LEGITIMACY and CONFLICT in AREAS of LIMITED STATEHOOD: a STUDY of POLITICAL VIOLENCE in NIGERIA by Steven M. Lizzol ___

Legitimacy and Conflict in Areas of Limited Statehood: A Study of Political Violence in Nigeria

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Authors Lizzol, Steven

Publisher The University of Arizona.

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/642152 LEGITIMACY AND CONFLICT IN AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD: A STUDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

Steven M. Lizzol

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

2020

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Getting to this point would not have been possible without the help and support from others. I would like to start by expressing my gratitude to my doctoral committee for their professional guidance throughout this process. To Kathleen Schwartzman for her practical reasoning and invaluable political insights. To Jeremy Fiel for his constructive evaluations and cunning methodological supervision. Finally, to my advisor Ronald Breiger whose phenomenal scholarly guidance made this dissertation and completion of this program possible. I am forever grateful for his patience, understanding, and supervision.

Of course, I could not have accomplished this feat without the love and support of my family. Thank you to my father and mother for nurturing my foundation of curiosity, discipline, and hard work; for always having faith in my capabilities and pushing me to achieve more than I thought possible. Also to my sister, Anna who has continually shown her support through all stages of my life. Thank you to the Anderson family for all your kindness and encouragement throughout this process. Thank you to my sons, Steven and Michael, for your understanding and patience while dad was in the office doing “homework.” Thank you most of all to my wife, Jenn.

Despite having intense job responsibilities, you were there to keep me on track and provide encouragement, comfort, and guidance when I needed it the most.

DEDICATION

For my sons, Steven and Michael Stay curious and keep asking questions

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government

Table of Contents ABSTRACT ...... 10 INTRODUCTION ...... 12 ZARIA MASSACRE ...... 12 LEGITIMACY ...... 13 THE ROAD AHEAD ...... 14 CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 16 THE CONSTRUCT OF LEGITIMACY ...... 16 Weber and Legitimacy ...... 17 The Importance of Legitimacy ...... 20 The Levels and Multidimensionality of Legitimacy ...... 23 THE RELATIONAL APPROACH TO LEGITIMACY ...... 27 Rulers and the Ruled ...... 28 Relationships within the Ruled ...... 29 State and Non-state Actors ...... 35 LEGITIMACY IN AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD ...... 37 LEGITIMACY AND VIOLENCE ...... 39 CHAPTER 2: LEGITIMACY IN NIGERIA ...... 47 THE STRUCTURE OF LEGITIMACY ...... 47 CATEGORIZATIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE ...... 55 THE DATA ...... 58 APPLYING THE STRUCTURE OF LEGITIMACY ...... 62 RESEARCH SITE: NIGERIA ...... 69 Federal Historical Context ...... 70 British Colonialism: 1904-1960 ...... 72 The Rise and Fall of Nigerian Republics ...... 74 Oil, Corruption, and the Path to Democracy ...... 76 The Fourth Republic ...... 79 THE GEO-POLITICAL ZONES OF NIGERIA ...... 80 North East ...... 81 North West ...... 84 North Central ...... 88 South East ...... 91 South West ...... 93 South South ...... 95 CONCLUSION ...... 97

CHAPTER 3: PROPRIETY, VALIDITY, AND THE SUSTAINMENT OF AN AUTHORITY SYSTEM ...... 99 INTRODUCTION ...... 99 Propriety, Endorsement, and the Dimensions of Legitimacy ...... 100 Propriety, Endorsement, and Authority System Sustainment ...... 104 PROPRIETY AND ENDORSEMENT ...... 108 Control Variables ...... 112 Results ...... 117 PROPRIETY, ENDORSEMENT, AND AUTHORITY SYSTEM SUSTAINMENT ...... 125 Measures ...... 125 Results – Neighborhood Resistance to Terrorist Groups ...... 128 Results - Propriety, Endorsement, and the Intent To Vote ...... 135 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ...... 142 Limitations and Future Research Directions ...... 146 CHAPTER 4: LEGITIMACY, EXPECTATIONS, & STATE PERFORMANCE ...... 149 EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY ...... 150 STATE-BASED VIOLENCE AND LEGITIMACY CHANGES ...... 154 Results – Security Needs and Relational Orientations towards Armed Non-state Organizations .... 158 LEGITIMACY CHANGES TO STATE-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN ZARIA . 176 Results - Zaria Event and Legitimacy Dimensions ...... 180 Results - Zaria Event and Negative Political Capital ...... 185 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ...... 192 Limitations and Future Research Directions ...... 196 CONCLUSION ...... 198 OVERALL FINDINGS ...... 198 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ...... 201 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ...... 205 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS ...... 207 APPENDIX A ...... 210 APPENDIX B ...... 211 APPENDIX C ...... 213 REFERENCES ...... 231

List of Figures Figure 2.1 Dimensions of Legitimacy ...... 55 Figure 2.2 Survey Wave PSU Locations ...... 60 Figure 2.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Models for the 2013 dataset ...... 67 Figure 2.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Models for the 2016 dataset ...... 68 Figure 2.5 North East Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 ...... 82 Figure 2.6 North West Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 ...... 87 Figure 2.7 North Central Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 ...... 90 Figure 2.8 South East Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 ...... 92 Figure 2.9 South West Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 ...... 94 Figure 2.10 South South Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 ...... 96 Figure 3.1. Interaction between Endorsement and Consensus – 2013 wave ...... 123 Figure 3.2. Interaction between Endorsement and Consensus – 2016 wave ...... 124 Figure 3.3. Interaction between Endorsement, Consensus, and Neighborhood Trust – 2016 wave ...... 129 Figure 3.4 Interaction between Endorsement, Consensus, and Neighborhood Trust – 2016 wave ...... 137 Figure 4.1 Interaction: State-based Violence, State Security Need, and Survey Wave on Specific Legitimacy Variables ...... 160 Figure 4.2 Interaction: State-based Violence, State Security Need, and Survey Wave on National Identity ...... 166 Figure 4.3 Interaction: State-based Violence, Support for Terrorist Groups, and Survey Wave ...... 169 Figure 4.4 Interaction: State-based Violence, Boko Haram Influence, and Survey Wave on National Identity ...... 173 Figure 4.5 Interaction: State-based Violence, Boko Haram Influence, and Survey Wave on Specific Legitimacy Variables ...... 174 Figure 4.6 Attitudes towards Nigerian Security Institutions ...... 183 Figure 4.7 Attitudes towards Boko Haram and Violence towards the Government ...... 187 Figure C.1 Ordered Logistic Regression – State Security Effectiveness ...... 225

List of Tables Table 2.1. Categories of Political Violence ...... 57 Table 2.2 Survey Dataset Locations and Sample Distribution ...... 60 Table 2.3 Summary Statistics Expected for Legitimacy Dimensions for 2013 and 2016 datasets ...... 63 Table 2.4 Factor Estimates Summary Statistics ...... 69 Table 2.5 Violent Events Geo-political Zones: 2007-2017 ...... 81 Table 2.6 Standardized Factor Indexes for the Dimensions of Legitimacy by Region: 2013 and 2016 datasets ...... 86 Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for favorable community orientations and general agreement ...... 112 Table 3.2. Hybrid Fixed and Random Effects HLM on Dimensions of Legitimacy (2013 Dataset) ...... 118 Table 3.3. Hybrid Fixed and Random Effects HLM on Dimensions of Legitimacy (2016 Dataset) ...... 120 Table 3.4 Fixed Effect HLM on Neighborhood’s Willingness to Resist (2016 Dataset) ...... 132 Table 3.5 Regression Gradient of the Function of Security Endorsement on the Willingness to Resist Terrorist Groups ...... 135 Table 3.6 Regression Gradient of the Function of Economic Endorsement on the Willingness to Resist Terrorist Groups ...... 135 Table 3.7 Fixed Effect Linear Probability HLM on Intent to Vote (2016 Dataset) ...... 139 Table 3.8 Regression Gradient of the Function of Security Endorsement on the Willingness to Resist Terrorist Groups ...... 142 Table 3.9 Regression Gradient of the Function of Security Endorsement on the Willingness to Resist Terrorist Groups ...... 142 Table 4.1 State-level independent variables ...... 157 Table 4.2. Impact of Security Needs, Perceptions towards Rebel Groups, and State-based Violence on Legitimacy ...... 163 Table 4.3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Legitimacy Orientations ...... 181 Table 4.4 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression on Security Orientations ...... 185 Table 4.5 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression on Negative Political Capital ...... 186 Table 4.6. Regional Imbalances and Expected Impacts on Model Results ...... 190 Table 4.7. Ordered Logistic Regression on the Welfare of Muslims and Importance of Education for Boys ...... 191 Table B.1 Descriptive Statistics – 2013 survey wave ...... 211 Table B.2 Descriptive Statistics – 2016 survey wave ...... 212 Table C.1 Hierarchical Linear Model on Dimensions of Legitimacy (2016 Dataset) – Full Model ...... 213 Table C.2 Hierarchical Linear Model on Dimensions of Legitimacy (2016 Dataset) – Full Model ...... 214 Table C.3 Hierarchical Linear Model on Community’s Willingness to Resist (2016 Dataset) – Full Model ...... 215 Table C.4 Hierarchical Linear Model on Community’s Intent to vote (2016 Dataset) – Full Model ...... 216 Table C.5 Legitimacy of State Residents in Low-, Medium-, and High-State Conflict, 2013 Wave ...... 217

Table C.6 Impact of Security Needs, Perceptions towards Terrorist, and State-based Violence on Legitimacy – Full Model ...... 218 Table C.7 Impact of Security Needs, Perceptions towards Boko Haram, and State-based Violence on Legitimacy – Full Model ...... 219 Table C.8 Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Legitimacy Orientations – Full Model ...... 220 Table C.9 Ordered Logistic Regression on Security Orientations Before and After the Zaria Massacre . 223 Table C.10 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression on Security Orientations – Full Model ...... 226 Table C.11 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression on Negative Political Capital – Full Model ...... 228 Table C.12 Ordered Logistic Regression on the Welfare of Muslims and Importance of Education for Boys ...... 229

ABSTRACT

Legitimacy is a ubiquitous social phenomenon that is studied in a variety of social scientific research domains. Yet, the term is inherently complex, multifaceted, and often situated within complex social arrangements. This dissertation examines the empirical complexities of legitimacy within Nigeria, an emergent and rapidly developing sub-Saharan African nation fraught with political violence and instability. The first chapter outlines the historic and contemporary theoretical fields, revealing legitimacy as a multidimensional symbolic commodity that operates within many levels of a given social structure. The dissertation synthesizes these theories and assumes a relational approach that takes into account the structural characteristics within Nigeria’s populace and evaluates the dynamics between primary actors of the country’s politically contested field: the institutionalized government, armed non-state challengers, and the citizenry as the legitimizing audience. Chapter 2 begins by operationalizing legitimacy’s multidimensionality using survey data from two nationally representative samples. Confirmatory factor analysis reveals seven distinct components consisting of both normative and performance-based evaluative sources

(where performance pertains to how a political system, institutions, and leaders function in practice). These dimensions are applied to Nigeria and reveal a diverse legitimacy landscape within a state balancing a complex and contentious ethno-political population. Chapter 3 investigates legitimacy relationships within a populace focusing on how neighborhood-level sentiments and community trust associate with individual legitimacy perceptions and attitudes towards authority system preservation. The analysis reveals that community consensus is a necessary condition for the positive influence of neighborhood-level legitimacy orientation on individual-level perceptions. Moreover, community trust is found to enhance the moderating properties of consensus on performance-based endorsement when predicting attitudes concerning

10 community resistance to terrorist organizations. Chapter 4 examines how broader citizenry needs and relational orientations influence legitimacy evaluations of violent state actions against armed non-state organizations. This chapter applies performance-based and dynamic relational legitimacy theories to two complementary sets of analyses that (1) examine national orientations after a year-long surge in state-based violence against rebel groups and (2) investigate differences in regional orientations after an unexpected and disproportionate state-based attack on civilians.

The models reveals that both security needs and orientations toward violent non-state actors significantly moderate the associations between state-based violence and legitimacy perceptions.

Additionally, outcomes stemming from the moderating effects of rebel groups orientations reveal inconsistent directionality between legitimacy dimensions. This suggests the possibility of legitimacy dilemmas, such that increased legitimacy within some sectors of a given society may come at the expense of decreased legitimacy in other sectors, and also that increased legitimacy on particular dimensions may exist simultaneously with decreased legitimacy on other dimensions.

Finally, the analysis reveals the importance of state-populace relations concerning the provision of government services, especially when matched with the needs of the citizenry, which can significantly enhance legitimacy perceptions across the dimensional spectrum. Overall, the analysis offers empirical clarification and theoretical advancements concerning the multidimensional and relational characteristics of legitimacy within a developing country characterized by violent political strife. The outcomes highlight the meaning, construction, sources, processes, and importance of legitimacy for any state concerned with establishing and sustaining central authority amidst internal areas of limited statehood.

INTRODUCTION

ZARIA MASSACRE

In the afternoon of 12 December 2015, a clash between military soldiers and civilians erupted in the northern city of Zaria, Nigeria. The violence occurred during a religious event held by the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a minority Shi’ite Muslim group located primarily in the northern region of the country. The IMN was established by Ibraheem Al-Zakzaky due to perceived marginalization of the Shi’ite population which makes up approximately five percent of the nearly 100 million Muslims in the country. In an attempt to distance themselves from a perceived oppressive, westernized government, the IMN established its own educational

(Fudiyyah) and judicial systems to include medical facilities in northern regions of the country.

Many of its members considered Al-Zakzaky and the organization in general as the rightful authority over their everyday lives (Unearthing the Truth 2016).

In the morning of 12 December, an improvised road block was established along a main road on the outskirts of the Hussainiya mosque otherwise known as the IMN headquarters. The roadblock was operated by IMN members to assist in a religious event planned at the headquarters later that day. The same day the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur

Buratai, was scheduled to oversee a military graduation parade at the army barracks within the city. An IMN barrier outside the headquarters building halted Buratiai’s progression to the ceremony. At this location each side grew increasingly suspicious of the other’s intentions. The

Nigerian military claims that IMN members were aggressively impeding their movement reporting that civilians armed with machetes and knives called out threats to assassinate the military leader. While IMN supporters grew increasingly concerned of an imminent military attack on their organization. From this moment the standoff intensified into violence as the

12 military unit cleared the road block by firing into the crowd of supporters. The IMN members fled to the headquarters building which received constant barrages of gunfire over the next 24 hours and was eventually raided by military members killing two women and injuring several others (Army Attack 2015).

After the altercations at the road block on 12 December, additional military members in heavy armored vehicles were deployed to Al-Zakazaky’s compound which was surrounded by hundreds of IMN supporters. Information concerning the altercations and the attacks on the IMN headquarters soon spread through the crowd who grew nervous of the increasing military presence. Civilians began to throw stones to impede additional approaching military members.

The army responded firing live ammunition into the crowd deliberately killing hundreds of unarmed protesters as they fled into the compound. The attack lasted into the next morning when soldiers approached the building killing wounded civilians, detaining Al-Zakzaky, and setting fires to buildings with people still inside. This occurrence was describe by one member in a 2016

Amnesty International Report:

“My daughter Aishatu had called my wife late in the morning on Sunday and said that her husband had been shot dead while standing near her outside the compound. Then Nuseiba called me just after 12noon and said that she had been shot in the stomach and her sister Aishatu had been shot in the head. They were both still alive by then. Then my brother who was also at the compound told me that my other daughter Fatima was shot outside the compound. Aishatu’s little girl was also killed. I think they all died in the fire in the makeshift medical clinic”” (Nigeria – Unearthing the Truth 2016:27)

Military units quickly demolished the IMN headquarters and Al-Zakzaky’s compound, and allegedly filled mass graves in secrecy on the outskirts of the city with an estimated 347 bodies.

LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy is inherently a complex term. Since 423 B.C., scholars have analyzed how it develops, sustains, changes, and diminishes. Despite legitimacy’s conceptualization centuries

13 ago, it remains timelessly relevant to the contemporary understanding of power relations. It is a ubiquitous element often discreetly woven into the fabric of many other social processes. This dissertation brings legitimacy into the forefront and attempts to harness its complex nature to further understand how violent political actions, such as those depicted in the vignette above, become uniquely meaningful to different actors within a structure of broader social relations.

This research borrows from sociological, political science, and social psychological theories to explore the empirical characteristics of legitimacy – its meaning, construct, sources, and processes. It does so using a multidimensional approach and applying it to different levels of relations within a given power structure. Rather than apply such theories to fully legitimated authority systems, the analysis evaluates legitimacy’s empirical characteristics in conditions where central authorities lack full control over their constituents. In other words, situations where legitimacy becomes an indispensable factor for the sustainment of power relations. As recognized by Weber ([1914] 2013), a primary goal of authority systems is to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy, or a belief in its right to authority. Without legitimacy beliefs, the sustainment of power relations becomes costly and ultimately unsustainable in the long-run. Therefore the main question this dissertation seeks to explore is how legitimacy develops within areas of weak governance. In doing so the analysis assesses how the needs and expectations of a given populace dictate the legitimacy evaluations of service provisions provided by the state.

THE ROAD AHEAD

The next chapter (Chapter 1) offers a review of the literature and provides the theoretical grounds for the multidimensional and relational construct of legitimacy. Chapter 2 furthers the discussion on the different dimensions of legitimacy offering a structure constitutes the basis of analysis used throughout subsequent chapters. Additionally, Chapter 2 provides a historical

14 outline and a contemporary examination of the critical players within the field of political conflict in Nigeria, the nation of focus for this project. It will also evaluate variations in legitimacy orientations for populations within different regions in the country. Chapter 3 will evaluate the relational aspects of legitimacy as it operates in the local context within areas of limited statehood. This chapter further examines how legitimacy perceptions at the individual and community level influence authority system sustaining attitudes. Chapter 4 investigates the broader relational aspects of legitimacy concerning the violent transactions between a given governance actor, challengers, and legitimacy audiences. It first examines how prior structures of legitimacy relationships dictate how state-based violent events are evaluated by different sectors of the citizenry. This chapter also examines the specific case of state-based violence towards unarmed civilians presented at the beginning of this short introduction; a two day event identified by some as the ‘Zaria Massacre.’ One of the survey datasets used for this research was administered over a period that captured legitimacy perceptions before and after the event. This offers unique insight to the variations in legitimacy as a result of a highly publicized violent a.

Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes all findings and draws conclusions from the previous chapters.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

As a concept, legitimacy is used in a variety of social scientific research ranging from the analysis of individual perceptions (usually towards various elements of governing systems) to explaining state interactions within the larger international community (Clark 2007). Yet, the term has proven rather elusive as researchers who do draw on it often fail to fully delineate the concept. Perhaps more perplexing is that the scholars who do offer a conceptualization of legitimacy frequently fall short to reach a coherent consensus. This comes to no fault of the scholarly community as the concept is inherently complex, multifaceted, and often situated within complex social arrangements (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012, Dornbusch and Scott 1975). A significant portion of this chapter will examine past legitimacy work to build a conceptualization that includes the essential markings of the term. The following sections will provide a review of the literature concerning legitimacy as a multidimensional, empirical concept that operates on multiple levels within a given society. By the end, the reader should have a developed understanding concerning this research project’s approach to legitimacy and a solid grasp on the direction for analysis in subsequent chapters.

THE CONSTRUCT OF LEGITIMACY

Theories on the importance of legitimacy date back 24 centuries with most throughout focusing on the stability of power relations. Early philosophical debates assumed a purely normative approach focused on the classic argument that might does not necessarily make right.

In other words, the acceptance of power relations by subordinates requires something more than raw coercive power where superior A threatens or uses violence to promote a desired attitude or behavior from subordinate B. The normative philosophical discourse of legitimacy provided the construct for more descriptive and empirical approaches focused on the stability of governments

16 leading to Machiavelli ([1883]1517, [1998]1532) who posited that pure coercive power is not capable of sustaining control over a population in the long run, but rather that long-term political stability depends on the legitimacy of the governing system which result in the voluntary acceptance of power relations. Machiavelli’s argument became further developed through

Rousseau’s ([1913]1762) social contract and Locke’s (1690) proclamation that a successful political power rests on a governing systems ability to provide for the public good resulting in consent of the governed. However, it was Max Weber at the turn of the 19th century who compiled such arguments into its most developed form.

Weber and Legitimacy

Weber ([1947] 1964, [1914] 2013) provided a conceptualization of legitimacy that many contemporary researchers use as the foundation for further extrapolation and is of particular relevance here. With a focus on social relationships, Weber recognized “power” as the

“probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rest” ([1914] 2013:53).

He further delineated power into different types, one being “authority” representing “the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons”.1 This suggests that compliance through authority, as a specific type of power and thus a probability of obedience that is more limited in scope, occurs for multiple reasons ranging from the desire to receive rewards to the avoidance of violent coercion. However, Weber theorized that authority limited purely on the appeal to material interests or other similar calculations of advantages will eventually result in relatively unstable power relations (32). Therefore, the

1 “Authority” is sometimes used interchangeably with “domination” or “legitimate domination” depending on the translation.

17 continuation of authority relations requires some degree of voluntary compliance; hence the critical element of legitimacy.

Weber viewed legitimacy as an affective appraisal in terms of beliefs based on the disposition to obey an acceptable or desired authority structure; such that, “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” ([1947] 1964: 382). Here it becomes evident that Weber’s view on legitimacy takes an empirical rather than a normative approach where the concept is “much more than a matter of theoretical or philosophical speculation; it rather constitutes the basis of very real differences in the empirical structure of authority” ([1914] 2013:953).2 From this empirical approach, Weber argues that every authority system desiring sustainment should attempt “to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy” (213). This does not suggest that legitimacy is a sufficient condition for the establishment and sustainment of authority, but stresses its importance to the sustainment of power relations. Therefore, we can progress with the assumption that to some degree a governance actor, which may be a state or non-state actor, comprised of administrative and security capacities, depends to some degree on the recognition of its legitimacy; in other words, its ‘license to govern’ or ‘right to rule’ (215, see also Gilley 2009, Linz 1980, Risse and

Stollenwerk 2018, Tilly 1985).

Using a multilevel approach, Weber ([1914] 2013) carefully distinguished between legitimacy beliefs at the individual level from that of the collective. To various degrees, an individual possesses beliefs on whether an authority relation is more or less legitimate. Weber argues that more important are the legitimacy beliefs of such a relation by the collective of which

2 Empirical legitimacy also discussed by (Schabert 1986:102) as “not the truth of the philosopher, but the belief of the people.”

18 the individual is embedded. The collective belief system concerning the legitimacy of a power relation establishes what Weber identifies as “validity.” Validity, or the legitimate order developed through norms and values and supported by social rewards and sanctions, heavily influences individuals such that it is “held by at least part of the actors to define a model or to be binding, [and] naturally increases the probability that action will in fact conform to it, often to a very considerable degree” (31). Thus, given the presence of validity, individuals become oriented to and behave accordingly through the existence and internalization of a legitimized authority and its consequential social order.

One final important aspect of Weber’s legitimacy theory to be discussed here is his categorization of its different bases. Weber acknowledged that citizens of a state ascribe legitimacy to, and in turn comply with higher levels of authority for different reasons. Such now famous bases include traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal foundations with Weber’s argument of progression towards the later as societies modernize. Therefore, authority systems exercise their power through different legitimacy claims in attempts to entice obedience of one type or another from a given population. Rather than explain these well-known typologies, I address them here as a critical development in legitimacy theory by Weber who recognizes that types of claims and evaluative criteria for power relations that dictate the ‘right to rule’ may be different from one society to another to include possible differences between sectors within the same society.

Weber’s theoretical foundation offers three critical elements that support the conceptualization of legitimacy and provide a solid base to further understand its dimensions and sources. First, power relations require a degree of legitimacy to enable the voluntary compliance of those ruled under a proposed social order. Coercion against a given group or population may

19 offer initial compliance, but such power relations are difficult to sustain in the long-run without some degree of voluntary consent. In other words, legitimacy is a crucial, yet not sufficient, aspect of power relations and must be taken into account if raw methods of power are to transcend into forms of accepted authority through the willful consent of subordinates. Second, legitimacy is mainly recognized as a belief or cognitive orientation towards a broader social belief system. While he does not deny that individual beliefs concerning social power relations influence social action, that which is deemed as valid or collective legitimacy primarily guides compliance for authority systems. As a result, those who personally disagree with the power relations for one reason or another are theorized to comply if embedded within a belief system that validates and observably ‘directs’ others concerning behavior towards the current governing arrangement. Furthermore, this point addresses that legitimacy is inherently dependent on relational ties whether it be between society and the ruling authorities or an individual and the larger society itself. Third, the different bases from which legitimacy develops suggests that it depends on cultural orientations of a given society. Therefore, legitimacy serves as a type of

“symbolic commodity” that connects with a society’s belief patterns with the potential to constitute new cultural frames defining “how things are” as well as “how things should be”

(Duyvesteyn 2017, Johnson et al. 2006:56, Thornhill 2008:165). The next section will examine each elements in further detail referencing more contemporary studies to develop the theoretical approach for this research project.

The Importance of Legitimacy

Since Weber’s seminal theorization of legitimacy, its importance to the stability of power relations has been heavily debated. Using the limited definition of legitimacy as being a belief constituted within a collective belief system that assesses and ultimately grants the rightfulness

20 of a particular power relation, researchers have challenged its specific application and importance often dismissing the concept as an uninfluential social phenomenon that serves little purpose when compared to other ‘authentic’ forces characterizing and explaining the outcomes of power relations – material access, coercion, geographic setting, and the like. In his early work,

Tilly (1978, 1985:171) considered legitimacy as an inconsequential element of power relations representing merely “the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority” based on fear of retaliation underscoring the importance of an authority’s monopoly of violence rather than their ability to conform to the social norms of rightful authority. Rather than concern itself with the generalized beliefs of the citizens, a governing body should focus on military might against other collective groups with access to and the ability to use material resources that may substantially challenge the current state of power relations.

Similarly, Przeworski (1991) and Kalyvas (2006:92) argued that collaboration and cooperation from citizens occurs primarily due to a lack of other alternatives and the overpowering coercive control of a particular territory where any aspect of popular satisfaction becomes wrongfully interpreted as an outcome of legitimacy. Provided the following arguments against legitimacy’s importance to include the inherent difficulties in conceptualizing and operationalizing legitimacy, it has been recognized as “one of the greatest “omitted variables”” in social science research (Gilley 2009:xiii).

Despite the past belittlement of the concept, legitimacy has found a resurgence into contemporary research due to further conceptual refinements and measurement capabilities.

Recapturing the essence of Weber’s argument against the sustainability of coercion, researchers have found legitimacy as a critical element to the development and performance of various governing actors (Arjona 2016, Felbab-Brown et al. 2017, Johnson and Watson 2015, Zelditch

21 and Walker 2003, Wolff 2015). Such scholars argue that legitimacy remains a prime concern when accounting for the stability of governing bodies and the motivation of appropriate behavior within certain power relations. As Wimmer (2013:5) recently posited, legitimacy, as an element of power relations needs “to move center stage” concerning scholarship on nation building, ethnic politics, and violent conflict. Tilly (2003, 2005b) came to this realization in his later work which stressed the importance of trust and community identity in the development and sustainment of democratic regimes – an approach that will be discussed further in later sections.

Furthermore, even those who argue that legitimacy fails to account for or simply ‘masks’ the more crucial factors that predict regime stability/change, there remains a degree of importance, and hence a rightful place for its consideration. Even Przeworksi (1985) who borrows from

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, argues that the “consent to exploitation” largely depends on the legitimacy of power relations. While he believes legitimacy ultimately develops through material interests, it constitutes as a non-material “readiness” or belief by subordinates providing “a time horizon beyond which this consent, regardless how thoroughly it is organized, will no longer be granted” (146). Therefore, even Prezeworski acknowledges “legitimacy” as an important aspect within power relations – a feeling (“readiness”) that influences the chance that those subordinate to authorities will accept and abide by their command. Finally, advancements in survey administration and data collection techniques have recently allowed researchers to examine aspects of legitimacy more accurately than previously possible. Available population data collected by organizations such as Afrobarometer, the Program for East Asia Democratic

Studies, to include the Gallup dataset analyzed for this study provide researchers the information to evaluate attitudes towards democracy, governance, economy, and social conditions. Such attitudinal resources combined with geospatial data on pertinent social events such as acts of

22 political violence, riots, and peaceful protests make contemporary assessments concerning the influence of legitimacy possible in ways more consistent with its original theorization.

The Levels and Multidimensionality of Legitimacy

As Weber argued, and as many have further developed, the basis of legitimacy is differentiated – the main reason an individual or community grants legitimacy to a ruler may be entirely different than another. Adding further nuance to the concept, Weber theorized that different dimensions of legitimacy may be influencing the acceptance of power relations simultaneously with more importance given to one dimension over another within a given time and context. However, legitimacy’s early theoretical construct lacks sufficient empirical practice.

Many researchers who include legitimacy in their analysis of political outcomes typically refine the concept to one aspect such as the degree of ‘confidence’ or ‘trust’ an individual has in a political system. While such an operationalization may provide insight to the impact of legitimacy, it fails to capture the multidimensionality aspect that the term is theorized to represent. Furthermore, those who use a multivariable approach to legitimacy often arrange various measures into one generalized factor. While this adheres to capturing the diverseness of legitimacy, it ultimately limits the analyst’s ability to examine how specific elements impact attitudinal or behavioral consequences. Additionally, researchers often fail to capture how legitimacy is represented at different levels by either aggregating means at the individual level to represent generalized collective attitudes rather than considering the effects collective legitimacy has on individual perceptions and behavior towards a governing entity.

First, legitimacy is a construct theorized to exist across multiple levels in given authority relationships. As posited by Weber, legitimacy develops both within the individual and throughout a collective. Borrowing from Dornbusch and Scott’s (1975) theory of authority,

Walker, Thomas, and Zelditch (1986) further clarified the different levels of legitimacy by recognizing propriety to be a particular individual’s personal belief that an act, belief, practice or procedure is right. Conversely, validity represents the collective understanding of what is right and observably governs the behaviors of individuals within a particular collective (Zelditch

2001:6). Much like Weber, Zelditch (2001:44) along with his colleagues argue that for the individual, a valid social order exists as a “cognitive object of orientation” that binds or embeds that person in a system of social controls making certain perceptions and social actions more likely than others despite propriety orientations (see also Chou 2015).

Embedded within validity are two distinct legitimacy types that capture the differences between multiple levels within power relations: authorization and endorsement. Authorization refers to the beliefs held by a ruler’s equals or superiors that legitimate the ruler’s power over their subordinates. Therefore, given ruler A has power over subordinate B, authorization captures the effects of power wielders at or above A’s level that legitimate A’s power over B. For example when a president publically appoints a cabinet member and offers that individual their confidence and support. Endorsement relates to the beliefs held by a subordinates equals, who are subject to the same power relations, that legitimate a ruler’s control over such subordinates – the beliefs from B’s equals legitimate A’s control over B (Dornbusch and Scott 1975, Zelditch

2001). For instance, President George W. Bush’s record high approval ratings immediately after the terrorist attacks on 9/11 decidedly legitimized his position of power in the U.S. government garnering an immense public support to engage in a costly global war against terrorism (Foyle

2004). Similar popular support endorsed President Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to declare war on Germany and Japan after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Berinsky 2007). Ultimately, with authorization and/or endorsement, legitimacy becomes a powerful social force.

With the knowledge that legitimacy operates through different levels within a power structure, one must also consider it as multidimensional concept. The multidimensionality approach has been developed through both organizational and political research fields. Both camps have argued that past legitimacy research operationalization of legitimacy were too limited; often reduced to a single variable that hindered broader aspects inherent in the concept.

In the organizational field, most notably Suchman (1995) divided legitimacy into three dimensions: pragmatic (assessments based on self-interested, practical consequences), moral

(evaluation based on normative expectations), and cognitive (internalized aspect of everyday life). While not strictly hierarchical, Suchman (1995:585) argues that as one moves from pragmatic to cognitive types, “legitimacy becomes more elusive to obtain and more difficult to manipulate, but it also becomes more subtle, more profound, and more self-sustaining, once established.” This approach to legitimacy differentiates types of ephemeral to more enduring and meaningful dimensions. Therefore, the argument here is that different dimensions of legitimacy equate to distinct consequences to concerning their strength and scope.

Scholars in the political research field have taken a similar multidimensional approach.

Easton (1975) organized the aspects of legitimacy or “political support” to range from specific support (a satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the perceived behaviors of certain political actors or institutions) to diffuse support (an evaluation of what a governing system is or represents rather than specifics on what it does or does not do). Specific support concerning certain ‘objects’ depends more on the outputs and performances of elected and appointed political authorities where diffuse support assumes a more enduring evaluation or generalized feelings towards a government system. Easton’s distinction between specific and diffuse political system support laid the groundwork for further development concerning the multidimensionality of legitimacy

25 particularly by political scientists Norris, Dalton, and Booth and Seligson. Norris (1999, 2011) further advanced Easton’s spectrum into five distinct components ranging from specific to diffuse elements of political support respectively: political community (attachment to the nation beyond present institutions and incumbents highlighting a sense of belonging, national pride, and national identity), regime principles (support for the values of a political system), regime performance (support for how a political system function in practice), regime institutions

(generalized support for political institutions), and political actors (the evaluation of the performance of particular political leaders) (see also Dalton 1999, 2004). Specifically it was

Booth and Seligson (2009) who closely examined the sources to and outcomes of the different dimensions of legitimacy finding variations that support the requirement to examine legitimacy as a multidimensional concept rather than have it ‘black boxed’ into one variable. The different dimensions will be further discussed in the next chapter; it is briefly mentioned here to assist with legitimacy’s conceptualization which can now be fully identified.

Provided the following discussion, we can conceptualize legitimacy as a multidimensional belief, embedded within a belief system consisting of values and norms, that assesses a governing object as appropriate or desired, thus perceiving the entity as having the right to rule. It is worth clarifying that based on the multidimensionality of legitimacy, the belief in a governing entities right to rule stems from both material and immaterial sources. A focus strictly on one aspect or the other disregards critical individuals or community considerations when complying with a governing entity. Furthermore, material and immaterial sources may matter more or less to legitimacy sentiments based on overarching historic and social contexts which an authority system is embedded in; a point further explored in subsequent chapters. With legitimacy conceptualized, the next section will discuss further attributes of legitimacy that will

26 be examined in this research project. Specifically, the next sections will discuss the relational properties that influence legitimacy, assessments of legitimacy in areas of limited statehood, and the relationship between legitimacy and acts of political violence.

THE RELATIONAL APPROACH TO LEGITIMACY

The legitimation of power takes place within a structure of relationships provided a given social and temporal contexts (Beetham 1991:99). Political research often focuses on the relationship developed between governing systems and its citizens. As suggested above, this relationship remains vital concerning the sustainment of an authority structure and the cost of authority through raw material interests or coercion alone; this especially reigns true for democratic political systems that require voluntary consent and popular participation to properly function (Beetham 1991, Gilley 2009). While the relationship between a political system and its constituents is important, restricting analysis to this interaction limits the transactions between two social entities when perceptions and behaviors often result from a complex network (i.e., three or more actors) of alliances and social influence (Granovetter 1985, Deephouse and

Suchman 2008). If the analysis of legitimacy is inherently relational, it requires consideration of the entire network of actors involved, not just a dichotomous relationship between leaders and followers (Malthaner 2015, Schoon 2016, 2017, Tilly 2003, 2005a, 2005b). Additionally, while legitimacy may produce stable power relations over a period of time, its establishment or diminishment consists of an ongoing process of legitimacy claims and feedback from the intended audience within a dynamic network of relations (Gilley 2009, Schoon et al. 2020). As

Bottoms and Tankebe (2013:129) suggest, legitimacy must be viewed as dialogic and relational between those claiming legitimacy and those evaluating that claim suggesting legitimacy as a dynamic and context-dependent process between many actors within a network of relations. A

27 holistic approach to legitimacy includes an examination of such systems of relationships between the rulers, possible challengers and the diversified sectors of the ruled. The following sections discuss the importance of such relationships laying the foundation for the scope of analysis concerning legitimacy and different social actors for this research project.

Rulers and the Ruled

The first examination will evaluate the relationship between the rulers and the ruled which will lead into a discussion of the importance of the relationships among the ruled themselves. By this point, the importance of the relationship between a governing entity and a given population has been heavily salient. Historically, scholars have stressed that for a governing entity to gain and maintain legitimacy it must perform in such a manner to represent and support the general interests of those whom they possess authority over (Beetham 1991,

Kelman 2001). This initial phase in the legitimation process is commonly known as performance based or pragmatic form of legitimacy derived from the reliable provision of goods and services in exchange for, what may be considered as a less meaningful and more transitory practice of obedience (Suchman 1995, Rothstein 2009). As a governing entity maintains a desired level of performance it possesses, the potential to achieve more enduring dimensions of legitimacy if they share similar governing goals and values of their constituents increasing cooperation and compliance (Schmelze and Stollenwerk 2018). The cyclical process of positive governing performances that develop into sustaining legitimacy beliefs that enhance a governing entities overall effectiveness is known as the virtuous circle – a powerful process of positive feedback that preserves governing institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Blair 2009).

Vicious circles are also possible when a governing entity’s failure to adequately perform and provide goods and services decreases their legitimacy resulting in lower levels of support

28 and participation by the ruled. Consequently, decreases in legitimacy result in further detriment to the performance of a governing entity. Once such a cycle occurs, ruling entities may begin to disregard general interests if attempts to cater to them fail to produce required support to sustain the power relations (Englebert 2000). Thus, “disconnected” power-holders may develop narcissistic tendencies individually or based on ethnic alliances and perform more coercive acts to maintain control (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, Bottoms and Tankebe 2013:154, Wimmer

2013). In an analysis of the relationship between states and their citizens, Gilley (2009:88, 93) suggests that,

“states may sow the seeds of their destruction when they begin to disengage from society on the basis of trust and reengage with it on the basis of threat and bribery. Once states (companies or school or parents, for that matter) begin to treat their citizens as knaves rather than angels, citizens are more likely to act like knaves because they believe everyone else is doing likewise, including the state itself… To win trust, the state must begin by trusting society… What is important is the way that the state becomes embedded in society through this cycle.”

Therefore, a governing entity’s relation with the society for which it claims to rule over becomes crucial to its sustainment. Those who seek long-term rule over constituents and thus require legitimacy must behave in a manner, constrained to some degree by the norms, values, and expectations of those they desire to rule over. The next section addresses how structural dynamics within followers makes legitimacy more or less achievable.

Relationships within the Ruled

The actions of governing actors and institutions towards a given population are an important element in the legitimation process. The evaluative process amongst the followers that results in a response to governing actors is another critical component that often becomes over simplified or disregarded in legitimacy research. Most empirical analyses evaluate legitimacy through the aggregation of individual beliefs often derived through survey data. While individual

29 perceptions towards a governing actor, or propriety, indicate an important aspect of legitimacy, they may not necessarily recognize the main motivator of behavior as argued by Weber and other more contemporary sociological scholars (Horne 2009, Tilly 2005, Melamed 2012, Zelditch

2006). Such scholars suggest that validity, or the “collective consensus that observably governs the behavior of, and its binding on, the members of a collectivity” is the enhancing social force that makes behavior more or less likely despite individual propriety (Zelditch 2001:6). A focus solely in individual beliefs disregards important factors external to the individual theorized to exceedingly influence acceptance and consequential behavior towards governing systems. To further understand how legitimacy claims by governing actors develops into valid forms of legitimacy, researchers should consider the structural arrangement of social actors within the governed.

In his critical remarks on Weber’s theory of authority, Blau (1964) argued that legitimacy perceptions concerning a governing entity’s right to rule developed throughout a collective as a result of the benevolent use of power by those in positions of authority. Linking with the discussion concerning the relationship between governing actors and their constituents above, he argued that authorities who use their position of power to further collective interests of dependent constituents develop a social relationship that obligates followers to reciprocate through willing compliance. Consequently, followers develop a common interest and shared beliefs to remain under the authority’s good will. The expression of shared feelings of loyalty develops collective norms of compliance which becomes enforced by the subordinates themselves independently of a ruler’s personal influence over a particular follower. A lack of personal obligation, or propriety, is not enough and will succumb to the normative constraints of the loyal collective; in other words, the endorsement of the authority system overcomes

30 individual concerns. As a sanctioned norm, “[t]he compliance of subordinates in authority relationships [becomes] as voluntary as our custom of wearing clothes” (312). Therefore, the greater legitimacy expressed for an authority structure amongst followers (i.e., validity), the higher the bar is raised for individuals to act defiantly against authority relationships (see also

Beetham 1991, Gilley 2009:152). While Blau argues against Weber’s theory concerning the inevitable transformation to rational-legal bases of legitimacy, he agrees with Weber’s approach on the importance of validity positing that endorsement transforms into an expectation of compliance by subordinates who are dependent on the actions of leaders given the inherent structure of power relations. Furthermore, research has shown that the effect endorsement has on compliance becomes generalized throughout a collective regardless of an individual’s position of advantage or disadvantage (Malamed 2012). Granovetter (2017:98) summarizes such outcomes as the “force of legitimate authority” where actors acknowledge and behave in orientation to a normative obligation to follow those who rule over them. Thus, legitimacy, developed through a base of norms and values, has the potential to constitute as a norm itself established and maintained through the structural constraints within the collective.

The social relations within the followers depicted by Blau (1963) clearly assumes a condition of dependence of subordinates to the performance of authorities. Perhaps more subtly, he further assumes a degree of interdependence, or at the very least a communicative connection between followers that aids in the development of normative obligations to obey those in higher positions of command. As suggested by Habermas (1976:105), it is a “communication community … who as participants in a practical discourse test the validity claims of norms and, to the extent that they accept them with reasons, arrive at the conviction that in the given circumstances the proposed norms are “right”.” However, the knowledge that there are varying

31 degrees of interdependence, or cohesion, within different given groups or communities suggests a similar degree in variance to the effect endorsement has on individuals. Recognizing this,

Horne (2009) suggests that the structure of social relations within a collective of followers dictates the impact endorsement has on individuals. If the ruler is deemed effective in their representation of and performance for the general interests of a collective structured by strong relationships, then constituents will be more likely to champion (or at the very least passively tolerate) fellow citizens who obey rules and commands administered by that ruler. At the same time, followers will be more likely to enforce legitimacy norms by sanctioning the disobedient in efforts to appear as valuable group members and to deter those who might weaken the current beneficial power structure thereby impacting the well-being of the community. An individual may refuse to recognize the authority of a ruler, but be bound by the consent of the connected collectivity (Hegtvedt and Johnson 2009). Conversely, more tenuous social ties decrease the likelihood of norm enforcement resulting in less social pressure to conform. In this instance, propriety becomes unchecked by validity enticing higher degrees of individual deviance/disobedience as a result of minimized consequences from peers.

