8 GLOBAL HUMANITIES Year 6, Vol. 8, 2021 – ISSN 2199–3939 Editors Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane Identity and Nationhood

Editorial by Texts by Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane Amrita De Sophie Gueudet Frank Jacob Udi Lebel and Zeev Drori

edizioni Museo Pasqualino

edizioni Museo Pasqualino direttore Rosario Perricone GLOBAL HUMANITIES

8

Biannual Journal

ISSN 2199-3939

Editors Frank Jacob Nord Universitet, Norway Francesco Mangiapane University of Palermo, Italy

Scientific Board GLOBAL HUMANITIES Jessica Achberger Dario Mangano Year 6, Vol. 8, 2021 – ISSN 2199–3939 University of Lusaka, Zambia University of Palermo, Italy Editors Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane Giuditta Bassano Gianfranco Marrone IULM University, Milano, Italy University of Palermo, Italy Saheed Aderinto Tiziana Migliore Western Carolina University, USA University of Urbino, Italy Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. Sabine Müller Angelo State University, USA Marburg University, Germany Stephan Köhn Rosario Perricone Cologne University, Germany University of Palermo, Italy 8 GLOBAL HUMANITIES Year 6, Vol. 8, 2021 – ISSN 2199–3939 Editors Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane

Identity and Nationhood

Editorial by Texts by Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane Amrita De Sophie Gueudet Frank Jacob Udi Lebel and Zeev Drori

edizioni Museo Pasqualino https://doi.org/10.53123/GH_8_5

Masculinities in Digital Trolls and Mediated Affect Amrita De SUNY Binghamton [email protected]

Abstract. This article analyzes the proliferation of post-2014 social media trolling in In- dia assessing how a pre-planned virtually mediated affective deployment produces phys- ical ramifications in real spaces. I first unpack Indian Prime Minister ’s hyper-masculine social media figuration; then study the generative impact of brand Modi Masculinity through a processual affective rendering regulated by hired social media in- fluencers and digital media strategists. Finally, I assess the impact of Modi Masculinity on individual social media users, who voluntarily or sometimes circumstantially become enmeshed in this constructed network. Keywords: masculinities, social media, trolling, affect.

For Baisakhi Chakraborti, a routine space, she was in the middle of an ani- bus journey from her departmental of- mated conversation with her colleagues fice at a North American University in about the current state of Indian politics November 2018 turned into “nothing when she was rudely interrupted. This short of a nightmare”.1 Oblivious to her was before the recently concluded Lok surroundings and with the deceptive as- Sabha elections in May 2019 when Nar- surance that the school bus was a safe endra Modi was re-elected as the Prime

1 The subject’s original name has been changed to protect her privacy. This excerpt is from a conversation I had with her on 10 January 2019. Names of all social media users have been changed for privacy reasons.

GLOBAL HUMANITIES © Photo by Jeremy Bishop on Unsplash YEAR 6, VOL. 8, 2021 – ISSN 2199–3939 61

