea Region would be to transport is a branch that tempts investments. Th e serve as one end of several transportation routes. same can be said about the Nord Stream gas pipe- A conference on the future of Russian ports, line, the beginning of which is near Vyborg. In held in 2010, discussed the international trans- Russian administrative practice, these, however, port corridors in diff erent regions of Russia. In are the crown jewels of the federation and there- its fi nal resolution, the conference mentions six

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 19 fore do not produce much in the local budgets, and here the dividing line between the NATO except through work places. and Russia must be organised in a civilised way Th e interest of Russia in the Baltic Sea Region (ibid.). gained more vitality in 2010-2011. Politicians spoke about the Baltic factor in EU-Russian rela- tions, referring no more to the three Baltic States, 4 Concluding remarks as the case had been after they joined the EU in 2004, but now principally to the Baltic Sea Re- Th is article has examined the question of the gion (Galbreath & Lašas 2011). When Germany, EU-Russian interface in the Baltic Sea Region by in turn, received the presidency of the CBSS on 1 analysing how Russia’s foreign political priorities July 2011, Russia seemingly started to prepare its are manifested in Russia’s policy towards the Bal- own turn in the same role. Th e fi rst act in April tic Sea Region in general, and in Russia’s agenda 2012 was that the media all over the country, for its upcoming CBSS Presidency in particular. especially the media that could address youth, was Since Baltic Sea Region cooperation has been ordered to proclaim a contest to design the logo of institutionalised by the EU with a set of diff erent Russian presidency in the CBSS. Social media has frameworks (ENP, ND, EUSBSR), Russia’s Baltic been used eff ectively in the campaign (Polozhenie Sea Region policies should also been read as reac- 2012). tions to these policy frameworks and initiatives. A few weeks earlier, Russian priorities for its As was pointed above, Russia will not prioritise CBSS presidency were published during a small the Baltic Sea Region in its foreign policy under conference in St. Petersburg. Th e main goals are Putin’s third term. It sets its sights on three diff er- the modernisation of the state/private partnership, ent fi elds: global policy and international rule of co-operation in the fi eld of anti-terrorist activi- law, the CIS countries, and EU-Russian relations ties, and interregional and sectoral co-operation in general, without mentioning closer details in (ITAR-TASS 2012). Th e Deputy Minister of each fi eld. regional development, Aleksandr Viktorov, In general, the core problem of the EU-Russia emphasised that the presidency will “open new interface in the Baltic Sea Region is its asymme- opportunities for the intensifi cation of relations try. Th e salience of the EU, both in constructing in the region”, and that this co-operation must the institutional framework and in setting the lead to “an improvement in the quality of the life agenda, has resulted in a dominant EU in the of the population of the member nations of the Baltic Sea Region. Although Russia has quite Council” (ibid.). eff ectively rejected any co-operation requiring An interesting thread of discussion that has commitment to these European policies, it has not recently awoken concerns Russian interests in the challenged the EU’s dominance with its own set Baltic Sea Region from a conceptual point of view, of competing Russian policies. Since almost all of emphasising security aspects as well. Th e concept the more important issues – environment, energy, of the ‘New North’, Novyi Sever, has been pro- soft and hard security – in the Baltic Sea Region moted, especially by Natalia Markushina (2011). require cooperation between the EU and Russia, In her view, a partnership is fair if it is awaited by Russia’s commitment to co-operation is needed the partners of the Arctic, Barents and Baltic Sea in order to prevent the EU from being left alone Regions. Secondly, the value orientations of the within its own institutional framework. North European countries are based on the issues However, the fact that Russia has not seen any of “soft security” and concerns of humanity. Th us, reason to present a competing set of Russian ideas politics is constructed in the search of a common indicates that Russia is quite satisfi ed with the opinion in questions concerning ecology, culture, current state of aff airs in the Baltic Sea Region. and the support of health care. Th ese instruments On the one hand, Russia’s sovereignty is not could bring the Sea region Perspectives and the threatened by the EU’s policies. On the other, the Northern Dimension partnership more closely possibility of withdrawing from any co-operation together. However, Markushina notes that ‘hard off ers Russia an easy, but eff ective, way of apply- security’ still preserves its actuality in the North, ing pressure to the EU. Th e fact that a Russian

20 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 be negotiated from the point of energy security and transportation, but energy saving and renew- able energy have been systematically neglected by Russia, and the Russian incentive to foster these issues in the CBSS will be next to nil. Soft security issues have always been second- ary for Russia, and the traditional hard security is the standard way of thought. Th e CBSS and the EUSBSR are not appropriate forums for discuss- ing hard security issues, but the human dimen- sion, such as facilitating the formalities of travel- ling, might well be pushed further. Th e CBSS is not competent to handle the visa regime issues, since they touch the EU’s external relations. However, it could at least launch some proposals to substantially facilitate visa formalities. So far, Poland and Russia have agreed on a visa-free entry between Kaliningrad oblast and Poland. Cruise ferry passengers from Finland have the unilateral right to stay visa-free up to 72 hours in St. Peters- burg. In March 2012, the analogous proposal con- cerning train passengers was rejected by Russia. Although the Governor of St. Petersburg has tried rejection is enough to freeze projects indicates that to compromise, it is not likely that rapid progress the real gap between expectations and capabili- will occur in this respect. Some promises are in ties lies on the EU’s side. One central reason for the air, but they will not be fulfi lled quickly. this might be found in the ‘Nos’ of the EUSBSR, How about globalisation? Th is theme was put making its implementation dependent on third on the agenda of the CBSS by Germany in 2011, party resources. but Russia has always been quite reluctant to dis- We already referred to the way that Rus- cuss the threats and opportunities of globalisation. sia delayed and hampered the ENP program by Phenomena like global warming, and measures to delaying its signature. Th is is one way to react to slow it down, have not been very welcome on the the demand to behave in a ‘European’ way, and Russian agenda. these kinds of actions are possible, but indeed not It will be interesting to see if northwestern probable, now that Putin has been again elected Russia can raise issues that Moscow does not re- President of Russia. For Russia, it would be valu- gard as important. If so, these issues are diff erent able to show the face of a benevolent actor who from, but do not contradict, Moscow’s prefer- wants to promote the human dimension, which is ences. Th e question might be of border crossing actually one important cornerstone of the CBSS. procedures and cross-border co-operation, as well Th e CBSS should pursue economic develop- as transportation and investment, but in any case, ment, and under it promote competitiveness, fos- northwest Russian authorities must sell their ideas ter entrepreneurship and logistics. Other declared fi rst to Moscow before they can be put on the priorities are environment, energy issues, educa- agenda. tion and culture, civil security and the human It is very likely that the Partnership of dimension. (Etzold 2010, 130-131). Logistics are Modernisation (PoM) will be buried in Putin’s an extremely important sphere in Russia, and even third term as President. Actually, the number of Putin has emphasised the importance of competi- organisations is quite high, and their duties are tiveness in his country. On the other hand, entre- often overlapping: ENP, CBSS and its energy co- preneurship has not been a high-ranked issue in operation BASREC, ND, and now the EUSBSR, Russian administration. Energy issues will surely are all multilateral co-ordination councils or pro-

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 21 grammes. Th e PoM may only survive as a bilateral Region states themselves. Additionally, a common Russo-German project as it now is. organisation for determining the objectives to be Considering, fi nally, the future of the EU- achieved in the Baltic Sea Region and for estab- Russia interface in the Baltic Sea Region, the lishing indicators for measuring the attainment of current institutional framework remains vulner- these objectives is needed. Th e renewed ND or the able to the same problems as the general ENP. CBSS could serve as such a platform, since Russia Since the core idea of all these frameworks also is member in both of them. After formulating the present in the Baltic Sea Region is to promote objectives, each state formulates an action plan. and support the EU’s interests and policy priori- Finally, based on the indicators, the performance ties, discrepancies and confl icts occur along this of each state is benchmarked, compared to other line. One might question whether all issues in the states and discussed in the steering organisation. Baltic Sea Region require a commitment to the Th e learning process occurs when worse perform- EU’s interests, initiatives or policies, and whether ing states learn from better performing states how they can be solved only along guidelines defi ned to eff ectively achieve the stated objectives. Such by the EU alone. a model could also be politically appetising for From the point of view of this article, the big- Russia, since the outcome of such an OMC-based gest problem, however, is an exhaustively institu- mechanism is non-binding and the states can tionalised and EU-centric environment, leaving freely decide what to do with their benchmark- diff erent actors with rather small room of ma- ing experience. No doubt, such an OMC-based noeuvring. No doubt, institutions formalise the model would not be the magic formula creat- interaction between diff erent actors and, thus, re- ing problem-free co-operation in the Baltic Sea duce the risk of arbitrariness. However, in a cross- Region. However, if it off ers possibilities to create border situation like the Baltic Sea Region, where a win-win situation at the EU-Russia interface in EU ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ should co-operate, the Baltic Sea Region by supporting the mutual the EU’s institutional framework creates asym- transfer of knowledge and experiences, it might be metries by excluding the “outsiders” from agenda- worth trying. setting. Another point is that the EU’s institutions are designed to support European integration – an objective Russia vehemently resists. References Today, the Baltic Sea Region is well net- worked and regional co-operation functions quite Agreement (1997). Agreement on partnership and well. However, encouraging and winning Russia cooperation establishing a partnership between to become involved in closer co-operation requires the European Communities and their Member improvements and new methods supporting the States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, development of common policies and mutual of the other part. Offi cial Journal of the Euro- learning, and preventing too large of asymmetries pean Union, L 327, 3–69. from emerging. One solution worth consider- Askeland, K. (2009). Researching the EuroFaculty ing could be an ‘open method of coordination’ Project at IKSUR Kaliningrad, - A Contribu- (OMC)-like mechanism, which tries to accom- tion to the Educational Development in Russia. plish a convergence of policies through a process Report. Stockholm: Council of the Baltic Sea of benchmarking and policy learning. Th e OMC States. has proven to be eff ective, especially in areas Bengtsson, R. (2000). Towards a Stable Peace in where the EU’s member states have been reluctant the Baltic Sea Region? Cooperation and Confl ict to accept binding decisions (See further Lelieveldt 35(4), 355-388. & Princen, 2011, 100). Bengtsson, R. (2010). Th e EU and the European Considering the Baltic Sea Region, an Security Order: Interfacing security actors. OMC-based mechanism could off er a relatively London and New York: Routledge. easy mechanism for functioning macro-regional Bengtsson, R. (2012). Th e EU Strategy for the co-operation. Th e most important point is that Baltic Sea Region in 2012 – Implementation the process would be driven by the Baltic Sea Challenges. Baltic Rim Economies No. 1, 27.

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POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 23 nya 2011 goda. http://2004.kremlin.ru/text/ Matter? Journal of European Integration. 2010, docs/2001/07/58035.shtml, visited 8 April 32(2), 193-212. 2012. NDDC (2012). Sotrudnichestvo ES i Rossii v re- Musiał, K. (2009). Reconstructing Nordic Signifi - gione Baltiiskogo morya. http://nddc.ru/index. cance in Europe on the Th reshold of the 21st php/RUS/home/news/81-2012-02-01-11-56-53, Century. Scandinavian Journal of History 34(3), visited 8 April 2012. 286-306. Steinbock, D. (2008). NATO and Northern Pastukhov, V. (1996). Paradoksal’nye zametki o Europe: From Nordic Balance to Northern sovremennom politicheskom rezhime. Pro et Balance. American Foreign Policy Interests 30(4), Contra 1, zima 1996. 196-210. Polozhenie (2012). Polozhenie o provedenii otkry- Timmis, G. (2006). German Ostpolitik under the togo Vserossiiskogo konkursa na razrabotku Red-Green Coalition and EU-Russian Rela- logotipa predsedatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federacii v tions. Debatte 14(3), 301-314. Sovete gosudarstv Baltiiskogo morya v 2012- Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 7 maya 2012 g. N:o 605 2013 godah. Prilozhenie k prikazu agentstva “O merakh po realizacii vneshnepoliticheskogo po delam molodezhi Kaliningradskoi oblasti. kursa Rossiiskoy Federacii”. http://graph.docu- http://youth.minstm.gov.ru/.cmsc/upload/ ment.kremlin.ru/page.aspx?1;1610881, visited docs/042012/Konk_SGBM.pdf, visited 9 May 30 May 2012. 2012. Vandeveer, S. D. & G. D. Dabelko (2001). Re- Putin, V. (2007). Nasha vneshnaya politika defi ning Security around the Baltic: Envi- napravlena na sovmestnuyu pragmatichnuyu ronmental Issues in Regional Context. In E. i neideologizirovannuyu rabotu po resheniyu Petzold-Bradley, A. Carius, and A. Vincze nasushchnykh dlya nas problem. Mezhdunarod- (eds.), Responding to Environmental Confl icts: naya zhizn’ No. 5. Implications for Th eory and Practice, Amster- Putin, V. (1999). Rossia na rubezhe tysyachiletiy. dam: Kluwer, 161-187. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 December 1999. Voropaev, V. (2009). Ministr Sergei Lavrov: Ne http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_mil- smeshivaite ekologiyu s politikoi! Izvestiya, lenium.html, visited 28 April 2012. 08.06.2009. Roggeri, A. (2012). EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Westerwelle, G. & S. Lawrow (2010). Die deutsch- Region – from Good Intentions to Eff ective russische Modernisierungspartnerschaft. Frank- Implementation and Results. Baltic Rim Econo- furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30.05.2010. – Th e mies No. 1, 22. Russian version: Lavrov, Sergei & Vestervelle, Rostoks, T. (2010). In Place of an Introduction: Gido: Chto i nam, i nemcam khorosho. Rossi- Why the Baltic Sea Strategy? In: Ž. Ozolina, I. iskaja gazeta, 31.05.2010. Reinholde & T. Rostoks (eds.) EU Strategy for Whitman, R. G. & Wolff , S. (2010). Much Ado the Baltic Sea Region: A Year After and Beyond. About Nothing? Th e European Neighbour- Riga: Zinātne, 9-38. hood Policy in Context. In: R. G. Whitman Smith, M. A. & G. Timmins (2001). Russia, & S. Wolff (eds.) Th e European Neighbourhood NATO and the EU in an Era of Enlargement: Policy in Perspective. Context, Implementation Vulnerability or Opportunity? Geopolitics 6(1), and Impact. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 69-90. 3-26. Steen, A. (2010). National Elites and the Russian Minority Issue. Does EU-NATO Integration

24 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Kaliningrad: Less of an Outpost, More of a Bridge

feared that the relative isolation could contribute to a gap in development in relation to Russia at large as well as in regards to the region’s rapidly developing neighbours. Overall, Kaliningrad found itself increasingly encircled by the EU, with both Lithuania and Poland moving towards EU Pertti Joenniemi & Alexander Sergunin membership. Issues pertaining to transit, terms of trade, crime, health, environmental degradation Abstract as well as security dominated the rather intense debate. On the more optimistic side, there was talk Kaliningrad, a relatively small Russian region about the region as a ‘test case’ and ‘experimental wedged between Lithuania, Poland and area’, bringing Russia and the EU closer to each the Baltic Sea, attracted a considerable other, or a ‘pilot region’, inviting Russia to develop amount of attention after the demise of policies more in tune with European regionalisa- the Soviet Union. It gave rise to some rather tion. However, Kaliningrad was, in some inter- optimistic, but also a considerable number ventions, instead depicted as a ‘puzzle’ – diffi cult of pessimistic, expectations. The past few to settle and even viewed in some cases as a ‘black decades have brought a considerable hole’ with a quite dim future. In general, the dose of normalisation, and with the past question was whether the region would turn into uncertainty and openness radically an isolated outpost or if it instead could become reduced, it may now be possible to portray a bridge, facilitating the development of relations Kaliningrad’s status in far more precise with its neighbours, as well as the broader interna- terms than was previously the case. Major tional environment. problems have been settled, although Today, it is evident that most of the initial un- some still remain to be tackled, and in some certainty felt in Kaliningrad, in Russian politics cases the region’s increasing integration at large, neighbouring countries, and the inter- and interaction with its environment has also national environment more generally, has by and opened up some new areas of contestation. large vanished. Rather than being in some sense experimental in character, Kaliningrad has in general gained a rather established position within 1. No Longer an Outpost Russia as well as in the sphere of EU-Russia relations, including relations with Lithuania and Initially, the region’s future was seen as uncertain, Poland as well. above all due to its detached location in being Th e EU enlargement has no doubt posed spatially separated from the rest of Russia. It was challenges to Russia, as well as opened up new ho-

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 25 rizons for its integration with Europe. Th e bright also some negative, eff ects. Whereas the region’s side of the current situation is that Kaliningrad is economy has in general developed quite favour- an obvious partner for the EU to co-operate with ably, preventing the emergence of any clearly in areas such as economics, trade, transit of people discernible gap in development, it has also become and goods, transportation, environmental protec- vulnerable to various fl uctuations. It has, as an tion, research and education. In fact, numerous indication of increasing connectedness, suff ered collaborative projects have been implemented over from an economic decline since the start of the the past two decades. Flexibility in the sphere of global fi nancial-economic crisis in 2008 (similar visa policies has enabled the region and the Ka- to other Russian regions). Production declined by liningraders to shed off feelings of being discrimi- 15% in 2009 (as compared with the previous year) nated against and becoming overly isolated. An (http://www.kaliningrad-cci.ru/news//9054/). institutional framework for such co-operation has In fact, Kaliningrad was particularly strongly been established, and positive experiences have aff ected by the crisis because of its dependence on been obtained. It may therefore be noted that Ka- foreign trade, and in particular imports. liningrad indeed enjoys the reputation of a ‘pilot However, by 2010 the radical socio-economic region’ and fi gures as a ‘frontrunner’ in the sphere measures undertaken by the regional and federal of EU-Russia relations. governments eventually yielded some favourable Nonetheless, it also seems that numerous bar- eff ect and the regional economy entered a phase riers to a more intensive EU-Russia co-operation of relative stabilisation and even displayed signs on Kaliningrad remain in place. Among the most of growth. Th e rate of growth in the regional compelling needs, problems such as constraints GDP has ranged from 6.5% in 2010 to 6.7% in on the mobility of persons, hindrances to invest- 2011 (Ministry of Economics of the Kaliningrad ment, as well as obstacles to cross-border trade in Region, 2012). Th e increase of foreign direct goods and services (including high customs and investment and foreign trade turnover was 50% transit tariff s, non-tariff discriminatory prac- in 2010 and 35% in the year to follow. Overall, tices, diff erences in standards, incompatibility of Kaliningrad is economically far ahead in compari- trade, bank, audit and book-keeping regulations, son to the other parts of the Northwestern Federal bureaucratic formalities, corruption) are still to be District in terms of industrial growth. fi xed. Moreover, the region’s transport system and Th ree special economic zones (SEZs) – related border infrastructure still require further develop- to industrial development, tourism and recreation- ment and a considerable number of institutional al activities as well as gambling − constitute the as well as societal problems remain to be settled. core of the region’s economy. Th e gambling zone Th e list of issues to be tackled also includes the remains in an embryonic form, but the Kalinin- lack of a modern public administration and civil grad SEZs have developed quite dynamically, even service. Th is applies to both the federal and the in the years marred by crisis. Th ey have actually regional levels. Still another issue-area to be sorted proved to be rather effi cient in solving Kalinin- out consists of various administrative reforms grad’s problems. It is to be noted, however, that proceeding at a slow pace, an erosion of human Russia’s forthcoming World Trade Organization capital, and various civil society institutions re- (WTO) accession may undermine the very exist- maining undeveloped. ence of these zones, as the logic of equality and standardisation underlying the WTO is at odds with the concept of privileged zones. Th erefore, 2. The Socio-Economic Situation the Russian government notifi ed the industrial SEZs in 2010 that their tax and customs privileges Kaliningrad has, rather than remaining detached may be abolished by 2016. and isolated, been integrated with its environs. It However, the outcome remains uncertain, is not just well-connected with the rest of Russia, as indicated by the announcement of Vladimir but has also been linked up with international Putin, then Prime Minister, that the special economic developments at large. Notably, this legal status and tax exemptions of the existing has had a considerable number of positive, but SEZs should actually remain. Th ey ought to be

