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This dissertation has been . , 66-14,206 microfilmed exactly as received DICKS, Samuel Eugene, 1935- THE QUESTION OF PEACE: ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY, A. D. 1439-1449. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1966 History, medieval University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan d" Copyright by SAÎ'iUSL EUGENE DICKS 1957 THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE THE QUESTION OF PEACE: ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY, A.D. 1439-1449 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY SAMUEL EUGENE DICKS Norman, Oklahoma 1966 THE QUESTION OP PEACE; ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY, A.D. 1439-1449 APPROVED BY / À ' ) t V 1 i\ J t'\ . i C , ■. lOilJ^xru^ U-. [VUjLiP y DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I especially wish to thank my dissertation director. Professor Leslie P. Smith of the University of Oklahoma, who spent an unusual amount of time advising me on all facets of my research and writing. I also wish to express my thanks to Professor William H. Maehl of the University of Oklahoma for suggesting the diplomacy of a portion of the Hundred Years War as a possible area of research and for also providing me with criticisms and suggestions. I wish to express my appreciation to the staffs of the University of Oklahoma Library, Washington University Library in St. Louis, Pope Pius XII Library at St. Louis University, the University of Chicago Library, Newberry Library, Harvard University Library, the British Museum, and the Public Record Office, for their assistance and the use of their facilities. I am also indebted to Mrs. Beatrice I. Pugh of London for locating and obtaining materials from the British Museum and the Public Record Office. I also wish to acknowledge the patience of my wife Sandra during the time I researched and wrote the dissertation and also thank her for typing the various drafts of it. I must add that I alone am responsible for any errors which remain in this work. ill TABLE OP CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION............. 1 II. THE CONFERENCE OF CALAIS (1439)........... 20 III. FRENCH PRINCES STRIVE FOR PEACE (1440-43),.. ?3 IV. A TRUCE AND A ROYAL MARRIAGE (1444-45)..... 112 V. THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON AND THE CESSION OF I'lAINE (1445).... 139 VI. THE DELIVERY OP MAINE (1445-48)....... 169 VII. THE CAPTURE OF FOUGERES AND THE PINAL CONFERENCES (1448- 4 9 ).......... 214 VIII. CONCLUSION............................... 285 BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................. ...... 301 Iv THE QUESTION OP PEACE; ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY, A.D. 1439-1449 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Much has been written on diplomacy during the earlier portions of the Hundred Years War.^ Yet, except for a recent work on the Congress of Arras (1435)» little has been written on diplomacy during the latter segments of the war. Diplomacy in the crucial years following Arras has only been discussed ^Eugène Dëprez, Les preliminaries de la guerre de cent ans; La papauté, la France et 1*Angleterre. Ï32B-1342 (Paris: A. Fontemoing, l9()^)‘;''Henry "sT Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War, 1326-134? (Ann Arbor,' Mich.': Univer­ sity of Michigan 'Press, 1929); Lucas, John III, duke of Brabant, and the French Alliance. 1345-1347 (Seattle. Wash.: University of Washington Press, 192?); Helen Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace under Benedict XII. 1334-13^2 (Philadelphia: privately printed, 1933); Pierre Chaplais (ed.), "Some Docu­ ments regarding the Fulfillment and Interpretation of the Treaty of Bretigny, I36I-I369," Camden Miscellany ("Camden Third Series," no. 80; London: Royal Historical Society, 1952)1 Edouard Perroy (ed.), "The Anglo-French Negotiations at Bruges, 1374-1377," Camden Miscellany. 2 Joycelyne Gledhill Dickinson, The Congress of Arras, 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy (Oxford: At the Clarendon ÿress, 1955). Although th£s work describes the more signifi­ cant political developments at Arras, it places greater stress on the methods of diplomacy in this age. 2 in the general histories of the period^ in spite of the fact that the occurrences in the final portions of a great conflict are often the most decisive in determining its outcome. The Hundred Years War did not end with the successes of the Maid of Orléans. Prance remained divided and its eventual unification under the "king of Bourges" would not be achieved for almost a quarter of a century. Prom 1^39 to 1449 dip­ lomacy between the courts of the two claimants to the croivn of France, Henry VI and Charles VII, was quite considerable. It dealt with the establishment and maintenance of peace, and the resolving of their differences