Minister of India for another 5-year term. 1. Methodology Baisakhi had referred to the rise of Hin- From October 2018 to the months du vigilantism when she was belligerent- leading up to the general election from 11 ly interrupted by a group of young men, April 2019 to 23 May 2019, I performed presumably from the same university. a close reading of both official and per- They accused her of spreading lies and sonal Twitter accounts. I first singled out misinformation about her country. Soon the Twitter accounts that had specifically after, she got off the bus, too scared to en- participated in disseminating the initial gage with this unexpected burst of vitriol. false tweet and the pornographic video This was only the beginning of targetted ascribed to Rana Ayyub in 2018. I first social media attacks. traced the DailyO news report, which had In another incident that took place on shared Rana Ayyub’s tweet, to find the a different scale, on 23 April 2018, an In- troll accounts. Some of these accounts dian journalist, Rana Ayyub, found her- appeared to be defunct or bot accounts. self trapped in a targeted viral social me- However, this search rendered a perva- dia hate campaign. Ayyub, who had been sive online digital ecosystem where I targeted many times before for her Mus- repeatedly noticed similar online behav- lim identity and her often critical con- ioral patterns. Out of the first hundred ac- demnations of India’s government, was counts that came up with the initial tweet, not unfamiliar with the online ecosystem ninety-two of them belonged or appeared 2 of hate campaigns. However, this time to belong to men. While Baisakhi’s virtual abusers were more toned down in terms she became the victim of “an online lynch of their abusive rhetoric, the comments mob” (Chatterjee 2018). This targeted, on Rana Ayyub’s profile on every tweet online blitzkrieg was prompted by a com- reflected a persistent toxic culture of on- munally charged fake tweet in her name line vitriol. Several investigative media from a Twitter handle posing as the offi- reports further confirm that global digital cial account of Republic TV (a prominent trolls overwhelmingly turn out to be men right-wing media channel in India). Soon (Gudipaty 2017; Megarry 2014). An ex- after, a pornographic video with her face amination of these Twitter accounts and morphed on it was relentlessly circulated their general online behavioral patterns on social media platforms like Facebook revealed an over-reliance on images and and Twitter alongside the personal details text that can be attributed to traditional of her address and phone number. More representations of ‘manliness.’3 Due to recently, on 3 July 2020, in the aftermath the frequent nature of their occurrence of another violent encounter between and similar replicative patterns, I have militants and security personnel in Kash- parsed these traits to launch an analysis mir’s Sopore region, Ayyub spoke out of masculinities in the Indian digital eco- against the unlawful killing of a 65-year- system. By way of evidence, I draw from old man, Bashir Ahmed Khan. She was a multi-disciplinary corpus, moving from again inundated with hate messages an investigative account by the journalist online; a Twitter account called ‘Hindu Swati Chaturvedi (2016) to official BJP Rashtra’ (Hindu Nation) reminded her social media campaigns and to scanning of Gauri Lankesh—a journalist who was Twitter for a close reading of accounts4 shot dead in 2017 (Taskin 2020). that regularly participate in trolling.

2 Some of the accounts appeared to be generated by generic online bots. 3 By ‘traditional representations of manliness’, I am specifically alluding to socialized as well as culturally idealized representations of heteronormative masculinities, such as personality traits that refer to initiative, risk-taking, and physical prowess, among other things (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Reeser 2011). 4 This article mainly provides a study of masculinities as a heuristic to understand the online architecture. For security reasons, the names of personal profiles have been changed.

