The Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant Major: the Most Important Senior Leaders in the Army

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The Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant Major: the Most Important Senior Leaders in the Army The Battalion Commander And Command Sergeant Major: The Most Important Senior Leaders in the Army By LTG James M. Dubik cal two-way communication system. the many challenges they will en - U.S. Army retired As such, senior leadership at the battal - counter. By the time an officer is se - and ion level (we use battalion as shorthand lected to command a battalion, he or COL David M. Hodne for all similar organizations) is perhaps she would have already served in the most important in the Army. multiple leadership positions internal attalion commanders and their The Army designed the battalion to the battalion—platoon leaders, com- Bcommand sergeants major are the level to capitalize on a unique combi - pany (or equivalent) commanders and senior leaders responsible for leading nation of officer and NCO leadership. staff principals. Most likely, the officer soldiers and caring for their families at In terms of officers, battalion com - also would have graduated from the very tip of the Army’s spear, and mand represents the level at which Command and General Staff College they both stand in the nexus of a criti - commanders are prepared most for and served as a battalion operations or 18 ARMY I February 2013 executive officer, possibly even as a decade. Simply put, the Army’s decen - at the tip of the Army’s spear. More staff officer at other echelons in Army tralized, Mission Command style is im - than a decade of fighting has re - or joint assignments. possible when battalion commanders minded all of us how important these The experience differential between and command sergeants major cannot two aspects of the battalion’s organi - battalion commanders and their sub - operate within the intent of higher. zational design are to success. ordinate officer leaders is huge, espe - The Army’s current position—with cially given the experience of the com - n addition to this “downward” com - the fight continuing in Afghan istan and mander’s partner in command: the Imunication function, battalion com - against al Qaeda and their affiliates, command sergeant major. These two manders and their command sergeants but with much of the force coming senior leaders use their experience dif - major also communicate “upward.” home to garrison life, budget cuts, ferential to guide their subordinates Senior commanders, whether during force reductions and all the challenges through the complexity of war at the their own battlefield circulation or via that these changes will bring—is in - tactical level. Squads and platoons win reports, rely heavily upon battalion dicative of how important the design wars, but the battalion commander commanders and command sergeants of a battalion and the role of its two se - and command sergeant major are di - major for accurate—even brutally hon - nior leaders will be off the battlefield. rectly involved in the unit’s day-to- est—descriptions and assessments. The Army consists of three relatively day action. They lead face to face, Such communications are absolutely separate but related generations of commonly sharing cold, wet, tired, essential to the coherency and efficacy leaders: those commissioned or re - hungry and dangerous conditions with of wartime command and form the cruited since 2001, who only know an their soldiers. Leadership at the battal - grist for a fact-based dialogue among Army at war; senior leaders whose ion level is a near perfect combination echelons of command, a dialogue that tactical experience was primarily de - of experience and exposure to soldiers. increases the probability that the orga - fined by the post-Vietnam and Cold Furthermore, for members of a bat - nization as a whole has sufficient un - War Army; and those in between. The talion—soldiers, young officers and derstanding and can, therefore, adapt lines between these generations are NCOs, as well as aspiring mid-grade its operations properly to the enemy not firmly drawn. Some individ ual officers and sergeants—the battalion and situation it faces. leaders do span generations, but two command and command sergeant ma - Battalions are designed to function important points emerge: The experi - jor are the Army. Both represent leaders within the nested leadership of eche - ences of each generation create differ - who have “made it.” The leadership lons of command, making battalion ent perspectives, and battalion com - they exhibit, the caring they display commanders and command sergeants manders and command sergeants and the command climate they set may major the communications conduit major will be a vital bridge between very well determine whether a soldier connecting senior generals to those these generations. reenlists or a leader stays in the Army. who are responsible to execute orders Battalion commanders and com - The standards enforced by the battal - mand sergeants major will, more than ion commander and command ser- ever, require mastery of intergenera - geant major result in the discipline and tional communication, not only in tactical proficiency that succeed in bat - terms of translating higher intent into tle—or not. Similarly, their discipline action but also with respect to serving and leadership standards are responsi - as a voice for a generation of young ble for the behavior of their soldiers, leaders who arguably already possess units and leaders out of battle, whether many of the adaptive and creative in theater or at home. No one can leadership traits the profession desires doubt that good or bad leadership at to cultivate. What these young leaders the battalion level has a profound ef - lack, and what senior leadership at the fect on the whole Army, but they fulfill battalion level must provide, is the a second, equally profound role: a two- broader context and maturity to trans - way communication conduit. late their wartime experiences into Battalion commanders and their meaningful training essential for sub - command sergeants major transmit, sequent generations. Over the next few and in some cases translate, not only years, battalion commanders and com - their senior’s tactical intent but at times mand sergeants major must be expert operational and strategic intent as well. in training and training management. Battalions, by design, constitute the Also required are a set of senior com - first echelon in the Army hierarchy ca - mand sergeants major, colonels and pable of conducting independent oper - general officers who will use the ations, and they have been doing this “The movies call it a cliff hanger , Army’s echelons as the two-way com - routinely in combat for more than a but the Army calls it teamwork .” munication network it is designed to 20 ARMY I February 2013 be—at home, as they did in combat. nale for the adaptive decisions that the reports to those seniors when neces - The Army’s senior leaders cannot make Army’s senior leaders make, and how sary. As such, senior leadership at the proper adaptive decisions that will al - these decisions must be implemented. battalion level has been the most im - ter institutional policies and programs To transmit and translate senior intent, portant leadership in the Army. Over unless those decisions are informed by battalion commanders and command the upcoming years of transition, the the candor that emanates from the bat - sergeants major must know and un - battalion’s leadership will retain its talion level. Battalion commanders and derstand it. Active and robust commu - importance. I command sergeants major are in direct, nications down are as important as daily contact with the 9/11 generation communications up. LTG James M. Dubik , USA Ret., is a of leaders; their voices must be sought, Battalion commanders and their former commander of Multi-National listened to and used. command sergeants major have car - Security Transition Command-Iraq and ried a heavy load for the Army since a senior fellow of AUSA’s Institute of s extensive as the battalion com - 2001. They have led soldiers in tough Land Warfare. COL David M. Hodne Amander’s and command sergeant fighting; they have cared for soldiers commanded two battalions in combat: major’s experience are, however, bat - and families before, during and after the 3rd Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry, in talion-level senior leaders need to un - 11 years of deployments. They have Iraq and the 2nd Ranger Battalion in derstand the complexities resulting stood at the nexus of the Army’s two- Afghanistan. He is now a U.S. Army from the challenges the Army faces, way communication system, translat - War College fellow at Georgetown Uni - the difficulties in finding balanced so - ing the intent of their seniors into bat - versity, en route to command 4th Stryker lutions to these challenges, the ratio - tlefield success and delivering accurate Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. 22 ARMY I February 2013.
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