B R EA KING TH E HIN DE N B U RG LIN E

T HE S TO R Y O F TH E

46T H ( N O R T H MID LA N D) DIVISIO N

B R EAKIN G T HE

H I N D E N B U R G L I N E

THE S TOR Y OF THE

46 TH (N O RT H MI DLAN D) DIVIS IO N

M A R E E OR R . . S R E LE M . C . . J P I T Y , . ,

WI TH A N IN TR ODUCTI ON B Y

- M R E ER B Y D C . B . O G N . F . O AJ AL G , ,

M . D . C .

WI T H T W O M A PS A N D S E V E N T E E N IL L U S T R ATI ON S

SH R U NW N LTD N F E . LON D O : T . I I , A D ELPHI T ER R ACE Fi r st published in S eptember 19 19

S co n d im r ss io n N ov mb r 1 1 e p e , e e 9 9

A LL RIGH TS RE S ERV ED OUR COMRADE S WHO HAVE FALLE N IN

THE GREAT ADVE NTURE

MAY W E PROVE WORTHY OF THEM

IN THE D AYS TO C OME

FOR E WOR D

’ MAJ OR PRIESTLEY S book is not intended as an official record ! nevertheless it affords a graphic and accurate account of what took place on a small but decisive sector of the Western front during the Battles of the ” Hundred Days . It was my good fortune to take over command of the North Midland Division at a critical moment of its career , and j ust before we marched south to j oin General ’ Sir H . Rawlinson s Fourth Army . To my predecessor, - ri Major General W . Thwaites , must be asc bed the credit of having organized and trained the Division into a fighting machi ne in which every officer and man was ’ imbued with a real soldier s spirit . It is to thi s fixed deter mination to win through at all costs , regardless of incidents on flank and in rear , that I mainly attribute the successes won by the Division . r c - We j oined the IX Co ps , ommanded by Lieut . Gen .

Sir Walter Braithwaite , and consisting of three distin uished fi 6 th r g ghting units , but the 4 were dete mined to make a name for themselves second to none .

No man can say that they failed .

ERALD . D G F BOY , Maj or -Gen er al

C O N T E N T S

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER PAGE OUTLINE OF THE PREVIOUS HISTORY OF THE 46TH

TH D D D 1 1 —1 18 (NOR MI LAN ) IVISION , 9 4 9

B Y E T N - U N T C ON T . C . N B D LI E A OL EL EW OL , D . S . O

T . D . 1 TH S H S A N D M OR E . ( /5 E RWOO D ) , AJ . A

E S R . E . L WI ,

PART I

THE B A TTLE OF B ELLE N GLI S E

2 th S e tember 1 1 8 ( 9 p , 9 ) CB A PTE R I AND R . PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS PREPA ATION S FOR THE ATTAC K

T C THE II . HE D S T C STAFFOR S ROSS . Q UENTIN ANAL AN D BREACH THE HIN D ENBURG LINE

III CC X D B Y H D C SU ESS E PLOITE S ERWOO S , LIN OLN S , AN D LEICESTERS

PART II

THE B A TTLE OF RAMI COUR T

THE C C IV . VI TORY AT RAMI OURT

E C - CK E D— THE V . EN MY OUNTER ATTA S REPULS AD VAN CE TO BOHAIN 14 CONTENTS

PART III

THE B A TTLE ! OF ANDI GN Y

P C HA PTE R AGE I THE C OF THE D E R I UE RVAL AN D V . LEARING BOIS Q THE BATTLE OF AN D IGNY LE S FERMES

PART IV

THE LAS T PHAS E : CA TI LLON TO S AI N S

V II THE D C TO D U D . A VAN E SAINS NOR

APPE NDICE S

D C D A N D DE I . GERMAN IVISIONS E N OUNTERE FEATE D B Y THE 46 TH D IVISION BETWEE N THE 24TH SEPTEMBER A ND THE 1 1TH NOV

1 18 EMBER , 9

C THE 2 TH II . ASUALTIES BETWEE N 4 SEPTEMBER

A N D THE 1 1TH 1 1 8 NOVEMBER , 9

D D D To THE D III . IMME IATE REWAR S GRANTE IVI SION FROM 24TH SEPTEMBER TO TI TH

1 18 NOVEMBER , 9

D 2 8TH 1 1 IV . OR ER O F BATTLE , FEBRUARY , 9 5

D 2 TH 1 18 v . OR ER O F BATTLE , 9 SEPTEMBER , 9

IND Ex I L L U S T R A T I O N S

HI S MAJESTY KING GEORGE V INSPE CTING THE BATTLE FIELD OF BELLENGLISE F r antispiece

FACING PAGE V C . . . . AND CAPTAIN J C GREEN , , C E C V . . V . C CAPTAIN C . G VI KERS , . , ARLY . HEROES OF THE 46TH DIVISION

V C T TH . . . . C LIE UTENANT J C BARRETT , , /5 LEI ESTERS . D D THE C SEVERELY WOUN E IN ATTA K ON PONTRUET , AN D AWARDE D THE VICTORIA CROSS FOR HI S BRAVERY AN D LEAD ERSHIP D URING THE ACTION

H THE AIR PHOTOGRAP OF ST . QUENTIN CANAL AT H THE C BELLENGLISE , S OWING DEFEN E SYSTEM To THE E AST OF THE CANAL AN D THE GERMAN BRI DGES 32

N H THE C C ST . QUE TIN CANAL , S OWING BRI K FA ING OF D T I TH THE CANAL AN ITS S EEP BANKS . N E DISTANCE THE REMAINS OF A GERMAN FOOTB RI D GE

- D . . B V C BRIGA IER GENERAL J V CAMP ELL , . BRIGADE COMMAN D ER I 37TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

H R H A N D THE AI R P OTOG AP OF BELLENGLISE ST. QUENTIN CANAL FROM ABOVE THE HIN DEN B URG DEFENCES WES T OF THE CANAL

H R E UE VAL R D ST . QUENTIN CANAL WIT Q B I GE . FROM ’ THIS PICTURE THE VALUE OF CAPTAIN CHARLTON s WORK IN PRESERVING THE BRID GE FROM D E S TR UCTION IS WELL SEEN I 6 I LLUSTRATI ONS

FACING PAGE

- r 6TH C. . . V . LIEUTENANT COLONEL B . W . VANN , , M C , / H D D C THE S ERWOO S . KILLE IN A TION AT BATTLE OF RAMICOURT

- S O D C B D . . MAJOR GENERAL G . F. BOY , . . , C 6TH M G . O. C. D . . 4 DIVISION

H S V C 1 m H D . SERGEANT W . H . JO N ON , . . , 5 S ERWOO S THE HERO OF THE ATTACK ON THE BEAUREVOIR FONS OMME LINE

- . C . C . V . LAN E CORPORAL W H COLTMAN , . , M M , 1 6TH H D H / NORT STAFFOR S , W OSE CONSTANT BRAVERY IN ACTION HAS AD DE D A GLORI OUs PAGE To THE HIS TORY OF THE 46TH DIVISION

- C M. G B D . . . RIGA IER GENERAL F G M . ROWLEY, BRIGADE COMMAN DER 138TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

D - H D BRIGA IER GENERAL SIR HILL C IL , 6TH C . R . A . 4 DIVISION

D - G . D BRI A IER GENERAL J HARINGTON , BRIGA E COMMAN DER 139TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

MEMORIAL CROSS ERECTE D ON THE HIGH GROUN D NEAR BELLENGLISE IN MEMORY OF THE FALLEN OF THE 46TH DIVISION B R EA KIN G THE HI N DE N BU R G LIN E

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTE R

OUTLINE OF THE PREVIOUS HISTORY OF THE 4OTH (NORTH MI D LAN D) D IVISION IN THE WAR

IN wr iting this introductory chapter it S hould at once be stated that it is not in any way intended to be a history of the Division since its arrival in France , nor does it attempt to do j ustice to the bravery and tenacity ex hib ited at all times dur ing the years it was on the l Western front . It is j ust an attempt to out ine its doings z and movements from the time of its mobili ation until , 1 18 in September 9 , it j oined the Fourth Army

6th The 4 Division , which was responsible for what was e d scribed in the Press as the Miracle of the War, and whose exploits during the Hundred Days are descri bed C — i in the following hapters , is one of the pre war Territor al

Divisions . In days of peace it was known as the North Midland u Division , and was composed of men from the co nties of

N . Derby , ottingham , Lincoln , Leicester , and Stafford It M - was then commanded by aj or General the Hon . E . J . - - B . . . C . . Montagu Stuart Wortley , , D S O Of z On the outbreak war the Division mobili ed , its 2 E 1 8 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LIN

headquarters being first at Derby , and afterwards at

’ Luton and Bishop s Stortford . After less than seven months ’ training in E ngland it was ordered to France I n 1 1 February 9 5 , enj oying the distinction of being the first complete Terri torial Division to arri ve in any

theatre of war . In less than two weeks after its arrival the Division ‘ - was placed in reserve for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle , ~ 1 h 1 h 1 1 . 2 t 3t March , 9 5 , but was not used It received fir e its baptism of at Ploegsteert , and later took over - the line in front of Kemmel and Neuve Eglise , whence e its next move was to the Ypres salient . H re it settled

down for nearly four months , part of which was spent

in front of the notorious Hill 60 . Whilst in this area the first Flammenwerfer attack made by the enemy was launched on the Division on

its left , which , stunned by the unexpectedness of the n ew 6th weapon , recoiled , leaving the left flank of the 4 D ivision in the air . What might have been a serious disaster was averted by the stubborn fighting of the 1 th 39 Brigade .

The Division was next moved to the Bethune area , 1 1 1 and on the 3th October , 9 5 , it relieved the Guards Division and made an attack on The Quarries and Fosse This was the first big attack the 46th Division rm had been called upon to perfo . The casualties were

- very high , reducing its strength by nearly one half . In December 1 915 the Division was selected to proceed l to Egypt , and two Brigades actua ly arrived there . The

orders were then countermanded however , the Brigades i were recalled, and the whole D vision retur ned to the

‘ N 1 16 orth of France in February 9 . Here they took over Virn the line before the famous y Ridge , which was at that t ime in the hands of the enemy . The unit relieved was

H ISTORY OF THE 46TH D IV ISION 1 9 fi a famous French Division , and this was the rst time

British troops had held this particular sector of the line . The next big effort demanded of the 46 th Division was the attack on Gommecourt , a village which was the apex of the most westerly portion of the enemy line at i that t me . The attack , which was carried out on the I S I u 1 1 6 J ly , 9 , was the extreme left of the great Somme f O fensive , and had been foreseen by the enemy and was ai not successful . Very heavy casualties were ag n sus t ain ed , and no gain of ground was made . It is pleasant to record in parenthesis that in 1 9 1 7 it was the privilege Of the 46 th Division to Chase the Germans out of the village where S O many of their comrades had fought their fi last ght only a few months before . i Wh lst following up the retiring army in this area , there

1 1 1 S fi was on March 3 th , 9 7 , some harp ghting , as he took up a position in a strongly-wired trench known as R ettem o y Graben . This position , after being bombarded for a day , was attacked by the sth North Staffords and sth South Staffords ! the 7 th Division attacking on their i right , with Bucquoy as their Obj ect ve . m 1 1 . The attack was made at p . on a very dark n l night , but owing to the wire o ly being partia ly cut m il ( due to the limited ti e at the disposal of the Art lery) , fi and the enemy ghting a very stubborn rearguard action , the attack was unsuccessful , and the two battalions mentioned suffered heavy casualties . In March 1 91 7 the Division relieved the 24th Division m in front of Lens in the Lievin sector , and it re ained there for four months . During this time much hard fi ghting took place , which culminated in the Operations I st 1 1 of July , 9 7 . From the time the sector was taken over the line was advanced an average of yards r and the ground captured included Cité St . Edwa d , Cite E 20 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LIN

’ m o n t d Ar c R iau , St . Theodore , Cité Jeanne , Cité de the R iaumo nt Bois de Lievin , the Bois de , and the important 6 tactical point Hill 5 . For the next fourteen months the Division was engaged in trench warfare in various parts of the Cambrai-Lens i im~ front , during which time the Canad an Corps on its

6th , mediate right , assisted by the 4 Divisional Artillery 0 i made their successful attack on Hill 7 . During th s action the Infantry of the Division broke up at least one

’ - enfilade fir e of the enemy s counter attacks by , causing many casualties . From this neighbourhood the next move was to the Givenchy area , where a line was taken over between the Lawe Canal and Givenchy , including the l famous Route A Keep , which had a few weeks ear ier been so gallantly defended by the 5 5th Division when they stemmed the German offensive in this part of the line . di During this long spell of trench warfare , rai ng o r - became the order of the day . Maj General W . Thwaites , C B m . who had assu ed command shortly after the Battle d of Gommecourt , was a keen isciplinarian and a popular leader . He encouraged, and indeed insisted upon , raid ing to the utmost , as being the type of warfare best f calculated to improve the o fensive spirit of the men . Many very clever coups were effected during the next fi fteen months . Numerous prisoners were captured in these raids , which materially assisted the process a of wearing down the enemy m or l. This system of training improved the fighting condition and capacity of the Division to such an extent that former reverses were forgotten , or remembered only in the determination to wipe them out by achieving decisive success in the th future . The 46 Division arrived at the scene of the actions described in the following chapters as hard as fit nails and for anything . H IS TORY OF THE 46TH D IV IS ION 2 1

General Thwaites handed over to his successor , Major

. B . . C General G F . Boyd , , a fi fi ghting force which proved itself thoroughly ef cient , and whose deeds in the last and most decisive months

of the Great War will live in history . During the operations outlined in this chapter the 6th 4 Division had served in the First , Second , Third , and rm Fifth A ies , and in the I , II , III , V , VII , X I , XIII ,

XIV , XVII , and XVIII Corps . Though called on to defend some of the most important parts of the Western

front , not one inch of ground was ever lost . The severity of the fighting in which the Division has been engaged during the War is best seen from an ex s amination of its ca ualty list . The total losses between 1 1 1 1th 1 18 : February 9 5 and November , 9 , were

Offic er s . 275

123 Total

Such figures do indeed S peak for themselves . PART I

THE BA TTLE OF B ELLEN GLI S E

2 th S e tember 1 18 ( 9 p , 9 )

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY OPERATION S AN D PREPAR ATIONS FOR THE ATTAC K

T fi 6th A an hour and date to be noti ed later , the 4

Division , as part of a maj or operation , will cross the

St . Quentin Canal , capture the Hindenburg Line , and advance to a position shown on the attached Map A . Such was the opening paragraph of the preliminary f 2 th order issued by the General Sta f on the 5 September , notifying all concerned of the general scope of the Opera tion which was fated to bring fame to the Division . At this period of the war the eyes of the whole of E urope were focussed in the main on one thing and one thi ng fi only . Would the Hindenburg Line suf ce , as the German s hoped and believed , to hold up the (up to that time) irresistible tide of conquest sweeping back slowly but steadily across France ! or would that last bulwark of German Imperialism be broken as under like lesser o b acles st , and trampled underfoot by the victorious Armies of the Allies ! The answer to that question was to be 2 th e given on the 9 Sept mber, and in the solving of the THE BATTLE OF BE LLENGL ISE 23 problem the 46th Division was destined to play a glorious and decisive part .

The General Staff , who , under instructions from the

IX Corps , had planned the attack , and who had better means of estimating such doubtful features as the moral of the forces opposed to us and the general disposition ’ fi of the enemy s forces , may have been con dent of

e . succ ss Many , however , who could only j udge from d ’ irect observation of the enemy s positions , or from aeroplane photographs , were of opinion that the Division had been given an impossible task . At the best it seemed likely that the efforts and sacri fices of the 46th Division might pin down the enemy l l on the Be leng ise front , and attract his reserves , Whilst the Americans and Australians broke through on the left , where they were faced with no natural obstacle . a If this northern attack succeeded , the result nt pressure

’ on ' the enemy s front to the north might -then save the 6 th situation on the Bellenglise front , and enable the 4

Division to get forward at a later period . The sequel was to S how which of these opinions was u ifi l d C j st ed , and incidental y to a mit for ever the laim of the 46 th Division to be classed with what the Germans ” r u n would call S turrn t ppe . 1 2th 1 1 8 fi On the September , 9 , after fteen months of l a most continuous defensive warfare , the Division moved from the Bethune area to the neighbourhood of Beau

’ Court sur l Hallue and passed into G . H . Q . reserve for a

’ few days rest and trai ning before proceeding into action ri near the southern limit of the B tish front . z r t t r On the s September , af e one or two days in the the l Tertry area , where Division was stil in reserve while the various Comman ders were reconnoitring their future area and the various preparations for the hand-over were 24 THROUGH THE HIN DENBURG L INE

i I st th made , the rel ef of part of the and 4 Australian all Divisions by the 46th Division was carried out , and ranks settled down to learn the new area in which they fi were to ght . The new front line consisted of some to yards length of an old German trench system to the west of the St . Quentin Canal which had been captured from the Germans by our predecessors and reorganized by them to

c suit defen e in the opposite direction . It formed a splendid defensive position and a very fair jumping-off ground for any future proj ected operations agai nst the Canal and the immensely strong Hindenburg Line to the east of it . At the time the North Midland Division took over the e line the enemy still held a strong system of trench s . with outposts in advance of them , on the west bank of the Canal , which he held in considerable strength and which prevented any near reconnaissance of the banks i and of the approaches to the Canal . Th s was , however , in a measure counteracted by the fact that along the greater part of our front our troops were on high ground overlooking the German defences . The country to the east of the Canal was spread out before their eyes like a map , only the valleys being concealed from View by the ridges between them and our line . From vantage positions on our front line almost the whole extent of the Canal opposite to us could be seen . th and the villages of Nauroy and Levergies , e latter of which was to become intimately known to the Division fi in the future ghting , were plainly visible . Into Bellen

, glise itself immediately below our trenches , it appeared

- possible to throw a cricket ball , and every movement of the Germans in the neighbourhood of the Canal and the village was plainly to be seen . Behind our line the country was of a very open nature ,

26 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE Artillery Groups during the forming up on the night i prev ous to the attack . A S usual in the case of an attack on prepared positions i of considerable strength , wh ch involved the concentra tion of a large force of artillery and other units not n i ormally associated with a Division in the l ne , one of the Chief problems to be overcome was the question of transportation to and from the line . In overcoming this ffi di culty the weather , which remained in the main dry fine and both immediately before and during the battle , was very helpful . In the sector of the attack the only main approaches to the front line were the two metalled roads which ran respectively through Le Verguier and through Vadencourt the latter , which forked into two i roads just west of the Tumulus , being the main div sional line of approach . These in themselves were not nearly ffi ffi su cient to cope with the forward tra c , but the country — ” between them was seamed with dry weather tracks , which were passable for horse traffic under the weather di i con tions then preva ling , while , in addition , the open nature of the country made it unnecessary to keep to tracks at all in dry weather . Preparation for an attack of any magnitude was much ham pered by the sharp bend back of the line upon our a right flank . A gl nce at the map showing the tactical S ituation on the a3r d September betrays at once this backward bend of the British line on the right of the front held on that date by the Division . The enemy held Pontruet in force , and even had strong posts well up in and about the group of farm buildings known as

- St . Helene and situated on the Vadencourt Bellenglise 2 th Road . On the 4 September a minor operation was undertaken by the I st and 6th Divisions on our right , having in view the capture of certain high gr ound in front THE BATTLE OF BELLE NGL ISE 27

of their line to the south of Pontruet . As a part of thi s operation the 46th Division was allotted the task of capturing Pontruet and the medley of trenches and - s hi i strong point which were based on t s v llage . The main attack was to be carr ied out by troops detailed 1 8 ri from the 3 th Infantry B gade , two companies of which were ordered to advance from the forming-up line along the

- Vadencourt Bellenglise Road from St . Helene eastward for 500 yards ! their obj ect being to o utflank the village of Pon r u - t et and establish strong posts due east of it . The advance was to be covered by a creeping barrage fired by the five l B rigades of Artil ery covering the front of the Division . i Meanwh le , two other companies of the same battalion 1 th were detailed to clear Pontruet itself , and the 39 Infantry Brigade were ordered to provide a mopping-up party to deal with certain trenches south-west of the l village . The Artil ery , in addition to the creeping barrage t he c P covering assault , were to con entrate on ontruet village and strong points in its immediate neighbourhood

during the early part of the assault . It was thus hoped to pin the enemy to his positions until the o utflankin g hi party had succeeded in reac ng their obj ective , when he would be compelled to retreat under enfilade fir e from these

companies . Tactically , the attack , although on a small

scale , was very prettily conceived and it was hoped that the whole of the garr ison of Pontruet and the trenches

round it , which were known to be held in force by the i . enemy , would be either captured or k lled z fi All preparations having been completed , ero was xed m 2 th for 5 a . on the 4 . At that hour the barrage the th opened and the two companies of 5 Leicesters , to o ankin Whom was allotted the task of utfl g the village , t advanced to the attack . At the same ime the sth S herwood Foresters made an assault on Beux and Leduc 28 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG L INE

Trenches , and , easily over running these works and cap turing or killing the garrison of the trenches , endeavoured to enter the village from the south east .

Almost at the outset of the attack two Stokes mortars , which had been detailed to assist in the attack from north

l fir e , of the village , were knocked out by enemy artil ery al and this hampered the attack from that side materi ly .

For some time the attack sped fairly well , and good progress was made by our men , who penetrated into the northern elements of Pontruet and captured the strongly s defended cemetery and the blockhouse . Their succe s

- was short lived , however , for the enemy , reacting strongly with fresh reinforcements , bombed their way back down ’ the Forgan s Trench— an enemy work running south east and north -west right up the area attacked - and -u drove our men back almost to the forming p line , forcing us to give up our hold on the part of Pontruet which remained in our hands . Hard fighting continued for several hours , but , according to statements of prisoners captured from the garrison , the enemy had been expecting an attack on Pontruet and was able to bring up strong reserves . A second attack in the evening by the 5th t Leicesters , reinforced by a company of the 5 h Sherwood

Foresters , was repulsed , without our obtaining a footing

m . l . a 2 th in the vil age At on the 5 , the order was therefore given to withdraw from Pontruet , but to hold on

to the captured posts to the north and west of the village . The attack was thus in a great measure a tactical

ai , f lure though it left our positions somewhat improved .

It had resulted , however , in the capture of one officer

- and one hundred and thirty six other ranks , and had given the enemy a foretaste of the fighting quality of the

Division . The mor al of the men throughout was ex cellent they fought with great dash and initiative and , L UT N N T C TT V C I TH C S T I A . . ARR . . I RS , V R E E J B E , , /5 LE E E SE E ELY U N I N THE TT C K ON PON TR U E I’ ‘ A N D W THE WO DED A A , A ARDED VI C TORIA CRO S S FOR HI S BRAV ERY A N D LEADERS HI P D U RI N G THE A C TIO N

e r o u e b o ur t e s o f Mess rs . W h i t ele Ltd . R p d c d y c y y ,

THE BATTLE OF BELLE NGLISE 29 held on with tenacity to captured posts against superior forces and under heavy shell fir e . An instance of the good work done is afforded by the behaviour of the crew of one of the Stokes mortars knocked out early in the fi ght . Although shaken by the shelling to which they had been exposed and discouraged by the loss of their un g , these men took to their rifles and fought gallantly throughout the action , killing many of the enemy and taking several prisoners .

The hero of the attack on Pontruet , however , was a 1 subaltern of the / 5th Leicesters , Lieutenant J . C . Barrett . He was the leader of a party attacking the strong and ’ - stoutly defended work known as Forgan s Trench . In spite of an intense fir e from the machine guns and riflemen defending the trench , he led a party of men against it , and , although wounded in the advance to the attack , he

succeeded in reaching the trench and sprang into it , himself disposing of two machine gu ns and inflicting e many casualties . During the m lee which followed he

was again severely wounded , but managed to climb out of the trench with the obj ect of finding out his own exact

position and locating the enemy . This he succeeded in

doing , and , despite loss of blood and the exhaustion con o u sequent his wounds , gave detailed orders to his men ,

directing them to cut their way back to their battalion,

from which they had become isolated . The party man ri aged to rej oin their comrades , but du ng the retreat

Lieutenant Barrett , who had refused offers of help for ri himself , was again wounded , this time so se ously that his he could not move , and was then carried back by men . It was undoubtedly due to Lieutenant Barrett ’ s splendid example and good leadership that any of the party man n aged to retur alive , and he was subsequently awarded

the Victoria Cross for his bravery in this action . 0 R THE E E 3 TH OUGH H IND NBURG ‘ LIN

On the 25th of September the first Divisional Order for

, the main attack on the St . Quentin Canal was issued and from that time forward all energies were devoted to preparations for the assault . The general idea of the operations was the breaking of the Hindenburg Line north 6th of St . Quentin , and to the 4 Division was assigned the task of storming the Canal between the village of R i ueval Bellenglise and q Bridge , and capturing the

i , defences behind the Canal , with Bellengl se itself which contained the entrance to the famous tunnel whose existence was already well known from state fi o f ments of captured prisoners . The nal objective the Division was a line on the high ground beyond the

— - I st villages of Lehauco ur t and Magny la Fosse . The Division on our right were ordered to protect our right flank and to hold themselves in readiness to advance eastwards south of the Canal and conform to the move ments of the enemy should he retire , occupying the village of Thorigny and the high ground around that village . In the event , the enemy resistance proved too stubborn on . the day of the attack ! the I st Division did not advance ! Thorigny was not taken until the following i - fir e day, and artillery and mach ne gun from the high ground on our right flank was the cause of much trouble during the later stages of the battle . On our left the 3oth American Division was ordered to storm the Bellicourt defences and cross the Canal where it l disappeared underground in the Bel icourt Tunnel . Then , turning south , they were to j oin our own troops in the E r . neighbourhood of tricou t The Americans , however, also experienced considerable resistance and were delayed fi in reaching their nal objectives , thus leaving this flank also in air for some time . ! the It fi n a l h was intended , l y , t at when the fin al obj ective

3 2 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE

er erIdiClllar roads , the Canal runs between almost p p C f vary li fs , which for the greater part of this distance r u between fifty and thirty feet high . South of this it ns practically at ground level with , in places , a slight em b ankm n e t . Right throughout , the Canal wall formed a t perpendicular obstacle faced with brick , both wes and east banks being strongly wired . The southern portion l of the Canal was practical y dry , but over considerably more than half of the front covered by the Division a depth of from six to eight feet of water had to be w reckoned ith . In addition to the natural strength of the Canal as an obstacle to advancing troops , no pains had been spared

n to strengthen the whole le gth , which bristled with well

- un sited concrete and steel machine g emplacements , and had been generally rendered as nearly as possible im pregnable . Indeed , we know from statements of German prisoners that it was considered b y them to be capable of defence against any possible attack . It is probable that this fact helped to lull the Germans into a false state of security which may in a measure have been responsible for the fact that all our preparations passed unheeded and that the attack did not seem to have been suspected until it actually took place . The two weak points about the Canal which were destined to have a decisive effect on the outcome of the battle were : ( 1) the bridges which were necessary for the

supply of the enemy troops on the western bank , and so could not be destroyed in good time ! and ( 2) the existence of certain concrete dams which had presumably been built by the enemy to serve as locks to retain the water . Where the Canal crosses the valley of the Omig n o n n i , south of Belle gl se , it is banked up above the level of the surrounding country and Without these concrete

THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 33

i n dams , there was risk of our guns breach ng the ba ks , n i allowing the water to drain away , and so dimi ish ng the

value of the Canal as an obstacle . These concrete dams would certainly have served their

purpose in such an event , but , although protected above

’ by strips of Concertina wire and on their sides by crows

feet and other devices , they were a possible means of

our troops crossing . There were several of these stoutly

built dams along the divisional front , and some of them were actually made use of by the Infantry in the l assau t . Beyond the Canal was an extremely strong system of v trenches , hea ily protected by wire belts , and based upon r the village of Bellenglise , the fa m of La Baraque , and

Harry and Nigger Copses . This line was continued parallel with the C anal to Lehauco ur t but the portion south of Bellenglise was not directly assaulted by our

troops , being attacked from the rear by the Brigade

detailed to advance on Lehauco ur t itself . Between Bellenglise and Magny-la-Fosse were two more continuous

lines of trenches protected by wire , while all over the ground to be traversed were sited individual strong -points an d machine - gun emplacements disposed after the prin ” ciple of defence in depth much used by the Germans

in the last two years of the war .