Perhaps more concerning for authority structures are cohesive followers who enforce norms of delegitimacy, defined here as a belief counter to legitimacy where consent to a governing entity becomes withdrawn by some degree. In such cases, followers view the actions of governing systems as detrimental to their values and overall well-being resulting in the enforcement of norms that support attitudes and behaviors of resistance and change towards the authority system that occur outside of institutionalized means; in other words a “disloyal opposition” (Linz 1980:27). As research has shown, cultivated perceptions of delegitimacy for governing actors makes deviant acts within a close-knit community significantly more likely

32 than if the governing actors were collectively perceived as legitimate (Kirk and Papachristos

2011, Papachristos et al. 2013). Similarly Hagan and colleagues (2016) found that perceptions of state delegitimacy amongst Iraqi Sunni communities significantly predicted increases in insurgent attacks against new Shia-dominated Iraqi government in 2007. The aforementioned studies attribute deviant behavior to a cultural frame based on (de)legitimacy, made possible through community social structures that cultivated shared meanings, shaped interpretations, and amplified the support for and enactment of violent strategies of action by non-state actors.

Tilly (2005b) provides a similar account towards the importance of relations within followers concerning trust networks. Trust networks, represented in a society by people connected through strong ties built on high degrees of conviction and dependence between members, possess the potential to considerably legitimize or delegitimize governing entity deemed ‘external’ from the network. For Tilly, it is not simply that ‘trust’ connects with democracy, rather that the relations between trust networks and public politics develop and solidify over time. The democratic dilemma concerning democracy’s dependence on some level of trust concerns the connection of existing trust networks to public politics without producing damaging effects on either side. Such relationships will only work through the “contingent consent on the part of the trust network members… arguing that a governmental shift away from coercion toward combinations of capital and commitment promotes contingent consent [i.e., legitimacy]” (2005b: 133-135). For example, if a state government performs in a manner that coincides with the values and norms established within a trust network (e.g., a tight-knit rural community) and are able to provide substantial benefits, then the state becomes more likely to establish its legitimacy throughout the entire network. Doing so leads to the blurring between social boundaries and allows for legitimacy to develop beyond ethnic or community lines

(Wimmer 2008, 2013). Conversely, if a state offers legitimacy claims that fail to provide expected benefits or that counter established norms and values within a trust network, it risks collective perceptions of delegitimation leading to stronger boundaries that further separate a given community (“us”) from a given governing actor (“them”) decreasing the desire to participate in democratic public politics and possibly increase attitudes and behaviors of collective resistance (Tilly 2003, 2005a).3

Theories from Tilly, Horne, and Blau supported through empirical research suggest that

Dornbush and Scott’s theory of endorsement, and ultimately Weber’s theory of validity matters when it comes to establishing social order, obedience, and support for a governing entity. As suggested, follower networks are important when considering the support or undermining of a particular governing entity. When analyzing legitimacy, researchers should consider variations in the structural characteristics of the followers as they have the potential to enhance the effects of validity through endorsement.

The research discussed thus far concerning the relations between rulers and the ruled and the structure of relations within the ruled themselves offer three elements that are critical to determining the effects of legitimacy (Zelditch 2001b). The first being consensus. Without it, legitimacy derives from propriety alone and such unchecked variance may threaten the power relations that constitute a given authority system. While it is doubtful any group or community will possess complete consensus where everyone equally supports a given authority system, similar to Zelditch and Walker (2003), my approach considers ‘near-consensus’ to qualify as consensus. Second, power dependence within a system of relations necessitates a need for

3 Tilly’s trust network theory is similar to Citrin et al.’s (1975:3) ‘alienation/allegiance’ or Seligson’s (1983) ‘political support/alienation’ approach, they focus on individuals where Tilly offers a more structural approach which is argued to have greater application to legitimacy analysis.

34 legitimacy. If followers where not dependent on rulers for services, material goods, or general social order than there would be no requirement for an authority system. Similarly, rulers

(especially those within a democratic system) to one degree or another depend on the performance of their constituents whether through paying taxes or providing votes for elections.

Finally, the density of social relations ensures that validity propagates throughout a given group or community. Legitimacy depends on these criteria for normative effects to occur. Deficiencies in one condition or another likely decreases the overall effects of legitimacy.

State and Non-state Actors

A propensity of the political research field discussed thus far have examined the authority systems between states and the citizens which they govern. This research project will assume a similar focus, however, it also recognizes that legitimacy relationships from a given population can occur with both state and non-state actors. Through historical analysis, Tilly (2005) suggests as states became more active in controlled regions, they were viewed as ‘challengers’ to the

‘non-state’ legitimized power relations within a local community characterized through strong bonds of trust. Using a Weberian approach, one could presume such communities to grant the right to rule within their community through a traditional bases – faith, family, or otherwise. In such cases, citizens viewed the state as the non-legitimate actor who threatened the legitimated power structure. Scholars such as Beetham (1991, 1993) and Tyler (1990, 2006) would argue that disregarding legal or constitutional arrangements of power abandons a critical aspect of legitimacy analysis. Yet, what is legal is not necessarily always justified as right; therefore, this research project relaxes such stipulations with a stronger focus on norms and values that justify a governing entity’s right to rule over a population. From Tilly and other contemporary scholars

(Arjona 2016, Bakker et al. 2012, Duyvesteyn 2017, Podder 2017, and Schoon 2017), the

35 theoretical and empirical focus in the political field has grown to consider legitimacy relations towards both the state and non-state actors vying to establish power relations over a population.

Non-state organizations such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Taliban in

Afghanistan who provide a governing capacity that offers or co-opts public services such as civil dispute reconciliation, healthcare, and education are recognized by some communities as a better alternative than the constitutionalized state or U.S.-led counterinsurgency actors (Gawthorpe

2017, Jackson and Florian 2019, Minatti and Duyvesteyn 2019). The Taliban in particular has been able to maintain their influence over Afghan communities since 1996 not through advanced or large-scale military might, but by the development of local legitimacy and the appeal of swift

Islamic justice opposed to the perceived corrupt Afghan government (Afghanistan’s Government

2019). ‘Successful’ counterinsurgency operations in such circumstances may cause a decrease in legitimacy for state actors initiating or strengthening vicious circle outcomes (Grynkewich 2008,

Lyall et al. 2013). Therefore, the legitimacy approach for this research project relaxes a strict adherence to state-citizens relations and assumes a broader approach to its conceptualization.

The main point made here and carried throughout the analysis is that legitimacy, as a system of relationships between rulers and the ruled, is one not to be constrained between the legally declared state and its citizens. Rather, legitimacy exists as a symbolic commodity that may be granted or restricted to various types of possible governing entities within a given regional or social context.

Given that legitimacy is not strictly limited to the relationship between a state and its citizens, the interaction for legitimacy between those governing entities who have it and those who strive to obtain it is often one of political complexity, friction, and conflict. For many developing countries, particularly those with a past history of colonialism, this struggle often

36 results in violent conflict over who has the right to rule (Englebert 2000). However, as recognized by Schoon (2017:735) “the process of building legitimacy is contingent not simply on the behaviors of [challengers], but on how those behaviors are situated within (and affected by) a broader system of relationships.” For example, if an authority violently attacks a challenger who is deemed legitimate by some sector of the population, it becomes more likely such behavior will delegitimize the state’s authority to some degree (Lyall et al. 2013).

Thus, to properly analyze legitimacy one must consider the complex and dynamic social context of current authorities, challengers, and constituents which they desire to rule over. Rarely are all three considered when developing a framework of legitimacy analysis. This is one area this research project attempts accomplish. Disregarding this dynamic network approach for a pure dyadic relationship between one element and another fails to capture essential characteristics that help explain the development and outcomes of legitimacy. Assuming a relational approach considers an entire network of actors involved to properly grasp the effects of legitimacy since “each party in a conflict is inevitably perceived as legitimate by someone”

(Schoon 2016:148). Furthermore, the reality of multiple legitimacy audiences creates legitimacy dilemmas, or “[s]ituations in which the actions that are necessary to increase an actor’s legitimacy vis-à-vis one vital audience decrease it among another.” (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk

2018: 454). These types of zero-sum conflicts are important considerations for governing entities especially in areas of limited statehood.

LEGITIMACY IN AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD

Another aspect to consider when examining the sources and effects of legitimacy is the breadth and depth of command of a power structure over its constituents. For this consideration,

I will focus on the state, however, it can apply to other contexts regarding power relations as

37 well. As mentioned previously, many political social scientist have evaluated legitimacy by aggregating individual perceptions into a single generalized measure. Thus, aggregated state legitimacy has been a staple throughout much of the cross-national studies concerning legitimacy

(Gilley 2009, Wimmer 2010, 2018). While cross-national studies have provided great insights to the general sources and outcomes of legitimacy across regions, I argue that such an approach drastically risks over generalizing the critical components of legitimacy and concealing the contextual nuance within a state’s boarders. If politics are indeed local, then it behooves political researchers to investigate relations as such especially given the argument that legitimacy of state and non-state actors vary across regions and subnational levels within countries (McLoughlin

2014, Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018). Legitimacy research needs to consider cases where governments are, but perhaps more importantly where governments are not serving its citizens and where other organized groups often aim to fill the gaps of a given state’s neglect (Levi

2019:377). Such groups often reflect a lack of confidence (not illegitimacy necessarily) in the government’s ability to act. Thus, the relational aspect of legitimacy becomes further complicated considering the lack of general consensus within states. In areas where the state is weak, governing entities are restricted in their capability to sustain levels of performance expected by those under their authority making legitimacy a more localized, rather than universal concept (Beetham 1991, Wimmer 2010).

Risse and Stollenwerk (2018:406) offer such an argument concerning the development for within state legitimacy research especially in areas of limited statehood where “a country’s central authority (government) lacks the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or lack the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence.” A deficient government presence in specific areas within a state decreases opportunities for the benevolent use of power

38 as argued by Blau and others (Hegvedt and Johnson 2009) creating a governing void susceptible to groups outside the central state to fill (Tilly 2003). Therefore, state legitimacy is an important element in areas of limited statehood given its cost-efficient potential to sustain compliance and general order where the use of force is limited. Areas of limited statehood also possess the challenge of diverse needs, values, and norms divided by disparate communities throughout the state (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018, Risse and Stollenwerk 2018). Legitimacy claims by the state positively received by one community may be rejected by another making uniform consequences unlikely and an increased likelihood of consequences derived from subjective assessments of impartiality (McLoughlin 2014). As suggested by Beetham (1991:144, 176),

“[i]n racially or ethnically divided societies it is almost impossible to favour one group without damaging the other, especially where this involves the modification of existing inequalities…the requirements of popular authority and popular consent on the one hand, and the attainment of a general interest on the other, proves unresolvable in these circumstances.”

Areas of limited statehood are also more susceptible to ethnic and other forms of social closure that mitigate the proliferation of national affiliation and the development of state legitimacy increasing the potential for violent conflict (Tilly 2003, 2005, Wimmer 2010, 2013). The next section offers a closer look at the relations between violence and legitimacy with a focus in areas of limited statehood.

LEGITIMACY AND VIOLENCE

Authority, or legitimate power is distinct from violence but the two concepts are intimately bound (Arjona 2017, Gilley 2009, Lake 2006, Malthaner 2015). In areas of limited statehood where contested regions over territory or populations exists, legitimacy claims often involve violence by state and non-state armed groups. As recognized by Tilly (2003:27), “[w]hen large scale collective violence occurs, government forces of one sort or another almost always

39 play significant parts as attackers, objects of attack, competitors, or intervening agents… For these reasons, collective violence and nonviolent politics intersect incessantly.” As representatives responsible for the use of force, violent actions by governing actors depend on, and simultaneously influence the legitimacy of their respective organizations. In areas where governing dominance is contested, the general ideological interpretation of violent acts is rarely in consensus (Jackman 2001, Schoon 2016). The discussion above suggests that to understand how violence becomes accepted or rejected as a legitimacy claim researchers must account for an actor’s (rulers, challengers, and the ruled) norms, values and beliefs, and their strategic position within a complex network of power relations. This section assumes such an approach with a specific focus on how violence influences legitimacy and how conditions of legitimacy can influence violence.

Violence, defined here as a social act of physical force conducted by an individual or group directed at an individual, group or structure with the intent to cause physical harm, can take many forms and occur for various reasons. With an emphasis on its relation to legitimacy, the analysis will focus on political violence defined as violence conducted with the intent to achieve a political end. For example, a state’s military who uses small arms to kill or capture members of a deviant militia, or a terrorist group who uses improvised explosive devices to destroy federal police building to free captured comrades and render the holding facility inoperable. While the former may be considered as authorized and the later as unauthorized forms of political violence, both examples involve an act to further political goals. More individualized forms of violence, for instance crimes of theft, homicide, or rape, while no less important, lack the primary motivation to achieve boarder political ends and thus will not be a main consideration for this research project.

When is violence by a governing actor accepted as a legitimizing claim? To answer this question requires an understanding of the status of, and relational framework between social actors in a given context (Jackman 2001). Actors of primary concern for this research are governing entities (e.g., states and their respective institutions), challengers (e.g., contentious non-state organizations), and a legitimacy source (e.g., a given population). In addition to the actors, the evaluation of violent legitimacy claims also depends on proportionality, referring to the amount of physical harm/damage necessary to achieve a desired result (Arendt 1970, Finlay

2010, Schoon 2014). Fundamentally, violence, as a legitimacy claim, is accepted when it conforms to a given source’s expectations (Eckstein 1992, Gerber and Jackson 2017). This depends on who is considered legitimate and what the audience deems as an acceptable use of force against a deserving deviant actor. For example, those who consider the state as a legitimate governing entity expect respective security institutions to protect citizens from deviants using an acceptable proportion of violence to achieve that end.

In areas with a strong central government, security expectations are likely more generalized and often met through relatively satisfactory performances by the state. This is partly due to the state’s authoritative power to shape what is legitimate force as oppose to deviant violence (Ball-Rokeach 1980, Tilly 2003). The more dominant a governing entity in a given context, the more control afforded to the symbolic definition and interpretation of violent acts.

As suggested by Jackman (2001:438),

“dominants obscure or legitimize their use of violence while highlighting and stigmatizing the violence of subordinates [or other challengers]. This permits dominants to incorporate violence into their routine strategies of control without increasing their own vulnerability to violence or corroding the legitimacy of their regime.”

Therefore, the ruling entity possesses some degree of violence categorization management to further legitimize their regime. In situations where the govern entity is considered legitimate,

41 state sponsored violence is more likely to be assessed as furthering collective interests developing positive experiences of subordinate dependence and collective norms of obligation to the regime (Beetham 1991, Bottoms and Tankebe 2013). As further supported by Malthaner

(2015:433),

“the belief in the rightfulness of an armed group… enhances a population’s acceptance of the coercive enforcement of compliance… and acts of violence to punish [deviants] run a lesser risk of provoking resistance… Thus, legitimacy and coercion are – in their basis as well as in their exercise – closely intertwined.”

Under a legitimate regime, as Jackman and Malthaner argue, state sponsored violence become more acceptable while contentious interactions outside the governing entity’s control remain relatively limited. However, low-capacity regimes lack the ability to control violent claim- making acts where a wide range of performances are tolerated and the ability to sanction

‘forbidden’ actions is limited (Tilly 2003).

When violence fails to match expectations, then legitimacy is at risk. Governing entities can use too much or too little violence or use violence towards an undeserving individual or group. But when is violence dictated as too much or too little or undeserving? This largely depends on norms, values, and beliefs of the actors and audience and how each are situated within a wider network of power relations. A good example comes from Desmond et al. (2016) who investigated the reactions of the Milwaukee population in response to a highly publicized account of unnecessary police brutality. In this case, nine white police officers violently attacked two unarmed black men suspected of theft; one of the victims received life threatening injuries but recovered after months of medical treatment and rehabilitation. Through an examination of police-related 911 calls, they found a significant reduction in crime reporting after the incident.

Moreover, they found a significantly higher decrease in expected calls from residents of

Milwaukee’s minority black neighborhoods to include a substantially longer recovery period to

42 normal levels of 911 calls than that of white neighborhoods. While the study focuses on a more criminal than political violent event, it effectively highlights the importance of actors’ relations and the proportion of force used when considering the consequences of legitimacy variation derived from violent actions. In this study, it could be argued that the state and respective institutions possessed a monopoly on force and deviance control, yet despite the subsequent public apologies and sanctioning of offending officers, the time it took to return to typical levels of police-related 911 calls was considerable lengthy (within 1 year for white neighborhoods and well over 1 year for black neighborhoods). This suggests that similar violent situations in areas of limited statehood could produce grimmer and longer lasting legitimacy consequences.

How do variations in legitimacy explain violent behavior by non-state actors? Recent research has shown legitimacy as a possible influence towards violent attitudes and behavior.

Considering the study by Desmond and colleagues mentioned above, the delegitimation of the state lead to decreases in police-related 911 calls and subsequently increased rates of homicides in black neighborhoods which experienced the highest decline in crime reporting behavior. A lack of state presence in communities with low levels of legitimacy towards a governing entity often results in citizens turning to violent non-state actors given a lack of confidence in the state to solve community level disputes (Kirk and Papchristos 2001). Hameed and Lamb (2012) revealed similar results examining governmental institutions in Pakistan and their responses, or lack thereof, to local disputes and violent non-state militant groups throughout the country. The ineffective reactions or, in most cases, complete absence of government in response to increasing rates of crime and violence delegitimized the government causing populations in such areas to request services from local militant groups to “keep the peace” and fill in the gaps (Lamb and

Hameed, 2012). Also, in some cases low levels of legitimacy towards state security institutions

43 associated with higher acceptability of private violence (Jackson et al. 2013). Therefore, the lack of monopoly on force and deviant control which leads to the subsequent delegitimation of a governing entity possesses the potential for non-state actors to behave violently as a reaction to a lack of higher level sanctions. Moreover, the use of violence by non-state actors may be considered legitimate by a given population depending on the relational characteristics of actors and the aspects of the violent act(s) itself. It must be noted here, as it was stressed above, such infighting likely also depends on the structural characteristics of a community as well as their legitimacy beliefs within a network of authority relations (Englebert 2000, Tilly 2003, 2005).

Research has also shown that legitimacy, derived from degrees of exclusion from political power, can lead to violent outcomes between the state and marginalized communities.

Through the implementation of cross-national datasets, Wimmer (2013, 2018) examined how weakly centralized, nascent states, whom exclude segments of society from representation at the higher levels of government, fail to achieve the legitimacy expectations held by citizens with various ethnic backgrounds. He summarizes the main aspects of his argument by stating that,

“political exclusion that violates established principles of legitimacy or that involves actors who seek to change these principles represents the most violence-prone contexts” (2013:16). Wimmer

(2018) argues that the ability of a state to provide desired services and goods and become embedded within ethnic communities through ethno-political representation at higher levels of the state, leads to an increase in state legitimacy and subsequently a greater propensity for citizens to identify with the nation rather than their ethnicity or community.

At this point the association between legitimacy and violence should be apparent. As stated by Jackman (2010:450),

“Decisions to take actions that will result in injuries to others or oneself, the type of injuries that are sought or tolerated, and the type of behavior to be used, as well as the

interpretation of those actions, are all made strategically… The social organization and symbolic manipulation of violence achieve a seamless welding of violence and legitimacy.”

The research discussed in this section leaves us with many outcomes to consider moving forward. First, violence and legitimacy, while distinct, are undoubtedly linked. The discussion furthered the importance of a relational approach to legitimacy suggesting the need to consider the strategic positioning of actors within a structure of power relations. Using such an approach to examine violence as a legitimacy claim, one must take into consideration the actor who committed the violence, the victim, the proportionality of violence used, and the audience who either accepts or rejects violent actors based on their respective locations within a complex network. It is also clear that legitimacy and violence are both “dependent” and “independent” variables contingent on differing cycles of influence given different contexts; acts of violence may legitimate and perceptions of legitimacy can lead to acts of violence. As summarized by

Schoon (2014:780), “[t]he legitimacy of violence is … an iterative, relational process that is rooted in the action of the government, the action of their opponent, and the social conditions within which those actions occur” (798).

Yet, there are unanswered questions pertaining to the relationship between legitimacy and violence. How do the various dimensions of legitimacy relate to different acts of political violence? Given that legitimacy is a multidimensional concept, how do violent events comprised of different actors, outcomes and audiences within a developing country influence changes in

‘specific’ versus more ‘diffuse’ elements of political support? Considering the relational characteristics of legitimacy, could violence by a governing entity against particular outgroups serve to further legitimate a regime for certain influential social groups? As suggested by

Beetham (1991:142-145), successful legitimacy in a developing country is far more likely to be

45 localized, rather than universal. Therefore, the real concern for governing entities is that violence does not detract from legitimacy held by influential groups that possess the organizing and material capacity to challenge authority relations: “interests that are not organized and articulated in the political domain can be ignored with impunity… minorities that lack collective voice or presence can be the object of considerable injustice, without any consequence for the legitimacy of the state” (170). Thus, in developing countries the use of coercive power against inconsequential communities may not matter to the sustainability of power relations. Even more concerning is if the coercion towards certain outgroups further legitimizes governing entities for more influential groups, making disproportionate violence against outgroups an acceptable performance. These questions and considerations will guide the following chapter’s inquiry into the development and consequence of legitimacy within a diverse developing country plagued by violent political contention.

CHAPTER 2: LEGITIMACY IN NIGERIA

Recognizing the importance of legitimacy within power relations necessitates a proper conceptualization and operationalization of the term. In the previous chapter, legitimacy was defined as a multidimensional belief, embedded within a belief system consisting of values and norms, that assesses a governing object as appropriate or desired, thus perceiving the entity as having the right to rule. Assuming a multidimensional approach, this chapter further outlines how legitimacy will be operationalized within the statistical analysis going forward. The chapter then proceeds to apply the dimensions to the sub-Saharan African country of Nigeria; a post- colonial nation with a diverse history of political, economic, and social conflict.

THE STRUCTURE OF LEGITIMACY

Beetham (1991:15) has argued that “[t]he key to understanding the concept of legitimacy lies in the recognition that it is multi-dimensional in character.” Recently, multidimensionality has become widely accepted, but the construct of legitimacy is highly debated leaving its dimensional structure yet to be fully resolved (Johnson et al. 2015). This first section will revisit and add greater detail to the legitimacy dimensions briefly discussed in chapter 1 to develop a construct that will support subsequent analysis in the following chapters. In general, the dimensions of legitimacy proposed below implements an Eastonian approach which accounts for diffuse and more specific facets of legitimacy. Within this overarching construct, I refine the normative evaluative aspect of legitimacy with a focus on procedural fairness and effectiveness.

Ultimately, this approach operationalizes legitimacy across seven dimensions: national pride/identity, procedural fairness, economic effectiveness, security effectiveness, and confidence in national and local governmental leaders.

One of the earliest, and perhaps broadest outline concerning the dimensions of legitimacy is captured in a framework centered on “political support” from David Easton (1975). With a focus on nation-state actors, Easton proposed a spectrum of ‘system support’ based on specific to more diffuse forms. Within this continuum, specific support refers to legitimacy for particular elected or appointed office-holders and diffuse support characterizes an individual’s abstract orientations towards the ideals which underlie a particular political system and its respective institutions where positive evaluations along the spectrum reveal an overall acceptance of a given political system (Norris 2011:23). Political researchers such as Dalton (1999, 2004), Norris

(1999, 2011) and Booth and Seligson (2009) have offered further refinements to Easton’s spectrum recognizing distinct dimensions that focus on (1) a sense of national identity and belonging, (2) the recognition of and connection with the core principles and values which a regime is based, (3) evaluations of the performance of a given regime and its institutions, and

(4) approval in incumbent office-holders at the national and local level (ordered from diffuse to more specific components).

Diffuse Support

In its most diffuse form, acceptance of a given power relation represents an internalized connection and sense of belonging to a given regime (Booth and Seligons 2009, Tilly 2005,

Wimmer 2013). Concerning a nation-state, these orientations are often expressed through strong sentiments of national pride and national identity. For example, Norris (2011:25) recognized

‘national identity’ to refer to “the existence of communities with bonds of ‘blood and belonging’ arising from sharing a common homeland, cultural myths, symbols and historical memories…”

However, as discussed in the previous chapter, such national identities in areas of limited statehood may be limited due to more approximate connections with local communities

48 segmented along ethnic or religious lines. In such cases, political loyalty and identities develop around sub-national communities. Even if national identities are expressed in areas of limited statehood, the meanings behind such identities may vary depending on the community of which they are expressed. Yet, research has shown that salient identities, referring to a particular identity emphasized over other reasonable options, tend to develop when individuals believe the affiliated governing entity as a legitimated actor within a field of other viable political options

(Gorman and Seguin 2018). Ultimately, identity affiliation is a meaningful measure which offers evidence of higher levels legitimacy for a governing entity.

A less diffuse dimension reflects the recognition and belief in the values and core principles of a given regime. This dimension outlines the broad parameters of a political system and addresses how power relations should organize and function (Dalton 2004). For a democracy, such principles and values focus on the accountability of public officials to the general population, respect of human rights to include equality for minorities, and the free-will to participate in decision-making opportunities within the government (Norris 2011:27, Stoker

2017). A lack of consensus on such underlying principles should be a legitimacy concern that places the sustainability of a democratic system at a higher level of risk.

Specific Support

While the previous dimensions suggest orientations to more abstract levels of governance acceptance, the remaining elements of legitimacy focus on the evaluation of a given governing entity and its respective institutions. This area arguably attracts more attention within the legitimacy research field and will be discussed in greater detail with a focus on procedural fairness and effectiveness. The following discussion begins with Beetham’s approach to the different dimensions within the middle ground of diffuse and specific legitimacy. Using his

49 construct provides the basis on the importance on legitimacy derived through normative evaluations and leads to the importance of procedural fairness and effectiveness when operationalizing the different dimensions of legitimacy.

Using a normative structural approach, Beetham argues that legitimacy consists of legal, moral, and behavioral elements that derive from the inherent negative characteristics of power relations (60). Legality provides the rules for the appointment of a position of power and also details the limits of that power within a given set of power relations. Rule of law thus serves as the granter and limiting aspect of power, but legality cannot provide fully adequate or self- sufficient criterion of legitimacy. Rather Beetham viewed it as a provisional base of legitimacy that requires justification derived from the belief systems of a given population. Finally, legitimacy must become evident through actions of consent based on the free will of people to participate and obey the relations of power.

Beetham’s construct has influenced legitimacy research in the political, legal, and sociological fields (Gilley 2009, Tankebe 2013, Billing and Scott 1994), however, his approach comes with some limitations. First, while the influence on legality is warranted, especially when considering the legitimacy of a constitutional state and its respective institutions, I argue it remains considerably less important when taking into account the other dimensions of legitimacy. For example, a strict legal use of power may not always legitimate a governing organization and may even result in delegitimation and the loss of a ‘right to govern’ (Bottoms and Tankebe 2013). Such studies show that in some cases governing actions performed outside of legal constraints can result in the stabilization effects. Ultimately, the law is subject to a social context and must always be considered in relation to a given community’s beliefs and values.

This is crucially important in areas of limited statehood where the legal enforcement of social

50 order is more likely to be undermined by local norms if there is incongruence between them.

While legality remains an influential aspect of legitimacy, its influence is deemed secondary when considering the justification of actions based on held beliefs and values.

A second limitation to Beetham’s construct of legitimacy is the inclusion of consent as a dimension rather than recognizing it as a consequence. If legitimacy is conceptualized primarily as a belief in a governing entity’s right to rule justified through a wider construct of values and norms within a given population, then consent, what Beetham recognized as the participatory element of legitimacy, should be regarded as an outcome rather than a construct of such a belief.

Researchers, most notably Tyler (1990, 2001, 2003, 2006), have attempted to reconcile this issue through the operationalization of legitimacy as an internal sense of obligation to authority.

However, as other researchers have rightfully addressed, obligation as a sense or behavior may occur for many reasons outside the construct of legitimacy and therefore should be regarded more as a broader concept (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012, Harkin 2015, Johnson et al. 2014,

Tankebe 2016, 2013).4 For example, populations may obey governing entities on the raw basis of coercion. Obedience can also derive from a general apathy derived from simple instrumental calculation or a lack of other viable options resulting in a type of benefit-of-the-doubt, rather than legitimacy based compliance (Schmelzle and Sollenwerk 2018). For these reasons, consent should be regarded as a possible outcome rather than a direct element of legitimacy.

What remains from Beetham’s construct then is the crucial consideration of belief and value systems that justifies acts of power as proper for a given population. Within this component resides elements of legitimacy that will be the focus of the proceeding analysis.

4 In a debate article, Beetham (1993) would later recognize that consent does not necessarily depend on the justification of legal actions by governing entities and may occur for other reasons outside the construct of legitimacy.

However, much like the overall dimensionality of legitimacy, the aspects of different normative judgements are highly debated. A widely accepted approach developed by Tyler and various colleagues assumes that different moral evaluations of a governing entity act as the antecedents to legitimacy. Such antecedents depend on the particular focus of a given study, yet invariably

Tyler (2001) posits that judgements of procedural fairness, recognized as the exercising of authority by procedures evaluated as fair, significantly influence beliefs in legitimacy (see also

Levi et al. 2009). Thus, for Tyler procedural fairness and legitimacy, identified by him and his research colleagues as an obligation to obey, remain conceptually and empirically distinguishable. However, recently Tankebe and colleagues (2016) challenged this construct arguing that normative evaluations on procedural fairness act as a component, rather than as a precursor of legitimacy. They posit that the normative evaluations of a governing entity’s right to rule depend on procedural fairness especially when considering liberal democracies (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012, Beetham 1991, Levi et al. 2009, Johnson et al. 2009). Using a multidimensional model proposed by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), they found that feelings of obligation to obey are significantly explained by elements of legitimacy judgements, such as procedural fairness, in separate U.S. and Ghana datasets. An additional study by Johnson and colleagues (2014:967) implemented confirmatory factor analysis on different dimensions and found procedural fairness and legitimacy, as operationalized by Tyler, to be empirically indistinguishable suggesting that “procedural [fairness] cannot be said to “cause” legitimacy if procedural [fairness] is legitimacy.” Therefore, this research recognizes procedural fairness as an important dimension of legitimacy.

As a necessary factor, procedural fairness is far from being a sufficient component to capture the normative judgements of legitimacy. Given that legitimacy perceptions develop as

52 attributes of degrees rather than absolutes, it suggests that dimensions of legitimacy may vary based on gradations of a more or less moral basis. As such, Tankebe and Bottoms also suggest a governing entity’s effectiveness as a more pragmatic form of legitimacy. This connects with

Suchman’s (1995) recognition between what he defines as the pragmatic and moral dimensions of legitimacy. In a pragmatic relationship, legitimacy is granted primarily, but not necessarily entirely, based on self-interested calculations of a given community or population. In this sense, legitimacy is granted based on an exchange relationship concerning what those in power can offer to enhance their constituent’s well-being. While to a lesser degree, it is argued here that pragmatic or performance-based forms of legitimacy are not entirely void of value or normative considerations. For an exchange to develop legitimacy, it must associate with the norms and values of the audience. For example, a governing regime that provides an educational system will only gain legitimacy from such an offering if it connects with the values of its population.

Providing a secular, westernized educational system to a population who values an edification based on religious theology and law will likely fail to gain support amongst the populace. A substantial part of the relevant audience must evaluate the offering as appropriate and worthwhile; thus, it is argued here that pragmatic legitimacy, while largely based on an exchange relationship, carries with it a normative base of evaluation (see also Mcloughlin 2018, Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018).

The research discussed thus far has led to the recognition of four legitimacy dimensions:

(1) national pride/identity, (2) recognition and belief in the values and core principles of a given regime, and the normative evaluation of a political system based on aspects of (3) procedural fairness and (4) effectiveness. This leads us to the most specific dimension of legitimacy which considers the evaluation of incumbent office-holders. This dimension is assessed usually through

53 levels of confidence or satisfaction with specific individuals running top-level offices and institutions within a governing entity. It is theorized to possess the least impact on the stability of power relations, especially within a liberal democracy. While attitudes towards incumbents may fluctuate, the regime is found to maintain control through higher system levels of legitimacy beliefs – what Linz (1980:36) describes as a “loyal opposition” who may possess critical attitudes towards a political process or incumbent leader, but use politically institutionalized means to achieve desired ends. However, grievances towards office holders may produce powerful dissent resulting fundamental political and social change. This concern is more applicable in areas of limited statehood where a leadership crises, characterized by the death or over-throw of a high-level incumbent, may generate wider actions to change or destroy the power relations within a regime (Norris 2011, Easton 1975). Typically, operationalization of the evaluation of incumbent officer-holders focuses on the top offices of a given government, for example assessments of a state’s president or prime minister. Yet, research shows that grievances towards leaders at the local level can result in community level delegitimation which can also influence orientations and actions towards the wider aspects of a nation-state regime (Booth and

Seligson 2009, Gawthorpe 2017, Lemay-Hébert 2009). Therefore, the final proposed dimensions of legitimacy offered here will include the evaluation of national and local office-holders.

Figure 2.1 Dimensions of Legitimacy

Figure 2.1 provides a summary of the dimensions of legitimacy. In the following chapter, each dimension will be assessed to capture how the proposed antecedents associate with the different elements, and how the dimensions relate with attitudinal outcomes. While the previous chapter provided a general conceptualization and theoretical approach, the next section aims to provide further detail on how the variations of political violence will be assessed.

CATEGORIZATIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Political violence, defined as violence conducted with the intent to achieve a political end, can take many different forms; therefore, the manner in which it is categorized requires specific attention. The categorization of political violence can assume many approaches ranging from a focus on specific actors (e.g., terrorists), degree of violence (e.g., number of deaths per capita), or specific victims (e.g., citizens in the general population or a specific subnational community). Yet, Crenshaw and Robinson (2010) posit that the taxonomy of “political action should probably focus on the nature of the action rather than the characteristics of the agents/organizations responsible for it” where the attributes of actors remain separate from the attributes of actions (236). Specifically, they suggests that the target or recipient of the violence

55 as the vital aspect to decipher what type of political violence has occurred as it “best indicate[s] the purpose of the perpetrators” (239). Categorizing political violence on other characteristics such as organizational size or strength of actors takes focus away from the acts underlying meaning. This approach is similar to Tilly (2003, 2004, 2005b) who argued that political violent acts such as terrorism can be employed by a wide range of political actors (state and non-state) with a variety of motives. Therefore, a focus on the target allows researchers to evaluate a politically violent act for the social message it intends or represents rather than the actor (state or non-state) solely dictating the type of violence conducted.

The development of political violent categories proceeds then depending on the different types of actors who may be labeled as ‘victims’ within in a given field. The first is citizens, recognized as unarmed constituents residing in a given nation-state territory. As unarmed actors, citizens will always be the victims when involved in a politically violent event. The next possible targets include state actors which include any institutions or organization with direct connections to the constitutionalized government of a given nation-state. Examples include federal military or police organizations, state organized educational system, or sponsored civilian militias. This analysis will also consider physical force against state owned property such as building or transportation vehicles as acts of violence against the state. The final targets considered for classification include publically identified violent non-state organizations. This classification identifies extra-state organizations organized with intent or potential to perform politically violent acts. Examples include rebel groups organized to counter an established governing regime, or identity militias organized through community, ethnic, and/or religious affiliations for the pursuance of more local goals.

While a focus on the target may aid in the identification of types of violence, addressing who conducted the violence and to what degree also remains important to its influence on legitimacy orientations. The variations of legitimacy towards a governing entity are likely impacted if violence against unarmed citizens occurred, but perhaps more importantly it should also consider if the perpetrator was a state or non-state actor. Thus, provided a target and perpetrator for a given violent event allows for a taxonomy of politically violent events to be developed. Borrowing from Crenshaw and Robinson’s (2010) continuum of political action, a violent event is classified as terrorism if lethal violence is directed towards civilian targets to achieve political outcomes. Terrorism then is sub-classified as either ‘state’ or ‘non-state’.

Guerilla warfare recognizes any violent acts conducted by smaller-scale, armed non-state actors against state personnel or infrastructure. Finally, violence against non-state armed groups will be classified based on perpetrator type. State-based armed conflict identifies violent acts directed at non-state armed groups by the state and non-state armed conflict recognizes violence between two non-state organizations. Table 2.1 provides the categories for political violence to be assessed.

Table 2.1. Categories of Political Violence Victims Perpetrators State Actors Non-state Actors

Civilians State-based Terrorism Non-state Terrorism

State Actors Security-based Infighting5 Guerilla warfare

Armed Non-state Actors State-based Armed Conflict Non-state Based Armed Conflict

5 While security based infighting is a critical consideration when evaluating a field of political conflict, such occurrences are rare in Nigeria 2007-2017; therefore, this category of violence will not be assessed for this study.

With both the dimensions of legitimacy and taxonomy of politically violent events outlined, we now turn to assess the proposed legitimacy dimensions and briefly introduce the country of study, Nigeria.

THE DATA

The geographic focus for this study will be the sub-Saharan African nation of Nigeria.

Nigeria provides a complex, contentious, and diverse social landscape which historically has transpired into intense violence with a less than adequate response by federal security forces. A detailed historic outline of the country will be provided in subsequent sections. This section will first outline the datasets used in this analysis and assess the different dimension previously discussed as viable variables for subsequent analysis.

Data used in this study come from two archival sources: survey data collected by Gallup in Nigeria6 and violent event data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED)

Project. The survey dataset is a collection of two survey waves administered throughout Nigeria ending data collection in 2013 and 2016 respectively. These two time periods situate themselves before and after a major rise in political violence within the country as will be further discussed below. The survey dataset serves the analysis in three ways. First, it provides opportunities to observe possible consistencies (or inconsistences) between statistical models concerning the influence of endorsement on propriety. If such relations are as strong as previous relations suggests, similar results should occur between the two datasets. Second, it allows the analysis to examine changes in legitimacy perceptions that associate with variations in levels and types of political violence. Finally, the collection of the 2016 dataset occurred during a rare state

6 Contact the author to request access to survey data.

58 terrorism event providing an opportunity to evaluate how the event impacted legitimacy orientations throughout the country.

The sample for both collections derived from the 2006 and 2012 Nigerian Census of

Population and Housing Report and was based on a stratified, multi-stage design. Each survey divided the country into 23 geographic regions which included the Federal Capital Territory

(FCT) and the states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano,

Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, and Zamfara; the

South East zone (Anambra, Enugu, Ebonyi, Imo and Abia states), South South zone (Edo, Delta,

Rivers, Bayelsa, Cross-River and Akwa-Ibom states) and South West zone (Lagos, Ogun, Oyo,

Osun, Ondo and Ekiti states). Each geographic region was further divided into areas based on population sizes (6 different population sizes: 1. under 10,000; 2. 10,000-49,999; 3. 50,000-

99,000; 4. 100,000-499,999; 5. 500,000-99,999; 6. 1 million or more).

Data collection techniques used proportional simple random sampling amongst each population size stratum within each geographic region to select 57 (2013 dataset) and 55 (2016 dataset) starting points for each respective survey. A Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) was assigned to each starting point and randomly selected a set number of houses to interview in the geographic area. Some areas were removed from selection due to security or logistic issues; such outcomes were prevalent in the 2016 dataset. If the selected house agreed to partake in the survey, the PSU would identify all possible individuals in the house who qualified to take the survey and randomly select one person to provide responses. The 2013 dataset resulted in a total sample size of 10,482 observations across 1,316 PSU locations, and the 2016 sample provided

11,681 observations across 1,255 PSU locations.

Figure 2.2 Survey Wave PSU Locations

2013 Dataset: 1,316 PSUs (n = 10,482) 2016 Dataset: 1,255 PSU (n = 11,681)

Table 2.2 Survey Dataset Locations and Sample Distribution

2013 2016 Location Sample Sample Distribution Distribution Adamawa 450 1,116 Bauchi 464 237 Benue 455 351 Borno 463 1,067 Gombe 455 339 Jigawa 454 391 Kaduna 453 872 Kano 446 1,039 Katsina 456 1,007 Kebbi 454 394 Kogi 459 168 Kwara 456 343 Nasarawa 455 369 Niger 453 384 Plateau 463 297 Sokoto 455 357 Taraba 454 366 Yobe 456 1,014 Zamfara 456 289 FCT 454 377 South South 455 191 South East 464 305 South West 452 408 Total 10,482 11,681

All surveys were administered via face to face interviews by locals familiar with the customs and languages of the respondents. The 2013 dataset collected information on Nigerian citizens age 16-65 starting on February 3rd, 2012 and ending on March 5th, 2013 with the 2016 dataset administration occurring between November 15th, 2015 and January 19th, 2016. Both surveys recorded sentiments on violence, institutional confidence, procedural justice, anomie, voting habits, and other behavioral and evaluative orientations among the Nigerian population.

The analysis also includes limited selections from complementary data obtained through small focus group interviews conducted by Gallup in 2014.7 This data is used only to supplement main findings from the 2013 and 2016 datasets and is not the main focus of analysis.

For the second dataset, this study incorporates the Armed Conflict Location and Event

Data (ACLED) Project dataset. This dataset allows the study to examine and apply data of violent events that occurred around the time survey administration. ACLED is an available online resource which categorizes all violent political events that occur in Africa and in

Southwest Asian countries. As presented on their website:

ACLED focuses on tracking a range of violent and non-violent actions by political agents, including governments, rebels, militias, communal groups, political parties, external actors, rioters, protesters and civilians. Data contain specific information on the date, location, group names, interaction type, event type, reported fatalities and contextual notes…. data are derived from a wide range of local, regional and national sources and the information is collected by trained data experts worldwide (ACLED 2017).

Actors differentiate between government (military and police forces) actors, violent non- government organizations, and civilians considered as non-combatants. Violent non-government organizations include the following: rebel groups, political militias, communal militias, and rioters. Event and fatality estimates are derived from a variety of primary and secondary sources.

7 This supplemental data to the nationally representative survey included 20 small (8 respondents) focus group interviews conducted in Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, and Sokoto State in the month of July and November of 2014. Groups were composed of fathers and mothers aged 24 to 30 and employed and unemployed males aged 20 to 26.

Given ACLED’s data collection process, their estimates are likely conservative. This study assumes the ACLED database to be an accurate representation of political violence which occurred in Nigeria during the period of interest.

APPLYING THE STRUCTURE OF LEGITIMACY

This study conceives political legitimacy as multidimensional in nature. The first dimension, national identity, reflects whether an individual identifies themselves primarily as a

‘Nigerian’ first before other reasonable options (e.g., faith, ethnic, or community identities). This dimension is operationalized through the question, “When you think of yourself, do you consider yourself primarily as: (1) a person from your town or region, (2) a person from your faith, (3) a person from your ethnic group, (4) a person of your job or occupation, (5) a Nigerian. The question was recoded into a dummy variable with (1) being ‘a Nigerian’ and (0) being ‘other’.

Table 2.3 Summary Statistics Expected for Legitimacy Dimensions for 2013 and 2016 datasets Dimension of Legitimacy (listed from Operationalization of Variables 2013 2016 most general to most specific) Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N National Pride/Identity When you think of yourself, do you consider yourself as primarily a 0.59 0.49 10,482 0.56 0.5 11,499 Nigerian? (1 = yes, 0 = no).

Recognition/belief in values & core How essential you think it is as a principles characteristic of democracy, (1 = Not at all … 4 = essential) regardless of whether we have that in Nigeria: People choose their leaders in free 3.97 1.44 10,333 elections. Civil rights like freedom of speech 3.87 1.26 10,289 protect people’s freedoms. Government leaders cooperate and compromise despite different 3.7 1.35 10,218 viewpoints and party affiliations.