62 Amrita De Masculinities in

Following the available scholarship on a revisionist history delineating a mythi- Hindutva masculinities (Banerjee, 2005; cal Hindu past, images and texts actively Chakraborty 2011; Vijayan 2019), my abound in the public imagination, affec- work primarily locates Hindutva mascu- tively generating Hindutva and, in turn, linities in the contemporary Indian dig- Rashtra (Hindu nation) as the ital ecosystem, attending to its semiotic default logic and end-goal of contempo- dissemination in both real and virtual rary governance. Though Hindutva is by spaces. In the first section, I trace the par- no means synonymous with Hinduism, ticular constituents of Modi’s hyper-mas- right-wing leaders and their followers culine figuration, evident from his con- (both local and global) have ensured that stant social media use. I note how he has they appear as a singular, uniform entity emerged as the perfect embodiment of (Banaji 2018). From the Sabarimala Tem- a traditional ideal of Hindu masculinity, ple issue of 20185 to cow-vigilantes lynch- highlighting how his digitally mediated ing Muslim butchers on the suspicion masculine persona results from careful that they were trading beef, to the recent- semiotic branding. I then unpack the na- ly resolved Babri Masjid issue (November ture of its processual rendering by both 2019), where the Supreme Court per- individual and collective economies by mitted a Hindu temple to be built on the considering the role of pre-planned affect same site as the previously demolished and semiotics in the dissemination of the mosque—there is a repeated adherence Modi masculinity brand. It is necessary to Hindutva as the governing logic, right to note here that I have used masculini- down to the granular details at every level. ties mainly as a heuristic to observe dom- It is important to note here that Hin- inant practices in the digital ecosystem. dutva is not a monolithic cultural con- More specifically, I note how digitally struct (Banerjee 2005); it has undergone mediated masculinities are produced several mutations according to its cul- through a pre-planned affective deploy- tural context’s specificity. Though some ment, further enabling the construction organizations are depicted as key ancil- of a vigilante public culture. laries of the Hindu right like the Rashtri- ya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vish- 2. Vigilante Nation and Hindutva wa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and current Masculinity Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bhara- While the above two incidents appear tiya Janata Party (BJP), there are some to be isolated cases with varying degrees tactical, ideological differences between of harassment, they only provide a mi- them; however, all these organizations croscopic glance of what seems to be present a formidable meeting ground a seamless continuum in Indian digi- of Brahmanical patriarchy with virulent tal space, regardless of the specificity of nationalism. Excessive militarization is the geographical location. Additionally, the sine qua non of these nationalist or- contemporary Indian public spaces (so- ganizations, situating violence and the cial, political, real, virtual) are inundated masculinist logic of decisive leadership by visual codes and semiotic cues that as the structure of Hindutva nationalism. demonstrate solid allegiance to Hindu Initially mobilized by Vinayak Savarkar iconography. From pictures of Ram and in the 1920s, Hindutva is a religious-po- Hanuman to the ubiquitous usage of the litical ideology that identifies the creation color saffron and repeated exhortations to of a Hindu nation as its ultimate goal (Ba-

5 The issue related to the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala rendered visible the entrenched patriarchy of Hindu reli- gious laws which restrict the entry of women into temples. In September 2018, the Supreme Court lifted the ban on the entry of menstruating women to the temple, citing the practice as illegal and unconstitutional. This sparked nationwide protests against the verdict by millions of devotees of the Sabarimala deity who saw the Supreme Court verdict as a violation of their religious beliefs (Babu 2019).

63

nerjee 2005). This logic is emboldened have focused on the visual landscape by technological affordances,made acces- (Brosius 2005), the internet (Lal 2014; sible in neoliberal India, which further Jaffrelot and Therwath 2012; Udupa promote the politics of hurt and religious 2018; Sinha 2017), and traditional media divides against Muslim minorities cul- artifacts like state-sponsored television tivating a pervasive atmosphere of hate channels (Rajagopal 1994). (Appadurai 2019). The politics of hate is The 2014 elections saw then affectively translated as aspirational an unprecedented use of social media in contemporary India. campaigning through which voters were In my consideration of contempo- mobilized to support Narendra Modi, rary Hindutva masculinity, I highlight the prime ministerial candidate. Modi is the diffuse processes of networked ex- known for his active participation on var- change which translate Hindutva into a ious social media platforms. His engage- “mediating discourse by its own right” ment on Twitter in the form of personal- (Reddy 2011), consistently presenting it- ized political broadcasting, endorsement, self as the bedrock of Narendra Modi’s and self-promotion has become central projected narrative of a Hindu Rashtra. to the management of his public persona In the following sections, I draw atten- (Govil and Baishya 2018). This persona is tion to both personalized and collective carefully calibrated to promote a visually official, state-sanctioned social media inclusive space through the dissemina- transactions and the circulation of semi- tion of personalized messages in the form otic codes that enable the production of a of the monthly program ‘’6 vigilante public culture in real and virtu- (Voice to the Heart), which is first deliv- al spaces. The group of young men who ered on the radio and then shared across interrupted Baisakhi and the online mob various digital platforms. Unlike previ- who trolled Rana Ayyub belong to these ous Indian leaders, Modi does not con- “vigilante publics” (Banaji 2018)—gener- duct press conferences—in doing so, he ating a consensus for a majoritarian Hin- has effectively deregulated mainstream dutva discourse, mobilized by the present media and unequivocally endorsed alter- BJP and its cultural ideologue, the RSS. nate digital channels of communication. 3. “Modi Hai Toh Mumkin Hai”: So- Modi’s usage of technology, social media, cial Media Transactions and Af- and popular culture is integral to the pro- fordances cessual rendering of his public image as Detailed scholarly ethnographic ac- deeply personal (Rai 2019). counts show how mediated images, Much of the semiotics of this social texts, and audiovisual content have been media branding is focused on projecting historically deployed by the BJP and RSS his image as decisive and unflinching, in- since their inception to enable a nation- flected with a brash aspirational machis- alist Hindu project by culturally indoctri- mo. Modi framed himself as the deliverer nating everyday consumers in their polit- from Congress party’s corruption through ical agenda. Central to this dissemination the projection of the Swaach Bharat (Clean is the idea of a composite Hindu identity India) campaign, announcing himself as that fosters modes of belonging and rec- the ultimate mascot of development or ognition of a primordial grand narrative vikas for neoliberal India (Srivastava 2015; of secure Hindu supremacy. Scholars Jaffrelot 2015).7 The theatrical semiotics