Altogether , the defences of the Hindenburg Line at this point were as thorough as the science of military engineering , backed by unlimited time and labour , could devise , and the defenders had every reason to believe that no troops in the world could be expected to storm them without colossal losses . The effect of the battle of the 29th September must fi be considered in the light of th ese facts . The con dence of the Ger mans in both their troops and their defence 34 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L IN E

system was fated to be shattered in one mighty blow , and the effec t of this reverse on the moral of the German Army and the German people must have been tremendous

indeed .

The fall of St . Quentin following on the breaching

of the Hindenburg Line was inevitable . Perhaps the best tribute to the work of the Division on this day of days in their history is seen in the remark of a staff officer

of another formation , who , in reply to a question as to who took the city of St . Quentin , replied The French a r l . 6th w ked into St Quentin , but the 4 Division captu ed it when they took Bellenglise . On the evening of the 27th September the 138th In fantr y Brigade , then holding the northern portion of our line , was ordered to attack the trenches on the ridge l i v between the two ravines west of Bel englise and R que al. o un This preliminary operati n was quite local , and was dertaken with the object of ensuring that our troops should meet with little resistance west of the Canal on the day of the main assault . All went well with the i . m attack After a prel minary bombard ent , the com pani cs of the 4th Leicesters detailed for the assault left r —u the fo ming p line in good order , and , following the C barrage losely , occupied the line of trenches which was their objective without difficulty and with very little The fighting . attack resulted in the capture of two officers and one hundred and forty-six other ranks and , all concerned had good reason to be satisfied with the work , and to trust that it was an omen of greater success l to fo low shortly , when the preparations for the attack on the Canal were completed . Our new line was immediately i consol dated , and com municatio n trenches leadi ng towards the enemy were blocked ! and at the conclusion of this operation the

36 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

- south west of Pike Wood , where it was reorganized and held on until dark . Similar fine work was done by the 1/ 6th North Staffords during the attack . The outpost company of this battalion was for S ix hours completely cut o ff from communication with Battalion Headquarters , all lines having been cut

fir e . by artillery The company , however , held on to its position against superior numbers for the whole of this c time , although suffering very mu h from the prevailing lack of ammunition . Casualties were very high , but the fi men , inspired by the heroic example of their of cers , in flict fought with an utter disregard of personal safety , ing heavy losses on the attackers , who were only able fi ai to make very insigni cant g ns of ground . Where all diflicult the men did so well it is to draw distinctions , but prominence should be given to the work of Pri vate 1 6 B . Mountford , of the / th North Staffords , who during the shortage of ammunition was mainly responsible for saving the situation on the front occupied by his com hi pany . Finding a German mac ne gun and ammunition in the captured trenches , he at once set to work , got the h gun into working order , broug t it into action , and caused many casualties to the enemy . For five hours under heavy fir e from Ger man ri fles and machine gun s fir S he manned this gun , ing hort bursts of fir e when l enemy attacks appeared ikely to develop with success, thus assisting materially in slow n down his advance and helping to repulse thr usts which were unusually

- determined and long sustained . l Fighting continued wel on into the day, but after his in itial success the enemy made very little progress along an y part of the front attacked . With few exceptions our men were able to retain their positions until dark but , the outpost companies were in a very unfavourable THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 37

d n enfila ed . position , being observed and from both fla ks ’ It was therefore dee ded to withdraw to our original line under cover of darkness , not only because the position of the men was unsatisfactory , but in order that a straight barrage could be put down for the main attack .

During the few days of preparation , every care was taken to prevent the enemy from realizing the imminence and magnitude of the attack . Reconnoitring parties were warned to keep themselves scattered and as in co n s icuo u p s as possible when in view of the enemy . There was to be no flourishing of maps in full view of enemy airmen or of direct observation from the enemy trenches . All troops in the front line were instructed to keep their heads down and to let as little movement as possible be seen , while movement of transport behind the lines , beyond the normal activity inseparable from the supply and maintenance of a division in comparatively peaceful

r . times , was rest icted to the hours of darkness The enemy airm en at this time were very active and daring , and frequently his reconnaissance machines would ,

- i fir e in spite of machine g r n and rifle , swoop down and pass over our front and support trenches at a very low altitude , watching for signs of unusual activity . With their scarlet —painted bodies the machines presented a striking appearance , looking for all the world like huge red birds di ving down on the look-out for their prey on the ground beneath . Very little could have escaped the knowledge of the skilled observers in the planes , and the result speaks well for the thoroughness of the precautions taken against observation , and for the skill with which officers and men carri e d out the orders gi ven to them . One of the first preparations to be made in all cases of attack where moves of Headquar ters are likely to 38 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

take place as a preliminary to the assault , is the choosing of suitable sites for the Headquarters of the higher form a 26th tions . On the , therefore , a party of the General f Sta f, with one representative from each Brigade and the Q C . Signal Company , made a tour of the country behind the front line and of the front line itself , and settled on a j oint Brigade Headquarters in a portion of the line

- ff where three or four deep dug outs , su icient to shelter

fir e . the Staffs from moderately heavy shell , existed This

2 1 , C position , unnamed except by a map reference (G , , subsequently became the headquarters of the 1 37th In m fan tr y Brigade when this Brigade stor ed the Canal , and was later used as Divisional Headquarters by the 3 2 n d Division when it passed through the 46th Division after

c the atta k . At the same time it was decided to move forward Advanced Divisional Headquarters to Small Post l N E . N . . Wood , a small copse about a mile of Vende les , from which place communication forward could be main tain d m e ore satisfactorily . The problem of communication in a battle such as the fi one projected was a dif cult one . Both our own troops l i and the enemy were strongly entrenched , and a pre im n ary bombardment of exceptional intensity was necessary before our assaulting columns could be hurled at the i enemy entrenchments with any chance of success , wh le such a bombardment necessarily invited heavy retaliatory fir e . It was practically a trench warfare attack without the buried cable system which alone had rendered com municatio n in trench warfare possible . A strong system of overland cables was designed to meet the case , but these lines were , as they were bound fir e to be , cut by shell again and again before the attack commenced . In fact , the party laying the forward lines was out working duri ng the whole of the night precedin g THE BATTLE OF BE LLENGLISE 39

the attack , and during the morning of the attack , without succeeding in getting the lines through to the leading

ri Brigade , which was thus for some time , at a critical pe od o ff o of the battle , cut from communicati n with the

Division altogether . To add to the troubles of the Signal c w company , the very openness of the ountry , hile facili tating the laying of cables across country , was fatal a h to their mai ntenance . During the d rk nig ts of the 2 th 28th 2 8th 2 th r 7 / and / 9 September , transpo t made little or no attempt to keep to the roads , but was driven l s across country , intent on y on reaching its de tination t n o t t . o u by the shor est route Lines were once or twice , i n but twenty or thirty t mes a ight , and linemen were out l working practica ly continuously . Perhaps the most ex the asperating incident occurred , however , when , on night m before the battle , a cavalry unit which shall be na eless settled down for the n ight midway between Divisional Headquarters and an impor tant forward communication z s post , and signali ed its arrival by cutting out ome hundred yards or so of the three twin cables which formed d the main ivisional route , in order to use them as a ! picket line for their horses . After this Signals felt that Fate could have no harder blows in store for them . Communications had to be extended considerably and lines laid to deal with the many extra units which were attached to the Division for the battle . New signal

fli r i o ce s appeared every few minutes , bringing w th them

N . C O . s . dragging new lines to be placed on the Divisional y — Exchange . Tanks , Cavalry, Artillery , C clists all were represented— but the most numerous of all were the attached Artillery Brigades . Between the arrival of the 2 8th m Division in the area and the night of the Septe ber , the strength of the Division in artillery increased from

R . F A . A . F . two B rigades of R . . to eight Brigades of and 40 THROUGH THE HINDE NBURG LINE one of all of them being placed under the com

- mand of Brigadier General Sir Hill Child , 6 4 th Division . In addition several Brigades of the Corps Heavy Artillery were firing on the front of the

Division . Artillery preparation for the attack was commenced 6th 2 th on the night of the 2 / 7 September , when a con cen tr ated bombardment of the Bellenglise salient was carried out with a mixture of high explosive and gas fir e shells . At the same time the normal harassing on the whole of the IX Corps front was considerably increased in order to mask the guns engaged in pumping

gas into selected areas behind the front to be attacked . This gas bombardment was carried out on a scale which

had not previously been attempted by any of the Allies , but results were not commensurate with the expenditure f of ammunition . Prisoners stated that the only e fect of

the bombardment , so far as gas was concerned , was to cause them to retreat to the deep dug -outs and tunnels with which this particular enemy area was so plentifully

provided , and thus very few gas casualties were caused . destr uc Far otherwise , however , was the result of the tive bombardment with high-explosive shells from guns w of all calibres which commenced on the follo ing day . e All evid nce , whether that of air photographs taken duri ng m the bombard ent itself, the close examination of the

shelled area when the battle was over , or the repor ts of the dazed and demoralized prisoners taken duri ng the S f action , goes to how that the e fect of the whirlwind of shells from our guns was absolutely devastating both to

m o a the German positions and to their r l. For the two days preceding the assault no rations or reinforcements reached the unfortunate occupants of the defences on either bank of the Canal . THE BATTLE OF BELLENGL ISE 41 This intensive artillery preparation was carried on without pause until the morning selected for the the - attack . In meantime , careful barrage time tables

had been worked out for the attack itself , and every gun

of the Field Artillery had been assigned its task , either in the barrage which should cover the advance of the in fantr l y , in the shel ing of specially selected areas where

enemy concentrations might be expected , or in assisting the Heavy Artillery in its task of neutralizing or an nihi lating suspected enemy strong-points and machine-gun emplacements . In an attack on a position which is fronted by a water z obstacle of the si e and depth of the St . Quentin Canal I t is naturally to be expected that towards the overcoming of that obstacle a large and even dominating part of the preparation for the attack should be directed . The cross ing of the Canal was the task of the Infantry , but the work of enabling the Infantry to cross was essentially mi E b the le of the ngineers , and the preparations made y — . Mo h ad . r s e the Lieutenant Colonel H T , R E . . , were extremely thorough .

C R . E . Unfortunately the . himself , while reconnoitring forward routes for pontoon wagons in the vicinity of 2 th Le Verguier on the 5 , was wounded in the leg by a a piece of a shell which exploded near him , and his wound , fi though not serious , was suf cient to incapacitate him for some weeks .

In his absence , and until his successor , Lieutenant

E . R . Colonel W . Garforth , M . C . , , j oined the

D R E . r ivision , the preparation was car ied out under the direction of the Adj utant and Assistant Adjutant . These preparations consisted mainly in the collection of material for , and the construction of , various means of crossing the Canal . Amongst the most successful of the means 42 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LIN E devised were small piers built of a framework of wood supported either by empty petrol tins or by bundles of cork slabs piers which were so devised that they could be used either as rafts to carry a single man across the Canal or as supports for foot -bri dges for taking a con tin di co lla uo us stream of men in single file . In ad tion p - sible boats had been provided , together with mud mats and scalingJadder s for negotiating stretches of mud and the steep brick walls of the Canal banks . Finally , some genius hit on the novel idea of making use of life-belts on a considerable scale . The latter idea in particular promised considerable prospects of success the autho ri ties at Boulogn e were telegraphed for the life-belts from

- l some of the leave boats , and over were co lected and were sent up and issued to the storming troops . On the 27th September arrangements were made for a dress rehearsal to take place , and men loaded with full kit as for a storming party were detailed to test each fi typ e of means for crossing the Canal . The rst attempt B iheco ur t was made near , but enemy shelling of batteries in the vicinity was so persistent and interfered so much with the preparations for the trial that it was postponed by order of General Campbell until the next day . On 28th the , therefore , the party proceeded to the moat at Chéteau Brie on the Somme , where the practice was carried out in front of the Divisional Commander in the pouring rain , but with good results . It was discovered by actual experience that the collapsible boats , which u req ired four men apiece to carry them , could be opened a hi and l unched in twenty seconds , w le men , weighted with their storming kit but supported with life-belts fixed d i high up on their bo ies , were able to sw m across a stretch of deep water , forty yards in breadth , and could not drown . Similar experiments were made with a man who

C HAPTE R II

D C THE S T C AN D THE STAFFOR S ROSS . QUENTIN ANAL BREACH THE HIN D ENBURG LINE

PREPARATIONS being sufficiently far advanced by that 2 th Z date , the 9 September was chosen as day , or 28th 2 th the day of the attack , and the night of the / 9 was spent by the General Staff and Headquarter Adminis tr ative Services in putting the final touches to the plans to which I have already referred , and to arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded , and for dealing with the in rush of enemy pri soners which might be expected if the attack was successful . During the same time the fi ghting troops were moving up to their assembly positions . 1 th ff The 37 Infantry Brigade , composed entirely of Sta ord i d - sh re troops , under Briga ier General J . V . Campbell , V C . . , had been chosen to lead the Division in the assault on the Canal and the Headquarters of this Brigade was moved on this night to the dug-outs in the support line of trenches which had already been selected for them , The troops themselves were disposed on the fo rmin g up line which had been taped out under the ffi direction of Engineer o cers , the tapes being laid parallel

- to , and two hundred yards behind , the starting line for the creeping barrage . 1 The troops of the supporting Brigade , the 38th In fan tr y Brigade of Leicesters and Lincolns , under Brigadier

General F . G . M . Rowley , D . S . O and the 139th

4 4 - P V C C M G D S O V C M . . G N . . B . . A , RIGA RIGADIER E ERAL J BELL , , B DE COMMAN DER T3 7 TH I N FAN T RY BRI G ADE

n n e r o u e b o ur tes o f . usse 8L S o n s 1 ak er S tr e e t o o R p d c d y c y J R ll , 5 , B , L d , 4 4]

THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 45

Infantry Brigade of Sherwood Foresters , under Brigadier

. r General J Ha ington , were also moved up into h i their positions during the night . They were t us d sposed ffi so that immediately the situation had cleared su ciently , they could move forward to the forming—up position at which they were to take over from the 1 37th Infantry Brigade and continue to press the attack until the final

obj ectives of the Division were reached and consolidated . Similar positions for Brigade Headquarters had been m selected , and the troops of both Brigades were conce ’ t r ated where as much shelter as possible from the enemy s fir e n u retaliatory was available , in order to avoid in ri necessary casualties . Casualties all three B gades were caused duri ng the night by enemy gas and high

explosive shells , and work was much interfered with di by this shelling , which , however , ed away towards

morning , giving satisfactory proof that the enemy did

not anticipate any immediate attack on a large scale . The general dispositions of the Division for the attack were as follows 1 The area to be occupied had been divided into two

main obj ectives , each limited by a line running almost

due north and south . These were marked respectively on the map issued by the General Staff before the action d r een by a r e and a g line , and for convenience of reference may be referred to as the Red and the Green

obj ectives . fi These main obj ectives were again subdivided , the rst blue into two portions by a line , and the second into three approximately equal portions by a green and a lu dotted b e line . These subdivisions were made to enable the assaulting troops to rest and reorganize under a ’ protective barrage of a few minutes duration , and each line was Chosen as bein g either a definite element of the 46 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LIN E enemy organization or a natural feature of the ground over which the attack was taking place . i Their positions would , of course , also be ind cated by the halt of the artillery barrage behind which the troops z would organi e . The intermediate obj ectives were made use of to enable leap-frog tactics to be utilized within the attacking Bri gades— one battalion passin g i through another to the attack , the tired battal on mean while remaining behind to mop up and consolidate a ai defensive line , while it was at the same time av lable to reinforce the fresh attacking battalion if necessary . 1 ri r To the 37th Infantry B gade , as al eady stated , was allotted the task of leadi ng the Division across the Canal . This Brigade was detailed to overcome any enemy resist ance west of the Canal , to cross the Canal itself , break through the main defences of the Hindenburg Line east of the Canal , capture Bellenglise , and advance to the

Red obj ective , where a defensive position was to be consolidated and the other Brigades would pass through to continue the attack . On this line the artillery barrage under which the troops u advanced was sched led to halt for three hours , a dense protective barrage being put down meanwhile to cover l the work of conso idation , to conceal the movements of ri the advancing B gades , and to prevent enemy coun ter attacks . During this interval of three hours the troops told o ff for the purpose were to complete the mopping-up of the 1 rh a area occupied by the 37 Inf ntry Brigade , and the i 1 8th rema ning two Brigades , the 3 Infantry Brigade on the left and the 139th In fantry Brigade on the ri ght , were to move up , deploy on the Red obj ective , and , i when the barrage l fted , to move forward to the capture c of the Green obj e tive , where they in their turn were to THE BATTLE OF BE LLE NGLIS E 47 consolidate and allow the 32 n d Division to pass through d e them to a istant obj ective . As will be se n the al 6th programme lotted was , so far as the 4 Division was concerned , carried through according to plan . To the storm ing Infantry was allotted a few sections of E ngineers for purposes as already outlined when describ E i ing ng neer preparations , while the remainder of the Divisional Engi neers and the Pioneer Battalion followed C a lose in the re r of the assaulting columns , bringing up

- bridging and road making material . The artillery programme has already been referred to

above . The particular feature of both the creeping barrages was the inclusion of a proportion of smoke l i shel , th s being intended to aid the concealment of hi z movement be nd our lines , and also to emphasi e the i l fts of the barrage , thus enabling the Infantry to n j udge more easily when a forward move was taki g place . i l fi Certa n y the rst obj ect of the smoke was achieved , though how far the artificial smoke was aided by natural fi i . fog is d f cult to estimate Owing to the fog , how

ever , the second obj ect was not so successful , and the lifts were not so well defined as they would have been

in clear weather . In order to thicken the barrage in its

- initial stages , a machine gun barrage was arranged to be - zud super imposed upon it . For this purpose the Life

1 M. C Guards M. G . Battalion and the ooth . Battalion u were attached to the Division , and placed nder the

th M. 6 G . l m Q C . com and of the 4 Batta ion , Lieutenant

w D . t Lann o e S . O. Colonel D . Ma hew , Two compan ies of tanks had been detailed by the IX Corps to cross over the Bellicourt Tunnel as soon as the Americans on the left of the Division had captured

their first obj ectives . They were then to move down the 6th south on to the front of 4 Division , when they 48 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LIN E were to assist the 138th and 139th Infantry Brigades , o e n company of tanks to each Brigade , in the advance from the Red line .

‘ Fo rming-up was successfully carried out on the night 1 th n before the attack , the 37 Infantry Brigade lini g up on the j umping- off tape on a three -battalion front while the 138th and 139th Infantry Br igades formed up - w some distance in rear on a one battalion front , ith orders that their leading battalions should occupy our old front line as soon as the attacking B ri gade had left . These leading battalions were instructed to detail one company each to follow the assaulting troops closely and assist a in mopping up the area west of the Canal . At the s me time the battalion commanders were instructed to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce the 13 7th Infantry ri ri B gade should this B gade , having crossed the Canal , be in danger of being outfought in the trench system beyond it . The remainder of the supporting Brigades were instructed not to move forward until orders were received from Divisional Headquarters . Z fi a m . S 2 h ero hour was xed for on eptember 9t . Even without an intimate knowledge of the gr ound a study of the trench -map of the Canal defences will S how the magnitude of the task which confronted the at tacking

Brigade . Well might the enemy be of the opinion that their positions were impregnable . As zero hour ap pr o ached there was no thought of rest for the S taff who had planned the attack , and who realized how much

might hang on the result of the next few hours . If the attack proceeded according to Schedule , there was no end to the possibilities opened up . Indeed , the end of the war would be brought very appreciably nearer . A suc

50 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

of the thickening of the mist due to the smokefrom the

shells , which soon produced an impenetrable fog . Keep ing direction in an early-morning attack is a S ign of i good leadership at the best of times , but on th s foggy — day when, even behind the lines so far back as ffi Divisional Headquarters, o cers and men were wandering about in vain endeavour to fin d their way— it required positive genius to succeed in leading straight to pre

arran ged obj ectives . A certain amount of confusion did

result from this fact , but fortunately the very nature of the obstacles to be encountered helped the advancing

fir st - i troops , and the Brigade fell upon the l ne trenches i in fair order and fleshed their bayonets , kill ng most of

the garrison , who , to do them justice , in spite of the barrage and their surprise at the unexpected attack put ,

up a stout enough resistance . Taking thi s first system of trenches in their stride and leaving stray Germans and individual strong- points to be dealt with by the mopping u n p parties of the supporting compa ies , the Staffordshi re z men , with barely a pause to reorgani e , swept on to the

banks of the Canal well up to time , whilst the I st Division , wi in accordance th Corps orders for the battle , formed a strong defensive right flank from our original trenches l l along the spur towards Bel eng ise . The enemy barrage fell on our trenches five minutes

after the troops had left , showing that , while his

batteries were on the alert , no particular attack had

. fi been expected By that time, our troops were ght

ing in the enemy outpost line , and suffered very few S casualties from his hells . His Artillery Comman d , i however , were quick to real ze that their guns were not likely to do much to hinder our attack unless S the range was hortened , and , before our troops were over the Canal , they took the risk of shooting down their THE BATTLE OF BE LLENGLISE 51

own men who would be intermingled with ours and , in e a last att mpt to smother the attack on the Canal , laid w do n a barrage j ust to the west of it . This was well

l c directed and powerfu , and aused many casualties to all three of the attacking battalions before the Canal was crossed .

r - The attack was car ied out on a three battalion front , 1 6 f 1 the / th South Sta fords being on the right , the / 5th f 1 6 South Sta fords in the centre , and the / th North f e Sta fords on the left . All three battalions reached the w st ffi bank of the Canal without too much di culty , though here and there individual companies were held up by machine gun posts and opportunity was thus given for the display

fi S of initiative by of cers and N . G. O . in overcoming these f obstacles . The experiences of the di ferent battalions f at the Canal and beyond it , however , di fer to such a marked extent that a clearer V iew of the action can be obtained if their adventures are considered separately and in detail . On the right the 6th South Staffords attacked in four waves, each of one company, on a front of four hundred yards . Few casualties were suffered in overrunning the i i German outpost l ne , and on reach ng the Canal it was l found to be dry , or nearly dry , on a most the whole x battalion front . What little water e isted was on ffi the left , and here o cers swam across , taking lines with di fi them , their men following without much f culty on

- rafts , or by pulling themselves along the life lines fi already placed in position by the of cers . In the centre i i and on the r ght of the battal on front , the attacking troops waded across , or crossed by means of rafts of cork and petrol tins thrown down on the mud in front of them . There was a little wire under the water — where water

— existed near the eastern bank of the Canal , but this did 52 THROUGH THE H IN DENBURG L IN E

not give much trouble . The enemy defended the eastern u bank of the Canal with bombs , and with machine g ns which were sited in concrete emplacements so arranged fi a as to en lade the Canal . The sting had been t ken out

, of the resistance , however , by the intensity of the barrage l C which had been so heavy , so we l directed , and so losely a followed up by our Infantry , that in m ny cases garrisons of enemy strong-points and trenches were unable to emerge before the positions were rushed by the advancing diffi ex eri troops . For a few minutes some culty was p n d n e ce in gaining a footing on the eastern ba k , but ,

- fir e owing to the fog , accurate machine gun at anything but point -blank range was impossible and considerable parties of our men made good their positions . The enemy then surrendered freely , prisoners being collected in batches and sent back under the care of one or two S lightly wounded men . As soon as the machine -gun nests an d posts immediately on the bank of the Canal had been cleared sufficiently to ffi enable our men to deploy , the o cers sorted out their n commands as far as possible , and the leading compa ies n advanced to the attack of the Blue line , a conti uous line of trenches with numerous and well-constructed strong points .

acco m Great as the task had been , the crossing was plished up to time the reorganization of the companies a engaged took place under a protective b rrage as arranged , and the advance to the Blue line was commenced as soon

z as the barrage lifted , at ero plus one hour and forty minutes . ai w an Here ag n , the troops were faced ith obstacle that might well have sufficed to hold them up for several hours and the trench system was very stubbornly de u fi fended , enemy machine g nners ghting well , many of THE BATTLE OF BE LLE NGLISE 53 u them being bayoneted at their g ns . Nothing could o f withstand the dash the troops , however , inspired as fi they were by the splendid leading of their of cers . In small parties and protected by the fog , they worked their way up to within a short distance of the enemy S trenches , then , rising with a hout , dashed in with the bayonet , the enemy giving way in all directions and n many of them maki g good their escape through the fog , in spite of considerable casualties inflicted by the artillery as they retired .

At the Blue line , a slight pause was made while the much disorganized C ompanies sorted themselves out as far as possible collecting small parties of men , and officers rearranging these parties into platoons and companies , and explaining to the section leaders under them their next objective in the attack on the Red line , which was commenced immediately the barrage lifted and permitted forward movement to be resumed . fi A slight adjustment had to be made rst , however , and the first and third companies advanced behind the hi creeping barrage , w le the second and fourth com e i p nies turned aside , chang ng direction to the right n and entering Belle glise . The organized defences of this village had meanwhile been dealt with as a p o ssible menace to the attack to right and left of them . Special groups of heavy artillery had been told o ff to pay particular attention to them and , during the initial stages of the assault , Bellenglise had been so well pounded that the machine gunners and In fan tr y holding the village had had little opportunity to assist in repulsing the general attack . — a m Now , in accordance with plan phrase com on enough in German c o mmuniqués but significant in the present connection— the heavy gun s switched on to the 54 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

Lehaucour t - - villages of and Magny la Fosse , which lay

- within the objectives of the leap frogging Brigades , and the Infantry rushed in on the village of Bellenglise and

mopped it up , paying particular attention to the cellars

and the entrances to the famous Bellenglise tunnel . It was from this tunnel that the 1 37th Infantry B rigade

drew the greater part of the prisoners captured by them , nearly a thousand officers and men being discovered in

this retreat alone .