26 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 extended, he argued in March 2010, from the case, particularly in the energy sector, owing to current twenty years to some 35 to 40 years. Rus- access to rather cheap gas and oil. Arguably, the sia’s Government has, in a similar vein, aspired construction of a nuclear station in Kaliningrad for a simplifi cation of the registration process for might further exacerbate this issue. residents of technological and innovation-type A further problem consists of inconsistencies SEZs, as well as a liberalisation of the tax regime. present in local and federal policies. Th ey are not Th is is done in order to attract more residents merely economic in nature, but have also resulted to special areas. However, a more reserved and in some socio-political tensions in the region, as critical view has been expressed by a number of well as some issues turning contentious in regard experts, believing that the prospects of the tourist/ to neighbours. For example, the former gover- recreation zones located in the national nature nor Georgy Boos’s socio-economic policies were reserve of the Kuronian Spit actually remain perceived by the Kaliningraders as ineffi cient and rather bleak. Th e construction of such areas is not led to a series of mass protests in early 2010. A in the cards, primarily for ecological reasons. Th ey rally, basically displaying dissatisfaction vis-à-vis point out that preservation of the quite vulner- the policies pursued by the regional authorities, able ecosystem in that area calls for rather cau- had nation-wide implications, as protests were tious policies. Moreover, progress is bound to be also raised against the federal government’s anti- hampered by various technical regulations, as well crisis strategy. Th e strategy was seen as ineffi cient, as a variety of bureaucratic obstacles (see in par- leading to demands for the resignation of premier ticular, Tkachenko & Tkachenko, 2011: 68-69). Putin. In general, analysts found reasons to blame Whereas the region’s in general rather favourable the policies pursued by Governor Boos for the dis- economic development lends credence to the more satisfaction, but on a more general level, the case optimistic scenarios, it must nonetheless be noted also highlighted the political risks that the system that, in some cases, access to subsidies and various of appointed governors created for the central grants seems to have distorted the functioning of government amidst a deteriorating economic situ- normal market mechanisms. Th is has been the ation. In other words, an initially internal regional

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 27 contest may also amount to expressions of dis- 3.1 Issues Pertaining to Energy satisfaction directed towards Russia’s centre, and thereby bring about demonstrations of distrust Unsurprisingly, the energy sector stands out as a levelled against the federal government’s policies crucial area of PfM-related co-operation. For ex- in general (Rogov, 2011). ample, the EU–Russia Energy Effi ciency Initia- tive supports EU–Russia co-operation in the area of sustainable energy, including energy effi ciency, 3. EU-Russia Co-operation on primary energy savings, sustainable use of energy Kaliningrad: Partnership for and renewable energy. Th e annual work pro- Modernisation grams of the joint EU–Russia Th ematic Group on Energy are to be implemented jointly by the Th e issue of Kaliningrad has in general facilitated EU and the Russian side. Under the Northern co-operation between Russia and the European Dimension Environmental Partnership, the on- Union. Th is has taken quite a number of forms, going project on rehabilitation of district heat- for example, a recent agreement on Partnership ing in Kaliningrad is in turn supported by the for Modernisation (PfM). Th e PfM was initi- European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel- ated by the EU-Russia Rostov-on-Don summit in opment (EBRD) (Commission of the European June 2010 to help Russia modernise its economy, Union, 2011: 35). Still another project on energy develop various socio-political institutions, and effi ciency is implemented under the auspices of bolster the legal system. A work plan was adopted the NDEP, with the objective of transferring in December 2010 and is regularly updated. knowledge to neighbouring municipalities. Th e In June 2011, the Council of the Baltic States Baltic Development Forum plays, along with (CBSS) decided to provide the PfM with a ‘Baltic some other partners, a signifi cant role in the Sea fl avour’ by establishing a program of moderni- implementation of the project. sation for the South Eastern Baltic Area (SEBA), Th e Kaliningrad offi ce of the Nordic Council with a special focus on the Kaliningrad region of Ministers, opened in 2010, has in many ways and its neighbourhood. Project development, the contributed to the regional energy effi ciency dia- dialogue with stakeholders, as well as improved logue. One of the outcomes of the NCM’s work communication, will constitute central parts consists of the creation of a network of energy of this regional partnership. It has a two-year managers from 11 regions of north-western Rus- time-frame and focuses on sustainable develop- sia and municipalities of the Kaliningrad Region ment, public-private partnerships, tourism, and (KR), including also energy experts from the university co-operation as its priority areas. SEBA participating regions (Grove, 2011: 19). Rotating will conclude with a conference in Kaliningrad in summer schools on energy planning and energy 2013 (see SEBA, 2011). effi ciency take place regularly in co-operation Although the SEBA-related programs of mod- with the CBSS. Th e Kaliningrad part of the ‘Ro- ernisation have in general been regarded as posi- tating summer schools’ project was completed in tive, they could in some instances also constitute May 2011 by arranging a Baltic Sea Region Rotat- a source of future tensions between Moscow and ing Energy Planning Academy (BALREPA) (see its European partners. Th is is because the concep- Council of the Baltic Sea States, 2011: 54). tual approaches to modernisation applied by the At large, the energy-related activities seem to parties actually diff er from each other. Whereas have facilitated a better understanding of the poli- Russia has mostly opted for European investments cies pursued by the various parties and contribut- and high-tech transfer, the European side endeav- ed, in particular, to increasing energy effi ciency in ours to develop a more general vision of moderni- north-western Russia. Moreover, they have paved sation (including the implementation of profound the way for additional projects funded locally, legal and socio-political reforms) in the context of by federal authorities or by the NCM, EU and these programmes. Russia’s quite specifi c interpre- the Nordic Environment Financial Corporation tation is not fully in line with the broader views (NEFCO). According to some reports, three pro- held by the European partners. jects developed by some of involved municipalities

28 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 are approved, and ten more projects are planned 3.3 The Dialogue on Environment (Grove, 2011: 19). An obstacle to further progress consists of Th e Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) is the Moscow’s unwillingness to ratify the European leading institution in this sphere of the Europe- Energy Charter (EEC), signed by Russia under an-Russian co-operation on KR. For example, President Yeltsin, but later viewed as discrimi- HELCOM’s BALTHAZAR project in the oblast natory in character. Th e separation between is aimed at implementing on-farm pilot projects production, reprocessing, and transportation of in order to ease pollution and reduce negative gas, as called for by the EEC, is not acceptable environmental eff ects impacting the Baltic Sea for Russia. A ratifi cation of the Charter would (Commission of the European Union, 2011: 10). in practice also necessitate the reorganisation However, a lack of proper facilities and a slow of a number of rather monopolistic energy gi- pace in constructing the infrastructure needed ants, such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Transneft, and has, in a number of cases, constrained the region’s would also provide foreign companies with a far relations with its neighbours and Baltic Sea coun- better access to the energy sector part of Russia’s tries in general. economy. When viewed from a Russian per- Two joint HELCOM/EU projects titled spective, these are problematic and challenging “Sub-regional risk of spill of oil and hazardous issues. substances in the Baltic Sea” (BRISK and its Still another obstacle to further co-operation Russian ‘branch’) aim at increasing preparedness pertains to the fact that Russia’s European on the part of all Baltic Sea countries to respond neighbours are frustrated by Moscow’s plan to to major spills of oil and hazardous substances build a nuclear plant in the Kaliningrad oblast by in the Baltic Sea. Th e work has included overall 2016. Th is intention runs against the dominant risk assessments of pollution caused by shipping anti-nuclear attitudes that are especially strong accidents (including the impact of oil, environ- in countries like Germany and Italy, which are mental vulnerability, eff ects of diff erent investi- among the key Russian partners in Europe. gated scenarios for each sub-region and eff ects of existing response measures for each sub-region), covering the whole Baltic Sea area. Similarly, 3.2 Transport-related Issues it entails identifi cation of various gaps in the existing emergency plans, also including as well As to transport, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea the creation of a list of further resources required Region (EUSBSR) foresees the KR’s involvement in this area. Th e various measures advocated in the modernisation of the regional transport also entail sub-regions and aim, furthermore, at infrastructure. For example, there are plans to facilitating the development and conclusion of include the KR into the Baltic Functional Air- sub-regional agreements between neighbouring space Block Initiative, an initiative launched by countries to ensure effi cient joint response opera- Poland and Lithuania in 2004. Th is may radically tions (Grove, 2011: 19). improve the quality of air traffi c management It is also to be noted that EU countries pay in the region (European Union Strategy for the considerable attention to the development of eco- Baltic Sea Region, 2010: 71-72). tourism in the KR. For instance, in 2009-2010 Notably, the EUSBSR also outlines a priority the Swedish Ministry of Environment granted area with the title “Co-operate for smarter trans- SEK 200,000 for a research study on possibilities port”. Th e aim is to improve safety, freight logis- for eco-tourism development in the KR, focus- tics effi ciency, and facilitate the shifting of freight sing on a pilot district of the Russian part of the from road to rail and sea, as well as improve the Vistula and Kuronian lagoons, and for a survey environmental impact of transport in the region on visitor perception of their expectation and their (e.g. the Green Corridor project from ports of stay on the Kuronian Spit of the KR (Council of Sweden, Denmark and Germany to ports of the Baltic Sea States, 2010: 30-31). Lithuania and Kaliningrad) (see European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 2010: 73).

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 29 3.5 Measures of Visa Regime Liberalisation

With the management of the Kaliningrad borders having been a key issue discussed between Russia and the EU impacting openness and access to the region, the question of visas has frequently been a priority question. Development has clearly pointed towards increased openness, and this trend seems to continue. Notably, an agreement was signed in December 2011 between Poland and Russia on a visa-free regime for the residents of the Kaliningrad oblast and two Polish border regions (Warmian-Masurian and Pomeranian voivodeships). Th e initial plan was to establish such a regime only within the 30-kilometer area from both sides of the border, but Moscow and War- saw managed to extend this practice to the entire Kaliningrad oblast and the two Polish voivodeships (http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/2FDAD0A77 0B410DD442579660051BC9D/). Interestingly, this agreement is seen by Russian and European experts as a model – with Kaliningrad indeed 3.4 Education and Youth serving as an experimental region and a pilot case in this issue area − to be replicated in other border Th e CBSS is the main venue for co-operation in regions. this area. For example, EuroFaculties serve as an In addition, the EU and Russia fi nalised a education project launched by the CBSS with the document titled “Common Steps towards Visa- aim of adapting university education in the Baltic Free Short-Term Travel” and a roadmap was Sea States and Russia to up-to-date standards in subsequently launched at the Brussels EU-Russia the spheres of research and teaching. Successful summit held in December 2011. According to this projects have been run in Kaliningrad (2000- document, the EU and Russia have to co-ordinate 2007). Th e Kant University in Kaliningrad sug- their eff orts in four specifi c areas: providing Rus- gested establishing a Baltic Network Institute of sian citizens with so-called biometric passports, Law as a follow-up of the EuroFaculty project. fi ghting illegal migration, developing a common In December 2009, the Administration of the approach to border controls, as well as fi ghting KR introduced the concept of the “Baltic Artek” trans-border organised crime − including money youth camp. In autumn 2010, the CBSS started a laundering, arms and drug traffi cking. Th e parties process on its end in order to add an international are also obliged to ensure freedom of movement of aspect to the newly established Baltic Artek Youth people in the country of residence by abolishing Camp in the KR. In August 2011, representatives or changing the existing administrative proce- of the CBBS travelled to Kaliningrad in order to dures of registration and work permits for foreign- explore further possibilities for co-operation on ers. Th e EU leaders emphasise that a full imple- youth issues in the BSR and in relation to the Baltic mentation of the agreed common steps can lead to Artek Youth Camp. In fact, the CBSS is currently the opening of visa-waiver negotiations. developing a project proposal in order to conduct However, Moscow regards the list of com- an international workshop session at the Baltic mon steps for visa-free short-term travel and the Artek Youth Camp, focusing on issues pertaining Russian-Polish agreement on local border traffi c as to regional identity, democracy, and sustainable insuffi cient. Th e concessions provided by Brus- lifestyles (July-August 2012). sels should go further, causing Russia to appear

30 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 to be the party advocating increased openness. uncertainty have been sorted out. Th ey have been Kaliningrad could function as a test case and a settled either by designing particular Russian poli- forerunner. Furthermore, the Kremlin insists on cies, through a dialogue and in co-operation with the intensifi cation of the EU-Russia dialogue in the EU, the countries of the Baltic Sea region and this area, with the aim of promptly signing a full- oftentimes also the neighbouring countries. fl edged visa waiver agreement. In order to account Security remains undoubtedly an issue area for the somewhat more reserved attitude, the to be settled. Th e acute fears part of the transition European side refers primarily to residual techni- period have been alleviated, and the attitudes both cal problems related to the process of implementa- in Russia as well as the neighbouring countries tion. For example, the EU notes that it is diffi cult are far more relaxed than initially after the demise for Russia to quickly provide its citizens with of the Soviet Union. However, on occasions the technically updated biometric passports. Brussels debate has taken a negative turn. Th is has in also emphasises that dialogue with Russia should particular been the case once issues pertaining to be in tune with the visa facilitation process, which missile defence have been debated with Russia, concerns various countries included in the Eastern then as a response to NATO plans threatening to Partnership. deploy surface-to-air missiles in the region. Th ese Th is is clearly a bone of contention, as Russia debates are clear signs that, on a more general fi nds this stance not only unreasonable, but also level, some of the initial duality pertaining to Ka- unrelated to the EU-Russia eff orts of settling the liningrad both as a problem and an opportunity visa issue. Moreover, the EU insists that Russia has not fully vanished. must cease issuing passports to residents of South However, many signs point to a positive trend Ossetia and Abkhazia, as the Union views these dominating, either in the sense that Kaliningrad two regions as occupied provinces of Georgia. It has turned into a rather normal entity located also emphasises the necessity to intensify co- in northern Europe, or by representing it as an operation on illegal immigration, improvement of ‘experimental area’ or ‘pilot region’ in the sphere controls at cross-border checkpoints, as well as an of EU-Russia relations. Th is is not to argue, how- exchange of information on terrorism and organ- ever, that the agenda would just be dominated by ised crime. In contrast to Russian expectations, various issues on their way towards being gradu- Brussels considers the introduction of the visa-free ally settled. Many of the more traditional ones regime with Russia to be a long term, rather than actually remain, and they do not always display a short term, prospect. progress. Th is applies, for example, to some ques- tions pertaining to crime, corruption, smuggling and environmental degradation. Lack of progress 4. Conclusions and Outlook may in turn impede the implementation of demo- cratic reforms in the region, and on some occa- Out of the various potential outcomes for Kalin- sions also destabilise the internal situation within ingrad after the demise of the Soviet Union, the and around the KR. worst expectations have clearly not materialised. Th e perception of Kaliningrad as an excep- Th e region is far from isolated, and there has been tional region, warranting special attention and considerable socio-economic development that immediate measures, may in some cases have fa- has reduced the gap between Kaliningrad and cilitated the settlement of its problems. However, the neighbouring countries. In addition, Russia also the opposite impact has occasionally been has been gradually able to coin policies that have discernible, with progress having slowed down as normalised the position of Kaliningrad amongst the region has unavoidably been linked with issues various Russian regions, and it would indeed of a more general importance. Th is is to say that, be erroneous to employ labels such as a ‘black rather than settling issues on their own merits hole’ in depicting the current state of aff airs in and in a pragmatic manner, progress has been Kaliningrad. Even the concepts of a ‘puzzle’ or hampered because of various broader symbolic an ‘anomaly’ seem out of place, given that most and political concerns. It is, in this latter perspec- of the issues creating doubt and bringing about tive, a sign of progress that Kaliningrad has, over

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 31 time, increasingly gained connotations of being Council of the Baltic Sea States. 2010. Lithuanian a relatively ordinary part of Russia and the Baltic Presidency 2009-2010. Annual Report of the Sea area. Th is enhances the pursuance of politics- Committee of Senior Offi cials. Available at: as-usual and allows local issues to be increasingly http://www.cbss.org/CBSS-Th e-Council/the- settled on their own merits. council Th is normalisation also adds to the prospects Council of the Baltic Sea States. 2011. CBSS An- for further sub-regional co-operation. Much of nual Report. Norwegian Presidency, 2010- the dialogue related to Kaliningrad has taken 2011. Available at: http://www.cbss.org/ place in the context of Baltic Sea co-operation, 2010. European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea the Nordic Council of Ministers, and the CBBS. Region. Annual report. 4 October. Annex1. Th ese forums will quite probably remain impor- Summary of Implementation. Available at: tant in this respect in the years to come. Regional http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/ contacts also off er opportunities for developing baltic/documents_en.cfm#2 Russian democracy and civil society, and will Grove A. 2011. ‘Role and achievements of the Nor- presumably serve as an important catalyst for ad- dic Council of Ministers (NCM) on environ- ditional reforms and intensifi ed integration. Such ment and energy in North-West (NW) Russia, developments will link Kaliningrad even more as a part of the Baltic Sea Region’, in: Baltic closely to the nearby areas as well as Europe at Rim Economies, 21 December, no. 5: 19. large. Sub-regional co-operation facilitates the rise Ministry of Economics of the Kaliningrad Region of a mechanism of interdependence in Northern 2012. Osnovnye Pokazateli Sotzialno-Econom- Europe and promotes mutual trust and under- icheskogo Razvitiya [Th e Main Indicators of standing among the actors of the region. Th is type Socio-Economic Development] // http://econo- of sub-regionalism might in some ways be condu- my.gov39.ru/socialno-ekonomicheskoe-razvitie/ cive to a settlement of various economic, social, osnovnye-pokazateli-ser/ (in Russian) political and transition issues, but increase in Rogov K. 2011. Th e “Th ird Cycle”: Is Russia Head- relevance with respect to addressing issues of more ing Back to the Future? In: Russia in Global recent origin. Th is is important, as the region’s Aff airs, 27 March 2011. SEBA: Modernization Partnership for the South Eastern Baltic Area Tkachenko S., Tkachenko D. 2011.‘Special Eco- Commission of the European Union 2011. Com- nomic Zones in Russia – new trends,’ in: Baltic mission Staff Working Paper in the Implemen- Rim Economies, 21 December, no. 5: 68-69. tation of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 13 September. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/ baltic/documents_en.cfm#2

32 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Norway: a Pragmatic Outsider in the Baltic Sea Region

BSR organisations, and the economic and energy bonds between Norway and the Baltic Rim states. With such a map at hand, it is easier to determine the current position of the Norwegian ship on the Østersjøen. Where does it go? What does it carry on board? Lidia Puka

Abstract 1. The Baltic Sea Region in the Policy of Norway

Norway is a Baltic Sea Region (BSR) outsider, Despite from not being a part of the BSR in a but a pragmatic one. Th e country selectively uses strictly geographical sense, Norway has developed regional modes of co-operation to promote its trade and shipping links, and people-to-people interests. Although it does not have a Baltic Sea contacts in the region since Viking times. None- coastline, the infl uence of the Baltic Sea environ- theless, the country is far from being recognised ment on the coasts of southern Norway makes as a driver of regional co-operation at present. In it actively participate in regional environmental contrast to Norway’s coherent long-term High co-operation. Moreover, the Nordic and Baltic Sea North policy, no offi cial document describes the co-operation forums are used to attract the atten- interests of Norway in the BSR. Th e Arctic and tion of the Baltic Rim states to Norway’s priority the Nordic dimensions are the priorities of the region, the High North, covering the Arctic and country’s regional policies, as they enable the Barents Sea areas. In terms of economic bonds, exchange of ideas with like-minded countries, and Norway is closely interlinked with northwest- project-based co-operation with Russia (Bailes ern Europe, with which it has a well-developed 1998: 21). Th e main BSR intergovernmental fo- oil and gas export, and electricity transmission rum – the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) infrastructure. At the same time, the BSR serves – is one of four regional councils in Northern as a platform for the promotion of the Norwegian Europe, namely the Nordic Council of Ministers private sector further east, enabling Norwegian (NCM), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) exploration of the markets of the southern Baltic and the Arctic Council (AC). Th ese four councils Sea littoral states. At the same time, countries of overlap in membership and partly in activities, the BSR remain an important source of human and are to some extent linked and co-operate with capital for Norway. Th is article maps out the each other, for instance within the framework of interests of Norway in the BSR. It off ers an analy- the Northern Dimension (ND) of the European sis of the role that the Region has in Norway’s Union (EU), Russia, Iceland and Norway. Moreo- foreign policy, the country’s performance in the ver, Norway’s involvement in the EU Strategy for