Evaluation of regime performance (1 = strongly disagree … 4 = (1 = strongly disagree … 6 = strongly agree) strongly agree) Procedural Fairness Individuals receive fair and equal 2.24 0.97 10,135 treatment in the courts. Everyone is treated equally and fairly 2.05 1.01 10,413 3.30 1.54 11,412 by the government. The government makes decisions about how to handle problems in fair 2.22 0.95 10,364 3.39 1.44 11,412 ways. Police only arrest citizens if they 2.18 0.98 10,387 3.36 1.42 11,424 have done something wrong. Judges accurately understand and 2.3 0.98 10,297 3.44 1.37 11,305 apply the law. All ethnic grps/tribes are treated 3.27 1.41 11,359 equally & fairly by the gov. All regions are treated equally and 3.28 1.41 11,335 fairly by the government

Table 2.3 (Continued) Effectiveness - Socioeconomic How effective is the Nigerian (1 = very ineffective … 4 = very (1 = very ineffective … 6 = very government at: effective) effective) Reducing poverty 2.09 1.04 10,353 3.67 1.62 11,483 Increasing employment opportunities 2.06 0.99 10,355 3.62 1.54 11,487 Increasing education opportunities 2.34 1.01 10,250 3.84 1.42 11,475 Effectiveness - Security Reducing terrorism in Nigeria 2.51 0.88 9,964 3.93 1.41 11,417 Reducing influence of Boko Haram 2.18 0.98 10,165 4.10 1.42 11,441 Responding to disasters 2.33 0.96 10,184 3.84 1.38 11,376 Countering the smuggling of illegal 2.22 0.94 10,037 3.87 1.37 11,261 drugs Countering the smuggling of illegal 2.22 0.98 10,024 3.87 1.41 11,234 weapons

Confidence in national-level leaders Please tell me if you have confidence (1 = no confidence … 4 = great (1 = no confidence … 4 = total in the people running each of the confidence ) confidence ) following institutions: National government 2.5 1.05 10,358 4.37 1.50 11,438 Military 2.8 1.04 10,341 4.37 1.40 11,457 Police/Law enforcement 2.3 0.96 10,358 3.87 1.43 11,443 Financial institutions/Banks 2.66 0.99 10,221 4.14 1.31 11,203 The national courts 2.43 0.94 10,242 4.01 1.35 11,275 Electoral system 2.25 0.96 10,280 4.00 1.37 11,363 Confidence in local-level leaders Local/City government 2.38 0.97 10,353 3.90 1.44 11,401

State government 3.99 1.47 11,433

As a single variable this question was not included in the factor analysis discussed below.

The second dimension is the recognition and the belief in the core principles of a given regime, which for Nigeria’s case is a federal democracy. Due to survey question limitations, this dimension is restricted to the recognition of core democratic principles only, captured in three survey items that assess how essential, (1) ‘not at all essential characteristic’ to (5) ‘an essential characteristic’, it is that people choose their leaders in free elections, that civil rights like freedom of speech protect people’s freedoms, and that government leaders cooperate and compromise despite different viewpoint and party affiliations; Cronbach’s alpha = .76 for the

2013 dataset only. The next dimension, procedural fairness, includes five questions from the

2013 dataset and six questions from the 2016 dataset that capture the extent to which government authority is exercised in a manner that is fair and evenhanded; Cronbach’s alpha = .79 for the

2013 dataset and .92 for the 2016 dataset. Government effectiveness represents the next dimension and reflects the ability of the government to successfully respond to socioeconomic and security needs. This dimension was separated given the distinct influences of Nigeria’s economic and security orientations, as is evident in the historical summary below. The two sub- dimensions include three questions for socioeconomic effectiveness (Cronbach’s alpha = .84 for the 2013 dataset and .91 for the 2016 dataset) and five questions for security effectiveness

(Cronbach’s alpha = .83 for the 2013 dataset and .92 for the 2016 dataset). The next dimension captures the approval of incumbent office holders. This dimension was assessed by six survey questions that capture the degree of confidence one has about individuals running national-level institutions (e.g., the military, or federal financial institutions); Cronbach’ alpha = .84 for the

2013 dataset and .91 for the 2016 dataset). The final dimension captures the approval of incumbent office holders at the local level. This is assessed in the 2013 dataset by a single survey

65 questions that captures the degree of confidence, (1) ‘no confidence’ to (4) ‘great deal of confidence’, one has towards local government leaders. The 2016 survey offers two survey questions that captures the approval of government leaders at the local and state level; therefore, these items are used in one factor; Cornbach’s alpha = .87. All scales were coded so that higher scores reflect more favorable judgements about the government. A complete list of survey items used to construct the dimensions of legitimacy is provided in Table 2.3.

The survey items expected to reflect the different dimensions of government legitimacy for each dataset were entered into a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model using the ‘lavaan’ statistical package (version 0.6-5) in R (version 3.6.2). Estimations for factor loadings were obtained using the recommended robust diagonally weighted least squares (DWLS) and a scaled- shifted test statistic for CFA for ordinal measures (Rosseel 2020). Model fit was evaluated using the standard chi-square goodness-of-fit test statistic, the comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker–

Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the Standardized

Root Mean Square Residual (SRMSR).

Figure 2.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Models for the 2013 dataset

Figure 2.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Models for the 2016 dataset

Many of the indices indicated an acceptable fit for both models: 2013 dataset – CFI =

0.93 / TLI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.08 (90% CI upper: 0.080, lower: 0.078), SRMR = 0.05; 2016 dataset – CFI = 0.96 / TLI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.09 (90% CI upper: 0.089, lower: 0.091), SRMR

= 0.04. Both chi-squared fit statistics where significant (p < 0.001) suggesting a poor model fit; however, this often occurs with large-N datasets (Harrington 2008). Thresholds for fit statistics vary; however, the following thresholds are recommended for an acceptable model (Harrington

2008, Brown 2015): CFI and TLI close to 0.95 or greater, SRMR ≤ 0.08 RMSEA ≤ 0.08. While some indicators fail to achieve ‘good’ fitting model standards, overall the models demonstrate an acceptable fit for the purposes of this study. Additionally, all survey questions load significantly on their latent variables (at a level of p < .001) and achieve sufficient magnitudes for their standardized loadings (> .55) as shown in figures 2.3 and 2.4. The model fit statistics for both samples indicate that the different dimensions of government legitimacy can be operationalized as factor scores for subsequent analysis. Scales are coded so that higher scores reveal higher levels of government legitimacy.

Table 2.4 Factor Estimates Summary Statistics

Mean SD Minimum Maximum Variables 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2016

Recognition in values & core principles -0.04 0.71 -2.00 1.10 Procedural Fairness 0.01 0.00 0.63 0.77 -1.63 -2.11 2.07 2.25 Effectiveness - Socioeconomic 0.01 0.00 0.82 0.87 -1.88 -2.25 2.42 2.05 Effectiveness - Security 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.84 -1.61 -2.34 2.00 2.07 Confidence in National-level leaders 0.00 -0.01 0.78 0.81 -2.00 -2.45 1.26 2.11 Confidence in Local-level leaders -0.01 0.83 -2.47 2.22

RESEARCH SITE: NIGERIA

Since its independence from British colonialism in 1960, Nigeria has developed into one of the largest democracies in the world becoming the most populated nation in Africa with an estimated one out of every five sub-Saharan Africans identified as Nigerian (Campbell and Page

2018). However, the path to development has been plagued with conflict, corruption, and violence. The Nigerian population has experienced three military coups, a two-and-a-half year civil war resulting in millions of deaths, and three failed republics (Campbell 2013, Conley-

Zilkic and Waal 2014). Currently operating in its fourth republic, many researchers describe

Nigeria as one of the most divided countries in Africa inundated with corrupt political leaders seeking personal gains at the expense of their constituents (Falola and Heaton 2008, Okpanachi

2009, Osaghae and Suberu 2005). During the sampling period for the datasets in this study,

Nigeria placed 16th out of 178 countries in the Fragile States Index putting the nation in a “high risk” category for possible collapse (Fund for Peace 2018). According to the 2019 FSI Report,

Nigeria is currently ranked as the 14th most “fragile” nation in the world indicating that economic, political, and security issues have persisted and comparatively gotten worse. While the country has advanced as a global diplomatic leader in Africa, it remains regarded as the

“troubled giant of Africa” due to a perpetuating troubled economy and contentious political environment within its borders (Campbell and Page 2018:3). To understand Nigeria’s current political climate requires a brief review of its historical development as most Nigerian’s continue to interact with others through cultures that maintain historical memories, traditional lifestyles, and past social frameworks (Falola and Heaton 2008). What follows is a summary of Nigeria’s historical development providing the backdrop for the countries contemporary contentious condition within its different geo-political zones.

Federal Historical Context

Before British colonialization and the development of arbitrary boundaries, the territory now recognized as Nigeria consisted of disparate city-states and kingdoms each with diverse religious, social, and economic structures and institutions. The northeast saw the development

70 the Jukun and Kanuri tribes which both established centralized political structures led by hereditary monarchial rulers (Falola and Heaton 2008). Hausa tribes of Kano, Katsina, and Zaria developed in western regions in the north along with nomadic Fulani pastoralist who increased trade opportunities and influenced the spread of Islam in the region. Wealth in northern areas derived from fertile agricultural land, livestock, wild animals, and minerals like salt and iron ore, all which became valuable exchange commodities through the trans-Sahara trade. The spread of

Islam in the Northern regions spurred further development as it connected west and east tribes of

Hausa and Kanuri and brought political advantages to tribal leaders due to economic and military connections with the larger Islamic world. The establishment of Qur’anic primary and advanced schools, to include opportunities to study abroad, further infused Islam into northern cultures

(Campbell and Page 2018). Yet, to ensure local legitimacy was maintained among constituents who primarily practiced traditional tribal religions, rulers practiced comparatively superficial

Islam that merged with pre-existing indigenous beliefs and practices. This allowed early tribal kings to appeal to the broader Islamic network of rulers while adhering to traditional religious practices of their local communities.

Southern regions saw the development of three primary tribes each with distinct political structures. The Igbo, also referred to as Ibo, tribe developed through a collection of decentralized political institutions within separate communities. Elders held leadership roles in the community and ruled primarily through democratic practices allowing villages to voice opinions on local affairs. Yoruba tribes in the southwest developed through a structure of monarchical community rulers who legitimized their control through connections to the tribe’s divine king in the city of

Ile-Ife (Falola and Heaton 2008). The southern tribes prospered through fertile agricultural enterprises, but the arrival of the Portuguese, English, and Dutch to the region in the fifteenth

71 century spurred the development of prominent slave-trade markets. By the nineteenth century, slave-trade institutions radically changed power structures in the region developing secret societies of wealthy slave traders to arrange political and economic systems to further benefit their accumulation of power in the region. At the same time, violent struggles over power increased as northern tribes attempted to capitalize on the coastal slave trade only to be heavily taxed by Yoruba communities.

Northern slave trade efforts discontinued due to a sweeping Islamic jihad throughout the region known as the Sokoto Caliphate (Campbell and Page 2018). Led primarily by Fulani reformers not bound to existing Hausa power structures, the caliphate violently confronted all

Northern provinces practicing what were deemed as artificial forms of Islam, and organized them under a strict, consolidated Islamic government. The new Islamic state further united the north through new economic trade routes, common Islamic dress, language, education, and legal systems such that more northerners began to identify themselves primarily through Islam than their community. However, in-fighting between the local rulers developed as top leadership positions were often filled by Fulani rather than Hausa members.

British Colonialism: 1904-1960

As the Sokoto Caliphate began to collapse in the middle of the nineteenth century, the

British, seeing the unrest in the south and northern regions as detrimental to trade commerce and feeling pressure from French and German interests, began to colonize the region with militant force (Campbell 2013). With British colonialization came Christian missionaries who transformed traditional Igbo and parts of Yoruba societies along the coast through the establishment of western faith and educational institutions. The British quickly took control of the decentralized Igbo in the southeast and took advantage of the in-fighting between Yoruba

72 communities to provide a peaceful alternative through opening up trade within the area through colonial regulations. Moving north the British also took advantage of the decentralization of the

Sokoto Caliphate, killing community leaders who resisted and hunting down the supreme caliph declaring control over the entire region known as the Nigerian protectorate by 1904.

The British colonial administration operated through “indirect rule” that sought to maintain its legitimacy through the structure of traditional kings and chiefs. In practice “indirect rule” ensured traditional rulers performed as the British colony desired or suffered replacement by a more malleable ruler (Falola and Heaton 2008). Economically, the British forced Nigeria into cash crop and mineral production creating an extractive economy based on the export of raw materials and the import of finished goods. They also introduced a cash economy that turned

Nigerians more towards urban sectors to find wage labor opportunities. At this time a new class of European-educated, literate, English-speaking Nigerian Christians emerged. These limited educational opportunities were localized in the urban south, but the demand was high given that such an education could land lucrative employment with the colonial government (Campbell and

Page 2018). The North who were culturally, politically, and economically separated developed strong concerns towards the south fearing southern political and cultural domination was transpiring. Such sentiments intensified as the establishment of secularized schools and regulations began their establishment in northern regions. Furthermore, the northern fears of secular state power structures promoted by a southern-dominated central legislature began to solidify and desires for a regional power model rather than a central authority approach began to take hold.

The structure of “indirect rule” started to lose legitimacy in rural, and later urban communities throughout Nigeria as it alienated indigenous authorities form their subjects; rather

73 than focusing on the well-being of their constituents, chiefs and kings operated to appease their

British rulers catering to their unfair business practices (Falola and Heaton 2008). New national movements in the 1930s started to rally against the colonial rule demanding greater involvement of Nigerians in its governance. While the leadership of the movement was western-educated

Nigerians, the membership included elements from north and south Nigerian societies. Yet, the difficult disagreements between regions on how to proceed with greater Nigerian involvement in the government remained regional which set the stage for conflict soon after independence in

1960.

The Rise and Fall of Nigerian Republics

During the preparation for independence in the 1950s, ethnic identities began to solidify and become politically meaningful. The northern ethnic groups rallied around the Northern

People’s Congress (NPC) and southeastern Yorubans developed and supported the Action Group

(AG) party while the southeastern Igbos assembled the National Council of Nigeria and The

Cameroons (NCNC). After independence in 1960, the newly elected government, devised of federal and regional assemblies, was divided between the three parties with a majority of the seats in the federal legislature filled by NPC members, followed by NCNC and the AG. Political actions by each party (e.g., hiring of military officers, infrastructure development, or health services) highly favored their respective region and ethnicity over the others. Regional favoritism led to corrupt census practices by the smaller parties in an attempt to gain more seats in the 1964 elections. Additionally, with control over their regions, the different parties prevented others from campaigning by arbitrarily detaining or arresting opposing candidates through local police.

As issues from federal voting transitioned to corrupt regional elections, riots broke out spurring a

74 military intervention that resulted in Nigeria’s first coup and the establishment of the first

Federal Military Government (FMG) in 1966 (Falola and Heaton 2008).

A majority of Igbo and Yoruba citizens welcomed the coup; however, communities in the north perceived it as a southern, specifically Igbo, form of domination especially given that the coup involved the killings of respected northern Muslim premiers while southern Christian premiers were merely arrested and later released. A counter coup by northern military officers and NCOs spurred violence by northern military units who killed 80,000 to 100,000 southeasterners residing in northern regions which sparked revenge killings of northerners in the southeast (Siollum 2009). In May, military leaders of the southeast declared the region’s independence from Nigeria renaming it as the Independent Republic of Biafra and thus starting the Nigerian civil war. The FMG violently resisted the secession in fear that other regions would follow suit, and in large part due to the large amounts of petroleum resources recently discovered along the Biafra coast. Despite international support from the USSR, France, Portugal, and the

International Red Cross, the Igbos became severely malnourished due to the surrounding FMG blockades. Weak and sustaining on an inadequate supply chain, the Biafra state collapsed ending the civil war in 1970 resulting in 1 to 3 million deaths; most due to starvation (Campbell and

Page 2018). The southeast region was quickly reintegrated into Nigeria as the FMG sought to take economic advantage of the petroleum reserves.

Since 1970, Nigeria has become a ‘rentier state’ making a vast majority of its revenue from the commercial extraction and exportation of crude oil (Sandbakken 2006). Thus begins

Nigeria’s perpetual dealings with corrupt political leaders accused at all levels of grafting oil revenues for party or personal gain. Throughout the proceeding three republics, petroleum revenues collected by the Nigerian regime have been distributed based on a prescribed

75 percentage system with the central government receiving the largest portion, followed by a smaller portion to the regional states, and finally to local governments. As a rentier state, the

FMGs and all civilian democratic regimes since have been perceived as more or less corrupt and disconnected from the opinions and well-being of the general population where power becomes maintained through the control of resources and the threat or use of coercion. As mentioned in the previous chapter, such an approach to government proves costly and often results in regime failure; an outcome Nigeria experienced continuously from 1970 to the establishment of its current republic thirty years later.

Oil, Corruption, and the Path to Democracy

As oil prices rose and fell in the 1970s, military head of states were replaced, sometimes violently, in an attempt to decrease corruption and transfer power to civilian authorities (Falola and Heaton 2008). To maintain acceptable levels of legitimacy new military heads of state would replace military governors and either build up or downsize the civil service sector to gain control over the economy. Head of states also increased the number of states during this period, from 12 to 19, in an attempt to gain legitimacy by ensuring petroleum revenues were spread more evenly between majority and minority populations. However, most military heads of state defaulted to coercive actions aimed to control protests and negative media attention. Such was the case in the first FMG who felt their control weakening culminating in the creation of a new constitution and transfer to civilian rule as a way to relegitimize the government.

Parties representing Nigeria’s second republic were vetted by a federal elections committee for their “national” character to prevent conflict through regional polarization. One party in particular, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) represented such national character and ended up winning the presidency to include a majority of the seats in the legislature. However, a

76 drop in oil prices drove Nigeria into a recession causing an 8.5 percent decrease in GDP, a 50 percent rise in inflation, and a rise in international debt to $18 billion (Ekperiware and Oladeji

2012). A wave of dissent moved throughout the nation as civil servants payments were withheld for several months, unemployment for unskilled workers rose, and urban crime increased along the coast, mostly smuggling of petroleum products, automobiles, and construction material.

Lacking options to develop legitimacy, the Nigerian government increased the federal police forces from 10,000 to 100,000 to coercively stop protests, quiet critical press outlets, and prevent oppositional parties from campaigning (Falola and Heaton 2008). This led to a highly corrupt

1983 election that enticed another military coup ending the second republic and instating military rule for the next 15 years.

The military coup against the second republic transitioned into a series of violent and oppressive FMDs, the first led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria’s current president (Campbell and Page 2018). In an attempt to stabilize the country and make it more appealing to foreign investment, Buhari aggressively prosecuted corrupt politicians from the second republic, mandated that all states pay the wages of unpaid civil servants, and instated a national character decree urging Nigerian citizens to live honorably for the betterment of the state rather than for individual gains. Such political actions garnered Buhari legitimacy; however, it was soon lost due to the establishment of a robust “police state” that imposed violent sanctioning against protests, misinformation from the media, and union strikes. Buhari soon lost support amongst the population and was overthrown by Major General Ibrahim Badamasi

Babangida who attempted to assume a more democratic position by proclaiming himself as the

‘president’ of Nigeria. Initially his rule was promising. He gathered input from the public concerning strategic economic decisions and he released imprisoned journalists. In an attempt to

77 pay off Nigeria’s debt, the FMD sought to privatize or commercialize 135 government organizations, but only 50 organizations were purchased (Falola and Heaton 2008). The legitimacy of Babangida’s FMD began to fall when he declared Nigeria as an official member of the Organization of the Islamic republic without consulting the population. This strengthened religious separations between Muslims and Christians sparking violent protests and riots. As unrest grew, Babangida, like his predecessors, turned to coercion to suppress critics, kill demonstrators, dissolve unions, and imprison journalist.

Demand for a civilian republic and elections were high throughout Nigeria which drove the establishment of another election committee to vet political party applications based on their

“national” character. After rejecting all applications, the FMD selected two candidates campaigning through artificially created parties, one moderately left and the other moderately right. The election, touted as one of the freest and fairest in Nigerian history, was nullified by

Babangida; a move that placed Nigeria on the brink of anarchy as both the southwest and southeast regions violently protested threatening to succeed. Babangida’s FMD lost all legitimacy, and in 1993 he hastily transferred power to a governing council that was shortly dismantled (Campbell 2013). Soon after, General Sani Abacha assumed the head of state position, erased any existence of the third republic, and established a brutal military regime that violently suppressed any political or civil resistance officially turning Nigeria into a pariah state.

Abacha’s reign lasted for five years and resulted in the establishment of six new states, massive inflation, the divestment of foreign holdings, declines in the oil sector, leadership corruption

(embezzlement of over $3 billion by Abacha alone), and the development of armed rebel organizations in the southeast in an attempt to reclaim land environmentally decimated by oil

78 extraction (Enweremadu 2013). After Achacha’s death from an apparent heart attack in 1998, the

FMD quickly set up elections and the fourth republic was instated in May 1999.

The Fourth Republic

Today, Nigeria continues to operate under the fourth republic and has achieved moderate success. From 1999 to 2007 Nigeria’s president was Olusegun Aremu Obasanjo; a Yoruban who ran under the People’ Democratic Party, the same party who won the most seats in the bicameral national assembly that year and who have maintained a majority up until the 2015 election.

Obasanjo served two terms, thought to have won both elections through manipulation of the political system. Despite his efforts to mitigate grafting by standing up the Economic and

Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to investigate alleged instances of corruption among public officials, many perceive such actions were made only to prevent the strengthening of opposition parties (Folarin 2009). During his terms, Nigeria’s GDP grew while the decline in the

Naira, Nigeria’s official currency, slowed. The petroleum market remained the largest revenue maker, but the non-oil sector grew by more than 16 percent. Yet, many Nigerians, especially in the rural areas suffered through and continue to remain in poverty while those in civil service positions continued to work without compensation prompting numerous strikes and school closures. Most Nigerians endured inconsistent utilities and unacceptable health services as many professionals leave Nigeria for more lucrative opportunities in other countries (Falola and

Heaton 2008).

High tensions during the 2011 election arose along religious lines as the incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the southeast running as the PDP candidate, ran against Muhammadu Buhari, a Fulani Muslim from the north running as the Congress for

Progressive Change candidate. The management of the election received relative praise from the

79 international community, but post-election grievances after the win by Johathan resulted in the most violent election in Nigeria’s history. Disbelief in a fair election by northern Muslims accumulated to violent clashes with Christians resulting in over 800 deaths in three days (Bekoe

2011, HRW 2011). With a focus on the economy, Jonathan made only marginal gains as poverty levels remained high in the northern regions. Any economic success by Jonathon was undermined by the rise of political violence by the terrorist group Boko Haram, a radical Islamic movement that saw little resistance by the Nigerian government. The failure to quell violent advancements by Boko Haram in the north, amongst other economic failures led to Jonathon’s loss in the 2015 election to Buhari. Jonathon publically accepted defeat calming a tense political atmosphere and marking the first time in Nigerian’s history that an incumbent president lost an election (Orji 2015).

THE GEO-POLITICAL ZONES OF NIGERIA

A review of Nigeria’s history reveals a troubled past filled with regional, ethnic, and religious boundaries that plague the nation with perpetual legitimacy deficiencies and contentious politics. Given such problems, it has been said that “[w]eak identification with the

Nigerian state translates into minimal loyalty to it, especially in the face of rival claims from family, religion, and ethnicity. It is the extended family, not any government institution, that provides a safety net for most Nigerians and enables their survival in times of public or private catastrophe.” (Cambell and Page 2018). This suggests nation-wide issues deriving from social closure which likely with continued low levels of government legitimacy. To better understand

Nigeria’s unique regional characteristics, we focus now on Nigeria’s contemporary history by examining the country’s six geo-political zones over a ten year period: 2007 to 2017. Nigeria’s geo-political zones were identified before the beginning of the fourth republic and recognize

80 common economic, political, and social characteristics amongst the country’s different states.

Each summary provides a brief overview of the social, economic, and political environment contributing to each region’s distinctness, followed by a closer examination of major political violent events. Table 2.4 provides a summary of the violent events and fatalities that occurred within each region and shows rankings for each zone according to the average yearly number of fatalities per capita during the period of interest.

Table 2.5 Violent Events Geo-political Zones: 2007-2017 (total fatalities in italics and rank order based on the average per capita in parentheses).

State-based Non-state State-based Non-state Armed Guerilla Based Armed Zone Terrorism Terrorism Conflict warfare Conflict 39 687 96 82 225 North Central 110 (4th) 5,604 (2nd) 356 (3rd) 241 (3rd) 1,523 (2nd) 33 1186 706 470 172 North East 1,101 (2nd) 13,427 (1st) 9,039 (1st) 3,829 (1st) 1,592 (1st) 24 371 72 94 77 North West 180 (5th) 3,982 (3rd) 420 (4th) 234 (4th) 425 (5th) 24 152 49 33 64 South East 277 (3rd) 286 (5th) 135 (5th) 48 (5th) 217 (4th) 46 587 139 140 194 South South 1,120 (1st) 874 (4th) 538 (2nd) 239 (2nd) 467 (3rd) 49 255 77 53 148 South West 57 (6th) 388 (6th) 129 (6th) 42 (6th) 147 (6th) 215 3,238 1,139 872 880 TOTAL 2,845 24,534 10,617 4,633 4,371

North East

The North East zone is represented by six states, Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,

Taraba, and Yobe with a total estimated population of 23.9 million in 2013 which rose to 26.2 in

2016 resulting in a population density of approximately 91 and 100 people per square kilometer respectively (Social Statistics 2019). Major ethnic groups in the region are Hausa-Fulani, Kanuri,

Jukun, and Tiv who are predominantly Muslim. The economy centers on agricultural exports

81 such as maize, rice, and cotton, to include large cattle markets in Yobe and Bauchi State.

Accounting for regional education, health, and living standards, the Oxford Poverty and Human

Development Initiative as part of the United Nations Development Programme identified the

North East as the highest poverty stricken region in Nigeria with over 67 percent of its population living in severe poverty reflecting high rates of child mortality amongst poor living conditions (Country Briefing 2011). The region has the lowest literacy rates in the country with an average state percentage of 34; the lowest occurring in Yobe with a rate of only 7 percent.

Unemployment is also well above the national average with a state average of 32 percent in 2011 and 28 percent in 2017 (Social Statistics 2012, 2017). In 2007 the region primarily sided with

Muslim runners for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). However, many northern communities parted from the PDP when it announced a southern Christian, Jonathan Goodluck as the party’s candidate for the 2011 presidential election. Since 2007, the region has decidedly voted for the

Congress for Progressive Change which would later turn into the All Progressives Congress

(APC); the party Muhammadu Buhari ran for and won in the 2015 presidency.

Figure 2.5 North East Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 North East: Violent Events and Fatalities 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Events Fatalities

Most violent events in northern Nigeria occur by the terrorist group Boko Haram, which natively translates to “western education is forbidden” (Adenrele 2012: 21). The violent non- state organization developed in 2002 as an Islamist youth movement against secular authority

82 and the institutionalization of “western” culture in Nigeria. The movement intensified in response to socioeconomic and political frustrations felt by northern Muslim communities witnessing the growing secularization of society during the early stages of Nigeria’s fourth republic (Forest, 2012). In 2009 Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf was captured during a violent uprising and killed while in police custody (ICG 2014). It is estimated that an additional

700 fatalities occurred, most being militant members. Boko Haram responded with organized violence that intensified over the years transitioning into a brutal extremist group with the aim to develop their own Islamic state under Sharia law in an attempt to resolve the perceived marginalization of Islamic culture (Adenrele 2012, International Crisis Group 2014).

As the organization grew more violent and influential in the north, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the northeast states of Adamaw, Borno, and Yobe in 2013. As identified in the standardized factor indexes in Table 2.5, all legitimacy dimensions were below the average for the nation at this time. Johnathan’s declaration of emergency brought national security and international humanitarian attention to the region, but a traditional military approach failed to stop Boko Haram’s asymmetric warfare advancements (Mickler et al. 2019). Violence by Boko Haram peaked in 2014 when the organization launched an aggressive territorial offensive in the region resulting in 6,644 deaths making it the deadliest terrorist organization in the world at that time (Blanchard 2015). That same year the organization gained global attention after abducting 276 girls in Chibok, a community in the southern region of Borno State. Since

2009, Boko Haram’s insurgency has cost more than 25,000 lives, displaced over half a million families, and demolished hundreds of facilities that house segments of Nigeria’s political, security, educational and economic institutions, most of which has occurred in the North East region (Campbell and Harwood 2018, ICG 2014:40). By early 2015, Nigeria deployed a

Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) comprised of a coalition of forces from Cameroon, Chad,

Niger, and Nigeria. The counterinsurgency operations also included a civilian component recognized as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) consisting of sponsored local militias, often comprised of armed young males, designed to protect communities from Boko Haram (Bukarti

2019). The MJTF was successful at regaining control of the northeastern territories. However, intense counterinsurgency operations by MJTF and CJTF often ignored rules of engagement resulting in the extra-judicial killings an estimated 1200 civilians (AI 2015). Despite these human rights violations, by 2016 all dimensions of legitimacy rose above the national average.

North West

Seven states make up the North West geo-political zone: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina,

Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara. It is the most populated region with 44.6 million in 2013 and 48.9 in 2016 resulting in a population density of 211 and 231 inhabitants per square kilometer respectively (Social Statistics 2019). Main ethnic groups consist predominantly of Muslim

Hausa-Fulani to include other ethnic groups such as Kanuri, Nupe, and Tiv. The lifestyle and overall economy is centered heavily on farming, particularly in the Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamafara states. The more central states of Jigawa, Kaduna, and Kano also have large manufacturing clusters that make up over 20 percent of Nigeria’s manufacturing employment (Bloch et al.

2015). Yet, there has been little economic development in the region as reflected in the low educational attainment and high rates of poverty. The North West has the second highest multidimensional poverty score in Nigeria with an estimated 60 percent of its population living in severe poverty (OPHI 2011). The average state literacy rate is 25 percent with educational attainment in the region being the second lowest in the country (Social Statistics 2019). Low rates occur because many students are not attending or choosing to drop out early from primary

84 and secondary school due to household labor responsibilities and the lack of funding towards government schools resulting in an inadequate number of teachers due to stagnant wages and decrypted or collapsed facilities (Hoechner 2018, NPC 2009). Moreover, it is estimated that nearly 40 percent of youths attend only Qur’anic schools, most which do not adhere to

Nigerian’s formal academic curriculum, as their only educational experience.

Table 2.6 Standardized Factor Indexes for the Dimensions of Legitimacy by Region: 2013 and 2016 datasets North Central North East North West South East South South South West Legitimacy Dimension 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 2016

National Pride (% who identify as ‘Nigerian’, 63% 63% 57% 66% 53% 41% 55% 50% 72% 37% 71% 76% mean = 59% (2013) and = 56% (2016) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.45) (0.48) (0.45) (0.42) 0.05 0.16 -0.35 0.10 0.00 0.12 Values/Principles (0.66) (0.48) (0.76) (0.70) (0.52) (0.48) -0.17 -0.31 -0.14 0.18 0.37 0.09 0.11 0.42 -0.10 -0.85 -0.33 -0.55 Procedural Fairness (0.61) (0.68) (0.55) (0.70) (0.59) (0.79) (0.65) (0.87) (0.58) (0.59) (0.49) (0.81) -0.17 -0.40 -0.12 0.12 0.35 0.18 0.16 -0.30 -0.10 -1.02 -0.32 -0.31 Effectiveness - Socioeconomic (0.89) (0.73) (0.69) (0.76) (0.76) (0.91) (0.17) (0.88) (0.81) (0.61) (0.71) (1.13) -0.13 -0.38 -0.05 0.19 0.20 0.11 0.26 -0.41 -0.04 -0.33 -0.28 -1.14 Effectiveness - Security (0.79) (0.74) (0.58) (0.67) (0.61) (0.88) (0.81) (1.11) (0.73) (0.98) (0.61) (0.63) -0.16 -0.37 -0.13 0.25 0.28 0.61 0.15 -0.41 -0.02 -1.14 -0.20 -0.76 Confidence National-level Leaders (0.81) (0.76) (0.70) (0.64) (0.75) (0.85) (0.86) (0.80) (0.74) (0.79) (0.62) (0.75) -0.20 -0.38 -0.05 0.19 0.30 0.12 0.02 -0.37 -0.08 -0.99 -0.31 -0.71 Confidence Local-level Leaders (1.03) (0.78) (0.91) (0.71) (0.97) (0.84) (1.09) (0.85) (0.96) (0.82) (0.97) (0.79)

As a result, development and unemployment levels remain comparatively high. In 2011 the state average unemployment rate was 29 percent for the region, but it showed some signs of promise by improving to 15 percent in 2017 (Social Statistics 2012, 2017).8 Similar to its eastern counterpart, the North West transitioned from the PDP to support the Muslim candidates associated with the APC in the 2011 and 2015 elections.

Figure 2.6 North West Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 North West: Violent Events and Fatalities 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Events Fatalities

Politically violent events are relatively low in the North West zone with the exception of the southeast part of the region. A vast majority of violence in the region has occurred in the central states of Kano and Kaduna with limited occurrences in the other western states. The uprising of Boko Haram in 2009 spread into Kano State where clashes between security forces and militants left a handful of militants dead. Most of the violence that erupted from the 2011 presidential election occurred in Kaduna State where clashes between Muslims and Christians resulted in 500 deaths, most which were Muslim. Police attempted to quell the violence, but extrajudicial and indiscriminate force resulted in many civilian casualties and other human rights violations (Taft and Haken 2015). Boko Haram activity rose again in Kano 2012 when militants violently attacked a police station and nearby civilians successfully freeing 700 of its captured

8 According to Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics, unemployment rates in the North West rose back up to 24 percent; slightly higher than the national rate of 23 percent. 87 members (Cook 2011). The same year a new radical jihadist terror group known as Jamā’atu

Ansāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān (or Ansaru) emerged in and around Kano conducting more discriminate violent acts focused on ousting foreign interest in Nigeria through the abduction and execution of western influencers in the region (Zenn 2013). In 2014 southern Kaduna also saw a rise in communal violence between Muslim Fulani pastoralist and Christians farmers of various ethnicities due to land rights disputes. A lack of government security and judicial presence in rural areas gave way to ethnic and community vigilante groups to achieve some degree of justice and resolution in civil disputes; a topic discussed further in the North Central section below. On the occasions when federal security forces provided a show of force in the region, they have been known to use excessive violence. For example, in 2014 and 2015 the military opened fire on protesting Muslim civilians resulting 35 and over 350 deaths respectively; the latter event will be further discussed in Chapter 4. Both events resulted in human rights violations and the conviction of lead military members who directed the attacks. Other displays of political violence in the northwest states of Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara are rare and limited in scope occurring mostly in limited skirmishes at the community level (Taft and Haken 2015).

North Central

The North Central political zone, known as the Middle-Belt, is made up seven states,

Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, and Plateau. The section also includes Nigeria’s Federal

Capital Territory (FCT) which houses Nigeria’s capital city, Abuja. The region makes up about

25 percent of the Nigerian territory and 15 percent of the population with 26.1 million inhabitants in 2013 rising to 29.3 million in 2016 (Social Statistics 2019). It is the second least dense region in Nigeria with population density of 121 and 133 people per square kilometer in

2013 and 2016 respectively. Ethnic groups and their religious affiliations are considered most

88 diverse in this region with Muslim and Christian Yorubas and Fulani in the western states of

Kawara and Niger, Christian Tiv and Muslim Hausa in the northeast states of Plateau and

Nassarawa, to include Muslim and Christian Gwari in the FCT and Christian Igla in southern

Kogi. The economy is largely agricultural based with a variety of substance and cash crops to include a substantial amount of pastoral grazing. The North Central zone has the third largest multidimensional poverty rating with an estimated 34 percent of the population living in severe poverty (OPHI 2011). The average state literacy is approximately 65 percent. The lowest literacy rate in the region is Niger with 23 percent and the highest percentages in Kogi (84 percent),

Benue (74 percent), and the FCT (79 percent). Educational attainment is higher than the North

West and North East zones, yet the rate of primary and secondary school completion remains below the national average especially in rural areas where agricultural responsibilities take priority and in northern areas where an estimated four percent of children attend only Qur’anic schools where most curriculums are not recognized by the Federal Ministry of Education. The average state unemployment in 2011 was 23 percent and decreased to 18 percent in 2017. States in the region remained below the national unemployment average; however, with the exception of the FCT, unemployment rates in the northern states within the region remained relatively high

(Social Statistics 2012, 2017). Prior to the 2015 elections, the North Central region voted primarily with the PDP with only Niger voting for Buhari as the CPC candidate in 2011; however, by 2015 the region was divided between APC affiliations in the west states of the region and PDP in the east.

Figure 2.7 North Central Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 North Central: Violent Events and Fatalities 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Events Fatalities

Violence in the Middle Belt largely occurs along ethnic and religious cleavages for diverse reasons. In rural areas many districts are embedded in a cycle of violence largely between Christian farming communities and Muslim pastoralists. Rising prices of beef, environmental degradation, grazing policy changes, and cattle wrangling in the north have forced many cattle herdsmen to migrate south to the Middle Belt region of the country (Bagu and Smith

2017). Violent disputes over land access prevail in the middle-belt and often create enduring successions of attacks and reprisal assaults along ethno-religious lines. For example, in 2010 and

2014 the region saw increased levels of violence occurring in northern areas of Plateau State where transient Muslim Fulani pastoralists fleeing intensifying violence from Boko Haram and cattle rustlers in the north were accused of grazing and destroying the farmlands of indigene

Christian Berom tribes (Taft and Haken 2015:63). Additionally, due to the security focus in the

North East region, police and other military members are spars especially in rural areas where most of the violence occurs causing many communities to develop militias for protection (ICG

2017). In urban locations ethno-religious violence stems from various political or economic conditions. For instance, in 2011 Kaduna state experienced high levels of sectarian violence where Muslim and Christian ethnic groups violently rioted against each other after the

90 presidential elections. The conflict resulted in more than 500 deaths and the destruction of multiple religious edifices (Harris 2013, Taft and Haken 2015). Overall, it is estimated that 1.2 million people are internally displaced and over 13,500 deaths are due to ethnic conflict in the middle-belt since the establishment of their latest republic in 1999 (Campbell 2013). More recently, it has been approximated that 2,500 people in 2016 died as a result of ethnic conflict that occurred in the middle-belt region (ICG 2017). As presented in table 2.5, legitimacy levels in this region sustain lower than average levels for both datasets.

South East

A collection of compact states nestled above the southern coast of Nigeria comprises the

South East geo-political zone. The five states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo make up approximately 11 percent of Nigeria’s population with estimates of 20 and 22 million people in 2013 and 2016 respectively (Social Statistics 2019). With a population density of over 700 inhabitants per square kilometer, it marks the highest concentrated population of all geo-political zones. The region is predominantly Christian Igbo with small sections of other minority ethnic groups such as the Igala. The region possesses rich collections of natural resources such as petroleum, natural gas, and bauxite. The local economy is largely driven by petroleum and natural gas extraction, but also consists of cash crops such as yams, rice, palm oil, and potatoes to include a sustaining trade and services sector. Average state unemployment rates were the second worst in the country at 20 percent in 2011 and 22 percent in 2017, yet the region obtains the second best multiple poverty index only slightly higher than the South West zone with an estimated 9 percent of the population living in extreme poverty (OPHI 2011). Educational attainment is also relatively high with primary and secondary school completion rates above the national average and the highest literacy rate (90 percent) of all geo-political zone (NPC 2009).

The region has voted decidedly for PDP since 2007, with the exception of Anambra state which has voted the All Progressives Grand Alliance party governor candidate for the past three elections.

Figure 2.8 South East Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 South East: Violent Events and Fatalities 400 300 200 100 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Events Fatalities

Despite educational attainment in the region, unemployment amongst youths remains high leaving many to turn to violent illicit organizations for employment. While comparatively low, political violence in the region centers on the separatist organization known as Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and actions of political thuggery and kidnappings from various gangs in the region. Since the Nigerian civil war, movements in the south have rekindled separatist sentiments organizing through groups such as

MASSOB and the Indigenous People of Biafara (IPOB), both groups which governors in the region have declared as “terrorist” organizations (Campbell 2017). During the period of analysis,

MASSOB violently protested against police forces based on corruption and abuse allegations resulting frequent reprisal attacks by both organizations (Taft and Haken 2015). Moreover, the group became more active after Buhari’s presidential win in 2015 resulting in violent police and military operations against the organization. Other frequent violent acts in the region include abductions of Nigerian officials, but these are often more criminally driven for the prospect of ransom payments rather than to achieve a political end.

South West

The South West geo-political zone consists of six states: Lagos, Ekiti, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo. The region has the second smallest land mass, but has the second largest population size of 34.7 and 38.3 million inhabitants in 2013 and 2016 respectively accounting for 20 percent of the Nigeria’s population (Social Statistics 2019). The region has the second highest population density of nearly 500 people per square mile in large part due to Lagos State which houses the largest city on the African continent, Lagos with an estimated population of 21 million (Social

Statistics 2017). Yoruba is the primary ethnicity with Igbo and Ekiti as notable minority groups within the region. Agriculture, fishing, and shrimping are the main industries in the region along with smaller mineral industries of limestone and granite (Taft and Haken 2015:63).

Unemployment, 11 percent in 2011 and 12 percent in 2017. Best multidimensional power score with an estimated 9 percent living in sever poverty. 88 percent literacy rate, roughly 25 percent of children attend only Qur’anic schools. Unlike Qur’anic schools in northern regions, South

West private Arabic schools improved funding and offer a curriculum that integrates segments of secular primary level curriculum (Oladosu 2012, 2019). Educational attainment for both primary and secondary schools are well above the national average, yet rural attendance and completion remains comparatively low with an estimated 47 percent of children learning to read. Political affiliation in the region sides with the Action Congress of Nigeria, a minority party mainly supported from 2007 and 2011 in governor and national assembly seats. By 2015 the ACN was merged with other parties into the APC leading many states to vote for Buhari in the presidential election. Most governor seats are filled by APC members with the exception of Ekiti and Ondo with PDP governors. Dispite low levels of violence, legitimacy orientations have remained below average for both 2013 and 2016.

Figure 2.9 South West Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 North West: Violent Events and Fatalities 200 150 100 50 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Events Fatalities

Violence in the South West zone marks the lowest in the country and stems primarily from cult activity as well as political clashes between opposing governmental parties. One of the most active violent organizations in Southwest is the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC). The

OPC is an ethnic nationalist vigilante group which operates to protect the interest of the Yoruba ethnic tribe and seeks sovereignty from the Nigerian government (Guichaoua 2010). In 1999 the

OPC reportedly targeted numerous individuals from other ethnic groups resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties (HRW 2003). In turn, the Nigerian government officially banned the OPC and proceeded to violently combat the organization with a “shoot on sight” directive (HRW 2003).

Overall, the security operations resulted in minimal degradation of OPC operations and entailed a number of human rights violations by the government (Ajala 2006). Currently, the OPC operates “underground” as a score settling and vigilante organization without much resistance from security forces (Taft and Haken 2015). Additionally, as in other parts of the county, political violence in the South West region increased during the 2011 election involving as the

National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), a trade association who supported the

Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and violently fought with PDP supporters killing two. The trade association continued to perform violent acts to further their political goals throughout the

94 time period of this study. Most other violent events in the region consisted of criminal and interpersonal violence.