6 Narendra Modi conducts a monthly broadcast called ‘Mann Ki Baat’ (roughly translated as ‘Voice from the Heart’) through . Since television is not available all over India, radio was selected for maximum outreach. Through this program, Modi conveys his ideas directly to the general population. 7 I use the phrase ‘neoliberal India’ to hint at the growing disparity between the rich and poor in India. BJP came into power with the agenda of ‘development’ which they hoped to achieve through more foreign investment and neoliberal economic policies—which essentially meant more privatization and access to global markets through

64 Amrita De Masculinities in Digital India

of his political campaign on social media fessionals and women dancers in tradi- engendered a brand of populist politics, tional, regional attire—, everyone was uniformly integrating disparate public seamlessly interpellated to the lyrical ca- cultures underlined by class caste intona- dence of ‘ hoon’ (‘I too tions into a singular ideological construc- am a watchman’). Immediately following tion. This discursive branding of him as this campaign’s launch, Indian social me- an ideal leader is initiated through an in- dia resonated with renewed fervor, with novative mix of Hindutva protectionism BJP supporters and ministers adding and developmental rhetoric. the prefix chowkidar‘ ’ to their social me- Through popular sloganeering and dia handles. While mapping the Twitter- simplistic rabble-rousing messaging like sphere at this point, I noticed most of the “India First” and “,”8 Modi social media accounts who had actively has dominated public discourse as the participated in the trolling of Rana Ayyub, ultimate embodiment of a leader who on several accounts, had also added the stands for a bold national character, dar- prefix chowkidar‘ ’ to their handles. ing to deliver the country from parasitic This campaign can be regarded as elite figures that cling illegitimately to a demonstrative example of Narendra power (Sinha 2017). While Modi’s 2014 Modi’s reliance on social media. A closer electoral victory capitalized on the an- inspection of the signs and symbols per- ti-incumbency wave against Congress, taining to this campaign and other pop- which was the ruling party before 2014, ular campaigns undertaken by the BJP in 2019 the rallying cry was “Congress during the last five years, from Modi’s mukt Bharat” (Congress-free India) and father-daughter selfie campaign to Modi‘ the popular ‘chowkidar’ (watchman) cam- hai toh mumkin hai’ (‘It is only possible paign. The Congress party failed to secure with Modi’), reveals a persistent invoca- 10% of the seats (55) in the Lok Sabha, tion of desirable Hindu masculinity. This leaving the present government without is visible through the consistent patterns an official opposition party. The BJP alone deployed in the semiotics of the official won 303 seats and 353 seats in total with political messaging in the ‘chowkidar’ the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). campaign: repeated calls to militarize Complementing the developmental and collectively organize to protect the rhetoric of 2014 with increased empha- nation and capitulate to Modi’s vision. A sis on national security, the BJP’s 2019 snippet from the video of this campaign election campaign mobilized muscular featured Modi on a tank dressed in army Hindu nationalism as its key ancillary. I clothes. This image was relentlessly cir- want to draw attention to the semiotics culated across all social media platforms. of popular electoral campaign rhetoric, Gesturing to conflated discourses of pro- publicly visible through Modi’s and the tectionism and patriotism, as articulated BJP’s official social media accounts: a through the figure of the watchman— case in point would be the much-publi- someone who stands guard— a particu- cized ‘chowkidar’ campaign. lar brand of Hindu masculinity was dis- Modi announced the ‘chowkidar’ cam- cursively injected into the national public paign for the upcoming Lok Sabha elec- sphere. This construction is twofold: the tions on his official Twitter account on 16 watchman is virtuous/patriotic and ag- March 2019. He followed this announce- gressive/militaristic—with Modi as the ment with a four-minute video clip, which perfect embodiment of both these qual- immediately started trending on Twitter. ities. Widespread, digitally mediated cir- Featuring Indian citizens from all walks culation further enables an idealized rep- of life—from peasants to corporate pro- resentation of Hindu masculinity, which