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 33 the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), increasingly with the country’s engagement in NATO. At the considered by some to be the currently most same time, to secure the national labour market, important instrument of regional co-operation, is Norway introduced transit regulations for labour very limited, as the country is not an EU member. migrants from the new EU countries (Europau- Th e relationship between Norway and the tredningen 2012: 16.1). countries of the Region is multi-layered. Th e Moreover, to address the political, economic, country has the strongest political linkages with and security challenges properly, Norway cre- the other Nordic countries, due to the historic, ated targeted policies towards Estonia, Latvia, political, lingual, and economic bonds. Germany Lithuania, and Poland (Europautredningen 2012: is seen as a crucial trade partner for Norway and, 16.6.3). Th e country’s interests in the BSR were since the inauguration of the European Eco- also defi ned in 2004, comprised of ensuring nomic Area (EEA) in 1994, of which Norway stability and security in the region; the promotion is a member, also the powerhouse of EU/EEA of sustainable economic and social development; co-operation. Norway also tries to manage good promoting the Norwegian private sector, econo- relations with neighbouring Russia, especially in my, and welfare state, and closing the welfare gap the fi elds of resource management, environment, between old and new EU/EEA member states. For and strengthening people-to-people contacts. It the purpose of the latter, 60% of the EEA fi nan- leads joint projects with Russia in the High North cial mechanisms were prescribed for the Baltic area, thus extending the scope of the BSR fora. States and Poland. Th e policy of Norway towards Russia aims at Eight years later, the country’s interests are ‘normalisation’ of neighbourly relations (Stoere still similar, as despite the fact that the BSR is 2011). Balancing of the inherent disproportion of considered to be much more economically and potentials between the states is a precondition for politically stable, the engagement of Norway the country’s security. Th e biggest challenge to the in the BSR has been rather limited. Poland is latter is posed by Russian unwillingness to reduce an exception to this rule. It is perceived as the its large arsenals of short-range nuclear weap- European country with which Norway has ons. As a response, Norway seeks to eliminate developed the strongest links since the 1990s. all weapons of this kind in Europe, while also Th e reasons for that are the positive prognosis for seeking allies among the Baltic Sea states (Stoere economic growth, the EEA funds, out of which 2012). Poland receives almost EUR 100mln annually, the With regard to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and post-2004 labour immigration fl ow to Norway, Poland, Norway’s interest increased during the and the fi nalisation of the off set agreement with collapse of the Soviet Union: Norway was one of Kongsberg Defence Systems. Moreover, after the the fi rst countries to recognise the independence Presidency in the Council of the EU in 2011, Po- of the Baltic States. Not surprisingly, from a legal land is perceived as an important partner within point of view, Norway has never recognised Soviet the EU. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Nor- authority in the region (Hodges 1998: 1). After way is respectively the fourth, sixth, and eighth the Baltic States regained their independence in largest investor. Th e country emphasises that the 1991, Norway assisted in democratic institution- economic crisis makes it harder for the countries building and market liberalisation processes in to bridge the economic gap in the BSR. Th is argu- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, although eff orts mentation is also raised in the internal political to develop trade relations with the countries were debate in Norway as a justifi cation for the deploy- rather limited. ment of EEA grants (Stoere 2012a). An increase in both security and trade came with the NATO and EU accessions of 2004. NATO enlargement was perceived by Norway, as 2. Norway’s Interests in the Council of a founder of the organisation, as an opportunity the Baltic Sea States to solidify peace and security in the region. At the same time, the country feared that the European Although Norway is defi nitely not a driver of BSR Security and Defence Policy would compete co-operation, it displays a pragmatic approach,

34 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 using the Presidencies of regional organisations, able development programme Baltic 21 was raised such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States by Norway (9th Ministerial Session 2000). (CBSS) and the Nordic Council of the Ministers Apart from these priorities, the Presidency (NCM), to promote its interests. Th e performance also made eff orts to develop the energy fi eld, of Norway in the main BSR intergovernmental fo- trying to attract the attention of the CBSS to the rum, the CBSS, has been moderate. Th e country High North. Norway has worked to improve the was present at the establishment of the organisa- safety of nuclear power plants, the availability of tion in March 1992, and signed the Copenha- data, and to develop early warning mechanisms. gen Declaration. Nonetheless, it was reluctant With the support of the members of the Barents to ascribe a larger political signifi cance to the Euro-Arctic Council and the European Commis- organisation, fearing that it could threaten Nordic sion, a renewed agreement for the Multilateral co-operation (Government of Norway 2004). At Nuclear Environmental Programme for Rus- the same time, through the CBSS, Norway has sia was negotiated. Moreover, the Ministers for actively contributed to supporting the post-Cold Energy of the Baltic Sea Region, at their meeting War democratisation and modernisation process of the former Soviet states, and to the protection of health and the environment in the BSR. In the past two decades, the political engage- ment of Norway in the CBSS has varied; not all Ministerial meetings have been attended by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Aff airs (Etzold 2010: 113-114), although the intensity of political representation did increase during the country’s CBSS Presidencies. Th e priorities that Norway selected refl ect the country’s interests in the BSR. During its fi rst Presidency, from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000, two priorities were singled out: economic growth and civil security. As underlined by the Heads of Government and the President of the European Commission at the Baltic Sea States Summit in Kolding in 2000, EU enlargement was seen as a chance to boost economic growth in the BSR through, for example, promotion of employ- ment and increased standards of living, fi ghting against corruption, and reducingtrade barriers (Baltic Sea States Summit 2000). For the latter, an Action Plan was prepared by the Ministers for Trade and Economic Co-operation, which helped to improve border crossing procedures for goods (3rd CBSS Ministerial Conference on Trade and Economy 2000). Th e most tangible results, however, were achieved in the civil security fi eld, in particular by the Task Force on Organised Crime and the Working Group Children at Risk, labour-market policy, and education. Additionally, during the 9th Ministerial Session of the CBSS in Bergen, the mandate of the Commissioner for Democratic Institutions was prolonged until 2003, and a call for raising the effi ciency of the regional sustain-

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 35 in Helsinki in October 1999, adopted a regional due to the additional post-2004 fl ow of EU/EEA co-operation initiative that included non-discrim- immigration, which exceeded 100,000 people in inatory delivery of energy and the integration of 2012 (Statistics Norway 2012). gas and electricity markets (2nd Meeting of the CBSS Energy Ministers 1999). However, progress towards the fulfi lment of the latter initiative has 3. The Baltic Sea Dimension of been far from satisfactory. the Nordic Cooperation Th e second CBSS Presidency of Norway took place from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, now in Norway has also been involved in the Baltic Sea a diff erent regional political setting. After EU dimension of Nordic co-operation. Th e fl exible enlargement in 2004, the CBSS started to reform mechanisms of the latter have enabled this co- its structures and activities in 2007/2008. Th e operation to involve the Baltic States, northwest Norwegian Presidency followed up on the reform Russia, and Kaliningrad in the mechanisms of the process. Th e goal was to increase the CBSS’s Nordic Council (NC) and the Nordic Council of effi ciency through transformation and specialisa- Ministers (NCM). tion, from a political forum into a high-expertise, From Norway’s point of view, the possibility project-oriented forum. At the same time, the of keeping touch with those Nordic countries that Presidency did not make an eff ort to secure ad- have joined the EU, and to keep informed on, and ditional funding for CBSS projects. Maritime indirectly infl uence EU decision-making, constitute policy was chosen as one of the Presidency’s an important element of Nordic co-operation. Th e priorities, on the grounds that shipping and latest example of this is the growth and employ- maritime activities were vital for the economic ment agenda. It is one of the priorities of the Nor- development of the BSR (Lahnstein 2010). Th e wegian NCM Presidency in 2012 to preserve the sustainable development of these sectors triggered Nordic welfare state model. It aims at generating consultations within the CBSS Expert Group on growth and promoting welfare during the Euro- Maritime Policy. Th e Presidency tried to evaluate pean debt crisis. An antidote could be, for example, cost-effi cient alternatives for ship fuelling, such developed through eff orts to generate green growth, as LNG, to prepare for the switch to the use of to promote the sustainable use of natural resources, low-sulphur content marine fuels in the Baltic Sea and to overcome the social challenges of the labour from 2015 onwards (International Maritime Or- market by securing gender equality (Nordic Coun- ganisation 2005). Th e fi ndings of the research had cil of Ministers, 2011). Th e similar growth and jobs also relevance for North Sea trading, as the same agenda has been promoted by the Danish Presiden- provisions apply to the North Sea routes. cy in the EU Council that commenced in January Norway’s second priority, combating traffi ck- 2012 (Th orning-Schmidt, 2011). ing in human beings, was linked with the fi ght For the internal policy of Norway, the preser- against forced labour. Following the Declaration vation of the so-called ‘Nordic values’ of democ- of the 15th CBSS Ministerial Session (15th CBSS racy, openness, and distribution of welfare has Ministerial Session, 2009), the Norwegian Presi- gained importance after the anti-immigration dency has monitored and evaluated the imple- terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July mentation of the Council of Europe Convention 2011. Th e political reactions after the attacks against traffi cking in the BSR, also in the fi eld have shown the solidarity and the will to preserve of labour traffi cking. For this purpose, the CBSS openness and democracy in the Nordic countries. Task Force against Traffi cking in Human Beings Even the right-wing Nordic parties, which often worked jointly with the International Organisa- used anti-immigrant rhetoric (like Danish People’s tion for Migration and the United Nations Offi ce Party or the Norwegian Progress Party), called for on Drugs and Crime on a comprehensive report moderation in the debate on immigration, and and best practices guidelines for state authorities tried to distance themselves from the views of the in order to more eff ectively identify victims of terrorist. Th ey were also critical toward opinions forced labour and labour market traffi cking. Th ese that suggested using the tragedy to understand topics also had rising signifi cance for Norway, the danger of a multicultural society.

36 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 With respect to collaborative projects in with imports totalling NOK 207.3bln. At the the areas adjacent to the Nordic countries – in same time, the region off ers a vast potential for northwest Russia and in the Baltic States – Nor- development, recognised by the governmental way shares the broad consensus that Nordic co- pro-export organisations, Innovation Norway, operation must continue, both increasing regional and the Norwegian Seafood Council. Th e former security and stability, and promoting economic has offi ces in all of the countries of the region, development. In relation to collaborations with and two in Russia: in Moscow as well as in St. Russia, Norway engages in cross-border projects Petersburg (Innovasjon Norge website 2012). Th e with Murmansk, rather than with Kaliningrad latter has offi ces in Russia, Sweden and Germany (Nordic Council of Ministers 2008; 2010a). Th e to promote the export of seafood (Norges sjoema- other area of co-operation concerns the protec- traad website 2012). tion of the environment. Norway participates in After the end of the Cold War, Norway, un- initiatives that the Nordic forums support with like Germany, did not redefi ne its export mar- additional expertise, like evaluation of the cost- kets. Despite political declarations (Stoere 2006), effi cient ways to restore the Baltic Sea as part Norway has also not used the economic potential of “Cleaner Nordic Seas” (Nordic Council of resulting from the 2004 EU/EEA enlargement. Ministers, 2010), or in the Northern Dimension As a consequence, trade with the southeastern Partnership for Environment (NDEP). However, Baltic Rim states (Poland, the Baltic States, and in spite of its fi nancial capabilities, Norway does Russia) remains largely underdeveloped. One of not push for progress in environmental protection. the reasons for that is that the limited export of Th e fi nancial contribution to the 2012 NDEP Norwegian energy products to the BSR, as only Support Fund of EUR 15.3mln places Norway northern Germany has gas pipeline connections below the average contribution of EUR 25.7mln with the Norwegian continental shelf. Th e eff ects (Northern Dimension 2012). of the 2008 recession can still be felt in the BSR, Despite the fact that the issues of hard secu- as despite the slow recovery, the trade balance rity have been left outside of the scope of Nordic in 2011 has decreased by a third, totalling some co-operation, in 2009 Norway tried to increase NOK 10bln, in comparison to the trade bal- co-operation on defence between the Nordic ance in 2008. Th e major regional trade partners countries, partially as a reaction to the increased of Norway remain Germany (where 10% of the military activities of Russia in the High North. total, and 45% of regional exports of Norway are Th e former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Aff airs directed), and Sweden. Th ey are also the main and Defence, Th orvald Stoltenberg, elaborated importing countries to Norway (Statistics Nor- a set of concrete measures for development of way, 2012a). Nordic foreign and security policy. Th e proposal However, Norway’s regional trade relations included the provision of collective responsibil- are undergoing three general changes. First, ity for the country’s security (Stoltenberg, 2009). Norway wants to restore the pre-recession trade Nonetheless, despite having signed the Declara- balance with Germany. Second, it aims to de- tion of Solidarity on 5 April 2011, the Nordic velop trade with Russia, which is also the main states remain split on issues of conventional secu- importer of Norwegian seafood. Th ird, it is trying rity, and represent diff erent capabilities. to develop trade with Poland. Decrease in trade exchange with Germany is probably the most signifi cant result of the 2008 recession in the 4. Economic Bonds of Norway in BSR. Exports from Norway to Germany in 2011 the Baltic Sea Region reached NOK 99bln, from NOK 118.5bln in 2008. With the other countries of the region, the From an economic point of view, the BSR has situation looks better, however. In 2011, import medium importance for Norway, generating and export with Sweden returned to the pre-crisis approximately 20% of total exports, mostly of level, with a positive trade balance to Finland and seafood, energy, and metal products. In 2011, the to Poland (ibidem). value of export to the BSR totaled NOK 227.4bln,

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 37 Export and import between Norway and the BSR in 2008 and in 2011

Total:

Germany

Svweden

Russia

Poland

Lithuania

Latvia

Finland

Estonia

Denmark

- 50,00 100,00 150,00 200,00 250,00 300,00 Value in bln NOK

Export from Norway in 2008 Export from Norway in 2011 Import to Norway in 2008 Import to Norway in 2011

Table 1. Export and import between Norway and the BSR countries in 2008 and in 2011. Author’s work based on data from Statistics Norway (ssb.no).

Trade balance between Norway and the BSR

60,00

50,00

40,00

30,00

20,00

Value in bln NOK 10,00

-

2008 2009 2010 2011 -10,00

-20,00 Year

Denmark Estonia Finland Latvia Lithuania Poland Russia Svweden Germany Total

Table 2. Trade balance between Norway and the BSR countries in 2008-2011. Author’s work based on data from Statistics Norway (ssb.no).

38 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 To counterbalance the relatively negative eco- 5. Energy Relations Between Norway nomic trend with Germany, Norway has tried to and the BSR Countries strengthen economic bonds via political channels. In a February 2012 speech in Hamburg, the Min- Norway is one of the leading petroleum export- ister of Foreign Aff airs of Norway, Jonas Gahr ers in the world, second-highest in terms of gas Stoere, emphasised Norway’s desire to strengthen export (100 bcm in 2009) and seventh largest in bilateral co-operation between the two countries terms of oil (2.1 mb/d). Th e country has planned during the European sovereign debt crisis, and to increase gas production to 110-130 bcm by Norwegian support for strengthening an eff ective 2020. With a view to petroleum discoveries, internal market in Europe. Th e completion of the Norway increased spending on fossil fuels explora- Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project between Rødby tion and production, and research and develop- in Denmark and Puttgarten in Germany is seen ment, from NOK 75bln to NOK 110bln in the as one of the means to reach this goal. Norway fi rst decade of 2000. Th is policy has already borne supports the project politically, but not fi nancially. fruit. Th e proven oil reserves of Norway have been Norway has also shown an interest in co-fi nanc- estimated at 7.1 billion barrels in 2010, although ing a project of a high-speed railway connecting oil production has been decreasing since 2001. Swedish Trelleborg and Germany, which would However, this negative trend can be off set the enable a high-speed railway link between Oslo production of oil from the recent discoveries of and Berlin (Oldberg, 2011). More importantly, it Aldous/Avaldsnes on the North Sea, and Skrugard is the northern city of Hamburg, and not Berlin, and Havis on the Barents Sea. Th ey are estimated that hosts the Innovation Norway offi ce, which to add from 15% to 30% to the current proven oil promotes Norwegian exports and industry. Th e reserves of Norway (Statoil, 2012). offi ce of the Norwegian Seafood Council is also Despite the abundant resources and the based in Hamburg, as Germany is a signifi cant geographical proximity to the BSR, Norwegian importer of Norwegian herring. At the same time, export of petroleum products to the countries of the Norwegian Consulate General in Hamburg is the Region is rather limited. During the Cold due to be transformed into an Honorary Consu- War, Norwegian resources were directed from late General in 2012 (Stoere 2012b). the continental shelf on the North and Nor- Considering that there are 140 million cus- wegian Sea to the Western European markets: tomers in Russia, the fact that Norwegian exports Great Britain, Netherlands, RFN and France (gas there amount to half of the amount of exports to pipelines) and the United Kingdom (oil pipelines). Finland, and 1/14 of exports to Germany, comes Currently, the main trends that shape energy co- as a surprise. Russia is one of the most signifi cant operation betweenNorway and the BSR countries importers of Norwegian seafood, mostly salmon, are development and further integration of the fj ord trout, herring and mackerel (Norges sjoema- Nordic electricity market, preservation of the gas traad website 2012). Although both of the coun- export to Germany, balancing relations with Rus- tries are non-complimentary exporters of the en- sia, and the absence of diversifi cation alternatives ergy products, Russia could off er a market for the to Poland and the Baltic States. Norwegian health equipment, pro-environmental First of all, in the electricity sector, Norway is solutions for energy, maritime and off shore tech- a part of the Nordic electricity market, NordPool. nologies for oil and gas industries and fi sheries, It has electricity connections with the Nordic and for the tourist services for Russian customers. states, Russia, and indirectly with Estonia and Po- Similarly Poland, currently a signifi cant importer land. Th e most important capacities link Norway of Norwegian salmon, is a prospective market for with Sweden and Denmark, however those with Norwegian armaments, green technology, seafood Finland and Russia help balance the Norwegian and tourism (Innovasjon Norge website 2012). grid in times of low hydropower production. Th e current projects aim to double the transmission capacity. Although some of them are still in the conceptual stage, they can result in better inte- gration of Norway with Germany (NorGer, and

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 39 Nord Link), Sweden (Sydvestlinken), and Den- minerals, gas and oil. Despite the tensions be- mark (Skagerrak 4). Moreover, their completion tween the countries in 2007, the eff ort to ‘nor- will supplement the regional projects of off shore malise’ the relations has already born fruit in the wind generation on the North Sea and in the Bal- form of the Treaty concerning Maritime Delimita- tic Sea. As a member of the North Sea Countries’ tion and Co-operation in the Barents Sea and the Off shore Grid Initiative since 2010, Norway has Arctic Ocean between Russia and Norway, which participated in the joint works on the regulatory entered into force on 7 July 2011. Th eoretically, it adjustments, and grid confi guration, together with has enabled the countries to proceed with en- i.e. Denmark, Germany and Sweden. However, as ergy exploration and production on the formerly indicated by the International Energy Agency, the disputed area in the High North. Th e Norwegian scope of the investments, including the develop- and Russian companies plan to start developing ment of off shore wind capacity in the proximity of the Shtockman fi eld (Gazprom, Statoil, and To- Norway through 2020, will depend on the growth tal), and exploring the Perseevsky license (Rosneft in domestic demand, electrifi cation of the petro- and Statoil). Either the development of the fi elds leum industry and transport, international trade or lack of progress will infl uence the High North potential, and the deployment of renewable energy policy of Norway. At the same time, the develop- sources (International Energy Agency, 2011). ment of the new fi elds in the region could increase To develop the latter, and decrease the costs the energy security of supplies of the Baltic Sea of the deployment of renewables, Norway co- littoral states. operates closely with Sweden. Th e development of With regard to the latter, Norway could be the joint renewable electricity certifi cate system, an alternative provider of gas to Poland, Finland launched in 2012, will hopefully result in de- and to the Baltic States, which note a high import creasing the costs of reaching renewable energy dependence on Russian gas. Also, ever since the targets, due to the development of additional 26.4 Skanled project was halted, there has been no TWh within the next eight years, for example, by pipeline project to directly connect gas from expanding the capacity of the Norwegian hydro- Norway to these countries. Th e reason for this power and Swedish biomass (ibidem). If proved state of aff airs is insuffi cient economic viability, successful, the system could be used as a best but also insuffi cient political will. However, due to practices example to be implemented in the Baltic the plans to construct LNG terminals in Poland, Rim EU States. Finland, and in one of the Baltic States, gas from Second, Norway invests in continuing the Norway could be sold on the South Baltic mar- stable export of petroleum products to Germany – kets from 2014 onwards. If commissioned in due the only BSR country to have gas pipeline con- time, by 2018 the LNG terminals in the BSR will nections with Norway (none of the BSR countries have a capacity between 7.5 to 10 bcm (5 bcm in have oil pipelines connections). In 2009, Norpipe Świnoujście, 1.2 to 2.5 bcm in Inkoo, and similar- to Emben and Europipe I and II to Dornum ly in the terminals in Riga, Klaipeda, or Paldiski). transported 43.8 bcm of Norwegian gas. Th e gas At the same time, the potential for increased LNG terminal in Ebmen is currently being upgraded exports requires an investment in additional gasi- and modernised to prolong its operation for the fi cation capacities on the side of Norway, as the next 30 years (Gassco website 2012). Germany main LNG terminal, Snoehvit, produced only 3.4 also imports half of Norwegian coal, although bcm in 2010 (from a total export capacity of 5.75 the coal production from the two mines situated bcm), as the majority of current LNG exports in Spitsbergen is rather minor (0.8 Mtoe in 2008, are directed to Asian markets. Alternatively, an with some coal also being exported to Denmark increase in the gas interconnectors between the and Poland). At the same time, the production BSR countries could give Norwegian gas, which helps to justify Norway’s claims to Svalbard. already reaches Germany and the Czech Republic, Th ird, Norway strives for improvement of access to the southeastern Baltic Rim states. relations with Russia. Th e interests of the two countries meet in the High North, believed to be the prospective region for the development of