South South

The South South geo-political zone, known as the Niger Delta is comprised by six states:

Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Corss-River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers with an estimated population of 26.2 million in 2013 which rose to 28.8 million in 2016 resulting in a population density of 309 and

338 inhabitants per square kilometer respectively (Social Statistics 2019). Since the colonial period, the population has remained predominately Christian with high concentrations of Igbo,

Ibibio, and Ijaw ethnic groups and other minority groups such as the Edo. The Niger Delta consists of a high proportion of youths, for example individuals 15-24 years of age make up over

20 percent of the population in Akwa-Ibom and Bayelsa. An MPI rating of .15 reveals a relative improvement of poverty and living conditions when compared to the northern regions with 11.6 percent in the Niger Delta considered to be living in severe poverty (OPHI 2011). The population is relatively educated with an average state literacy rate of 85 to 89 percent between 2013 and

2016 and percentage of out-of-school children remains much lower than that of their northern counterparts (FME 2017). Furthermore, this region is considered the most resource-rich in

Nigeria largely due to the vast amounts of petroleum reserves off the coast which have accounted for more than 90 percent of all extraction since the start of the fourth republic (CITE). However, oil drilling in the Niger-Delta has resulted in wide-spread pollution along the coastal region and into major rivers with an estimated 3.1 million barrels of crude oil spilled between 1974 and

2014 (Chinedu and Chukwuemeka 2018). Such neglect has drastically impacted environmental ecosystem and the local economy by killing or severely contaminating shoreline fish, nearby crops, and drinking water reserves with little efforts by the government or the transnational

95 companies to provide cleaning services (AI 2018). Despite the regions relatively high educational achievements and wealth from oil revenues, it has sustained high unemployment rates from a regional state average of 25 percent in 2011 to 29 percent by 2017. Unemployment has impacted educated youths 15 to 24 years of age more substantially in the region which many have associated with the increase and sustainment in violence in the region (AOAV and

NWGAV 2013, Surajo and Karim 2016). The region has primarily voted PDP members for state and federal positions since 2007, with the exception of Edo State who has elected an AC/ACN governor since 2011.

Figure 2.10 South South Geo-political Zone Politically Violent Events and Fatalities: 2007-2017 South South: Violent Events and Fatalities 1500

1000

500

0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Events Fatalities

A considerable amount of violence in the region today can be traced back to the

Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), a social movement led by Ken Saro-

Wiwa in the mid-1990s to obtain greater control over resources and oil revenues while holding the Nigerian government and international petroleum companies accountable for the oil spills in the region. When their demands to the government fell on deaf ears, MOSOP mobilized protests in Rivers State that quickly grew into riots as young activist encouraged violence against oil company facilities and personnel (Falola and Heaton 2008). The government’s extrajudicial arrest and hanging of Saro-Wiwa, along with eight others, established entrenched grievances between the federal government, military and local populations for years to come (Taft and

Haken 2015). Direct attacks on oil production facilities, personnel, and pipelines throughout the

2000s by oil stealing syndicates sparked swift and brutal force from the government often resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians. By 2005, many of the oil bunkering groups amalgamated into the organization known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger

Delta (MEND). In 2009, MEND operations slowed down oil production by up to 40 percent prompting the development of other various cults and armed groups, thus turning the region into a volatile hotspot for kidnappings and ransom operations (USEIA 2016). That same year, the government responded through heavy ground assaults and aerial attacks against Ijaw communities that resulted in extensive destruction of farmland and fishing holes to include the death of thousands of villagers (Taft and Haken 2015). The government responded by administering an amnesty program which has decreased violent acts in the region (AI 2009, Taft and Haken 2015). However, past mismanagement of amnesty stipends, their removal by the

Buhari government in 2015, and the continued high unemployment rate leave little opportunities outside of violent operations resulting in a recent resurgence in MEND actions and other oil bunkering groups in the region such as the Niger Delta Avengers (Aghedo 2013, E.A.D.W.

2016). Since 2013, legitimacy orientations have been below average.

CONCLUSION

A review of Nigeria’s contemporary history across its six geo-political zones reveals a complex and troubled giant in the African continent. Vast differences in economic, political, and social characteristics between each region offers a unique opportunity to further explore legitimacy theory. As argued in the previous chapter, legitimacy research is most valuable in nations like Nigeria where areas of limited statehood vary and political conflict prospers. The implementation of legitimacy’s multidimensional structure presented at the beginning of the

97 chapter reveals divergent levels of political support. These variations and the complex political structure of Nigeria are further explored in the next chapter which examines the sources and consequences of legitimacy.

CHAPTER 3: PROPRIETY, VALIDITY, AND THE SUSTAINMENT OF AN

AUTHORITY SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION

Thus far we have explored the dimensional aspects of state legitimacy by using confirmatory factor analysis to identify a spectrum of seven elements ranging from diffuse to more specific attitudes. Application of these dimensions to the sub-Saharan African country of

Nigeria reveals a diverse legitimacy landscape within a state balancing a contentious ethno- political population that remains consistently on the brink of collapse (Campbell 2013). Despite a large economy, areas of limited statehood are abound throughout the country, particularly in the central and northern regions where ethnic and rebel violence have thrived. Yet, southern regions also endure the consequences of limited statehood as evident by the actions of separatist organizations and violent protests against the government due to poor socioeconomic conditions.

Gaps in governance in combination with a fast growing population makes state legitimacy an increasing concern for the future stability of the country.

As addressed in chapter 1, important relationships to consider pertaining to the development and cultivation of legitimacy are those within the population of the governed. It is argued below that such relationships depend on neighborhood consensus and structural characteristics that make legitimacy more or less developed and influential within a given region, and that they remain critical components of the legitimacy puzzle in the Nigerian context. The literature suggests that without consensus or the presence of social connections, the effects of legitimacy falter putting the sustainment of a given governing entity at risk (Zelditch 2001,

2006). Given the consequences of such conditions, it is surprising that their application in legitimacy research remains largely confined to laboratory experimental manipulations (Walker

99 et al. 1986, Melamed 2012, Horne et al. 2016). Moreover, such studies fail to evaluate how legitimacy processes and conditions manifest across different dimensions where structures may be more or less explicit across the diffuse-specific spectrum. Therefore, further non- experimental examination of legitimacy relationships and the conditions that make them consequential to the sustainment of a governing system is warranted. This chapter seeks to cultivate further insights on such legitimacy processes and structures in the natural Nigerian context and how they apply to different dimensions of legitimacy. This chapter’s general approach utilizes the 2013 and 2016 data sets to explore the relationship between individual- and community-level legitimacy perceptions and how it is moderated through the condition of neighborhood consensus. It then further examines how variations in the presence of neighborhood social ties impacts legitimacy outcomes in terms of governing system sustainment attitudes. The proceeding begins by revisiting the literature on the different levels of legitimacy which leads to the development of the hypotheses that guide the analysis.

Propriety, Endorsement, and the Dimensions of Legitimacy

As suggested in chapter 2, legitimacy is fundamentally a multi-level process operating at the individual-level and the broader organizational- or community-level (Dornbusch and Scott

1975; Walker et al. 1986, 1991; Zelditch 2001). Individual legitimacy beliefs, referred to as propriety, have been shown to influence behavior that aids in the sustainment of a given authority system (Jackson et al. 2012, Norris 2011). Important findings also reveal that the normative regulation of power exercised through social systems of legitimacy are capable of influencing and even overriding the effects of individual-level attitudes (Horne 2009, Melamed

2012, Thomas, Walker et al. 1988, Zelditch 2006). In other words, the more pervasive legitimacy norms towards an authority system are, the greater impact they have on propriety. This social

100 aspect of legitimacy is referred to as validity, and develops through the aggregation of propriety expressed through social behavior and discourse eventually solidifying into an “objective reality” over a period of time (Bitektine and Haack 2015:53). Validity is divided into two distinct elements: endorsement, referring to legitimacy beliefs held by a follower’s peers, and authorization, denoting the expressed legitimacy beliefs of a follower’s superior by an equal or higher authority figure (Zelditch 2006). Each have been found to influence individual-level propriety and subsequent behavior, however, the analysis here specifically focuses on the effects of endorsement.

While propriety remains an important legitimacy element to power relations, theory suggests that the stability of authority depends primarily on the collective process of social validation rather than individual legitimacy perceptions (Berger et al. 1998, Bitektine and Haack

2015, Zelditch and Walker 2003). For example, an individual who originally believes that an authority system is prejudiced, and consequentially delegitimated, may change attitudes given the pressures of positive sentiments from their peers. Moreover, they may continue to possess different perceptions, but choose not to act on them based on the calculation of possible sanctions from violating the broadly accepted social order (Asch 1952, Bonardi and Keim,

2005). Therefore, the existence of a social system of legitimacy possesses the power to dampen individual pressures towards challenging the current governing system while increasing attitudes and behavior that support it (Walker et al. 1993, Horne 2009). These social pressures have been found to have similar effects concerning delegitimated validity as well, resulting in sentiments and actions to change or resist a governing system (McAdam et al. 2001, Sell and Martin 1983,

Sewell 1996, Vergne 2012).

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While theory suggests that favorable endorsement increases the likelihood of stability and compliance within a social system regardless of propriety, these effects are theorized to depend on the degree of consensus and the social structure of the collective where such perceptions are developed (Bitektine and Haack 2015, Horne 2009, Zelditch 2001). Consensus, or the degree of agreement within a collective, is an implicit condition for legitimacy perceptions to operate as normative pressures (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006, Dzehtsiarou 2011). As suggested by Bitektine and Zurich (2015:57), “[t]he more isomorphic the judgment expressed by multiple evaluators, the greater the perception of validity of that judgement,” and thus the greater influence it has in propriety attitudes. Without consensus, the effects of endorsement should noticeably decrease as sanctioning becomes socially unwarranted. In such circumstances individuals may operate based on unsanctioned propriety alone. Therefore, it can be assumed that a lack of consensus inhibits the effects of endorsement on propriety.

The first section examines the relationship between individual-level propriety and community-level endorsement and the moderating effects of consensus on the relationship as it operates within the Nigerian context. Provided that the country’s landscape is replete with areas of limited statehood, neighborhoods are often left to operate relatively independently of the central government (Abegunde 2009). In many areas, individuals heavily rely on their local community for infrastructure development, security, dispute resolution, health, and other services

(Kim and Isma’il 2013, Owumi and Ajayi 2013). For example, during the 2014 supplemental interviews when asked if members in the community would report a crime to the national police unit in their neighborhood, most respondents commented that they would seek assistance from other local resources due to police corruption and a lack dispute resolution:

[No] because I look at it as a waste of time. They will even inflict more injury to what has already happened to you. Maybe the first time they are able to extort money out of you

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because the first thing they will ask you is for money for fuel. (Gombe unemployed male, age 26)

I cannot go to the police to report simply because I know nothing will come out of my reporting. (Kaduna unemployed male, age 26)

Most often now a lot of people prefer to go the Civil Defense. (Sokoto mother, age 26)

The last response is indicative of the general sentiment to seek local paramilitary units rather than the nationally managed and operated Nigerian Police Force. This type of neighborhood reliance manifest community-level orientations as an influential source of local- and state-level legitimacy norms (Ojebode 2016). Individuals who deviate from such norms ultimately risk inaction and possibly social sanctioning to include some degree of separation from their community (Horne 2009). While mostly interdependent, neighborhoods are not completely separated from the federal government and in certain areas have witnessed some degree of successful state integration. For example, respondents from the group interviews whose community had exposure to national military units expressed confidence in their ability to provide security:

They view [the military] with dignity. They give them a lot of respect because if anything happens to you and you report it to the soldiers, they ensure that justice prevails. (Sokoto unemployed male, age 26)

I prefer the military. Because when you report anything to them, except you do not reach them they will take action. That is why I trust them. (Kaduna mother, age 26)

Such communities have the potential to establish prominent state legitimacy norms that shape individual-level propriety. Therefore, the moderating effect of consensus on endorsement is expected to be influential at the community-level for a majority of the Nigerian sample and will be the primary source of endorsement for this analysis.

An additional consideration is required to predict how the effects of endorsement on propriety change, if at all, across the different dimensions. One may be inclined to predict more

103 diffuse dimensions to possess a greater endorsement effect. For example, if a community member resides within a neighborhood whose members primarily identify themselves with the state, then an individual residing in that community may be more inclined to possess the same identity. While this may be the case, I argue that such diffuse legitimacy dimensions represent more internal, durable bonds to a nation-state that are less affected by the immediate attitudes of others (see also Norris 2011, Dalton 1999). Conversely, specific forms of legitimacy such as performance and leadership attitudes are more likely to be explicitly expressed and change, therefore having a greater potential to be influenced through social discourse (Easton 1975).

Thus, it is proposed that the effects of endorsement on propriety will be of greater significance for more specific forms of legitimacy.

The aforementioned theory and contextual elements leads me to formulate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3.1 (H3.1): Endorsement, recognized as favorable neighborhood legitimacy orientations, will have a positive association with individual-level propriety. This association will be more prominent for more specific dimensions of legitimacy.

Hypothesis 3.2 (H3.2): Consensus will moderate the relationship between endorsement and propriety, such that strong levels of consensus will strengthen the positive relationship between endorsement and propriety.

Propriety, Endorsement, and Authority System Sustainment

The next section examines the affect endorsement and propriety have on attitudes concerning the sustainment of a governing system. If a citizen perceives a government as a legitimate authority deserving of the right to rule, it then becomes more likely that the individual will possess positive attitudes towards conventional participation within institutionalized channels (Norris 2011, Booth and Seligson 2009). For example, in democratic societies this includes favorable attitudes towards voting in elections, contacting government officials, and

104 partaking in lawful demonstrations. Furthermore, if favorable legitimacy increases attitudes and behavior concerning conventional forms of political participation, it likely possesses a negative association towards organizations who operate outside institutionalized channels to challenge the current governing system (see also Arjona 2016, Horne et al. 2016). Therefore, positive legitimacy orientations are assumed to increase resistance towards such groups in order to sustain the current order provided by a governing system. It is expected that individual-level propriety and community-level endorsement possess a positive relation with sustaining attitudes concerning an authority system. However, as discussed above, community endorsement should have a stronger association with sustaining attitudes than propriety.

Additionally, while endorsement effects of specific legitimacy dimensions will influence individual perceptions, it is assumed that the effects of endorsement through more diffuse dimensions will have a greater effect on attitudes toward the sustainment of a governing system.

For example, an individual would feel more compelled to vote in an upcoming general election if they resided in a community with high democratic values rather than positive perceptions of the incumbent president. While such correlations between diffuse propriety perceptions and attitudes towards political participation has been shown in previous research, most fail to account for the effects of endorsement which are theorized to possess a greater influence than propriety (Moisés and Carneiro 2017, Norris 2011). Yet, given the relative short history of the current republic and the tumultuous past of failed democratic governing systems, it remains plausible that more specific legitimacy dimensions hold greater influence over system sustaining attitudes due to weakly developed diffuse perceptions. However, it is proposed here that despite possible lower levels of diffuse legitimacy, endorsement through more diffuse legitimacy dimensions will have

105 a greater effect on perceptions towards a governing system’s sustainment than endorsement through more specific attitudes.

Hypotheses 3.3 (H3.3): Propriety will have a positive association with authority system sustaining attitudes especially for more diffuse dimensions of legitimacy.

Hypothesis 3.4 (H3.4): Endorsement will have a positive association with authority system sustaining attitudes especially for more diffuse dimensions of legitimacy.

The second section also aims to explore the moderating impact of consensus and community ties on the relationship between endorsement and attitudes concerning sustainment behavior towards an authority system. If endorsement has a positive association with attitudes towards authority system sustainment, then it is assumed that such a relation is enhanced when moderated by community consensus. Furthermore, endorsement is expected to be more influential on system sustaining attitudes when it is enacted within a social structure made up of relatively strong relationships. As Tilly (2005:135) argued, connected communities with positive legitimacy orientations propagate system sustaining attitudes and are more likely to develop “an unbreakable interest in governmental performance… Interested citizens participate more actively, on the average, in elections, referenda, lobbying, interest group membership, social movement mobilization, and direct contact with politicians…” (135). This occurs in large part due to the capability of a densely connected community to propagate and enforce legitimacy norms more effectively than a less dense network (Bloodgood et al. 2016). In such communities, those who express destabilizing attitudes and behavior risk separation from a community they depend upon, and those who sanction such deviance increase the potential to be rewarded by others (Horne 2009). Thus, the structure of social relations dictates the effectiveness and probability of sanctioning towards attitudes and behaviors that threaten to destabilized the current governing arrangement.

106

Such social relations make the consequences of unsupportive perceptions and behaviors more severe and detrimental to individuals within the structure, and consequently less likely to occur. Therefore, it is predicted that the moderating effect of consensus on the association between endorsement and authority system sustaining attitudes depends on the degree of social ties within a neighborhood. If a given area is only moderately connected, then it might not matter if positive orientations and consensus exist. This could occur for two reasons. The first being that if a deviant attitude or behavior is observed, the benefits for sanctioning by others will likely go unnoticed and therefore, constitute as an unnecessary effort. Second, if the deviant actor is sanctioned, the impact of the sanctioning act resides with the individual or trivial group rather than the more influential impact of a connected community. Therefore, the risk of public deviant expressions decreases. Yet, as social connections within a neighborhood increase, deviant attitudes and behavior become increasingly rewarding for those who sanction and detrimental for deviant actors (Gelfand et al. 2011). These outcomes become enhanced if supported through community consensus that propagates through strong social ties. Thus, it is expected that a rise in social connections within an area enhances the interactive dynamic between endorsement and consensus and their interactive relationship with authority system sustaining attitudes.

To summarize, system sustaining attitudes will increase if positive legitimacy orientations are present in a given area. This is moderated at the neighborhood level by consensus such that when it is present, it will enhance the effect of endorsement. Moreover, the moderating effects of consensus will differ depending on the social ties present within a neighborhood, such that higher indications of social ties enhances the effect of consensus and endorsement leading to the formulation of the final hypothesis:

107

Hypothesis 3.5 (H3.5): There will be a three-way interaction of endorsement, consensus, and density of social ties in predicting attitudes towards authority system sustainment, such that the association between endorsement and system sustainment will be strongest when community consensus is strong and neighborhood ties are high.

The evaluation of the hypotheses proceeds by using two series of hierarchical linear models (HLM). The first series uses both the 2013 and 2016 datasets to evaluate H3.1 and H3.2.

The second HLM series assumes a similar formula and evaluates hypotheses H3.3-H3.5 while taking advantage of survey items present in the 2016 data set that allow for the analysis on the impact of community ties. Overall, the results offer relatively strong support for H3.1 and H3.2 while H3.3 through H3.5 receive only partial support. These outcomes are discussed in detail below.

PROPRIETY AND ENDORSEMENT

To formally investigate H3.1 and H3.2, table 3.2 and 3.3 display results from regressions of propriety on community endorsement for the 2013 and 2016 survey wave respectively. The analysis uses a hierarchical linear model (HLM) structure given the stratified sampling nature and the regional implications to variations in legitimacy attitudes. Despite the inclusion of state- level control variables that may explain variations in government support, omitted variable bias is highly probable given legitimacy’s complex nature. To alleviate biased between-effect estimations, the models relax the assumption that between and within effects are the same by assuming a hybrid approach that combines fixed and random effects. Therefore, the analysis adopts the following general structure:

푦푖푠 = 훽1 + 훽2(퐸2푖푠 − 퐸̅2∙푠) + 훽3(푋3푖푠 − 푋̅3푠) + 훽4푋4푠 + 훽5 퐸̅2푠 + 훽6 푋̅3푠 + 휁푠 + 휖푖푠 where 푦푖푠 is the legitimacy rating of subject i residing in state s. 퐸2푖푠 represents the measurement of endorsement. The respondent’s deviation from the cluster (state) mean of endorsement is represented by 퐸2푖푠 − 퐸̅2∙푠. The inclusion of these deviations combined with the cluster mean

108 covariate 퐸̅5푠, or the between effect, reveals the fixed effect association between endorsement

9 and propriety through coefficient 훽2. The same is said for 푋3푖푠 − 푋̅3푠 , and 푋̅6푠 which represent the same approach for respondent level control variables; with their fixed effect on legitimacy

10 represented by coefficient 훽3. Finally, 푋4푠 denotes state-level control variables that account for items such as levels of violence and economic development that occurred during the year prior to data collection, while 휁푠 and 휖푖푠 represent the state-level and respondent-level residual respectively. Additionally, missing values on respondent-level variables were managed using chained multiple imputation techniques using Stata, version 15. A description of the methods regarding the multiple imputation process is provided in Appendix A.

Measures

This section evaluates how the presence of positive legitimacy orientations in a neighborhood, recognized as endorsement, and the enhancing condition of neighborhood agreement on such orientations, regarded as consensus, influences propriety. Each predictive variable is operationalized using procedures derived from Delphi studies. The Delphi technique was introduced by the Rand Corporation in 1950 and is considered a tool that elicits consensus on sensitive issues using simple statistical measures (Christie and Barela 2005, Helmer-

Hirschberg 1967, Henshel 1982). Traditionally, this technique is used to evaluate and eventually reach consensus on a specific topic amongst a group of subject matter experts when general

9 The deviation from the cluster mean of endorsement is uncorrelated with 휁푠 because it does not vary between clusters, given that 휁푠 does not vary within them. The hybrid approach also relaxes the random effects assumption that the random intercept is uncorrelated with respondent-level covariates since the cluster mean (훽푝 푋̅푝푠) and the state-level residual (휁푠 ) represent the random intercept within the model. An endorsement variable was generated through the product of a participant’s community orientation and consensus measurements prior to the calculation of the necessary state mean deviations for the hybrid model. 10 A recent article by Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran (2020) discusses a double-demeaned interaction estimator that provides a strict within-unit interaction estimator that disregards the assumption of uncorrelated unit-specific moderators leading to more precise coefficient estimates. This analysis uses standard FE interaction estimator and recommends the application of the double-demeaned interaction estimator in future analysis. 109 outcomes are disputed or unknown. Usually it involves multiple survey waves to the same respondents who are asked to re-evaluate their initial responses while being provided simple statistical measures that indicate the degree of consensus the panel has on the subject. Such measurements of agreement include, but are not limited to, frequency distributions, standard deviations, and the interquartile range. Typically, survey redistribution ends when consensus is achieved based on the previously identified statistical measures meeting or superseding specific thresholds. It must be stated that it is not the intent of the current analysis to perform a classical

Delphi study given the main focus and cross-sectional nature of the data. Rather this study borrows how consensus is measured to evaluate its effect on endorsement and the relationship with propriety.

A recent review examining Delphi studies in management and business scientific fields found standard deviations as the most prominent statistic used to recognize the presence of consensus (Giannarou and Zervas 2014). The same review addressed the importance of a combinatory approach that assesses consensus using multiple statistical measurements (2014:67,

77). The analysis here follows such recommendations using calculations that indicate the presence of a favorable neighborhood legitimacy orientation (i.e., endorsement) and general agreement of such orientations (i.e., consensus). It is predicted that as a legitimacy norm, favorable neighborhood perceptions towards a governing entity will have a positive influence on propriety. However, this tendency is expected to be qualified by the level of community agreement on such perceptions. Thus, it is expected that higher levels of propriety will occur if an individual resides in an area with positive endorsement and such a tendency will be enhanced if neighborhood consensus is present. Methodologically, it is assumed that the interaction

110 between the two covariates should provide evidence how the presence or absence of positive legitimacy orientations and general agreement associates with propriety.

The operationalization of favorable community orientation and general agreement uses suggested approaches within the Delphi methodological field (Christie and Barela 2005,

Giannarou and Zervas 2014). Thus, a favorable orientation at the community level, or endorsement as conceptualized for this study, is identified through a binary variable (1-favorable orientation met, 0-favorable orientation not met) that recognizes if at least 51 percent of community members within a PSU have a propriety score within the top 40 percent of the range for the respective variable. For example, if an individual resided in a community that has six out of ten members who rate their confidence in national government between a six and a ten on a ten-point Likert scale survey item (1-no confidence, 10-total confidence), then that respondent would be identified as living in a community with favorable legitimacy orientations concerning confidence in the national government. General agreement, or consensus, is also recognized through a binary variable (1-agreement met, 0-agreement not met) if the PSU’s standard deviation is at or below 15 percent of the total range of the respective legitimacy variable.11

Using the previous example, general agreement would be considered met if the standard deviation of the ratings by others was 1.5 or below. Both endorsement and consensus measurements are calculated for each participant using propriety scores of the other community members within a PSU. The exclusion of each participant from the calculations allows the analysis to properly assess endorsement effects on propriety with the expectation that the former

11 These calculations follow the minimalist conceptualization of consensus as described by Zelditch and Floyd (1998) who argue that near-consensus constitutes its existence without requiring all members to have the same or similar perceptions. Furthermore, consensus is issue-specific suggesting its presence concerning one issue and the absence for another. This supports the current analysis using separate models for the different legitimacy dimensions. 111 enhances the development, or at least positively associates with the later. Summary statistics for neighborhood endorsement and consensus concerning each survey wave are provided for each legitimacy dimension in table 3.1.

These calculations are performed for all dimensions of legitimacy excluding national identity which is represented by a dummy variable (1-identify as Nigerian, 0-other). The standard deviation for a binary variable offers little in terms of providing a range in which the responses fall. Therefore, consensus of national identity within a neighborhood was recognized through a dummy variable if the proportion of PSU members who identified themselves as

Nigerian was at or above 0.60.

Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for favorable community orientations and general agreement 2013 Wave 2016 Wave Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood Neighborhood

Endorsement Consensus Endorsement Consensus 0.525 0.49 National Identity - - (.50) (0.50) 0.571 0.758 Democratic Principles - - (0.50) (0.43) 0.149 0.916 0.175 0.757 Procedural Fairness (0.36) (28) (0.38) (0.43) 0.171 0.870 0.292 0.738 Economic Effectiveness (0.38) (0.34) (0.45) (0.44) 0.176 0.870 0.275 0.734 Security Effectiveness (0.38) (0.33) (0.45) (0.44) 0.191 0.866 0.313 0.783 Conf. in Nat. Gov. (0.39) (0.34) (0.46) (0.41) 0.45 0.297 0.282 0.751 Conf. in Local Gov. (0.50) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) Note–Cells display proportion of favorable community orientations and general agreement (top) and the standard deviation in parentheses (bottom) for the respective legitimacy dimensions for each dataset. Excluding ‘National Identity’ favorable community orientation is represented by a binary variable that recognizes if a community which the respondents resides in has at least 51 percent of the respective legitimacy scores within the top 40 percent of the range. General agreement is represented by a binary variable that recognizes if a community which a respondent resides in has a standard deviation at or below 15 percent of the total range of possible values for the respective legitimacy dimension. National identity consensus was omitted due to its binary nature. Democratic principles were not avail in the 2016 wave.

Control Variables

Control variables at the respondent level include theoretically relevant covariates concerning demographic attributes, attitudes and experiences, and aspects of governmental

112 access that may influence legitimacy orientations towards the state. I discuss each in turn here as they will be included in subsequent models in other chapters. Full details and distribution characteristics for these variables are located in Appendix B.

Demographic characteristics included gender, age, household income, educational attainment, employment status, religion, and language. Gender is often an identifier that reflects aspects of inequality within a given social system, and the Nigerian case is no exception

(Ridgeway 2014, Kanter 1977). Such gender inequalities persist in Nigeria as the primarily male dominated society continues to hoard social and economic opportunities limiting females’ prospects of advancement (Makama 2013, Owoyemi and Lousanya 2014). This is evident in the

2016 survey were over half (53 percent) the respondents agreed that too much credence is given to women’s ideas in their respective community. Given gender’s connection with social inequality in the Nigerian context, it is included in the analysis as a binary variable for those who identify as female and is expected to have a negative association with legitimacy. Age may also contribute to legitimacy as younger respondents likely possess lower stakes in a governing regime than older individuals who become embedded and more dependent on the system for their well-being (Lake 2006). Therefore, it is included and is expected to have a positive association with legitimacy.

Employment is incorporated as a binary variable and is expected to associate positively with legitimacy; specifically with attitudes towards institutional performance. However, many

Nigerians who are employed endure aspects of underemployment which maintained a national average of approximately 17 percent during the administration of the two survey waves (Under- employment Watch Q1, 2016). Thus, monthly household income is also included into the models as a continuous variable and is expected to have a positive association with legitimacy. It is

113 expected that educational attainment may also associate with legitimacy. For example, it has been shown that formal levels of education associate with positive attitudes towards more diffuse dimensions of legitimacy, such as democratic principles, and with less favorable attitudes towards more specific elements such as institutional performance and support for governmental leaders (Booth and Seligson 2009). Therefore, its inclusion is expected to associate differently with legitimacy depending on the dimension. Religion is also included as a control variable as it has been shown to shape attitudes and engagement towards a political system as is evident in the historical analysis of Nigeria in chapter 2 (see also Fowler 2018, Thomson 2016). It is incorporated through a binary variable that addresses if a participant responded that they practiced the Muslim faith at the time of data collection. Language is incorporated given that research shows that the ability to converse using a country’s recognized common language associates with a more favorable connection to a governing system (Wimmer 2018, Tilly 2005).

The ability to speak English, Nigeria’s official language, is included as a binary variable and is expected to have a positive association with legitimacy attitudes.

Individual attitudes and experiences that act as sources of legitimacy and that are controlled in the analysis below include media exposure, acceptance of other ethnicities and faith, past political participation, and a sense of security. Exposure to the media has been shown to influence perceptions towards a governing system and its institutions (Intravia et al. 2018,

Tsfati and Cohen 2005). The datasets reveal that over 97 and 92 percent of respondents from the

2013 and 2016 survey waves respectively consume media (e.g. television, internet, radio, newspaper) at least once a week. Therefore, the models below do not control for general media exposure. Rather the models control for which news source a respondent prefers when searching for information. The media outlet with the highest proportion of trustworthiness (32 and 35

114 percent in the 2013 and 2016 survey wave respectively) was the Nigerian Television Authority

(NTA) who broadcasts both nationwide television and radio programs. As a government-owned news outlet, it is assumed that those who trust NTA as their primary source of information will have higher state legitimacy perceptions.

Research has also shown that those more trustworthy or accepting of outsiders are more likely to believe that the governing system operates with their best interest in mind (Booth and

Seligison 2009, Tilly 2005a). This aspect is controlled through two survey items concerning how accepting the respondent would be towards a neighbor of a different religion and ethnicity.

Additionally, perceptions of safety and security are likely to associate positively with those who feel more secure holding higher evaluations of the governing system (Kusters et al. 2007,

Stollenwerk 2018).12 Thus, the models include a survey item that assesses how safe the respondent feels in the area where they live (1-very unsafe, 4-very safe). Finally, past political participation is controlled for by a binary variable that addresses if the respondent voted in the last general election with the assumption that those who participated in government procedures would be more likely to offer support towards the system (Persson et al. 2013).

The final group of individual controls include governmental access at the national and local level. National level access is controlled using information from the Ethnic Power

Relations (EPR) dataset which identifies politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to executive state power (Vogt et al. 2015). Within the dataset, politically relevant ethnic groups are categorized according to their degree of access to national levels of power: (1) those who rule alone, (2) share power, or (3) those who are excluded. During survey administration for both

12 Understandably in areas of limited statehood feelings of security may derive from other non-governmental sources (e.g., ethnic militias, rebel groups, etc.) (Janssen 2015). Such complexities are further evaluated in subsequent chapters. 115 waves, no single group controlled the executive levels of government. Thus, EPR categorization is represented in the models through a binary variable that indicates if a respondent shared ethnic ties to national level power or is excluded. The models also control for local government access using a binary variable that identifies if the respondent shares the same ethnicity as the state governor during the time of data collection.

State-level controls include index scores derived from the Human Development Index

(HDI) and religious diversity within a given state. Sub-national HDI incorporates indices of health, educational opportunity and attainment, and economic equality and development for each state (Subnational HDI, 2019).13 A state’s development is controlled for using index scores from the year prior to survey administration. Theoretically, a lower index score should associate with lower state legitimacy perceptions, especially regarding more specific dimensions (Gilley 2009,

Klick 2013). Yet, Nigeria’s history reveals a governing system replete with corruption where state-level resources may be distributed to only a select few. Therefore, it is possible sub-national level indices result in a null or even negative effect. The other state-level control accounts for religious homogeneity. As Nigerian reports suggest, regions with higher degrees of religious variation may be more prone to stability issues that would decrease state legitimacy (Eke 2018,

McDougal et al. 2015). Given that Nigeria is in large part split between Christians and Muslims, religious homogeneity was operationalized by taking a given state’s Muslim percentage and calculating the absolute value of its difference from .50. This produced a scale of 0 to .50 with higher scores indicating higher degrees of religious homogeneity.

13 Specifically these subnational indices are determined based on the following: health – life expectancy at birth; education – expected years of schooling and mean years of schooling; economic – GNI per capita (Technical notes, 2019). 116

Results

The columns in Table 3.2 and 3.3 present the coefficients and standard errors for the variables of interest for each legitimacy dimension assessed in the 2013 and 2016 survey respectively. The full list of primary independent and control variable coefficients and standard errors for each model is located in appendix C. The row at the bottom of each panel provides estimates for the total within- and between-state variance for each unconditional model. The intraclass correlation (ICC), or the proportion of between-state difference, reveals most of the variation in legitimacy occurring among respondents within the same state. However, there is still noticeable legitimacy variation between states suggesting that regional differences may explain changes in legitimacy attitudes to include variations in its consequences.14

Column 2 provides respondent-level coefficients for the main effects of endorsement and consensus within a neighborhood. For a majority of the models, state-level control coefficients failed to reach statistical significance, therefore the results shown derive from the individual- level coefficients from the fixed effects portion of the analysis. The model reveals a significant positive path coefficient for the association between endorsement and propriety across all legitimacy dimensions partially supporting H3.1. Additionally, the coefficients reveal no noticeable trend between endorsement and propriety concerning differences between diffuse and more specific dimensions of legitimacy. All remain highly significant and relatively substantial in magnitude across both samples. Therefore, H3.1 remains partially supported given that

14 Given the construct of the hybrid fixed and random effects, a correlation between the cluster means of the within- state covariates and the between-states covariates is expected. This results in inconsistent random intercept variances for subsequent models. For this reason only the estimator for within-state variance is presented for subsequent models. 117 endorsement does positively associate with propriety, however lacks noticeable changes between legitimacy dimension types.

Column 3 of Panel A for both tables represents a linear probability model regressing national identity on positive neighborhood orientations. Results show a significant and strong association with propriety suggesting that increased levels of community national pride/identity increase the probability an individual will possess similar sentiments by approximately 52 and 37 percent for the 2013 and 2016 dataset respectively, while controlling for the other variables in the model.

Table 3.2. Hybrid Fixed and Random Effects HLM on Dimensions of Legitimacy (2013 Dataset) (1) (2) (3) A. National Identity Endorsement 0.518*** (0.04) Consensus

Endorsement x consensus

Within- / between-state variance 0.21 / 0.05 0.15 / 0.01 Intraclass Correlation 18% 6%

B. Democratic Principles Endorsement 0.797*** 0.602*** (0.06) (0.06) Consensus -0.045+ -0.197*** (0.02) (0.05) Endorsement x consensus 0.262*** (0.05)

Within- / between-state variance 0.39 / 0.11 0.26 / 0.03 0.25 / 0.03 Intraclass Correlation 21% 11% 11%

C. Procedural Fairness Endorsement 0.730*** 0.552*** (0.06) (0.09) Consensus 0.041 0.016 (0.05) (0.05) Endorsement x consensus 0.194+ (0.10)

Within- / between-state variance 0.47 / 0.17 0.21 / 0.07 0.21 / 0.07 Intraclass Correlation 27% 25% 25%

118

Table 3.2. (Continued) (1) (2) (3) D. Economic Effectiveness Endorsement 0.980*** 0.678*** (0.08) (0.13) Consensus 0.093* 0.056 (0.04) (0.05) Endorsement x consensus 0.334* (0.14)

Within- / between-state variance 0.47 / 0.17 0.36 / 0.10 0.36 / 0.10 Intraclass Correlation 27% 22% 22%

E. Security Effectiveness Endorsement 0.749*** 0.573*** (0.07) (0.10) Consensus 0.082** 0.052+ (0.02) (0.03) Endorsement x consensus 0.201* (0.09)

Within- / between-state variance 0.34 / 0.13 0.27 / 0.08 0.27 / 0.08 Intraclass Correlation 28% 23% 23%

F. Conf. Nat. Leaders Endorsement 0.719*** 0.462*** (0.06) (0.09) Consensus 0.107* 0.067 (0.05) (0.06) Endorsement x consensus 0.285** (0.08)

Within- / between-state variance 0.41 / 0.18 0.34 / 0.11 0.33 / 0.11 Intraclass Correlation 31% 25% 25%

G. Conf. Local Leaders Endorsement 0.885*** 0.717*** (0.07) (0.06) Consensus -0.043 -0.347*** (0.05) (0.04) Endorsement x consensus 0.607*** (0.06)

Within- / between-state variance 0.76 / 0.29 0.61 / 0.12 0.59 / 0.10 Intraclass Correlation 27% 16% 14%

Note. –Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using robust standard errors. State-level N = 37 for all columns. Column estimates are from 2013 survey wave data; regressions of respondent-level legitimacy dimensions on individual- and state-level independent variables. Full list of control variable coefficients provided in appendix C. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

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Table 3.3. Hybrid Fixed and Random Effects HLM on Dimensions of Legitimacy (2016 Dataset) (1) (2) (3) A. National Identity Endorsement 0.371*** (0.01) Consensus

Endorsement x consensus

Within- / between-state variance 0.2 / 0.06 0.17 / 0.02 Intraclass Correlation 22% 8%

B. Procedural Justice Endorsement 0.569*** 0.296** (0.06) (0.11) Consensus 0.113*** 0.052 (0.02) (0.03) Endorsement x consensus 0.354** (0.10)

Within- / between-state variance 0.5 / 0.2 0.43 / 0.15 0.43 / 0.15 Intraclass Correlation 28% 25% 26%

C. Economic Effectiveness Endorsement 0.508*** 0.007 (0.12) (0.19) Consensus 0.039 -0.138+ (0.05) (0.07) Endorsement x consensus 0.676*** (0.18)

Within- / between-state variance 0.58 / 0.25 0.52 / 0.17 0.51 / 0.17 Intraclass Correlation 30% 24% 25%

D. Security Effectiveness Endorsement 0.488*** 0.065 (0.11) (0.18) Consensus 0.041 -0.104+ (0.03) (0.06) Endorsement x consensus 0.564*** (0.13)

Within- / between-state variance 0.55 / 0.24 0.49 / 0.16 0.48 / 0.17 Intraclass Correlation 31% 25% 27%

E. Conf. Nat. Leaders Endorsement 0.457*** 0.317* (0.06) (0.12) Consensus 0.049 -0.004 (0.06) (0.05) Endorsement x consensus 0.175 (0.11)

Within- / between-state variance 0.52 / 0.25 0.45 / 0.17 0.45 / 0.17 Intraclass Correlation 33% 27% 27%

120

Table 3.3. (Continued) (1) (2) (3) A. Conf. Local Leaders Endorsement 0.535*** 0.280** (0.05) (0.09) Consensus 0.040 -0.056 (0.05) (0.04) Endorsement x consensus 0.340** (0.10)

Within- / between-state variance 0.56 / 0.25 0.49 / 0.16 0.48 / 0.17 Intraclass Correlation 31% 25% 25%

Note. –Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using robust standard errors. State-level N = 34 for all columns. Column estimates are from 2016 survey wave data; regressions of respondent-level legitimacy dimensions on individual- and state-level independent variables. Full list of control variable coefficients provided in appendix C. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Subsequent panels in tables 3.2 and 3.3 reveal the interaction between endorsement and consensus in column 3 to have significant and positive effects concerning most legitimacy dimensions across both survey waves, with procedural fairness in the 2013 wave achieving only marginal significance and confidence in national-level leaders in the 2016 wave failing to reach the desired estimation precision. These results suggest that the positive relationship between endorsement and propriety is moderated through the presence of neighborhood consensus such that respondents residing in an area with favorable legitimacy orientations and general agreement concerning such perspectives are more likely to have positive propriety orientations than an individual residing in a neighborhood where consensus is absent.

The failure to reach an adequate significance level for confidence in national governmental leaders may be a result of personnel turnover that occurred during the administration period for the 2016 survey. By this time, president Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in as Nigeria’s new president, however many of his cabinet positions remained unfilled for months leaving the population in an ambiguous state concerning attitudes towards national leaders (Mitter 2015). While turnover was also present at the state and local level, these changes were less substantial than the national level due to the unprecedented and historic unseating of

121 the incumbent president. With such fluctuations, it is reasonable to consider that the interaction between endorsement and consensus towards national leaders lacked significant influence over individual attitudes during this period. Despite this insignificant result, the models show that allowing the association between propriety and endorsement to depend on the degree of consensus reveals a significant effect of the interaction across most legitimacy dimensions, holding all else constant; thus, providing evidence for the support of H3.2.

To further illustrate the interpretations of the interaction effects, figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the marginal means for all dimensions that reached an acceptable significance level in the

2013 and 2016 models respectively. Common tendencies across both figures are the increase in propriety associated with the presence of both a positive neighborhood orientation and general agreement when compared to neighborhoods without consensus. This increase is significantly different from a community with only a favorable orientation suggesting that consensus is an important factor when considering positive endorsement effects on propriety.15 Moreover, neighborhood orientations that are not favorable, yet maintain the presence of general agreement have a significant negative association with propriety revealing that the effects of legitimacy and delegitimacy through endorsement have similar, yet opposite associations on individual perceptions. For most models, this decrease is not significantly different from areas with less favorable legitimacy orientations and an absence of general agreement suggesting that consensus loses influence as endorsement become less favorable. However, figure 3.1 shows democratic principles and confidence in local leaders having a significant decrease (t(36)=-4.11, p<0.001 and

15 2013 (df=36): democratic principles – t=2.11, p=0.04; procedural fairness – t=2.10, p=0.04; economic effectiveness – t=3.31, p=0.002; security effectiveness – t=3.23, p=0.003; confidence in national leaders – t=6.09, p<0.001; confidence in local leaders – t=4.55, p<0.000. 2016 (df=33): procedural fairness – t=4.52, p<0.001; economic effectiveness – t=3.98, p<0.001; security effectiveness – t=4.27, p<0.001; confidence in local government – t=2.57, p=0.02. 122 t(36)=-9.50, p<0.001 respectively) from less favorable legitimacy orientations that fail to reach general agreement. Similar differences occur with the dimensions of economic and security effectiveness in the 2016 wave. However, these differences reach only marginal significance levels (t(33)=-1.97, p=0.06 and t(33)=-1.81, p=0.08 respectively). Finally, the figures reveal no noticeable trend between endorsement and propriety concerning differences between diffuse and more specific dimensions of legitimacy. The effects reached significant levels across both diffuse and specific dimensions, and figures 3.1 and 3.2 reveal inconsistent differences between endorsement effects which fail to support the proposition that endorsement for more specific dimensions would produce a greater influence on propriety.

Figure 3.1. Interaction between Endorsement and Consensus – 2013 wave

123

Figure 3.2. Interaction between Endorsement and Consensus – 2016 wave

Overall, the results in this section offer partial support for H3.1 by showing that favorable endorsement has a positive and significant association with propriety. Furthermore, the results show support for H3.2 by revealing the moderating effect of consensus on the positive association between endorsement and propriety for a majority of the legitimacy dimensions.