‘minimum government, maximum governance’ (a popular election slogan). 8 Both of these slogans render visible the explicitly nationalistic imperative of the current administration.

65

is then affectively cast as aspirational. In organized social media presence be- the following sections, I track popular in- hind the enduring success of the BJP. stantiations of the semiotics of this dis- Chaturvedi notes that the overwhelming cursive deployment vis-à-vis official BJP majority of these social media influenc- social media accounts and personalized ers, who could be defined as committed responses to them. Modi Bhakts, are men hailing from most- ly semi-urban, lower-middle-class back- 4. Key Regulators of Hindu Mas- grounds (2016: 81). Neoliberal consump- culinities and its Affective De- tion, with its easy access to affordable ployment smartphones and internet connections, While seemingly abstract and expan- has fostered a “distinctly middle-class sive in scope (what is masculinity?), the discourse which has gained prominence term becomes more recognizable when since the urban middle-class constitutes analyzed for its iterations or performances a major group of Internet users in India” (Butler 1988). The appearance of mascu- (Udupa 2018). These influencers gener- linities then becomes familiar when seen ate specific iterations of digital Hindu in the light of its manifestations through masculinities to write the nation into be- speech (verbal as well as non-verbal acts), ing through a combination of affect and embodied behavioral patterns, gestures, publicly endorsed religious, socio-politi- and seemingly projected dominance cal discourse. Pre-planned affect is thus against its perceived antithesis, feminin- retooled through increased digital con- ity (Srivastava 2015). Its hegemony is fur- sumption to foreground an “affectively ther emboldened through various chan- charged ideal of communicative immedi- nels such as the state and its mechanisms, acy” (Govil and Baishya, 2018). laws and regulations, family, popular Deleuze and Guattari (1987) famously culture, and media. Among these, media described affect as something that exists and its various ramifications remain the most formidable and prolific site for the “beyond subjectivity” existing at the pre- transmission and circulation of global subjective level, free from discourse or and local ideas of masculinities (Athique language (Reeser 2017). Susanna Paas- 2012). This was clearly visible in the Lok onen’s (2019) work on networked affect Sabha elections in 2014 and 2019. studies the capacity of bodies to affect A 2019 study by the University of Ox- and be affected by one another, stating ford identified India among 70 nations that affect cuts across and joins together where the government has deployed bodies human and nonhuman, organic “cyber troops” for social media manip- and machine, material and conceptual, ulation. This study identified Indian cy- of flesh and of thought. The collective af- ber troops as “medium-capacity,” which fective economy of networked affect are means they are full-time employees hired always in transition, moving in between to control public online information bodies (both material and virtual). This is (Sirur 2019). Indian investigative reports key to the semiotics of the affective de- have noted that Modi has a team of “150 ployment of masculinities by social me- paid social media influencers hired by PR dia influencers and ‘cyber-troops.’ companies, according to an insider who Chaturvedi further reveals that among is photographed with the prime minister the Twitter handles followed by Modi, 26 at various times” (Ninan 2019). These accounts “routinely sexually harass, make influencers run Facebook pages and death threats and abuse politicians from WhatsApp groups, which relentlessly other parties and journalists with special spread fake news, doctored videos, pho- attention given to women, minorities and toshopped images, and paid news. Dalits” (2016: 6). All these handles pro- Investigative journalist Swati fess religious and/or national sentiments, Chaturvedi’s 2016 book I Am a Troll ranging from ‘proud Hindu’ or other vari- puts forward a revelatory account of the ations like ‘garvit hindu’ to ‘desh bhakt’ (lit-