40 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 6. Conclusions and Outlook values has increased after 22 July 2011, the most tragic peacetime atrocity in the history of Norway. As a non-Baltic Sea state, global energy supplier, Th e BSR forums are also used as tools for and global exporter of investments, Norway shows political discussion. Since the EU enlargements of a limited interest in the Baltic Sea Region. In 1995 and 2004, they have off ered a possibility to this respect, it is similar to the biggest regional indirectly promote Norwegian interests in the EU, players: Russia, Germany and Poland. Th e Baltic and to extend the country’s sphere of infl uence Sea dimension plays a secondary role even in the eastwards. In the foreseeable future, the trend of regional foreign policies of the country which a moderate involvement and step-by-step co-op- focuses primarily on the High North. Th is state of eration is likely to continue. However, the limited aff airs is a consequence of a pragmatic calculation. development of the Stoltenberg report on increas- From the point of view of Norway, BSR co-op- ing the foreign and security policies of the Nordic eration brings little added value to already estab- states shows that, even between the Nordics, the lished bilateral and multilateral Nordic relations. path of co-operation has yet farther to go. At the same time, Norway shows responsibil- Th e analysis of economic and energy rela- ity in the BSR forums. Th e country’s presiden- tions of Norway and the states in the BSR shows cies in the Council of the Baltic Sea States and that the importance of the region (approx. 20% the Nordic Council of Ministers shed a light of total Norwegian exports), and a positive trade on the country’s interests in the BSR: marine balance, result predominantly from trade rela- trade, combating human traffi cking and forced tions with Germany, and (although to a lesser labour (CBSS), environment, security, economic extent) with Sweden. At the same time, southern co-operation, preservation of the Nordic welfare Baltic Sea Region markets have yet to be explored state model, and promotion of democracy and for Norwegian industry and products. It is likely openness (Nordic co-operation, and projects with that Norway will focus on restoration of the trade Russia). Th e signifi cance of the promotion of these balance with Germany to the pre-recession level, and on developing trade with Russia and Poland.

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 41 Th e former is a prospective market for Norwegian Baltic Sea States Summit, 2000, Baltic Sea Coop- health equipment, maritime and off shore tech- eration and the European Stability and Integra- nologies for oil and gas industries and fi sheries; tion, cbss.org, Chairman’s Conclusions, 12- the latter, for Norwegian armaments and seafood. 13.04.2000, Kolding, Denmark. Both countries could also potentially import Nor- Bailes, AJK 1998, Th e Barents, Baltic Sea and Black wegian pro-environmental energy solutions and Sea Cooperation in a European Security Context tourist services. in: Brundtland, AO (ed.), Regional cooperation For Germany and the Nordic states, Norway in three overlapping circles: the Barents Euro-Arc- remains an important energy supplier. Due to nu- tic Region, the Baltic Sea cooperation, the Black merous projects, and fi nancial credibility, it is also Sea economic cooperation. Proceedings from a a country with a strong say in the development conference for senior working level diplomats, of the regional electricity market and supplies. NUPI, Oslo, 12-14.03.1997. Norway could also enhance energy security in the Etzold, T 2010, Live and let die: adaptability and BSR, by off ering an option for the diversifi cation endurance of regional organisations in North- of gas supply sources, mostly to the southern Bal- ern Europe, PhD thesis, Manchester Metro- tic Sea states and Finland. Bearing in mind that politan University. the infrastructure investment project of a gas pipe- Europautredningen [EEA Review Committee, ap- line connection to Poland failed on the grounds pointed on 7 January 2010], 2012, Utenfor og of lack of economic feasibility, an alternative is innenfor. Norges avtaler med EU [Outside and needed. With the completion of the construction Inside. Norway’s agreements with the European of the LNG terminal in Poland, Finland, and one Union], utenriksdepartementet.no, Offi cial Nor- of the Baltic States (to be selected by the European wegian Reports, Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, Commission), the export of LNG from Norway Oslo. will become technically possible. Whether or not Gassco website, 2012, Gass delivery 2011, at: http:// it happens will depend on the economic feasibil- www.gassco.no/wps/wcm/connect/gassco-en/ ity of investments, political interest and, last but gassco/home/var-virksomhet/mottakstermi- not least, the relationships between Norway and naler/gas-delivery/gas-delivery [accessed on regional gas exporters. With all likelihood, while 20.05.2012]. taking such decisions, the country will, once Government of Norway, 2003, Proposisjoner til again, remain pragmatic, calculating the costs and Stortinget om samtykke til ratifi kasjon av avtale benefi ts of its BSR engagement carefully. om Den tsjekkiske republikks, Republikken Estlands, Republikken Kypros’, Republikken Latvias, Republikken Litauens, Republikken Bibliography Ungarns, Republikken Maltas, Republikken Polens, Republikken Slovenias og Den slovakiske 2nd Meeting of the CBSS Energy Ministers, 1999, republikks deltakelse i Det europeiske økonomiske Helsinki conference in 1999, cbss.org, 24- samarbeidsområde (EØS) med tilliggende avtaler, 25.10.1999, Helsinki, Finland. regjeringen.no, Draft resolution to the Parliament 3rd CBSS Ministerial Conference on Trade and nr. 3 (2003–2004), Government of Norway, Economy, 2000, Action Plan, cbss.org, Ministe- Oslo. rial Conference on trade and economic co-op- Government of Norway 2004, Norway and the eration in the Baltic Sea region, 7-8. 02.2000, Baltic Sea Region Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Bergen, Norway. Lithuania, europaportalen.no, Policy Memoran- 9th Ministerial Session of the CBSS, 2000, Bergen dum, Government of Norway, Oslo. Communiqué, cbss.org, 21-22.06.2000, Bergen, Hodges, B 1998, Nordic contacts 1991-1998, Master Norway. thesis, University of Washington. 15th CBSS Ministerial Session, 2009, Declaration, Innovasjon Norge website, 2012, http://www.inno- cbss.org, 4.06.2009, Elsinore, Denmark. vasjonnorge.no/ [accessed on 15.04.2012].

42 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 International Energy Agency, 2011, Energy Policies Oldberg, E 2011, Snabbtåg Oslo-Trelleborg-Berlin, of IEA Countries Norway. 2011 Review, OECD/ 19.12.2011, at: http://www.dn.se/ekonomi/ IEA, France. snabbtag-oslo--trelleborg--berlin [accessed on Lahnstein, E 2010, Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Re- 27.05.2012]. gion from the CBSS perspective, cbss.org, speech, Statistics Norway, 2012, Immigration and im- Government of Norway, Mariehamn. migrants, at: http://www.ssb.no/english/sub- International Maritime Organisation 2005, jects/00/00/10/innvandring_en/ [accessed on International Convention for the Prevention of 15.04.2012]. Pollution from Ships, MARPOL 73/78, imo.org, Statistics Norway, 2012a, Utenrikshandel, at: Annex VI, International Maritime Organisa- http://www.ssb.no/emner/09/05/ [accessed on tion. 15.04.2012]. Nordic Council of Ministers, 2008, Guidelines for Statoil website, 2012, Det norske oljeeventyret, at: the Nordic Council of Ministers’ cooperation with http://goodideas.statoil.com/eventyret [accessed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania for 2009-2013, on 15.05.2012]. http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of- Stoere, JG 2006, Norway’s Role in the Development ministers/ministers-for-co-operation-mr-sam/ of the Baltic Sea Region, Baltic Rim Economies, estonia-latvia-and-lithuania/documents/ expert article 58, no. 5, pp. 6. guidelines-for-the-nordic-council-of-ministers- Stoere, JG 2011, Th e Government’s White Paper co-operation-with-estonia-latvia-and-lithua- on the High North, regjeringen.no, speech, nia-2009-2013 [accessed on 15.04.2012]. 21.11.2011, Oslo. Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010, Cleaner Nordic Stoere, JG 2012, Foreign policy address to the Stort- Seas, http://www.norden.org/en/publications/ ing, regjeringen.no, speech, 14.02.2012, Oslo. publikationer/2010-731, Copenhagen, [accessed Stoere, JG 2012a, Redegjørelse av utenriksministeren on 5.04.2012]. om viktige EU- og EØS-saker, regjeringen.no, Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010a, Guidelines speech to Parliament, 8.05.2012, Oslo. 2009-2013 for the Nordic Council of Ministers’ Stoere, JG 2012b, Norway and Germany – a close cooperation with North-West Russia, partnership in a time of European crisis, regjer- http://www.norden.ru/userfi les/File/Publica- ingen.no, speech at Handelskammer, 6.02.2012, tions/Guidelines%20NWR%202009-2013- Hamburg. EN.pdf, [accessed on 10.05.2012] Stoltenberg, T 2009, Nordic cooperation on foreign Nordic Council of Ministers, 2011, Th e welfare and security issues. Proposals presented to the state in a Nordic perspective. Programme for extraordinary meeting of Nordic Foreign Minis- the Norwegian Presidency of the Nordic Coun- ters in Oslo on 9 February 2009, Oslo, at: http:// cil of Ministers 2012, Copenhagen, at: http:// www.mfa.is/media/Frettatilkynning/Nordic_ www.norden.org/en/publications/publikation- report.pdf [accessed on 15.04.2012]. er/2011-726 [accessed on 13.05.2012]. Th orning-Schmidt, H 2011, Welcome to the Danish Norges sjoematraad website, 2012, http://www. EU Presidency, 15.12.2011, at: http://eu2012.dk seafood.no/ [accessed on 15.04.2012]. [accessed on 15.05.2012]. Northern Dimension, 2012, Northern Dimen- sion Partnership for Environment Support Fund 2012, at: http://www.ndep.org/part- ners.asp?type=nh&pageid=2 [accessed on 15.04.2012].

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 43 The Odd One Out? Iceland’s Foreign Policy Commitment to the Baltic Sea Region

preoccupied with Arctic politics in the future. Yet, it remains striking that a small state such as Ice- land, for which prioritisation is a prerequisite in its foreign policy, has focused on the BSR at all. At times, it tends to be overlooked that Iceland’s role in BSR politics is everything but obvious, as Ice- Christian Rebhan land is a small state with only 320,000 inhabitants and a distance of 2,000 km from its capital to the outermost border of the BSR. What explains Abstract and Introduction Iceland’s foreign policy commitment to the BSR?

Iceland dedicates a considerable part of its foreign policy activity to the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). Historical legacies It was the driving force behind the recognition of the independence of the three Baltic States, For Halldór Ásgrímsson (2012), Secretary General Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, at the beginning of the Nordic Council of Ministers and former of the 1990s. It actively campaigned for a speedy Prime Minister (2004-6) and Foreign Minister integration of Poland and the Baltic States into (1995-2004) of Iceland, history is the key to the institutional framework of the West in the understanding Iceland’s interest in the BSR. He 1990s and 2000s. Iceland also joined regional claims that one should not underestimate the fact organisations such as the Council of the Baltic Sea that “most Icelanders love their history and conse- States (CBSS). Not least because of these commit- quently have read the descriptions of the Vikings ments, Iceland is conventionally considered to be who travelled along these paths in the early Mid- a member of the BSR itself and an integral part dle Ages”. Iceland also became part of the Kalmar of its political, economic and cultural dynamics Union, and Icelandic villages became part of the (Bengtsson 2011: 11). Of course, co-operation Hanseatic League. In 1918, Iceland’s history and with the states of the BSR is not Iceland’s top the history of the BSR intertwined once again, foreign policy priority. Iceland’s governments have as it was the year in which Iceland regained its traditionally focused on Iceland’s relationship sovereignty from Denmark, while Estonia, Latvia with the United States, the other Nordic states and Lithuania declared their independence from and the European Union (EU). Due to its tradi- the emerging Soviet Union. Even if there is no tional dependence on fi sheries, Iceland also has direct link between these two events, there is no a lot more in common with its more immediate doubt that this common history created some sort neighbours in the North Atlantic than with the of belongingness, a feeling of shared fate between coastal states of the Baltic Sea. Moreover, its geo- Iceland and the Baltic States, which laid the basis graphical location will make Iceland increasingly for the special relationship to be established later.

44 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Ásgrímsson (2012) believes that the fact that Iceland’s far-reaching support for Baltic Iceland and the three Baltic States gained their independence occurred at the same time as independence in the same year has lived for a long Iceland was renegotiating an important bilat- time in the minds of the Icelandic people, so that eral trade agreement with the Soviet Union (cf. Icelanders always had a lot of sympathy for the Jóhannesson 1997: 101-116). Th e Soviet Union fate of these nations throughout the 20th century. also threatened to cancel diplomatic relations Iceland never recognised their occupation through with Iceland. Moreover, Iceland faced the risk the Soviet Union and formally upheld its recogni- of potential alienation from the other Western tion of the independence of the Baltic States from states. In early 1991, the Icelandic Prime Min- January 1922 de jure, although de facto Iceland ister Davíð Oddsson even received an informal accepted Soviet occupation (Jóhannesson 1997: warning from the United States and other Nor- 9-15). Nevertheless, when the tides were turning dic states not to proceed any further (Ibid.: 112). in Europe in the late 1980s, Iceland became the Of course, Iceland profi ted from the “unique most ardent advocate for Baltic independence. freedom of small nations” and was less bound by realpolitik as other Western states, which felt that they had their hands tied (Ibid.: 135-137). Support for Baltic independence Lennart Meri, then Estonian Foreign Minister, 1990-91 maintained that its distance from Russia meant that Iceland simply did not have to fear Russia When Lithuania declared its independence on 11 as much as other states (Th omson 1992: 222) March 1990, the vivid memory that Iceland’s po- and a US delegate mentioned to Foreign Minis- litical leaders still had of their own protracted and ter Hannibalsson how truly a privilege it would diffi cult struggle for independence made them be “to represent a small country and be able to particularly sensitive to the increasing Lithuanian speak one’s mind” (Alþýðublaðið 1995). Yet, it requests for international recognition (Ólafsdóttir was also not clear that Iceland would use this 2012). Broad political consensus soon emerged “unique freedom of small nations” to further the among all political parties to assist Lithuania and case of the Baltic States. the other Baltic States as much as possible. From Consequently, Iceland’s role is not forgotten the summer of 1990 onward, Iceland’s then-For- in the Baltic States, but remembered with respect eign Minister Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson emerged and admiration. Emanuelis Zingeris, Chairman of as the main spokesperson for the unequivocal the Foreign Aff airs Committee of the Lithuanian right of the Baltic States to independence in Parliament at the time, revered Hannibalsson’s various international forums (Jóhannesson 1997: courage and support (Jóhannesson 1997: 68f.). 41-43). In October 1990, Lithuania’s Head of Th e city of Vilnius showed its gratitude to Iceland State, Vytautas Landsbergis, visited Iceland and by renaming a street in the city centre “Iceland called on the Icelandic politicians to reconfi rm Street” (Islandijos gatvė) in February 1991. Even their recognition of Lithuanian independence and today, Iceland’s role during the independence to re-establish diplomatic relations. Despite Soviet struggle of the Baltic States from 1990-91 is threats, the Icelandic parliament subsequently fervently remembered. In 2011, Iceland’s For- reconfi rmed its recognition of Lithuanian inde- eign Minister Össur Skarphéðinsson met with pendence of 1922 on 11 February 1991. After the the foreign ministers of the three Baltic States to Soviet coup d’état attempt, which started on 19 celebrate the 20th anniversary of Baltic independ- August and provoked the declarations of indepen- ence (Icelandic MFA 2012: 18). Estonia organised dence of Estonia on 20 August and of Latvia on an “Iceland Day” on 22 August 2011 in order to 21 August, Iceland also reconfi rmed its recogni- show its “gratitude to the Republic of Iceland for tion of the independence of the two other Baltic its bravery in being the fi rst country to recognise States. On 26 August 1991, Iceland became the Estonia re-gaining its independence in 1991” fi rst state in the world to re-establish diplomatic (City of Tallinn 2011). On the same day, the city relations with all three Baltic States. In only a of Riga inaugurated a memorial stone on a public couple of days, many Western states followed suit. place to be named “Iceland Square”, commemo-

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 45 rating Iceland’s role in its struggle for independ- March 1992, when Iceland was denied member- ence (Icelandic MFA 2011). ship in the CBSS for geographical reasons. While Iceland’s membership was strongly supported by Norway, the other doubtful case, the two initia- Political interests in co-operation with tors of the Council, Danish Foreign Minister Uff e the countries of the BSR Ellemann-Jensen and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, looked at the planned Iceland’s leading role in the Baltic struggle for co-operation predominantly in geographi- independence laid the ground for its later in- cal terms. On the one hand, Ellemann-Jensen volvement in the politics of the Baltic Sea region. explained that this view was not directed against Owing to its desire to avoid isolation and to foster Iceland, but arose from the necessity of draw- continued Nordic co-operation, it was only logical ing a geographical line, considering that Belarus, for Iceland to increase its activities in the BSR Czechoslovakia and Ukraine had announced their as part of a necessary readjustment of its foreign interest in membership as well (Morgunblaðið policy. By 1992, it had become clear that Iceland’s 1992a). On the other hand, the Icelandic govern- main foreign policy pillars would face signifi cant ment argued that a lot of other matters were more changes in the years ahead. On the one hand, important than geography, for example, historical Iceland lost its strategic relevance as part of the connections and the future of the Nordic Council, NATO defence alliance with the end of the Cold of which Iceland would become the only country War (Ingimundarson 2008). Th e United States not represented in the CBSS. Foreign Minister were increasingly less interested in shouldering the Hannibalsson painted a gloomy picture of Ice- responsibility and fi nancial burden of Iceland’s land’s future: defence. Although the future structure of bilat- One quickly becomes aware that […] the Nor- eral co-operation between Iceland and the US dic countries fi rst and foremost will be busy was uncertain, Iceland’s political elite always had dealing with their agreements with the Eu- a ”subconscious feeling” that bilateral relations ropean Union, their subsequent co-operation would eventually weaken and Iceland would be as a sub-region within the European Union forced to reorient its foreign and security policy and with the regional co-operation around the (Ásgrímsson 2012). Th is happened in gradual Baltic Sea. Th is could mean that the Nordic steps up until autumn 2006, when the last Ameri- Council and Nordic co-operation as we have can soldiers left Iceland. On the other hand, the known it has come to its end, that it is re- end of the Cold War and the emergence of the placed by the Council of the Baltic Sea States Central and Eastern European states as new co- and EU membership […] so that the paths of operation partners in the international commu- the Nordic countries and Iceland diverge and nity moved the focal point in Europe towards the Iceland becomes isolated from [Nordic] co- East – further away from Iceland. Enlargement operation (Morgunblaðið 1992b). of the European Union (EU) posed yet another challenge for Iceland as it increased the danger Th us, it was a huge boost for Iceland when its of isolation from its Nordic neighbours who – in continued lobbying eff orts for membership of the contrast to Iceland – had applied for EU member- CBSS were rewarded by the Polish presidency in ship in 1992. 1995. Judging from its desire to avoid isolation Nowhere did this fear of isolation become and to foster continued Nordic co-operation, it clearer than in the initial rejection of Icelandic was not a surprise either that Iceland also showed membership in the Council of the Baltic Sea a keen interest in membership in other regional States (CBSS). From the perspective of the Baltic organisations in Northern Europe. In 1993, it independence struggle, it would have seemed became a founding member of the Barents Euro- strange had Iceland not been included in the Arctic Council, and in 1996, of the Arctic Coun- regional organisations that mushroomed after the cil. Iceland also continued its role as a spokesper- end of the Cold War and formalised co-operation son for the integration of Poland and the Baltic in the BSR. Yet, exactly this is what happened in States into the western institutional framework