Having thus accomplished their task the battalion , f which had su fered surprisingly few casualties , proceeded z to organi e the Red line , in which task they were much hampered by enemy machine-gun fir e from the eastern n fir e fi l end of Magny Valley, until this harassi g was na ly

silenced by some of our own Lewis gun detachments . Runners were then despatched to the rear with the fi news that the rst objective had been taken , and the men found what shelter they could and settled down

- to rest , prepared to repulse a counter attack should any

be made . 1 th f The centre battalion , the / 5 South Sta fords , who were detailed to attack on a somewhat wider front than

the troops on their right , formed up with two companies 00 in line , each on a frontage of 5 yards . Owing to the severe casualties this battalion had suffered while repulsing the enemy counter-attacks on the 2 8th

September, the orders for the attack were altered at the

last moment , the third and fourth companies being com b in ed into one supporting company . When the battalion advanced to the attack of the trenches west of the Canal , i the right company , ow ng to the fog and smoke lost , i direction and bore sl ghtly too far to the right . This error of direction was detected in time by the battalion and commander, however, under his orders the gap b e THE BATTLE OF BE LLE NGLISE 55 tween the two companies was filled by a section of the 1 r 37th Trench Mo tar Battery . Here again , little trouble was experienced in overrunnin g the enemy trench system 160 west of the Canal , from which prisoners were taken and despatched to the rear under escort . The Canal itself contained at this point deep water and , no bridges being found intact , the men who , in i common with all the assaulting troops , were equ pped - d rm u with life belts in ad ition to their no al eq ipment , crossed by swimming or were hauled over by means of It heaving lines and planks . was in such a situation as this that the fog proved so invaluable . The farther bank of the Canal was strongly defended by the enemy with rifle fir e and light machine guns fired from concrete emplacements , but at this period of the day it was impossible to see more than a few yards , and the enemy could not tell with any certainty where our troops were until they were right upon them , when the latter lost no m ti e in charging , and quickly silenced the enemy machine ’ n guns by the destruction of the gu s crews . So quickly indeed was progress made , that comparatively few casual f i fi ties were su fered in th s very dif cult operation . This was again in great measure due to the splendid leading of both officers and Any hesitation at this juncture would have been fatal and might have resulted i in the total fa lure of the attack . It was absolutely essential for success that the troops should keep up with the barrage and make the utmost use of the fog . The courage and determination of all ranks was beyond praise , hi did but , even at t s high level , certain individual leaders so extraordinarily well and showed such resource and initiative that their efforts had a marked effect in the stormn of the Canal . n Such an i stance is that of Corporal A . E Ferguson , 56 THROUGH THE HINDE NBUR G LINE

who , after overcoming all resistance on the west side of the Canal , collected together his own section and a party of men from different units who had become lost

l , in the fog , and persona ly led them across the Canal scaling the east bank against considerable opposition , - C a i chasing the enemy down their own dug outs , and le r ng

In N . C . O the trench line opposed to him . this way , this fi with a small party of about fteen men , was responsible for the capture of ninety-eight prisoners and ten machine i w guns . Another name which will rema n associated ith the capture of this portion of the Canal is that of Sergeant who i W . Cahill , although unable to sw m , plunged into the Canal and got across as best he could with a number of men he had collected round him . These men he at once led to the top of the eastern bank , where he found fli l s an officer and a small party of our men in di cu tie .

e a he Without h sit tion attacked the enemy , captured four machine guns , and held on to his position on the Canal bank until the remainder of our men had crossed and the enemy resistance was completely overcome . The thickness of the fog had caused the companies at v this point to be ery mixed up indeed , and other similar cases occurred of parties composed of men of several different units being collected by an officer who had

. W . . wn lost his own men Second Lieutenant B Bro ,

collecting a small party of twenty men in this manner , plunged into the Canal at the head of them and n obtained a footi g on the right bank of the Canal , ri u captu ng four machine g ns and their crews . Having secured this post , he returned into the water and i - i rema ned waist deep for nearly an hour , haul ng men fi z across , then nally reorgani ed them and led them r w a fo ard in the next dvance . In spite of the greater difficulty caused by the water

THE BATTLE OF BE LLE NGLISE 57

in the Canal , this battalion also succeeded in keeping up i w th the barrage on the east bank of the Canal , and re

z n organi ed under the protective barrage , before advanci g

to the capture of the system of trenches beyond . Here the support company j oined up with the advanced i compan es , and the whole moved forward to the Red

w . obj ective , hich was taken without further trouble One

of the companies of the battalion , at this time under

Second Lieutenant C . Jones , who had taken over command of the company when his company commander was

severely wounded , was detailed to assist the right battalion by Clearing the northern portion of the village of Bellen

glise . This he did so successfully and speedily that he

was able to take it almost in his stride , and advanced with the remaining companies of the battalion to the fi nal obj ective , after capturing eight machine guns and fi four eld guns on his way . This enemy battery , like

many others met with during the day , remained in action

until the last moment , when they were surprised by our

troops and captured . It is likely that the delay in limbering up and falling back was due in this case to a lack of knowledge of the exact situation owing to the

fog , but it is noteworthy that , in this and in subsequent

actions in which the Division took part , the enemy i w artillerymen , l ke his machine gunners , fought very ell

indeed . The former manned their guns until the last fi S moment , ring over open ights at our advancing troops , and often fought bravely with their ri fles when no longer f if able to use their guns with e fect . Far d ferent was their exce action from that of the Infantry , who , with a few p z fi tions , were demorali ed from the rst , and seldom put up ri a stiff resistance , surrende ng freely , as they did on this

occasion , as soon as there was any reasonable excuse for hi un doin g so . Had it not been for the mac ne g ners in 58 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE particular the Division could have reached its obj ective very much quicker and with much fewer casualties than it did , though as it was the success of the attack was phenomenal . Perhaps the most dramatic scenes of the attack on the

Canal occurred on the front attacked by the left battalion , f li the 1/ 6th North Sta fords . This batta on was given a 800 frontage of attack of yards , and formed up with two companies in line and two in support . It was known to the staff that the R iqueval Bridge on the left of the battalion obj ective was the main artery of supply for the German troops on the west S ide of the Canal and that this bridge had remained undestroyed up to the C previous evening . There was therefore a possible hance z of the bridge being sei ed intact , and Captain A . H . Charlton with his company were detailed to attempt its fi capture . This of cer led his company by compass ri i bearing towards the b dge , but when descend ng the ravine leading towards it was held up by machine gun fir e from a trench defending the approach to the z bridge . Captain Charlton , reali ing the urgency of the i situation , took forward a party of n ne men , captured the gun , killing all the crew with the bayonet , and then rushed the bridge . The sentries on the bridge and the pioneers who had been detailed to blow it up had been forced to take shelter from our bombardment , but seeing

fir e our men approaching rushed out to the charges . A race ensued , which was won by the assaulting troops , S the nearest N . C . O . hooting all four of the Germans , ffi z while the o cer sei ed the leads , cut them , and threw the charges into the Canal . Sentries were then posted ri on the b dge , and the whole of the company stormed across and mopped up the trenches and enemy posts on the the east side of Canal .

THE BATTLE OF BE LLE NGL ISE 59

In addition to this bridge , on to the repair of which the 466 th Field Company was immedi ately turned the battalion was fortunate enough to fin d several foot -br i dges

over the Canal , and use was also made of a concrete dam hi ’ of stout construction , from w ch the enemy s wire was u q ickly Cleared . In consequence of the presence of these bridges little trouble was experienced by this battalion

crossing the Canal , and our troops poured over so quickly that the enem y garrison was taken by surprise and was

unable to oppose our advance . The company first over the R i ueval B ri dge itself . q 1 0 captured 3 prisoners in one trench , including a battalion

commander and his staff .

S z At the Blue line , when the light pause for reorgani a

tion took place , the supporting companies passed through the advanced companies , who in their turn formed up

behind them . The whole battalion then swept forward fi h to the capture of their nal objective , w ich was reached by the leading companies immediately after the barrage had passed over it and halted beyond . H ere the battalion consolidated , sent up success signals , and despatched

runners back to Brigade Headquart ers to report . a m Thus by . . , in the space of two hours and thirty

- minutes , exactly according to time table as laid down by f 1 the Divisional Sta f , the troops of the 37th Infantry Brigade had overcome enemy opposition west of the

St . Quentin Canal , crossed that obstacle , and stormed through a line which the Germ ans believed to be im i pregnable , and wh ch had been strengthened with every device that the Masters of modern fortifications could invent . Well might the men of the Brigade , resting on their obj ectives and awaiting relief by the supporting i ’ troops , feel content with their morn ng s work . Already some enemy prisoners were on their way back 60 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE m towards the divisional cage , and a considerable nu ber of machine guns and field guns were among the captured material . The casualties of the Brigade , including those sustained during the counter - attack of the night of the 2 th 28th 2 fi 7 / September , amounted in all to some 5 of cers and 555 men . The majority of the wounds were due

- fir e to machine gun and were comparatively slight , and the total was amazingly small compared with the results gained , being in all probability considerably less than

the total of enemy dead and wounded, exclusive of the ri p soners already referred to .

6 2 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

r t , every description , wande ing abou in all directions and with little hope of finding their way any where until the mist cleared . From time to time a slight clearing of the mist would enable men with their wits about them to sight some well-known landmark and to make progress in the right direction , so that gradually the whole mass worked away from the so und of the guns and so drifted back towards Le Verguier , Vadencourt and other posts , ffi where they were sorted out by the Tra c Control , placed

’ i to their on the r correct roads, and started off destina tions . The stream continued , however , and until the fog cleared shortly after noon there was little reli ef in f the situation behind the line . Much su fering must have been caused to the walking wounded through their in

fin d - ability to the aid posts prepared for their reception . The effect of the fog on the Divisional communications l i . v h was especial y noticeable A complete sual sc eme , on which a great deal of energy had been expended , was u rendered seless by the fog . Lines which were intact before the fog commenced were continually broken , more fi fir e by traf c than by shell , and, once broken , it was a i matter of hours sometimes before the far end of the l ne , which might have been dragged several hundred yards by transport , could be discovered . Still more difficulty was experienced in laying forward lines during the early stages E of the battle . nemy shelling caused frequent breaks in the lines as they were being laid , and the broken ends , hurled outwards by the force of the explosion , could only iffi be collected and brought together with d culty , by which time a test would betray the fact that a similar accident had occurred farther back , and the whole work was to do over again . The remaining resource of ri Signals , a system of despatch ders and orderlies , reinforced before the commencement of the action by a THE BATTLE OF BELLE NGLISE 63

platoon of corps cyclists and a troop of Cavalry , was of more use . But even here trouble was experienced . The roads were badly cut up behind our lines and were non

in - existent front of them , so that motor cycle despatch

riders were forced to work on foot . Here again the fog was a ser ious obstacle Formation Headquarters were almost indiscoverable , and orderly after orderly left Divisional

Headquarters not to return until well on in the afternoon .

- In a similar manner , stretcher bearers going out after wounded cases were again and again lost , and were in

some cases several hours before returning to their unit . One such case is worthy of particular mention as typical of the initiative which was perhaps the most characteristic feat ure of the behaviour of the rank and file throughout the action , and which helped to make the Battle of Bellenglise , which , like the Battle of Inker ’ in War l di man the Crimean , was essentia ly a sol er s battle , such a marked success . M 1 2n d M F Private H . osley , of the / North idland ield

Ambulance , together with Private H . George of the same the 1 th unit , were attached to / 5 Leicesters and followed them up Closely in their advance . They then found a wounded infantryman , dressed him , and , having no stretchers with them , they took waterproof sheets from four German prisoners and made them carry the case , intending to make for the Advanced Dressin g Station at

Jeancourt . - On the way down , groans were heard from a dug out , so Mosley went down and found six wounded Germans , who gave him to understand that our men had thrown - s a bomb into the dug out . The two men dre sed the

Germans , and , taking waterproof sheets from a further twelve prisoners , they made up rough stretchers and forced these men to carry their wounded comrades . 64 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE

AD S They then carried on towards the , but came across a tank which had been knocked out and from whi ch they drew a wounded of ficer and two wounded men , whose wounds they dressed , and then made pris oners carry them also .

Near the St . Quentin Canal , the party had to take cover for some time owing to the intense shelling , and during this time three more of the prisoners were wounded .

When again able to go forward , another party of twenty Germ ans was requisitioned and made to take their turn at carrying the patients .

On arrival at the Bellenglise Tunnel, Private Mosley then found four of our own wounded men and six wounded

Germans . He therefore foraged around and discovered rm i a party of thirty more Ge an pr soners , dressed the wounded, improvised stretchers in the same manner as before and once more resumed the road to the dressing station , which was reached without incident and without further addition to the convoy . This now consisted of twenty stretcher cases and seventy-five unwounded prisoners ! quite a large enough command for two full privates of the British Army , and one which proved a source of some embarrassment to the British Field Am b ulan ce attached to the Americans , to whom the command

. was handed over A rolling stone may not gather moss , but on this occasion the wandering private acted rather on the principle of the snowball rolling down hill through fresh snow , and managed to collect as many prisoners as are nor mally captured as the result of a z successful action of some si e . The fact that no attempt at escape was made is a significant comment on the m o ral ri of the German p soners generally , who in all cases ri showed a marked desire to reach the B tish cages . Meanwhile Divisional Headquarters wer e anxiously THE BATTLE OF BE LLENGLISE 65

fi awaiting some de nite news of success , although all rumours pointed that way . The G . O . C . was , however , fi f quite con dent that once the Sta fords crossed the Canal , he could rely on them being resolutely and Closely sup Leices ported by the Sherwood Foresters , Lincolns , and fi ters . Every of cer and man knew the task ahead and few orders were needed . There was no thought of failure , and every battalion of the Division backed up closely like the members of a trained football team . At about nine o ’ clock the welcome news was received from General Campbell that his left and centre battalions fi had crossed the Canal , though there was no de nite news from the right battalion . Later a message came in from R E . A Lieutenant Reid , . commanding the Divisional

Mounted Detachment , that a wounded sergeant had re ported definitely that the 8th Sherwoods were crossing the Canal .

It was enough . Orders were instantly issued for the whole Division to press forward to the barrage and to advance straight on their objectives . The Divisional Commander ’ s confidence in his leaders fi was fully justi ed , and before the orders reached the

Brigades the troops were already in motion . A great victory appeared to be in sight . The whole Division was now definitely launched across I st l the Canal . On the south , the Division had ga lantly and quickly carried through its task of protecting our fi flank . From the north reports were at rst favourable , but became more disquieting later .

This was , however , no occasion for thinking about — flanks ! a break - through was intended and break i through we did , holding every yard ga ned and taking l every inch of our al otted obj ectives . Perhaps at no time durin g the battle was better work 66 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE done than the feat performed by the officers and guides who were responsible for bringing the 138th and 139th Bri gades into position on their forming-up line in time for the final assault from the Red obj ective . Both west and east of the Canal the roads were choked with the human flotsam and j etsam from the battle , and with transport and details moving towards the front line . The fog was as thick as at any time during the morning , and ’ on occasion it was difficult to see one ’ s hand before one s face , while a great portion of the march had to be made -d fin d ffi over ill e e tracks , which were di cult enough to pick out even in moderately clear weather . The compass e had to be relied on almost entirely , and the only h lp received was at the various b ridges over the Canal . Here E ngineer officers with compasses were able to take bear ings and to assist such small companies of men as had m been separated from the main colu n , by giving them the direction they would have to keep in order to reach their l correct positions in the ine . Here again , as in other o o r phases of the battle , the fog afforded unlimited pp tunities for the exercise of the qualities of leadership on the part of subordinate commanders , and seldom indeed fi S did these fail to make the best of a dif cult ituation . The new forward move entailed a cer tain rearrange ment of the Artillery , those batteries in position at a distance from our old front line being now firing at ex

treme range . To adjust matters, the Brigades moved forward immediately the Red objective was reached

fir to positions already selected , where lines of e had r been previously marked out . The fo ward move was

carried out most expeditiously , and the Brigades came into action again and were able to take their part in the creeping barrage when the advance from the Red line ’ h was commenced after the three hours alt . Finally when THE BATTLE OF BELLE NGLISE 67

the attack had recommenced , three more Brigades in rear fir e ward positions ceased , limbered up , and moved across ’

No Man s Land , taking up positions between our old front

line and the Canal , from which they were able to take fi their part in the nal protective barrage . One of these latter Brigades was heavily shelled and suffered many wi casualties , and the personnel was thdrawn from the guns for a short time until the worst of the shellin g was

over .

During the pause between the two phases of the attack , the E ngi neers of the Division were engaged mainly in superintending the work on forward roads , both west and east of the Canal , and in repairing existing bridges over the Canal . In particular, it was discovered that the r stout concrete da n , already mentioned as having been utili zed by the Infantry of the 137th Brigade in crossing the Canal , might easily be repaired and adapted to take horsed transport , so with praiseworthy initiative Lieu 66th tenant T . H . Midgley , of the 4 Field Company , who had already distinguished himself by his dash during the attack on the Canal , at once set his men to this work . The bridges were repaired or adapted by the early m fi afternoon , and, at 3 p . . , eld guns and horsed transport commenced to cross the Canal . The sections attached to the 137th Infantry B rigade had rendered the R iqueval Bridge serviceable very early in the day , and had withdrawn the demolition charges from ri several other b dges which had been mined by the enemy, but left by him undestroyed . One N Corporal E R . 66th . Openshaw of the 4 Field Company , , was in the forefront of the attack on one of the German bridges , personally accounting for a machine-gun ‘ n est to the west r of the bridge , bayoneting two of the pionee s who were

e guardin g it , and rec iving the surrender of the third, 68 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE who was able to point out the position of the demolition

charges .

2n d , In the meantime , the Engineers of the 3 Division to whom had been handed over all the pontoons and

normal bridgi ng material of our own field companies , were building the pontoon bridges over which their own transport and artillery was to pass that evening and the

following day . During the reconnaissance of the Canal bank and the strengthening of the bridges some 250 of the enemy were discovered and surrendered to the various parties of the

fi . eld companies , and were sent back under escort Another piece of useful work carried out during the afternoon and the following day was the clearing of the

Bellenglise Tunnel . In this tunnel many charges were

found and removed , and, by happy thought , the German personnel who had been in Charge of the electric-light

plant were searched for , discovered , and set to work . The mechanics then readily divulged the fact that the German

dynamo was connected to a mine , so that the tunnel would

be blown up when the engine was started . From this admission to the pointing -out of the mine was but a small

- step , and the mine was removed and the electric light

. plant set working This proved to be in perfect order,

so that the remainder of the search within the tunnel , which incidentally brought to light a certain amount of

valuable and interesting signalling and other stores , was Carried out by the light of a Ger man electric plant worked

by Ger man soldiers . a m At . . , the barrage commenced to move forward

from its protective position in front of the Red lin e , and the troops of the 138th and 13 th Infantry Brigades 9 , keeping close behind it , advanced towards the line of trenches which formed the main obstacle on the way to

70 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

the front , while the attacking troops were galled by heavy

- machine gun and rifle fir e from the right flank . It was one of those moments when battles are won and lost , but the man capable of dealing with the situation was - there to meet the emergency . Lieutenant Colonel B . W . 6 . C 1 Vann , M of the / th Sherwood Foresters , seeing that his men were held up and that the barrage was gradually outstripping them , with a corresponding increase of fir in - enemy resistance , rushed forward to the g line , exposing himself without thought for his own safety . Running from group to group of his men and encouraging z them with precept and example , he reorgani ed and led ab so the whole line forward . By his prompt action and o f lute contempt danger the whole situation was changed , the men were encouraged , and the line once more swept forward , catching up with the barrage and proceeding without further hitch to the Green line In the final s Lehauco ur t ffi as ault on the village of , this o cer again fi un distinguished himself , rushing the team of a eld g firi - which was ng at point blank range . He shot with his revolver one of the gunners who was on the point fi of ring and clubbed two others . The success of the day, in fact , was in no small degree due to the splendid fin e gallantry and leadership displayed by him . n fi After passi g the rst Green objective , the fog com menced to clear considerably , and the Whole right flank of the attack was much troubled by the enemy occupying the high ground to the south of the Canal . Machine guns from this direction swept our right flank continuously , and enemy field guns firing over open sights quickly put out of action all five tanks allotted to the 139th

. Infantry Brigade This battery was in its turn , how ever, put out of action by a small party of our men , r l a who, with g eat ga lantry and on their own initi tive, lLrE U TE N A N T- C N V C M C I 6 I’ H W S OLO EL B . W . . , . . , / SHER OOD K I N CT N A T THE TT OF R M C U T ILLED A IO BA LE A I O R .

n W e r o u e b o ur tes o f Lan ficr Ltd . 2 Old o n S tr eet Lo o n . R p d c d y c y g , , 3 , B d , d ,

THE BATTLE OF BE LLENGL ISE 7 1

recrossed the Canal and shot or bayoneted the gunners . Little trouble from infantry was experienced from this

- direction , though several feeble counter attacks were made , one mounted Ger man officer making three sepa rate attempts to rally his men and continuing his efforts until well- directed shots killed both hi mself and his horse , whereupon the men whom he was trying to rally immediately retired . It would appear that here the enemy lost his great I st chance to retrieve the fortunes of the day . The Division Artillery put down a heavy smoke barrage on i e th s flank , which was intend d as a protection against enemy action as well as cover from observation for In our own troops . the event the barrage did not prove hi t ck enough to afford a screen for our movements , though the fog at first proved an excellent substitute . Certainly it placed an obstacle in the way of a counter e - z - f attack , but a w ll organi ed counter o fensive, supported by plenty of reserves and carri ed through with as much i determ nation as our troops had shown in the attack , might have placed the 46th Division in an awkward position . The most Charitable explanation of the lack of reaction whi ch was so conspicuous a feature of the enemy ’ s fighting during th e day is that he was pinned down to hi s positions Tst by the demonstrations made by the Division , and was afrai d to involve any considerable number of troops in case of our attack extending farther to the south . The ultimate objective of our advance on the right flank i i l Lehauco urt of the Div sion included the v l age of , and , di in the attack on this village , in vidual action once more played a conspicuous part . Lieutenant J . N . Wightman , 1 6 o wn of the / th Sherwoods , having reached his objective hi u and taken several mac ne g ns , two trench mortars 72 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

and two field guns at small cost , led his men forward and pushed right through the village . In spite of opposition he managed to secure the bridge across the Canal , and succ eeded in cutting o ff many prisoners and putting z several guns out of action . He then organi ed his com pany for defence and retained his hold on the village s until the arrival of the support companie , when the whole body moved forward and occupied the line of the final objective .

On the left of the attack the 138th Infantry Brigade , fi c advancing from the rst Green line , was fa ed by the strong trench system in front of the village of Magn y-la z Fosse , beyond which was a sunken road strongly organi ed

- for defence with numerous machine gun posts . In the capture of this line the tanks of the Brigade played an important part , cutting broad swathes through the wire entanglements , which here had been very little damaged r by our artillery fi e . Wheeling after their passage through the wire , the tanks then proceeded northward enfiladin along the line of the trench and sunken road , g them and gi ving the crews of the machine guns such a bad time that they fell comparatively easy victims to the Infantry pouring through the gaps in the wire . The tanks , closely followed by the Infantry , then advanced fi towards the village , and , after a little street ghting , the resistance of the enemy garrison was overcome . At

. m . p the battalion in question , the sth Lincolns , z reached its obj ective and reorgani ed , throwing out a

- screen of Lewis gun posts , behind which the line was

. th quickly consolidated In the meantime , the 5 Leicesters, w follo ing the Lincolns , reached Knobkerry Ridge by 1 2 noon and halted there , while company commanders , in consultation with the commanders of the tanks attached to them , made their plans for the attack on the final - C B C M G D S O D C M N F . . . . . G G . . MAJOR E ERAL . BOYD , , , , C 6 TH D V S N O . G . 4 I I IO

W a te r ur n e tt SL Co td 1 2 htsb r rd e r o u e b o ur tes o f H . . . L R e p d c d y c y l B , n g , k r W e Par Co m e S . Hyd ,

74 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

The cause of the signal defeat of the enemy in the fi Battle of Bellenglise was , rst and foremost , undoubtedly

- the fin e bearing and splendid determination , of the

Infantry engaged . Superbly led , the troops at every turn did j ustice to their leaders . Other conducing causes , fi however , were the magni cent support given to the

assaulting troops by the . Artillery , and the opportune fog which completely shrouded all movement from n observation by the enemy , nullifyi g to a great extent the preparations for defence , which were based on the existence of a clear and comparatively open field of fir e n a n for his e fil di g machine guns . A fi As regards the work of the rtillery , it is dif cult to

find words to describe its excellence . To those of us who had the opportunity of subsequently examining the fi battle eld , the state of the enemy defences after the preparatory work of the heavy guns was a revelation of

. t what heavy artillery could do The Field Ar illery , in spite of the fact that most of the guns were in silent fi positions and had not registered , red a barrage which was one of the finest under which troops have ever 0 advanced during the war . N cases of S hort shooting were reported , and the Infantry throughout moved with fi fi a con dence which was fully justi ed . During the action the majority of the batteries moved forward into new

positions which had been selected in advance , but , so ex pe ditiously were the moves carried out and so well had they been planned, that they made little appreciable i d fference to the intensity of the barrage . The enemy ’ s footing on the west side of the Canal was a feature which might have been invaluable to him had f he contemplated o fensive action , yet proved in the event to be very largely the cause of his downfall . He was obliged to keep several of his bridges intact in order to THE BATTLE OF BE LLE NGLISE 75 supply an d reinforce his men on the west side of the

Canal , and it was over these bridges that the main body of the - 137th Infantry Brigade eventually poured to the attack of the defences on the east bank . If he had realized the magnitude of the projected attack and had retired over the Canal in good time , destroying his bridges behind him , there is little doubt that our

m . casualties would have been i mensely greater Indeed , the attack might conceivably have failed , though in view of the satisfactory weather conditions the latter is unlikely . A feature of the German resistance was the com ar ativel p y small amount of artillery retaliation . A strong barrage fell on our old front line after the troops had left it , and the range was shortened in time to cause us con sider ab le casualties before the leading Brigade had crossed ll the Canal . Such obvious places as Ascension Va ey and i other depressions beh nd our line , where concentration might have been expected , were also heavily punished throughout the morning , until the enemy was compelled by our success to remove his guns in order to avoid their capture , and had lost those guns he had failed to remove .

’ The failure of the enemy s ar tillery to give a good ac count of itself must also be attributed to the fog . Had fir e ir observation been possible , could have been d ected the 1 8 on our marching columns and transport , and 3 th and 139th In fantry B rigades in particular must have suffered heavy casualties while advancing to their form ing up position on the Red line . The same cause probably accoun ted for the slight use made by the enemy of his fi heavy artillery . All his ring in the early morning at an d such targets as Bellenglise Bridge , Bellenglise itself ,

La Baraque had to be done by the map . When the fog

Cleared later in the day , he must have been feeling very doubtful regarding the safety of his guns , and was 76 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE no doubt engaged in moving a large proport ion of them

to positions further back . It is difficult to estimate how far the fog which played such a decisive part in the winning of the battle was due

to natural causes , and how far to the general effect of

the bombardment , and in particular to the proportion

of smoke shell fired in the barrage . Undoubtedly the

latter tended to thicken the fog considerably , but a heavy and persistent mist in the early morning is one of the features of the weather of Northern E urope in the neigh b o ur ho o d of open water at this particular period of the

year . It is likely that the possibility of the occurrence of such a mist had been taken into consideration when

. c i plans for the attack were made In any case , ond tions

could not have been more favourable . The enemy had based his defence almost entirely on a cunningly-devised system of machine—gun emplacements en filade arranged to the Canal and , where possible , the

ground west of the Canal . From concrete emplacements approached from behind through winding entrances

- ! ” and with roomy dug outs beneath them , the Boche machine-gunners could sit in comfort with a good store

of ammunition , water , and food , and rake the Canal in both directions without the slightest trouble and with

very little danger to themselves . Nothing short of a direct hit from a heavy shell would have made an im pression on many of these small forts— for they were

else w an d nothing , theoretically , in clear weather , the passage of the Canal should have been pretty well an

l . fi impossibi ity Nothing is more signi cant , therefore , than the fact that as one strolls along the banks of the

St . Quentin Canal one can see emplacement after em

- placement , immensely strong , well sited and undamaged by our artillery fir e . Yet the occupants of these THE BATTLE OF BE LLE NGLISE 77 fortresses have long ago gone either to swell the death roll of Germany , or to add to the number of German

prisoners who are working behind our lines . The extraordinary features of the defensive scheme on our immediate front and on our left flank were un

doubtedly the Bellenglise and Bellicourt Tunnels . The latter was simply a cunningly-adapted tunnel of civilian

origin , where the Canal for some three miles passes

through a subterranean cutting . The only local interest this tunnel held was due to the reported discovery within

it of a series of cauldrons , one of which contained a dead

German , and which were said to be the outward and visible S ign of the presence of a plant for rendering down the bodies of German soldiers— a Kadaver v r w n dun san alt e e g st in fact . A close examination of

the cauldrons , however , shows nothing to uphold this i — view , and it is much more l kely indeed practically certain— that the cauldrons were used for di sinfecting '

soldiers clothes or some equally legitimate purpose . Far more interesting from a military point of view

is the Bellenglise Tunnel , which is probably the best existing monument of that painstaking thoroughness ” which is the chief racial characteristic of the Boche . fi - - This huge arti cial dug out , the spoil heap of which

has half buried the village of Bellenglise , and which must have taken many months of effort and endless

labour to complete , is an excellent example of the futility of a great part of the human effort the sum of which

goes to make up modern war . The pride of the German ’ E ngineers hear ts , it was destined to serve merely as a z shelter for several hundred demorali ed soldiers, who ri remained safely ensconced within it until , on the ar val l s of a small party of our men , they de ivered themselve

fi h t . up , glad to be nis ed wi h the war 78 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE

Both of these tunnels were capable of housing several

thousands of men , and were absolutely safe assembly places where the enemy could laugh at the worst efforts f of our artillery . For o fensive operations they would

have been invaluable reservoirs , but for the defence of

the Canal they were too close to the front line to be ideal . The fog and the indomitable perseverance with which our men kept up with the barrage and so prevented

the egress of these reserves , caused the Bellenglise Tunnel to become S imply a means of swelling the tale

of prisoners captured by our leading Brigade . Thus was the work of two years neutralized and more than z neutrali ed in three or four hours . By the next day the

victors themselves were snugly housed in the tunnel , lighted brilliantly by a Boche electric plant tended by

Boche electricians , safe from the raids of German aero

planes , and doubly safe from the shells from the German heavy guns which were at that time again making l i Bel engl se and La Baraque their principal targets . Four thousand two hundred pri soners and seventy 800 — guns , at a cost of rather under casualties such was the record the 46th Division had to its credi t on the night 2 t f of the 9 h September . The e fect on the mo ral of the enemy was to be displayed in the days that were to

come . Never again would his Infantry fight confident

in the idea that , if the worst happened , they had behind them an impregnable line on which to fall back and re — — z . organi e They knew and we knew that , whatever the

German papers might say , there could be no line to come r like the Hindenbu g Line , which had taken two years to make and on which all the resources of German military engineering and an immense amount of money and labour had . been expended! The breaking of the Hin denburg Line marked a defin ite THE BATTLE OF BELLE NGLISE 7 9

stage in the history of the war , for it opened the way to a war of movement which could only end in one way . 6th e The 4 Division had done its share . Next day we wer u r to learn that , sim ltaneously , the line had been b oken along the whole front on which it had been attacked by i the First , Third , and Fourth British Armies ! w th it was broken the backbone of German resistance and the fai th of the German people in the power of the German r A my . In this connection a quotation from the colum n Through German E yes in The Times of December 1 1 th ifi z is sign cant , and emphasi es , as nothing else has done , the importance of the action in which the 46th Division played a conspicuous part . There Professor Hans D elb r iick— a German of the Germans— writes

The turn in our fortunes began with the collapse of our attack on Rheims and the successful advance i of the French north of the Marne . Accord ng to certain observations which had been communicated f to me , Ludendor f had then already become very r unce tain at heart . Nevertheless he and Herr von Hintze duri ng the next nine weeks did nothing to ease our position politically — until on S eptember the 29th Ludendorff collapsed and completed o ur defeat ” by the offer of an armistice .