Conversely, the results show that if unfavorable legitimacy orientations and consensus are present in a neighborhood, which one might classify as disapprobation, it becomes more likely that propriety assumes the form of delegitimation. This suggests that the effects of legitimacy and delegitimacy through endorsement have similar, yet opposite influential effects on individual perceptions. While the models are unable to show the possible causal effects of endorsement on propriety, they provide evidence of the strong relationship between the two elements of legitimacy as it operates in a natural Nigerian environment. The analysis turns now to evaluate

124

H3.3 through H3.5 by examining the effects of propriety and endorsement on attitudes towards the sustainment of a governing system.

PROPRIETY, ENDORSEMENT, AND AUTHORITY SYSTEM SUSTAINMENT

The first section illustrated that endorsement has a significant association with propriety and that the relation was moderated by consensus across both Nigerian datasets. Furthermore, the models above provided evidence that consensus concerning less than favorable legitimacy orientations corresponds with significant decreases in propriety. This section now focuses on the effects of propriety and endorsement on attitudes towards the sustainment of a governing system.

It is expected that both levels of legitimacy possess a positive relation with sustaining attitudes.

However, theory suggests that endorsement should have a greater influence on such perceptions where social norms of legitimacy encourage individuals to sustain authority systems considered as beneficial to the group and sanction attitudes and behaviors that seek to weaken an authority’s rule. Similar to the previous section, it is assumed that neighborhood endorsement effects are enhanced in the presence of consensus regarding such attitudes. Moreover, it is argued that attitudes towards the sustainment of a governing system are considered to be an interactive function of positive community orientations, general agreement of such orientations, and a community’s social structure. Such social relations make the consequences of unsupportive perceptions and behaviors more severe and detrimental to individuals within a supportive neighborhood structure, and therefore less likely to occur.

Measures

To investigate how social structure enhances the effect of consensus and endorsement on attitudes towards the sustainment of a governing system, the analysis examines the density of community social ties as addressed in H3.5. To test the first and second order moderating effect,

125 the analysis takes advantage of a survey item added in the 2016 wave that asks how trustworthy people are in the respondent’s neighborhood (1 – most can be trusted, 2 – some can be trusted, and 3 – need to be careful). Though trust and density are distinct concepts, network theory and empirical research recognize trust as a critical mechanism that enables connections within a social network suggesting that higher degrees of trust associate positively with the density of social connections within a group or community (Buskens 2002, Coleman 1988, 1990,

Granovetter, 1973, Liu et al. 2013, Sankowska 2015). Therefore, while not a specific measurement of density, perceptions of neighborhood trust were regarded as an acceptable estimate. Responses to this item were transformed into a binary variable that identified if most or some people in a respondent’s given community could be trusted (1) or not (0). Similar to community legitimacy orientation, community trust perceptions were operationalized by calculating the mean PSU ratings while excluding the participant to capture the effects of both propriety and endorsement within the same model.

Analysis on system sustaining attitudes examines two variables provided in the survey data: (1) perceptions on an individual’s neighborhood willingness to resist groups who threaten to destabilize instated authority systems, and (2) attitudes towards political participation.

Concerning the former, the analysis assumes that if an authority system and its respective institutions are legitimized by a community, it should promote legitimacy norms that influence perceptions to resist organizations who threaten the performance and existence of a governing entity, such as terrorists or rebel groups. Therefore, the main dependent variable for the first set

126 of analyses comes from the following survey item: how willing are people in this area to stand up against terrorist groups (1-none, 4-most).16

This section also investigates the association of the predictive variables of interest on system sustaining attitudes pertaining to political participation. Past research has shown that state legitimacy perceptions associate positively with political participation in democratic governments suggesting that higher perceptions of state as fairness and effectiveness make contributions the sustainment of the system (e.g., voting, joining a political party, contacting a government official) more likely (Holbig and Gilley 2010, Lijphart 1997, Lindberg 2004,

Seligson 2002, Tilly 2005). The analysis here focuses on attitudes towards voting captured by the survey item: do you intend to vote in the next national election (1-yes, 0-no).

This section explores the relationship of the aforementioned predictive variables and their interactive functions with attitudes towards authority system sustainment through a hierarchical linear model with the following general structure:

푦푖푠 = 훽1 + 훽2푋2푖 + 훽3푃3푖 + 훽4퐸4푖 + 훽5푇5푖 + 훽6푇5푖퐸4푖 + 훼푠 + 휖푖푠 where 푦푖푠 represents the outcome, in this case attitudes towards resistance to terrorist groups or political participation for respondent i residing in state s. 푋2푖 are respondent-level control variables that account for the same items in the previous section. The models also control for propriety 푃3푖 concerning each respective dimension to assess possible effect differences with endorsement. 퐸4푖 denotes the interaction between endorsement and consensus, while 훽4 represents the coefficient of interest that identifies the effect of the three way interaction between endorsement and consensus (퐸4푖), and community trust (푇5푖) on the dependent variables. To

16 This item does not capture the specific orientation of the respondent, however it is assumed that the respondent considers themselves as a member of the community and therefore likely to react in a similar fashion as those around them. 127 assess the net effects the dependent variables the model implemented here forgoes a hybrid approach and uses state-level fixed effects to account for unobserved regional differences

17 through 훼푠.

Results – Neighborhood Resistance to Terrorist Groups

Table 3.4 displays results of community resistance to terrorist groups regressed on propriety, endorsement and social structure to include the interactive product of endorsement, consensus, and neighborhood ties. Column 1 displays the most parsimonious model and shows coefficients and standard deviations for propriety across all legitimacy dimensions for the 2016 wave. Column 1, as well as columns 2 through 4 reveal no significant associations between propriety and the perceived willingness of a respondent’s community to resist terrorist groups.

Propriety’s null association may occur due to the dependent variable’s focus on “people” in the community and not the specific individual. As a collective action, it remains possible that individual attitudes may not be applicable when responding to a question regarding the larger neighborhood. However, as a member of that community, the analysis assumes that the respondent, to some degree, includes themselves as a community representative holding similar values when answering the question. As the first section revealed, endorsement has a strong association with propriety, therefore, it is somewhat unexpected to see a null effect across all legitimacy dimensions resulting in a failure to support H3.3.

Column 2 includes the main effects for positive community orientations, general agreement, and community trust. The model shows that only community trust is significantly and

17 While state-level variables likely influences legitimacy outcomes concerning resistance to terrorist groups, other factors contributing to such variations are not present in the data available for this research. Fixed effects controls for these unmeasured state-level factors and provides greater focus on the dependent variable of interest. Furthermore a Hausman test using Stata 15 reveals inconsistent coefficients between the fixed and random effects models suggesting that the fixed approach is preferred. 128 positively associated with terrorist group resistance across all dimensions while positive neighborhood legitimacy orientation and general agreement manifest no significant relation on the willingness to resist. These results fail to support H3.4 which posits a positive and significant association between endorsement and system sustaining attitudes. Column 3 provides coefficients and standard deviations for all main effects and two- and the three-way interaction(s) while column 4 presents the same coefficients with all control variables included in the model. A full list of coefficient results is located in appendix C. The coefficient for the three-way interaction achieves statistical significance for both economic (β=1.52, t=3.23, p<0.01) and security effectiveness (β=1.62, t=3.76, p<0.001) dimensions. This suggests that for the effectiveness-based legitimacy dimensions, the moderating effect of consensus on positive legitimacy orientations varies depending on a community’s level of trust which is conceptualized here as an indicator of denser social ties. Regression slopes based on coefficient estimates from column 4 are plotted in Figure 3.3 to facilitate interpretations of each three way interaction. The plots present the predicted mean outcomes for low and high proportions of community trust set at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Cohen et al. 2003, Jaccard and Turrisi

2003).

Figure 3.3. Interaction between Endorsement, Consensus, and Neighborhood Trust – 2016 wave

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Starting with economic effectiveness, main effects reveal that in the absence of general agreement and community trust, a community’s positive perceptions on a state’s economic performance can produce a relatively robust and significant increase (β=1.11, t=2.44, p<0.05) in an individual’s perception of the community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups, holding all other variables constant. The presence of trust in a community also produces a positive and significant main effect (β=0.60, t=3.02, p<0.01), although the association is weaker than the presence of favorable economic effectiveness orientations. A negative coefficient for the two way interaction between favorable community orientation and general agreement (β=-1.24, t=-

3.08, p<0.01), the coefficient of focus in the previous section, reveals that the perception of a community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups is higher for individuals residing in a neighborhood with positive economic effectiveness perceptions and a lack of general agreement on such perceptions amongst extreme low levels of community trust. While, extreme low levels of community trust exist within the data, they prove to be a rare occurrence. An additional model using center-mean community trust variables reveal insignificant associations concerning the focal independent variable and the first level moderator variable (β=-0.01, t=-0.05, p=0.96).

Additionally, a point estimation examining the difference concerning positive community orientations towards economic effectiveness in the presence and absence of general agreement reveals an insignificant variation at low levels (1 standard deviation below the mean) of community trust (F(1,33)=2.67, p=0.11).

Hypothesis 3.5 proposes that the moderating effect of consensus would depend on the connections between, or social structure of a community. Column 4 for economic effectiveness reveals that the presence of positive economic effectiveness orientations, general agreement, and community trust produces a significantly positive effect on the dependent variable showing that

130 higher degrees of community trust may increase the parameter of the two-way interaction between favorable attitudes towards economic effectiveness and general agreement. As illustrated in the second plot of Figure 3.3, there is a significant difference in moderating effect of consensus on endorsement between relatively low and high proportions of community trust

(F(1,33)=6.87, p<0.05). This becomes further evident in Table 3.5 where the row indicates the presence or absence of the first-order moderator, consensus, while the columns represent low and high degrees of community trust defined by one standard deviation below and above the mean.

The table shows a significantly positive slope for endorsement when general agreement and relatively high levels of trust are present in a community. While the difference reaches acceptable significance levels, the magnitude of the change is marginal, increasing predicted perceptions by less than half (0.36) a point on the rating scale. Despite the minor increase, the positive and significant relation of the three-way interaction on perceptions of the community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups for economic effectiveness offers partial support for

Hypothesis 3.5.

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Table 3.4 Fixed Effect HLM on Neighborhood’s Willingness to Resist (2016 Dataset) (1) (2) (3) (4) A. National Identity Propriety -0.033 -0.029 -0.030 -0.033 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) Endorsement -0.001 -0.128 -0.104 (0.10) (0.22) (0.22) Community trust 0.512** 0.433+ 0.465* (0.14) (0.23) (0.22) Comm. orientation x trust 0.152 0.121 (0.31) (0.31)

Within- / between-state variance 1.08 / 0.32 1.08 / 0.29 1.08 / 0.29 1.07 / 0.29 Intraclass Correlation 23% 21% 21% 21%

B. Procedural Fairness Propriety 0.047 0.020 0.023 0.032 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) Endorsement 0.126 -1.116** -1.108** (0.09) (0.40) (0.40) Consensus -0.088 0.042 0.036 (0.06) (0.16) (0.16) Community trust 0.496** 0.460+ 0.474* (0.16) (0.23) (0.21) Endorsement x consensus 0.085 0.119 (0.38) (0.39) Endorsement x comm. trust 1.402** 1.407** (0.45) (0.44) Consensus x comm. trust -0.145 -0.137 (0.23) (0.22) Endorsement x consensus x comm. trust -0.105 -0.141 (0.43) (0.44) Within- / between-state variance 1.09 / 0.31 1.08 / 0.28 1.07 / 0.28 1.06 / 0.28 Intraclass Correlation 22% 20% 21% 21%

C. Economic Effectiveness Propriety -0.041 -0.075 -0.079 -0.076 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) Endorsement 0.124 1.141* 1.112* (0.08) (0.45) (0.46) Consensus 0.019 0.092 0.061 (0.07) (0.14) (0.15) Community trust 0.514** 0.624** 0.603** (0.15) (0.21) (0.20) Endorsement x consensus -1.235** -1.237** (0.38) (0.40) Endorsement x comm. trust -1.240* -1.196* (0.56) (0.57) Consensus x comm. trust -0.138 -0.103 (0.18) (0.19) Endorsement x consensus x comm. trust 1.526** 1.522** (0.46) (0.47)

Within- / between-state variance 1.09 / 0.32 1.07 / 0.29 1.07 / 0.28 1.07 / 0.28 Intraclass Correlation 23% 21% 21% 21%

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Table 3.4. (Continued) (1) (2) (3) (4) D. Security Effectiveness Propriety 0.112 0.093 0.090 0.091 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Endorsement 0.016 0.876* 0.884* (0.06) (0.41) (0.40) Consensus 0.066 -0.041 -0.045 (0.06) (0.15) (0.15) Community trust 0.459** 0.366 0.383 (0.15) (0.25) (0.24) Endorsement x consensus -1.374** -1.385** (0.39) (0.39) Endorsement x comm. trust -1.039* -1.023* (0.46) (0.44) Consensus x comm. trust 0.100 0.103 (0.19) (0.20) Endorsement x consensus x comm. trust 1.623** 1.622*** (0.44) (0.43)

Within- / between-state variance 1.08 / 0.29 1.07 / 0.28 1.07 / 0.27 1.06 / 0.26 Intraclass Correlation 21% 21% 20% 20%

E. Confidence in National Government Leaders Propriety 0.096 0.068 0.068 0.073 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Endorsement 0.082 -0.434 -0.454 (0.07) (0.30) (0.29) Consensus 0.088 -0.299 -0.296 (0.07) (0.19) (0.18) Community trust 0.466** -0.066 -0.039 (0.15) (0.30) (0.28) Endorsement x consensus -0.033 -0.016 (0.37) (0.35) Endorsement x comm. trust 0.702* 0.747* (0.32) (0.32) Consensus x comm. trust 0.510* 0.502* (0.24) (0.23) Endorsement x consensus x comm. trust -0.107 -0.149 (0.41) (0.39)

Within- / between-state variance 1.08 / 0.3 1.07 / 0.28 1.07 / 0.29 1.06 / 0.28 Intraclass Correlation 22% 21% 21% 21%

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Table 3.4. (Continued) A. Confidence in Local Government Leaders Propriety 0.004 -0.019 -0.020 -0.017 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) Endorsement 0.055 -0.285 -0.273 (0.07) (0.27) (0.27) Consensus 0.112+ -0.128 -0.127 (0.06) (0.21) (0.20) Community trust 0.512** 0.226 0.241 (0.15) (0.31) (0.29) Endorsement x consensus 0.047 -0.014 (0.42) (0.41) Endorsement x comm. trust 0.344 0.343 (0.30) (0.31) Consensus x comm. trust 0.265 0.257 (0.26) (0.24) Endorsement x consensus x comm. trust 0.001 0.055 (0.49) (0.47)

Within- / between-state variance 1.09 / 0.31 1.08 / 0.3 1.08 / 0.3 1.07 / 0.3 Intraclass Correlation 22% 22% 22% 22%

Note. –Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using robust standard errors. Columns 1-3 are without controls; column 4 is with controls. Respondent-level N = 11,681 and state-level N = 34 for all columns. Column estimates in panels A through F are from 2016 survey wave data; regressions of perceptions on a community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups on respondent-level independent variables. Columns 1 and 2 include main effects. Columns 2 and 4 include two way interactions between community orientation and trust. Columns 2 and 4 also include endorsement operationalized through the three way interaction between community orientation, consensus, and trust. The interaction between community orientation and consensus, and the interaction between consensus and trust are insignificant and omitted from the table. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Turning to security effectiveness, the full model in column 4 reveals a similar significant main effect concerning favorable community orientations (β=1.62, t=3.76, p<0.001) suggesting that in the absence of general agreement and community trust, a community’s positive perceptions on a state’s security performance produces an increase in the perception of the community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups. Additionally, the two way interaction between favorable community orientation and general agreement (β=-1.39, t=-3.56, p<0.01) reveals that the perception of a community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups is higher for individuals residing in a neighborhood with positive security effectiveness perceptions and a lack of general agreement on such perceptions amongst extreme low levels of community trust. Point estimations reveals the difference concerning positive community orientations towards security effectiveness in the presence and absence of general agreement is significant even at more

134 moderate low levels (1 standard deviation below the mean) of community trust (F(1,33)=9.95, p<0.01).

Column 4 for security effectiveness reveals that the presence of favorable orientations, general agreement, and community trust produces a significantly positive effect on the dependent variable (β=1.62, t=3.76, p<0.01), suggesting that higher degrees of community trust may increase the parameter of the two-way interaction between favorable attitudes towards security effectiveness and general agreement. The fourth plot in Figure 3.3 displays the increase in perceptions on a community’s willingness to resist when favorable security orientations are present. This increase is only marginally significant when compared to communities that fail to reach positive orientations (F(1,33)=3.56, p=0.07). Additionally, Table 3.6 shows that the slope fails to reach a statistically significant difference from zero. Ultimately, these results provide comparatively weaker support for H3.5 then perceptions on economic effectiveness.

Table 3.5 Regression Gradient of the Function of Security Endorsement on the Willingness to Resist Terrorist Groups Low Community Trust High Community Trust Slope SE t 95% CI Slope SE t 95% CI Agreement 0.350 0.169 2.07* 0.004 to 0.696 -0.081 0.195 -0.41 -0.422 to 0.318 not met Agreement 0.042 0.113 0.38 -0.188 to 0.273 0.213 0.102 2.08* 0.004 to 0.422 met

Table 3.6 Regression Gradient of the Function of Economic Endorsement on the Willingness to Resist Terrorist Groups Low Community Trust High Community Trust Slope SE t 95% CI Slope SE t 95% CI Agreement 0.232 0.150 1.54 -0.075 to 0.538 -0.135 0.104 -1.30 -0.348 to 0.078 not met Agreement -0.203 0.098 -2.08* -0.403 to -0.002 0.116 0.062 1.89 -0.011 to 0.243 met

Results - Propriety, Endorsement, and the Intent To Vote

Table 3.7 displays results of the intent to vote regressed on propriety, endorsement and social structure. Column 1 displays the most parsimonious model and shows coefficients and

135 standard deviations for propriety across all legitimacy dimensions for the 2016 wave. With the exception of national identity, column 1, as well as columns 2 through 4 reveal expected significant and positive associations between propriety and the intent to vote across all legitimacy dimensions. Thus, the results offer support for H3.3. The other exception would be confidence in local leaders which loses significance in column 4 after the inclusion of the control variables. It is worth noting that the magnitude of the relation is comparatively marginal. For example, a one standardized unit increase in confidence towards national governmental leaders associates with a 4 percent increase in the probability that the individual will vote in the next national election, holding all else constant.

The inclusions of the main effects for endorsement, consensus, and community trust in column 2 reveal only a significant and positive association with community trust. Unexpectedly, favorable community legitimacy orientations failed to produce significant associations with the intent to vote across all dimension in column 2, thus failing to support H3.4. Columns 3 and 4 reveal positive and significant three-way interactions between the variables of interest, but only for the most specific legitimacy dimensions of confidence in national (β=0.32, t=2.88, p<0.01) and local leaders (β=0.24, t=3.09, p<0.01). Regression slopes based on coefficient estimates from column 4 are plotted in Figure 3.4 to facilitate interpretations of each three way interaction.

The figures present the predicted mean outcomes for low and high proportions of community trust set at one standard deviation above and below the mean (Cohen et al. 2003, Jaccard and

Turrisi 2003).

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Figure 3.4 Interaction between Endorsement, Consensus, and Neighborhood Trust – 2016 wave

All main effects for both confidence in national and local leaders in Column 4 produce positive and significant associations with the intent to vote revealing that the presence of one variable in the absence of the others within a community increases the probability that an individual has intentions to vote in the next national election. The first and third plot in Figure

3.4 displays the interaction between favorable community orientation and general agreement when community trust is low. The interaction provides results that oppose expectations with the presence of favorable legitimacy orientations and general agreement showing lower probabilities of the intent to vote than in the presence of only strong confidence in national and local leaders.

However, such differences at high levels of community endorsement are not significantly different (conf. nat. – F(1,33)=1.73, p=0.20; conf. local – F(1,33)=3.06, p=0.09) and only reach significant differences between the presence of consensus when endorsement is absent (conf. nat.

– F(1,33)=1.73, p=0.05; conf. local – F(1,33)=6.00, p=0.02). This suggests that the intent to vote increases when a community lacks favorable attitudes, has general agreement on such orientations, and lower than average trust within a neighborhood. Thus, those who reside in neighborhoods with confidence in their national and local leaders may be less inclined to vote.

This may be a result of their relative satisfaction with current authority system. While those who

137 live in communities with less than favorable orientations may feel more motivated to vote in the next election to change who currently manages the government at the national and local levels.

However, the probabilities in both instances remain relatively high (above .85) suggesting that individuals overall are more likely to vote regardless of changes in a community’s confidence in governmental leaders.

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Table 3.7 Fixed Effect Linear Probability HLM on Intent to Vote (2016 Dataset) (1) (2) (3) (4) A. National Identity Propriety 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.005 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Positive community orientation 0.004 0.061 0.054 (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) Community trust 0.113* 0.148+ 0.103+ (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) Comm. orientation x trust -0.068 -0.057 (0.08) (0.06)

Within- / between-state variance 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.07 / 0.01 Intraclass Correlation 8% 7% 7% 5%

B. Procedural Fairness Propriety 0.034* 0.032* 0.032** 0.021** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Positive community orientation 0.006 0.044 0.041 (0.02) (0.12) (0.10) General agreement -0.006 0.055 0.041 (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) Community trust 0.104* 0.160* 0.112* (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) Comm. orientation x agreement -0.012 -0.028 (0.11) (0.11) Comm. orientation x trust -0.021 -0.042 (0.12) (0.11) Comm. agreement x trust -0.067 -0.050 (0.04) (0.04) Comm. orientation x agreement x trust -0.015 0.020 (0.12) (0.12) Within- / between-state variance 0.8 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.07 / 0.01 Intraclass Correlation 8% 8% 7% 5%

C. Economic Effectiveness Propriety 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.027*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Positive community orientation 0.006 0.103 0.119 (0.01) (0.10) (0.09) General agreement 0.011 0.151** 0.121** (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) Community trust 0.094* 0.226** 0.173** (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) Comm. orientation x agreement -0.140 -0.130 (0.11) (0.09) Comm. orientation x trust -0.109 -0.129 (0.10) (0.09) Comm. agreement x trust -0.167** -0.136*** (0.05) (0.04) Comm. orientation x agreement x trust 0.157 0.142 (0.12) (0.10)

Within- / between-state variance 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.07 / 0.001 Intraclass Correlation 9% 8% 8% 6%

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Table 3.7 (Continued) (1) (2) (3) (4) A. Security Effectiveness Propriety 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.034*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Positive community orientation 0.008 0.116 0.104 (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) General agreement 0.005 0.101* 0.082* (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) Community trust 0.085+ 0.177** 0.133** (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) Comm. orientation x agreement -0.152 -0.122 (0.09) (0.07) Comm. orientation x trust -0.123 -0.103 (0.08) (0.06) Comm. agreement x trust -0.117** -0.095** (0.04) (0.03) Comm. orientation x agreement x trust 0.172 0.127 (0.10) (0.08)

Within- / between-state variance 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.07 / 0.001 Intraclass Correlation 8% 8% 8% 5%

B. Confidence in National Government Leaders Propriety 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.017** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Positive community orientation 0.007 0.272** 0.225* (0.01) (0.10) (0.09) General agreement 0.002 0.222** 0.167** (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) Community trust 0.099* 0.309** 0.230** (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) Comm. orientation x agreement -0.343** -0.291** (0.12) (0.10) Comm. orientation x trust -0.301** -0.254* (0.10) (0.09) Comm. agreement x trust -0.263** -0.201** (0.08) (0.06) Comm. orientation x agreement x trust 0.387** 0.321** (0.13) (0.11)

Within- / between-state variance 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.07 / 0.001 Intraclass Correlation 7% 7% 6% 4%

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Table 3.7 (Continued) A. Confidence in Local Government Leaders Propriety 0.021* 0.018* 0.019* 0.008 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Positive community orientation 0.000 0.209* 0.163* (0.01) (0.08) (0.07) General agreement 0.003 0.188** 0.143** (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) Community trust 0.106* 0.275** 0.206** (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) Comm. orientation x agreement -0.305*** -0.228** (0.08) (0.07) Comm. orientation x trust -0.227** -0.180* (0.08) (0.07) Comm. agreement x trust -0.215** -0.167** (0.06) (0.05) Comm. orientation x agreement x trust 0.331*** 0.241** (0.09) (0.08)

Within- / between-state variance 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.07 / 0.001 Intraclass Correlation 8% 7% 6% 5%

Note. –Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated using robust standard errors. N = 11,681. Column estimates in panels A through F are from 2016 survey wave data; regressions of intent to vote in next national election on respondent-level independent variables. Columns 1 and 2 include main effects. Columns 2 and 4 include two way interactions between community orientation and trust. Columns 2 and 4 also include endorsement operationalized through the three way interaction between community orientation, consensus, and trust. The interaction between community orientation and consensus, and the interaction between consensus and trust are insignificant and omitted from the table to conserve space. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Examining plots 2 and 3 in Figure 3.4 reveals negligible effects on the presence of endorsement when agreement is met and community trust levels are high. This again subverts expectations given that more endorsement fails to increase voting intentions when consensus and trust are present. The results offer some support for H3.5 given that the probability of voting intention significantly increases when trust becomes more prevalent in communities with favorable local confidence orientations and general agreement (F(1,33)=7.82, p=0.01). However, these differences are only marginally significant concerning confidence in national leaders

(F(1,33)=3.34, p=0.08).

Tables 3.8 and 3.9 display the gradient for the association positive community orientations has on individual voting intentions and offers further understanding of the three-way interaction from column 4 for specific dimensions of legitimacy. The row indicates the presence or absence of the first-order moderator, consensus, while the columns represent low and high

141 degrees of community trust defined by one standard deviation below and above the mean. The tables reveal that the relation of community confidence in both national and local leaders to individual intentions on voting can be neglected with the exception of a marginally significant negative relation concerning confidence in local leaders when consensus and low community trust are present. Overall, the results on the intent to vote fail to support H3.5.

Table 3.8 Regression Gradient of the Function of Security Endorsement on the Willingness to Resist Terrorist Groups Low Community Trust High Community Trust Slope SE t 95% CI Slope SE t 95% CI Agreement 0.054 0.034 1.62 -.015 to 0.125 -0.026 0.016 -1.44 -0.057 to 0.010 not met Agreement -0.026 0.018 -1.41 -0.063 to 0.012 0.213 0.012 0.13 -0.022 to 0.025 met

Table 3.9 Regression Gradient of the Function of Security Endorsement on the Willingness to Resist Terrorist Groups Low Community Trust High Community Trust Slope SE t 95% CI Slope SE t 95% CI Agreement 0.046 0.027 1.71 -0.010 to 0.103 -0.014 0.017 -0.82 -0.049 to 0.021 not met Agreement -0.031 0.016 -1.91+ -0.064 to -0.003 -0.002 0.121 -0.19 -0.027 to 0.022 met

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter applies the literature on legitimacy concerning propriety, endorsement and the theorized necessary conditions of consensus and social structure to the politically contested country of Nigeria where government legitimacy remains critical given the preponderance of areas of limited statehood. Although theories concerning the relationship and conditions of the variables of interest have been evaluated in previous studies, they are often examined in closed laboratory environments and rarely evaluated in natural settings and at the scope presented in this chapter. Additionally, such studies often focus on the unidimensional approach of legitimacy and seldom explore the inherent multidimensional aspect of supportive attitudes towards a governing entity. Furthermore, the analysis used a novel interaction approach concerning the conditional

142 effects endorsement has on propriety and system sustaining attitudes. The theoretical analysis and empirical findings contribute to the literature by demonstrating the complicated relationship of legitimacy concerning the associations between citizens within a country of limited statehood, recognized by relatively weak state institutions and non-state governance actors (Risse and

Stollenwerk 2018). Overall, the data offer mixed support for the five hypotheses.

The main purpose of the first section was to investigate the relationship between endorsement and propriety and how neighborhood consensus moderates the effects of endorsement. In support of H3.1, the results show that positive endorsement does possess a strong association with propriety and that this influence was present across all legitimacy dimensions. Consistent with H3.2, the analysis revealed that neighborhood consensus significantly moderates the relation between endorsement and propriety such that the presence of consensus enhances the positive effect of endorsement. The results also demonstrate that the presence of community consensus on less than favorable legitimacy significantly predicts what may be considered as impropriety at the individual-level. These outcomes highlight the importance of neighborhood perceptions in countries with areas of limited statehood such as

Nigeria and how such communities possess the potential to propagate support, or lack thereof towards a governing entity.

The second section examined legitimacy associations with attitudes towards authority sustaining behavior with a focus on neighborhood resistance to terrorist groups, and the intent to vote in the next national election. The analysis found relatively weak evidence in support of hypotheses 3.3 through 3.5 warranting a discussion on the possibilities why such assumptions failed to match the empirical outcomes. Hypothesis 3.3 found only partial support given that propriety had a null association with perceptions of the community’s willingness to resist

143 terrorist groups, but a positive association with the intent to vote across all legitimacy dimensions excluding national identity. This outcome may suggest that propriety holds greater effects on system sustainment behavior when the action is more individualistic in nature such as voting or other individual acts such as contacting a government official or paying taxes.

Furthermore, there was no noticeable trend concerning differences in significance or magnitude for propriety coefficients concerning more diffuse dimensions of legitimacy.

Inconsistent with H3.4, the analysis found null endorsement main effects for both system sustainment measures. While unexpected, this provides some evidence that endorsement requires a set of conditions for legitimacy norms to influence attitudes and behaviors concerning authority system sustainment. Providing some support to this inference, the analysis reveals limited support for H3.5 by showing that neighborhood endorsement, through favorable economic and security effectiveness orientations, have a positive association with perceptions of a community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups when neighborhood consensus and relatively strong community ties are present. Significant outcomes for these performance-based forms of legitimacy, rather than more diffuse legitimacy dimensions as predicted, suggest the importance of governance effectiveness concerning attitudes that make an authority system worth defending

(Rothstein 2009, McLoughlin 2018). Thus, in states with areas of limited statehood, performance effectiveness proves to be a powerful source of legitimacy for system sustaining attitudes as theorized by Schmelzle and Stollenwerk (2018:459). Yet, the models evaluated here provide further nuance showing that such perceptions depend less on individual propriety and more on how perceptions concerning a government’s effectiveness is endorsed by a community through the presence of consensus and social connections; a condition where legitimacy norms become more likely to manifest.

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Reasons that perceptions of a community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups associated only by performance-based legitimacy and not more diffuse dimensions such as procedural justice or national identity could be due to the relative nascent development of

Nigeria’s fourth republic. As legitimacy theory suggests, diffuse dimensions are characterized as deep-seated orientations to governing systems that develop over time through beneficial performance and thus creating a reserve of government goodwill towards the system (Easton

1975, Norris 2011). Given Nigerian’s history of government corruption and failed republics, it is likely diffuse legitimacy dimensions lack enduring characteristics that lead to the promotion of favorable attitudes towards system sustaining behaviors. Rather, meaningful dimensions of legitimacy reside more so with the beneficial aspects of state performance. The sustainment of government effectiveness then appears to be a key aspect to the cultivation of system sustaining attitudes which may eventually evolve into more diffuse legitimacy development within countries like Nigeria. Additionally, the significance in the three-way interaction at more specific dimensions may occur because such legitimacy orientations are more publically expressed and socially available to cultivate norms of legitimacy that influence system sustaining attitudes and behaviors. More diffuse dimensions may not be socially available and therefore be reserved for more individual- rather than neighborhood-level effects.

This may also provide reason as to why significance occurred concerning the three-way interaction between specific dimensions of endorsement, consensus, and social ties and its effect on the intention to vote in the next national election. Ultimately, these results failed to support

H3.5, yet provided evidence that neighborhood consensus on less than favorable attitudes concerning confidence in national and local leaders had higher likelihood to vote when residing in areas with relatively weak social ties. Thus, the significance of the interaction found at more

145 specific dimensions of legitimacy further suggests their influential characteristics within a developing country. Moreover, it is also likely that given the historic allegations of corruption plaguing Nigerian elections, many may feel the act is less a representation of the ideal democratic government and more a mechanism to ensure ethnic or religious connections at the strategic levels of national authority (Wimmer 2018). The data for this analysis does not provide clarification on this meaning and perhaps should be a data item for future surveys.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Before transitioning to the next chapter, I will address some limitations to the analysis covered in this chapter than may enhance future studies of similar interests and parameters. It’s worth noting that these are specific limitations to the current analysis as I leave general limitations to be discussed in the final chapter. First, as the results reveal, a lack of association between more diffuse dimensions and system sustaining attitudes puts into question what it means to identify as a “Nigerian.” The theoretical development up to this point has viewed national affiliation as an indicator of a deep and enduring legitimacy type. Moreover, such sentiments should possess some predictive influence towards sustaining attitudes as found in recent legitimacy studies (Booth and Selgison 2009, Norris 2001, Stoker 2016, Thompson 2001,

Wimmer 2018). However, this may not be the case in the Nigerian context. The expression of a national identity may associate with other aspects of the country (e.g., geographic location or historic strife) rather than a deep connection with the relatively immature governing system. If in fact they do relate to national pride as theorized, then perhaps such attitudes remain more ephemeral as specific legitimacy are characterized given Nigeria’s contemporary experience with failed democratic systems. This aspect is not explored in the data and perhaps should be an

146 aspect of investigation in future surveys especially when considering such identities in nations with limited statehood.

Additionally, the research here assumes that legitimacy perceptions calculated at the neighborhood level constituted as a symbolic commodity are accurately recognized, and adjusted to by a given respondent, when in fact there may be degrees of misalignment between actual and perceived attitudes of community members. The methodological approach in this chapter aggregates neighborhood responses to represent a public opinion based evaluation of endorsement. A more thorough approach would involve an indirect measure of collective representation as recognized by the respondent (Jepperson and Swidler 1994:367).18 This would ensure alignment between the social and internal representations while providing additional considerations if such aspects are in dissonance. Such issues highlight the overall limitations of the use of secondary data which restricts analysis to that which is provided.

Perhaps one of the biggest limitation was due to the cross-sectional nature of the data.

These limitations only allowed for relational aspects between the variables of interest rather than the examination of specific effects of endorsement on propriety. While theoretically it is assumed that the former effects the latter, it is difficult to ascertain this directionality considering the

‘snapshot’ nature of the data. Furthermore, it is possible that associations between propriety and endorsement manifest as an unrelated spurious relationship due to proximities in locations and other social similarities that manifest similar legitimacy orientations rather than the direct effects of endorsement on propriety. Panel data could provide further insights to such effects and provide further insights on how fluctuations in legitimacy consensus and neighborhood ties impacts the effects of endorsement on propriety and system sustaining attitudes and behaviors.

18 For example, a survey item that assesses the respondent’s view on the legitimacy orientation of others. 147

A final limitation to address here is that validity was examined through neighborhood endorsement. Based on prior research, it was assumed that neighborhood endorsement was an influential legitimacy norm producing structure for individuals in the Nigerian context. However, as addressed in chapter 1, validity derives from multiple sources, for example authorities, the media, to include social communities outside an individual’s neighborhood. Therefore future research should examine what sources of validity are more meaningful to certain groups or regions within a state and account for the views expressed in such media and how they influence individuals. Moreover, as argued by Tilly (2003, 2005), trust networks, or insulated communities that individuals affiliate and conduct long-term, high-risk activities with are not necessarily restricted to geographic restrictions (i.e., neighborhoods). Therefore, future considerations should take into account what other social communities individuals connect with and thus influence their legitimacy perceptions.

In conclusion, this chapter showed that legitimacy norms at the neighborhood level possess a positive association with propriety. Furthermore, the relations of such norms on authority system sustaining attitudes can be enhanced through the moderating effects of consensus and social structure. In the case of the developing country of Nigeria, such moderating properties were found to be prevalent through more specific legitimacy dimensions. The next chapter explores the higher levels of relations that influence legitimacy perceptions; that between the state, its citizens, and non-state actors. Moreover, the next chapter further examines the impact of government performance on legitimacy orientations with a specific focus on violent actions by Nigerian security institutions.

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CHAPTER 4: LEGITIMACY, EXPECTATIONS, & STATE PERFORMANCE

By the end of 2012, violence by non-state organizations was increasing in Nigeria highlighting the detrimental consequences of areas of limited statehood spread throughout the country. As recognized by former U.S. political counselor and ambassador to Nigeria John

Campbell (2013:166), “[t]he federal government has failed to provide basic security for its citizens and has lost its monopoly on violence, two basic attributes of a sovereign state.”

However, in May 2013 the Nigerian government organized an offensive primarily in the northeast to regain governance in the region; an effort that eventually culminated in the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force in 2015 (Albert 2017). These efforts recaptured territories once controlled by non-state organizations such as Boko Haram. As detailed in Table 2.5, the rise in legitimacy between 2013 and 2016 occurs most prominently in the North East geopolitical zone where the drastic increase in state-based conflict occurred. Most notably, a majority of states in the North East region changed their legitimacy orientations from negative to positive suggesting that an escalation in state-based conflict against armed non-state organizations has associations with increases in state support. Therefore, if government legitimacy attitudes were higher in 2016 than they would have been without an increase in violent state-based intervention, the change to more positive orientations could possibly be considered a result of the different levels of state conflict. However, states in other regions that experienced an increase in state-based conflict such as Imo and Abia in the South East, Rivers and Delta in the South South, Osun in the South West, and the Federal Capital Territory in the

North Central zone maintained low or experienced a decrease in legitimacy between the two surveys. Therefore, the relationship between violence and legitimacy appears more nuanced as argued in chapter 1. The current chapter seeks to investigate such subtlety by evaluating how

149 diverse needs and relations within the political contentious nation of Nigeria shape the evaluations of state-based conflict and how such evaluations implicate changes in state legitimacy orientations amongst its populace.

EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY

As stressed previously, legitimacy develops for many diverse sources. For example, a group may find a governing entity as having the right to rule based on traditional religious beliefs, ethnic or racial connections, pragmatic considerations of self-interest, or the simple consideration that the organization is the least evil governance actor (Levi and Sacks 2009, Linz

1983, Suchman 1995). However, the main focus of this chapter is state performance concerning violent acts against armed non-state actors and how it influences legitimacy perceptions.

Scholars have stressed that for a governing entity to gain legitimacy it must perform in such a manner to represent and support the general interests of those whom they possess authority over

(Beetham 1991, Kelman 2001). Though some view such performance-based legitimacy approaches as an ephemeral, non-normative and, therefore tenuous form of legitimacy (Levi

2018), its importance to the development of more enduring forms of governance support remain vital, especially in areas of limited statehood where state performance can quickly lead to virtuous or vicious circles of governance (Easton 1975, Risse and Stollenwerk 2018, Rothstein

2009, Tilly 2005). As stated by two respondents from the supplemental focus groups:

… the leaders should [not] stand still, and do something for the country… The problems are so numerous and if action is not taken, it can lead to something else. (Kano employed male, age 30)

… if you send a leader to go and fight for your rights, he will not do that. Instead he cheat[s] the people under him, and that could lead to violence… everybody will not be happy with what is happening… in a situation where by you wasted your time and voted for someone because he knows your problems and you think he will help you, but unfortunately he did not, so you will [be] thinking of violence. (Kano employed male, age 30)

150

Therefore, while distinct, governance effectiveness and legitimacy are inherently connected

(Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018).

A critical question then is how can the performance of a governing entity be generally evaluated as worthwhile and appropriate in areas of limited statehood that often entail multiple governance actors and diverse legitimacy audiences with varying values and needs? Such issues apply directly to the diverse and politically contentious country of Nigeria where the rubrics for effective governance are far from uniform and can often be in conflict with each other. In these circumstances, governance actions may be more or less significant to legitimacy depending on the differing values that dictate the governance expectations of communities. Given the diversity of legitimacy audiences in areas of limited statehood, governance performance often leads to a legitimacy dilemma where a given action increases legitimacy for one group at the expense and perceptions of delegitimation by another (Beetham 1991, Mcloughlin 2015, 2018). Further complications arise when there are non-state governance actors vying for support who may offer effective performance that undermines the legitimacy of the constitutional government. This brings into consideration the inherent relational aspects of legitimacy that implicate how actions between governance entities influence evaluations by the constituents they wish to rule.

Ultimately, the performance of governance actors in areas of limited statehood is inescapably embedded within the structure of social relations gaining deeper meanings than mere tenuous conceptualizations of legitimacy as some scholars argue.

This chapter focuses on the various levels of state-based security actions and how they coincide with prevalent security needs and prior orientations towards violent non-state groups.

As discussed in chapter 1, it is theorized that a governing body who increases their control of violence within a region should possess greater power over its symbolic definition and, thus

151 shape perceptions that legitimate the use of such force and ultimately their authority over others

(Ball-Rokeach 1980, Malthaner 2015, Tilly 2003). This argument is not to say that subordinates lack the ability to denounce incidents of state violence, rather that in general, “the organization of violence hems in subordinates’ responses to it” (Jackman 2001:461). However, to properly analyze the connection between violence and legitimacy one must consider the aforementioned relational aspects between pertinent players and how their governance expectations and actions towards each other influence changes in audience legitimacy perceptions (Schoon 2016, 2017,

Eckstein 1992, Gerber and Jackson 2017).

The analysis here examines the relationship between the identified triad of actors in chapter 1: the citizens, the constitutional government, and armed non-state organizations who challenge the authority of the state. Although there are many different legitimacy audiences to consider in the field of contentious politics (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, Gawthorpe 2017), the audience of focus for this analysis is the diverse populace of Nigeria. While Nigeria is widely identified as a rentier state, the existence and prosperity of its federal republic still depends on popular support and the political participation of its populace making it a vital source of legitimacy (Cheeseman and de Gramont 2017, Lewis 2003). Taking a performance-based approach, the analysis focuses on the regional security needs of the populace throughout the country and how the performance of the state matches such interests while taking into account the structure of social relations with other non-state actors. It is argued that the legitimacy effects of violent actions by state-based security forces are moderated by the prior relations audiences have with the victims of such violence. For example if the state attacks an armed non-state organization that an audience evaluates negatively, then it is probable such actions by the state are viewed as acceptable and likely enhance the relationship with the audience and hence the

152 legitimacy that characterizes it. However, if the government uses force against a group that an audience has positive connections with, then the state risks compromising their legitimacy. In areas of limited statehood, sections of the citizenry may offer support to other viable governance actors who behave violently towards the state and, thus more likely to further delegitimize state institutions that failed to act in the group’s best interest.

The empirical strategy here is to exploit such complications in an effort to explain changes in legitimacy. Therefore, this chapter will examine how prevalent needs and prior orientations towards victimized groups influence changes in legitimacy at various levels of state- based conflict. Moreover, that analysis will also examine how state conflict and the audience’s relational position towards non-state actors impacts negative political capital such as positive attitudes towards rebel groups and violence against the state. The examination of such complexities are best captured through the investigation of the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.1 (H4.1) – A given population’s state legitimacy depends on the actions of the state and how they coincide with the needs and expectations of those under their authority, such that state support perceptions will be higher when prior security needs are met by a higher state security presence and will be lower when needs are neglected through lower state security presence.