46 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 throughout the 1990s and 2000s. It was an active growth. At the beginning of the 2000s, the great proponent of NATO’s open door policy and cam- extent to which the economies of Iceland and of paigned for the early accession of Poland and the the countries of the BSR had become intertwined Baltic States into NATO (Ásgrímsson 2012). became obvious (cf. Gísladóttir 2007). Trade in manufactured goods between Iceland and the three Baltic States and Poland had increased by Economic interests in co-operation with almost 350% between 2001 and 2007, amount- the countries of the BSR ing to about 270 million Euros in 2006. During the 2000s, both Iceland and the Baltic States were Th e end of the Cold War did not only lead to among the world’s top economic performers, with political changes, but also opened up new mar- economic growth rates of 6-7% per year. kets for Icelandic exporters, not only in the BSR. Th is is why, in 2007, then-Foreign Minister Many Icelandic companies took an active interest Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir (2007) praised the in investing in the Baltic Sea region and con- economic relationship between Iceland and the tributed to a dramatic increase in trade between countries of the BSR. Th e presence of Icelandic Iceland and the countries of the BSR (Gísladóttir companies in the BSR had grown “both in terms 2007). In the early 1990s, economic reasons were of volume and value, expanding into diverse and therefore part of the Icelandic government’s moti- non-traditional sectors that would have been un- vation to lobby intensively for CBSS membership. imaginable just a decade ago”. All kinds of Icelan- By acceding to the CBSS, the Icelandic Ministry dic companies were active in the BSR, in particu- for Foreign Aff airs (MFA) wanted to follow up lar in the Baltic States. Byko, a construction and on these new possibilities for Icelandic export do-it-yourself store, and Hnit Baltic, an engineer- businesses (Ólafsdóttir 2012). Icelandic Foreign ing consulting fi rm, had already established pres- Ministers repeatedly emphasised the importance ences in the early years of Baltic independence. of the CBSS as an instrument for facilitating Later on, they were joined by the highly esteemed economic co-operation and enhancing sustainable Icelandic clothing and fashion house 66° North,

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 47 which manufactured its products in two facilities solidarity with the region“. Moreover, Gísladóttir in Latvia, by the Hampiðjan Group, one of the believed that Iceland and the Baltic States were largest fi shing gear and super ropes manufactur- natural partners, who shared “many of the same ers of the world, which moved all its production economic values and characteristics such as open of rope and netting to a new factory in Lithuania and vibrant markets, dynamic and well-educated in 2004, by Icelandair, which acquired a majority labour forces and the desire to meet proactively stake in the Latvian SmartLynx Airlines in 2006, the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Cen- and by the pharmaceutical company Lyfj a, which tury”. soon operated 45 pharmacies under the name Th e fi nancial crisis clearly dampened her Farma in Lithuania. Meanwhile, the transport optimistic outlook to some extent. Yet, even today, companies Eimskip and Samskip supplied a great more than one quarter of Icelandic goods are volume of Baltic goods to Iceland, Europe and exported to the countries of the BSR (cf. Statistics beyond. For Gísladóttir, this highly successful Iceland 2011). Th erefore, the BSR will remain economic co-operation would have been unthink- important for Iceland from an economic perspec- able without the aforementioned special relation- tive (see table 1). Despite the fi nancial crisis, the ship between Iceland and the Baltic States, which total number of Icelandic exports to the BSR has had proven Iceland’s “long-term commitment and continuously increased since 2007 (see table 2).

Table 1: Iceland’s exports to the BSR as percentage of its total exports 2007 2008 2009 2010 % +/- % % +/- % % +/- % % +/- % BSR (total) 24.5 -3.4 23.3 -1.2 24.3 +1.0 26.5 +1.8 Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 +0.1 0.2 +0.1 Germany 13.4 -1.6 11.3 -2.1 11.3 0.0 14.0 +2.7 Latvia 0.0 -0.1 0.1 +0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 Lithuania 0.9 -0.5 1.3 +0.4 1.1 -0.2 1.5 +0.4 Poland 0.6 -0.2 0.8 +0.2 1.1 +0.3 1.1 0.0 Russia 1.4 -0.5 1.3 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 2.1 +0.9 Nordic (total) 8.2 -0.5 8.5 +0.3 9.5 +1.0 7.6 -1.9 Denmark 3.3 -0.2 3.1 -0.2 2.7 -0.4 2.7 0.0 Finland 0.4 +0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 Norway 3.8 -0.2 4.4 +0.6 5.8 +1.4 4.2 -1.6 Sweden 0.7 -0.2 0.8 +0.1 0.8 0.0 0.5 -0.3

Table 2: Iceland’s exports to the BSR in absolute numbers

2007 2008 2009 2010 Mio. ISK +/- % Mio. ISK +/- % Mio. ISK +/- % Mio. ISK +/- % BSR (total) 74733.9 +10.5 108698.4 +45.4 121701.5 +12.0 148394.8 +21.9 Estonia 51.7 -53,7 163.6 +216.4 324.2 +98.2 1020.0 +214.6 Germany 40815.0 +12.3 52777.4 +29.3 56403.2 +6.9 78320.7 +38.6 Latvia 68.3 -70.0 155.4 +127.5 131.0 -15.7 191.4 +46.1 Lithuania 2763.9 -16.2 5956.7 +115.5 5733.1 -3.8 8352.6 +45.7 Poland 1909.4 +-0.0 3545.2 +85.7 5321.2 +50.1 6306.7 +18.5 Russia 4185.6 -10.1 6201.2 +48.2 6093.0 -1.7 11593.3 +90.3 Nordic (total) 24940.0 +18.1 39898.9 +60.0 47695.8 +20.0 42610.1 -10.7 Denmark 10080.3 +18.6 14642.5 +45.3 13512.3 -7.7 14.869.0 +10.0 Finland 10 8 0.3 + 37.3 9 98.9 -7.5 1116.0 +11.7 1172.7 + 5.1 Norway 11565.0 +20.1 20344.8 +75.9 29066.7 +42.9 23787.4 -18.2 Sweden 2214.4 +0.1 3912.7 +76.7 4000.8 +2.3 2781.0 -30.5

48 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Moreover, the most recent export statistics show Area (EEA) (Icelandic MFA 2002). Due to its that an increase in Icelandic exports to Estonia, advanced economic modernisation and growth Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Russia rates (if compared with the Russian mainland) even compensated for a signifi cant decrease in ex- and its exemptions from tax and custom tariff s, ports to the other Nordic states in 2010. Germany the region was particularly attractive for Icelandic in particular has regained signifi cance as Iceland’s exporters. In 2002, then-Foreign Minister Ás- 2nd largest export country, coming in behind the grímsson called on Icelandic enterprises to look Netherlands, largely due to increased exports of into trade and investment possibilities in Kalin- Icelandic aluminium. In 2008, the aluminium ingrad. Iceland subsequently also showed a keen sector for the fi rst time replaced fi sheries as Ice- interest in the programme for modernisation and land’s leading economic sector. In 2010, it already economic development of the South Eastern Bal- accounted for 76.5% of all exports to Germany. tic Area (SEBA), which is currently implemented by the CBSS (Ólafsdóttir 2012). Chairing the CBSS in 2005-2006 (for the Iceland’s policy objectives in the CBSS only time so far), the Icelandic MFA (2005a) also stressed the protection of the maritime environ- Within the CBSS Iceland has put great emphasis ment in the Baltic Sea. As a country dependent on regional co-operation in Northern Europe as on fi sheries, Iceland was particularly aware of the a whole, linking the work in the CBSS with the tremendous importance of the state of the ocean work of the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), in a global sense. Th en-Finance Minister Geir the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the H. Haarde asserted that Iceland would therefore Arctic Council (AC) and EU policies such as take any potential threat to the living resources the EU’s Northern Dimension (ND) and the of the sea very seriously (Icelandic MFA 2005b). EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea region (EUSBSR) He stressed that the protection of the Baltic Sea (Icelandic MFA 2005a). Th us, Iceland actively would be an even more diffi cult endeavour as – in promoted the implementation of the new guide- contrast to the North Atlantic – it is an enclosed lines for the NCM’s co-operation with Estonia, sea with a lot of sea traffi c. Th e main objective Latvia, and Lithuania 2013 during its NCM should be to reduce pollution and to prevent oil Presidency in 2009 (Nordic Council of Ministers spills in the face of increasing oil transportation in 2008). It also emphasised co-operation in the the region. border regions of the BSR in order to explore new Other priorities of the Icelandic Presidency opportunities for cross-border co-operation and to included the promotion of renewable energy avoid political, economic and social disparities at sources and the sustainable use of energy in the the new external borders of the EU after the 2004 region. Th e Icelandic Presidency believed that enlargement (Icelandic MFA 2004). Th e Icelan- it could share Iceland’s valuable knowledge and dic MFA (2007) believed that the CBSS would experience in this area with other CBSS member have the greatest value if it constituted a forum, states. Moreover, the Icelandic MFA (2005a) also which facilitated co-operation between the various emphasised co-operation on nuclear and radia- stakeholders in the area, governmental agencies, tion safety and the consolidation of the Baltic Sea local governments, business institutions, academic Parliamentary Conference, the focus on the latter institutions and NGOs, in order to exchange arising due to Iceland’s strong tradition of parlia- views, best practices, know-how and insights. mentary democracy. Iceland focused particularly on the inclusion Among the current activities of the CBSS that of North West Russia and the Kaliningrad region Iceland supports fi nancially and organisationally in the process of further economic integration. It are the Task Force against Traffi cking in Hu- considered the Kaliningrad region to be a central man Beings, the Expert Group on Sustainable and important part of the BSR, not least because Development, Baltic 21, and the Expert Group it remained one of the few sub-regions in the for Co-operation on Children at Risk (Ólafsdót- BSR outside of the internal market established tir 2012). In this respect, Iceland’s commitment by the Agreement on the European Economic to combat traffi cking in human beings, especially

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 49 in women and children, deserves special mention. 2012). Th e Nordic-Baltic Eight’s (NB8) Memo- Th en-Foreign Minister Gísladóttir emphasised in randum of Understanding on the placement of 2007 that this was the fi eld in which the CBSS diplomats in embassies of other Nordic or Baltic could accomplish “the most in improving the lives States provided another boost for Iceland. Th e of those living in the Baltic Sea Region” (Icelandic agreement will make it possible for one NB8 state MFA 2007). Gísladóttir stressed that the fi ght to place its diplomats in the embassy of another against traffi cking in human beings should not NB8 state when it does not have its own embassy only result in better policing, but also address the in that particular country (Icelandic MFA 2012: economic and social roots of the problem: gender 110). Co-operation with the countries of the BSR inequality and poverty. has thus provided to be an excellent opportunity for Iceland, which only had embassies and perma- nent missions in 19 diff erent countries in 2012, Long-term benefi ts of Iceland’s to maintain a diplomatic presence worldwide on commitment to the BSR fl exible and cost-eff ective terms. Moreover, due to its outspoken support for an Icelandic politicians have always been aware that early integration of the Baltic States and Poland their co-operation within the CBSS might have into the western institutional framework, Iceland benefi cial eff ects for Iceland’s long-term interests. has also won valuable allies in the EU. In 1998, As a small state, Iceland lacked the fi nancial and a leader in Iceland’s largest newspaper, Morgun- administrative means to build up a strong bilateral blaðið (1998), praised Iceland’s eff orts in defend- presence in the Baltic Sea region on its own, by, ing the interests of the Baltic States, but also for example, establishing embassies in each of the pointed out that it might be the other way around countries of the region. However, Iceland was able soon: to rely on the institutional framework of regional It might not be too long until Iceland will institutions such as the NCM or the CBSS in look to the Baltic States itself for support in order to assist it in its bilateral eff orts (Ásgrímsson international cooperation. All three Baltic

50 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 States are prospective candidate states of the cession negotiations by the Estonian government, EU […] and Iceland is in very close relations in particular with regard to agriculture, regional with the European Union because of its mem- policy and monetary aff airs (Morgunblaðið 2011). bership in the European Economic Area and Moreover, Estonia has invited Iceland to par- will greatly need to have its interests represent- ticipate in joint actions against computer crime ed among the member states of the Union. within the framework of NATO’s cyber-defence centre situated in Tallinn. Th e article also quoted Halldór Ásgrímsson, then According to Skarphéðinsson (2011), the Iceland’s Foreign Minister, who believed that it Baltic States also proved to be valuable allies of was therefore of utmost importance for Iceland Iceland in the on-going Icesave dispute. Lithuania to continue to cultivate its relationship with the supported Iceland’s cause within the Interna- Baltic States. Ásgrímsson argued that they would tional Monetary Fund (IMF) when the dispute soon be included in the decision-making process threatened to halt continued IMF assistance to concerning the possibilities for Iceland to partici- Iceland. Its moral support was valued even higher pate in future EU projects. It would be certain by the Icelandic authorities, as many politicians in that they would become good allies of Iceland Iceland felt betrayed in the dispute by its closest within the EU and in other international organi- allies in the Nordic states (Morgunblaðið 2009b). sations. When asked about this statement today, Poland also made the EU’s accession negotiations Ásgrímsson (2012) is convinced that Iceland’s with Iceland one of its top priorities during its EU close involvement in co-operation around the Presidency in the second half of 2011. Th e Polish Baltic Sea has strengthened its position vis-à-vis government declared that it wanted to accelerate the EU. He maintains that its Nordic and Baltic Iceland’s accession negotiations and that it wanted partners in the EU have succeeded in involving not only to open more, but also more controversial Iceland in a number of EU projects, for example chapters than the EU had been willing to so far, as an equal partner in the new Northern Dimen- mentioning fi sheries and agriculture in particu- sion since 2007. Close co-operation with its Baltic lar (Vísir 2011). However, due to the increasing partners has thus become a loophole for Iceland to escalation of the mackerel dispute between the EU participate in EU projects without having to join and Norway on the one hand, and Iceland and the EU fi rst. the Faroe Islands on the other, such acceleration Its Baltic partners have also supported Iceland of the accession negotiations did not ultimately in important foreign policy matters. Only one take place. week after Iceland applied for EU membership on 16 July 2009, the Lithuanian parliament declared its support for Iceland’s application, “remember- Conclusion and outlook ing and highly appreciating the support off ered by the Republic of Iceland to the Lithuanian nation Historical legacies, political circumstances as and the State of Lithuania when the Republic of well as concrete economic interests all explain Iceland was the fi rst to recognise the re-estab- in part why Iceland has dedicated a considerable lished independence of Lithuania” (Seimas 2009). part of its foreign policy activity to the Baltic Th e Parliament also declared that Lithuania was Sea region (BSR). Its feeling that its fortunes are prepared to share its own experiences from EU ac- intertwined with those of the Baltic States created cession negotiations with Iceland. Lithuania’s then sincere sympathy in Iceland for the Baltic strug- Foreign Minister Vygaudas Usackas even travelled gle for independence and made Iceland the most to Iceland on 25 July 2009 where he stated that ardent advocate for their independence. However, Iceland had been the fi rst state to recognise the in- Iceland’s later involvement in the BSR was also dependence of Lithuania so that Lithuania would motivated by the political desire to avoid isola- now want to be the fi rst state to declare its support tion and to foster continued Nordic co-operation for Icelandic EU membership (Morgunblaðið after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Icelan- 2009a). In 2011, Foreign Minister Skarphéðinsson dic companies invested heavily in the BSR and was also off ered expert assistance in the EU ac- made it an important export market for Icelandic

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 51 products. Iceland’s commitment proved very ben- rikisraduneyti.is/radherra/raedur-og-greinar-isg/ efi cial in the long run. Its membership in regional nr/1743. organisations in the BSR strengthened Iceland’s —— (2004) Opening address by Valgerður Sver- diplomatic presence and countries of the BSR also risdóttir, Chairman of the Nordic Council of supported Iceland in important foreign policy Ministers and Icelandic Minister of Industry matters such as EU membership and the Icesave and Commerce and Nordic Co-operation on a dispute. Iceland’s foreign policy commitment to conference on regional co-operation and European the BSR might therefore not be self-evident from integration in Prague, 23 November 2004, at an overly literal reading of the map, but hardly http://formennska.forsaetisraduneyti.is/Frettir/ surprising in light of recent history. Raedur/nr/1621.html. Membership of the EU would bind Iceland —— (2005a) Priorities of the Icelandic Presidency even closer to its partners in the BSR. Iceland in the Council of the Baltic Sea States, at http:// would be included in the EUSBSR and be able to eystrasaltsradid.utanrikisraduneyti.is/Priorities/ take part in its decision-making and implementa- index.html. tion processes. However, recent polls indicate that —— (2005b) Address by Mr. Geir H. Haarde, the prospects for membership are quite uncertain. Minister of Finance of Iceland, at the 14th Baltic Only 27% of the Icelandic people supported EU Sea Parliamentary Conference in Vilnius, 29 membership in April 2012, while 54% rejected it August 2005, at http://eystrasaltsradid.utanriki- and 18% did not take a position (Morgunblaðið sraduneyti.is/Speeches_Declarations/nr/2797. 2012). Th is must be considered an exceptionally html. negative result as negotiations on the most contro- —— (2007) Statement by Mrs. Ingibjörg Sólrún versial matters for Iceland, fi sheries and agricul- Gísladóttir, Minister for Foreign Aff airs, at the ture, have not even started. However, Iceland’s 14th Session of the Council of the Baltic Sea commitment to the BSR guarantees that Iceland States, in Malmö, Sweden on 12-13 June 2007, will not be left alone – irrespective of whether it at http://eng.utanrikisraduneyti.is/news-and- joins the EU or continues to remain outside. publications/nr/3720. —— (2011) Íslandstorg vígt í Riga, 22 August 2011, at http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/fret- Bibliography tir/nr/6401. —— (2012) Skýrsla Össurar Skarphéðinssonar utan- Alþýðublaðið [an Icelandic newspaper] (1995) ‘“Ég ríkisráðherra um utanríkis- og alþjóðamál, pre- á enn ólokið ýmsum erindum í pólitík”’, 17-19 sented in the Icelandic Parliament on the 140th March 1995. Legislative Session 2011–2012, April 2012. Ásgrímsson, H. (2012), Secretary General of the Ingimundarson, V. (2008) ‘“Öryggissamfélag” Nordic Council of Ministers [Interview], Co- Íslands og Bandaríkjanna, 1991-2006: frá penhagen, 29 February 2012. óvissu til upplausnar’, in Ingimundarson, V. Bengtsson, R. (2011) ‘Th e Baltic Sea Region in (ed.) Uppbrot hugmyndakerfi s: endurmótun íslen- 2011’, in Henningsen, B. and Etzold, T. (eds.) skrar utanríkisstefnu 1991-2007 (Reykjavík, Hið Political State of the Region Report (Copenha- íslenska bókmenntafélag), pp. 1-66. gen, Baltic Development Forum), pp. 11-14. Jóhannesson, G. Th . (1997a) Stuðningur Íslands City of Tallinn, Iceland Day, 21 August 2011, at við sjálfstæðisbaráttu Eystrasaltsríkjanna 1990- http://www.20.ee/iceland-day. 1991, MA Th esis (Reykjavík, Heimspekideild Gísladóttir, I. S. (2007) ‘Iceland and her companies Háskóla Íslands). in the Baltic Sea region’, Baltic Rim Economies, Morgunblaðið [an Icelandic newspaper] (1992a) 5, Expert Article 132, 31 October 2007, pp. ‘Undirbúningsfundur að stofnun Eystras- 10f. altsráðsins: Landfræðilegar ástæður útiloka’, 7 Icelandic MFA [Ministry for Foreign Aff airs] March 1992. (2002) Utanríkisráðherrafundur Eystrasaltsráð- —— (1992b) ‘Svæðissamtök við Eystrasalt í sins í Kalingrad í Rússlandi, at http://www.utan- burðarliðnum: Gæti þýtt að leiðir Íslands og annarra Norðurlanda skildi’, 29 February 1992.