6 th sm ce I t The 4 Division , in spite of many changes 1 1 rr i had arrived in France in 9 5 , was still essentially a Te tot ial Division in the fullest and greatest sense of the i word . Noth ng could exceed the wave of feeling and pride which swept across the North Midland Counties on the receipt of news of this - one of the greatest achieve ments of the war— for which their o wn Division was respo nsible . 80 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE

Dozens of congratulatory messages were received from individuals and from institutions personally interested in the exploit of the men of their own counties , who were engaged in making history and in creating traditions to up o f lift the hearts those who should come after them , while setting a standard for future Territorials to strive to i equal . Such messages , republ shed in Divisional Orders all and read by the troops , could not fail to intensify an

m oral . ardour and raise a , already well above the average Perhaps the message which most touched the hear ts and steeled the nerves of men who not so long ago themselves had thronged the playing-grounds and class-rooms of Mid land schools , was one from the Mayor of Buxton , worthy of record in its intimate appeal Two thousand boys and girls from Buxton s chools , Derbyshire , assembled in the Market Place to-day and saluted the Union Jack in honour of the 6th glorious deeds of the 4 Division . They thank all you for you have done for them , send their love ,

and pray God to bless you all .

82 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LIN E

ff the strain of a most tremendous e ort and , though flushed — i with well merited success , the troops were to a certa n extent j aded by their previous efforts . The Battles of Bellenglise and Ramicourt may be con tr asted in a single sentence Bellenglise was a miracle Ramicourt was a victory therein lies the essential difference between them . m 0th zud At p . . on the 3 September the 3 Division 6 th n passed through the 4 Division , who were resti g on Lehauco ur t their final objective beyond Magny and , and

r , advanced , closely supported by British Caval y to what it was trusted would be the last fight the Germans should make in prepared positions this side of the Sambre

Oise Canal . The Division , however , met with more fi l opposition than was expected , and was na ly held up on the general line running between Sequehart (ex clusive ) and Joncourt (inclusive) , while in front of -Fo nsomm e i them the enemy held the Beaurevoir l ne , a partially completed but strongly wired system of trenches . He had also strong forces in Sequehart and strong posts thrown out everywhere in front of his main v line of resistance right across the front of the Di ision . On the left and right the Australians and 1 st Division were also held , and the waiting Cavalry were forced to return west of the Canal and give up the attempt to break through for the present .

It was quite clear that , if the original plan of a break o n through a large scale was to be carried out , a further attack would be necessary in order to overrun this last organized defensive position , which , though much less strong than the Hindenburg Line itself , was an insuperable obstacle to Cavalry , and , bravely defended by stout troops , i was likely to g ve Infantry also a good deal of trouble . At a Corps Conference held in the afternoon of the zud THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 83

o 6th Oct ber , the G . O . C . 4 Division was instructed to attack and capture the line Sequehart (exclusive) 2nd l Montbrehain , getting into touch with the Austra ian to - Division the north west of the latter village . At the 2n d - same time the 3 Division , side slipping to the right , was to attack and capture Sequehart , thus protecting our right flank .

Readers of this account will remember that the con clusio n 2 th of the Battle of Bellenglise , on the night of the 9 6 th i September, found the 4 Division rel eved of pressure on zud their front by the 3 Division , but with both flanks unprotected . Owing to the exposure of its flanks v n the Di ision remained in action throughout the ight , and it was not un til the early hours of the morn in g that our right flank was cleared by the occupation of Talana I il 2 n d Hill and Thorign y by the st Division . St l later the Australian Division overcame the resistance of the troops E ri opposed to them , and , advancing through t court , j oined up with the 3 zud Division well to our left front . z h This squee ed the 46t Division out of the line altogether ,

Divisional Headquarters remaining at Small Post Wood , 1 8th while the Infantry Brigades concentrated , the 3 1 Brigade to the west of the Canal , the 37th Brigade on the eastern bank of the Canal , with Headquarters and one n 1 th battalion in the Bellenglise Tun el , and the 39 Brigade also east of the Canal with Headquarters in a dug-out in the Canal bank . The latter Brigade acted as Divisional Reserve to the 32n d Division and was placed temporarily under the orders of the G . O . C . of that Division . Of the — l five 16 . . Artil ery , Brigades the th Army Brigade R H A the 1 4th Army Brigade the 23 r d Army Brigade 8th H . A 1 1 r i R . the 1 6 st Army Br gade , and the — n the R F . A d Army Brigade . . remaine in action coveri g 84 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

2n d u advance of the 3 Division , while the remaining fo r h the 5th Army Bri gade the 23 r st and 230t

F A . Brigades and the 232n d Army B rigade R . . withdrew out of action and were placed in reserve to the west of the Canal . The Signal Company meanwhile received instructions to establish a Forward Report Centre at La Baraque , on the site of what had formerly been a small farm

- - at the cross roads 500 yards north east of Bellenglise . Here were a number of deep dug-outs and one or two strong cement shelters which had formerly been the Headquarters of one of the German formations holding

' the main Hindenburg Line east of the Canal . This Report Centre with the necessary signal office and local ” fi telephone lines to G , Q , and other essential of ces - sited in the neighbouring dug outs , was completed during I st zud ~ the and October , and communication success fully established with Corps Headquarters ! with all three Infantry Brigades in their reserve positions ! an d with 3zud Division Advanced Report Centre in a dug a i fi out few yards d stant from the new signal of ce . At the same time three cable detachments were ordered up to La Baraque , ready for a move forward in the - event of a break through , while all the cable which could be got forward in the time was also collected here . All possible preparations were thus completed to meet any situation which might arise , either in the event of the Division being required to pass through the 3 zud

Division on a route march through the enemy country , or to reinforce in the event of the battle going against our troops . Subsequent events were to demonstrate that thi s prevision was to have a decisive bearing on the readiness fi of the Division to ght the battle, the plans for which

86 THROUGH THE HIN DENBURG LINE of the low rounded ridges near the Canal there was no E change . verywhere were the same gently undulating features with occasional woods or copses , the whole seamed by the sunken roads which throughout were one of the salient characteristics of the country over which the Division had fought . These sunken roads , owing to the shelter and security from observation afforded by them and the facility with which they could z f e be organi ed for de ence , wer of the greatest importance from the military point of view . It was along such roads as ran approximately north and south that the enemy , after having been pushed out of his last l prepared ine , put up his most stubborn defence while being pressed back over this Open country . Other features of the country which had a certain effect on military dispositions were the little scarps which existed along the edges of most of the valleys in the district .

At these points, where the ground rises to form the flat- contoured hills , the earth had usually been cut away to form a little cliff anything from two to six or even more feet in height ! the resultant scarp , when ri di facing in the ght rection with regard to the enemy , i afford ng shelter from observation . These faces were ll r usua y of soft ea th , chalk , or crumbly sandstone , and were used to a great extent by both combatants who , burrowed into them and so obtained a certain measure of security from Shell fir e at the cost of a minimum amount of labour . The shelter thus afforded from the weather conditions was also not to be despised as the autumn crept on , the nights grew longer , and the tempera ture fell lower . Many hundreds of men of the 46th Division will in future days look back with pleasure to the nights r spent in these little , not uncomfo table, bivouacs after ’ fi a hard day s work either ghting or chasing the Boche . THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 87

far Indeed, it may not be from true that the best days

1 18 n of many lives will be those of the autumn of 9 , whe to be alive and well was a thing to be grateful for , and when the British Army was at last obtaining a just reward all fi for its dogged and patient ghting . Little was known of the country over which the coming was battle to be fought , but , from aeroplane observat ion ’ e and prison rs statements , it had been possible to plot on our maps the system of defence known as the Beaurevoir-Fo n so mm e line where the enemy had turned 6th at bay , and which the 4 Division was now asked to

. i breach On the map , this l ne appears as a con tinuo us double line of trenches heavily protected by

- two strong barbed wire entanglements . It was appar ently stronger at the western than at the eastern end' of the objective of the Division , where , however , it was supported b y ~the organized defences of the village of Sequehart and was overlooked and en filaded by the r machine guns and a tillery on the high ground to the east . Actually a close exam ination of the line after its capture by our troops alters the values of the photographic representation considerably . Aeroplane photographs will show a line of trenches well and will betray the chief

- - strong points , but the details of a carefully prepared system such as the one under present consideration are -Fo o mm not so easily seen . The Beaurevoir ns e line was both stronger and weaker than it appeared . The un expected strengt h of the line lay in two prin al fi cip things . The rst was the stout heart of the garrison c whi h held it , properly imbued , as the men were , with a sense of its importance as the last of the German out

c . lyin g . lines of defen e The second source of strength - ft . was the presence at fi y yard intervals of strong , well e - un constructed concrete sh lters , where machine g crews 88 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

could obtain immunity from our barrage , to reappear immedi ately it had passed and mow down our attack N ing Infantry if they lagged behind it . ever had it been more important for the success of our attack that the Infantry should keep up with the guns if casualties and perhaps repulse were to be avoided .

The weakness of the line , on the other hand , consisted in the fact that its construction had never been com l 2 th p eted . Our success on the 9 September had been so wholly unexpected that work on the F o n so mme line had been restricted to the buildin g of the concrete strong an d - points , the wiring of entanglements , the tracing out

- of the lines of trenches to a spade depth only . Surely the German Higher Command must have r eflected the British cannot take the Hindenburg Line in their stride . They will attack , as on the Somme , after weeks i i of prel minary bombardment , and in the meant me we shall have plenty of time to complete the preparation of further lines behind .

On the contrary , the whirlwind attack on the Canal proved irresistible and the assault on the Fo nso mme line found the enemy to a certain extent unprepared , though the line as it was , with rifle pits three or four feet deep dug by individual defenders , was a sufficiently formidable obstacle to render the success of an attack doubtful . One feature of the Fo n somme line as it appears at present is the small extent to which it has been damaged by artillery . Near the Canal the de fences had been smashed into Chaos by our heavy artillery , so that in places it was difficult to di stinguish the original F plan on which they were built . The o nso mme line is , however, practically undamaged there is not one single concrete emplacement on the whole of the Divisional

fir front which has been damaged by artillery e, while the

90 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

position had become very obscure indeed, and had to be C leared up , on one portion of our front at any rate , by a retreat to positions well behind those held by us at the ’ conclusion of the morning s attack . When the orders for attack were received from the 2 n d IX Corps , the situation on the front held by the 3 m Division was anything but clear , and reliable infor ation could not be obtained as to the exact position of our own - i front line troops and those of the enemy . It was dec ded , di therefore , to attack from a line some stance behind i our reported front l ne , in order to make certain that the forming-up of our troops should not be interfered w with by contact ith enemy patrols . The selection of a forming-up line which could be located and on which the troops could be disposed in the darkness of the early iffi morning might have been a matter of extreme d culty . c The problem was in this instan e solved , however, by - l the presence of the Joncourt Sequehart Road , a we l marked feature running parallel to the whole front of attack and , providentially , only a few hundred yards in front of the line held by the enemy . Guides from all units were therefore selected , shown the road and en the approaches to it , and s t back to lead their units to

l - their appointed places on this ine . The actual formin g up line was taped out some 2 00 yards in front of this road a and approximately p rallel to it . To allow latitude for any possible Short shooting or i incorrect disposit on of the attacking troops , the initial b arrage line was laid down some 200 yards in advance -u of the forming p line . Here it was to wai t six minutes b efo r e ' liftin r g, in order to pe mit the Infantr y to redis tribute themselves under its shelter before moving fi forward against the rst obj ective .

‘ Per haps the ar m most affected by the shor tness of THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 91

notice before the attack was the Artillery . The C . R . A . 46th Division had under his command nine Brigades of Ar Horse and Field tillery , and with this force he was ordered to cover the front of attack of both the 46th and d v 2n . fi e 3 Divisions Of these Brigades , were already in fir e five position , and the from these was arranged so as fr bn t fir e to cover the whole of the attack , the from the i remain ng four , which had to move forward , being super r imposed upon the barrage lai d down by the fo mer . i Thus , in the event of the failure of these other Br gades ai to come into action in time , a f lure which had to be Ci reckoned with and which might , under adverse rcum l stances , have been unavoidable , there wou d be no gaps in sufli cien tl in the barrage , and the troops , though y w supported , could have advanced to time ith a fair prospect of success . Instructions were at once sent out to all Brigade Commanders to reconnoitre positions well east of the

Canal within yards of the front line , and to make the necessary arrangements to get their batteries in line and their amm unition dumped ready to open fir e z on the initial barrage line at ero hour if possible , or as soon afterwards as they could manage . In this connection it may be interesting to the civilian reader to have some account of the special difficulties of the Artillery under circumstances such as those we are considering . To deal with a particular case , the officer commanding any one of the nine Artillery groups covering the Division in the Battle of Ramicourt received his orders about one hour before dark . His preparations had to be completed and his batteries

m . n . ready for action by a. the followi g day d s Positions must be reconnoitre , hor es must be brought i up from the wagon lines , guns must be got nto posi N 92 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LI E

tion , telephone lines must be laid from Brigade Head

. quarters to batteries , barrage tables must be prepared and ammunition brought up and dumped handy to the guns . e y The group commander , taking his batt r com manders with him , proceeds direct to the area allotted to l him , and arrives with half an hour of day ight remaining in which to choose his headquarters and the battery positions . Battery positions must of course be Chosen so that they are not under direct observation of the enemy . Precautions must also be taken to ensure that the guns can clear the crest in front of them and have a Clear line of fir e to engage the targets assigned to them . The exact positions of the enemy are not known with ’ fi any certainty . A moment s thought will suf ce to Show that the difficulties of Choosing in such short time suitable n positions for four batteries , in u known country , with he ai t situation obscure and the light f ling, are all but C insuperable . When , in spite of ircumstances , battery positions have been selected and a Brigade Head u o flicer s q arters chosen, are sent back to bring the guns into position . The officers sent back have had little chance of studying

- the country , and it is by now a pitch black night . The ffi roads are crowded with tra c , tracks are deep in mud

-u - and broken p every few yards by deep shell craters . E very yard of the way there is imminent danger of gun or wagon falling headlong into a hole from which h it would take ours to retrieve them . When the posi fi a u tions are n lly reached , the g ns must be manoeuvred over shell-torn ground into the precise sites selected for them . f Meanwhile , the Brigade Staf , sitting in a hole in a

94 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

W as re ular a hole w g and adequate, so that the Infantry were able to advance behind it with confidence . The r Ole of the Heavy Artillery during the present battle was a very subordinate one when compared with the par t played by it in the attack on Bellenglise . Good work 6 - i was , however , done, both by the inch howitzers wh ch fi 6 o - u red in front of the barrage , and by the po nders and m heavier guns which bombarded Sequehart , Ra icourt ,

, and Montbrehain , together with the main approaches to and commanding features in , the area attacked . The problem of signal communications in such a battle as that projected was no small one . Very fortunately, the establishment of an Advanced Report Centre at La

Baraque provided the skeleton of a system , the details fi l S of which might be , and were , l ed in at hort notice

fi R A . C . C . under di f cult circumstances . The Signals was faced with the problem of discovering from Brigade commanders the positions which they were selecting for their new Headquarters , and anticipating their require ments by connecting these Headquarters by telephone with Advanced Division . This had to be done for nine ri B gades , and , in most cases, the lines to be laid were two n or three miles in length . It was fortu ate , indeed , that five of these Brigades were already connected to the 32n d

Divisional Report Centre at La Baraque itself , so that a

‘ short strip of poled cable 200 or 3 00 yards in length was sufficient to connect the two arteries together and to assure t emporary communication with the greater part of the Artillery . For the rest , cable detachments worked all night despite darkness and a sporadic bombardment by gas shells which was responsible for several slight casualties . On more than one occasion lines were cut ai l l as they were being l d and , in particu ar, the vi lage of

Joncour t . proved so unpleasant that the route to the THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 95 Divisional Observation Officer had finally to avoid that place . Both horses and men of the cable detach v ri ment had worked all the pre ious day and , du ng the l preparations for the Battle of Be lenglise , had had a gruelling time . Nothing daunted , however , by previous

work or present danger, all ranks persevered , and by ’ n n six five mor i g , when o clock brought us to within z — minutes of ero hour , the last line that to the Australian flank— h Division on our left was through , and bot Flank all I Divisions , the nfantry Brigades (both front and rear

Headquarters) , and eight Artillery Brigades were in touch with Divisional Headquarters by telephone . When the ri Divisional Commander and C . R . A . ar ved and the battle

began , they were able to control the whole situation from

a central point , where they could each consult the other as Artillery support was needed or Infantry dispositions n were changed . Good commu ication is essential in modern warfare where the opposing armies are far-flun g m u over many miles of country , and at Ra ico rt , under l circumstances as adverse as they we l could be , the 6th ifi 4 Signal Company just ed itself to the last man . Day broke and showed a strong and easily—maintain ed i cable network , w th both telegraph and telephone com mun icatio n i to all Headquarters , th s being duplicated by complete visual and wireless systems which , however, were not used to any great extent because the lines held o up s well . r i all Caval y , Eng neers , and Artillery , play their essential the parts in modern war , and , to understand battle , a n discussion of the n ecessary preparations which make . i so great measure for success or failure is essential . Yet , e when once the description of the battle itself is reach d , nf li m it is the I antry (the R B I . as they de ght to call the selves) who mus t perf orce— an d of right— take up the 96 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG L INE greater proportion of our interest and attention . Battles — — i can be won t rue , at tremendous cost w th little or no artillery preparation , and with little or no assistance from Cavalry or Engineers . This was proved for ever E in the early days of the war on the astern front , where the masses of ill- armed and ill-equipped Russian soldiery were driven to their death , yes , and to victory , against

f - W , the b est equipped army in E urope . ithout Infantry ~ on the other hand , no amount of artillery or other prepara ri destr uc tion can lead to any capture of ter tory , or to the

a . tion of an opposing rmy So , at Ramicourt , while the Artillery and Signals played an important part in the fin d victory , it is to the Infantry we must turn to the

! driving-force which out -fought the German Divisions opposed to us and registered another victory on the already long list to the credit of the British Armies . The march of the Infantry to the forming-up positions was carried out in the pitch blackness of a very dark night and over unfamiliar country . Despite this , how rm ever, no hesitation or trouble occurred , and the fo ing u fi p line was reached in good time . By this time , the rst glimmer of dawn made it possible for officers to locate their positions and forming-up was carried out without fi dif culty by means of the taped line , or on compass

-« bearings , all front line battalions deploying on the agreed 200 i positions yards behind the barrage l ne . Enemy e artill ry was normally active during this period , paying Lehauco ur t particular attention to Valley , and , while ai 1 6th w ting for the barrage to open , the / South Staffords were unfortunate enough to lose an officer and six men by a direct hit from a shell . The Infantry of the Division were attacking on a two Brigade front with the 139th Infantry Brigade on the 1 th n r left and the 37 I fantry Brigade on the ight , the

E 98 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LIN

ploughed by the tanks . The Infantry, pouring through through these gaps , or making their way independently

n , the wire belts , then rushed the trenches with the bayo et carrying all before them , and utterly destroying the t garrison who , to do them justice , made no attemp to , escape their fate by flight . It is estimated that practically the whole garrison of this line was wiped out , between 150 and 200 German bodies being found after the battle in the trenches on the front attacked by the 139th Brigade

F o nso mm e , alone . Immediately in rear of the line more - stiff fighting was experienced . Here enemy machine gun sections were dug in in isolated gun-pits which were very difficult indeed to deal with .

It was I n the attack on such posts that Sergeant W . H . Johnson of the I / 5th Sherwoods well earned the Victori a

Cross which was later bestowed upon him . This when his platoon was held up by such a nest of enemy his S - machine guns , worked way forward ingle handed under very heavy rifle and machine-gun fir e and charged r the post , bayoneting several gunners , and captu ing the two machine guns which had been delaying the advance .

During the attack , he was severely wounded by a bomb , but nevertheless continued to lead his men forward until , r r a similar situation occurring , he again ushed fo ward alone and attacked the post . This time , taking a leaf ’ out of the enemy s book , he made his attack with bombs and , putting both guns out of action , captured the crews , thus again enabling the troops to advance and preventing l them from fa ling dangerously far behind the barrage . Having cleared the Beaurevoir-Fo n so mme line with comparatively few casualties to themselves , the Sherwoods l then advanced on the vil age of Ramicourt , where , — however , the two leading battalions the 5th and 8th S o - herwood F resters apparently lost direction slightly , N T N S N V C 1 TH W T S . . . S HE H ERGEA W JOH O , , /5 SHER OOD . ERO OF TH E A TTAC H ON THE B E AU R E vo rR -F ON S OMME LIN E

e r o u e b o ur tes o f E . Ta o r S o n 6 r i e P a e W o r kso R p d c d y c y yl , , B dg l c , p .

100 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE

About this period of the action , it became evident that the Division on the left of the 46th Division was - not making progress according to time table , so , in

C . C order to prot ect the left flank of the Brigade , the . 8th Sherwood Foresters was directed to despatch two companies through Wian co ur t to form a defensive

r . flank . This was done and a few p isoners taken r Thus , with its flank secure , the B igade was once more in a position to move forward against the strong bodies of the enemy who had taken up their position in the sunken roads and in the railway-cutting at Ramicourt

Station , and who were likely to delay the advance con sider ab l y , unless the Infantry fell upon them while their resistance was smothered by our barrage .

At about this period of the advance , the troops also came under enfilade fir e from high groundtothe north-west of Montbrehain and slightly to the left front of the final objective assign ed to the Division . In order to avoid this fir e galling , hedges and sunken roads had to be resor ted to , and the advance in consequence now lost its ordered r nature , the men d ibbling forward as occasion served

and taking advantage of every possible bit of shelter . am During the advance to R icourt , the tanks allotted to the Brigade played a subordinate part , but they were very useful in clearing out isolated machine-gun nests -u and , especially , in mopping p the western outskirts of

Ramicourt , where , however , all but one were knocked out . The remaining tank advanced with the Infantry

until immediately south of Montbrehain , when , just before

fi - reaching the rst objective , it advanced single handed against a nest of no less than sixteen machine guns , u killing the whole of the crews of these g ns , but being fi itself disabled during the ght . From this stage the , Infantry advanced without further help from tanks . THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 101

In spite of strong resistance and fairly heavy casualties , the sunken roads at Ramicourt Station were Cleared of

the enemy without our men falling behind the barrage , h fi o b and eventually , the w ole line formed up on the rst

ectrve n - - j , a li e running north west and south east through e the southern outskirts of Montbrehain . Here , the barrag fi halted for twenty minutes , and , while the ghting troops z n fi were reorgani ed , success sig als were red , and news sent back to Divisional Headquarters of the good progress made by the attack . On receipt of this news , the sup 1 8 porting troops under the command of the G . O . C . 3 th Infantry B r igade were or dered to occupy the Beaurevoir 6 th F o n so mm e i . . . . l ne At the same time , the C R A 4 Division ordered two batteries from each group to move forward into the area west of Ramicourt ready to support any further advance or to assist the Infantry to repulse any counter~attack which might be launched after they

fi . had reached their nal objective Meanwhile , the absence of any support on our left flank had entailed the nort h eastward extension of the defensive flank already pushed

ian co ur t out in the direction of W . The greater part of the 8th Battalion of Sherwood Foresters was therefore ri now fully engaged in protecting this flank , and the d ving power of the Brigade was by so much reduced .

During the attack , as in the attack on Bellenglise , and subsequent attacks in the more open warfare which was to follow , the trench mortar batteries attached to each

Brigade , an arm of the Service which ( as its name sug ri gests) was developed du ng trench warfare , had proved of great use , but were handicapped by their comparative immobility . Sometimes , it was even found advisable to r iflem en use the personnel of the sections as , and good value from the men was undoubtedly obtained in this way . u There were many occasions , however , when the g ns did 1 02 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

c ex ellent work , either in dealing with unusually stubborn

- machine gun nests , or in the protection of an exposed fir e flank by overhead , and , throughout this and other

o fli cer s actions , all , N and men of these batteries behaved superbly , whether employed as Infantry or

Artillery . In the attack on Ramicourt , especially , one — officer of the 1 39th Trench Mortar Battery Second E d so n 1 th o r ester s Lieutenant H . g of the / 5 Sherwood F n greatly distinguished himself . Bei g determined that his mortars should play as important a part as possible in the battle , he showed the greatest perseverance and gallantry , taking his section of guns up through the heavy enemy barrage , and succeeding on three occasions in bringing them into action against the retiring enemy , causing many casualties amongst them . Later on , when d unable to keep pace with the a vance , he found a company ffi all u of Infantry whose o cers had become cas alties , so , k ta ing command , he reorganized the company and led it forward . During the subsequent advance , losing no chance of turning his technical knowledge to advantage , he showed marked initiative , twice turning a hostile — o n trench mortar on the enemy one occasion , destroying an - un enemy machine g nest and , on another , di spersing a party of enemy who were collecting for a local counter attack . The attack from the first obj ective was resum ed by the 6th Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters immediately the protective barrage lifted , and , at the start , the fresh

attack met with strong enemy resistance, heavy street fi ghting taking place in Montbrehain , particularly in the area about the cemetery which had been strongly organized for defence . This latter place was finally rushed and Cleared by a series of locally-organized small attacks , but it proved impossible to consolidate and hold

104 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

i . . gallant lead ng of Lieutenant J W Potter, overcame all opposition and rushed the teams , bayoneting or shooting those of the gunners who did not either take to i . flight or surrender , and capturing all six guns Th s of ficer then endeavoured to lead his company eastward against heavy machine -gun fir e and two batteri es of

field guns firing over open sights , but was unable to make progress against the overwhelming oppositionencountered , and was finally obliged to dig in and consolidate his position in the eastern outskirts of the village . The mopping-up of the village of Montbrehai n was

a m . completed by . , and our troops , by that time , rested practically on the objectives assigned to them in the plans for the attack . Attempts were then made to push out platoon posts to the high ground on the

- north , east , and south east of the village . The strength of the Brigade had , however , been seriously depleted ri du ng the advance , and the enemy were in great strength l and we l supported by artillery , so that all attempts to debouch from the village proved abortive . Another thing which had , of course , led to great dispersion of strengt h which otherwise might have sufficed to establish our hold on the high ground beyond the village was the , insecurity of both flanks and the consequent necessity of providing troops to make them safe . The most advanced post of the Australians lay due east of the Wian co ur t village of , so that the front held by the troops of the 1 39th Brigade was twice the length originally

. h intended On the left also , alt ough the Sherwoods - were on the inter brigade boundary , contact could not i be established with the Stafford Br gade , and parties pushed out to gain touch had been , up to this time , unsuccessful . The Staffords, owing to similar trouble - with their right flank , had side slipped considerably and , THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 105 the reserve troops pushed in to fill the gap had not yet

reached their forward positions .