Hypothesis 4.2 (H4.2) – A given population’s state legitimacy depends on the actions of the state and how they coincide with the relations within a larger social structure of governance actors, such that state support will be higher when there is an increase in state-based violence towards groups who are viewed more negatively by the population and legitimacy will be lower when there is an increase in state-based violence towards groups who are viewed more positively by the population.

Hypothesis 4.3 (H4.3) – A given population’s negative political capital will increase when there is an increase in state-based violence towards groups who are viewed more positively by the population.

The proceeding sections include two sets of complementary analysis. First, using both the

2013 and 2016 wave data sets, the analysis uses a fixed-effects regression model that demonstrates how prior state-level needs and orientations towards armed non-state actors

153 influence the effect of state-based violence actions on legitimacy orientations. Second, using the

2016 wave data set, the analysis leverages survey data collected before and after an unexpected state-based violent event against civilians in Kaduna state. The models evaluate how a politically violent event against a specific victim (unarmed northern Muslims) affects state legitimacy attitudes in different regions in the country. The results show that northern respondents, who are more likely to possess positive attitudes towards the victims, express greater state delegitimacy after the event. Conversely, southern respondents express a null affect with some indications of a possible increase in state legitimacy after the violent event.

STATE-BASED VIOLENCE AND LEGITIMACY CHANGES

To investigate these hypotheses more formally, this section reports results from regressions of legitimacy on the proportion of violent events conducted by state security forces against violent non-state organizations. The models also include state-level dependent variables that capture the impact of prior attitudes concerning security needs and orientations towards violent non-state actors. Because the analysis requires combining data from both waves, legitimacy factor scores used in previous models are not applied given the differences in factor loadings for the two data sets. Therefore, one question per legitimacy dimension was selected to represent individual level attitudes for their respective dimension. The selection of the survey item was based on the following requirements: (1) the question must be provided in both waves and (2) must offer an adequate loading weight from the factor analysis results in chapter 2. A proportion of maximum scaling adjustment was performed on the 2013 rating scales to assume

154 the appropriate range for comparison against the 2016 results (Moeller 2015).19 A full list of legitimacy variables used to include a discussion on their selection is provided in Appendix D.

The models used below pool data from the first and second survey waves and have the following general structure:

푦푖푠푡 = 훿푠 + 훾푤2016 + 훼푍푖푡 + 훽푡푊2016푋푠 + 휑푊2016푃푠 + 휖푖푠푡 where 푦푖푠푡 is the legitimacy orientation of subject i residing in state s during survey administration wave t (wave 1 administered 2012-2013 or wave 2 administered 2015-2016). 훿푠 denotes the state of residence dummies, 푤2016 is the 2016 wave survey dummy, and

푍푖푡 represents covariates for subjects i such as gender, educational attainment, employment status, and religion. 푋푠 denotes the sub-national human development index (HDI) score as of

2013 to control for differences in violence by state that may be correlated with legitimacy ratings. It also identifies state-level variables that may be correlated with legitimacy changes between waves such as a dichotomous variable that indicates whether a state voted for the presidential candidate who won in the 2015 general election and the total amount of political violent events that occurred within a given state from January 2014 to 15 November 2015.20 휑 represents a coefficient of interest which corresponds to the interaction term between the 2016 wave dummy and the percentage of violent events conducted by state organizations against armed non-state groups from 1 Jan 2014 until the main start of survey administration for wave 2,

15 Nov 2015. This interaction term will be referred to simply as the “state conflict percentage.”

19 Differences between the 2013 and 2016 rating scales were adjusted using that using the following: POMS = [(observed-minimum)/(maximum - minimum)]. This approach transformed the 1-4 responses from the 2013 data set into the following: 1, 2.66, 4.33, and 6. 20 These dates are used to capture the dynamics of political violence that occurred in the state up until the main administration of the 2016 survey which began 16 Nov 2015. While survey results were collected from 3 January to 14 Nov 2015, they make up less than one percent of the total number of participants for that wave. Thus, the intervening period is expanded to account for critical political violent events that occurred prior to the main administration of the 2016 survey. 155

Percentages for state conflict were used to access the degree of ‘violence control’ the government possesses in each state in relation to other forms of violence by non-state actors that include non-state terrorism, non-state based armed conflict and guerilla warfare; assuming the larger the proportion of state-based violence, the greater control (or at least attempt to control) the constitutional governing organization has over an given region. Overall, this coefficient indicates whether states with higher rates of state conflict during the period between surveys experienced significant increases or decreases in legitimacy ratings across all dimensions.

Prior to model estimations, it is worth examining if the proportion of state conflict, as the focal independent variable, is related with pre-intervening period outcomes. If higher rates of state conflict naturally occur in states with higher legitimacy perceptions, then the models risk reporting biased results. Borrowing from Golden and Olivetti (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2004) the states were divided into three groups of equal size termed low, medium, and high state conflict proportions. As shown in table C.5, legitimacy dimensions for the 2013 wave do not vary consistently by the grouping of state conflict percentages in such a manner that would cause concern for biasing the results.

Additional important independent variables include the greatest perceived need, specifically the desire for security, represented at the state level as the percentage of respondents who recognized ‘safety/security’ as their greatest need in 2013. To account for the relational aspects, the analysis focuses on how prior orientations towards armed rebel organizations impacts evaluations of a state’s performance. Prior challenger orientations are operationalized as state-level means to the following 2013 survey question: how important is it to support charities that fund groups like al Qaeda (1-not important at all, 4-very important). It is assumed that respondents who consider it important to support terrorist groups finds value in their actions and

156 considers their behavior against the state as acts that support their well-being. A more specific analysis restricts the sample to only northern geopolitical zones (i.e., North Central, North East,

North West) and replaces the general rebel support question with a survey item that assesses orientations towards a specific Nigerian rebel group, Boko Haram, operating in the northern regions during the time period of interest. All state-level variables of interest for the analysis are provided in table 4.1.

Table 4.1 State-level independent variables. Mean (SD) Variable max / min Percentage of violent events by the state security forces against 11.43 (10.20) armed non-state organizations - January 2014 to November 0 / 30.00 2015

Percentage of respondents who identified ‘safety/security’ as 8.00 (7.76) their primary need. 0 / 27.45

How important is it to support charities that fund groups like al 1.99 (0.59) Qaeda? 1 / 6

How positive or negative of an influence is Boko Haram having 2.31 (1.06) on Nigeria? 1 / 6

The inclusion of each perceived need and rebel orientation variables involves a main effect coefficient, an interaction with the 2016 wave dummy, and an additional three way interaction with the state conflict percentage and the 2016 wave dummy. The coefficients that represent these triple differences are one of the primary concerns in the discussion below. Given that state conflict percentage and the other variables of interest vary by location and time, all standard errors reported below are corrected for clustering at the state and year level using robust standard errors.21

21 This was accomplished in Stata (v15) by first grouping state and wave variables using the egen command and then running the regression by clustering on the newly defined group. This resulted in a total of 68 clusters to account for heteroscedasticity and possible serial correlation within the data.

157

Results – Security Needs and Relational Orientations towards Armed Non-state Organizations

Column 1 in table 4.2 displays results for the most parsimonious specification which includes only state dummies, year main effects and the proportion of state-based violence. This model indicates that there was a tenuous and significant increase for select legitimacy orientations between wave 1 and wave 2 in areas with higher levels of state-led violent events against armed non-state organizations. These significant increases were observed in legitimacy orientations concerning procedural fairness (β=0.025, t=2.13, p<0.05) and confidence in national

(β=0.06, t=3.20, p<0.01) and local government leaders (β=0.026, t=2.08, p<0.05).

Subsequent models control for individual- and state-level characteristics that might explain changes in legitimacy orientations beyond the percentage of state-based violence. The model in column 2 adds gender, educational attainment, religious preference, spoken language, employment status, monthly household income, and if the individual voted in the last election.

All individual level controls are interacted with the 2016 wave dummy. Magnitude and significance for state conflict percentage remained largely unchanged for these models. Column

3 incorporates the aforementioned state level covariates. Each state-level control variable is also interacted with the 2016 wave dummy. The state-level HDI and voting covariates caused little changes in the magnitude or significance of the coefficient relating to the proportion of state- based violence. However, the inclusion of total amount of violent events decreased magnitude and significance of the state conflict coefficient rendering them all insignificant with the exception of marginal significance retained when regressed on confidence for national government leaders.

Models 4 through 6 include the state-level main effect of the percentage of respondents who viewed ‘safety and security’ as their greatest need in the 2013 survey. This variable is

158 interacted with the 2016 wave dummy and state conflict percentage to assess differences in legitimacy orientations based on variations of state-level prior security needs reported in the

2013 survey and percentage of state conflict during the intervening years prior to the administration of the second wave. These models also include an individual level binary variable indicating if ‘safety/security’ is the respondent’s greatest need allowing the model to evaluate if state level aggregation has any added importance beyond an individuals’ own orientations. The coefficients for each three-way product term in column 4 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level suggesting the presence of an interaction effect between the 2016 survey wave, prior needs of security, and the experienced levels of state conflict. With the exception of national identity, the coefficients for the interaction effects are all positive indicating that as prior needs for security increase so does the slope of state-based conflict on legitimacy perceptions for 2016 wave sample. Additionally, the differences between the squared multiple correlations for each panel in columns 3 and 4 indicate that the three-way interaction accounts for more of the variance for specific legitimacy dimensions (e.g., the interaction accounting for 5 percent of the variance in confidence in national leaders oppose to only 1 percent in national identity and procedural fairness). Regression slopes based on coefficient estimates from Column 4 are plotted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 to facilitate interpretations of each interaction for national identity and more specific dimensions of legitimacy respectively. The plots represent outcomes using high (1

SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) levels of state conflict proportion and state- level security needs as the moderator (Cohen et al. 2003, Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). The light grey line in each plot represents the average legitimacy rating for the 2013 wave and provides a baseline for comparisons between the variations captured in the 2016 wave due to the effects of state-conflict and its moderation through prior security needs.

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Figure 4.1 Interaction: State-based Violence, State Security Need, and Survey Wave on Specific Legitimacy Variables

I will first discuss outcomes concerning the less diffuse legitimacy dimensions as the unintuitive results from the national identity model deserve additional considerations that will lead into the discussion concerning the results in column 5. Therefore, with the exception of national identity, the models presented in panels B through F in Table 4.2 show that higher legitimacy ratings occurred for individuals residing in states that had a higher perceived need of security and experienced a higher proportion of state-based conflict against armed non-state

160 organizations. Consequentially, the models show that a failure to provide security services in areas with higher security needs associated with lower levels of legitimacy. Plot 2, 4, 6 8, and 10 in figure 4.1 all reveal significant positive slopes concerning the relationship between the proportion of state conflict and legitimacy attitudes in areas with higher needs of security.22

Moreover, the point differences between the 2013 baseline and the 2016 wave produce significant differences across all legitimacy dimensions.23 These results directly support H4.1 suggesting that governments who act on the needs of their constituents, in this case security needs match with a higher state presence, will be viewed as more legitimate. Consequentially, the models show that a failure to provide security services in areas with higher security needs associated with state delegitimation concerning procedural fairness (F(1,68)=9.27, p<0.001), and confidence in national (F(1,68)=34.03, p<0.001) and local governmental leaders (F(1,68)=26.21, p<0.001) and showing little difference from the 2013 baseline for economic and security effectiveness dimensions. These outcomes also coincide with H4.1 signifying the consequences of delegitimation to governing organizations who fail to attend the needs and desires of those under their authority. Ultimately, the models show that the relation between state performance and citizenry needs matters in countries with areas of limited statehood and that inaction on desired security needs results in little to significantly detrimental legitimacy impacts across the dimensional spectrum.

22 Slope significance of the proportion of state conflict on legitimacy dimensions in areas with high security needs: procedural fairness - β=0.19, t=4.35, p<0.001, CI 95% [0.10, 0.27]; economic effectiveness - β=0.12, t=2.59, p<0.05, CI 95% [0.03, 0.21], security effectiveness - β=0.19, t=4.30, p<0.001, CI 95% [0.10, 0.28]; conf. in national leaders - β=0.38, t=7.64, p<0.001, CI 95% [0.28, 0.48] conf. in local leaders - β=0.26, t=6.83, p<0.001, CI 95% [0.17, 0.32] 23 Point difference between 2013 and 2016 waves at high security need and high security events: Procedural fairness - F(1,68)=15.33, p<0.001; economic effectiveness - F(1,68)=19.92, p<0.001; security effectiveness - F(1,68)=65.96, p<0.001; conf. in national leaders - F(1,68)=44.67, p<0.001; conf. in local leaders - F(1,68)=35.01, p<0.001. 161

The models also reveal a negative slope concerning the effects of state conflict on legitimacy dimensions in areas with lower prior security needs. All slope coefficients reach acceptable significant levels with the exclusion of economic effectiveness.24 Plots 1, 3, 5, and 9 in figure 4.1 all depict higher levels of legitimacy when lower state security action is taken in areas with little desire for it.25 It is also worth recognizing that legitimacy decreased for individuals residing in states with low security needs and high proportions of state-based conflict. However, significant differences between the2013 baseline occurred only with security effectiveness (F(1,68)=7.99, p<0.01), and confidence in local leaders (F(1,68)=4.30, p<0.05) with the difference concerning confidence in national leaders reaching only marginal significance

(F(1,68)=3.86, p=0.054). This outcome proves somewhat unexpected as an increase in state sponsored security forces should possess greater control over the legitimation of violence and expected increase in state legitimacy orientations. However, in areas where security is not the main concern, a greater proportion of violence by the state may be evaluated as unwelcomed or perhaps misguided as citizens deem other areas of governance more imperative to their well- being.

24 All coefficients and tests of significance provided in the first row for panels B through F in column 4.

25 Point difference between 2013 and 2016 waves at high security need and high security events: Procedural fairness - F(1,68)=15.51, p<0.001; economic effectiveness - F(1,68)=4.31, p<0.05; security effectiveness - F(1,68)=17.66, p<0.001; conf. in national leaders - F(1,68)=16.35, p<0.001; conf. in local leaders - F(1,68)=28.94, p<0.001. 162

Table 4.2. Impact of Security Needs, Perceptions towards Rebel Groups, and State-based Violence on Legitimacy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) A. National Identity τ × State conflict % 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.016* 0.045*** 0.062*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) τ × Security need 2013 0.020+ 0.005 0.017+ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) τ × State conflict % × Security need 2013 -0.001* -0.001 -0.002*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × Support rebels 2013 0.107 (0.08) τ × State conflict % × Support rebels 2013 -0.015*** (0.00) τ × Boko Haram Influence 2013 0.077 (0.05) τ × State conflict % x Boko Haram influence 2013 -0.014*** (0.00) R2 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 Includes individual-level / state-level controls n / n y / n y / y y / y y / y y / y N 21956 21956 21956 21956 21956 19888 B. Procedural Fairness τ × State conflict % 0.025* 0.022* 0.012 -0.046* 0.022 -0.009 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) τ × Security need 2013 -0.095*** -0.106*** -0.098*** (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) τ × State conflict % × Security need 2013 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × Support rebels 2013 -0.186 (0.24) τ × State conflict % × Support rebels 2013 -0.029** (0.01) τ × Boko Haram Influence 2013 -0.339** (0.10) τ × State conflict % x Boko Haram influence 2013 -0.015** (0.00) R2 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.23 Includes individual-level / state-level controls N / N Y / N Y / Y Y / Y Y / Y Y / Y N 21956 21956 21956 21956 21956 19888 C. Economic Effectiveness τ × State conflict % 0.015 0.013 0.015 -0.024 -0.033+ -0.077** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) τ × Security need 2013 -0.047 -0.023 -0.038 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) τ × State conflict % × Security need 2013 0.005* 0.003 0.003 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × Support rebels 2013 -0.389+ (0.22) τ × State conflict % × Support rebels 2013 0.010 (0.01) τ × Boko Haram Influence 2013 -0.594** (0.17) τ × State conflict % x Boko Haram influence 2013 0.021* (0.01) R2 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.26 Includes individual-level / state-level controls n / n y / n y / y y / y y / y y / y N 21956 21956 21956 21956 21956 19888

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Table 4.2. (Continued) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) D. Security Effectiveness τ × State conflict % 0.007 0.005 -0.007 -0.092*** -0.137** -0.103* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) τ × Security need 2013 -0.064* -0.038 -0.068* (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) τ × State conflict % × Security need 2013 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × Support rebels 2013 -0.234 (0.29) τ × State conflict % × Support rebels 2013 0.026 (0.02) τ × Boko Haram Influence 2013 0.043 (0.16) τ × State conflict % x Boko Haram influence 2013 0.004 (0.01) R2 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.21 Includes individual-level / state-level controls n / n y / n y / y y / y y / y y / y N 21956 21956 21956 21956 21956 19888 E. Confidence in National Government Leaders τ × State conflict % 0.060** 0.056** 0.035+ -0.081*** -0.022 -0.030 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) τ × Security need 2013 -0.186*** -0.197*** -0.196*** (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) τ × State conflict % × Security need 2013 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × Support rebels 2013 -0.253 (0.22) τ × State conflict % × Support rebels 2013 -0.025** (0.01) τ × Boko Haram Influence 2013 -0.106 (0.17) τ × State conflict % x Boko Haram influence 2013 -0.019+ (0.01) R2 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.31 0.30 Includes individual-level / state-level controls n / n y / n y / y y / y y / y y / y N 21956 21956 21956 21956 21956 19888 F. Confidence in Local Government Leaders τ × State conflict % 0.026* 0.025* 0.007 -0.068*** -0.047** -0.072** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) τ × Security need 2013 -0.140*** -0.141*** -0.140*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) τ × State conflict % × Security need 2013 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × Support rebels 2013 -0.040 (0.20) τ × State conflict % × Support rebels 2013 -0.009 (0.01) τ × Boko Haram Influence 2013 -0.110 (0.15) τ × State conflict % x Boko Haram influence 2013 0.001 (0.01) R2 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.22 Includes individual-level / state-level controls n / n y / n y / y y / y y / y y / y N 21956 21956 21956 21956 21956 19888 Note. – τ = wave 2016. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at state and year level. All column estimates in panels A through F are from pooled 2013 and 2016 wave of legitimacy perceptions on the state-level independent variables interacted with τ and different state level variable (where relevant). Columns 2 through 6 include individual level main effects and their interaction with τ. Columns 3 through 6 include state-level main effects interacted with τ. Column 6 sample is restricted to respondents residing in the northern geo political zones. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

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For example, southern states such as Abia, Delta, Ekiti, and Ogun that matched the circumstance of an above average proportion of state conflict, a low need of security, and a sustained negative orientation of state legitimacy had overwhelming concerns for improved socioeconomic status and essential infrastructure such as access to drinkable water and sewage disposal. Interactions with state security forces in these areas were likely viewed as negative disruptions as they primarily involved violent force to quell protests or riots spurred by perceived socioeconomic and procedural fairness injustices (“Crackdown on journalists and assault on protests” 2016,

Odisu 2016). Moreover, northern states with low levels of security needs such as Bauchi witnessed an increase of state sponsored security forces during the military-led surge against

Boko Haram. Nigerian security forces tasked with eradicating Boko Haram from the northeastern regions were known to perform violent and indiscriminate community raids resulting in extra-judicial civilian casualties. For example, a December 2014 military raid in

Mundu, Bauchi resulted in the death of at least five civilians and the destruction of nearly 90 percent of the town’s structures (“Nigeria: At least 1,000 Civilians Dead” 2015). Similar human rights violations occurred in other norther states; however, legitimacy rose in states such as

Borno who had the highest security need and near the highest proportions of state conflict. This may suggest higher tolerances for state terrorism, or state-based violence against unarmed civilians, in areas where security is needed the most. However, for areas less concerned with security, the unwanted and negative presence of state security forces appears to result in delegitimacy orientations especially for more specific dimensions.

Returning now to national identity, figure 4.2 reveals state conflict slopes that oppose expectations posited in H4.1 depicting a negative relationship on national identity for high security need areas (β=-0.02, t=-1.73, p=0.09) and a positive trend in low security need states

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(β=0.02, t=2.15, p<0.05). Differences in point estimates reveal higher state-level security needs met by a relatively high proportion of state conflict results in no statistical difference from the

2013 baseline and 2016 wave (F(1,68)=0.00, p=0.95). Additional point statistics at high and low ranges of the independent variables reveals no significant difference between the 2013 baseline and the 2016 wave with the exception of differences concerning low levels of security need and low state conflict performance (F(1,68)=9.61, p=0.002). Regardless of insignificant point differences between waves, the trends presented in Figure 4.1 clearly oppose the expectations outlined in H4.1 and require additional consideration before discussing results from the subsequent models.

Figure 4.2 Interaction: State-based Violence, State Security Need, and Survey Wave on National Identity

Research suggests that when people perceive a risk to their wellbeing, they will seek feasible identities that emphasize connections to more powerful groups who are able and more likely to support their interests (Feinstein 2016a, 2016b, Gorman and Seguin 2018). Therefore, individuals in states who possess a greater need for security and who are not achieving acceptable levels from local security organizations may seek higher order, national affiliations considered more likely to fulfill their security needs. This may be the case for 2016 respondents

166 residing in states with higher than average prior security needs and lower than average state conflict percentages such as Gombe, Kaduna, Niger, and Zamfara who witnessed increases in non-state conflict events during the intervening period with lower levels of state intervention.

Additionally, Ethnic Power Relations data from both states show an increase in national level access due to the 2015 presidential election which may further explain such tendencies towards national identities as a link to higher levels of state security support.

A closer examination of states with higher security needs and an increased state security presence reveal additional aspects not captured within column 4 that may influence such unexpected results concerning national identity. In general, states with a greater than average security concern and increased state conflict percentages showed an increase in the proportion of respondents who primarily identify as a Nigerian. However, states in similar circumstances, such as Yobe, experienced increases in state conflict, but also endured a much higher proportion of non-state conflict and terrorism prior to the 2014 military surge. Such states may view the military presence as only a temporary solution and seek affiliation with violent organizations more likely to sustain a local presence. Kebbi State experienced similar security needs and low state conflict circumstances and had a significant decrease in national identity from 48 to less than 10 percent. Between surveys, Kebbi endured less than 10 violent events with more than half involving state security personnel. Most events conducted by security forces resulted in the deaths of armed civilians participating in communal militia activities. Such state actions may drive individuals away from state affiliations and develop a desire to identify with particularistic groups that are more aligned with their interests. This may increase support for armed non-state actors and impact identity affiliation and other legitimacy orientations. These relational type of inquiries are the main focus for the next model which assesses the impact of the general

167 orientations towards violent non-state actors and how such attitudes effect identity and the evaluation of the state.

Column 5 adds the 2013 state-level main effect that captures prior orientations concerning the importance to support charities who in turn support organizations opposed to the state. This model also includes an individual-level covariate concerning the same question to evaluate if the aggregation of prior attitudes at the state level has any added importance beyond an individuals’ own orientations. Interactions concerning security necessity and state conflict percentage maintain acceptable significance levels for all legitimacy dependent variables excluding national identity and economic effectiveness. The results show that legitimacy dimensions concerning national identity, procedural fairness, and confidence in national level leaders produce significant coefficients regarding the interaction term between state conflict percentage, support for rebel organizations, and the 2016 wave dummy. These interactions are plotted using simple slopes in figure 4.3 using high (1 SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) levels of state conflict and support for charities that fund terrorist groups as the moderator. Similar to figure

4.2, the light grey line represents the average legitimacy rating for individuals the 2013 wave and provides a baseline for comparisons between the variations captured in the 2016 wave due to the effects of state-conflict and the moderating effects of support for terrorist organizations.

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Figure 4.3 Interaction: State-based Violence, Support for Terrorist Groups, and Survey Wave

Plot 1, 3, an 5 in figure 4.3 reveal significant positive legitimacy trends for individuals residing in states with a more negative prior orientations towards terrorist groups and who experienced a higher percentage of state conflict against armed non-state organizations holding other variables constant.26 Additionally, all point estimations at high levels of state conflict produce significant differences from the 2013 baseline.27 In support of H4.2, these results suggest that legitimacy levels of national affiliation, procedural fairness, and confidence in

26 Slope significance of the proportion of state conflict on legitimacy dimensions in areas with low support for terrorist groups: national identity - β=0.02, t=3.01, p<0.01, CI 95% [0.01, 0.04]; procedural fairness - β=0.05, t=3.93, p<0.001, CI 95% [0.03, 0.08]; conf. in local leaders - β=0.08, t=5.82, p<0.001, CI 95% [0.05, 0.11] 27 Difference between 2013 and 2016 waves at low terrorist support and high security events: National Identity - F(1,67)=9.00, p<0.01, Procedural fairness - F(1,67)=37.94, p<0.001, Confidence in National Leaders - F(1,67)=52.10, p<0.001 169 national leaders are higher in locations with prior negative attitudes towards terrorist groups and higher proportions of state conflict.

Plots 2, 4, and 6 in figure 4.3 present mixed slopes concerning areas with high support for terrorist groups. National identity shows a significant negative slope (β=0.01, t=-3.89, p<0.001) suggesting that higher proportions of state conflict associate with significantly lower levels of national affiliation.28 These results offer further support to H4.2 which posits that more positive support towards rebel groups would result in negative legtiaimcy reactions towards the state in areas where state conflict is greater. Procedural fairness reveals similar negative trends that are below the 2013 standard, yet the slope fails to achieve statistical significance. Confidence in national leaders produces an unexpected trend showing a positive relationship between state conflict and legitimacy for individuals residing in states with more supportive attitudes towards terrorist. This slope reaches only marginal significance (β=0.02, t=1.93, p=0.06) and remains below the 2013 baseline. However, these results ultimately fail to support H4.2. While unexpected, such a trend for confidence in national leaders may offer some support to theories concerning the ephemeral nature of more specific legitimacy dimensions. Higher degrees of state conflict may influence more positive attitudes towards the state’s capability to govern while at the same time decreasing support for possible challengers. Moreover, states that fail to act risk lower levels of specific legitimacy amongst constituents who show more support towards rebel groups. This however, does not explain how negative trends occurred in the more diffuse legitimacy dimension of national identity. Theoretically, more diffuse dimensions should sustain as performance rises and falls, however, as addressed in the previous chapter, diffuse dimensions

28 Difference between 2013 and 2016 waves at high terrorist support and high security events: National Identity - F(1,67)=5.02, p<0.05, Procedural fairness - F(1,67)=19.51, p<0.001, Confidence in National Leaders - F(1,67)=3.98, p=0.05. 170 such as national identity in areas of limited statehood may not be as durable as theory would suggest, especially in the Nigerian context where governing systems rise and fall with some degree of historic regularity.

Ultimately, outcomes limited to national identity, procedural fairness, and confidence in national leaders provide partial support for H4.2. Partial support is given because only three of the six dimensions produced significant coefficients. Moreover, while the models that do reach significance provide clear support for increases in legitimacy concerning areas with less support for terrorist groups, they offer mixed results concerning areas that offer more support for terrorist groups. Lastly, the independent variable of focus for column 5 captures orientations towards groups who may oppose the state, but this survey item lacks precision to account for any specific rebel organizations operating in a given area. For additional clarification, the final model assesses orientations towards Boko Haram, a well-known rebel group who primarily operates in the northern geopolitical regions of Nigeria.

Column 6 replaces general rebel support with a state-level mean of the 2013 survey item that assessed how positive or negative of an influence Boko Harm is having on Nigeria (1-very negative, 6-very positive). Similar to previous columns, individual level responses considering

Boko Haram’s influence are also included in the analysis. This model adds further precision by restricting the sample to geopolitical zones whose preponderance of state conflict during the intervening period was conducted against Boko Haram forces or other violent actors suspected to be supported by the rebel group. It is assumed that those who view Boko Haram in a positive manner would consider their governing goals and practices as more beneficial to their own well- being.

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The interaction between security need and state conflict percentage maintained similar magnitudes, direction, and significance across dimensions with the expedition of national identity and economic dimensions failing to reach acceptable significance levels. Significant effects for the Boko Haram influence interaction are observed concerning national identity, procedural fairness, and economic effectiveness with marginal significance for confidence in national leaders. With the exception of economic effectiveness, the models match expectations in

H4.2 and show that legitimacy increases more substantially for individuals residing in states with decreased prior orientations towards Boko Haram and who experienced higher amounts of state conflict during the intervening period.29 Moreover, the slopes produced significant positive differences from the 2013 baseline for high proportions of state conflict.30 Additionally, the models concerning national identity (β=-0.02, t=-3.76, p<0.01) and procedural fairness (β=-0.03, t=-4.71, p<0.001) reveal a significant negative association between state conflict and legitimacy in areas with more favorable attitudes towards Boko Haram. Conversely, the slope for confidence in national leaders failed to reach an acceptable significance level (plot 6), while economic effectiveness achieved a positive and significant slope suggesting the presence of positive attitudes in areas with higher levels of state conflict and more favorable attitudes towards Boko Haram (β=0.04, t=2.10, p<0.05). This unexpected outcome may be a result of an overall expansion in Nigeria’s economy that occurred for most of the intervening period. Despite a rapid decrease in crude oil prices in 2015, the Nigerian economy showed signs of improvement largely based on the steady increase of crude oil prices throughout 2013 and most of 2014. By

29 Slope significance of the proportion of state conflict on legitimacy dimensions in areas with low support for Boko Harm: national identity - β=0.03, t=4.67, p<0.001, CI 95% [0.02, 0.04]; procedural fairness - β=0.02, t=2.08, p<0.05, CI 95% [0.001, 0.04]; economic effectiveness - β=-0.03, t=-1.60, p=0.12, CI 95% [-0.07, 0.01];conf. in local leaders - β=0.08, t=5.13, p<0.001, CI 95% [0.05, 0.11] 30 Difference between 2013 and 2016 waves at a negative influence of Boko Haram and high security events: national identity - F(1,39)=45.67, p<0.001;procedural fairness - F(1,39)=41.42, p<0.001; economic effectiveness - F(1,39)=22.79, p<0.001; confidence in national leaders - F(1,39)=38.76, p<0.001 172 the end of 2015, Nigerian’s attitudes toward their economy overall was more positive than it was in 2013 despite lower perceptions due to high unemployment rates of the southern states.31 The increase in perceptions towards economic effectiveness in states that had more positive attitudes towards Boko Haram and who witnessed greater state conflict could be a result of greater access to financial benefits from the state due to an increase in government control and security in the area. This may also explain why attitudes toward economic effectiveness rose for all variations between Boko Haram sentiments and state conflict percentage except circumstances with increased perceptions toward Boko Haram and a lower security presence by the state.

Figure 4.4 Interaction: State-based Violence, Boko Haram Influence, and Survey Wave on National Identity

31 This is supported based on the difference of means between the 2013 and 2016 survey concerning the question that assesses how effective Nigeria is at increasing employment opportunities (1-very ineffective, 6-very effective); 2.77 and 3.62 respectively with proportion of maximum scaling adjustments made to the 2013 observations. This trend is further supported by a nationally representative sample of Nigeria conducted by the Pew Research Center (Tamir 2019). 173

Figure 4.5 Interaction: State-based Violence, Boko Haram Influence, and Survey Wave on Specific Legitimacy Variables

Overall, the results from models 5 and 6 offer support for H4.2 with some limitations.

Excluding economic effectiveness, all significant three-way interactions produced a significantly positive association between state conflict and legitimacy in areas with prior negative orientations towards rebel groups. Unexpectedly, the models failed to show consistent trends concerning areas with more favorable attitudes towards non-state organizations who violent challenge the authority of the state. More diffuse dimensions coincided with the expectations outlined in H4.2 revealing a negative association between state conflict and legitimacy. Yet, evidence from more specific dimensions such as confidence in national leaders produced positive associations suggesting that the state’s security performance in the short run may increase levels of specific support even when such violent actions are against organizations considered more

174 favorably within a given area. In suggesting that actor relations and the interactions between those relations matter when considering legitimacy outcomes. Conversely, state security inaction may be detrimental concerning more specific forms of legitimacy in areas with rebel support, while beneficial in such areas for more diffuse support which remained higher when state conflict was low.

To summarize, the results in this section appear broadly consistent with expectations provided in hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2. The models presented suggest that levels of state conflict with regard to different types of violence in a given area failed to account for variations in levels of legitimacy. Rather, changes in the relationship between state-based violence and legitimacy differed depending on the level of security need and orientations towards rebel groups. In general, legitimacy perceptions rise substantially if security needs are addressed by the state.

However, neglect to such needs suffers the consequences of substantial state delegitimation.

Decreases in legitimacy perceptions also occur in areas who have lower needs of security yet experience higher levels of state conflict suggesting misguided or unwanted actions offer states no assistance in developing support from their citizens. The analysis also reveals that attitudes towards rebel groups have a significant influence on the effects state-based conflict has on select dimensions of legitimacy most notably national identity, procedural fairness, and confidence in national-level leaders. In general, the effect of state violence towards non-state organizations depends on the relational aspects between violent groups and citizens of a given area. These outcomes will be discussed further in the discussion section below. The focus now turns to the next section which explores more immediate changes in legitimacy to a specific case of state- based violence against unarmed citizens.

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LEGITIMACY CHANGES TO STATE-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS IN ZARIA

This section brings the analysis back to the state-based violence that occurred in the city of Zaria discussed in the introduction chapter. To briefly summarize, the event involved state-led violence against members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) in Zaria city located in the northern state of Kaduna from 12 through 14 December 2015. It is estimated that nearly 350 civilian fatalities occurred over the 36-hour period (Nigeria Human Rights Report, 2019). The

Nigerian military justified the attacks as a necessary defensive response to a failed assassination attempt on top military leaders in the region. Despite these claims, reports from Human Rights

Watch and Amnesty International accused the military of using disproportionate and indiscriminate violence against unarmed men, women, and children (“Nigeria-Unearthing the

Truth,” 2016, “Nigeria-Army Attack,” 2015). While violence was common in Nigeria’s northern regions during this time, the perpetrators, victims, and scope of the violence was unexpected, thus providing a drastic discontinuity in state-civilian relations. It is assumed that after the event, changes in legitimacy orientations, especially those concerning security institutions, are more likely based on the unprecedented degree of violence by the military against unarmed civilians rather than due to other events. By 15 December 2015, major national news outlets such as the federally controlled Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), BBC Nigeria, CNN International, and

Al Jazeera had all published reports on the event.

It is theorized that the impact of violent events on legitimacy depends on the complex social positions and relationships of social actors concerning who conducts the violence, the recipient, and the evaluating audience. To examine these claims, the proceeding methodology and analysis borrows methodology from Gorman and Seguin’s (2018) examination of global identification attitudes in relation to an unexpected terrorist attack in Lebanon in 2013. However,

176 the geographic scope here broadens the region of consideration between southern and northern states. Given the rapid spread of information concerning the event, it is assumed that many individuals became aware of the incident soon after its publication by major news outlets, some of which who circulated articles as early as 13 December (Iroegbu, 2015).

The impact of the event on legitimacy orientations is measured using responses from the

2016 survey wave. Respondents from the sample were selected based on the following criteria:

(1) they responded to the survey at least one week prior to the mass publication of the event (Dec

7 – Dec 14) or any time after the publication up until the end of survey administration (Jan 2,

2016), and (2) resided in a state that included respondents before and after the event. From this criteria, the analysis captures the effects of the state-based terrorism on shifts in legitimacy orientations regarding three southern (Cross River, Ondo, and Ekiti) and twelve northern states

(Adamawa, Bauchi, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Nassarawa, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, Zamfara, and FCT).

The analysis assumes three approaches. First, factored legitimacy orientations from surveys collected before the military attack are compared to those collected after the event.

Second, the analysis provides a focus on more specific attitudes on the effectiveness of Nigeria’s security institutions and the confidence respondents have towards those who lead them. Specific security orientations were assessed in the 2016 survey through three questions. The first measures how effective the Nigerian government is at providing security for its citizens based on a six point response scale ranging from 1-“very ineffective” to 6-“very effective.” The second uses the same six point scale to assess how effective the respondent considers the government is at reducing terrorism in Nigeria. The final question captures the degree of confidence the respondent has concerning the leaders of the military assessed through a six point scale from 1-

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“no confidence” to 6-“total confidence.” A number of confounding variables theorized to contribute to changes in legitimacy and rebel group orientations are incorporated in the models.

These variables include: gender, religion, age, educational attainment, household income, what media outlet is considered the most trust worthy, if the respondent feels safe where they live, and national and local political access through ethnic similarities.32

Larger negative effects towards state legitimacy are expected to occur in the northern states who possess greater religious and cultural connections with the victims of the attack and null or positive effects from southern states who are physically and traditionally separated from the victims; thus more likely to view such communities as inconsequential or perhaps as negative

‘outgroups’ given the country’s historic tensions derived from traditional differences between norther and southern states. While strains between Shia and Sunni Muslim denominations are present in Nigeria, religious differences between Christians and Muslim generally persists as a more prominent line of distinction. This is evident within the 2016 survey where both Muslim and Christian participants are significantly more comfortable working with and living amongst individuals of a different denomination than of a different religion.33 The final analysis examines orientations towards rebel groups after the event with a focus on attitudes towards Boko Haram.

The analysis centers on the survey question that assesses the respondent’s orientations on the group’s influence in Nigeria: 1-very negative to 6-very positive.

32 See Chapter 3 for a full discussion on control variables and their theoretical association with legitimacy perceptions. 33 Based on paired t-test models between responses to (1) how comfortable the respondent would be accepting a co- worker of a different religion, and (2) comfort of the respondent accepting a co-worker of a different sect/denomination; responses ranging from ‘very uncomfortable’ to very comfortable’ on a six-point scale. The same paired t-test was performed on similar comfort orientations focusing on the acceptance of neighbors of a different religion and of a different sect/denomination. Four paired t-test analysis assessed: Muslim respondents in the north and south and non-Muslim respondents in the north and south. 178

Given the imbalances of the control variables in pre- and post-event samples, a quasi- interrupted times series (ITS) design is used to evaluate the effects from the event rather than a true natural experiment. The approach implements a segmented regression analysis to evaluate possible changes in perceptions after the event using samples from northern and southern regions of the country.34 The first set of models implements a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to evaluate possible associations the violent event had on different dimensions of legitimacy for each region. Each model for individual i assumes the following:

푦푖 = 훽0 + 훽푐푋푐 + 훽푠퐴푠 + 휖푖 where 푦푖 represents the legitimacy dimension and 푋푐 denotes the individual level control covariates corresponding to coefficient 훽푐. The coefficient of interest is 훽푠 which corresponds to the dummy covariate that addresses if individual i participated in the survey before (0) or after

(1) the event from the period December 7, 2015 to January 2, 2016.

The second and third set of analyses uses an ordered logistical regression model to assess any associations the event might have had on differences in attitudinal responses concerning the state’s security capabilities and attitudes towards armed non-state organizations, specifically the well know rebel group Boko Haram. These models also assess how such historic events may associate with changes in attitudes concerning violence conducted by organizations outside the state. It is anticipated that state-based terrorist events may cause citizens to seek security and governance from other known and available alternatives. These models assume the general formula:

Pr (푌푖 ≤ 푚|푋) 퐿표푔 ( ) = 휏푚 − 훽푖푋푖 + 푈 Pr (푌푖 > 푚|푋)

34 Interrupted time series designs typically incorporate statistics on changes of level and trend into the analysis. Unfortunately, data collection does not span far enough after the event to credibly assess trend changes. Therefore, the analysis focuses primarily on level differences pertaining to legitimacy perceptions. 179 where 푚 is a category for the dependent variable, 휏 represents the cut point, 푋푖 is a matrix of individual-level control covariates as discussed above, and 푈 is a constant term. All models are assessed using a multiple imputed data set to account for missing variables.35

Results - Zaria Event and Legitimacy Dimensions

Table 4.3 displays coefficients and standard errors from the OLS models with legitimacy orientations regressed on the binary variable that signifies if a respondent conducted the survey after 15 December 2015. Column 1 and 2 provide coefficient results from the full model for the north and south sample respectively. The results show significant decreases in more specific dimensions of legitimacy for respondents residing in northern regions. Specifically, northern residents surveyed after the event were significantly less likely to consider the government as impartial or have confidence in the state’s ability to provide adequate security than those in the north who provided responses before the event. These respondents were also more likely to possess lower perceptions of confidence in national and local governmental leaders than northern residents who provided responses before the violent event, holding all other variables constant.

The trend in significance and magnitude for each coefficient support the dimensional construct of legitimacy suggesting that specific dimensions are more likely to be influenced in the short term than more diffuse elements. Furthermore, the results show changes in legitimacy dimensions that coincide with evaluations specific to the event. For example, while there is a significant change in security effectiveness, there is no statistical difference in attitudes concerning economic performance. Additionally, the results show that while southern attitudes towards the government were more positive for individuals who provided responses after the

Zaria event, these differences were not significant. A full list of coefficients is located in table in

35 See appendix A for details concerning the imputation process. 180 appendix C. Overall, the models provide strong support for H4.2 that posits that legitimacy will decrease when state-based violence occurs towards groups who are viewed more positively by the population.

Table 4.3. Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Legitimacy Orientations (1) (2) South North A. National Identity Zaria event -0.126 -0.050 (0.11) (0.04)

R2 0.28 0.12 N 140 2028 Pre / Post 110/30 1848/180

B. Procedural Fairness Zaria event 0.224 -0.116* (0.21) (0.06)

R2 0.27 0.17 N 140 2028 Pre / Post 110/30 1848/180

C. Economic Effectiveness Zaria event 0.241 -0.089 (0.24) (0.06)

R2 0.29 .10 N 140 2028 Pre / Post 110/30 1848/180

D. Security Effectiveness Zaria event 0.259 -0.144** (0.22) (0.05)

R2 0.34 0.16 N 140 2028 Pre / Post 110/30 1848/180

E. Confidence in National Gov. Leaders Zaria event 0.023 -0.308*** (0.23) (0.05)

R2 0.30 0.19 N 140 2028 Pre / Post 110/30 1848/180

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Table 4.3. (Continued) (1) (2) South North F. Confidence in Local Gov. Leaders 0.007 -0.294*** (0.22) (0.05)

R2 0.29 0.16 N 140 2028 Pre / Post 110/30 1848/180 Note. – Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. All column estimates are from separate OLS regression models restricted to north and south samples respectively within the period of interest. ‘Zaria event’ indicates if an individual provided responses after 15 December. Estimates were taken from the full model with all previously identified controls. Table C.6 provides coefficients for all variables in the model. Row below coefficients provides number of observations pre/post attack. A test of coefficient differences between regions resulted in significant results at the p < 0.05 level with the exception of national identity which failed to reach significance. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table C.9 in appendix C displays the ordered logistical regression results in odds ratios, of all four security institution dependent variables. The results reveal similar patterns for northern respondents who show a significant decrease in perceptions towards state security institutions concerning effectiveness and confidence in those who lead them. For the north, the models show a significant increase in the odds of being in a lower rating category for those surveyed after the event. Moreover, the southern sample produced marginal significant and positive difference between before and after respondents for survey items regarding terrorism reduction and security in their area. However, a parallel regression assessment using the Stata user-written program ‘omodel’ reveals that the assumption is not met. An additional ‘brant’ test confirms the model’s violation (χ2 = 217.11, df = 56, p < 0.001) suggesting that a generalized ordered logistic model may produce more accurate and consistent estimates. With this approach, the model assumes the following general form:

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exp (훼푗 + 푋푖훽푗) 푃(푌푖 > 푗) = 푔(푋훽푗) = , 푗 = 1, 2, … 푀 − 1 1 + {exp(훼푗 + 푋푖훽푗)}

where 푀 is the number of categories of the ordinal dependent variable which the model determines the probabilities that 푌푖 will assume on each distinct value from the scale of the dependent variable. For the present analysis 푀 equals six, thus when 푗 = 5, the model assumes the format of a logistic regression contrasting 5 with the other possible outcomes 1, 2, 3, 4, and

6. This construct relaxes the often violated parallel line assumption with ordered logistic regression and allows coefficients to differ across values of 푗 while maintaining goodness of fit.