concerning their claims to the French crown and various lands in Prance. This work is a study of that diplomacy during those critical and decisive years. The Hundred Years War ifas really a series of wars begin­ ning in 1338. The primary issue of the wars was the desire of the English kings to maintain and increase the size of their holdings in Prance, as opposed to the goal of the French kings to unify the nation under their crown. The conflict was complicated by the claims of various English rulers to the crown of Prance, and by the demands of the French monarchs that the kings of England do homage for their lands in Prance. Although quite old the most detailed general histories in English or French remain; James H. Raunsay, Lancaster and York, A Century of English History. A.D. 1399-1484 (2 vois.'; Oxfordl At the Clarendon Press, I092); G. du Presne de Beaucourt, Histoire de Charles VII (6 vols.; Paris; Libraire de la Société bibliographique, Ï881-91). 3 The first war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Brétigny in 1360 by Edward III and the Dauphin Charles (the able future Charles V). By this treaty, Charles agreed to pay a ransom of three million ecus d'or for the captured French king, Jean II (13^0-64). Edward III surrendered his claim to the French crown in return for Valois recognition of his full sovereignty (i.e., without homage) over almost one-third of France. The English-held lands thus recognized were generally in south­ western France between the Loire and the Pyrenees, except for Calais and certain other small holdings along the north coast. Charles V (1364-80) promoted the organization of a non-feudal army to compete with the more modern English army, but this program was largely interrupted by his early death. Yet, dur­ ing his brief reign, English holdings were reduced to Calais and a narrow strip of coast in Guienne. The deaths of Charles V and Edward III (d. 1377) were followed by internal troubles in both countries and a lull in the war. The reign of Charles VI (1380-1422) was one of misgovern- ment and strife in which the gains made by Charles V were lost. Periods of insanity made him unable to rule and the various princes of the blood competed for control of the government. The powerful dukes of Burgundy used the financial and military resources of the throne to increase their influence in the Low Countries. This was resented by the other blood princes led by Louis, duke of Orléans. Louis was assassinated in 1407 by henchmen of John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy (1409-19)» 4 After three years of considerable intrigue, civil war broke out between factions led by the duke of Burgundy, and by Bernard VII, count of Armagnac and father-in-law of Charles, the new duke of Orléans. The ambitious Henry V of England (1 ^13-2 2) could not let the opportunity pass to declare him­ self king of Prance and renew the war in l4l$. English con­ nections with the dukes of Burgundy had generally been close because of the commercial ties existing between England and Flanders. Yet Henry and John were wary of each other. Each wished to use the other for his own objective, the crown of Prance. Some of the adherents of John fell at Agincourt in 1413, but this crushing French defeat at the hands of the English was primarily an Armagnac defeat. Charles of Orléans was taken prisoner by the English and remained in England for most of the rest of his life. In a secret pact made in May of 1417» John recognized Henry and his descendants as heirs to the French throne and promised to do homage. The Burgun­ dians took Paris from the Armagnacs in I4l8. The Anglo- Burgundian pact had not been exposed and it appeared that, in the face of an English threat, the rival French parties might unite. Talks between John and the dauphin (the future Charles VII) opened in July. Tempers flared and John held that the dauphin could not agree to any settlement without the approval of his father, the king. Assassination had been feared by each side from the start and on July 16 John the Fearless was struck in the head with an axe. Adherence to a 5 pro-English policy against the Armagnacs was no longer in A doubt. John was succeeded by his son Philip the Good (1419-6?) who, duty bound to avenge the murder of his father, became a public ally of Henry V. The Lancastrian king was approached by both French groups and was thus able to increase his de­ mands. In the face of English aggressions, the Armagnacs also attempted unsuccessfully to resolve their differences with the Burgundians. The Burgundians had recently gained control of the mad Charles VI, and on May 21, 1420, the remarkable Treaty of Troyes was signed. Charles VI agreed to allow Henry V to 4Detailed works on the complex relations among the Valois, Lancastrians, and Burgundians, as described in this and following paragraphs, include: Richard A.

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