Thus , twelve noon found our Left Brigade somewhat fi precariously established on their nal obj ective , and , d before procee ing to follow their fortunes further , it is necessary to turn and consider what had happened in 1 i the meantime to the 37th Infantry Br gade , which was

entrusted with the attack on the right of our front . While the attack of the l 3gth Brigade was a straight

forward assault on a frontage of some yards , and the main difficulties c onsisted in the overcoming of enemy resistance in the F o n so mm e line at one of its strongest points and the capture , or envelopment , of the villages of Ramicourt and Montbrehain , the task of the 1 r 37th B igade was essentially different . h h This Brigade , w ile attacking on a somew at narrower fi frontage at rst , was faced with the necessity of spread m ing out fanwise , in order to confor to the lack of zu movement of the 3 d Division on their right flank . Throughout the action their most difficult problems were I— ( I ) the fillin g-up of gaps due to this fanwise increase of their front ( 2) their uncertainty about the village of Sequehart ! (3) the avoidance and neutralization l of machine-gun and artil ery fir e from the high ground ri of Mannequin Hill , running as it did ght across their front . z A t ero hour , the Brigade moved forward on a two l 1 f batta ion front with the / 5th South Sta fords in support . Lehauco urt The latter were ordered to assemble in Valley . but , as the enemy barrage fell on the southern slopes of i this valley , they later moved forward to the h gh ground a bove it and so avoided further casualties . The first obstacle in the way of the advance of the 1 6 f / th North Sta fords , moving on the left of the attack , N I -o 6 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L I E

a Chatai ni s 00 400 was g e Wood , a small copse 3 or y rds square in which all the trees had been cut down and removed by the Germans , but where the brushwood afforded good concealment for enemy machine gunners

r i m n f and fle e . The Sta fords opened out on either side

of this wood , two companies going to the right and two fi to the left , while a tank red into it from the front and engaged the attention of the enemy within it . Once past it , the right and left halves of the battalion joined up again and moved forward to the attack on the F o nso mm e - I th line , while the support battalion the / 5 South Staffords— sent forward a platoo n to mop up the wood - an d the farm buildings at its north eastern corner . The latter proved to be honeycombed with dug-outs which were subsequently used by us as a Brigade Head quarters . — I 6th Meanwhile , the right battalion the / South St affords — had met with no opposition until they ad van ced against the crest of the hill immediately south Chatai n ies a of g Wood , where considerable resist nce f was encountered and overcome , the enemy su fering severely from our Lewis-gun fir e as they retreated down the valley to the eastward . Following up the retreating I 6th f enemy closely , the / South Sta fords were again held up almost immediately by the defences of the south o f Fo n so mm e ward extension the line , which runs south ’

ai d Uterte . east towards Font ne Here , considerable trouble was experienced from machine guns hidden in en concrete emplacem ts , and was not overcome until the guns had been rushed and the crews bayoneted . The battalion at this period of its advance suffered considerable casualties , but pushed on and reached its final objective ui a . on the slopes of Manneq n Hill by m . Strong patrols were pushed forward at once over the top of

N 108 THR OUGH THE HINDENBURG LI E fi sights at our advancing line . This obstacle was nally u dealt with by a party of Lewis g nners , who worked round to a flank and put the guns out of action . The al batt ion , with the exception of a small composite party of 1/ 6th North Staffords and Sherwood Foresters , now — side slipped to the right considerably and , as mentioned fill above , the support battalion was pushed in to the gap thus created . - — Meanwhile , this small party of thirty two men twenty — of the Staffords and twelve Sher woods pressed on to wards Doon Mill , which the enemy held in force and from which he poured a galling fir e on the left of the 137th

Brigade and the right of the 139th Brigade . They were , fi however , unable to reach their objective , and , nding v thev themsel es out of touch with all other British troops , were obliged to return to Neville ’ s Cross and the road ai running south from this point . Here , they maint ned their positions for two hours under en filade machine-gun fir e fi from Mannequin Hill , which nally forced a retire ment to a line running approximately north and south , ~ about yards south east of Ramicourt . 1 ai Thus , the 37th Infantry Brigade also gained its m n objectives to time , but , in order to do so , had absorbed all reserve troops into the fighting lin g and was l subsequently ob iged to fall back considerably , owing to heavy enemy fir e from the dominating ridges along its front . There appears to have been no organized counter attack on this portion of the front until late in the day , but the enemy fought stoutly and isolated posts , strongly held , prevented our line being established on the crest of Mannequin Hill and at Doon Mill as was intended those , parties of our Infantry who did get forward being sub j ected to enfilade fir e and exposed to the danger of bein g cut o ff. The open nature of the country in fact enabled , , THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 109 the enemy to dominate the situation from the high i ground on which he was able to maintain h mself , and our troops had to be withdrawn into positions where lad fi they could be sheltered from this enfi e re . CHAPTER V

ENEMY COUNTER-ATTAC KS REPULSE D— THE ADVAN CE TO BOHAIN

ONC E the attack on the St . Quentin Canal and the

Hindenburg Line was an assured success , it became evident that the front attacked by the 46th and 3 2n d

- Divisions was a likely place for a possible through break , in which the condi tions of really open warfare might quickly be established and Cavalry might come into their own again . One of the most picturesque features i beh nd the line , during these days , was undoubtedly m this concentration of Cavalry in our im ediate rear . - For some days , every dry weather track was one long line of horsemen moving up two by two ! all the roads were crowded with Cavalry transport , and the whole countryside was covered with their camps and bivouacs . Cavalry Corps Headquarters was established at the

Tumulus , and every preparation for a possible advance was made , the only flaw in the dispositions being that success would have been more probable had the fore most Brigades been camped well to the east instead of to the West of the Canal . It was originally intended to push the Cavalry through after the attack made by the 3 2n d Division on the 3oth I st September and October , but , owing to the successful — resistance of the enemy on the Beaurevoir Fo n so mme n d an d line , this idea had to be aba oned , the advan ced

N 1 12 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L I E — the sth Leicesters— was held in reserve to reinforce the 137th Infantry Brigade should their presence be required . The first counter-attack of any magnitude took place

. m on the front held by the 1 39th Brigade . At p enemy scouts were observed moving through Champignons

Copse , and these men were followed by troops in artillery

formation . Word of this movement was at once sent

Ar back to the tillery , but communication between battalion fr e and brigade was intermittent only , the lines being l di d quently broken by enemy shel s , so that the news not reach the Artillery until the counter-attack had c ommenced .

Our barrage thus fell behind the Germans , who con tinned to advance in waves until they reached the road ’ running due south from Neville s Cross . From here , the enemy in small bodies moved on down the sunken road - running south west from the Cross , and managed to make their way along this road for some 500 yards before coming under heavy Lewis -gun and rifle fir e from our tr00ps east of Ramicourt . Foiled in their advance in n x this direction , they e t worked up towards Montbrehain , f ri and , taking advantage of the cover a forded bythe quar es fi - south of that village , ltered into the south west corner of the village , where they were lost to sight . In View of this situation and of a report received at this time at Brigade Headquarters to the effect that the enemy was massing for a counter-attack north of Mont 1 th r brehain , the G . O. C . 39 B igade decided to withdraw his men from the village itself . Orders were therefore given for a line to be consolidated south of Montbrehain , utilizing the Beaurevoir-Montbrehain Railway from the Divisional boundary to 250 yards south of Ramicourt h n Station , and t e ce due south to the line already held by 1 the 37th Brigade . THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 1 1 3 It was only through the energy displayed by both ffi C . O . S o cers and N . that the withdrawal from the bottle o f ai neck Montbreh n was carried out without loss , but the troops were finally extricated from their dangerous

position and took up the line marked out for them , th M being reinforced by the 4 Leicesters and the onmouths , who were sent up from the F o n so mme line for the purpose . l This ine was held as strongly as possible , and all avail able reserves were concentrated in the sunken roads to

the north and south of Ramicourt . The enemy soon reoccupied Montbrehain and placed machine guns on

the western outskirts of the village , but all his attempts o t debouch from the village were stopped by our fir e .

During the attack , one section of our own machine guns did very good service with indirect fir e against the

advancing enemy . Throughout the day , the companies of the Machine - Gun Battalion attached to the attacking i ’ Br gades had been of immense help , engaging the enemy s field guns and his enfiladin g machine guns whenever possi

ble and inflicting numerous casualties . Great initiative was shown on many occasions by officers commanding - f un . . machine g sections , and Lieutenant W H Ho f , of the 6th - u 4 Machine Gun Battalion , particularly disting ished - en himself during a counter attack , instructing his m to take up position on a vantage -point behind the retiring Infantry while himself collecting the Infantry and leading them forward to the attack . He thus gained time for his men to establish themselves in a command

- ing position , with the result that the counter attack was held up . ’ The enemy s retaliatory fir e was much heavier during the counter-attack j ust described and for the rest of the l . r day Ramicourt itse f , and Montbrehain before its e 8 1 14 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE occupation were both heavily shelled and all civilians , were evac uated from both Villages . As Ramicourt had

- r become a death trap , our reserves were dist ibuted round

. about it , instead of in the town itself The line as now held was maintained intact until the

r d th , night of the 3 /4 October , when , on the extreme left our troops were withdrawn from the railway north of the Montbrehain-Wian co ur t Road and disposed along that road facing northwards in order to deal with a possible flank attack .

- No further counter attack was made on the left Brigade , ~

m . but , at p . , the enemy appeared to have advanced and made a gap in our line on the front held by the

1 37th Brigade and to be filtering through this gap .

w u . The advance , ho ever , was not successf l Orders were sent to the and a barrage put down in front of our i line by both field and heavy artillery . This was ma n t ain ed until the situation was cleared up , our line being z reorgani ed behind the protection afforded by the guns . Thus on the evening of the 3 r d October the Division held a line extendi ng from the north-western slopes of Manne quin Hill to where the Montbrehain-Sequehart Road crosses the German light railway between Joncourt and Montbrehain . From there the line ran to Rami court Station , thence along the Beaurevoir Railway to where the latter crosses the Montbrehain-Wian co ur t

Road , and thence along that road to the Divisional Wian co r u t . boundary , west of On the night of the 3r d/4th October that portion of the line held by the 139th Brigade was taken over in its 1 8 n entirety by the 3 th Brigade and the Mo mouths , and the former Brigade was Withdrawn into Divisional R e serve . During the whole of the 4th October the line was held

1 1 6 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

Of and it is estimated that at least 25 per cent . the men engaged in the fighting actually fleshed their t O bayonets . Certainly , the percentage of enemy dead B eaur e wounded was very high , and in places , as in the voir-F o n so mme line and the machine -gun nests behind it , practically the whole garrison were slain where they

mo ral stood . This splendid was well reflected in the behaviour of our wounded , the majority of whom asked to be patched up and to be allowed to return to the ri n - fi g line . m ora The l of the enemy , too , was very much better in the Battle of Ramicourt than at Bellenglise . Not only did the machine gunners and the artillerymen— who — fi have always fought stoutly put up a good ght , but the

Infantry also showed very great determination , especially

- in the counter attacks . These were pressed energetically h and wit considerable initiative , small parties steadily making their way along hedges and sunken roads under fir very heavy e from our men . All the enemy troops must have been impressed with the importance of the line they were holding and with the dire results which would i - inev tably follow a break through at this juncture . His object was to hold on here at any cost , and thus to ri - ensure a steady retreat to the next ver line . This object , as the sequel was to show , was in great measure achieved , though he was compelled to leave behind much valuable material . No account of the battle could be considered complete were reference not made to the fin e work carried out by the in the attention to and evacuation of the wounded . An advanced dressing station was estab lished - - in Magny la Fosse , and the wounded from the aid-posts on the greater part of the front were i dealt w th expeditiously at that station . The road THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 1 17

i from Leverg es to Magny was , however , hopelessly blocked

by a derelict tank , and cases that would normally have been brought from the left sector of the attack by this road were , instead , taken direct to the IX Corps main

- dressing station at Vadencourt .

Throughout the action , there was an entire absence of

confusion in the medical arrangements , and evacuation

proceeded smoothly and quickly , over men being fi dealt with during the ghting . The doctors and staff worked unremittingl y from early in the morning until

- late at night . The drivers of the motor ambulances are

c man also entitled to a spe ial meed of praise , v of them - working continuously for twenty four hours on end , driving at the risk of their lives through areas which i were heav ly shelled both with gas and high explosive . Many casualties occurred in the during the th day , and , on the early morning of the 4 October after ,

e - all pati nts had been evacuated , a high explosive gas

shell burst at the door of the A D S . at Magny and three ffi o cers and twenty other ranks were badly gassed . Maj or ri S . S . B . Har son , in command , continued to perform hi s

duties , though badly gassed , and visited all posts before he would permit himself to be evacuated . This very gallant officer died of his wound and gas poisoning in the a - l o th c sualty clearing station on the October .

- During the attack on Mannequin Hill , Lance Corporal 1 6 th f Coltman , of the / North Sta fords , being in charge of — the stretcher bearers attached to his unit , earned the Victori a Cross by conspicuous bravery in the rescue of badly wounded men . Already the proud possessor of the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Military

Medal , in each case with the coveted bar which indicates C . . O that the decoration has been twice won , this N . has himself contributed a brilliant page to the history of the 1 1 8 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

i fi Divis on . During the heavy ghting about Mannequin

, Hill , word was brought to him that three of our men too severely wounded to move , had been left behind when the battalion retired on account of the overwhelming enfilade fir e from the summit of the hill . On his own

- initiative , Lance Corporal Coltman then went forward into the valley in which the men had been left and , under concentrated enemy artillery and machine-gun fir e , succeeded in locating them , dressed their wounds , and carried each one to his stret cher squad in rear of our line , thus saving their lives . Without pause or rest , he assisted in dressing and carrying wounded for forty f eight hours , his e forts continuing until the last man had been attended to . The forward work of the officers and stretcher-bearers ai of the Field Ambulances was also beyond pr se , many

v u r indi iduals disting ishing themselves by their effo ts .

C . . . . I I st Major H D Lane , M , of the / North Midland Field

- Ambulance , during the attack on the Beaurevoir Fon l somme ine west of Ramicourt , pushed forward through ’ n the e emy s barrage and , although wounded , continued to search for and withdraw wounded under very heavy shell fir e and aimed machine—gun fir e from the left

flank , from which the enemy could not at that time be dislodged . Later , being informed that civilians had been released in Ramicourt , he went forward to that Village and collected them together . He then placed them in safety , supplied them with food , and took the utmost care of them until they could be removed out of danger . The presence of civilians in Ramicourt and Mont ai breh n was a good sign . It showed quite clearly that we were getting past the devastated area and into the back areas which formerly were occupied by the Headquarters of the Germ an higher formations .

THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 1 1 9

- From now on , as we penetrated far ther into enemy o ccu pied territory , more and more of the civilian inhabitants were released . The movement of the armies began to ri partake more of the nature of a t umphal march , the advanced troops being everywhere received with open arms by the families released by them from a slavery which , if sometimes tempered with uncouth attempts at ingratiation , was still in the highest degr ee distasteful to the people of the occupied districts . One of the most dramatic sights during the advance was undoubtedly t he fi scene when , in the midst of the ghting at Mont a r breh in , before even the Ge mans were completely driven from the town , the few remaining inhabitants , regardless of their safety in their j oy at their newly regained freedom , rushed from their houses with mugs of steaming hot f r co fee , the only tribute an impove ished population could offer to their liberators .

Soon , the tide of battle was to sweep on beyond the ruin of their homes , and they were to be left in peace to make the best attempt they could at repairing their shell torn houses and to eke out a slender existence on rations

spared by our men , or issued by the French Mission . Of means of local subsistence there were left practically none . The German occupation and the subsequent tide of war had left the area bare of ever ything except a few fields - i of sugar beet , and such food as isolated ind viduals l had managed to hide away during the ast few days , when the thunder of the British guns was heard

approaching nearer and nearer , and the possibility of the upsetting of the Germ an usurpers became more of

a reality and less of a dream . i r d During the even ng of October 3 , the Division received a very large amoun t of attention from enemy

aeroplanes . These carried out repeated bombing attacks N 120 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG L I E fi on the bivouacs of the troops in the eld , on transport

r , lines , on transpo t and columns of troops on roads on all villages within our lines and on other places hk ely -places to be used by us as Headquarters , or as assembly

for troops . The nights were dark , but the airmen were

unusually bold and flew very low , while the use of para chute lights o f extraordinary brilliance and of considerable

duration annulled , in great measure , the disadvantage

’ (from the airman s point of View) of the dark night . Any member of the Division whose duties took him l on to the main roads around La Baraque, Bel englise , and Magny-la-Fosse dur ing this and the succeedi ng

nights , will vividly recall the disagreeable sensations which passed up and down his spine as he sat ’

in his car , or on the driver s seat of his transport

wagon , or stood in the road in one of the many blocks

of traffic . The steady double throb of the Boche twin-engined planes was sufficient advertisement of the presence of enemy aircraft in the immediate neighbour hood without the ear-splitting blasts of the warning

whistles , barking out their three long blasts from every d irection . These latter made many a man whose nerves were not in the best condition long to seize the whistler and screw his neck until he swore never to put lips to

. whistle again Suddenly, in one direction or another a , - parachute light would flare out , illuminating the whole i z countryside , wh le every man ga ed towards the spot w here the light was floating slowly downwards , or , if the l parachute was overhead , sat sti l in a state of expectancy ,

wondering where the fateful bomb was going to drop . There is something very devastating to the nerves about

a bomb . It seems so inevitable . There are many men whose n erves are proof against shell fir e of any descrip

, wa tion though few like it or go out of their y to meet it .

1 22 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE

a fi at La B raque . G Of ce was here snugly harboured at

- the bottom of a large and roomy Boche dug out , and on the night of October 3 r d a party of seventy or eighty German prisoners from the Battle of Ramicourt were waiting outside in the dusk for their turn for examination f ffi by the Sta f Intelligence o cer . Suddenly , the three whistles were heard and the drone Of a Germ an plane a became audible , increasing in loudness as the plane p r o a p ched and swooped towards the ground . There must h ffi still ave been su cient light for the airman , who was himself plainly visible to the watchers below , to see the n body of men be eath him , though it was certainly far too dark for him to have been able to distinguish the field grey uniform .

Just before he reached the group , he must have moved

- the lever controlling his bomb dropping apparatus , and u two bombs dropped almost sim ltaneously , both of which exploded in or near the unfortunate group of prisoners .

The scene that followed was indescribable . With the explosion , there arose a wail of anguish from the victims of the bomb , and , for a few seconds after a wards , there was soft sickening rain of blood frag , ments of flesh , and limbs , over the whole of the i immed ate neighbourhood . Some forty or fifty of the

- unfortunate prisoners , with some half dozen of our own men who were passing the spot at the time were , literally blown to pieces , while another three or four dozen were lying strewn about the mouth of the dug-out with fearful wounds , nearly all of them about the legs and lower part of the body . There was a rush of the survivors - for the steps of the dug out itself , and the staff, endeavour ing to make their way out to discover what really had happened , found their egress completely blocked by THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 123 cowering and moaning prisoners crouching among a

. débris of human bodies The place smelt like a shambles , and the most hardened campaigners sickened before the sights which were brought to light when offi cers with flash-lights arrived to ascer tain the extent of the damage fi - and render r st aid to the wounded . A strong party was at once turn ed on to cleari ng up the mess , but La Baraque smelt of blood until the day

we left it , and every one was heartily glad when , on the 6 th 6 October , the Division handed over to the th Division , who were taking over the sector , and Headquarters moved back into rest at Vendelles . For days afterwards , traces

f c of the e fe ts of the explosion were visible , and one neatly n divided half of a face , found near the Visual Station ma y fi i yards away , will long be indelibly xed in the m nd and imagination of the finder . 6th On the October , the command of the sector on a general line east of Wian co ur t and Ramicourt passed to 6 th ai the G . O . C . Division , who , however , ret ned the 139th Infantry B r igade and the Monmouths un der hi s command . The same day , information was received that IX r the Corps would attack , with the XV French Co ps , i on the right and the Amer can Corps on the left , on a fi r date which would be noti ed sho tly . In the IX Corps , 6th 6 th the Division were to be in the line , with the 4 r d Division and the 3 Infantry Brigade in Corps Reserve , the 46 th Division being held in readiness to pass through the 6 th Division should the attack made by the latter be successful . Headquar ters of the Division remained at Vendelles during this time , but an advanced report centre was - - th opened at Magny la Fosse on the 7 October , and a system of signal communication with a main poled cable route of three pairs was led well forward of this , in anticipa 124 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE tion of the Division going into action during the next few

8th . . . v days . On the October , the G O C Di ision and G

Staff moved forward to Magny , although on that date the 6 th Division was fighting and the 46th Division troops t (except the Divisional Ar illery , who were assisting the

6 th Division) remained in reserve . th 1 8 ih On the 7 , the 3 th Infantry Brigade was structed to move forward to its assembly position west of

Pr s ll s e e e Farm , and the dispositions of the troops of the 46th Divi sion on the 8th October were as follows — 137th 1 8 n Infantry Brigade in the Bellenglise Tunnel , 3 th I fantry 1 th Brigade as above , and 39 Infantry Brigade at or

- - around Magny la Fosse . In order to keep Divisional Headquarters inform ed as completely as possible of the course of events , the Ofli cer w Divisional Observation , with one ireless set and hi with s observers , was instructed to move forward

and observe the result of the attack on Beauregard , r esn o Mericourt , and F y, which was being carried out by

6th . him the Division By means of news sent back by , 6th the G . O . C . 4 Division was kept in close touch with a situation which was at times very obscure . Following on the attack on Ramicourt on the 3r d

October , the enemy had evidently become convinced that his position , without prepared defences as it was , d was untenable , and he retreated stea ily , closely followed by the British troops who were in action continually with his rearguards . The 46th Division played no great par t in the fighting i at this time , the General Staff in the ma n contenting themselves with holding a watching brief the Infantry being kept in positions where they could reinforce the attacking Division if necessary . The Pioneer Battalion— the Monmouths— however ,

N 126 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG L I E

’ d Ut r te Farm e , our own line running through Beauregard in the lin e r 6 th , and Me icourt . The Division remaining

- o n n eco ur t Farm on a one brigade front , were to attack J h bombarded early on the 9t October , while their artillery

- - Fresnoy le Grand . On completion of the relief by the 1 38th Brigade , the

6 th , C . O . command of the sector passed to the G . 4 Division Pr eselles the 1 37th Brigade being ordered to the area and the 1 39th Brigade to Levergies . On the morning th of the o , when the bombardment of Fresnoy by the

1 8 , 6 th Divisional Artillery ceased , the 3 th Brigade according to orders sent forward patrols into Fresnoy , c and found the town uno cupied , our men being received with every demonstration of extreme j oy by the 1 50 to 200 inhabitants who had remained in the town when it was evacuated by the Germans . Some machine -gun fir e was encountered from the rail

- way line east of the village , but , after a little local fi ghting , this opposition was overcome and the Brigade

- occupied the railway line . r o th On the October , Divisional Headquarters opened -le- fi di at Fresnoy Grand , n ng there the best billets the troops had occupied since leaving the Bethune area . Although the village had been damaged to some extent by our bombardment and was for some days after our occupation subjected to intermittent attentionfrom enemy

- high velocity guns , yet it was comparatively undamaged , many houses being quite untouched . From the time of the first advance of the 46th Divisio n z li into the area beyond the destroyed one , the po cy of restricting the bombardment of towns and villages to shrapnel only was carefully followed . From this time l u on , very litt e damage was done to any b ildings by our artillery, unless they were known to be occupied as enemy G -G N F R W D G BRI ADIER E ERAL . G . M . O LEY , BRI ADE COMMAN DER I 3 8 TH I N F AN TRY BRIGADE

e r o u b ur t s o f io tt ! Fr ak r W e o e E er S t eet o n o n . 1 R p d c d y c y ll : y , 5 5 , B , L d , .