Table 4.4 presents the coefficients and standard errors derived from using the gologit2 user- created program in Stata (Williams, 2006).

Figure 4.6 Attitudes towards Nigerian Security Institutions

Note – Figure displays the mean ratings of security forces in northern and southern regions of Nigeria before and after the Zaria event. Dark grey bars indicate before-event means, light grey bars indicate after-event means.

Figure 4.6 shows mean comparisons of the three security survey items pertaining to

Nigeria’s security institutions and its leaders, and coincides with the generalized ordered logit results presented in table 4.4, which omits southern sample results as all resulted in insignificant coefficients. A full list of coefficients for each sample can be found in table C.10 in appendix C.

In general, figure 4.6 shows southern respondents becoming less negative towards security

183 institutions while the northern sample significantly decreases in support for security institutions.

Column 1 in table 4.3 shows that holding all other variables constant, northerner respondents who participated in the survey after the event had 0.47 and 0.53 times lower odds of rating the country’s ability to provide security as ‘very effective’ and ‘effective’ respectively. Coefficients concerning the state’s effectiveness at reducing terrorism did not reach significance for any response for the northern sample. The center plot in figure 4.6 reveals that the difference for northern attitudes pertaining to terrorism reduction was a marginal increase. Conversely, the southern sample became noticeably less negative in their responses after the event suggesting that southern respondents may have viewed the attack as an act of state conflict against violent non-state actors rather than an act of state terrorism. This may be due to media coverage by NTA which a significantly larger proportion of the southern sample trusts for information (south = .48, north = .31, t=3.55 p < 0.001, df = 1516). The state-owned news source heavily promoted the event as a necessary defensive response to a terrorist threat which likely shaped southern audiences perceptions and legitimizing the military attack on civilians to some degree (Usman

2015). Column 3 in table 4.4 displays similar results as column 1 with significant lower odds of favorable ratings concerning confidence in military leaders. Overall, the results show that northern residents were less favorable towards military institutions and its leaders after the Zaria massacre and southern residents developed less negative attitudes towards the security arm of the nations. These results are consistent with H4.2, indicating that violent actions by the state may result in legitimation or delegitimation depending on the victim and the evaluating audience.

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Table 4.4 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression on Security Orientations (1) (2) (3) Provide Security Reducing Terrorism Confidence in Military Leaders Rating Scale 1-very ineffective, 6-very effective 1-very ineffective, 6-very effective 1-no confidence, 6-total confidence 1 0.84 0.63 0.344* [0.41,1.75] [0.27,1.49] [0.14,0.87] 2 1.20 1.06 0.77 [0.75,1.91] [0.60,1.86] [0.47,1.26] 3 0.77 1.14 0.615* [0.55,1.07] [0.74,1.75] [0.42,0.90] 4 0.539*** 0.91 0.542*** [0.38,0.76] [0.64,1.28] [0.40,0.74] 5 0.476** 0.77 0.634* [0.28,0.80] [0.51,1.16] [0.42,0.95]

N 2028 2028 2028 Pre / Post 1848/180 1848/180 1848/180

Note. –Confidence intervals are provide in brackets. All column estimates are presented in odds ratio and are from generalized ordinal logistic regression models restricted to the north sample within the period of interest. Rating scale indicates the different levels respondents could select when answering each survey item; larger numbers indicate more positive attitudes towards the element in each question. Estimates were taken from the full model with all previously identified controls. Table C.10 provides coefficients for all variables in the model. Row below coefficients provides number of observations pre/post attack. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Results - Zaria Event and Negative Political Capital

The aforementioned models provide evidence suggesting significant association between

southern and northern legitimacy shifts concerning the period before and after the violent event

in Zaria. The analysis now turns to examine possible changes in negative political capital, or

civility/democracy-reducing attitudes. The first model investigates variations concerning the

well-known rebel group, Boko Haram. If legitimacy assumes a ‘zero-sum’ game, decreases in

the current governing system may result in increased support for other viable options. The

second model examines attitude shifts in the acceptance of violence towards the government to

change its policies or actions. If state violence becomes delegitimized, then the state risks losing

symbolic control over who conducts it and how it is performed. Therefore, misuse of this control

may result in greater appeal towards extra-state violence or resistance towards the state.

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Table 4.5 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression on Negative Political Capital (1) (2) Violence to force government to Boko Haram influence Rating Scale change policies or actions 1-very positive, 6-very negative 1-strongly disagree, 6-strongly agree 1 1.470* 1.366 [1.03,2.10] [0.94,1.99] 2 1.415* 1.342+ [1.01,1.98] [0.96,1.87] 3 1.437* 1.053 [1.02,2.02] [0.70,1.59] 4 1.260 1.024 [0.88,1.81] [0.54,1.93] 5 1.292 0.001 [0.81,2.07] [0.00,84.57]

N 2028 2028 Pre / Post 1848/180 1848/180 Note. – Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. Confidence intervals (95%) are provide in brackets. All column estimates are from ordinal logistic regression models restricted to the north sample within the period of interest. Rating scale indicates the different levels respondents could select when answering each survey item; larger numbers indicate more positive attitudes towards the element in each question. Estimates were taken from the full model with all previously identified controls. Table C.8 provides coefficients for all variables in the model. Row below coefficients provides number of observations pre/post attack. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Figure 4.7 displays mean comparisons of attitudes towards Boko Haram and non-state violence for both regions before and after the event. These trends coincide with the generalized ordered logit results presented in table 4.5. The southern sample is omitted from table 4.5 due to all categories resulting in insignificant coefficients. A full list of results for both regions is provided in table C.11 in appendix C. The results show a more favorable change in attitudes towards Boko Haram for both regions with the southern sample becoming less negative and the northern sample shifting to a positive orientation towards the rebel group. Table 4.5 displays such a shift showing that northern residents who provided responses after the event have approximately a 1.5 times higher odds of responding in a more positive category than ‘somewhat negative’ holding all other variables constant. This trend is present for the more negative categories as well suggesting a more positive shift in attitudes towards Boko Haram. Overall, this

186 suggests a decrease in more negative attitudes and a slight increase in more positive attitudes towards the rebel group Boko Haram for the average post-attack respondent. Violence to force the government to change also shows positive shifts to more supportive attitudes concerning violence towards the state, however only category 2, ‘disagree’ has a significant coefficient suggesting post-event participants have a 1.3 times higher odds of responding in a higher category holding all else constant. Overall, these results provide support for H4.3 suggesting risky trends of negative political capital for certain populations as a result of state violence against a valued, or at least, tolerated subpopulation.

Figure 4.7 Attitudes towards Boko Haram and Violence towards the Government

Note – Figure displays the mean ratings of Boko Haram influence and perceptions on the use of violence towards the government to change its policies or actions in northern and southern regions of Nigeria before and after the Zaria event. Dark grey bars indicate before-event means, light grey bars indicate after-event means.

Alternative Explanations

To assess possible validity limitations to the results provided above, I first examine imbalances in theoretically relevant variables that may be influencing the outcomes. First, it is worth noting that the inclusion of the control covariates for all of the models above is one strategy to mitigate bias from possible sample imbalances. With the exception of the economic dimension, the addition of these controls does not affect the direction or significance of the OLS 187 regression results in the northern region. While statistical significance for procedural fairness is lost for the southern region (see table C.10), direction remains consistent. If the impact of the event was indeed an artifact effect, then the inclusion of the relevant controls would likely remove or significantly decrease the effect of the violent event. This may well be the case concerning the decrease in effect on the economic dimension as it is considered the least effected dimension of legitimacy by the violent event in Zaria.

Despite the inclusion of controls, it remains important to investigate possible biases based on differences in the samples. The northern sample had statistically significant imbalances in two variables to include two others obtaining marginal significance. The first being ‘religion’ where the proportion of Muslims dropped from 0.75 before the event to 0.58 after the event. A decrease in Muslim participants may be concerning given that non-Muslim faiths are the minority in northern Nigeria. This may result in a decrease in legitimacy orientations especially given the likelihood that marginalization effects of non-Muslims are perpetuated through government policies and actions. A cross tabs examination of legitimacy ratings in the northern sample reveals greater negative orientations for non-Muslims when compared to Muslims. However, it also shows that the two groups react to the event in similar ways with decreases in legitimacy and increases in negative political capital suggesting a possible greater influence based on regional than religious effects. If northern non-Muslims considered Muslims as ‘outsiders’ then one might expect a null change or perhaps an increase suggesting that the event was viewed as an exercise of legitimate force against nefarious actors; this was not the case.

The other variable that had a significant difference between pre- and post-event northern samples was how accepting the respondent would be towards a neighbor of a different ethnicity.

While significant, the mean remains relatively high at 4.83 and 4.57 for before and after northern

188 participants respectively. With only a 5 percent change in score that did not show a drastic change in orientation, the effects of this significant difference are considered minimal. Similar outcomes were observed with marginal differences in age (‘before’ mean = 33, ‘after’ mean =

35) and employment status (‘before’ proportion = 0.35, ‘after’ proportion = 0.32).

The southern sample had statistically significant imbalances in four variables and to include two others obtaining marginal significance. The first being ‘age’ which shows only a marginal difference between before and after southern samples at means of 33 and 35 respectively with similar distributions (SD = 11.6 and 11.4 respectively). Language was also imbalanced with a larger proportion of English speaking respondents in the post-even southern sample. Respondents who did not speak English only made up approximately 5 percent of the pre-event sample and were not part of the post-event sample. Non-English speaking respondents had minimally higher legitimacy ratings than those who could speak English in three of the six dimensions. If it is assumed that directionality was similar to those who could speak English and the relation between state legitimacy and negative political capital remained consistent, these mixed legitimacy differences would not be a significant driver of changes in the models ran above. Given such low proportions, the impact of this imbalances can be considered minimal.

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Table 4.6. Regional Imbalances and Expected Impacts on Model Results. South North β Expected Bias β Expected Bias 1.009 0.994 Female - - (0.07) - (0.01) - ** Muslim 1.126 - 0.937 In Favor (0.12) - (0.02) - * + Age 1.006 In Favor 1.001 Against (0.00) - (0.00) - ** English 1.373 - 0.985 - (0.14) - (0.02) - Education 0.986 - 1.000 - (0.02) - (0.00) - + + Employment 1.144 In Favor 0.972 In Favor (0.09) - (0.01) - Household Income 0.984 - 1.007 - (0.03) - (0.01) - Voted in last election 0.938 0.981 - - (0.08) (0.02) - - 0.876+ 0.979 Trust Federal News Outlet In Favor - (0.07) (0.02) - - 1.031 0.996 Feeling of Security - - (0.02) (0.01) - - 0.681*** 0.989 Nat. Gov. Access Against - (0.07) (0.02) - - 0.806* 0.988 Local Gov. Access Against - (0.08) (0.01) - - Ethnicity Acceptance 0.972 0.983** - Against (0.03) (0.01) - - 1.011 1.005 Optimistic Outlook - - (0.03) - (0.01) - Note – All β coefficients result from bivariate regression models with the ‘after event’ dummy as the independent variable. Significance acquired through two-tailed test. All dichotomous coefficient variables, excluding ‘household income’, ‘feeling of security’, and ‘optimistic outlook’, represent the percent change between before and after event samples. Non-binary variables represent the mean change in their respective ratings between the two samples. Expected bias outcomes represent the expected impact of imbalances for each significant change as it pertains to prior theory and empirical results, to include the results presented in previous chapters.

Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) category is the third imbalanced variable in the southern sample. Given the national political arrangement, most southern participants were excluded from access to national level power due to their ethnicity. There was only one participant in the pre- event sample and no respondents who were categorized as having access in the post-event

190 sample. This suggests that the sample was arranged to develop result counter to expectations suggesting that a higher degree of those removed from access would have lower legitimacy perceptions. The same trend occurs with the final significant imbalance in power access at the local level with a higher proportion of those without access being in the post-even sample, again suggesting results that would be counter to expectations in H4.3. Also, marginal imbalances occurred with increases in those who trust NTA as their primary source for information and those who are employed for the post-event southern sample which would also influence the model against expectations.

A final set of imbalance tests considers systematic bias in specific concerns for Muslims and imbalances in prior attitudes in turn. The first examines orientations towards the general welfare of Muslims that may significantly be more or less prominent in the before or after event samples. To assess this possibility a variable assessing the extent a respondent worried (1-‘not at all’ to 4-‘a lot’) about the welfare of Muslims living around the world was regressed on the before and after attack binary variable including all other controls. The results in column 1 and 2 in table 4.7 show no significant difference between before and after samples for both north and south regions suggesting that biases towards Muslims remains balanced between samples. A full list of coefficients is located in table C.12 in appendix C.

Table 4.7. Ordered Logistic Regression on the Welfare of Muslims and Importance of Education for Boys (1) (2) (3) (4) South North South North Welfare of Muslims Importance of a boys education After event 1.148 0.957 1.078 0.829 (0.60) (0.17) (0.58) (0.11) [0.41,3.19] [0.68,1.34] [0.38,3.10] [0.64,1.08] N 140 2028 140 2028 Note – Effects are reported as odds ratios (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are provided in parentheses, and confidence intervals (95%) are provide in brackets. Estimates were taken from the full model with all previously identified controls. Table C.12 provides coefficients for all variables in the model. Row underneath coefficients provides number of observations. Parallel regression assessment using ‘omodel’ and ‘brant’ tests suggest the assumption was met.

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Next, I assess the potentiality that prior orientations concerning traditional attitudes dictates imbalances that may drive legitimacy outcomes. To assess this possibility a survey question assessing the extent a respondent agreed (1-‘completely disagree’ to 6-‘completely agree’) with the statement, ‘education is more important for a boy than for a girl’ was regressed on the before and after attack binary variable including all controls using an ordinal logistic model. Similar to the previous imbalance test, the columns 3 and 4 in table 4.5 reveal no significant difference between before and after event samples for both north and south regions. A lack of imbalances between before and after respondents provides further evidence of the differences in legitimacy and negative political capital orientations occurring as a result from the violent event rather than sampling imbalances based on prior attitudes.

To summarize, the effect of the Zaria massacre seems consistent with the expectations outlined in the hypotheses. The models showed that the violent event resulted in significant differences in legitimacy and negative political capital for northern respondents. Thus, northern residents appeared to respond to the event as civilians residing in areas of limited statehood who turn to other viable governing options when state performance is lacking or detrimental to the wellbeing of the collective. At the same time, the event did not cause significant differences in pre- and post-event samples for southern respondents. Moreover, these results highlight the critical relational characteristic of legitimacy which must account for the interactions of multiple players within fields of political conflict.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter applies the literature on legitimacy concerning the implications of citizenry needs and expectations, to include the consequences derived from the complex social relations between violent actors, their victims, and the evaluating audience within a nation replete with

192 violent political contestation. The findings contribute to theories that addresses a state’s monopoly of force and its potential to contribute to the legitimacy relations of a governing system. However the analysis presented reveals that the performance-based effects of security services on legitimacy is not a straightforward outcome and largely depends on the relative values and expectations of a given audience. Moreover, the analysis adds to such theories by taking into account critical relational aspects embedded within violent state-based actions and how such associations impact legitimacy outcomes within a field of contentious politics. This chapter further contributes to the literature by evaluating how such moderating effects occur across the different legitimacy dimensions revealing that not all are impacted equally.

The first section set out to evaluate how prior state-level security needs influenced the effects state conflict had on legitimating audiences. In support of H4.1, the results showed that changes in the relationship between the proportion of state conflict and legitimacy differed depending on the level of prior security need within a region. The relationship differed such that favorable state legitimacy perceptions manifested when higher needs of security were met with increased levels of state-based violence. Moreover, the models revealed a negative relationship for individuals residing in states with low security needs, such that as the proportion of state conflict increased, perceptions of state legitimacy decreased. These findings highlight that that the provision of services by the state do not automatically transition into positive receptions.

Rather, the performance-legitimacy exchange depends on the shifting needs and expectations of the differing sectors of a given populace (see also McLoughlin 2015). Failure to meet expectations is a legitimacy risk, but perhaps more interesting is how the provision of undesired services has the potential to delegitimize the state.

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The first section also investigated how prior orientations towards organizations who violently oppose the state influence the relationship between state-based violence and legitimacy.

As expected in H4.2, the data revealed that increases in the proportion of state-based conflict in areas with negative orientations towards rebel groups associated positively with state legitimacy; this occurred for both diffuse and specific dimensions. The data showed noticeable higher levels in diffuse legitimacy dimensions of national identity and procedural fairness for both the general

‘terrorist’ and Boko Haram models when low support for such groups was met with higher degrees of state-based violence. These results coincide with theories that suggest individuals to be more likely to identify with, and therefore support, organizations who are deemed capable of meeting their interests (Beetham 1991, Kelman 2001, Gorman and Seguin 2018). Thus, a rise in state legitimacy occurs when security needs and the expectations of safety against deviants is met through the performance of the state. Conversely, if interests are subverted by the state either through inaction when action is desired or the provision of undesired services, then legitimacy is at risk. This was the case for diffuse dimensions that resulted in lower legitimacy when states failed to direct force on identified deviant groups or when state violence was conducted against supported challengers. Thus, a failure to provide security or violent attacks against supported organizations may cause individuals to seek identities and offer diffuse support to other groups that better align with their interests and values.

Positive trends for more specific dimensions such as confidence in national leaders occurred for individuals residing in states with prior negative orientations towards rebel groups.

Such outcomes support H4.2 given that regions with higher proportions of state conflict saw higher legitimacy levels when there was prior low support for rebel groups and lower levels of legitimacy when prior orientations towards rebel groups was higher. However, the results also

194 showed positive trends for states with more favorable rebel orientations. This contradicts H4.2 yet connects with theory that suggests more specific dimensions of legitimacy are prone to changes based on perceived benefits and satisfactions from performance. Therefore, confidence in national leaders can be increased through performance that indicates benefits from services such as security as found in the results. The trends also indicate that inaction of security services by the state likely leaves gaps for other organizations to fill and further promote their legitimacy claims. The combination of diverging tendencies between diffuse and specific dimensions concerning the effect of state violence in areas more supportive towards rebel groups suggests that a greater state security presence possess the potential to gain legitimacy along more specific dimensions while at the same time lose legitimacy along more diffuse elements such as national affiliation.

The second section examined the state-based violent event that occurred in Zaria in

December 2015. The results provided further support for H4.2 showing that violence against a valued group associates with lower legitimacy perceptions especially for more specific dimensions. The results in the second section also supported H4.3 revealing noticeable increases in negative political capital after the event suggesting that legitimacy assumes some characteristics of a zero-sum game where delegitimation for one governing actor results in some degree of legitimation for other viable options (Gorman and Seguin 2018, Linz 1980).

In sum, this chapter confirmed that citizenry needs and their relation to other political actors within a field of political contention matters when considering the legitimacy outcomes of state-based violent acts. While state-based conflict may in general have positive main effects on legitimacy outcomes, it gains significant explanatory power when accounting for the moderating effects of expectations and interests to include the orientations towards non-state challengers.

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This research further highlights the importance of performance-based legitimacy and its impact on both specific and diffuse legitimacy dimensions suggesting its importance to the cultivation of authority system support in areas of limited statehood.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

This analysis on the interactive effects of need and rebel group orientations provides further clarification to the existing legitimacy literature. However, like all research, this study has limitations. Given the data set’s focus on attitudes towards different state institutions, the primary concentration of analysis centered on acts of violence by state security forces against violent non-state actors and how such acts influenced state legitimacy. While state-based violence is a critical factor when examining support for authority systems in a politically contested arena, the analysis here only accounts for violent acts by non-state organizations through the proportionality characteristics of the primary independent variable. Subsequent studies should also examine how violent behavior from various non-state actors impacts state and non-state legitimacy orientations.

Another limitation centers on the cross-sectional nature of the data. While this research examines the points before and after a critical spike in political violence in Nigeria, it lacks the capability to evaluate the long-term effects which are important to the evaluation of shifts in state legitimacy (especially when considering more diffuse dimensions). Current findings from organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continue to publish reports of human rights violations by the Nigerian military that may alter state legitimacy attitudes.

Moreover, individuals who suffered extrajudicial imprisonment during that period are now being released and likely have implications on how such military action legitimizes or delegitimizes the state (“Military Detention of Children” 2019).

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A final limitation concerns possible sampling bias in the 2016 dataset. As mentioned previously the dataset suffered from sampling limitations that restricted survey administration to more secure locations throughout the country. Therefore, the 2016 results are likely biased due to the inability to capture data from areas with higher exposure to politically violent events. Data from such locations may offer further insight to the legitimizing impacts of military operations.

Moreover, data restricted to less violent locations may possess higher or lower regards for military operations given their physical separation from the violence.

In closing, this chapter highlights the relational and performance-based importance of legitimacy in areas of limited statehood. It behooves practitioners to strategically reflect on such implications when conducting the use of violence. The following chapter will summarize the main findings and focus on the more substantive implications.

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CONCLUSION

The focus of this dissertation was to explore the empirical characteristics of legitimacy – its meaning, construction, sources, and processes. The aim has been relatively straight forward, identify and harness legitimacy’s complex characteristics and evaluate their implications within areas of limited statehood. To accomplish this, the research closely examined how legitimacy operates in the diverse and politically contested nation of Nigeria. This final chapter briefly reviews the main findings and overall contributions to the legitimacy literature. It also discusses how the findings apply to political implications in Nigeria and the broader implications to governance actors operating in areas of limited statehood.

OVERALL FINDINGS

A review of the literature found legitimacy to be an inherently complex, multifaceted, and often misunderstood concept. Using Weber’s seminal theorization of legitimacy, the review implemented approaches from sociological, political science, and social psychological fields and conceptualized legitimacy as a multidimensional belief, embedded within a belief system consisting of values and norms, that assesses a governing object as appropriate or desired, thus perceiving the entity as having the right to rule. The multidimensional nature of legitimacy was operationalized across a spectrum of seven dimensions ranging from diffuse to more specific elements. These dimensions included the broader category of national pride/identity and democratic principles, the more normative and performance-based evaluations of procedural fairness, economic effectiveness, and security effectiveness, and the specific appraisals of incumbent office holders based on levels of confidence in national and local governmental leaders. The theoretical dimensions were empirically identified using confirmatory factor

198 analysis on the 2013 and 2016 Nigerian data sets and used as focal dependent or independent variables throughout the dissertation.

Implementing a relational approach, legitimacy was assessed through various interactive levels. The primary relational level examined legitimacy effects within a given group of followers. Using authority systems theory, the analysis examined the important implications of validity, or the “collective consensus that observably governs the behavior of, and is binding on, the members of a collectivity”, and its influence on propriety, or an individual’s personal belief that a legitimacy object (act, norm, practice, or procedure) is right (Walker et al. 1986, Zelditch

2001,). Coinciding with expectations, the analysis found positive associations between validity orientations at the neighborhood level (i.e., endorsement) and propriety at the individual level.

Moreover, the conditional effects of neighborhood consensus robustly enhanced the association between endorsement and propriety. It was also found that the density of neighborhood social ties, operationalized through the measurement of perceptions of community trust, influenced the moderating properties of consensus on performance-based endorsement. Therefore, individuals were more likely to possess system sustaining attitudes when legitimacy was locally cultivated through consensus and higher degrees of community connectedness. This outcome was noticeable when evaluating such effects on attitudes towards the respondent’s community’s willingness to resist terrorist groups. Such endorsement associations failed to manifest in attitudes towards more individualistic sustaining behaviors such as voting suggesting that endorsement may have different levels of influence on propriety given the individualistic or social characteristics of a given behavior.

Chapter 4 investigated the broader relational aspects of legitimacy concerning the associations between a given governance actor, challengers, and legitimacy audiences. Utilizing

199 performance-based and dynamic relational legitimacy theories (Schoon 2016, 2017, Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018), the analysis confirmed that the needs of a given citizenry, specifically security needs, play a significant role in the evaluation of governance actions. The state’s ability to match, or at least attempt to match desired security needs through higher degrees of violent actions against armed non-state groups in a given region was shown to associate positively with legitimacy perceptions. This relation was observed for normative, performance-based and more specific dimensions of legitimacy. Conversely, a failure to provide security when a higher demand exists associated with noticeable decreases in legitimacy especially when considering procedural fairness and confidence in governmental leaders. Moreover, an increase in violent state actions in regions with lower security needs negatively associated with normative, performance-based and more specific dimensions. These outcomes suggest that in areas where security is not the primary concern, a greater proportion of violence by the state may be evaluated as unwelcomed or misguided as citizens deem other areas of governance more imperative to their well-being. The diffuse dimension of national identity produced results that challenged expectations, however closer examination of the data revealed that past non-state violence and negative experiences from state actions may be the reason individuals diverted from state affiliations and sought identities with more particularistic groups (Gorman and Seguin

2018).

Additional models in chapter 4 found that changes in the relationship between state-based violence and legitimacy differed depending on prior orientations towards rebel groups. This was a significant association for legitimacy dimensions at diffuse and specific levels. Coinciding with expectations, the models revealed that regions with unfavorable attitudes toward rebel groups had higher legitimacy ratings with increased proportions of state conflict. The linear model also

200 showed that lower proportions of state conflict associated with lower levels of legitimacy.

Results concerning diffuse and specific dimensions were mixed for individuals residing in regions with more favorable attitudes towards rebel groups. For such cases, a negative relationship manifested concerning state conflict and national identity. This was expected given the state’s actions against rebels who were evaluated more positively were the enemy of my friend becomes viewed more so as my enemy. However, confidence in national leaders revealed a positive relationship suggesting that the increased presence and actions of state security forces has the potential to increase government support in one area while decreasing legitimacy in others; thus putting security operations in a type of legitimacy paradox.

The final analysis examined an unexpected and significant case of state-based violence towards unarmed civilians that occurred within the administration period for the 2016 wave. This provided an opportunity to evaluate the short-term legitimacy dynamics through pre- and post- event comparisons. An examination of the pre- and post-event differences revealed strong negative trends in legitimacy for northern respondents who were assumed to positively identify with the victims of the event and null effects for the southern sample. Additionally, northern respondents revealed significant increases of negative political capital after the event resulting in more favorable attitudes towards the rebel group Boko Haram.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The findings from the analysis contribute to the legitimacy literature in a number of ways. First, the results provide strong support for the inherent relational characteristics of legitimacy. Given its social characteristics, the process of legitimacy rarely occurs in a vacuum and for the strategic actor often entails the considerations of a boarder network of relations. Past legitimacy theories and empirical studies tended to focus on dyadic relationships between an

201 evaluating audience and either the state, state challengers, or other third party actors (e.g.,

NGO’s, foreign state actors). One goal of this research was to empirically assess the relationship between a given populace and the constitutional state while taking into account additional associations that possess the potential to significantly alter the way in which a governance actor is evaluated. As a symbolic commodity, legitimacy exists within complex arrangements of social structures such that it constitutes both as attribute which is assigned by followers, and as a process which takes into account the positions and orientations of multiple actors (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, Johnson et al. 2006, Schoon 2016).

As addressed in the previous chapters, these processes occur on multiple levels. One level evaluated in the analysis was that between the individual and their local community. While expectations concerning the associations between neighborhood endorsement and propriety were met, the results concerning attitudes towards system sustaining behaviors was less convincing.

Endorsement models used to assess attitudes on authority sustaining behavior produced expected results concerning behaviors that were more social in nature (i.e., endorsements positive association with the willingness to resist a violent non-state actor). However, inconsistent associations were found with more individualist behavior (i.e., voting) suggesting that the impact of endorsement and the conditions which enhance its effects may be more applicable to attitudes and behaviors that are subject to social evaluation. As suggested by Horne (2009), the farther removed an individual is from the dependence of others, the more likely they will act according to personal rather than collective orientations. A more individualist act inherently separates the individual from the critique of others, hence diminishing the risk of sanctions. Therefore individual-level behaviors may be influenced to a greater degree by propriety even when situated within a context of social interdependence. The analysis presented in chapter 2 suggests that it

202 could be the social or individual nature of the act under consideration that dictates whether endorsement or propriety has the main influence over attitudes and behaviors towards the sustainment of an authority system. This brings to light additional considerations for authority systems theory when considering the conditions that make endorsement effects more or less likely.

The other relational level evaluated was the triad between state actors, violent non-state challengers, and the evaluating audience of the populace. This analysis found support concerning the implications of audience orientations towards non-state challengers on the evaluation of state security actions. Moreover, the analysis allowed the associations to vary based on diffuse to more specific forms of legitimacy while at the same time accounting for normative and performance-based elements. This approach permitted the simultaneous evaluation of relational conditions and their effects across different legitimacy types (see also Schoon et al. 2020). As stated previously, inconsistent results occurred between legitimacy dimensions concerning the association between state conflict and legitimacy while accounting for the moderating effect of rebel group orientation. For some models diffuse forms of legitimacy (i.e., national identity) resulted in a negative relationship with state conflict while specific elements (i.e., confidence in national government) revealed a positive association. Despite the cross-sectional nature of the data which calls into question causal inferences, the results offer interesting theoretical considerations. This outcome suggests a possible double-dilemma condition for governance actors to consider while making legitimacy claims. One contradiction involves the increase of legitimacy from a segment of the populace while losing legitimacy from another. For example, state-based violent acts against armed non-state organizations that result in delegitimation from rebel sympathizers and at the same time legitimation from rebel antagonists. The other dilemma

203 involves acts that may decrease legitimacy in one dimension while increasing it in another.

Though the diffuse-specific support approach accounts for legitimacy differences based on long- and short-term fluctuations, it assumes consistent directionality between the two extremes or at the very least an inconsequential association (e.g., a decrease in specific support for government officials, whilst no change for diffuse support concerning the broader governmental system).

Conflicting directionality amongst legitimacy dimensions may be a result of its application to areas of limited statehood where sources of legitimacy are typically more diverse than regions of consolidated statehood (Risse and Stollenwerk 2018). Moreover, the characterizing of diffuse legitimacy dimensions as more durable, lasting-bonds of national pride and identity may lack application to areas of limited statehood, such as in the Nigerian context where democratic regimes historically have represented transient attempts of governance. In such circumstances diffuse legitimacy dimensions towards the state may be as, or even more dynamic than specific forms of support. Diffuse support for such areas may also assume a more local characteristic connecting with durable ethnic or religious structures of governance rather than broader aspects of democratic principles (Tilly 2005, 2003).

A final theoretical implication concerns the importance of services within areas of limited statehood. A governing entity’s provision of services has been linked to what Suchman (1995) identifies as pragmatic or exchange legitimacy which accounts for self-interested calculations used to evaluate the appropriateness of authority actors. Some scholars criticize performance- based legitimacy recognizing it as a deficient and cursory account of support (Levi 2018).

However, the results found in chapter 4 support the importance of service provisions to state legitimacy relations especially when matched with the needs of the citizenry. The paring of services to needs in the Nigerian context offered significant associations with legitimacy

204 perceptions across the dimensional spectrum. It can be assumed that similar results would occur in comparable areas of limited statehood. Therefore, it behooves scholars to emphasize the importance of service provisions and its implications to legitimacy and virtuous cycles of governance (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018).

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

For the country of Nigeria, legitimacy perceptions remain more critical now than perhaps they have in the past. The country remains a promising yet troubled state. Despite an estimated

GDP growth of 2 percent in 2019 and steady developments in non-oil sectors (e.g., telecommunications and crop production), the country continues to be heavily reliant on oil exports which make up more than 90 percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange (Campbell 2020).

Inequality remains ubiquitous with more than 40 percent of the population living below the poverty line as identified by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statics (Poverty and Inequality 2019).

The relatively peaceful transition of power that occurred after the 2015 general elections was overshadowed by the insecurity that ensued during the 2019 elections resulting in the deaths of over 620 people (Widespread Violence 2019). Moreover, recent resurgences in terrorist activities by Boko Haram and other splinter cells such as the ISIL-aligned Islamic State West African

Province and the Shekau faction in the north, to include Fulani militias in the central states ranked Nigeria as the third highest country in the world to be impacted by terrorism (Global

Terrorism Index 2019). This comes at a time when human rights groups are exposing Nigerian security forces to include units of the civilian joint task force for past extrajudicial imprisonments and executions of individuals suspected to be involved with Boko Haram

(Military Detention 2019).

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There are three main regards that stem from the findings presented here that apply to the

Nigerian context as well as other countries with similar degrees of limited statehood. The first recognizes the importance of local legitimacy perceptions. The data shows that local orientations towards the state possess the power to propagate legitimacy norms that influence system sustaining attitudes. Additional attention to local representation should be a primary concern.

One area of great potential rest within the federally funded and managed Nigerian Police Force.

A recent public survey conducted by Nigeria’s Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability

Project revealed the country’s police force to be regarded as highly corrupt with 63 percent of the respondents expected to provide bribe money in order to receive security services (Nigeria Anti-

Corruption 2019). Similar sentiments were provided in the supplemental focus group interviews to the Gallup datasets:

Honestly, they are not doing any reasonable job. If you see police now, for instance, they only have one language, in fact, it is their song to sing N20 bribe. (Sokoto father, age 28)

On the police I have lost confidence in them long ago. (Kaduna employed male, age 25)

[Contacting the police] is a waste of time. They will even inflict more injury to what has already happened to you. Maybe the first time they are able to extort money out of you because the first thing they will ask you is for money for fuel. (Gombe unemployed male, age 26)

As frontline representatives of the state, Nigerian police forces possess the potential to legitimize government institutions at the local level. Such a ‘legitimacy investment’ could prove beneficial for countries like Nigeria who currently suffer nearly 3 percent of their GDP due to the impact of terrorist activity.

The second, involves the recognition of needs and expectations of the populace. This likely produces the biggest challenge to any governance actor operating in areas of limited statehood. Such expectations should at the very least be recognized and, if possible, addressed

206 through service provisions. As the analysis shows, the ability of governance actors to attend to the needs of their constituents associates positively with legitimacy returns. This at least was found in the security aspect within the data. Legitimacy is at risk when expectations are disregarded or when unwanted provisions are provided.

The final point centers on the relational implications that any governance actor must take into consideration when operating in a politically contentious environment. Governing entities should function with a strategic orientation to the larger social structure of relations within areas of limited statehood. Moreover, they should account for the embedded legitimacy properties within relations and evaluate how actions towards one sector of the populace could impact legitimacy relations with others.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

This chapter closes with a brief discussion on general limitations concerning the analysis followed by some final thoughts on future research directions. As with any project that uses secondary data sources, the analysis was restricted to the sample and variables developed with different intentions than my own. However, this was a minor issues as most variables of interest were present in the dataset. Other general limitations include restricted data from rural locations in the 2016 wave due to reported security risks. From the articles cited above, such areas were more likely to experience nefarious security practices by both Nigerian Military Forces and the

Civilian Joint Task Force. Such exposure would likely alter the results presented in this research concerning state legitimacy measurements. Another area of concern not addressed in the data was whether a respondent was currently displaced due to political violence. By 2017 over 1.9 million Nigerians were forcibly displaced from their homes (Connor and Krogstad 2018). While a survey item addressed if a respondent had ever been displaced due to violence, it did not

207 capture if the respondent was displaced at the time of recording. Finally, the survey was conducted via face to face interviews. Such data collection techniques could increase social desirability biases which likely impacted responses to more sensitive questions concerning orientations towards terrorist and other rebel groups. Despite these limitations, it is believed that the data provided an adequate array of survey items that allowed the main points of this project to be evaluated.

The final question to address is where the research goes from here. One reasonable point of departure would be to investigate how specific endorsement conditions change its effect on propriety and system sustaining attitudes and behaviors. For example, what are the implications to propriety when consensus is bimodal such that both positive and negative consensus exists?

Another logical direction would be to combine the approaches of chapters 3 and 4 assessing how violent political acts conducted within a system of social relations influences aspects of validity and how such changes influence individual-level propriety and future political actions. Another point for further investigation could evaluate how legitimacy, derived from performance-based sources, sustains or weakens over a longer period of time? Theory would suggests that they would eventually turn inconsequential however such influences may have longer lasting impacts when situated in areas of limited statehood where services may be highly desired and therefore offer more value to a given community. Another consideration is how needs and expectations of an audience change and how state or non-state shifts to new desires result in increases or decreases in legitimacy.

It is evident then that many questions concerning legitimacy dynamics still remain. The focus of this project has been one of relational considerations. It is highly probable that legitimacy will continue to be a prominent aspect of governance as suggested by philosophers,

208 political scientists, and sociologist. It is the hope of this author that this work has provided further clarification on the intricacies of legitimacy. If not for legitimacy in general, then that of the Nigerian context.

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APPENDIX A

Multiple Imputation

Rates of missing data can be observed in descriptive statistical tables 2.3 and B.1. Largest missing values stem from demographic questions concerning monthly income and perceptions towards armed non-state actors such as general survey items referencing terrorist or more specific groups such as Boko Haram. Missing values for such items were expected given their sensitive nature. Multiple imputation techniques were implemented to account for missingness in the data. This approach uses the distribution of observed data to estimate plausible values and develop a ‘complete’ data set. Multiple imputation was conducted on all data sets and included all independent and dependent variables identified within the models presented in the analysis.

All non-linear terms were created before imputation procedures and imputed as if they were ‘just another variable’ (Hippel 2009). Chained imputation was conducted in Stata v.15.1. Predictive mean matching was used due to the non-normal distribution of most variables within the data sets and to ensure values remained within the range of observations. This technique borrows an observed value form a donor with a similar predictive mean. Based on recommendations from

Morris and colleagues (2014), the sampling pool was set at 15 donors to mitigate biased results.

Data was imputed 10 to 20 times based on the specific data set used in the analysis. These numbers were based on White and colleagues (2011) who recommend preforming the number of imputations based on the survey items with the highest percentage of missing data. Kernel density plots revealed good approximation between observed and completed variables for all data sets.