52 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 —— (1998) ‘Bandamenn við Eystrasalt’, 10 June Seimas [the Lithuanian Parliament] (2009) Resolu- 1998. tion on Membership of the Republic of Iceland in —— (2009a) ‘Litháar styðja ESB-aðildarumsókn the European Union, Vilnius, 23 July 2009. Íslendinga’, 22 July 2009. Skarphéðinsson, Ö. (2011) ‘Litháen og viðurken- —— (2009b) ‘Ísland stóð eitt í hvirfi lbylnum’, 27 ning Íslands’, in Morgunblaðið, 19 February October 2009. 2011. —— (2011) ‘Eistar styðja umsókn Íslands’, 19 Statistics Iceland (2011) ‘Vöruviðskipti við útlönd August 2011. 2010’, in Hagtíðindi: Statistical Series, 1, 2011, —— (2012) ‘Mikill meirihluti vill ekki í ESB’, 27 15 April 2011, at https://hagstofa.is/lisalib/get- April 2012. fi le.aspx?ItemID=12358. Nordic Council of Ministers (2008) Nordic Road Th omson, C. (1992) Th e Singing Revolution. A Map: Programme for the Icelandic Presidency of Political Journey Th rough the Baltic States (Lon- the Nordic Council of Ministers 2009 (Copen- don, Joseph). hagen, Nordic Council), at http://formenns- Vísir [an Icelandic news portal] (2011) ‘Pólverjar ka2009.forsaetisraduneyti.is/media/Formenns- lýsa yfi r stuðningi við að viðræðum við Ísland ka2009/Enska.pdf. verði hraðað’, 12 July 2011. Ólafsdóttir, S. (2012), Director, Department of Nordic Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Af- fairs of the Republic of Iceland [Email Inter- view], 28 February 2012.

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 53 Creating a Coherent Framework for Baltic Sea Co-operation

1. Baltic Sea Co-operation (BSC) and the challenge of coherence

Baltic Sea Co-operation (BSC) has grown tremen- dously over the past few decades, in particular in the aftermath of the Cold War. Today, it spans Tobias Etzold & Stefan Gänzle multiple policy sectors, involves a wide range of private and public actors from the European, Executive summary national, sub-national and local levels, encompass- ing both state and non-state actors. Some political observers have called BSC an ‘institutional night- ‘Coherence’ is a term often used rather mare’, whereas others have labelled it a ‘positive ambiguously. As it is procedural in character, mess’. Owing to institutional and policy overlap coherence not only refers to bringing about and co-ordination problems, all actors face the consistent results, but also to the ways other challenge of creating an eff ective and effi cient sys- actors are being integrated into policy- tem of BSC which can yield tangible, effi cient and making processes. This article explores sustainable results, as well as eff ectively deal with several of the main institutions and policy the problems and challenges that the region is frameworks in the context of Baltic Sea Co- facing . It was with this in mind that the German operation (BSC) – the Council of the Baltic Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States Sea States (CBSS), the Northern Dimension (CBSS) for the year 2011/12 proposed as one of (ND), the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea its priorities to foster “a coherent framework” Region (EUSBSR), and the Nordic Council (Foreign Ministry of Germany 2011: 3 and 9) for of Ministers (NCM) – and assesses the co-operation among the various forums in the potential for promoting coherence in a set Baltic Sea Region (BSR). of important policy areas, including energy, environmental and cultural co-operation. The fi ve ‘Cs’, or defi ning ‘coherence’ The article encourages the EU and its partner countries to draw regional actors closer Th e elusive quest for coherence is one of the to the decision-making process and to recurrent themes of political life – at both the utilise their potentials as platforms within a domestic and international levels. Moreover, it is coherent system of regional co-operation.1 one of the most frequently bemoaned shortcom-

1 This article has fi rst been written as a Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) ings in international co-operation. Th is holds Briefi ng Paper for the 2011/12 German Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States and has been presented at an informal meeting of Baltic Sea stakeholders discussing the issue of coherence during the Baltic Sea Days in Berlin on 24 April 2012. The paper Sea Region”, jointly conducted by the SWP and the German Federal Foreign Offi ce / has been produced inside the framework of the project “The Council of the Baltic Sea German Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States. The paper and article refl ects States and the creation of a coherent framework of regional co-operation in the Baltic solely the view of the authors.

54 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 particularly true today, in times of economic policies and actors (the CBSS assuming a ‘leader- crisis and scarce fi nancial resources triggered by ship’ role in BSC, to give yet another example). the European sovereign debt crisis. Yet, with the Th us, coherence is a twofold concept, embodying sole exception of totalitarian regimes, all forms of both concrete results and methods for achieving political pluralism are exposed to the challenge consistent results. Finally, the concept of coher- of coherence. In complex systems of international ence should not be reduced to its output, but co-operation, such as the one in the BSR, incoher- rather be conceived of as a process embracing both ence is almost the natural state of aff airs. Th e term the output and input dimensions of a political ‘coherence’, however, has remained rather vague process. With regards to the latter, coherence also and ambiguous, in particular as it tends to be refers to ways other actors and stakeholders are used interchangeably with other concepts, such as integrated into the policy-making process. ‘co-ordination’ or ‘consistency’. Moreover, it car- ries some emotional ‘baggage’ as, in principle, all policies and actions are envisioned as ideally being 2. The institutional framework for Baltic coherent. Perhaps it is best conceptualised as ac- Sea Co-operation (BSC) and actor tions and actors ‘being structurally harmonised’. coherence From that angle, coherence represents a high stage of structural harmonisation, based on ‘coordina- BSC is both institutionally and thematically tion, comprehensiveness, completeness, continuity dense. Th e institutional framework of the BSR and consistency’ (fi ve ‘C’s) in terms of policies and is complex and involves many diff erent lay- actors. For example, while ‘consistency’ refers to ers, formats, constellations and levels. Relevant the character of an outcome […], which may or regional co-operation structures in Northern may not be logically compatible with another, ‘co- Europe include the Council of the Baltic Sea herence’ goes beyond this and specifi es the quality States (CBSS), the Northern Dimension (ND) of a process, in which ideally the single entities of the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland, the EU involved join together in a synergetic procedural Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), whole (see Gebhard 2011: 106). In other words, Nordic Co-operation – Nordic Council (NC) and although co-ordination is an important pillar Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), Baltic Co- within the overall concept of coherence, coherence operation, Nordic-Baltic Co-operation (Nordic- itself is more than just co-ordination. In addition, Baltic 8/NB 8), informal co-operation among EU coherence has a more positive connotation than members in the region (Nordic Baltic 6/NB 6 co-ordination, which is sometimes understood and NB 6 plus Poland and Germany), the Arctic as something that ‘scares’ people, since everyone Council (AC) and the Barents-Euro Arctic Coun- wants co-ordination, but nobody wants to be ‘co- cil (BEAC). Several bodies operate on parliamen- ordinated’. tary, trans-governmental (sub-national or local elements cooperating internationally) and trans- national (non-state and non-governmental actors Coherence: Two types, two dimensions co-operating internationally) levels: for example, One can distinguish between two types (the- the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC), matic/policy versus actor) and two dimensions the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation (horizontal versus vertical) of coherence: fi rst, (BSSSC), the Union of Baltic Cities (UBC) and while thematic/policy coherence refers to struc- several Baltic Sea NGO networks. Several special- tural harmonisation of a policy, actor coherence ised organisations play roles as well, such as Baltic refers to the degree of unity within an actor or an Sea Region Energy Co-operation (BASREC) institution. Second, horizontal coherence refers to and the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) that coherence between diff erent international policies promotes co-operation concerning the protection and actors (and would, in practical terms, trans- of the maritime environment. late into a ‘coordinator’ role for CBSS in BSC, In this context, the focus of this article will be for example) whereas vertical coherence refers to on 1) the CBSS, 2) the ND and 3) the EUSBSR coherence between international and national as the main overarching structures of BSC as well

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 55 as 4) Nordic co-operation / the Nordic Council of has a potential to foster lateral coherence and Ministers as a structure that also has a potential cohesion. Th e CBSS plays a particularly im- for fostering co-operation in the BSR. portant role in integrating Russia in regional co-operation, and provides a relevant link be- tween Russia and the EU. In this respect, the South Eastern Baltic (SEBA) modernisation partnership and the Northwest Strategy of Russia, in which the CBSS is closely involved, also have an important function. Russia itself has called to ensure the independence of the CBSS vis-à-vis the EU (see Makarychev 2012: 9). Russia will assume the one-year CBSS Presidency on 1 July 2012. Th e country has taken an active approach towards BSC and, in its CBSS Presidency programme, strives for coherence and continuity with previous and 1) Since 1992, the Council of the Baltic Sea future CBSS presidencies (Lanko 2011). States (CBSS) provides a platform for politi- cal multilateral dialogue on common regional Th e CBSS has outstanding expertise in issue issues and for co-ordination among all the areas such as civil security (for example, chil- states of the region at the highest political dren at risk, traffi cking in human beings and levels. Its broad mandate has been re-empha- radiation and nuclear safety), maritime econo- sised by the reform process between 2007 my and sustainable development. Th erefore, it and 2010. Lithuania’s then Foreign Minis- has good credentials to establish and maintain ter, Usackas (Balticness Autumn 2009: 4), a leading position among Baltic Sea organi- claimed that “the political dimension of the sations and co-operation networks within CBSS should remain strong. Its broad mem- those issue areas and to contribute to related bership, comprising all Baltic Sea countries, projects within the ND and the EUSBSR. is the CBSS’s biggest advantage, providing it Issues that are not explicitly covered by the with a strong position in the region’s political EUSBSR, for instance, culture, Baltic Sea landscape” (ibid.). He further opined that “the identity2 and region branding, could also be CBSS is still able to create an environment for highlighted and utilised as further trademarks a better understanding among participating of the CBSS. Th e German CBSS Presidency countries and could provide a natural plat- of 2011/12 aims to make the CBSS strong form for EU relations with Iceland, Norway and fi t for the future, so that it will be able and Russia” (ibid.). Th e CBSS deals with to remain a “pioneer of regional co-operation concrete joint regional challenges, problems, and a symbol of the regional identity” (Hoyer opportunities and interests, with no more 2011: 4). emphasis on the high-political side than necessary. Such pragmatic functional regional 2) Th e Northern Dimension (ND), in turn, has co-operation could have a positive impact at a (much) wider geographical focus than the high political levels, where the co-operation BSR, as it also includes the Barents Sea and between EU member states and Russia is the Arctic. Th e ND was restructured in 2006, more diffi cult. Involving Russia and the EU and has functioned as the Northern Dimen-

(European Commission / European External 2 Whether a fully-fl edged Baltic Sea identity exists, shared by all its riparian countries, Action Service) as equal members and being seems to be a rather abstract and philosophical question. Perhaps identity could therefore be understood in a more pragmatic and fl exible manner. Challenges and involved in the ND and the EUSBSR, the problems that affect more than one country and require a joint solution create a certain notion of identity among states and people and so do the institutions that deal with CBSS could provide a platform for co-oper- those issues. A certain notion of a regional identity in terms of jointly recognising and ation at the intersection of EU internal and dealing with common problems, challenges and opportunities could contribute to coherent, effective and consistent co-operation. external policies. In this respect, the CBSS

56 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 sion of the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland legally binding. Th e launch of the strategy has since 2007, involving the three non-EU provided post-enlargement Baltic Sea co-oper- members on an equal footing (see Archer and ation with a fresh impetus and incentive. One Etzold 2008). Th e four regional councils – of the objectives of the strategy is to improve CBSS, Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), co-ordination of activities and, in a nutshell, Arctic Council (AC) and Barents-Euro Arctic coherence. Th e EUSBSR off ers an opportu- Council (BEAC) – act as ND partners (see nity for regional organisations and the EU Alto et al 2011; Herolf 2010). Four ND to enhance their co-operation and to create partnerships, the ND Environmental Partner- synergies. Th e European Commission ensures ship (NDEP), the ND Partnership for Public overall co-ordination of the strategy and facil- Health and Social Wellbeing (NDPHS), and itates the involvement of relevant stakeholders the fairly recently established ND Partner- (European Commission 2012: 6). Th us, the ships on Transport and Logistics (NDPTL) EUSBSR provides regional organisations with and Culture (NDCP) are the most visible the opportunity to embed their activities into activities within the ND. Several prospects for a wider strategic design and broader institu- employing the ND to create in regional coop- tional framework, while the EU might be able eration in the BSR and beyond can be identi- to benefi t from the regional experience and fi ed, for example in the areas of transport expertise that these bodies have accumulated and energy (see below). Th ere is a strong link over time. Co-operating more closely “would between the ND and the CBSS, underpinned be a way forward in shaping the political by a close partnership between the permanent space and would not threaten their identities” CBSS Secretariat and the Secretariat of the (Antola 2009: 11). Hence, the Council of the NDPHS, which are located within the same EU encouraged the member states to fur- premise. Th e relationship between the CBSS ther investigate the “synergy eff ects between and NDPHS provides a good example of divi- the EUSBSR and multilateral co-operation sion of labour, as the CBSS does not have its structures and networks within the Baltic Sea own working structure in the area of health. Region ... through better co-ordination and Overall, the NDPHS is also a good example eff ective use of communication channels and of a structure that involves various actors fora related to EUSBSR and Baltic Sea Region and attempts to create coherence in a specifi c to provide increased effi ciency of intervention policy area. Co-operation between other ND within macro region” (Council of the Euro- partnerships and the CBSS, for example in pean Union 2011: 5). the cultural fi eld, however, could still be im- proved. Two years into the implementation of the strategy, it is probably too early to judge 3) In recent years, however, the launch of the whether the ambitious goals of increasing macro-regional EU Strategy for the Baltic co-operation and creating synergies have been Sea Region (EUSBSR) (see Schymik 2011) achieved, but there are some promising signs. has probably been the most signifi cant change Currently, regional actors such as HELCOM in BSC. Th e EUSBSR focuses on environ- are in the process of becoming important mental sustainability, economic development, partners and co-ordinators for implementation accessibility, and safety, and has identifi ed 15 of parts of the strategy. Th e CBSS is in a good priority areas along those lines. Th e strategy position of providing a co-operation platform can be seen as an expression of the fact that between the strategy and third countries. As EU membership has shifted from a mar- the latest EUSBSR implementation report ginal to a dominant paradigm in the region of the European Commission indicated, since the 1990s, providing the opportunity “the strategy is fostering the development of to conduct regional co-operation, at least new inclusive networks, as well as increased partially, within an EU context, rendering cooperation and a better division of labour for the co-operation more result-oriented and existing networks”, and, “provides a common

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 57 reference point for the many organisations and complementary institutional landscape that, in the Baltic Sea Region” (European Com- however, is not overly coherent in terms of stream- mission 2011: 3). ‘Reference point’ is indeed lining and co-ordinating eff orts of various actors a more appropriate term for describing the might do the trick better than an overly coher- strategy than ‘framework’, as the latter might ent and rational one, as some issue areas are so be understood too narrowly, due to the fact complex that every little contribution could help. that there are several frameworks for BSC Forced coherence could have an artifi cial charac- already. Th e EUSBSR as a reference point for ter and hamper, rather than foster, co-operation. BSC could also more easily be accepted by In other areas, however, there is more need to non-EU-members, such as Russia, Norway connect existing structures as there either is a po- and Iceland, which, owing to its EU-internal tential risk to create negative overlap and duplicate character, cannot become fully involved in the existing structures, or this has already happened. strategy but should naturally be included in In other fi elds of co-operation, the various struc- any major framework of BSC. tures have already established well-functioning co-operation, an eff ective division of labour, and 4) Th e Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) co-ordination mechanisms.3 was established as an intergovernmental organisation in 1971, fostering co-operation 1) In co-operation within the area of civil secu- between the governments of the fi ve Nor- rity (for example, civil protection and nuclear dic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, & radiation safety) there was no evidence of Norway and Sweden. It is one of the oldest any harmful overlaps; the co-ordination level regional organisations in Northern Europe. is overall good. Th e relevant CBSS structures Naturally, Nordic co-operation focuses on the maintain good working relationships with Nordic area (“Norden”) but has opened up their counterparts on other levels. Th e CBSS and became more ‘international’- and Europe- Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation focused in recent years. Th e BSR and Nor- Safety (EGNRS), for example, co-operates den’s adjacent areas have even become priori- effi ciently with other related regional co- ties for Nordic co-operation. Th e NCM plays operation arrangements, such as HELCOM, a strong role in the implementation of the ND and there is a clear division of labour with and the elaboration and implementation of HELCOM in the area of environmental the EUSBSR, attempting to contribute with monitoring. Th e Baltic Sea Civil Protection its expertise and experience to the strategy’s Network provides a direct link between the success, mainly in the areas of research, inno- CBSS and Nordic co-operation. Th e CBSS vation and energy. According to the European has a co-ordination function in civil security- Commission (2012: 6) continued dialogue related projects within the EUSBSR. If there with the NCM “will ensure a more co-ordi- were problems within this fi eld of co-opera- nated use of human and fi nancial resources”. tion, they were technical in nature, sometimes Owing to its expertise, experience and fi nan- relating to arrangements with non-regional cial and human recourses, the NCM is in a actors such as the UN or the EU. Shaping the good position to contribute to the creation of function of an umbrella co-ordinator within a coherent system of regional co-operation in or across sectors does not necessarily provide Northern Europe and the BSR. added value.

3 We are drawing on the outcome of workshop sessions on civil security, energy and economic development, environment, and education and cultural co-operation 3. Creating coherence across policies during the conference ‘Baltic Sea Cooperation – A Model for Coherence?’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 1-2 December 2011, on conference papers and on statements of conference participants. We are grateful to Pertti Joenniemi (University of Eastern Finland), Pami Aalto (University of Tampere), Whether the creation of more coherence is Arild Sæther (University of Agder), Kristine Kern (University of Wageningen), Marko Joas (Åbo Akademi University), Hiski Haukkala (University of Tampere), Mia Crawford, required and useful in regional co-operation Jan Lundin and Christer Pursiainen (CBSS Secretariat), Andrea C. Bayer (Ars Baltica depends to a great extent on the specifi c issue area. Secretariat) and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues (IBEI) for their input, in particular on the sections on civil security (Pursiainen), energy (Aalto), environment (Crawford, Kern In some areas of co-operation, a comprehensive and Joas) and culture (Sæther and Bayer).

58 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 2) Another case in point is energy. Th is is an area in which co-operation and coherence is still underdeveloped. Nonetheless, there is some potential for creating more coherence, especially in ‘small’ and ‘new’ energy fi elds (renewable energies, energy effi ciency etc.), to which any eff ort to improve coherence in BSR energy co-operation could best be directed. In these, the EUSBSR, for example, could have a role in intra-EU coordination. Good chances for co-operation within the ‘small’ energy fi eld exist through the ND and the NDEP in particular, as a result of their linkages with the wider EU-Russia framework. Work through these bodies could be combined with the sizable NCM research and funding in this 21/CBSS, HELCOM, the EUSBSR, BSPC, fi eld, while BASREC could be brought closer trans-governmental organisations such as the to their actions in order to create more critical BSSSC and UBC and various environmental mass. Iceland could be taken in through the NGO networks. Overall, this institutional ND to work on geo-thermal energy, while overlap does not have any major negative con- Norway is capable of helping to develop CCS sequences. Th e current situation is character- (Carbon Dioxide and Capture Storage) and ised by synergies between HELCOM and the LNG (Liquefi ed Natural Gas) shipping. Uti- EUSBSR, and by a division of labour between lising the CBSS secretariat to increase policy Baltic 21 and HELCOM, for example in the planning and co-operation capacity could area of climate change adaptation. CBSS/ also be considered. A concrete step into this Baltic 21 have a particular responsibility for direction could be to re-establish a permanent the latter, while HELCOM mainly focuses BASREC secretariat (currently, the rotating on the maritime environment. Th e environ- BASREC presidency covers the secretariat mental focus of the EUSBSR apparently is function) as an independent unit within the on biodiversity and eutrophication. CBSS permanent CBSS Secretariat. Manned with and HELCOM could co-operate even more distinguished experts in the energy fi eld, such closely, for example, in the form of establish- a secretariat could help re-establishing BAS- ing a joint environmental maritime working REC as an important actor within the fi eld of group. Stakeholder participation has improved energy co-operation, strengthen its organisa- considerably as well. From an environment tional structures, and provide some continu- and sustainability point of view, the region is ity. Th e CBSS could exert a political function much more coherent than it used to be only within energy co-operation, as evidenced a few years ago. Th e launch of the EUSBSR when the CBSS foreign ministers adopted and the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan a declaration on energy security in the BSR (BSAP), the CBSS reform with its long-term at the extraordinary ministerial session in priorities, and the integration of Baltic 21 into Plön on 5 February 2012 (see CBSS 2012). the core structures of the CBSS have served as Th is declaration stresses the signifi cance of a united forces of co-ordination and coherence political dialogue on energy co-operation and among actors. However, the environmental energy security at the highest levels, affi rming governance of the BSR requires new leader- the need and paving the way for closer politi- ship concepts and styles. Individual leadership cal co-operation in this fi eld. is still important, but needs to be comple- mented by organisational leadership, with one 3) In environmental BSC, an institutional organisation/actor taking the lead more clearly complex has developed that includes Baltic in terms of providing a platform for other

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 59 actors and co-ordination of activities, taking role, but the project is also supported by the initiatives and promoting co-operation when NCM. More projects along those lines could needed. Th is type of leadership is not to be be conducted, as the Eurofaculty concept has understood in a hierarchical, but rather in a been perceived as fairly successful overall. Th e facilitating sense. Leadership within networks European Humanities University in Vilnius, must be based on co-operation and requires a Belorussian university in exile, is a fairly additional skills such as coaching, facilitating successful joint endeavour of the NCM and and mediation. Th is also applies to other areas the European Commission and also involves of BSC. various other organisations and foundations.