1 28 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE Nothing had been too small or insignificant to escape h ’ the plunderers . In t ese heaps , children s toys lay side by side with old machine guns and rifles , machinery with kitchen utensils , the iron heads of tools with old shell cases salved from former battlefields ! the whole mixed up in inextricable tangle with c0pper and galvani zed iron wire from the old French telegraph routes and fences . z h Never before , since civili ation became more t an a name , can a captured country have been robbed so systematically and so thoroughly by a ruthless conqueror . The enemy ’ s comparatively unmolested retreat was secured principally by the efficient manner in which his E ngineers had performed their task of demolition . As he retired , he blew up both the roads and railways behind n him , and our advancing tra sport was again and again held up by yawning craters across their path . In the open country around Fresnoy and Bohain , the consequent was delay not , however, as serious as he must have - anticipated . Dry weather tracks existed nearly every where , and even these could be ignored by horsed transport on fin e days when the surface of the ground was fairly hard . From time to time , therefore , our troops could press forward close on his heels , sure of the necessary supplies of rations and ammunition , while on occasion he was hustled very unpleasantly indeed . The rapid advance of a modern army , however , is not possible without the aid of railways , or at least of mechanical - transport , and the system of delay action mines used by the Germans was well calculated to hold up our - progress . At every cross roads mines had been buried some of them timed to explode a few hours after the enemy had left , others a few days , some even after a delay of several weeks . No rule of modern war is more true than that which THE BATTLE OF RAM ICOURT 1 2 9 limits the speed of advance of an arm y by the rate at which the railhead on which it is based can be moved forward . Throughout the whole of the present advance and the greater one which was to follow , the movement of our railhead proved to be the decisive factor . So E thoroughly had the German ngineers done their work , that the position of railhead was never certain for two E or three days together . Our own Railway ngineers w m t ould work night and day repairing the per anen way , the rails of which had been blown up with small gun cotton charges at intervals of ten or twenty yards , and would successfully get the line completed as far as Bohain d - or Vaux Andigny . A elay action mine would then go up between Fresnoy and Bohain or between Bohain and h Vaux Andigny , and back would go the rail ead again the fi for some days , while gap was being lled by gangs of

. the Chinese coolies , or German prisoners Once more line would be put through and trains would arr ive with rations and supplies for a few days , when again a mine h h ai e . t e would throw the r l ead back several mil s Thus , i fi question of supplies was a very d f cult one indeed , and one which definitely limited the progress made by the

Division . t In its broader aspect , herefore , from the view of the pursuing troops , the chief disadvantage of the delay action mine was undoubtedly its effect on the transport A of the rmy . The Divisional troops , however , pressing on in the van after the retreating Germans , were more intimately concerned with the mines placed at the cross o r roads , at irregular intervals along main roads , and i timed to explode with n a few hours of the German retreat . A party of our men would be scouting caref ully along the w road when , ithout warning , several of these mines would explode with a roar, throwing a column of débris and 9 E 13 0 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LIN smoke some hundreds of feet into the air . Discretion came with experience , however ! main roads and cross roads were usually given a wide berth by the troops of the u advanced g ard , and , if mines there were , these had either been blown or their positions betrayed by the evidences

- of fresh turned earth , before the arrival of the main body

, Of the leading Brigade . Casualties were therefore few though progress was considerably delayed . Three or four miles to the north-west of Fr esno y lay o ur the town of Bohain , which was entered by troops on l r oth . the October Here , over French civi ians had r w been left behind by the retreating Ge mans , and ild scenes fi of enthusiasm greeted the advancing troops . The of cers and men first into the town were mobbed by an hysterical crowd of men , women , and children , almost delirious in their joy at being once more free to live their normal

. fi lives Here for the rst time , signs of business life were

- . u seen Shops were fairly n merous though ill stocked , and many of the inhabitants were still working in their houses at the silk-looms for which the town was famous before the war . The town had been evacuated after the issue of the famous manifesto instructing officers and men to pay all consideration possible to the civilian inhabitants of the d occupied istricts and to avoid wanton damage , and latterly this instruction had been liberally interpreted by the enemy . Little wilful destruction had been done , though here , above all other places , the genius of the E German ngineers had been given full play . At every

- cross roads , the road had been blown away so thoroughly that only a deep crater remained , stretching right across from side to side of the street , while the houses on either side had collapsed as though built of cards in hopeless ,

. ruin With these exceptions , however , the town was little

PART III

THE B A TTLE OF ANDI GN Y

CHAPTE R VI

THE C LEARING OF THE BOIS D E R IQUE RVAL AN D THE BATTLE OF A N D IGNY LE S FERMES

WHILE Divisional Headquarters were establishing them in i selves Fresnoy , the lead ng troops of the Division — the 138th Infantry Brigade pushing forward from

Bohain , encountered strong enemy resistance on the

R i uerv al. edge of the Bois de q This wood , an outlier i of the larger Forest of And gny , stretched north and south right across the Divisional front of yards . Filled as it was with machine-gun nests and strongly z - organi ed networks of trenches and strong points , it

opposed a serious obstacle in the path of our advance . A considerable portion of the wood had been cleared by the Germans , trees having been cut down and converted into timber for the lining of dug- outs and other mili tary

works . These recently cleared areas , however , while affording better observation both for ourselves and for the enemy , were still choked with thick undergrowth an d were sown with strongly organized defences hidden by - . m the scrub From well concealed emplacements , ene y machine gunners were able to command all approaches to the wood . l o th Thus , on October , strong patrols of the 1/4th 132 THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY 133

Battalion , Leicestershire Regiment , advancing cautiously along the Bohain -Aisonville Road and over the country the i to north of this road , were met by heavy mach ne fir n gun e from the edge of the wood . Attempts to e ter

the wood all along its front were repulsed , the battalion f ri su fe ng a considerable number of casualties . Later in 1 i the day , the / 5th Battal on Leicestershire Regiment ,

- who had relieved their sister battalion , made determined attempts to penetrate into the wood . This attack , which was pressed with determination and carried out with fi w skill , at rst met ith some success , and the leading patrols of the battalion pushed some distan ce into the i i outer fr nges of the wood . The pr ncipal success was achieved by the Headquarters of the battalion , who established themselves in a house on the western edge r of the southe n lobe of the wood . The companies on r c either side , however , were d iven ba k by the enemy , i f and the Battal on Headquarters Sta f found itself isolated , enemy forces holding the wood on either side . Aided by

nine or ten Frenchmen , who had become separated from the main body of their comrades and who had with them f two mitrailleuses , the Battalion Sta f put up a very stout fight and managed to hold on to the outskirts of the wood and to the captured house for some hours . 1 1th fi a On the October , while this ghting was actu lly 1 in progress , instructions were issued for the 37th Infantry th Brigade to relieve the 1 38 Infantry Brigade . The 1/ sth Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment was ordered to move forward and take over from the 1/ sth Battalion i hi Leicestershire Regiment when and where poss ble . T s f fi was easier said than done . A sti f ght was in progress , and the situation as regards the disposition of our own ’ and the enemy s forces was extremely obscure . The

CD . of the Staffords , with his Adjutant and Company N 134 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L I E

Commanders , rode forward to get into touch with the . Headquarters of the battalion they were to reli eve . r whi ch After riding about for several hours , du ing they had frequently to go to ground to avoid hostile - fir e machine gun , they were reluctantly obliged to give up their quest and ride back to obtain more exact in formation . Battalion Headquarters , situated as described

, above was then located , touch was gained with it and provisi onal arrangements for the relief were made . The actual handing over , however , was not carried out for

- - fi some hours , owing to the rough and tumble ghting on the outskirts of the wood , the Leicesters being pinned to their positions and unable either to advance or to retreat . Communication between the companies of the relieving battalions was established by means of the Lucas lamp i a m . f and , at . , the Sta fordshire men advanced w th two companies in the line , one in support and one in reserve . The right company in the line was ordered to move to the south-west edge of the wood and the left company was given orders to advance towards Fontaine

- de Colombier , on the Bohain Andigny Road . Both a m companies deployed and advanced and , at . . , touch was established with the enemy . The attack was held up by machine-gu n fir e from all along the edge of the wood, the support company at the same time - fir e i m coming under machine gun from Retheu l Far , to i the south of the wood . By this t me the relief of the platoons of the left company of the 1/ sth Leicesters had been carried out and touch established with the 6th Division on our left flank , but the Headquarters and the right company of the Leicesters were still isolated in the south-west outskirts of the wood and

. m hard pressed by the enemy At p . therefore , the Staffords were ordered to attack the trench system

N 136 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LI E afforded by the trees and thick undergrowth of the

wood , the obstacle was one which promised to be very difficult indeed to overcome . At the same time also , the 126 th French Division on our right , though not confronted by closely wooded country , had experienced much diffi culty in making progress against well-organized - defences based on a series of strongly built farm houses , ’ all of which had been converted by the enemy s en gi neer i n g genius into miniature forts . th On the 1 a October, therefore , a j oint attack by the

French and ourselves was arranged , with the object of storm ing these defences and once more starting the enemy on the run . The ultimate obj ective of the French V Division was the illage of Mennevret , while that of the 137th Brigade was a line running approximately along the eastern edge of the Bois de R iquer val and the western ’ n n i n edge of the Foret D o mi ale d A d g y .

The attack was arranged to commence at noon , but , so m e miscalculatio n the through , French barrage descended v quite fi e minutes before our own . The enemy on our front , warned by the thunder of the guns on their left , were ready and waiting for our men . The 6th South f Sta fords , advancing behind our barrage , were met by — fir e heavy machine gun , while the enemy barrage fell right upon them and caused them to become much dis z organi ed before the wood was reached . In spite of fir e this harassing , however , the battalion pressed for ward and, on the left , one company managed to penetrate into the trench system in the clearing which had been ’ the object of the previous day s attack . At the

same time , D Company, under Captain G . H . Ball , forced its way into the south-west outskirts of the wood ,

- - but the enemy artillery , trench mortar and machine gun barrage was so heavy and caused so many casualties that THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY I 37

the company was compelled to fall back from the wood . a Here , however , Captain B ll rallied his men and , rein ! I 6 th f forced by B Company of the / South Sta fords , coolly reorganized his company and again advanced into the wood at its head . Much opposition was encountered u from enemy machine g ns , in particular from the house at the edge of the wood and from a derelict British tank which had been abandoned in the previous attack . In face of this , however , the men managed to make their way for ward amidst a hurricane of bullets . The two companies penetrated into the wood some 200 yards without coming across any sign of German occupation except the barrage , fi but , on this line , dim shadowy gures were seen moving amongst the dense undergrowth and the already galling fir e fi fir e was redoubled , while for the rst time rifle was added to the little inferno already raging . As it was obvious that further progress was impossible unless the attackers were strongly reinforced , an attempt ffi was made to consolidate the line already held . O cers and men proceeded hastily to dig themselves in and obtain what shelter they could , but the enemy opened

- fir e n trench mortar with disconcerti g accuracy , and orders had to be gi ven to withdraw to the edge of the wood . The enemy , who must have been exceptionally well served by his scouts , now dropped a heavy barrage along the edge of the wood , and Captain Ball decided to order a retirement to the high ground west of the wood . Here the original line held before the attack was once more taken over . Many casualties had been suffered during this litt le operation and the men engaged were much shaken by their experiences . The enemy was so well hidden in the i undergrowth , and so well suppl ed with machine guns , that he possessed an overwhelming advantage , and this , 138 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE

him z . There to do justice , he utili ed to the utmost extent is no more unnerving type of battle than such hole-and corner fighting as is necessary to oust a well-organized defending force from a wood which they are determined ’ to hold . The enemy s rearguards were formed of picked troops , who fought stoutly and with more individuality than was usually shown by the Germans during these

, last months of the war . In the circumstances the men of the South Staffords had been set an impossible task and had acquitted themselves well . Let us give honour when honour is due . It may be honestly said that never during the German retreat did their machine fi r gunners ght better , or more stubbo nly , than in those days wh en R iquer val Wood held up the Division .

Day after day for several days in succession , our troops advanced to the attack , only to be denied by a devoted fi band of men who were willing to sacri ce themselves , In order to permit the demoralized remainder to walk away in comparative immunity . So , the actions of the 1 r 1 th 1 2 th oth , and October , and the skirmishing on the following days , left the Germans on the Divisional . fi front masters of the eld , while on our right also , the

French were unable to capture Retheuil Farm . For the space of a week the pursuit was checked , While some way of circumventing this obstacle and the Forest of Andigny , i of which it was an outl er , exercised the ingenuity of the f General Sta f . The solution of this problem gave rise di n to the tactical triumph known as the Battle of An g y , which we will now consider in so far as it affected the 6th 4 Division .

All frontal attacks on R iquer val Wood and the Forest of Andigny having thus been repulsed by the enemy 1 rearguards , orders were issued on the sth October for a

140 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE and included that village and the hamlet of R egnico ur t . It was arranged that the Division should not take over h i the line held by the 6t Div sion , but that our Infantry should take up position on the line of deployment . 6th shortly before zero . By this hour , all troops of the r Division were to be withdrawn west of this line , to avo d the artillery barrage which would cover the attack .

As in the case of former battles on a maj or scale , the approach to the day of conflict was heralded by the arrival of various free-lance units which had been assigned r to the Division by the Co ps , for the purpose of assisting On our own Artillery and Infantry . this occasion , a troop of Scots Greys was attached for reconnoitring purposes , and a secti on of three tanks to assist in mopping up various strong-points whose existence was known or sus G . . pected . Two companies of the Life Guards M Batta lion and one company of the 6th M. O . Battalion were also fir e allotted to the Division . These were detailed to in the machine-gun barrage which would cover the advance r fi of the Infant y , or were given de nite tasks in the pro t ctio n e of the flanks of the Division , or in the consolidation of the objectives once they had been gained . Last but not least , the Divisional Artillery was reinforced by the addition of four Bri gades of R . H . A . and who

. . were , as before , placed under the orders of the C R A 6 th 4 Division . Owing to the nature and direction of the projected i attack , the Artillery , in particular , were faced w th a very l intricate problem . Similar concentrations of artil ery had been arranged to cover the advance of the 6 th u Division and the American Divisions , and the g ns of the Brigades covering the former occupied every available gun-position which existed within range of the 6th Division front . It was , therefore , impossible to site the batteries THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY 141

covering the advance of the 46th Division in such a r fi position that a no mal frontal barrage could be red , and it was decided to try the novel experiment of an en filade hi oblique or barrage . With t s Obj ect in i v ew , all the guns were arranged as nearly as possible in en filade of the front on which the attacking Brigades - enfilade would advance , and time tables for a creeping

barrage were made out , the necessary lifts being made

- on the leap frog principle . d r In iscussing this , the last barrage of g eat intensity under which the troops of the Division were fated to

advance in the present war , it may be permissible to

enter into a little more detail . The reader of this account who is not conversant with modern artillery may thus

be given some idea of the uses of an artillery barrage , a factor which has played so important a part in this war and which has been developed to a very high state the fi of perfection . The idea of barrage is rst and fore most to afford the attacking troops a certain measure

of protection , by forcing the enemy to take refuge in his

- - dug outs , saps and trenches . Intense , well directed covering artillery fir e will so plaster the ground ov er

which the assault is being made , that troops exposed in i the open stand very l ttle chance indeed of survival .

They are , therefore , constrained to take shelter, and a determined attacking force keeping well up to the line of bursting shells can overrun the strongest defences

without much trouble . On the other hand , should the

- - barrage , through badly worked out time tables , or through the Infantry being delayed by some unforeseen

i . accident , get ahead of the latter , it is of l ttle use The defending troops can lie snugly hidden in their shelters

until the rain of shells has passed and then , emerging from - man o their dug outs , can their machine guns and sho t 142 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

down the approaching enemy rifiemen at their leisure .

Were it not for the artillery barrage , not one attack in a hundred made against strong works held by determined

machine gunners could achieve success , while the losses of the attacking Infantry would outnumber those of the

defenders to a colossal extent . fir e While , however , the artillery is mainly directed

towards the protection of the advancing Infantry , it has n other roles to play as well . By the inclusion of rou ds i of smoke shell , a dense wall of fog can be formed wh ch

not only hides the advancing Infantry from sight , but hi w ch , under favourable circumstances , may shroud the

whole battlefield . It may thus entirely obscure the the diffi intentions of attacker , rendering it very cult

indeed for the defender to counter hi s moves . Such a w fi fog may , and probably ill , exercise a de nite influence

in favour of the attacking side , which possesses the initiative and is able to make the greatest use of the e power and moral effect of un xpected action . i - - Aga n , a well thought out barrage has a very decisive effect in enabling the assaulting Infantry to rest and reorganize at intermediate obj ectives selected by the f ui sta f as s table places for pauses in the operations . A normal barrage will also assist the attacking troops in maintaining direction under adverse weather conditions

and in the confusion and smoke of a battle . In an attack which involves an advance of several thousand yards to

particular obj ectives, this function of the barrage is most

. f al important The e fect of the front barrage , or rather f the e fect of its absence , was to be well seen in the presen t

battle The men , accustomed to hear the guns behind them and the scream of the shells passing over their

heads , were bewildered by the transverse fir e of the enfilade e r dl barrage and lost dir ction ve y ba y , Much

THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY 143

confusion resulted from this , and many casualties were caused by the crews of machine -gun nests which were left undestroyed and so were in a position to fir e from the rear upon our men , when the latter were sweeping forward to the attack of positions beyond them . One other use of the guns which should be mentioned ’ is fi the retaliatory barrage red by the defender s Artillery . The plans for this barrage are carefully worked out b e n forehand i the event of an attack . As soon as news of a the assault can be got back to the guns by sign ls , ’ by the noise of the enemy s barrage , or by line or runner , fir e all available guns are brought into action . These on - pre arranged obj ectives , with the idea of isolating the attacking troops , preventing supplies and reinforce m an ments from reaching the , and inflicting as m y casual ties as possible during the earlier stages of their advance . A fai r example of the number of shells which are fired in a normal barrage is afforded from consideration of l the barrage at the Battle of Be lenglise . Here on a 00- fift - 1 8 - 5 yard front , y four pounders and eighteen 45 howitz ers were engaged in forming the barrage . Of these 18 - u fi guns , the po nders red two rounds per minute and the fi howitzers one round per minute . The shells were red i to spread the bursts evenly along the barrage l ne , so all 12 6 i 00 that , in , a total of shells fell on a l ne 5 yards l long wi thin the minute , giving a total of one she l per four yards per minute . This barrage was kept up for eight hours and , allowing for slowing down of the rate of fir e duri ng the intervals when a stationary protective b arrage was being fired , there cannot have been less than some shells fired on this short frontage during the battle . While five of the six Artillery Brigades attached to the Division fired in the enfilade barrage coveri ng the main 144 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

ai , attack from the north , the rem ning Brigade the 14th Army Brigade was detailed to assist the 1 n e the 37th I fantry Brigade , whose ord rs were to hold original line on which the fighting had taken place a few days previous , and to act as the pivot of the attack . In order to distract the enemy ’ s attention from the ai m n attack , arrangements were made for a Chinese f attack to be carried out by this Brigade , every e fort being directed towards giving to this the appearance of reality . With this idea , all the visible and audible signs of a frontal attack on the wood from our o ld i front line were simulated in deta l . In the preparation E o o r of this attack , the ngineers were once more given pp tun ity to display the genius for construction which is essentially their strong point and , once more , this work ’ had to be carried through against time . At four hours notice , apparatus for elevating ninety dummies was made by three carpenters in addition , the work was carried out to a new design , so that the whole range of ninety men a could be packed in one lorry . These dummies were l id out during the night in front of convenient shell holes , in which c the men Operating them could lie oncealed . One man z could Operate nine dummies and , at ero hour when the barrage opened , the dummies were pulled up , thus giving the appearance of men springing forward to the attack . The men controlling them then fastened the raising-line around some convenient stump and made the best of l their way back to avoid the reta iatory barrage . d fi u In ad ition to the dummy g res , three dummy tanks had been provided , and these also were taken up during the night to positions where they would be likely to ’ attract the enemy s attention . Of these dummy tanks , one was a full sized replica of the largest and most

‘ 146 THROUGH THE HIN DENBURG L INE

- th u ai x e action , this ro te was extended up the Boh n Vau Andigny Road to the farm which had been selected as a j oint Brigade Headquarters for the two fighting Brigades . r For this extension , the poles of a German pe manent route were employed , one cable being slung on the poles at a height of 1 5 feet above the ground , and the other run along the ground . The latter was fastened to each pole of the permanent route in order to localize breaks fi caused by shell r e . This route was reinforced by both w l ireless and visual , but the cable held so we l, in spite of heavy shelling , that the latter systems were only employed to a limited extent . The Headquarters of the 137th Brigade was in Bohain itself and was con n ected with the Headquarters of the Battalion holding the front to the west of the wood by both cable and wireless . The latter proved very useful during the early hours of the attack , when the German barrage made it impossible for some hours to maintain lines to this uni t . Aeroplane photographs had supplied material for very complete maps of the German defences in all the more open portions of the area to be attacked and , during the 16 l th October , a heavy pre iminary bombardment was

i - rr . ca ed out Special attention was paid to wire cutting , and destructive fir e was directed for some hours on the hamlets of R egnico ur t and Andigny les Fer mes and on

- all known strong point s . Z fi fi a . m ero hour was nally xed for . on the 1 7th

October and , well before that time , the attacking B rigades

, had formed up with a front of yards , on a line one hundred yards south - east of the Bohain -Vaux Andi gny

- Road , the inter brigade boundary being about Vallée 1 Hasard . The 39th Infantry Brigade advanced on the right of the Divisional Sector and the 138th Infantry THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY 147

1 Brigade on the left . One battalion of the 37th Infantry R i uer val Brigade held our front to the west of the Bois de q , the other two battalions being held in Divisional Reserve - d to the west of Bohain and on the Bohain Seboncourt Roa . The country over which the attack was to be made was very open , the only patch of woodland being situated just to the west of the village of R egn ico ur t . In clear f weather , the task of the flank guides of the di ferent units would have been very simple and little trouble would l have been experienced in keeping direction , especia ly as the objective throughout its length was a well- marked S main road . Dawn broke , however , to how the whole line shrouded in a dense fog , which was quite as thick as any of the mists which , during the last weeks of the war , made direction-keeping in early-morning attacks no mean problem . The waiting troops could see nothing of the country over which they were to attack :

Punctually to the minute the barrage opened , and the Sherwoods on the right and the Lincolns and Leicesters 6th on the left moved forward to the attack . The 4 Division was advancing to the last general action in which it was to take part . 8th i On the right of the attack , the Battal on Sherwood

- Foresters moved forward on a three company front ,

D Company following in close reserve . Immediately behind the attacking battalion , two companies of the i sth Sherwoods were held in support . The rema nder of this battalion were dug in under a bank in shelter of the small wood near the j oint Brigade Headquarters . About this spot also was grouped the remaining battalion

6th . of the Brigade , the Sherwoods , in Brigade Reserve fi From the commencement of the advance , dif culty was experienced in keeping direction . A gently rising slope led up to the road which was the final obj ective of 148 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

the Brigade , while down the centre of the battalion front ran a slight ridge which divided the area of attack into two n earlv equal halves . It was impossible to see more than five yards ahead and the centre company , losing direction , gravitated down the slope of the ridge towards the east an d so left the summit practically untouched .

- — The first obstacle to the advance — machine gun nests on some high ground where a little copse gave shelter to the machine gunners— was overrun without difficulty and , on the extreme right and left of the attack , good progress was made . The right company, in particular , fi experienced little opposition , reached its nal objective without trouble , and commenced to dig in . A sudden lightening of the mist , however , betrayed the presence of this company to some enemy machine gunners who were strongly posted in a clearing on the R egnico ur t Ridge which overlooked the position . Promptly seizing their opportunity , the enemy turned a concentrated machin e fir e gun on this company and inflicted heavy casualties , the survivors exper iencing the great est difficulty in hang ing on to their exposed position .

The clearing of the fog , however , had also given the officers of the attacking battalion their first chance to obtain a general idea of the situation , and the centre company , who had found themselves somewhere imm edi i ately west of And gny les Fermes when the fog lifted , commenced to work their way back across the front towards the scene of the setback , being j oin ed on their way by the Reserve Company . At the same time ,

E . . R . E . Lieutenant M Thomas , , of the 465th Fi eld

Company , who was attached to the 8th Sherwoods for

, l . G. the attack gallantly co lected a party of N O . S and men from various units who had become mixed up in the attack and led these men , together with the sappers

' 1 50 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE The capture of the Brigade obj ectives was thus complete

a m , by . . All enemy resistance now ceased , though - un fir e throughout the morning , desultory machine g Henn echies fi fi from Wood , and a eld gun ring at E v échés yards range from near the Borne des Trois , forced our men to lie low . 1 8th r On the left of the attack , the 3 B igade advanced - th on a two battalion front , the 4 Leicesters being on the right and the sth Lincolns on the left , the sth Leicesters -u being held in Brigade Reserve . When forming p , a few casualties were caused through the enemy shelling the Bri gade assembly-area with high -explosive and gas z -u shells , but at ero minus one hour , forming p was com lete p and , when the barrage opened , all were ready to advance . a m Here also the fog caused trouble and , at 7 . . , the O C th . . 4 Leicesters reported that he had under his com mand elements of the Cameron Highlanders , Black Watch and Loyal North Lancashires— all from the I st Division — on our left also men from both Sherwoods and Lincolns , besides remnants of his own companies . This being so , it was inevitable that machine-gun nests should have n been overlooked duri g the advance and , here also , these

unscotched scorpions caused many casualties . No particular hitch occurred on the Divisional front how , - un fir e ever , but machine g from the high ground about e Les Gobelets and Belle Vue proved v ry harassing . These strong-points were cleared in the face of great opposition I st by the Battalion Loyal North Lancashires . This same battalion was later on of the gr eatest assistance in cleari ng the left edge of Andigny les Fermes in which , f fi village the enemy put up a very sti f ght . Instructions were issued from Divisional Headquar ters immediatelv that , Andigny was occupied , strong patrols THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY I SI

were to be pushed out in the direction of Mennevret , in

, order if possible , to obtain touch with the French . f These patrols encountered sti f resistance , however , and m until 7 p . . , the company of sth Leicesters detailed for this purpose were held up by machine-gu n fir e from the

. n north of the village Later on , touch was obtai ed with

- a French patrol at La Nation cross roads , but the position a m could not be held . It was , indeed , not until . . on the 1 8th that our line was definitely established in

continuation with that of the French . fir e Throughout the action , the supporting artillery

had been , as it was in all the battles and skirmishes of the advance , extraordinarily accurate , the initial pro gramme being modified accurately and in good time as

the situation developed . E specially good was the work of f certain forward guns , selected from di ferent batteries and placed directly under the orders of battalion com — manders . Kept well advanced and man handled by their crews into good positions as close as possible behind the i advanc ng Infantry , these guns were fought with great s l re olution , and were markedly successful in dea ing with isolated machine-gun emplacements and strong-points where the enemy were making a successful stand against

r ifl m en . our e , bombers and machine gunners Firing i r over open sights and from beh nd hedges , b ushwood , ’ or any slight cover which could be made use of , the guns crews necessarily took great risks and suffered com par atively severe casualties . These forward guns indeed proved invaluable and well repaid the audacity with m oral which they were handled , while the of our own Infantry was by no means lessened by the realization that , as ever , their Artillery was close behind them and sharin g both their triumphs and their dangers in the r fullest deg ee . E 1 52 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LIN

On the front held by the 1 38th Brigade after the

- , attack , no counter attack was attempted by the enemy b ut 1 1 a. m . , at , he was reported by the Sherwoods to be massing for a counter- attack in front of Henn echies Wood . B z V this time , he must have reali ed the perilous position I n - which he stood , and the counter attack was his last

, attempt to restore the situation . The effort , however Hi was not successful . s assembling troops were caught b fir e v our artillery , and the few men who survived the b - fir e barrage were shot down y Lewis gun , only one man h reachin g o ur trenc es alive . d fi ri c On this front also , much if culty was expe en ed in u i obtaining to ch w th the French , who were to have joined up with us at the northern edge of the strip of woodland where Henn echies Wood merges into Andigny Forest . Patrols were sent out to get into touch and eventually located our Allies holding a post about one hundred yards

’ u so th of Forester s House .

e m . Meanwhile , at . , when the main attack was 6th f well launched , the North Sta fords moved back to i w the orig nal line along the western edge of the ood , from which they had withdrawn slightly to avoid our fi barrage and the enemy reply . Strong ghting patrols were at once sen t out and the Bois de R iquer val was ffi c n cleared without di culty , tou h being obtai ed with - m the French north west of Retheuil Far .

This task accomplished early in the day , the battalion Henn echies then pushed forward , clearing Wood as they r u went and securing a few p isoners and machine g ns . m At . . , the wood was completely free of the enemy p , and contact was established with the Sherwoods on the left l and the French on the right . Night fe l with the Brigade o n - established the line Mennevret Andigny and , at 18th 1 8 dawn on the , the 3 th Brigade took over the front

1 54 THROUGH THE H IN DENBURG LIN E

went . No great amount of resistance was expected from the retiring enemy and none was encountered , but , to - guard against the possibility of a counter attack , these mobile troops were closely supported by Infantry and forward sections of Artillery . The advance continued without check during the day m r st 126th and , at p . the Division and the French f Division succeeded in e fecting a junction at Wassigny , squeezing the 46th Division out of the line . In all the delicate and anxious work of clearing these forest obstacles , a main feature of the operations was the close liaison maintained under difficult circumstances 6 between the French and the 4 th Division . Again and i i again, in order to envelop some more than ord nar ly ffi ri di cult obstacle , French and B tish troops were com p elled to separate with the intention of meeting again - on the farther side of the strong point or wood in question . fi Continually during the ghting our flank troops , or the r French , were extricated from se ious situations by their l Al ies , and throughout the troops worked together with the greatest camaraderie . The only visible effect of their fighting alongside one another was an obvious desire to excel in gallantry and in courtesy . Considerable difficulty r was expe ienced in gaining touch , and unfortunate contre

’ at temps occurred , as when , Forester s House a French fi of cer, advancing through the open under the Impression that the post was already in our possession , was shot down i - i at po nt blank range by German mach ne gunners . On fi the same occasion , further ghting resulted in a j unction being effected about 200 yards south of the post and , here perhaps the E ntente Cordiale reached its highest ih . o rs pitch French p , themselves exhausted by a ’ fi day s hard ghting , insisted on emptying all their water bottles and presented o ur men with the last drops of liquid THE BATTLE OF . AND IGNY 1 55

they possessed . It is such incidents as these that , long after the troubles of war are forgotten , will stand out in the memories of the men who shared these trials and passed through tragic days together . Memories of such deeds of comradeship should go far indeed to smooth

- over the pin pricks of petty international squabbles , should such recur in the halcyon days of peace .

- In after days , when our minds hark back to these - -b e- - t never to forgotten times , the men of the cent ving sixieme will be among the best - remembered by their 6th comrades of the 4 Division , while , amongst the most f i pleasant memories of the Sta f , w ll be the recollection of the courtesy which throughout was the hall-mark of the

French Command . The part played by the 46th Division in the clearing of Andigny Forest and its outlying woods came to an 18 end on October th , when the Division retired for a few ’ - ri well earned days rest . Du ng the last ten days of h battling throug wooded and enclosed country , checks were frequent and casualties severe . The calibre of the

resistance encountered may be gauged from the fact that , in the Battle of Andigny alone , prisoners were captured from seventeen different regiments of six separate

Divisions . They were undoubtedly picked men chosen u to fight in carefully selected positions as rearg ards , while the main German Armies made good their retreat to the

- line of the Sambre Oise Canal . ’ By the devoted work of his rearguards the enemy s l l f withdrawal to this ine was successfu ly ef ected , in spite

of the utmost our troops could do . A pause in the h du operations then took place , w ile the Allied Armies g

themselves in in their new positions , and drew breath for

the greater effort which was to break , once and for all , 6th i in the the new canal and river line . The 4 Div sion , 156 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE meantime in comfortable billets in Fresnoy and Bohain , , settled down to systematic training for its next leap

, forward . These few days when the Division rested l flushed with a series of successes which , they felt , equa led the record of the best of the fighting troops of a fighting

. Army , will not soon be forgotten The records of the past three weeks were written with blood and iron across a stretch of twenty miles of captured country . Over

prisoners , seventy guns , and machine guns too l numerous to count , had been sent back to swel the tale of captures taken by the victorious British Armies in E z c . this , the enith of their areer xhausted by the recent fi di heavy ghting , all ranks were in a con tion thoroughly to enjoy the rest that had been merited so well .