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APPENDIX B

Table B.1 Descriptive Statistics – 2013 survey wave Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Endorsement Democratic principles 8574 .571 .495 0 1 Procedural fairness 8574 .149 .356 0 1 Economic effectiveness 8574 .171 .376 0 1 Security effectiveness 8574 .176 .381 0 1 Confidence in national leaders 8574 .191 .393 0 1 Confidence in local leaders 10353 .454 .498 0 1 Consensus Democratic principles 9931 .758 .428 0 1 Procedural fairness 9931 .916 .277 0 1 Economic effectiveness 9931 .87 .336 0 1 Security effectiveness 9931 .87 .337 0 1 Confidence in national leaders 9931 .866 .34 0 1 Confidence in local leaders 10456 .297 .457 0 1 Controls Gender 10482 .43 .495 0 1 (1 = female) Age 10482 30.46 11.066 16 65 Religion 10359 .577 .494 0 1 (1 = Muslim) Language 10482 .482 .5 0 1 (1 = English) Education 10357 4.58 1.981 1 9 Household income 7906 2.14 1.548 1 13 Employment status 9630 .479 .5 0 1 (1 = Employed) Media outlet you trust the most 10240 .321 .467 0 1 (1 = Federal Television) Voted in last election 10482 .754 .431 0 1 (1 = Yes) Acceptance of neighbor - ethnicity 10303 .85 .357 0 1 Acceptance of neighbor - religion 10310 .815 .389 0 1 Government access - national 10105 .661 .473 0 1 Government access - local 10105 .435 .496 0 1 Feel safe where you live 10417 3.33 .776 1 4 My future in Nigeria is bright 10248 3.174 .824 1 4

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Table B.2 Descriptive Statistics – 2016 survey wave Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Intend to vote in next election 11138 .912 .283 0 1 Community’s willingness to standup to 9257 2.578 1.136 1 4 terrorism Endorsement National identity 11475 .488 .5 0 1 Procedural fairness 10423 .175 .38 0 1 Economic effectiveness 10423 .292 .455 0 1 Security effectiveness 10423 .275 .447 0 1 Confidence in national leaders 10423 .313 .464 0 1 Confidence in local leaders 10423 .282 .45 0 1 Consensus Procedural fairness 11506 .757 .429 0 1 Economic effectiveness 11506 .738 .44 0 1 Security effectiveness 11506 .734 .442 0 1 Confidence in national leaders 11506 .783 .412 0 1 Confidence in local leaders 11506 .751 .433 0 1 Controls Gender 11681 .49 .5 0 1 (1 = female) Age 11581 32.10 11.12 16 65 Religion 11637 .68 .468 0 1 (1 = Muslim) Language 11681 .65 .48 0 1 (1 = English) Education 11493 4.16 2.34 1 9 Household income 8686 1.87 1.67 0 13 Employment status 11160 .40 .49 0 1 (1 = Employed) Media Trust 11302 .35 .48 0 1 (1 = Federal Television) Voted in last election 11599 .79 .41 0 1 (1 = Yes) Acceptance of neighbor - ethnicity 11430 4.76 1.11 1 6 Acceptance of neighbor - religion 11413 4.72 1.13 1 6 Government access - national 11681 .50 .5 0 1 Government access - local 11670 .43 .494 0 1 Feel safe where you live 11568 4.76 1.13 1 6 My future in Nigeria is bright 11346 4.948 1.059 1 6

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APPENDIX C Table C.1 Hierarchical Linear Model on Dimensions of Legitimacy (2016 Dataset) – Full Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Conf. in Conf. in National Democrat Procedura Economic Security Local Nat. Gov. Identity ic l Fairness Effectiveness Effectiveness Gov. Ldrs Ldrs Gender (1 = female) -0.008 0.001 -0.011 0.004 -0.006 -0.026+ 0.023 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) Age 0.000 0.001* 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.002** 0.001 0.000 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Religion (1 = Muslim) -0.012 0.012 -0.037 -0.029 0.007 -0.024 -0.023 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) Language (1=English) 0.021 0.019 0.011 0.070* 0.056* 0.018 0.004 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) Educational Attainment 0.014*** 0.010* -0.007 0.000 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Monthly Household Income -0.007 -0.024*** 0.013* 0.022** 0.023*** 0.029*** 0.027** (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Employment (1 = employed) 0.034 -0.007 -0.008 -0.024 -0.016 0.027 0.000 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) Trust nationally owned media -0.004 -0.026 0.021 -0.025 -0.047* 0.054 -0.013 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) Voted in last election (1 = yes) 0.005 0.012 0.015 -0.006 -0.002 -0.020 -0.038 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) Accept different ethnic 0.006 0.104** -0.024 -0.013 -0.021 0.046 -0.009 neighbor (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) Accept different relig. neighbor 0.033* 0.085* 0.005 -0.024 -0.027 0.071+ 0.045 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) EPR category (1 = sr./jr. 0.008 -0.007 -0.017 -0.023 -0.016 -0.032 -0.037 partner) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) Local government ethnic access 0.030* 0.032 -0.032 -0.042 -0.057* -0.049+ -0.053 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) Feel safe in community 0.006 -0.044* 0.054** 0.029 0.038* 0.063** 0.044 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) Community Endorsement 0.518*** 0.602*** 0.552*** 0.678*** 0.573*** 0.462*** 0.717*** (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) Community consensus -0.197*** 0.016 0.056 0.052+ 0.067 -0.347*** (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) Comm. Endorsement x 0.262*** 0.194+ 0.334* 0.201* 0.285** 0.607*** Consensus (0.05) (0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) Constant 0.191** -0.409*** -0.276* -0.328** -0.318*** -0.511*** -0.448** (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) Null Model Within- / between-state 0.21 / 0.39 / 0.41 / 0.76 / variance 0.05 0.11 0.47 / 0.17 0.47 / 0.17 0.34 / 0.13 0.18 0.29 Intraclass Correlation 18% 21% 27% 27% 28% 31% 27% Full Model Within-state variance 0.15 / 0.25 / 0.33 / 0.59 / 0.01 0.03 0.21 / 0.07 0.36 / 0.10 0.27 / 0.08 0.11 0.10 Intraclass Correlation 6% 11% 25% 22% 23% 25% 14% N 10482 10482 10482 10482 10482 10482 10482

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Table C.2 Hierarchical Linear Model on Dimensions of Legitimacy (2016 Dataset) – Full Model (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Conf. in Conf. in National Procedural Economic Security Nat. Gov. Local Identity Fairness Effectiveness Effectiveness Ldrs Gov. Ldrs Gender (1 = female) -0.032** 0.079** 0.007 -0.052 -0.037 -0.006 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) Age -0.001+ -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Religion (1 = Muslim) -0.003 0.054 -0.022 -0.027 0.046 0.051+ (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) Language (1=English) 0.001 -0.140+ -0.047 -0.093 -0.054 -0.034 (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) Educational Attainment 0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.006 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) Monthly Household Income -0.008 0.016+ 0.016 0.018 0.005 0.001 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Employment (1 = employed) 0.015 0.017 -0.024 0.010 -0.015 -0.034 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) Trust nationally owned media 0.009 0.018 0.013 -0.053* -0.001 0.024 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) Voted in last election (1 = yes) -0.011 0.106** 0.110* 0.115** 0.094* 0.075* (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) Accept different ethnic neighbor 0.038** 0.021 0.007 0.049* 0.048* 0.023 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Accept different relig. neighbor 0.003 0.074*** 0.046+ 0.048* 0.060** 0.066** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) EPR category (1 = sr./jr. partner) -0.015 0.013 0.057 0.024 0.056+ 0.049 (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Local government ethnic access 0.006 -0.030 0.005 0.001 0.029 0.052+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Feel safe in community -0.023 0.047** 0.023 0.042* 0.044* 0.041+ (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Community Endorsement 0.371*** 0.296** 0.007 0.065 0.317* 0.280** (0.06) (0.11) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12) (0.09) Community consensus 0.052 -0.138+ -0.104+ -0.004 -0.056 (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) Comm. Endorsement x Consensus 0.354** 0.676*** 0.564*** 0.175 0.340** (0.10) (0.18) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) Constant 0.335** -0.915*** -0.428 -0.644* -0.940*** -0.817** (0.12) (0.17) (0.31) (0.26) (0.23) (0.24) Null Model Within- / between-state variance 0.52 / 0.56 / 0.2 / 0.06 0.5 / 0.2 0.58 / 0.25 0.55 / 0.24 0.25 0.25 Intraclass Correlation 22% 28% 30% 31% 33% 31% Full Model Within-state variance 0.45 / 0.48 / 0.17 / 0.02 0.43 / 0.15 0.51 / 0.17 0.48 / 0.17 0.17 0.17 Intraclass Correlation 8% 26% 25% 27% 27% 25% N 11681 11681 11681 11681 11681 11681

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Table C.3 Hierarchical Linear Model on Community’s Willingness to Resist (2016 Dataset) – Full Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Confidence Confidence Economic Security National Procedural in National in Local Effectivenes Effectivenes Identity Fairness Gov. Gov. s s Leaders Leaders Gender (1 = female) -0.041 -0.039 -0.041 -0.036 -0.040 -0.041 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Religion (1 = Muslim) 0.028 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.017 0.025 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) Language (1=English) 0.123 0.135 0.125 0.130 0.126 0.119 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) Educational Attainment -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Monthly Household Income -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Employment (1 = employed) 0.039 0.040 0.033 0.034 0.039 0.034 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Trust nationally owned media -0.092* -0.106* -0.096* -0.092* -0.095* -0.096* (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Voted in last election (1 = yes) -0.021 -0.030 -0.015 -0.035 -0.032 -0.024 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) Accept different ethnic neighbor 0.015 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.012 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Accept different relig. neighbor -0.022 -0.023 -0.021 -0.027 -0.026 -0.021 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) EPR category (1 = sr./jr. partner) -0.112* -0.100* -0.108* -0.114* -0.114* -0.105* (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Local government ethnic access -0.039 -0.033 -0.038 -0.038 -0.035 -0.037 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Feel safe in community 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.018 0.019 0.023 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Propriety -0.033 0.032 -0.076 0.091 0.073 -0.017 (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) Endorsement -0.104 -1.108** 1.112* 0.884* -0.454 -0.273 (0.22) (0.40) (0.46) (0.40) (0.29) (0.27) Consensus 0.465* 0.036 0.061 -0.045 -0.296 -0.127 (0.22) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.20) Community trust 0.121 0.474* 0.603** 0.383 -0.039 0.241 (0.31) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) Endorsement x consensus 0.119 -1.237** -1.385** -0.016 -0.014 (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.35) (0.41) Endorsement x comm. trust 1.407** -1.196* -1.023* 0.747* 0.343 (0.44) (0.57) (0.44) (0.32) (0.31) Consensus x comm. trust -0.137 -0.103 0.103 0.502* 0.257 (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) Endorsement x consensus x 2.124*** -0.141 1.522** 1.622*** -0.149 0.055 comm. trust (0.27) (0.44) (0.47) (0.43) (0.39) (0.47) Constant 2.124*** 2.160*** 1.968*** 2.204*** 2.491*** 2.210*** (0.27) (0.23) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) Null Model Within- / between-state variance 1.08 / 0.32 1.09 / 0.31 1.09 / 0.32 1.08 / 0.29 1.08 / 0.3 1.09 / 0.31 Intraclass Correlation 23% 22% 23% 21% 22% 22% Full Model Within-state variance 1.07 / 0.29 1.06 / 0.28 1.07 / 0.28 1.06 / 0.26 1.06 / 0.28 1.07 / 0.3 Intraclass Correlation 21% 21% 21% 20% 21% 22% N 11681 11681 11681 11681 11681 11681

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Table C.4 Hierarchical Linear Model on Community’s Intent to vote (2016 Dataset) – Full Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Confidence Confidence Economic Security National Procedural in National in Local Effectivenes Effectivenes Identity Fairness Gov. Gov. s s Leaders Leaders Gender (1 = female) -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.045*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Religion (1 = Muslim) 0.018 0.017 0.020+ 0.019+ 0.018 0.018 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Language (1=English) 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.006 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Educational Attainment 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Monthly Household Income -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Employment (1 = employed) -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Trust nationally owned media -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Voted in last election (1 = yes) 0.295*** 0.292*** 0.291*** 0.290*** 0.291*** 0.293*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Accept different ethnic neighbor 0.009** 0.009* 0.009** 0.008* 0.009* 0.010** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Accept different relig. neighbor 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) EPR category (1 = sr./jr. partner) -0.015 -0.015 -0.017+ -0.016+ -0.016+ -0.016+ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Local government ethnic access 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Feel safe in community 0.012* 0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Propriety 0.005 0.021** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.017** 0.008 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Community orientation 0.054 0.041 0.119 0.104 0.225* 0.163* (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) Community consensus 0.103+ 0.041 0.121** 0.082* 0.167** 0.143** (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) Community trust -0.057 0.112* 0.173** 0.133** 0.230** 0.206** (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) Community orientation x consensus -0.028 -0.130 -0.122 -0.291** -0.228** (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) Community orientation x trust -0.042 -0.129 -0.103 -0.254* -0.180* (0.11) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) Community consensus x trust -0.050 -0.136*** -0.095** -0.201** -0.167** (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) Community orientation x consensus x trust 0.020 0.142 0.127 0.321** 0.241** (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) Constant 0.545*** 0.562*** 0.503*** 0.547*** 0.464*** 0.470*** (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) Null Model Within- / between-state variance 0.08 / 0.01 0.8 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 0.08 / 0.01 Intraclass Correlation 8% 8% 9% 8% 7% 8% Full Model Within-state variance 0.07 / 0.01 0.07 / 0.01 0.07 / 0.001 0.07 / 0.001 0.07 / 0.001 0.07 / 0.001 Intraclass Correlation 5% 5% 6% 5% 4% 5% N 11681 11681 11681 11681 11681 11681

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Table C.5 Legitimacy of State Residents in Low-, Medium-, and High-State Conflict, 2013 Wave Low Medium High All National Identity 0.64 0.50 0.61 0.58 (.48) (.50) (.49) (.49) Procedural 3.00 2.98 2.25 2.77 Fairness (1.73) (1.67) (1.51) (1.68) Economic 2.81 2.98 2.51 2.77 Effectiveness (1.72) (1.65) (1.50) (1.65) Security 3.31 3.87 3.39 3.51 Effectiveness (1.52) (1.49) (3.31) (1.46) Confidence in 3.71 3.85 3.86 3.50 National Leaders (1.83) (1.60) (1.61) (1.75) Confidence in 3.34 3.61 2.91 3.30 Local Leaders (1.68) (1.52) (1.54) (1.61) Note. – Standard deviations are in parentheses. There are 12 states in the ‘low’ group: Bayelsa, Benue, Ebonyi, Jigawa, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Ondo, Oyo, Sokoto, Taraba, Zamfara; 11 states the ‘medium’ group: Bauchi, Cross River, Enugu, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Nassarawa, Ogun, Osun, Plateau; and 11 states in the ‘high’ group: Abia, Adamawa, Borno, Delta, Ekiti, FCT, Imo, Kebbi, Lagos, Rivers, and Yobe.

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Table C.6 Impact of Security Needs, Perceptions towards Terrorist, and State-based Violence on Legitimacy – Full Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Confidence Confidence National Procedural Economic Security in National in Local Identity Fairness Effectiveness Effectiveness Gov. Gov. Leaders Leaders τ -0.572+ 1.970* 2.100+ 1.508 3.696*** 2.350** (0.31) (0.90) (1.12) (1.02) (0.83) (0.76) τ × State Voted for President 0.050 -0.118 0.487* 0.031 -0.229 -0.597*** (0.08) (0.15) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19) (0.15) τ × Human development Index 0.503 -1.722 -1.798 0.944 -2.863* -1.714+ (0.39) (1.27) (1.35) (1.42) (1.13) (0.96) τ × Total violent events 0.000 -0.003+ -0.003+ -0.006** -0.007*** -0.005** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × State conflict % 0.045*** 0.022 -0.033+ -0.137** -0.022 -0.047** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) τ × Security need 2013 0.005 -0.106*** -0.023 -0.038 -0.197*** -0.141*** (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) τ × State conflict % × Security need 2013 -0.001 0.008*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.011*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × Support rebels 2013 0.107 -0.186 -0.389+ -0.234 -0.253 -0.040 (0.08) (0.24) (0.22) (0.29) (0.22) (0.20) τ × State conflict % × Support rebels -0.015*** -0.029** 0.010 0.026 -0.025** -0.009 2013 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) State of residence dummies y y y y y y Individual-level covariates × τ y y y y y y Constant 0.061 1.715*** 2.720*** 4.546*** 3.748*** 3.715*** (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.44) (0.47) (0.38) R2 0.13 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.31 0.23 N 21956 21956 21956 21956 21956 21956

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Table C.7 Impact of Security Needs, Perceptions towards Boko Haram, and State-based Violence on Legitimacy – Full Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Confidence Confidence National Procedural Economic Security in National in Local Identity Fairness Effectiveness Effectiveness Gov. Gov. Leaders Leaders τ -0.638* 2.922*** 2.995*** 0.267 3.101*** 2.627** (0.25) (0.41) (0.68) (1.02) (0.76) (0.75) τ × State Voted for President 0.025 -0.279+ 0.557* -0.054 -0.250 -0.536** (0.08) (0.16) (0.21) (0.25) (0.22) (0.18) τ × Human development Index 0.486 -2.438*** -2.402* 1.913 -2.056+ -1.679+ (0.33) (0.65) (0.93) (1.71) (1.11) (0.95) τ × Total violent events 0.001* -0.002+ -0.002 -0.007** -0.007*** -0.004* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × State conflict % 0.062*** -0.009 -0.077** -0.103* -0.030 -0.072** (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) τ × Security need 2013 0.017+ -0.098*** -0.038 -0.068* -0.196*** -0.140*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) τ × State conflict % × Security need 2013 -0.002*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.011*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) τ × Support rebels 2013 0.077 -0.339** -0.594** 0.043 -0.106 -0.110 (0.05) (0.10) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) τ × State conflict % × Support rebels -0.014*** -0.015** 0.021* 0.004 -0.019+ 0.001 2013 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) State of residence dummies y y y y y y Individual-level covariates × τ y y y y y y Constant 0.140+ 2.673*** 3.210*** 4.084*** 3.522*** 3.846*** (0.07) (0.20) (0.26) (0.28) (0.22) (0.21) R2 N 19888 19888 19888 19888 19888 19888

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Table C.8 Ordinary Least Squares Regression on Legitimacy Orientations – Full Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) South North South North National Identity Procedural Fairness Zaria event -0.128 -0.126 -0.037 -0.050 0.385+ 0.224 -0.178** -0.116* (0.10) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.21) (0.06) (0.06) Female -0.022 -0.025 0.046 0.127*** (0.08) (0.02) (0.17) (0.04) Muslim 0.172* -0.032 -0.001 0.028 (0.07) (0.03) (0.27) (0.05) Age -0.009** -0.001 0.004 -0.002 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) English -0.122 -0.017 -0.033 -0.512*** (0.20) (0.03) (0.43) (0.04) Education -0.039+ 0.016** 0.008 0.027** (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) Employment 0.111 -0.021 -0.107 0.155*** (0.08) (0.02) (0.21) (0.03) Household Income -0.016 -0.017 0.023 0.019 (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) Voted in last election -0.007 -0.018 0.481* 0.110* (0.09) (0.03) (0.20) (0.05) Trust Federal News Outlet 0.077 0.164*** -0.323 0.170** (0.07) (0.03) (0.22) (0.05) Feeling of Security 0.010 -0.071*** 0.037 0.062*** (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) Nat. Gov. Access -0.799*** -0.100*** 0.338 0.021 (0.10) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) Local Gov. Access 0.193* -0.079** -0.239 0.038 (0.09) (0.03) (0.19) (0.04) Ethnicity Acceptance 0.059* 0.038*** 0.000 (0.03) (0.01) (.) Optimistic Outlook 0.027 0.065*** -0.207** 0.081*** (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) Constant 0.782*** 0.750* 0.553*** 0.483*** 0.101 0.052** (0.04) (0.33) (0.01) (0.09) (0.07) (0.02) R2 .02 .28 .01 .12 .03 .27 .01 .17 N 140 140 2028 2028 140 140 2028 2028

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Table C.8 (Continued) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) South North South North Economic Effectiveness Security Effectiveness b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se Zaria event 0.354 0.241 -0.131* -0.089 0.350 0.259 -0.195*** -0.144** (0.23) (0.24) (0.06) (0.06) (0.23) (0.22) (0.06) (0.05) Female -0.054 -0.011 -0.118 -0.066+ (0.17) (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) Muslim 0.079 -0.076 0.291 0.008 (0.25) (0.06) (0.25) (0.05) Age 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004* (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) English 0.241 -0.482*** 0.376 -0.499*** (0.40) (0.04) (0.38) (0.04) Education 0.014 0.011 0.018 0.012 (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) Employment -0.121 -0.056 -0.130 -0.054 (0.21) (0.04) (0.22) (0.04) Household Income 0.049 0.016 0.110 0.043* (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) Voted in last election 0.339+ 0.127* 0.464* 0.154** (0.20) (0.05) (0.21) (0.05) Trust Federal News Outlet -0.155 0.184*** -0.044 0.059 (0.20) (0.05) (0.19) (0.05) Feeling of Security 0.041 0.067*** 0.050 0.079*** (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) Nat. Gov. Access 0.159 0.016 -0.441 -0.094* (0.28) (0.05) (0.27) (0.04) Local Gov. Access -0.025 0.089* 0.043 0.108* (0.20) (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) Ethnicity Acceptance -0.262*** 0.075*** 0.000 (0.07) (0.02) (.) Optimistic Outlook 0.171* 0.031 -0.260*** 0.120*** (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) Constant -0.588*** -0.994 0.149*** -0.641*** 0.196** 0.074** (0.10) (0.71) (0.02) (0.19) (0.07) (0.02) R2 .02 .29 .01 .10 .02 0.34 .01 .16 N 140 140 2028 2028 140 140 2028 2028

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Table C.8 (Continued) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) South North South North Confidence in National Leaders Confident in Local Leaders Zaria event 0.220 0.023 -0.385*** -0.308*** 0.257 0.007 -0.376*** -0.294*** (0.22) (0.23) (0.06) (0.05) (0.22) (0.22) (0.06) (0.05) Female -0.098 -0.062+ -0.044 -0.017 (0.17) (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) Muslim 0.076 0.119** -0.021 0.060 (0.24) (0.05) (0.25) (0.05) Age 0.003 -0.009*** 0.008 -0.010*** (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) English 0.036 -0.438*** -0.085 -0.430*** (0.51) (0.04) (0.53) (0.04) Education 0.042 0.026** 0.038 0.015 (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) Employment -0.166 0.069* -0.135 0.097** (0.20) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) Household Income 0.011 0.020 -0.018 0.010 (0.07) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) Voted in last election 0.436+ 0.213*** 0.342 0.213*** (0.23) (0.05) (0.22) (0.05) Trust Federal News Outlet -0.095 0.066 -0.177 0.118** (0.22) (0.04) (0.21) (0.04) Feeling of Security 0.110+ 0.070*** 0.095 0.062*** (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) Nat. Gov. Access 0.301 -0.164*** 0.349 -0.065 (0.25) (0.04) (0.25) (0.05) Local Gov. Access -0.324 0.073* -0.445* 0.069+ (0.20) (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) Ethnicity Acceptance -0.246*** 0.161*** -0.257*** 0.139*** (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) Optimistic Outlook 0.123 -0.018 0.109 -0.068** (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) Constant -0.637*** -0.852 0.137*** -0.749*** -0.620*** -0.470 0.132*** -0.359* (0.10) (0.71) (0.02) (0.15) (0.10) (0.75) (0.02) (0.16) .01 .30 .02 .19 .01 .29 .02 .16 N 140 140 2028 2028 140 140 2028 2028 Note. – Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors. All column estimates are from separate OLS regression models restricted to north and south samples respectively within the period of interest. ‘Zaria event’ indicates if an individual provided responses after 15 December. Row below coefficients provides number of observations pre/post attack. A test of coefficient differences between regions resulted in significant results at the p < 0.05 level with the exception of national identity which failed to reach significance. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

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Table C.9 Ordered Logistic Regression on Security Orientations Before and After the Zaria Massacre. (1) (2) (3) (4) South North South North Effectiveness to Provide Security Effectiveness to Reduce Terrorism Zaria event 0.670** 1.740 0.879 2.268+ [0.53,0.85] [0.77,3.95] [0.67,1.16] [1.00,5.15] Female 0.952 0.711 1.118 0.816 [0.80,1.13] [0.36,1.39] [0.93,1.34] [0.37,1.79] Muslim 1.360* 1.919 1.089 1.623 [1.06,1.74] [0.64,5.76] [0.85,1.39] [0.71,3.72] Age 0.984*** 0.996 0.997 1.003 [0.98,0.99] [0.96,1.03] [0.99,1.00] [0.97,1.03] English 0.285*** 2.595 0.352*** 0.436 [0.24,0.34] [0.56,11.99] [0.29,0.43] [0.01,12.98] Education 1.038+ 0.988 1.061* 1.161 [0.99,1.08] [0.78,1.26] [1.01,1.11] [0.88,1.54] Employment 1.023 0.815 1.252* 0.478+ [0.86,1.22] [0.35,1.90] [1.04,1.50] [0.21,1.10] Household Income 1.103* 1.290 0.902* 1.111 [1.02,1.20] [0.93,1.78] [0.83,0.98] [0.85,1.45] Voted in last election 1.472** 2.178+ 1.204 1.081 [1.16,1.86] [0.88,5.41] [0.95,1.52] [0.42,2.79] Trust Federal News Outlet 0.750** 0.918 0.568*** 0.735 [0.62,0.91] [0.42,2.02] [0.46,0.70] [0.35,1.55] Feeling of Security 1.251*** 1.135 1.401*** 1.373* [1.14,1.37] [0.89,1.45] [1.28,1.53] [1.06,1.77] Nat. Gov. Access 0.820+ 0.192* 0.716** 3.544* [0.67,1.01] [0.05,0.69] [0.58,0.88] [1.16,10.85] Local Gov. Access 1.859*** 1.297 0.986 0.720 [1.54,2.24] [0.62,2.70] [0.80,1.21] [0.31,1.69] Ethnicity Acceptance 1.500*** 0.564*** 1.213*** 0.822 [1.38,1.63] [0.41,0.77] [1.12,1.31] [0.63,1.07] Optimistic Outlook 1.104+ 1.573* 1.323*** 1.445* [0.99,1.23] [1.12,2.22] [1.20,1.46] [1.06,1.97] / cut1 0.735 2.277 0.841 1.069 [0.32,1.67] [0.13,40.58] [0.40,1.77] [0.02,56.75] cut2 2.897** 6.051 2.823** 3.116 [1.30,6.45] [0.36,102.28] [1.34,5.94] [0.06,158.81] cut3 8.968*** 16.043+ 6.115*** 7.165 [3.98,20.19] [0.98,263.64] [2.90,12.89] [0.14,362.98] cut4 32.499*** 29.482* 18.057*** 17.723 [14.29,73.92] [1.75,495.59] [8.45,38.60] [0.35,889.95] cut5 136.560*** 85.307** 104.059*** 124.279* [59.43,313.81] [4.75,1530.49] [47.79,226.59] [2.52,6129.03]

N 2028 140 2028 140

223

Table C.9 (Continued)

(5) (6) South North Confidence in Confidence in Military Leaders Military Leaders Zaria event 0.615*** 0.789 [0.47,0.81] [0.33,1.87] Female 0.832* 0.921 [0.70,1.00] [0.45,1.88] Muslim 1.321* 1.884 [1.04,1.67] [0.71,5.03] Age 0.979*** 0.991 [0.97,0.99] [0.96,1.02] English 0.552*** 1.421 [0.46,0.67] [0.34,6.01] Education 1.051* 1.026 [1.01,1.10] [0.82,1.29] Employment 1.235* 0.886 [1.03,1.49] [0.35,2.22] Household Income 1.041 1.151 [0.97,1.12] [0.85,1.56] Voted in last election 1.179 1.718 [0.92,1.51] [0.74,4.01] Trust Federal News Outlet 1.317** 0.842 [1.07,1.62] [0.32,2.22] Feeling of Security 1.047 1.253+ [0.97,1.13] [0.99,1.59] Nat. Gov. Access 0.624*** 0.738 [0.50,0.78] [0.22,2.43] Local Gov. Access 0.827* 1.121 [0.69,0.99] [0.52,2.43] Ethnicity Acceptance 1.574*** 0.628** [1.46,1.70] [0.46,0.86] Optimistic Outlook 0.936 1.446* [0.84,1.04] [1.05,1.99] / cut1 0.128*** 1.085 [0.06,0.27] [0.10,12.11] cut2 0.326** 1.667 [0.15,0.69] [0.15,18.13] cut3 0.773 2.546 [0.36,1.67] [0.24,27.31] cut4 2.428* 4.717 [1.12,5.28] [0.44,50.32] cut5 11.219*** 15.468* [5.12,24.58] [1.39,172.33] N 2028 140 Note. – Effects are reported as odds ratios (two-tailed tests). Confidence intervals (95%) in brackets. All column estimates are from separate ordered logistic regressions restricted to north and south samples respectively within the period of interest. ‘Zaria event’ indicates if an individual provided responses after 15 December. Row underneath coefficients provides number of observations. A test of coefficient differences between regions resulted in significant results at the p < 0.05 level for each survey item with the exception of confidence in military leaders which failed to reach significance. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

224

Figure C.1 Ordered Logistic Regression – State Security Effectiveness

225

Table C.10 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression on Security Orientations – Full Model Government Effectiveness at Providing Security Response (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Zaria event 0.843 1.195 0.767 0.539*** 0.476** [0.41,1.75] [0.75,1.91] [0.55,1.07] [0.38,0.76] [0.28,0.80] Female 0.682 0.717* 0.991 0.990 0.867 [0.38,1.21] [0.52,0.98] [0.79,1.24] [0.81,1.22] [0.67,1.12] Muslim 1.515 1.227 1.417* 1.550** 1.524* [0.65,3.55] [0.82,1.84] [1.03,1.94] [1.15,2.10] [1.03,2.26] Age 0.976* 0.978** 0.985** 0.984** 0.990+ [0.95,1.00] [0.96,0.99] [0.97,1.00] [0.97,0.99] [0.98,1.00] English 0.700 0.445*** 0.354*** 0.226*** 0.138*** [0.40,1.21] [0.33,0.61] [0.28,0.45] [0.18,0.29] [0.10,0.20] Education 0.939 0.946 1.015 1.077** 1.055 [0.83,1.06] [0.87,1.02] [0.96,1.07] [1.02,1.14] [0.99,1.13] Employment 0.974 1.184 1.403** 1.059 0.608** [0.53,1.78] [0.86,1.63] [1.10,1.78] [0.86,1.31] [0.45,0.82] Household Income 1.127 1.158* 1.191** 1.147* 1.015 [0.86,1.48] [1.01,1.33] [1.06,1.34] [1.03,1.28] [0.89,1.16] Voted in last election 1.800+ 1.691** 1.679*** 1.257+ 1.246 [0.93,3.48] [1.17,2.45] [1.28,2.20] [0.96,1.65] [0.90,1.72] Trust Federal News Outlet 0.749 0.813 0.839 0.773+ 0.723* [0.38,1.49] [0.57,1.16] [0.66,1.07] [0.59,1.01] [0.53,0.98] Feeling of Security 1.156 1.343*** 1.279*** 1.176*** 1.262** [0.87,1.53] [1.16,1.55] [1.15,1.42] [1.07,1.29] [1.10,1.45] Nat. Gov. Access 1.253 0.969 0.816 0.610*** 1.239 [0.53,2.97] [0.66,1.43] [0.62,1.08] [0.47,0.79] [0.92,1.67] Local Gov. Access 0.954 1.470* 1.504*** 2.056*** 2.071*** [0.51,1.80] [1.03,2.10] [1.19,1.91] [1.66,2.55] [1.60,2.68] Ethnicity Acceptance 1.602*** 1.672*** 1.517*** 1.425*** 1.388*** [1.32,1.94] [1.48,1.89] [1.37,1.68] [1.29,1.58] [1.22,1.58] Optimistic Outlook 1.119 0.969 1.065 1.205** 1.090 [0.87,1.44] [0.82,1.15] [0.93,1.22] [1.07,1.36] [0.94,1.26]

Government effectiveness at reducing Terrorism Zaria event 0.631 1.055 1.139 0.908 0.767 [0.27,1.49] [0.60,1.86] [0.74,1.75] [0.64,1.28] [0.51,1.16] Female 0.783 0.789 0.949 1.222+ 1.051 [0.44,1.39] [0.54,1.15] [0.72,1.25] [0.99,1.51] [0.83,1.32] Muslim 0.929 1.084 1.090 1.171 1.118 [0.35,2.50] [0.60,1.95] [0.70,1.71] [0.85,1.61] [0.79,1.57] Age 0.987 0.993 0.995 0.993 1.001 [0.97,1.01] [0.98,1.01] [0.98,1.01] [0.98,1.00] [0.99,1.01] English 0.449+ 0.307*** 0.395*** 0.313*** 0.370*** [0.20,1.00] [0.20,0.47] [0.29,0.53] [0.25,0.40] [0.28,0.49] Education 0.900 1.013 1.022 1.074* 1.053+ [0.74,1.10] [0.93,1.11] [0.96,1.09] [1.01,1.14] [0.99,1.12] Employment 1.296 1.666** 1.452** 1.522*** 0.968 [0.72,2.33] [1.17,2.37] [1.11,1.89] [1.22,1.90] [0.75,1.25] Household Income 0.941 0.918 0.921 0.936 0.888+ [0.69,1.28] [0.79,1.07] [0.83,1.02] [0.85,1.03] [0.78,1.01] Voted in last election 1.851+ 1.677* 1.263 1.251 1.144 [0.93,3.70] [1.12,2.52] [0.92,1.73] [0.96,1.64] [0.84,1.56] Trust Federal News Outlet 0.726 0.607** 0.470*** 0.535*** 0.702* [0.40,1.33] [0.42,0.88] [0.35,0.63] [0.42,0.69] [0.53,0.92] Feeling of Security 1.127 1.267** 1.304*** 1.351*** 1.726*** [0.86,1.47] [1.06,1.51] [1.15,1.47] [1.21,1.50] [1.46,2.04] Nat. Gov. Access 0.332+ 0.365*** 0.559** 0.539*** 1.053 [0.11,1.03] [0.20,0.65] [0.38,0.82] [0.41,0.70] [0.81,1.38] Local Gov. Access 0.885 0.976 0.675** 0.987 1.185 [0.44,1.77] [0.68,1.40] [0.51,0.90] [0.78,1.24] [0.92,1.52] Ethnicity Acceptance 1.109 1.163* 1.155* 1.207*** 1.356*** [0.88,1.40] [1.01,1.34] [1.03,1.30] [1.10,1.32] [1.21,1.52] Optimistic Outlook 1.126 1.202* 1.278*** 1.267*** 1.661*** [0.86,1.48] [1.02,1.42] [1.12,1.46] [1.12,1.43] [1.38,2.00] N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 Pre / Post 1848/180 1848/180 1848/180 Pre / Post 1848/180

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Table C.10 (Continued) Confident in Military Leaders Response (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Zaria event 0.344* 0.773 0.615* 0.542*** 0.634* [0.14,0.87] [0.47,1.26] [0.42,0.90] [0.40,0.74] [0.42,0.95] Female 0.724 0.724+ 0.760* 0.886 0.860 [0.37,1.41] [0.51,1.04] [0.58,0.99] [0.72,1.09] [0.69,1.07] Muslim 0.781 0.777 1.110 1.318+ 1.637** [0.24,2.53] [0.46,1.32] [0.79,1.56] [0.99,1.76] [1.19,2.25] Age 0.954*** 0.967*** 0.971*** 0.983*** 0.986** [0.93,0.98] [0.95,0.98] [0.96,0.98] [0.97,0.99] [0.98,1.00] English 0.597 0.498*** 0.439*** 0.610*** 0.603*** [0.21,1.69] [0.33,0.75] [0.33,0.59] [0.49,0.76] [0.48,0.76] Education 1.072 1.071 1.036 1.072* 1.036 [0.90,1.28] [0.97,1.18] [0.97,1.11] [1.02,1.13] [0.98,1.10] Employment 1.003 1.231 1.693*** 1.446** 0.980 [0.50,1.99] [0.82,1.84] [1.25,2.29] [1.15,1.81] [0.77,1.24] Household Income 0.923 1.114 1.150* 1.060 1.001 [0.64,1.33] [0.97,1.28] [1.01,1.31] [0.96,1.17] [0.90,1.11] Voted in last election 1.986+ 1.465+ 1.570** 1.045 1.044 [0.99,3.98] [0.96,2.24] [1.15,2.14] [0.80,1.37] [0.78,1.40] Trust Federal News Outlet 0.640 0.969 1.298 1.375** 1.355* [0.24,1.68] [0.63,1.50] [0.92,1.83] [1.09,1.74] [1.07,1.72] Feeling of Security 0.768 0.841+ 1.013 1.101* 1.107* [0.56,1.05] [0.69,1.03] [0.89,1.15] [1.00,1.21] [1.00,1.22] Nat. Gov. Access 0.362+ 0.520** 0.808 0.623*** 0.559*** [0.12,1.12] [0.32,0.85] [0.58,1.12] [0.48,0.81] [0.43,0.73] Local Gov. Access 2.080+ 1.393+ 0.803 0.909 0.668*** [0.99,4.38] [0.95,2.03] [0.60,1.08] [0.73,1.13] [0.53,0.85] Ethnicity Acceptance 1.612*** 1.738*** 1.730*** 1.540*** 1.571*** [1.28,2.04] [1.50,2.01] [1.55,1.93] [1.40,1.69] [1.40,1.76] Optimistic Outlook 1.084 0.980 0.917 0.934 0.908 [0.84,1.39] [0.80,1.20] [0.79,1.07] [0.83,1.06] [0.80,1.03] N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 Pre / Post 1848/180 1848/180 1848/180 Pre / Post 1848/180 Note. – Confidence intervals are provide in brackets. All column estimates are from ordinal logistic regression models restricted to the north sample within the period of interest. Rating scale indicates the different levels respondents could select when answering each survey item; larger numbers indicate more positive attitudes towards the element in each question. Row below coefficients provides number of observations pre/post attack. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

227

Table C.11 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression on Negative Political Capital – Full Model Boko Haram Influence Response (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Zaria event 1.470* 1.415* 1.437* 1.260 1.292 [1.03,2.10] [1.01,1.98] [1.02,2.02] [0.88,1.81] [0.81,2.07] Female 1.258* 1.027 1.127 1.158 1.034 [1.01,1.57] [0.82,1.28] [0.91,1.40] [0.90,1.49] [0.74,1.44] Muslim 0.503*** 0.348*** 0.322*** 0.350*** 0.511** [0.37,0.68] [0.26,0.47] [0.24,0.44] [0.25,0.49] [0.34,0.78] Age 1.017*** 1.013** 1.015** 1.017** 1.017* [1.01,1.03] [1.00,1.02] [1.00,1.02] [1.01,1.03] [1.00,1.03] English 0.208*** 0.267*** 0.335*** 0.400*** 0.361*** [0.16,0.26] [0.21,0.34] [0.26,0.43] [0.30,0.53] [0.24,0.54] Education 1.153*** 1.073* 1.085** 1.098** 0.990 [1.09,1.22] [1.02,1.13] [1.03,1.15] [1.03,1.17] [0.91,1.08] Employment 1.106 1.393* 1.270+ 1.310+ 1.575* [0.88,1.39] [1.08,1.79] [0.99,1.63] [0.99,1.73] [1.10,2.26] Household Income 0.912+ 0.946 1.003 1.025 0.934 [0.82,1.01] [0.86,1.04] [0.91,1.11] [0.92,1.14] [0.82,1.06] Voted in last election 0.866 1.054 1.286 1.195 1.035 [0.63,1.19] [0.79,1.40] [0.93,1.77] [0.86,1.66] [0.65,1.65] Trust Federal News Outlet 1.347* 1.333* 1.105 1.018 0.976 [1.06,1.71] [1.04,1.70] [0.86,1.42] [0.80,1.30] [0.67,1.41] Feeling of Security 0.691*** 0.739*** 0.754*** 0.812*** 0.869* [0.61,0.78] [0.67,0.82] [0.68,0.84] [0.73,0.90] [0.77,0.98] Nat. Gov. Access 0.994 1.456** 1.391* 1.350+ 1.234 [0.74,1.33] [1.11,1.92] [1.05,1.85] [0.95,1.91] [0.85,1.80] Local Gov. Access 0.948 0.876 0.798+ 0.787+ 0.652* [0.73,1.24] [0.69,1.11] [0.61,1.04] [0.60,1.04] [0.44,0.96] Ethnicity Acceptance 1.031 1.028 0.997 0.966 0.916 [0.94,1.13] [0.94,1.13] [0.91,1.09] [0.87,1.07] [0.80,1.05] Optimistic Outlook 1.049 1.006 0.985 1.088 1.192+ [0.94,1.17] [0.90,1.13] [0.87,1.11] [0.96,1.23] [0.98,1.45] 2 Violence Towards the Government to Force it to Change Policies or Actions

Zaria event 1.085 1.283 0.800 0.685 0.431 [0.75,1.56] [0.93,1.76] [0.53,1.22] [0.37,1.27] [0.08,2.25] Female 1.072 1.000 1.010 1.031 1.531 [0.86,1.33] [0.82,1.22] [0.79,1.29] [0.72,1.47] [0.62,3.80] Muslim 0.970 0.738* 0.682* 0.723 1.174 [0.69,1.37] [0.55,1.00] [0.48,0.96] [0.47,1.10] [0.43,3.18] Age 1.000 1.006 1.010+ 1.014+ 1.031 [0.99,1.01] [1.00,1.02] [1.00,1.02] [1.00,1.03] [0.99,1.07] English 0.893 0.563*** 0.426*** 0.440*** 0.876 [0.71,1.12] [0.45,0.70] [0.32,0.57] [0.30,0.65] [0.38,2.01] Education 1.109*** 1.017 1.034 0.988 0.897 [1.04,1.18] [0.97,1.07] [0.97,1.10] [0.91,1.07] [0.73,1.11] Employment 1.515** 1.166 0.973 0.965 0.423+ [1.18,1.94] [0.94,1.45] [0.76,1.25] [0.67,1.39] [0.17,1.08] Household Income 0.901+ 0.952 0.983 1.048 1.055 [0.80,1.02] [0.87,1.04] [0.89,1.09] [0.90,1.21] [0.77,1.44] Voted in last election 0.808 0.698** 0.635** 0.608* 1.623 [0.60,1.08] [0.54,0.90] [0.47,0.86] [0.40,0.92] [0.49,5.42] Trust Federal News Outlet 1.410** 1.542*** 1.866*** 1.726* 1.729 [1.10,1.81] [1.23,1.94] [1.40,2.49] [1.13,2.65] [0.68,4.42] Feeling of Security 0.890+ 1.004 1.015 1.022 0.883 [0.79,1.00] [0.91,1.11] [0.91,1.13] [0.89,1.17] [0.61,1.28] Nat. Gov. Access 1.293+ 1.359* 1.440* 1.159 1.066 [0.98,1.70] [1.05,1.75] [1.07,1.94] [0.80,1.67] [0.47,2.41] Local Gov. Access 0.977 1.040 1.088 0.645* 0.414+ [0.76,1.25] [0.84,1.29] [0.85,1.40] [0.45,0.92] [0.16,1.07] Ethnicity Acceptance 0.780*** 0.808*** 0.865** 0.926 1.060 [0.70,0.87] [0.74,0.88] [0.78,0.95] [0.80,1.07] [0.66,1.70] Optimistic Outlook 1.054 1.057 1.140* 1.236* 1.242 [0.93,1.19] [0.94,1.19] [1.01,1.29] [1.01,1.51] [0.79,1.95] N 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 Note. – Confidence intervals (95%) are provide in brackets. All column estimates are from ordinal logistic regression models restricted to the north sample within the period of interest. Rating scale indicates the different levels respondents could select when answering each survey item; larger numbers indicate more positive attitudes towards the element in each question. +p< 0.10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

228

Table C.12 Ordered Logistic Regression on the Welfare of Muslims and Importance of Education for Boys (1) (2) (3) (4) South North South North Welfare of Muslims Importance of a boys education After event 1.148 0.957 1.078 0.829 (0.60) (0.17) (0.58) (0.11) [0.41,3.19] [0.68,1.34] [0.38,3.10] [0.64,1.08] Female 0.655 1.095 1.100 1.010 (0.29) (0.11) (0.43) (0.09) [0.27,1.56] [0.90,1.34] [0.51,2.38] [0.84,1.21] Muslim 7.840*** 3.997*** 0.034** 1.494** (4.34) (0.57) (0.04) (0.19) [2.61,23.56] [3.03,5.28] [0.00,0.42] [1.16,1.92] Age 0.991 1.001 1.020 1.010* (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) [0.96,1.03] [0.99,1.01] [0.99,1.05] [1.00,1.02] English 2.162 1.789*** 0.642 0.292*** (1.57) (0.20) (0.70) (0.03) [0.52,8.99] [1.43,2.24] [0.08,5.41] [0.24,0.35] Education 0.879 0.941* 1.435* 1.088*** (0.13) (0.02) (0.20) (0.02) [0.66,1.18] [0.90,0.99] [1.09,1.90] [1.04,1.14] Employment 1.003 1.134 0.879 1.270** (0.45) (0.11) (0.36) (0.12) [0.41,2.45] [0.94,1.37] [0.39,1.97] [1.06,1.52] Household income 1.217 1.086+ 0.957 1.006 (0.25) (0.05) (0.17) (0.04) [0.80,1.84] [0.99,1.20] [0.67,1.37] [0.93,1.09] Voted in last 0.855 1.106 0.599 1.099 election (0.39) (0.15) (0.27) (0.12) [0.35,2.08] [0.85,1.44] [0.24,1.47] [0.89,1.36] Trust Federal News 0.794 0.553*** 0.390+ 1.043 Outlet (0.39) (0.06) (0.21) (0.10) [0.29,2.14] [0.45,0.69] [0.14,1.11] [0.86,1.26] Feeling of security 1.160 1.269*** 0.665** 1.142** (0.16) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) [0.88,1.53] [1.16,1.39] [0.51,0.86] [1.05,1.24] Nat. gov. access 3997192.309*** 1.031 1.648 0.697*** (5968370.52) (0.13) (1.21) (0.07) [199344.69,801 [0.80,1.32] [0.39,6.97] [0.56,0.86] 50347.37] Loc. gov. access 1.811 0.877 0.360+ 0.768** (0.91) (0.09) (0.22) (0.07) [0.67,4.93] [0.72,1.07] [0.11,1.21] [0.64,0.92] Ethnicity 0.859 0.996 0.959 1.002 Acceptance (0.15) (0.05) (0.14) (0.04) [0.60,1.23] [0.91,1.09] [0.72,1.28] [0.93,1.08] Optimistic Outlook 1.223 1.257*** 1.144 1.080+ (0.21) (0.06) (0.19) (0.05) [0.87,1.71] [1.14,1.39] [0.83,1.58] [0.99,1.18]

229

Table C.12 (Continued)

(1) (2) (3) (4) South North South North Welfare of Muslims Importance of a boys education / cut1 1.611 4.392*** 0.174 0.616 (2.72) (1.74) (0.25) (0.21) [0.06,46.47] [2.01,9.59] [0.01,2.81] [0.31,1.22] cut2 5.514 10.831*** 0.689 1.813+ (9.25) (4.37) (0.95) (0.63) [0.20,155.88] [4.89,24.01] [0.05,10.29] [0.91,3.60] cut3 20.749+ 32.981*** 2.168 3.935*** (34.50) (13.32) (2.99) (1.38) [0.76,566.62] [14.88,73.09] [0.15,32.40] [1.97,7.84] cut4 6.030 8.855*** (8.81) (3.14) [0.34,105.95] [4.42,17.74] cut5 10.928 40.820*** (16.69) (14.76) [0.55,218.42] [20.09,82.94] N 140 2028 140 2028 Note – Effects are reported as odds ratios (two-tailed tests). Standard errors are provided in parentheses, and confidence intervals (95%) are provide in brackets. Row underneath coefficients provides number of observations. Parallel regression assessment using ‘omodel’ and ‘brant’ tests suggest the assumption was met.

230

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