4) In the fi eld of cultural co-operation, there 6) Eff orts to establish sustainable co-operation in still appears to be a need to create platforms the area of maritime aff airs are closely related for a) the exchange of information and to EU advances to establish an integrated knowledge, both between project leaders and maritime policy for the European Union. Th is organisations such as Ars Baltica, NDPC, is a fairly new fi eld of co-operation which, CBSS, NCM and b) the presentation of from the start, was based on the idea of link- projects and the best practices results that the ing the activities of diff erent actors. In 2009, BSR has to off er. In the opinion of cultural the CBSS established an Expert Group on stakeholders, it might be useful to organise Maritime Policy. Th e group aims at “position- back-to-back meetings of the steering groups ing of the Baltic Sea Region as a European of, for example, NDPC, the CBSS Senior model region for maritime best practice and Offi cials Group for Culture (SOGC) and for a balanced co-existence of a successful Ars Baltica. Also common conferences and maritime economy and adequate protection workshop days could be useful, where project of the marine ecosystem” (CBSS 2009: 2). leaders and stakeholders can meet, learn from Th e Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference each other and develop new ideas for co-oper- (BSPC) has been engaged in this fi eld with a ation, aiming at better utilising what already working group for integrated maritime policy, exists. According to stakeholders, reducing operating between 2009 and 2011. A similar the number of (co-operation) structures in the working group operates under the Baltic Sea cultural fi eld to a manageable size could make States Sub-regional Co-operation (BSSSC). sense as they all deal with the same or similar Th ese groups have diff erent recipients but are issues and partly involve the same persons co-operating with each other and attempting and staff . As fi nancial means are limited, they to develop joint political priorities and guide- could possibly be more effi ciently used with lines. Th erefore, their activities have a com- fewer co-operation structures. A concrete step plementary eff ect on each other. Th e common in this direction could be to merge the sec- goal of the maritime working groups of CBSS, retariats (not the institutions as such) of Ars BSPC and BSSSC (2011) is “to contribute to Baltica in Rendsburg and the NDPC (cur- the process of turning the Baltic Sea Region rently located within the NCM Secretariat in into a maritime model region in Europe Copenhagen). Overall, there is a strong need within which the balance between economic, for improvement in both the fl ow of informa- social and ecologic interest is maintained”. tion and in the dialogue between the diff er- Various concrete projects within this fi eld ent projects and the political level, as well as are carried out by several actors, emphasising between the various stakeholders in the fi eld this objective. A project such as Clean Baltic of cross-cultural co-operation. Sea Shipping “is dedicated to substantiate the goals and strategies of several organisations 5) In the fi eld of science and education there like HELCOM, CBSS and BSSSC” (Clean are some examples in which various actors Baltic Sea Shipping 2012). Another example co-operate with each other. In the EuroFac- is the project Effi cienSea, a fl agship project of ulty project Pskov, the CBSS takes a lead the EUSBSR (priority area 13) and funded

60 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 by the Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007- 2) For several BSR countries, merging the CBSS 20134, fostering transnational co-operation with the ND would be the wrong signal, in in maritime safety und accident prevention in particular as the implications of such a move order to ensure effi cient, safe and sustainable have been and are completely unclear. Th e traffi c at sea. CBSS integration into the ND is not a realis- tic option, as the ND has a wider geographical scope, and some countries of the region do not 4. Conclusions, recommendations regard themselves as Northern, in particular and summary Poland and Germany. Moreover, this would compromise these countries’ recent eff orts to In general, creating cohesion and maintaining a become more actively engaged in BSC. It also variety of co-operation structures do not neces- speaks against utilising the ND as an over- sarily have to be contradictory. Creating more arching framework and co-ordinator for any coherence does not automatically imply making activity in any area of BSC. It might impede existing co-operation structures redundant or co-operation if the fairly concrete concept of merging them with each other. In specifi c cases, BSC were embedded in a wider and therefore the latter might be useful, in others rather not. vaguer concept.

1) It is possible that diff erent actors to exist 3) In each area of co-operation, a diff erent struc- alongside each other, as long as their activi- ture could be used as the overarching and ties complement each other. As long as the co-ordinating one, depending on which one is individual institutions have a specifi c enough the most appropriate and capable in taking on purpose, are able to contribute to overall such a role in the respective fi eld (see above). co-operation eff orts, and are useful for their Coherence can be improved if, for example, members, they should maintain a ‘right to the most suited actor provides the platform exist’ – even in times of fi nancial hardship. In within a specifi c fi eld of co-operation and such a case, creating coherence would primar- acts as a facilitator of co-operation (such as ily imply increasing the exchange of informa- the European Commission in the case of the tion and the co-ordination of activities, as well EUSBSR). Th is would also ensure an eff ective as fostering an eff ective if not “smart” division division of labour. It, however, will be impor- of labour (= actor coherence). Th is could lead tant that the various keepers of the platforms to comprehensiveness, completeness, continu- and facilitators permanently keep in touch to ity and consistency, in particular with an eye ensure coherence. on achieving concrete and consistent results. Th e dissolution of international institutions 4) It is apparent that, in several areas of the and frameworks for co-operation, if not regional co-operation, all or most of the vari- supported by all members, may trigger even ous structures of BSR run working groups (for higher tangible and intangible costs. It is nec- example, environment and maritime policy). essary to keep non-EU members, in particular Th is could be interpreted as an unnecessary Russia, involved in regional co-operation duplication of structures; some call indeed through as many diff erent platforms on vari- for joining forces. However, this can also be ous levels as possible. Th e more functional and seen as a contribution to policy coherence and complementary platforms for co-operation comprehensiveness, as these groups include with Russia there are, the better and the more diff erent stakeholders (national government fruitful, complementary and comprehensive offi cials, sub-state offi cials, Members of Parlia- the exchange and co-operation could become. ment, local representatives, NGO representa- tives) and have diff erent recipients at various levels, involving an impressive number of

4 The Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-2013 also fi nances projects in other areas diff erent actors in this co-operation. Nonethe- of co-operation (science, education and environment) of which a considerable number are EUSBSR fl agship projects. less, the interaction and co-ordination of the

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 61 activities of these diff erent structures on the In summary, the BSR could be regarded as a various levels within this multi-level govern- house, in which general Baltic Sea co-operation, ance system will have to be ensured. dealing with the joint problems, challenges and op- portunities of the region, forms the roof. Th e vari- 5) Regionalisation, decentralisation and transpar- ous structures and levels of regional co-operation ency in the decision-making processes should are the pillars that carry and support the roof. Th e be further promoted and enhanced. In this re- EUSBSR and the ND provide the outer support spect, the European Parliament, national par- posts, one representing the EU’s internal dimension liaments, regional parliamentary organisations, of BSC, the other standing for the EU’s external as well as civil society actors (both national dimension, including Russia and also forming the and trans-national) should be more strongly touch point of the BSR and BSC with the outside involved and hence play a stronger role in world, i.e. wider Northern Europe and even be- this coherent system of regional co-operation. yond. Th e CBSS, including non EU-members and Regional challenges could be directly tackled being based at the intersection of EU internal and where they emerge by those actors that will be external policies (see 3.1), forms the support pillar most directly aff ected by them, with the pos- right in the centre of the house. Th e surrounding, sible support of other actors on diff erent levels. slightly thinner, pillars – Nordic/Baltic/Nordic- Such an approach has the potential to en- Baltic co-operation, HELCOM, parliamentary hance the subsidiarity of foreign policy and its co-operation (BSPC, NC), trans-governmental and democratisation. It could facilitate establishing transnational co-operation (for example, BSSSC, a three-layered democratic system in terms of UBC, NGO Networks), all also involving non decision-making and policy implementation EU-member states or actors from non-EU-member (see Jutila and Tikkala 2009: 39): European states – complement and stabilise the construct. – regional – national. More subsidiarity in All these pillars of BSC are needed, perhaps some foreign and regional policy could provide the more and some less: if one breaks away, the whole still primarily intergovernmental BSC with a construction becomes unstable and might collapse. stronger democratic backbone. Generally, the Together, all the pillars form a coherent, compre- BSR, because of its dense institutional net- hensive and stable whole. work, has a potential to develop the concepts of network governance, multi-level governance (eff ective vertical interaction among various References: international actors and among international and national actors) and subsidiarity (see Aalto, Pami, Aileen A. Espiritu, Dmitry A. Lanko Filtenborg, Gänzle and Johansson 2002: 390) and Sarah Naundorf (2012), Coherent North- further and make them work in an eff ective ern Dimension. Th e Policy Priorities of the and effi cient manner on a regional level. Arctic Council (AC), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Council of the Baltic Sea Figure 1: “The Baltic Sea House” States (CBSS) and the Nordic Council of Min- isters (NCM), in comparison with the Northern Dimension Objectives, Report of the Northern Dimension Institute, 10 January 2012, http:// www.ndinstitute.org/ndi-studies-and-projects/ studies Antola, Esko (2009), EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Report for the Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung London Offi ce, London: Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung. Archer, Clive and Tobias Etzold (2008), “Th e EU’s Northern Dimension: Blurring Frontiers be- tween Russia and the EU North?”, Nordeuropa-

62 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 forum, No. 1, pp. 7-28, http://edoc.hu-berlin. Regions concerning the European Union Strat- de/docviews/abstract.php?lang=&id=29021 egy for the Baltic Sea Region, COM(2012) 128 Auswärtiges Amt (2011), Rede von Staatsminister fi nal, Brussels, 23.3.2012, http://ec.europa.eu/ Werner Hoyer bei der Ostseeparlamentarierkon- regional_policy/cooperate/baltic/documents_ ferenz (BSPC) am 29. August 2011 in Helsinki, en.cfm#1 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoser- Filtenborg, Mette S., Gänzle, Stefan and Elisabeth vice/Presse/Reden/2011/110829-ST_Hoyer_ Johansson (2002), “An Alternative Th eoreti- BSPC.html cal Approach to EU Foreign Policy: ‘Network CBSS (2009), CBSS Expert Group on Maritime Governance’ and the Case of the Northern Policy Terms of Reference. Adopted by the CBSS Dimension”, Cooperation and Confl ict37, No. Committee of Senior Offi cials, Copenhagen 2 4, pp. 390-413. June 2009, http://www.cbss.org/Economic- Gebhard, Carmen (2011), “Coherence”, in Chris- Development/expert-group-on-maritime-policy topher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), Inter- CBSS (2012), Declaration on Energy Security in national Relations and the European Union, the Baltic Sea Region adopted by the 17th Ex- Oxford: OUP. traordinary CBSS Ministerial Session, Schloss Foreign Ministry of Germany (2011), German Plön, 5 February 2012, http://www.auswaer- Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea tiges-amt.de/DE/Europa/Ostseerat/110624- States 2011/12. Programme of Work, Berlin, Praesidentschaft_node.html http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Europa/ CBSS, BSPC and BSSSC (2011) Common Vision, Ostseerat/110624-Praesidentschaft_node.html Linking Eff orts, Strengthening Visibility, Infor- Herolf, Gunilla (2010), Cooperation in the North – mation from the joint event at the European Multilateralism or Mess? Mercury E-paper No. Maritime Day in Gdansk, Poland, http://bsssc. 7, December 2010. com/index.php?system_cms=5&s=24 Jutila, Karina and Terhi Tikkala (eds.) (2009), To- Clean Baltic Sea Shipping (2012), Turn of Tide in gether or Apart? Th e Nordic Council and the EU, the Use of Fuels in Shipping in the Baltic Sea: Report 1, Th ink Tank e2, Helsinki, Finland. Baltic Sea Programme 2007-2013 Project heralds Lanko, Dmitri (2012), “Russia’s 2012/2013 Clean Shipping Strategy and new Energy Solu- CBSS Presidency” in Baltic Rim Economies tions for Shipping, http://www.clean-baltic-sea- 21.12.2011, Quarterly Review 5/2011, Pan-Eu- shipping.eu/ ropean Institute Turku, p. 70, http://www.tse. Council of the European Union (2011), Council fi /EN/units/specialunits/pei/economicmonitor- Conclusions on the review of the European ing/bre/archive/Pages/default.asp Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Makarychev, Andrey (2012), Russia - EU: Compet- 3125th General Aff airs Council meeting Brus- ing Logics of Region Building, in Sandschnei- sels, 15 November 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/ der, Eberhard (ed.) DGAPanalyse, March 2012 regional_policy/cooperate/baltic/documents_ N° 1. en.cfm#1 Schymik, Carsten (2011), Modellversuch Makrore- European Commission (2011), Report from the gion. Die EU Strategien für den Ostsee- und den Commission to the European Parliament, the Donauraum, SWP Study 1, Berlin: Stiftung Council, the European Economic and Social Wissenschaft und Politik, http://www.swp- Committee and the Committee of the Regions on berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/ the Implementation of the EU Strategy for the swp-research-paper-detail/article/eu_modellver- Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), COM(2011) 381 such_makroregion.html fi nal, Brussels, 22.6.2011, http://ec.europa.eu/ Ušackas, Vygaudas (2009), “Together we are Strong- regional_policy/cooperate/baltic/documents_ er”, Interview with the Lithuanian Minister for en.cfm#2 Foreign Aff airs, in Balticness (autumn), pp. 1-4, European Commission (2012), Communication h p://www.cbss.org/component/op on,com_ from the Commission to the European Parlia- rsgallery2/Itemid,123/gid,12/page,inline/ ment, the Council, the European Economic and view,inline/ Social Committee and the Committee of the

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 63 Rightwing Populism in Northern Europe

• In Poland only a few years ago, populism-(and anti-German sentiment-) dictated politics became popular, and fi lled the offi ces of the head of government and chief of state. • Also in the Baltic States and Russia, right- wing populism and even extremism is a Bernd Henningsen widespread phenomenon. In the Baltic States, SS veterans still march regularly. In all the Introduction: The right-wing Baltic States and in Russia, homosexuals, for example, are still not accepted but rather face populist European reality (legal) restrictions by wide parts of society and the political system, and even have to fear Right-wing populism in Europe is, 67 years after violent physical attacks by radicals. the military defeat of Fascism and National So- • Even where an independent right-wing popu- cialism, again a political reality. In most European list movement has not appeared on the scene, countries, right-wing populism has, to varying previously conservative parties have played degrees, become institutionalised in parliaments that role and adopted right-wing populist and governments. It has become the focus of rhetoric. the public sphere, politics, the police, the public • So far, only Germany stands out from this prosecutor’s offi ces, and academia. It is part of European pattern, even though populist the political day-to-day life in Central, Northern, rhetoric are used by established politicians of Southern, Western, and in Eastern Europe. It also the big parties – no ‘movement’ has gained is a political reality in the Baltic Sea Region: any infl uence. • In Denmark, right-wing populism has domi- nated governmental politics for more then Within this context, the most shocking event was ten years – without assuming any responsi- the massacre executed by the Norwegian Anders bility – bringing a reactionary cultural and Behring Breivik on 22 July 2011 in Oslo and on foreign policy to a country that was once an the island of Utøya – this date marks a new epoch example of liberality; the Norwegian populist in Norwegian and (Northern) European history.1 movement had a comparable infl uence on the political climate of the country. • In Norway, Sweden and Finland, countries which are esteemed in their liberality, right- wing populist movements have seats in Parlia- ment. 1 Owing to the specialised expertise of the author, this article will mainly focus on developments in the Nordic countries and cannot go into detail regarding other countries of the BSR.

64 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Defi nition and history It really is noteworthy that right-wing pop- ulism, anti-culturalistic rhetoric, and its criminal Right-wing populism is a genus. Right-wing eff ects in Northern Europe are today publically radicalism, far-right extremism, and actionism discussed as questions of freedom of conscience which qualifi es as right-wing belong to the same and the press. While in Germany and in France, ideological family. One should not be occupied by the appearance of right-wing radicals and right- these kinds of defi nitions for too long, as they say wing populists and their eff ects on politics and little about actual relationships and conditions; society has been seen as an executive problem these terms are interchangeable: in Hungary, – laws become harsher, the police and security Victor Orbán’s ‘Fidesz’ began as a ‘leftist’ move- forces receive strengthened search and seizure ment. Also the Finnish party of the ‘True Finns’, powers – one can generalise the reaction of the although classifi ed as right-wing populist overall, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg to entails some rather left-wing elements, especially the bombing in Oslo and the Massacre on Utøya as regards social policies. People, groups and fac- on 22 July 2011. Norwegian politics and society tions associated with right-wing populism have were encouraged to remain open, transparent, and committed murders in nearly all European coun- liberal. Th ere has been no debate on the merits tries and done so for years. Th ey did it in Sweden, of strengthening the executive. Jens Stoltenberg in the Netherlands, in France, in Germany and in showed with his reaction that, in that society, the Norway in 2011. Right-wing populism – even in values of democracy and human dignity could be its criminal and murderous form – has become a expressed through emotions; in extreme situa- part of European normalcy. tions, a society sustains itself not only through Today, European integration politics and words but also through its traditions. Th e bound- Brussels’ eff orts towards integration have been less sadness of the nation found a home in the per- re-interpreted as a stab-in-the-back legend, aimed son of the head of government, who, by collecting at killing off national sovereignty; a persecution this despair, very literally stabilised the situation. complex has been constructed through reaction- ary national self-aggrandisement, erosion or denigration of the justice system, and the canalisa- The Myth of ‘Nortopia’ tion of emotions through paranoid mechanisms (for example, fi nding scapegoats, such as the Jews, Th e literary and cultural export boom of the end the Gypsies, the Germans, or Brussels). Th is goes of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries hand in hand with a strong detachment from real- (to say nothing of Scandophilia before that, the ity, whose place is taken by paranoid mechanisms Scandinavism and the Gothism of early 19th designed to ward off a depression resulting from a century), and the debates on the ‘Scandinavian reactive (and imaginary) loss of purpose. Th e Nor- welfare model’ of the 1960s and 1970s led to a wegian Anders Breivik is just one example, albeit a wide-spread perception of the Northern European very criminal one. countries as being political, social, and cultural Truly, modern right-wing populism in Europe paradises. Contemporary opinion had found its started in Scandinavia, even before it became Utopia: Nortopia, an idyll nonetheless notorious popular in Austria. Th e liberal welfare states of for its awful climate. Northern Europe – Denmark and Norway – were After the bombing in Oslo and the massacre the fi rst societies in which right-wing populist at Utøya, many commentators wondered if this movements achieved overwhelming success and idyll had come to an end. Responses to this varied representation in Parliament, and even came close by temperament and experience, and indeed, they to taking over government: Mogens Glistrup in turned out in many diff erent ways: if nothing Denmark, and Anders Lange in Norway became, else, many Norwegians no longer recognised their after 1973, gladiators in the political arena and country after that day, and a sympathetic world the subsequent ‘common sense’ tax protest move- – and those who would not be sympathetic with ment. Norway – wrestled with their own horror.