Yet , while the enemy still stood at bay , rest could not z be allowed , even for a week , to monopoli e our minds and bodies . A carefully prepared training programme pro vided both organized recreation and the more serious preparation for future operations which was essential f if the Division was to maintain its high level of e fort . E l ach morning , the ro ling downs round about Fresnoy and Bohain were crowded with officers and men engaged in tactical training . The afternoon saw dozens of foot i ball teams engaged in mimic battle , wh le , evening after evening , the crowded houses at the cinema and Whizz bangs ” were sufficient witness that the lighter side of life was being catered for so far as open warfare conditions would permit . all Meanwhile , the news from points was such as must u cheer the least sang ine heart amongst us . Bulgari a and

Turkey were down and out , and Austria was on her last legs . In France , the chief enemy was being slowly but

inexorably beaten back the roar of the conflict receded,

The 4oth D s o n al co ncert -tro u e ivi i p .

PART IV

THE LAS T PHAS E : CA TI LLON TO S AI N S

CHAPTER VII

THE AD VAN CE To SAINS D U NORD

I t ON November s , after a slight pause for the advance of railhead and for the bringing-up of the necessary

l assult . heavy arti lery , a general was once more ordered

The attack was to be on a greater scale than ever before , the battle-front stretching from well north of Valenciennes to west of Guise . The whole weight of the First , Third , and Fourth British Armies and of the French Army on our right was to be thrown against the new German line

- in one huge sledge hammer blow . r On our own small section of the front , the IX Co ps ,

- facing the line of the Sambre Oise Canal , was opposed by a formidable obstacle , but , such was the enthusiasm of n the men , that no one felt the slightest doubt regardi g the outcome of the attack . r d I st On the 3 November , the Division on the right and the 3 zud Division on the left of the Corps front 6th attacked and breached the line of the Canal , the 4 Division Artillery assisting in the barrage fired to cover the 6th advance . The 4 Division , who had during the pre ceding days moved forward in readiness to exploit any

hr I st V ia success , passed t ough the Division and advanced , - z e the Catillon Me i res Road , to take up the pursuit of the

15 8 THE LAST PHASE : CAT ILLON TO SA INS 159

e a . retr ating enemy . Here , at last , was really open w rfare Never was the difference in m oral between the British and German Armies at this period of the war better shown than on that day , when , their improvised defences once more broken , the enemy Armies fled pell mell towards the Belgian frontier . Along the main roads leading from fi the battle elds streamed columns of prisoners , the dirt fi and stains of the battle eld yet on their persons , de moraliz ed by their defeat and with open expressions of j oy at their capture . H ere or there among them strode an occasional officer or man who still held up his head and looked the whole world in the face , refusing to ’ admit his own or his country s defeat . Such men were fi scarce , however , and those outbursts of de ance which did occur were mostly contradicted by the circum stances of the surrender of the men themselves . The German rearguards fought well an d with de vo tio n , but signs were many that the main mass of the fi rank and le were beaten to a finish . Visions of a triumphal march to the Rhine were beginning to colour the day- dreams of our men as the battalions swung by singing and whistling , to try conclusions for the last time with an enemy who was already morally de i l feated . So they marched stead ly forward with we l z li bron ed faces , neat uniforms , and workman ke packs , no mean sample of the irresistible human tide which had burst the dam constructed by the greatest military

Power of our day across the face of E urope . Now the f column of German prisoners is past , and a very di ferent sight greets the eye of the advancing troops . It is the

I s t Division returning from its victory , and never before had troops marched back from the battlefield more spick

u . and span , as tho gh from a review Not a strap was

l . u out of place, not a button du l Four by fo r the men 160 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

n swung past , ex cha ging a fusillade of chaff with their comrades who marched forward to carry on the good work

, they had so well begun . In their one night of leisure all traces of conflict had disappeared , and the premier Division of the British Army marched to its well-ear ned i rest as to a Ceremonial Parade . Well m ght the German fi prisoners straggling along , fty or sixty in charge of one nonchalant guard , feel that Nemesis was at hand and the day of their triumph passed for ever . 6th At the end of October , the Headquarters of the 4

Division had been moved to Bohain and , after a few ’ days rest , the whole Division commenced to march to their positions immediately in rear of the I st Division . ’ Headquarters moved successively to Molain and l A r b r e ai de Guise, where the General Staff rem ned , closely con n ected by telephone with the Staff of the I st Division in their advanced Headquarters at Bellevue Farm . 6 h . . . t Here after the battle , the G O C 4 Division took over command of the sector , and orders were issued to the 138th Brigade to relieve the 1 st Brigade and endeavour to locate the position of the retiring enemy . Active patrol work was carried out on the night of the th th 4 /5 November and , in the early hours of the sth , our Infantry had pushed forward as far as Zo b eau and T aill n o o . Grand Farm During the advance , little resist

- ance was encountered , and four 77 millimetre and thr ee - centimetre guns were captured . 1 th On November sth , the 39 Brigade from their new 1 billets at Catillon , and the 37th Brigade from Bois de ’ l Ab b aye and the district round La Louviere Farm were , instructed to pass through the 14th Infantry Brigade and the 138th Infantry Bri gade and to take up the pursuit ,

keeping the enemy on the run so far as possible . Both w Brigades met ith little opposition and , by the evening

THE LAST PHASE : CATILLON TO SA INS 16 1

th of the 5 , an outpost line was established on the line - Barzy Prisches and to the north , touch being obtained z with the French at Bar y . H ere some opposition was encountered from the enemy posted on high ground 1 north and east of Prisches , and the advance of the 39th Brigade was supported by a barrage of 1 8 - pounders and z 4 5 howit ers .

R . . G A . For the advance , one Brigade and two additional

R . F . A . Brigades had been allotted to the Division . Of

R F . A . these , one Brigade . was attached to each of the fi ghting Brigades , the other three Artillery Brigades being 6 held in reserve under the orders of t he C . R . A . 4 th

Division . The enemy having very thoroughly destroyed the bridge over the Canal at Catillon , all the Divisional transport and the Field Artillery were compelled to cross the Canal by a pontoon bridge thrown across by the ’ l b b a Divisional E ngineers west of Bois de A ye . Transport difficulties were thus considerable . The pontoon bridges ffi ffi were in themselves barely su cient to take the tra c , and the approach to the bridges from both banks was across open fields . These were soon churned into a sea of mud in which limbers and guns more often than not

. stuck fast , in their attempts to pass over Traces and an d fin all harness were broken again and again , y , transport had to be lined up in a queue some distance from the l bridge and each separate vehicle rushed over at the ga lop .

It was quite clear that , unless the situation was quickly i taken in hand and the approaches improved , the Div sional transport might be held up for an indefinite period . The ri 465th Field Company , who were working on the b dge , rose to the occasion , however , and a corduroy road was

constructed , the bridges were improved , and the transport

finally flowed across in a steady stream . So was the firs t

11 162 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L INE of ther iver -obstacles surmounted without too much delay , and the Artillery enabled to dash forward , make up for an d s lost time , cover the advance of their re pective

Infantr y Brigades . In ri l the meantime , the site of the old b dge at Catil on all fi had been reconnoitred , and the gap parti y lled with fascines , sandbags , and débris . The Canal was thus made u in passable for Infantry , who co ld cross with no further - ri convenience than wet feet . Motor cyclist despatch ders i e i were also able to cross, volunteers carry ng th ir mach nes all o di Via over , but other transp rt had to be rected Bois

’ b b a e 6 th de l A y until the , by which date the Corps

E ngineers had completed a bridge for lorry traffic . 6 th 1 th On the morning of the November , the 39 Brigade advanced under a comparatively light barrage and , when e an advanc of yards had been made , the enemy abandoned his positions and little more resistance was n ri experienced duri g the day . Both B gades reached e di fi their obj ctives without f culty , the speed of their advance being limited only by the necessity of keeping them in signal touch with Division an d supplied with rations and ammunition . 1 th The leading battalion of the 39 Brigade , the sth

Sherwoods , had spread outwards on either side to envelop hi 8 th Prisches, w le one company of the Sherwoods was v detailed to mop up the illage itself . This battle was in

marked contrast to everything that had gone before it .

To the initiated, who knew that in a few minutes a barrage would Open up , it was an extraordinary sensation to see the old men and women of the village and the farmhouses f about , moving their household e fects peacefully in wheel. barrows and odds and ends of carts up and down the road li between Batta on Headquarters and the gun-positions As the barrage opened civilians appear ed In crOs from

164 THROUGH THE H INDE NBURG LINE

of the town at once organized gangs of the more able l bodied members of the population . Soon , wi ling hands were hard at work fillin g up the craters left in all the fi principal roads by mines red by the enemy as he retreated .

- e . Not all of these had explod d , however Delay action mines were numerous , but few of these had escaped the i notice of eyes eager to serve their country and her All es .

Mine after mine was pointed out and labelled , and it was in no small degree due to this gratuitous help that casualties from mines were to a great extent avoided . r ni Du ing the day the advance was continued to Cartig es , which was entered by the 5th Sherwoods and troops 1 of the 37th Brigade , in spite of some opposition from

. enemy machine gunners The weather had been bad , a di r in pouring down stea ly all day , but nothing served to damp the enthusiasm , either of the troops , or of the inhabitants who turned out in great numbers to greet them . Here was seen the extraordinary sight of a battalion marching in fours into a town the outskirts of which we re still held by enemy machine gunners , a continuous stream of bullets from across the River Petite Helpe striking the l . houses A bil eting party, undeterred by this too warm reception , continued its work and the battali on tired , ’ after its day s march , settled down in billets in the outpost line . Many were the amusing contretemps due to this proximity to an irritated enemy , who had had to leave his comfortable quarters for wet and windy bivouacs on the safe side of the river . Two officers of the Sherwoods , having found a complete German officer ’ s kit abandoned by its owner , inadvertently settled down on the exposed Si de of a house to examine the booty . Wrapped in i co n emal a the r g task , they f iled to notice the attention they were receiving , until a spatter of machine -gun bullets THE LAST PHASE : CAT ILLON TO SAINS 165 on the walls above reminded them that the owner of the

kit might not be so very far away after all , and that it was indiscreet as well as impolite to open it under his

observation .

The night passed in quietness , disturbed only by fir e occasional angry bursts of from across the river ,

where the enemy retained his positions until daylight . th 8th On the following day , November 7 , the I 3 Brigade relieved the 1 37th and r 3oth Brigades and continued the

advance across the Petite H elpe . Here a momentary

check was experienced , for the rains had been heavy and

the little river was in flood . All bridges had been E i destroyed by the enemy and , once more , the ng neers

were called upon to provide the means of crossing . The men of the 468th Field Company were at once set to work

and , before the daylight had fled , no less than three bridges 6 th spanned the stream . Later in the day , the 4 5 Field fi l - Company , who had been engaged in l ing mine craters

- on the main Prisches Cartignies Road , reached the bank of the river farther to the south and commenced work

on a bridge for motor transport , which was completed

th . m . by p . on November o 8th 6 6th On November , also , the 4 Field Company were ordered to construct a bridge across the river sufficient

- to carry 6 o pounder guns . The site of the old bridge was

- reserved for a motor transport bridge , which was to be

built at a later date by the Corps , but a place was chosen

near by to give the maximum of road approach . A c bridge of 7 5 feet span was onstructed , but could only be reported fit for horse transport by nightfall . The enemy was retiring quickly , however , and the passage of the heavy guns was a matter of urgency in order that the whole Division might continue the pursuit . The recon struction of the bridge to a stronger design was therefore LIN 1 66 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG E i m . . hav ng been commenced at p , fresh material th m . , a . received from Prisches . At on the 9 the fit bridge was certified for the guns , was examined and approved by the Artillery officer in charge of them , and the heavies limbered up and crossed . It is estimated that guns and other vehicles crossed the bridge within twenty- four hours of its com

letio n p , comprising the heavy transport of our own

Division , part of the transport of the French Corps on our right and the whole of the transport of the 3 2n d Division , fi on our left . From these gures , some idea can be gleaned of the impedimenta of a Division on the march . Keeping touch with the enemy by means of mounted troops and scouting Infantry is the least part of the task involved , r and these days , when three British A mies chased the

Germans across a country devoid of food and forage , were not the least severe test on the organization which had to ensure the arrival and distribution of the supplies h and ammunition , without which pursuit would ave been futile and dangerous .

Busy days indeed for both G and Q . Divisional

Headquarters moved every two or three days , and , the fi higher the formation , the more dif cult is the movement of its Headquarters . A company packs up its tin box of papers and the balance of its imprest account and is ’ ready to move at a moment s notice , with or without i transport . The move of Battal on Headquarters is a little less simple , and Adjutants have been known to look ri wor ed when moves were frequent and unexpected . Brigade is the first formation with a tendency to split into advanced and rear headquarters . Brigade Headquarters l transport is of respectable dimensions , though sti l horse drawn , and so able to tackle pontoon bridges and the viler roads which lead thereto . Moves of Divisional

E 1 68 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L IN Staff was made up and placed under the command of one in of the subalterns of the company . He was given str uctio n s to keep in close touch with the leading Brigade fin d advancing along the main Divisional route , to out from the Brigadier each evening his probable moves for the following day , and to anticipate these moves as far as possible . In this way , at least one cable pair was laid along the road hedges or poled over open spaces and kept well ahead of Brigade H eadquarters , ready for use when a new headquarters was established for the night . This pair was reinforced as soon as possible by a second pair , and the lines made as secure as possible . A Corps cable detachment then followed up at its leisure , making the cables quite safe and improving the route . Whenever possible , old German permanent routes were used , stretches several miles long being sometimes found so little destroyed that it was possible to make them good . ri In this way , good speaking was obtained between B gade and Divisio nm far better indeed than between Division

. l i and Corps , where lines were even longer Visual signa l ng was impossible in the close country through which we were advancing , but , by means of leapfrog tactics , continu c ai ous wireless communi ation was maint ned . Wireless proved very useful also for the collection and dissemina tion of news of general interest . The ether was overcharged with epoch-making items of news in these stirring days , and the crowds of E nglish and French round the Wireless Press notices , where the English and French communiqués were displayed side by

- side , were quite one of the features of the street scenes in

, , du Prisches Cartignies and later in Sains Nord . The bridging of the Petite Helpe having been completed ffi l su ciently to al ow horsed transport to pass , the pursuit was once more pressed with vigour . The 138th B ri gade THE LAST PHASE : CAT ILLON To SAINS 1 6 9

were instructed to make towards Avesnes , and pushed forward to establish themselves on the high ground to - the south east of that town . Considerable resistance was next encountered in the country south-west of Avesnes and along the Avesnes

Etroeungt Road . Late in the day , the sth Leicesters overcame the enemy ’ s resistance along this road and r ri - established themselves ast ide of it , captu ng a four gun ri battery and sixteen prisoners . The French on our ght ,

- however , were counter attacked and forced to retire , thus exposing the flank of the Brigade , and , until the situation was restored , a defensive flank had to be thrown 2md back . On our left , we were in touch with the 3 Division near Avesnelles and little resistance was en in countered this direction .

The check was only momentary , however , though at one time the enemy ’ s shelling reached an intensity remotely i resembling that of former days . For a few hours dur ng the day , the neighbourhood of Grand Maison Farm , where some of our artillery was in position , was heavily punished , ’ but this was the last occasion the enemy s guns were to trouble us at all . The rapid advance of the Infantry and of the screen of Cavalry forced the retirement of such guns as escaped capture . 8th z On the November , this last organi ed attempt at resistance was overcome with the assistance of concentra l tions of our own heavy and light arti lery . After several fi all hours ghting, the enemy gave way in directions and the B ri gade marched unhindered to their final th obj ectives for the day . On the o November , the advance was resumed , but halted according to orders on

- du . a general line Sains Nord Semeries , inclusive At the for mer place , one of those unfortunate occurrences happened , of which the wonder is that they are not more NE 1 70 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG L I

frequent in modern warfare , fought as it is in three onwards dimensions . While our troops were pressing

, towards Semeries , leaving Sains on their left flank French Infantry and Cavalry were pouring along the roads to the south of that town and into the country beyond . The streets of Sains were full of rejoicing civilians clustering round the few Signal and officers who had yet found their way into the town , and to whose presence they E ffi were not yet accustomed . A party of nglish o cers guided by the Curé were making an examination of the wrecked railway-bridge lying across the main road and of the abandoned stores in and about the railway-station

Suddenly , the air seemed full of the drone of aeroplane w engines and , looking up , the sky was seen dotted ith British planes circling round the town and evidently trying to make out the identity of the crowd collected in the streets . The conclusion arrived at was soon pointed in a most unpleasant manner . Bullets sprayed into the town from the machine guns of the planes , while a little farther to the south and east , dull crash after dull crash announced the fact that our planes were bombing the roads near by . For some d minutes the bombar ment continued , until one plane , sweeping nearer earthwards than the rest , must have picked up the message of the frantically-waving handker chiefs and hands . fi The ring ceased , but not before several casualties had been caused , almost the last cases treated by the medical officers of the Division being some of our French ll A ies wounded by splinters from the bombs , or by - fir machine gun e . fi - No further ghting took place , though scouting parties were pushed out through Ramousies and Liessies without

a . r o th g ining touch with the enemy On the November,

1 72 THROUGH THE H INDENBURG LINE

part as great as in the past , but never will its members have reason to be ashamed of the example set in the 1 autumn of 19 8 .

The work of clearing up the battlefields proceeds apace , but the Scars of War are deep and will not easily be hidden or erased . - To day , walking along a country road , the author of this account came acro‘ss a shell hole filled with bloody water . Hard by , the hoof of a horse protruded from a ri hasty grave . Again , not many yards away , a B tish ’ soldier s shrapnel-drilled steel helmet lay asprawl upon the ground .

- Blood , hoof , and helmet all three mute witnesses to one small incident in the greatest tragedy the world has ever seen .

To the living are the Fruits of Victory , but let us not forget our glorious Dead . There cannot be a single officer or man of the 46 th Division but has cause to mourn the loss of a brother , a comrade , or a friend of more peaceful days . Let us endeavour to make the E ngland in whose defence they fell a better place for ourselves and for our and their descendants . So may we dedicate our lives , as this short history of the exploits of the 46 th

Division is dedicated , to those who gave their lives for an ideal . So shall the men who fell at Hohenzollern Redoubt at , l Gommecourt , at Belleng ise at Ramicourt and Andign y , or a thousand other unnamed places , feel that after all fi their great sacri ce was not made in vain . Thus we may leave them lying in their oft - times name s le s graves in France , but with their memori es enshrined M EMORIAL CRO S S ERECTED ON THE HIGH GROU N D N EAR BELLEN GLI S E I N MEMORY OF THE FALLEN OF THE 46 TH

D IV I S ION .

A P PE N DI X I

GERMAN DI VI S I ON S EN GOUN TERED A ND DE FEA TED B Y THE 4OTH (N OR TH MI DLA ND) DI VI S I ON B E TWEE N THE PE RI OD 24TH S EPTEMB ER To 1 I TH N OVE MB E R 1 18 , 9

2nd Division . th 5 Reserve Division. 1 D 5th Reserve ivision . 2 2n d Reserve Division . 2 h i 4t Div sion . 25th Reserve Division 2 h 9t Division . th i 34 Div sion . th v 7s Reserve Di ision . th s i o 7o Re erve Div si n . 815 t Reserve Division . 8 th s 4 Re erve Division . 1 1 th 9 Division. 1 th D 97 ivision. 2215 t D ivision . 2 r st is 4 Div ion. A P PE N DI X I I

CAS UA LTI ES B E TWEEN 24TE S E PTE MB ER AN D 1 1 TH N OVE MB E R 1 18 , 9

Total 2 17 Total A P PE NDI X I I I

I MMEDI A TE RE WA RDS GRAN TED TO 46 17 1 (NOR TH MI DLA ND) DI VI S I ON FR OM 24TH S EPTEMB ER TO 1 1 TH N OVEMB ER 1 18 , 9

V C . .

D S . O. Bar to . D S . . O. d B 2 n ar . to M C . B ar to M . C.

M . C.

Other Ranks

V. C .

M . C . B ar to D . M . C . D . C . M . zud Bar to M . M . B ar to M. M .

M. M .

Ofi cers t er . O h Ranks CH CRO DE FREN I x GUERR E 13 9 H ‘ C EVALIER DE L ORDRE LEOPOLD II 1 B ELGIAN DECORATION MILITAI RE 2

1 78 APPEND IX IV

e o a n . Staff Captain Capt i W. J B d w

u en an E r uhar t . A . D . C . Lie t t q I st North Midlan d T D - o n e . . F A u n e . T g R . . . Brigade , Lie tenant Colo l J , . - HIll ChIld 2n d No r th Midland Lieuten an t Colonel Sir S . , V O . F A M. . R . e . . Brigad , - Leveso n 3 r d No rth Midlan d Lieuten an t Co lo n el C . C .

F A o r . R . . . Brigade , G we 4th No rth Midlan d

- GIsb o r n e . . F A . eu en o e . d R . . . H C G Briga e , ow Li t ant lon l L — e c . A C eut en o n e . . D . . North Midlan d . Li ant Col l R P L a h North Midlan d Heavy 0 - d Hm . Battery Lieuten ant Colo nel W.

SHERWOOD FOR ESTERS BRIGAD E

— r ri d e al . . Colonel (tempora y B ga i r Gener ) C T Shipley , late r Ro yal Fusilie s .

E o r e n . Brigade Major Major . M . M r is , D vo Regiment n r t 8th Staff Captain Captai R . Wo dswor h , Sher r wood Foreste s.

- T D th e o o o e u e o . o . . 5 Sh rw d F rest rs Lie t nant C lonel G M sley, - dm an 6 r o e u o . . o th She wood F rest rs Lie tenant C lonel G D Go , D V . .

* F Li u n ~ n hS h r wo o d o r es er s e te ant Co lo el . . 7t e t C . W Birkin o u — n 8th Sherwo d Foresters Lie tenant Colo el G . Fowler.

LI N COLN AN D LEICES TER BRIGAD E

o m r - r f dl C lonel (te porary Brigadie Gene al) Clif ord , late Mid esex n Regime t . a o Adle r o n Cam r n . r c e o Brigade M jor Maj r R L. , High n e la d rs . f E h . . c t c Staf Captain Captain J Vi ars , 4 Lei esters .

th c en - o o E a n 4 Lei esters Lieut ant C l nel R . . M rti . th e c u n - o o T D 5 L i esters Lie te ant C l nel C . H . Jones , . . * th c eu en n — o T e . o . D 4 C . . Lin olns Li t a t ol n l J W Jess p , th c eu e - T E 5 Lin olns Li t nant Colonel . . Sandall .

s u t s r e t r an sf The e ni we err e d t o t he 5 9 t h D ivi sio n o n the 2 9 t h an uar 1 8 o n r a e s e n y , I 9 , r e uce fr o m fo ur t o t hr e e t t ali o n s J B ig d b i g d d b a . APPEND IX IV 179

STAFFORD BRI GAD E

m d - B m w r o ilo . Colonel (Te porary Briga ier General) W. K R R Brigade Major Major R . Abadie , . . . f E E l 6 th o u Sta f Captain Captain G . . lwe l , S th ffo Sta rds. * h r - t af LI u . 5 No th St fords e ten an t Colonel J . Knight 6 h - o t fo . eu en n o n e t . North Staf rds Li t a t C lo l J . Gret n h u - m t af u en n o n . 5 So th St fords Lie t a t C lo el R . R. Ray er 6 th o u af o eut n n - o T e o u e . . S th St f rds Li a t Col nel F Wat rh se , T D . .

n u - n E e O C a e n n o e . . . Divisio al Tr in Li te a t Col l . L. M ars

S S O eut en n em r o r . . . . . Li a t (t po ary Maj ) F J

Wilde . C l O. . North Mid and

Co . c . c . . Div . Cy list Captain T S Bla k

- E . I u n n o n e . st Lie te a t Col l A Wraith ,

2 n d . . e Major R M W st , — u n . 3 r d Lie tenant Colo el H . H . C Dent ,

P b ur N S u . . ar M . ec . . . Div. San Lie tenant W K y ,

A Y C S . r . . . N ec . M. . . . Mob Vet Captain C Ha tley,

Thi s un it was t r ans fer r ed t o th e soth Divisio n o n t he 2 9 th r e e fr o m fo r t o t r e atta o n s an u ar 1 18 o n r a e s e n d uc u e . J y , 9 , B ig d b i g d h b li AP PE NDI X V

H 1 18 PTE MB ER 2 T , ORDER OF B A TTLE , S E 9 9

AI E E 46TH DI VIS ION . H ADQUART RS

- G C j o G G . . d , O. . Ma r eneral F Boy .

M . D C. . . (F)

m . Lieutenant C . R. R . Ro er

al . . Captain A . S . Ne e , M C - Lieutenant Colonel C . F. Jer S O. D . ram, . S D . O. Major S . Hay, . m - Captain M . H . J . Bu s Lin

dow. Lieutenant-Colonel R Duck

D S O. worth , . .

Major H . N . Forbes , M . C . ,

D C M. . . ll m Major K . G . Wi ia s D S . O. Colonel T . Kay, .

Major S . R . Foster, M . C .

o . . u l Maj r G M Man el e , M . C . l Major C . L. Vea .

Major C . Hartley. u - E Lie tenant Colonel . L. D S O. Mears , . .

S S . o O ...... Maj r F J Wilde , M C v al al O fic u n E Di ision Buri s f er Lie tena t R . K . wan. i Offic i ll. Div sional Gas er Capta n K . J . S . Ferra al Offic al . Division Salvage er Lieutenant B . W. D e Divisional Interpretation Offi c er Lieutenant S . Read . ai Wi . . llirno tt Senior Chapl n Rev G S . . mmu Offic n E A nition er Lieutena t . V. Grimston . m a Camp Co mandant Capt in W . B . T . Rees . O O fi u Forward bservation f cer . . . Lie tenant J Walker, M C 18 0

182 APPE ND IX V

C/230 B atter y

m . Major V. B . Rowe , M . C . (Battery Co mander) m Lieutenant A . L . Graha , M . C .

c n . zud Lieutenant H . Ma lea Em 2 n d Lieutenant W. ery .

D/230 B attery

D S O m . Major S . C . Wright , . . . (Battery Com ander)

Lieutenant D . Gray. T Lieutenant R. W. . Jones . u z ud Lieutenant C . P . B rges .

I T F A 2 S D . . . 3 BRIGA E , R

- S O n D . . u e . . . . Lie t na t Colonel N G M Jervis ,

2 n d u . . m Lie tenant K D Abraha s , M . M . m A V C Captain W. G . Tho son, . . .

Captain J . Lang,

A /23 1 B attery h . . m Major G . L. Wrig t , M C (Battery Com ander) .

euten . . c . . Li ant A V Maddo k, M C E u n . . 2 n d Lie tena t W Date .

u n . . 2n d Lie tena t M G Jones.

B /23 1 B attery m l . . . m Major G Ca pbel , M C (Battery Co mander) . m Lieutenant S . J . S ith .

n . . l Lieutena t J S A lport .

d u . . 2n . Whi Lie tenant R S L te .

C/23 1 B attery

-E o . . . . m n Major C R Morris yt n , M C (Battery Com a der) . E B u n . . o uc e Lie te ant H h r.

u . 2n d Lie tenant J Lee .

d . 2n . Lieutenant J C Binns .

D/23 1 B attery

. . B A , . . m Major G Hewson M C ( attery Com ander) .

u . . Lie tenant D A Carr. n 2n d eu . . B w Li tena t S W ridg ater.

zud u . . am Lie tenant N A Br well. APPE ND IX V 183

6TH S I AL M 4 DIVI ON A MUNI TION COLUMN HEADQ UARTERS

o Maj r J . R . Wilson .