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 65 many), and for all of them, non-European foreign- ers. Anti-Jewish pogroms and anti-Semitism has existed throughout nearly all of Europe over the centuries. In Scandinavia, people created anti- Semitism in a place nearly bereft of Jews. In this respect, one can come to the conclu- sion that peace-loving, idyllic, democratic, social egalitarian Scandinavia – the phrase ‘Scandina- vian Welfare Model’ became the modern utopian cliché – was an ingenious branding concept, in today’s marketing terms. Nothing could destroy the image of a politi- cally and culturally happy Northern Europe: not the knowledge of domestic Scandinavian anti- Semitism, the widely held sympathies for the German Nazi regime, or the not-insignifi cant collaboration with the occupiers. Nor could the knowledge of Nazi workshops, where Scandina- vians published the right-wing German political scene’s materials, banned in Germany, during the 1960s and 1970s, or sent letter bombs, without any success, against judicial or police targets, or even the most recent criminal eff orts, which are becoming clear in the light of Iceland’s fi nan- cial and economic conduct, dim this image. Th e achievements of the welfare state, its fl at social hierarchies and (relative) gender equality were more important components for the construction of this image. Th e South has dreamed of an idyllic North and told Scandinavians, who believed it and made it their reality. Th is dream of a healthy, unalien- Against the backdrop of this apostrophised ated world was, as bitter as it sounds, over before paradigm shift, one must object that Norway Utøya – Norwegians and the world could fi nally in particular, and the North in general, has see that they lived in a European normalcy, not never been an idyll. Since the middle of the 19th just since 22 July 2011. century, the political dreamers and fools of the In 1975, a novel came out in Sweden, where a völkischen ideologies have so thoroughly duped us fl ower girl shot the head of government in broad into believing that Scandinavia was a political and daylight. It was the fi nal novel, ‘Th e Terrorist’, in cultural paradise that, in the end, even the Scan- Maj Sjöwall and Per Wahlöö’s ten-volume ‘Novel dinavians believed it – not only that they were about a Crime’. More than ten years later, this somehow better, but that evil only came from the exact event transpired in reality when the Swed- outside. Th e heterostereotype became an autoste- ish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, was shot dead in reotype: Sweden turned itself into a moral Great public in the capital, unprovoked. Th e fact that Power, and Norway became the most peace-loving reality has nothing to do with novels remains nation among peace-lovers. Internally, all was unchanged: in reality, the murderer was never good, as the evil was external. For Sweden, this conclusively identifi ed. Nonetheless, 17 years later meant the Russians, for the Danes, this meant the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, was primarily the Germans, but also the Swedes; and also publically murdered, although this time the for Norway, this meant Sweden again (and Ger- killer was identifi ed as a mentally disturbed per-

66 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 son with a migration background. Th e knife, and Democrats had long lived in the same glass house. the willingness to use it, are also common stock One also could come easily to the conclusion tales about Finnish society. Th ese cases are by no that a social environment of accepted xenophobia means exclusive to Sweden or Finland. exists in these countries. Th is came to the fore in Th us, Scandinavian countries in general, and Norwegian society after the events 22 July. Norway in particular, are completely normal, Th e institutional and political success of the modern societies, where people murder, whore Progress Party in Denmark, and, after its dissolu- and drink; every deviance of human existence is tion, its successor party, the Danish People’s Party, not only possible, but happening. To deny this, or under its xenophobic leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, have claim that it is monocausal – a result of welfare become model parties on the European stage. It bums, alcohol, Protestantism, a xenophobia par- has expanded and has had ideological infl uences ticular to some region, or anything else – is non- on similar parties in Norway and Denmark. Th e sense. It is quite noteworthy that a group of artists strategist of the party, Member of the European was very shocked by the writings and actions of Parliament, Morten Messerschmidt, was the per- Breivik, because they recognised their own imagi- sonal advisor to the Dutch populist Geert Wil- nary images in his actions: Lars von Trier, Th omas ders (Koch) and the chairman of a party, which Enger and Henning Mankell. Utøya is not a employed Orwellian Newspeak and called itself non-location in Scandinavian literature and fi lm, the ‘Party for Freedom’, a freedom that, above all, in which the massacre happened a long time ago, means freedom without foreigners and Muslims. and Nortopia is no ‘nowhere’, as the etymology of In 1997, Mogens Glistrup was the originator of ‘utopia’ implies; it rather is a dystopia. the message that Islam was invading Western countries in order to slay their people. Th ere- fore, one had the obligation to exterminate the The longue durée of Northern Mohammedans. Th is message found fertile soil European (right-wing) populism among the Danish völkischen movement and only became more frenzied in their rhetoric after 9/11. As has already been established, in Europe, Th e belief that the Nordic countries cultivate particularly in the Northern European countries, a friendly nationalism is one of the polite beliefs political life has been infl uenced for years, if not about Nortopia that foreign observers hold, and centuries, by populist and right-wing populist domestic apologists may have gotten a sense of movements and parties. Denmark and Nor- their self-deception after the political successes way have lead the way since 1972. Right-wing of right-wing populists and the events of 22 July. populists have dictated politics and even political However, this belief hides, and the European de- discourse for years (and bourgeois conservatives culturation experience neglects, that nationalism bemoan to this day that leftists hold the high is never friendly, as it declares one’s own nation to ground in the cultural discourse...). Th ey do be superior and exceptional. It segregates, excludes this under the banner of ‘people’, ‘freedom’ and and despises its neighbours. Scandinavia’s internal ‘progress’, naming themselves the ‘Progress Party’ humour culture is an example of this. and ‘People’s Party’; they re-brand themselves as ‘true’ and authentic, as if George Orwell had given these parties names in Newspeak. (Orwell, Public discourse and the challenges of 241-251; in the world of ‘1984’, the War Offi ce is freedom of the press and expression named ‘Ministry of Peace’, and the Ministry of Information is named ‘Ministry of Truth’.) In the It would be absurd to make talking about stupid meantime, Sweden and Finland caught up. Th e things illegal. If stupidity became socially domi- Swedish movement has a criminal history; there nant and there were no sustained public debate have been murders. Th e Danish movement has on it, and limits were not negotiated, then it lead to the establishment of the most xenophobic would become a danger to public safety. When, foreign policy in Europe, receiving the backing as happened on 22 July 2011 in Norway, a mass even of the Social Democrats. Norwegian Social crime emerges from political, and as discussed

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 67 above, absurd normalcy, this is certainly danger- not strike a balance with this taming must deal ous. In this respect, an imagined idyll has come with its victims. More police forces and more to an end. Th e question remains of how this could restrictive laws can help only little. Th e Norwe- happen. gian tragedy shows that this strategy of projecting In relation to the general, public speechless- evil outside can calm people’s minds for a time or ness, in the past it is not surprising that it fi rst could even be used to run a society, but does not became clear, with the massacre of summer 2011, suffi ce for actually solving political, economic and that terrorism, fundamentalism and outbreaks social problems. Th e culture of xenophobia is not of unprovoked violence come from the heart of the remedy, but the symptom of the fragility of society. Scandinavians might have to admit now modern societies. that evil did not come to them from outside, but was their own off spring. Th erefore, an open public discourse is a necessity for the survival of democ- References: racy and liberty – freedom of the press is situated in the very heart of every society, but the freedom Koch, Henning: Information given to the author. of the press necessarily entails responsibility for Orwell, George: Th e principles of Newspeak. the culture of this discourse. ‘Anything goes’ is In: id.: Nineteen eighty-four. A novel. Har- the opposite of responsibility. mondsworth 1962, pp. 241-251. – In the world Every society needs a political organisation of 1984, the War Offi ce is named ‘Ministry in order to tame the evil – parliaments, parties, of Peace’, and the Ministry of Information is courts, press, you name them. A society that does named ‘Ministry of Truth’

68 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 Final Remarks, Key Messages, Conclusions and Outlook on 2013

2012 were a strong manifestation of the fact that many Germans are engaged in regional aff airs. Still, the German Presidency did not introduce the important European economic agenda to the regional level and did not make much use of the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Th e two Tobias Etzold policy areas were more or less living separate lives. Although Germany made a great and valuable eff ort, which was much more than one could Th is second Political State of the Region Report expect, it perhaps did not accomplish so much in has been an attempt to provide an overview of real project terms besides organising a political political developments in the Baltic Sea Region dialogue, which is obviously also of great impor- (BSR), this time focusing on a somewhat smaller tance. number of countries and issues. In order to Nonetheless, as one of the largest countries achieve this goal, the report identifi ed and ana- in the region, Germany still has a very important lysed important trends within the region. In order role to play in the development of the region and to conclude the report, a number of questions in regional co-operation. Because of its CBSS need to be addressed. First, what are the key mes- Presidency, the region has been more present on sages of the report? Second, where are we in 2012, Germany’s foreign policy agenda in 2011/12 than and what is the current situation of the region? it usually is. Th e other countries of the region Th ird, what has been achieved in the last 20 years seem to have appreciated Germany’s more active of Baltic Sea co-operation, and what still needs regional stance in this period, although it is quite to be achieved in order to develop the Region clear that Germany’s main interest is to develop further? Finally, what are the sensitivities and the relations with the Russian Baltic Sea Region challenges in this context? provinces, including Kaliningrad. Th e risk is that, Th e acting presidencies of the EU and CBSS, once the CBSS presidency has passed on to Russia held by Denmark and Germany, respectively, on 1 July 2012, the region might again vanish reveal some interesting and important informa- from Germany’s political agenda. Owing to its tion. Th e German CBSS Presidency celebrated the close links, it would, however, be in Germany’s 20th anniversary of the CBSS, and was therefore own interest, as well as in the interest of other looking backwards more than forwards in terms countries, to develop a more sustainable and uni- of themes and institutional developments. It has form policy towards the region. been very active and (co-) organised an impressive For Poland, as the other large country of the number of high-level stakeholder meetings, events region, the BSR has become more interesting in and conferences. As mentioned before, the Baltic recent years. Undoubtedly, the Polish EU Presi- Sea Days that were organised in Berlin in April dency has played a role in this regard, but more

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 69 generally the BSR is increasingly seen as a source not particularly advanced, is not a particularly of inspiration for the economic direction which German and Danish phenomenon. To a simi- Poland could be taking over the next 10-15 years. lar extent, this also applies to most of the other Th e Nordic states, which are very strong in in- governments in the region. Only Finland, Sweden novation and adaptation to global markets, would and to some extent the Baltic countries endeavour perhaps be less problematic sparring partners than to have coherent national Baltic Sea policies. Th e Germany. With the latter, basic reconciliation BSR, its problems, challenges and opportunities, is still an issue. Th e Polish interest for regional and regional co-operation are often seen as issues co-operation, which is very strong in the North- at the margins and perceived by governments as ern voivodeships, provides new opportunities ‘nice to have’ themes that are not urgent priorities that should be fully explored and utilised by the on the political agenda, which in an EU-context smaller partner countries in the region. tends to be dominated by crisis-management. At Th e Danish EU Presidency showed that Den- the same time, the high participation of represent- mark is again becoming a more important Euro- atives at the ‘grass-roots’ level in regional events pean partner. Th e EU policies of the new social and manifestations is an important reminder to democratic-led government are more EU-friendly national decision-makers that the region has a and proactive than the ones of the previous liberal- deep and wide popular foundation, linked with conservative governments. On the regional level, the possibility to exert pressure bottom-up. In the Danish EU Presidency wished to host the 3rd contrast to wide EU co-operation and the EU Annual Forum of the EU Strategy for the Baltic institutions in particular, some of the regional Sea Region, together with Summit Baltic Develop- platforms are also open, accessible and under- ment Forum is, in Copenhagen in June 2012 in standable. In contrast to other European regions, order to keep co-operation on the agenda. it also has to be recognised that there is a generally In the fi rst half of 2012, Denmark is responsi- positive attitude towards cross-border co-opera- ble – as EU Presidency – for chairing the negotia- tion in the BSR. tions on the EU’s budget for the next seven years Th us, the basis for higher ambitions for (the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014- regional co-operation exist, but currently other 2020), which will defi ne the fi nancial instruments topics in European and international relations that can be employed for regional cooperation dominate the overall political debates, especially in Europe, including the Baltic Sea Region. Th e the European fi nancial, debt and economic negotiations also include a new Connecting Europe crises. Th e interest in the EUSBSR of most of facility, which will focus on infrastructure devel- the countries’ central governments seems to opment within energy, ICT and transport. Th e have declined again due to the above priorities. outcome of the negotiations are expected to be Generally, it is still questionable to what extent fi nalised end of 2012 and will be very important the mostly positive joint and national offi cial for the future of the EUSBSR. Not least it will be statements on the value of regional cooperation, important that the objectives of the strategy and expressing primarily a ‘diplomatic’ interest (nice the funds will be more streamlined than it has words but little action and few eff orts), refl ect been the case till now. the countries’ ‘real’ interest, engagement and In this regard, Denmark – together with commitment. Most countries of the region fulfi l some of the net contributors to the EU’s budget their duties in Baltic Sea regional co-operation; – has been advocating the need to cut down on they do no less but also not much more than structural funds, which could complicate the that. Th is is somewhat surprising given the fact elaboration of regional projects. In this, a certain that the Baltic Sea Region is currently Europe’s misbalance between the regional and the EU only economic growth motor. Th e countries level becomes increasingly apparent, in particular around the Baltic Sea could play a key role in in terms of funding, political commitment, and generating growth and helping the continent re- prioritisation. turn to sustainable growth. At least, appropriate Th at currently the interest in the region networks and frameworks have been established and the commitment to joint regional eff orts is for playing a more active role in implementing

70 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 infrastructure projects that could benefi t the challenge for them. Perhaps some sort of politi- competitiveness of Europe more widely. cal co-operation in the form of exchanging views Baltic Sea co-operation has achieved quite a and experiences and jointly trying to strengthen lot both in real as well as in political terms. Th e the democratic systems of all the countries could countries cooperate with each other, have close help in this regard. trade relations, and exchange views and experi- From a broader European perspective, the ences. However, there is more to do: overall, EU countries in the BSR have in fact a lot to off er huge challenges remain in the region, as the arti- and a chance to position themselves at the Top of cles of this report have shown. Co-operating ef- Europe. Th is slogan has again become relevant, fectively with Russia, encouraging the country’s although it seemed to be abandoned some years interest and commitment in the BSR, and giving ago when the economic and fi nancial crisis in the country a sense that its regional involvement 2008-2011 hit, aff ecting the Baltic States particu- is regarded as important by the other countries larly severely. Today, Estonia, Latvia and Lithu- of the Region, without always giving in to every ania represent the countries in Europe that have Russian sensitivity and demand, seems very been able to cut back on public spending, intro- important. Kaliningrad and its socio-economic duce wide policy reforms without social unrest, development remain a challenge, but also an and return to positive growth rates. Estonia and opportunity for the region. Also, a continued Latvia even had their Prime Ministers re-elected, engagement and commitment of the region’s which is a new phenomenon in the young Baltic outsiders, Norway and Iceland, is due to their, democracies. In 2012, the distinction between the in particular Norway’s, resources and experience unstable (primarily in economic, but to some ex- with regional co-operation – not unimportant tent, also in political terms) South and the stable for the region. Creating a coherent framework North in Europe became very strong. for regional co-operation in order to achieve ef- Th is – in some ways favourable – situation fective and effi cient co-operation, sustainable re- has not been conducive for a clearer identity for sults, and a ‘smart’ division of labour, is another the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. It re- task and challenge for the countries of the region mains to be seen whether the Danish Presidency and the institutions. A discussion and think- of the Council of the EU will take new initia- ing process on how to create more coherence tives to push forward the regional dimension has been started, some progress has been made, of the EU’s internal strategy. At the very least, and in some issue areas, more co-operation and the dual German and Danish presidencies did co-ordination between stakeholders seemed to provide an ideal framework for co-operation in evolve fairly smoothly. Overall, concerning the the region. Such a, ideally coherent, framework issue of coherence and many other challenges, as for co-operation could and even should be used mentioned above, the Baltic Sea stakeholders still more eff ectively in the future in order to utilise have quite some work ahead of them. Fighting the region’s opportunities, to tackle its problems the challenge of populist movements in all the and challenges and to even off er solutions to countries of the region will also remain a major Europe’s/the EU’s general problems.

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 71 About the authors

Hans Brask has been Director of Baltic De- Tapani Kaakkuriniemi is Head of Education velopment Forum since August 2007. His back- (Master’s programme) in the Aleksanteri Institute ground is in international aff airs since he began at the University of Helsinki. He is the Director working in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of the Finnish National Master’s Programme in in 1990. Russian and Eastern European Studies.

Kimmo Elo (Dr.Pol.Sci) is Adjunct Professor for Peer Krumrey is a fellow in Nordic and Baltic Political Science at the University of Jyväskylä, Sea Region Studies at the German Institute for In- Finland. He currently serves as lecturer in Po- ternational and Security Aff airs (SWP) in Berlin litical Science and Contemporary history at the and Ph.D. student at Freie University of Berlin. University of Turku, Finland. Lidia Puka (graduate in Law and International Tobias Etzold (Ph.D.) is an Associate and project Relations) is Senior Analyst at the Polish Institute leader for Nordic and Baltic Sea Region Studies at of International Aff airs. the German Institute for International and Securi- ty Aff airs (SWP) in Berlin and coordinator of the Christian Rebhan (M.A. in International Rela- Political State of the Baltic Sea region report. tions) is a Ph.D. student at the Humboldt Univer- sity of Berlin and at the University of Iceland. Stefan Gänzle is Associate Professor at the De- partment of Political Science and Management, Alexander Sergunin is Professor at the School University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway. of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University. He holds M.A. (history) from Nizhny Bernd Henningsen is a retired Professor of Novgorod State University (1982), Ph.D. (history) political science, culture and politics of Northern from Moscow State University (1985) and Habili- Europe and the Baltic Sea region at the Depart- tation (political science) from St. Petersburg State ment for Northern European Studies, Humboldt- University (1994). Universität zu Berlin.

Pertti Joenniemi (Licenciate in Social Sciences) is Senior Researcher at the Karelian Institute at the University of Eastern Finland in Joensuu.

72 POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 About the Baltic Sea Region Think Tank “DeepWater”

Since the adoption of the EU Strategy for the Berlin), the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Baltic Sea Region in 2009, the debate on the Centre for Baltic and Eastern European Studies future of the region and the relationship between (CBEES) at Södertörn University (Stockholm), the countries of the region has attracted renewed and the Department of Northern European Stud- and wider interest. Not since the EU enlargement ies at Humboldt University (Berlin), this (virtual) towards Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 has endeavour could be realised. Although there is the interest in regional and European integration no haptic space or established institution, a vivid been so vivid, despite the recent economic and collaboration and intellectual exchange of experts fi nancial crises. around our common Sea has materialised since In order to maintain the EU strategy and 2010. Th e fi rst result of our joint ambitions and regional integration as a long term process (and a endeavours was the Political State of the Region vision for other European regions), we consider it Report 2011. For the fi rst time, the political de- necessary to establish an open and more inte- velopments of the Region in 2010/2011 have been grated forum for open discussions on the state of evaluated, and domestic developments within the regional aff airs and to create a forum of experts. countries of the Region have been put into a wider Th e idea to establish a (virtual) think tank for regional perspective. Th is report is the second of the Region emerged a few years ago and has been its kind, continuing this endeavour and covering discussed at diff erent forum, such as the BDF the time period of July 2011 to May 2012. By summits. It was intended as an attempt to create means of these reports, DeepWater has become a common cross-border platform, aimed at raising known to and will gain further recognition from awareness, mutual understanding and greater a wider public. We are prepared to continue our visibility, enhancing the political dialogue in the endeavours – as a group of experts entirely inde- Baltic Sea Region, and off ering expert advice to pendent of governments, international organisa- politicians, administrations and various stakehold- tions and corporate actors. As a means of reaching ers in the region. out to a bigger audience and with hope to further With the support of the Baltic Development the debate on regional aff airs, a special website Forum, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Riga/ will be developed during summer 2012.

POLITICAL STATE OF THE REGION REPORT 2012 73 Baltic Development Forum The leading high-level network for decision – makers from business, politics, academia and media in the Baltic Sea Region

Nytorv 3, 1st fl o o r DK-1450 Copenhagen K Denmark Telephone: +45 70 20 93 94 Fax +45 70 20 93 95 [email protected] www.bdforum.org