Captain W . Savory, M . C . T Captain W . . Wo od

S ectio n I

u Captain J . B . M rphy .

S ectio n I I

Th . . ur sfi ld Captain J H e .

S A A . c i . . S e t o n

n Captai H . Payne .

. u Captain C A . Pa lden , M . C.

M D X 6 T M T COM AN ING /4 . . BA TERY E Captain . Porter.

D I Y 6 T M. COMMAN NG /4 . BATTERY

n . u E Captai R. L H nter, M . C . , R .

O E EE E E R YAL NGIN RS , H ADQUART RS

Lieutenan t~C lo n el Mo r shead D S u o . O. H . T. , . (wo nded at duty) , R E C . . . Lieuten an t~Co lo n r el . c R . E W Ga forth , M . C . , A ting C . R E l a . Captain H . J . C . Marshal , Adjut nt . u t n R E Lie tenant A . R . Page , Assis ant Adjuta t . .

6 TH D R E 4 5 FIEL COMPANY,

M o mm in Office ajor W. H . Hardman , M . C . , C and g r. d - in — o mm a t i . . zu . C p a n G . H . Jones , M C , C and t Office E ec . Lieutenant A . . Rome , S ion r T m as e t o n Offi e eu en n E o . c . Li t a t M . . h , M C S c i r d u A n uth ec o ffic z u e . i sco O . Lie t nant J , S ti n er ud e n ec Offic z e . c Li ut ant L Bla klock, S tion er. 184 APPE ND IX V

6 H D M R E . 46 T FIEL CO PANY,

mm n Offic . r m . . o Major H . M . Fo dha , M C , C a ding er — - D l 2n d in mm . Captain H . C . a y , Co and

en ec Offic . Lieut ant A . Fox , S tion er

Offic . u en an E . u c o Lie t t A . H bbard , Se ti n er

t Offic . m e . . c n an . Lieute t F . T Ja s , M C , Se ion er

O fic . zud u . . Lie tenant T H Midgley, Section f er

68I H D R E . 4 FIEL COMPANY, ffi Lo wb r id e O c . Major G . C . g , Commanding er — - G r 2md in m n . Mc r e o . Captain g , M C Com a d ffi L S t o n O ce . e u en n . o un . . ec i t a t W Y g, M C , i r

u n n B a lo ec o n Of fice . e e a . . Li t t F N y r, S ti r

L n n M B e ct n Offi e . ieuet a t . o c e o c . R y , S i r fi D . o er ect n O ce . eute n . . Li na t R T C lli , S io f r

E 6 TH D S L L R . 4 IVI IONA SIGNA COMPANY,

m in E . i Office . Major . A Lew s , r Co mand g E e 2 n d- - m n ri e . . in . Captain R. . P stl y, M C , Com a d A O. C R . . . al Captain S W. Kirby, M C . , . . Sign s . ten n u r c O. C 1 Lie a t W. H . Ald i h , . Signals, 37th Brigade . u en n O C n 1 h e . e . . 8t Li t a t M . V Jon s , Sig als , 3 Brigade .

n S . . u O. C 1 h . . t e all C . t Lie te ant F H gg , M , Signals , 39 Brigade. Li ut n n t n e a . O. C 2 I s . . . n t G A K app, M C , . Sig als , 3 Brigade , lgp A . .

eu n o . 1 . . 0 . . ct Li tena t S A M ore, C No Se ion. u W e ffi . . e O c Lie tenant H S alk r, Wirel ss er.

u e . . c O fice Lie t nant A C Cowe , Se tion f r. 2 d u n n . l . D. C. n . . al 2 0 Lie tena t R G Wi ls , M C , Sig s , 3 th B r R F A i . . gade , . 2n d u e a Lie t n nt R . S . Lowe. zud eu E m Li tenant W. . Tho as . 2 nd u . . O. C . n Lie tenant R V Jenner, Sig als, Machine Gun B attalion. zud u . . i Offi Lie tenant A P Boone , W reless cer.

I 37TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

B r i adier ~G en l er a . . V l . C g . J V Campbe l , , B n rigade Comma der.

ai . T . . C A , . . . . ri a Capt n C White V , M C , B gade M j or.

18 6 APPE ND IX V

E I /6TH BATTALION SOUTH STAFFORD SHIRE REGIM NT i - . . Command ng Lieutenan t Colonel C . Lister, M C , Offic er. - - 2 nd in m . . . Major J . M . Frew, M C , Co mand

n . a . . Capt in J P Wood , Adjuta t m Offi . 2nd Lieutenant T. L. Free an , Signal cer

Co mpany Co mmanders

Captain G . S . Harris, M . C .

E i . Major . Lew s

Captain P. R . Teeton , M . C .

u . . ai . . Capt n A P B swell , M C

Platoo n Co mmand er s

c . 2n d Lieutenant F. C . Bee h

E . G . vans

n . C . W. Bria d

B k . . J . a er, M C

P . W. Burgess , M . C . , a F. A . Morg n , M . C .

m . E l . Li . . eutenant M Wi lia s , M C C D M. nd e . . . 2 Lieut nant H Watts ,

o . J . R binson

al . . S . W ters , M C

C . P. H . Sylvester.

L . J . Knight .

m . R . S ith

H . W . Wooton .

u . Lie tenant J A . Armstrong , M . C .

t . H . C . Marrio t , M C .

1/6TH BATTALION NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE R EGIMENT

u - T m E m i . Lie tenant Colonel . R . vans , Co and ng E ai . . een u Capt n V Gr , Adj tant . u E ur . . n u n Lie tenant F B t , Assista t Adj ta t . u r . e e te . Captain G Mah r, Q a t rmas r ff . c e n s o r Offic Captain M Rad li , Tra p t er.

. ffi . c O c r Lieutenant J R Wi ks , Signal e .

e a . al Offic Li uten nt T Be e! Lewis Gun er. APPE ND IX V 1 87

Co mpany Commanders d 2n n . m Lieutena t H N . Tho pson. ai . . Capt n A H Charlton , M . C . zud Lieutenant F. L . May.

. . e o Captain F J N wt n , M . C .

Platoon Co mmand cr s

u u Lie tenant W. S . Ang s. E . l F . Brind ey. E r i . W. Pa k nson. E m A . . Cha bers . o W. Wo dward .

. E W J . A . nsor. B E C . . . King.

L. Roberts. B eeli h . n am J g , M . C .

R . H . Sennett .

R . Barron.

. c . . . l Offic . Captain P H Bellanger, M C , Medi a er

. . . ain . Captain F W Cleveland, M C Chapl

I 37TH TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY

i . c an a i . Capt n B . D Hat hett , M . C . , Comm d ng r Lieutenant H . Grego y. u O . Lieutenant J . lton

d an . . . zu Lieuten t T R D Davies.

I 3 STH INFANTRY BRIGADE

- M S . G D . O al . . . . . Brigadier Gener F G M Rowley, C Brigade

Commander. B r i l . . i . ai . Capt n D H l , M C , gade Maj or .

E n a i . Captain . A . Huski son , St ff Capta n l Offic N c . u . Lie tenant H . Salter , Intel igen e er

n il r . e . Captai C. Sch le , M C Q Learn r 188 APPEND IX V

1 TH C H R /5 BATTALION , LIN OLNS IRE EGIMENT

- m . . . C d Lieutenant Colonel H G Wilson, om an ing

. Captain R. White, Adjutant

a n . . u r . . Capt i J C Urq ha t , M C

Offi . Lieutenant F. C . King , Signal cer

al O fic . l . . ai . . Capt n J H Lloyd Wil iams , M C , Medic f er

Company Commanders

u . . u . . Lie tenant G H Q antrill , M C

n u . Captai R . G . D nn

e . Lieutenant W. Ch er n m t Captai W. H . G . S y h .

Platoo n Co mmander s

n m . Lieutena t H . Ba ber

E . . A . Dennis

C . R. Madden , M . C .

H . F. Hawkeswood .

R . D . Lepine .

e nd Lieutenant A . C . Fisher.

R . S . Lord . fi Lieutenant J . W. Mans eld.

u . . zud Lie tenant W. A Giles

F. S . Skinner. c A . G . Bla k, M . C . n i Lieutena t R. B . Harr s .

u n . . zud Lie te ant F. W L Few. n J . H . Hopki s. Wh a les W. pp . m 1 2 . 4 4 4 Sergeant N . S ith

1 r H I CE H /4 BATTALION , LE STERS IRE REGIMENT

- u an e . . a . Lie ten t Colonel F. W. Fost r , M C , Comm nding - - d in m n . c . . 2n Major G . R. A . Be kett , M C , Com a d i a . h . Capt n D . W Howart , Adjutant d O fi 2n ll c . Lieutenant W. L . Bass , Inte igence f er fi . O . A F. Castle , Signal f cer

W. K . Fox . i n e c Offic Capta n G . S . Brow , M di al er.

. O fi Lieutenant J A . Tyler, Transport f cer.

. . e M F Shepherd , Quart rmaster.

X V 190 APPEND I

Platoon Co mmander s

s . 2n d Lieutenant A . A her

u n . H . J . Q i t

. S . H . Dennis

w . J . W. Le in

E r o . . Cosg ve

. . Lieutenant S . G . H . Steel , M C C r V . . J . C . Bar ett ,

n o . 2n d Lieuten an t A . Joh s n

. W . W. Parsons

Lieutenant S . Corah . r D . T. Slope .

E u . 2n d Lieutenan t J . G . . B ckley r 240467 Ser geant P. Bowle .

- o . 2409 19 Lance Sergeant G . F wkes

240 1 18 Corporal B . Mead.

t . s . 242599 Sergean R . B Hayne

I 38TH TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY

mm i . Captain A . N . Bloor, Co and ng

a . Lieuten ant A . R msden B risa A . C . De y .

139TH INFANTRY BRIGADE

- m a . al . n Brigadier Gener J Hari gton , Brigade Com nder

ai E . . . . . Capt n J Grinling , M C , Brigade Major i We tm an a . ai . . . e . . Capt n W C C , M C , Staff Capt n O e m fi c r . e . . . Lieut nant A G T Lo er, Intelligence

u n . . . . Lie tena t W A Lytle , M C fi r O c . Lieutenant F. Clay , T ansport f er

1/5TH BATTALION SHERWOOD FORESTERS

- . c . . Lieutenant Colonel A Ha king , M C , Commanding. d-i - m an . . . zu n . Captain R S . Pratt , M C , Co m d i a . . a Lieutenant (Acting Capt n) J B . Raymond , M C Adjut nt . ll am o . Ofli . l c cer Lieutenant G H Wi i s n , Inte ligen e . ffi . . . O . n c . Lieutenant S G Faire , M C , Sig al er

E . zud u an . Gun Offic Lie ten t H Kirkby, Lewis er . m e . c z e . Li utenant D Ma ken ie , Quarter ast r APPEND IX V .1 91

u o fic . . c O . Lie tenant C S Bla kw od , Transport f er e n m c Offic Lieut na t J . Cha ley, Medi al er. E Rev. . H . Hines , Chaplain .

Co mpany Command er s

u n n c n m Lie te a t (A ti g Captain) D . S ith , M . C . 2 n d u u e . . c e . . Lie t nant J N Ja q s , M C Littleb o Captain C . N . y , M . C . u n c n a . Lie te ant (A ti g Captain) H . V. How rd , M C.

Platoo n Co mmand er s

n . el n Lieutena t J F. Cr li , M . C . h t R . G . W i taker , M . C . 2n d u e n Lie t na t J . C . Wheatley. T t A . H . . Gen . I) ar o . M . . B r ws m R . N . Lake an .

E . Lieutenant F. Ann . e n d u en Lie t ant F. R . Hartshorne . lt T . Mou on. m s . C . W. Hol e D c . . J . R. en h , M C

c . . F. T. Met alfe , M C

I /6TH BATTALION SHERWOOD FORE S TERS

- B o n e . mm i Lieutenant C lo l W. Vann , M . C Co and ng. e d- n - mm n . e 2n i . Major J . A Sh dd n , M . C . , Co a d ud— - mm E . . c n z in Captain . F. Winser, M C , A ti g Co and .

E . . . u . Captain Kershaw, M C , Adj tant a Offic l . Captain W. T. Stephens , Sign er Offic 2 n d . c . . c . Lieutenant A Ma kintosh , M C , S out er E 2 n d Lieutenant R . . H . Stott . u ai . . u r . Capt n S B Bo lton , Q a termaster fi n O . Lieutenant H . D . Vaughan , Tra sport f cer Offic di al . Major A . W. Shea , Me c er

Co mpany Command ers m u . . . . Lie tenant J N Wight an, M C

13 i . . Captain H . . P nk , M C i e a a . . . . Lieut n nt (Acting Capt n) J F Dennis , M C

i . . Captain F. W. Hipk ns, M C 1 92 APPEND IX V

Platoon Commanders

l . . Lieutenant C. B. Newel , M C

C M. D . . uc . . F. To h , M C ,

H . A . Payne .

t . . R . A . Fri h, M C

E . C . . Wardle

W. Bavin .

To m kin so n . P. A . p

l . A . J . Tyre l

A . Jephson .

B imr o se . . C . , M C

W. Meakin. E S ar r o tt . c .

I /BTH BATTALION SHERWOOD FORES TERS

- l m e a d u a . Lie ten nt Colonel J Fin ay De pst r , Comm n ing fi Of cer. - - d in . E . c zu ai . . . Capt n C P lliott , M C , A ting Command t l c u . Captain C . H . Powe l , A ting Adj tan T ut c u eb b t n Offi . Lie tenant S . A . , Sig al er

2n d u . . n e . . Lie tenant W J Wi t r, M C

2 d . n Lieutenant R S . Plant . ffi O . e . . o e c Lieut nant H M T yn , A ting Transport cer S ffic t . . n . ic O . Captain G M. L. Homa , M . C , Med al er

D E . u Captain Rev. . St rt , M . C . , Chaplain .

Co mpany Co mmander s m Captain G . Tho as , M . C . 2 n d e Li utenant J . Bloor , M . C . , M . M . eu e E . r . Li t nant S . Cai ns , M C . i a . Capt n J B . White , M . C .

Platoon Commander s

. D . M l . C Lieutenant S Bradwel , M C . , . .

. c l J F. Sha k eton, M . C .

R. M . Barker . u F. T . W. Sa nders.

P. A . Turner.

‘ 1 94 APPEND IX V

n u e T ms d . 2 e . i Li t nant A . W llia B 22 8 e e . c e 57 5 S rg ant C or h rt. ne Lieutenant H . J . C . Hai s. I I st m c n - / North Midland Field A bulan e , Lieute ant Colonel

mm . T . A . Barron, Co anding

I 2n u c o . . . / d North Midland Field Amb lan e , Maj r G H H

Manfield m a . , M . C . , Com nding 1 r d l n e m a c - nel /3 North Mid a d Fi ld A bul n e, Lieutenant Colo

Tu n e o m . A . C . F. r r, C m anding

46TH BATTALION MACHINE GUN CORPS

eu e - -Lan n owe Li t nant Colonel B . Mathew ,

manding. d- - . . . zu in Major G A Wade , M C . , Command. D c e u Captain R. i k ns , Adj tant .

2nd eu e . . e l c Offic Li t nant A C Park, Int l igen e er. S o merfield u Captain M. J . , Q artermaster.

Company Co mmand er s

Wi d e . n el r Major H S . , M . C .

H . Witty. B . . o u he W T g y , M . C . u M. Do glas.

- S econd-ln Command of Compan ies

Captain R. Page .

T. A . N . Walker.

. . A R M . Darby, M . C . Ma . cVie Lieutenant N .

C ampany Tr an spo rt Oflicers

Captain G . Woody.

. Lieutenant W Harris , M . C .

. . l H A Spend ove.

S ection Ofi eer s

t . f Lieutenan W H . Ho f, M . C .

. L H . C . Guthrie.

. . e S A Park s . zud Lieutenant H . Johnson . APPE ND 1X V 1 9 5

L E ieutenant A . . Cowley.

A . W. Briggs. zud k n . On e Lieutenant W G . c .

i . J . R . W lson eu Li tenant C . G . Larking.

C . J . Highwood. zud u E Lie tenant S . A . arl.

R. R. Willing. R u an d . dl . Lieutenant H W.

F. A . K . Park.

W. Ackland.

2 nd . Lieutenant B. A . Lane

S ub-S ectio n Commanders

eu c . Li tenant J . M . Kit hing E en W. . Warr

IIJIXEDK 198

uise 1 8 ud ustr a an 1 , , G , 5 s o n z , 3 Divi i , ( A li ) 3 7 u o t ar m 1 G y F , 5 3

th 2 6 12 12 1 , Divisio n 6 , , 3 , 5 , 43 , H

0 1 - A M. C l . 9 o mer can , t Co . 9 Divisio n th i ) , 3 , 3 Hackin ieu . , , 3 ( A g , L - N 1 1 1 n . 1 0 Hai r Ge . , 4 g , B ig O S . . 6 8 - n D . s o n 2 n d 1 8 , , 3 , o n r G e . Divi i , 3 , 3 , 3 , 43 7 Harr in gt , B ig 10 1 10 8 8 8 10 10 9 , , 3 , 4 , 5 , 5 , 7 , s S 1 1 8 . n riso n Maj or . B 7 , th 2 0 D v s o n , rr Co se i i i , 55 Ha y p . 33 th r en c 1 2 1 6 1 0 1 2 Divisio n 12 6 F h) , 5 , 3 , Hen n echies Wo o , , 5 , ( d 5 0 I r n e 2 2 2 , , 3 3 , S 3 Hin den bu g Li , , 4 3 Hi 8 D o o n ll , 9 D o o n 10 8 H 6 0 18 Mill , ill , H 6 2 0 ill 3 , H 0 2 0 E ill 7 , n t ze Her r vo n Hi , , 7 9 - eut H 10 2 E d so n eco n . W H 1 1 , d i . g S L ff e ut . Ho , , Li 3 t 18 , z n e o u t 1 Egyp Ho he n o ller R d b , 73 n in eer s 1 6 6 6 6 ’ E g , 4 , 43 , 4 4 , 4 , , 7 , Hu so n s os t 2 d P , 5 , 49 12 1 1 1 6 1 6 8 , , 44 , 49 , 2 0 th 1 1 1 7 Hussar s , , tr co ur t 0 8 E i , 3 , 3

F n ker man 6 I , 3 C l E er uso n . . . F g , p A , 55 N M 1 18 e m u ance 1 I st . Fi ld A b l , / M 6 u c n d N . 6 e m u an e 1 2 . eanco r t Fi ld A b l , / , 3 J , 3 - C 12 R E th 1 8 eut Co l M . m an 6 s . . . e Co . . enk n , 5 Fi ld p y , 4 s , 4 , J i , Li J V 8 W H C . S r t . . o hn son e . . 9 j , g , , m an R E 6 6 th ur t 8 2 1 1 e Co . . o n co Fi ld p y , 4 , 59 , J , , 4 - C o n es eco n eut . . J , S d Li , 5 7 m an R E 6 8th 16 ar m 12 6 e Co . . o nn eco urt Fi ld p y , 4 , 5 J F , ammen er fer 1 8 Fl w , o n ta ne de Co o m er 1 K F i l bi , 3 4 ' o nt a n e d Ut er te 10 6 1 2 6 F i , , ' K adaverv erwe n dun s an stalt r t r s Ho use 1 g , 7 Fo es e , 54 ' K e mm e 18 o r an s r en c 2 l , F g T h , 9 K n o ker r R e 2 o sse E t 18 b y idg , 7 F igh , r n o le r an 12 12 6 12 8 F es y d , 4 , , , G L

La ar a ue 1 2 6 8 8 B q , 3 , 3 , 7 , 7 , 4 , 1 2 0 12 2 12 , , 3 La o u er e ar m 16 0 L vi F , 2 1 c 8 La at o n Cr o ss R o a s 1 1 G 3 N i d , 5 ar fo r t eut -Co l D S an cer s 1 2 th 1 1 1 . . O G h , Li W . . L , , M C R E 1 1 8 . an e a o r H D M C 1 . . , . , 4 L , M j . . , ' r Pte H r eo e . . 6 L Ar b e d e u se 16 0 G g , , 3 G i , en c 2 0 a e Can a 2 0 Giv hy , L w l , o mmeco urt 1 0 1 Le Cate au 1 6 G , 9 , 3 , 7 3 , 7 r an aiso n ar m 16 e uc r en c 2 G d M F , 9 L d T h , 7 r an To aillo n Far m 16 0 Lehauco urt 0 6 0 1 d , . . G . 3 . 3 3 , 54 . 9 7 . 7 uar s D is o n 18 8 2 10 G d iv i , , 5 IND EX I 99

’ eicesters th 1 1 1 1 1 1 N e e s Cr o s s 8 10 10 8 1 12 L , 4 , 3 4 , , 3 , 3 3 , vill , 9 , 7 , , 1 0 i er Co se 5 N gg p , 3 3 e ce ster s t h 2 2 8 2 6 2 L i , 5 , 7 , , 9 , 3 , 7 ,

en s 1 2 0 L , 9 , Omi n o n R er 2 Le s o e et s 1 0 g , iv , 3 G b l , 5 O n C l e s a . 6 Le r o n ua 1 p h w , p , 7 T q y , 3 e er es 2 1 1 1 2 6 L v gi , 4 , 7 , Le er u er 2 6 1 6 2 P V g i , , 35 , 4 , es s es 1 1 i i , L 7 Pet t e He e R i er 16 1 6 1 6 i lp , v 4 , 5 , 9 e i n 1 , 9 Li v o e steer t 18 Pl g , n co n s t h 2 1 1 1 1 0 Li l , 5 , 7 , , 5 o n t r ue t 2 6 2 2 8 P , , 7 , Lo a N o r t an es 1 0 y l h L , 5 o t t er eut W 10 P , Li . . . , 4 Lud en d o r fl J , 9 7 Pr e selles ar m 12 F , 4 ut o n 18 L , r est e a o r R E M C I n t P i l y , M j . . , . . , . r sc es 16 1 16 2 16 16 1 6 6 P i h , , , 3 , 4 , , M M achin e G un Battalio n Life R uar s 1 0 G d , 47 , 4 ac n e G un atta o n 6 th 1 0 M hi i , , 4 B l . C R . A . M ac n e Gun at t a o n 6 th M hi B li , 4 , 47 , R am co urt 8 1 8 2 8 8 1 i , , , 5 , 9 , 9 , 9 4 , 1 1 3 6 — 10 0 10 2 10 10 9 , 9 7 , , 3 , 5 , ac i n e G un att a o n r o o th M h B li , , 4 7 a n la o sse 0 6 2 M g y F , 3 , 3 3 , 5 4 , 9 , 7 , I 7 3 R am o us e s 1 1 i , 7 ann e u n H 8 10 10 6 10 M q i ill , 9 , 5 , , 7 , R a l n s o n G en S ir H I n t w i , . . , . R e ni co ur t 1 6 1 1 8 1 1 g , 4 , 47 , 4 , 49 , 5 5 ar n e M , 7 9 R e e ut 6 id , Li 5 L w e - o l D t C . at e ann o e u . M h w , Li . , R ethe ut arm 1 1 8 1 2 , 3 4 , 3 , 5 47 Rh e m s i , 7 9 enn e r et 1 6 1 1 1 1 M v , 3 , 39 , 5 , 5 3 Ri uer val o s d e 1 2 1 6 1 8 q , B i , 3 , 3 , 3 , er co ur t 12 12 6 M i , 4 , e L eut T H R E 6 Midgl y , i . . . , . . , 7 Ri uerval ar m 1 q F , 35 o a n 16 0 M l i , R i ueval r e 0 1 8 q B idg , 3 , 3 , 3 4 , 5 ,

o n m o ut s r e R e t . 1 I st M h hi g , / , 43 , 6 59 , 7 R o n so n a o r 1 bi , M j , 49 o nt a u- t uar t - o r t e a o r M g S W l y , M j R o ute Ke e 2 0 A p , E C B t Ho n . . G en he . . - . . J , , R o e r G en wl y , B ig . F . G . M M V O 1 . . 7 44 o n t r e a n 8 8 10 0 M b h i , 3 , 9 , 9 4 , 9 7 , , S

- l H T a ns d u N o r 1 8 16 1 1 Mo r shea eut Co . . d . , Li . , S i d . 5 , 9 , 7 D S O R E 1 am r e -O se Can a 8 2 1 1 8 . . . . , 4 S b i l , , 55 , 5 Pt e H R A M C 6 6 co ts r e s 1 1 1 1 0 1 o s e . . . M l y , . , . , 3 , 4 S G y , , 4 , 5 3 untfo r Pt e B 6 e o n co ur t 1 o . M d , . , 3 S b , 47 emeri es 1 0 S , 7 e ue ar t 8 2 8 8 10 10 S q h , , 3 , 7 , 9 4 , 5 , 7 , 10 9 N aur o 2 e en a o r M C 10 y , 4 Sh dd , M j J . A . . , 3 N e u e-C a e e 18 er o o o r e st er s th 2 2 8 v h p ll , Sh w d F . 5 , 7 , , Ne u e-E se 18 8 10 2 10 1 16 2 16 v gli , 9 , , 3 , 4 7 , , 4 200 INDEX

-G en B r W C . ait es a o . . : r o o o r est er s 6 th 0 1 Thw , M j , , e , Sh w d F , , 7 , 7 I nt 2 0 2 1 10 2 10 1 . , , 9 9 , , 3 , 47 Times The er o o o r ester s 8 th 6 8 , , 7 9 Sh w d F , , 5 , 9 , o rt ar att er i th Tren ch M B y , 37 , 5 5 n a Co m an 8 16 8 1 0 Sig l p y , 3 , 3 9 , , 7 V ma o st o o 8 8 S ll P W d , 3 , 3 o mm e 1 2 8 8 r 2 2 1 1 S , 9 , 4 , a en co u t 2 6 , , 7 V d , 5 , 7 S t He en e 2 6 2 . l , , 7 a en c enn e s 1 8 V l i , 5 S t uen t n 1 1 6 . Q i , 34 , 4 , 7 a ée Has ar 1 1 V ll d , 44 , 53 S t ue n t n Can al 2 2 2 0 1 - . , 3 , W V C , , , 3 l B . i 4 u Co . Li t . Q Van n e . , M C 0 10 . . , 7 , 9 9 , 3 S tafi o r d s th N o r t 1 , 5 h , 9 aux n n 12 V A dig y , 9 taff o r s 6 th N o rt 6 1 8 S d , h, 3 , 5 , 5 , en e es 8 1 2 1 V d ll , 3 , 3 , 45 10 10 10 8 1 1 1 2 5 , 7 , , 7 , 5 m R e 18 Vi y idg , t affo r s th o ut 1 1 S d , 5 S h , 9 , 35 , 5 , W taffo r s oth o ut 1 106 1 6 S d , S h, 5 , , 3 , ass n 1 I I W ig y . 39 . 54 37 ! W atlm tr e et 1 g S , 3 Wi ur t 10 0 10 1 10 1 1 1 an co , , 4 , , T , 12 3 t N 1 man eu . . t . al an a H 8 Wigh , Li , 7 T ill , 73 , 3 J Y er tr 2 T y , 3 r es al en t 18 The uar r es 18 i , Q i , Yp S The umu us 2 2 6 1 10 T l , 5 , , 49 , m s eut E R E 1 8 o a . . . . Th , Li M , 4 o r n 0 8 Zo b eau 1 6 0 Th ig y . 3 , 7 3 , 3 ,

m t m Hazetl W t n Ven L Pr i ed m Grea B r ita b a so e d . on don y , y, , L and Aylesb ury

INDEX

r —Gen er o o o r esters oth 0 1 a tes a o . Sh w d F 7 7 , Thw i , M j W 10 2 10 1 I n t 99 , , 3 , 47 . , er o od o r esters 8 th 6 8 Times The Sh w F , , 5 , 9 , , , 7 9 10 0 10 1 10 1 1 8 1 1 6 2 r en c or tar att er 1 th , , 3 , 47 , 4 , 49 , T h M B y , 37 n a Co m an 8 1 6 8 1 0 Sig l p y , 3 , 39 , , 7 m al o st oo 8 8 S l P W d , 3 , 3