66 Amrita De Masculinities in Digital India

erally, ‘devoted to the nation’) and ‘Bharat followers. Sometimes tweets are generat- mata ki jai’ (‘long live Mother India’).9 ed through active bots, thereby amassing They also identify themselves as ‘blessed online consumers as a cognate around to be followed by the prime minister of politically charged keywords. India.’ Far from distancing himself from In the following section, I examine these people, Modi legitimized their troll- the semiotics of the affectively modulat- ing activities by inviting them to a selec- ed processes engaged in the transmis- tive meet-and-greet under the banner of sion of masculinities through the repeat- ‘Digital Sampark,’ held at his official resi- ed sharing of crudely composed memes, dence on 1 July 2015 (The Quint 2015). social media bios, and virulent hashtags. As is evident from the online trolling I also circle back to the opening inci- of Rana Ayyub, women who openly criti- dents to highlight how bodies (virtual cize Modi and the BJP’s exhortation of a or physical) are transformed after com- Hindu Rashtra are subjected to violent or- ing into contact with the premeditated ganized trolling by Hindutva proponents. affective intensities, like the chowkidar‘ ’ Repeated sexualized trolling in the form campaign deployed by the current BJP of rape threats and online doxing results government in India. in many women closing their accounts and choosing to stay away from any kind 5. Anatomy of Official ‘Internet of social media engagement. Mohan Hindus’ (2015) identifies these influencers as In- For a closer study, I singled out Twit- ternet Hindus: bloggers and tweeters who ter accounts from Modi’s list of followers are fierce supporters of Hindu national- who, at first glance, did not appear to be ism, people who cohere in digital spaces profiles of public personalities. Most of to generate opinions passed off as pithy these accounts mention that they are be- truisms. Their activities include sharing ing followed by Narendra Modi and the memes, posts, and videos in support of BJP President, . For instance, Modi, consistently ridiculing Rahul Gan- I came across an account named Rajiv dhi, sharing posts calling for the protec- Sharma—his Twitter bio described him tion of cows and banning burkhas for as an RSS follower, graphic designer, ‘security’ reasons, and sharing the false student, social media strategist, cricket propaganda of love jihad.10 The sheer enthusiast, and ‘blessed to be followed force and gravity of the consistent mes- by PM Modi and Amit Shah’—with over saging and its related semiotics produce 37,000 followers. His profile picture, pre- truths out of unverified, misrepresented, sumably his portrait, revealed a strapping incomplete data points that take on the youth, flexing muscles in a tight shirt and semblance of factual certitude. Ray-Ban sunglasses. From direct Islamo- People who dare to question these phobic content to shared images of rows facts are routinely denounced as ‘sicku- of muscular men wielding sticks, his lar,’ ‘libtards’ or ‘presstitutes’ (derogatory newsfeed revealed a dominance of an ex- terms directed at liberal-left journalists).11 clusively male homosocial space. Under Special hashtags targeting journalists his tweets, the comment threads indicat- deemed anti-Modi are created every day. ed a frequent male readership, while he Thousands of tweets are then rapidly sent retweeted images shared by other men out in quick progression by these cyber with common hashtags as captions. All troops—each of whom has thousands of these accounts were collectively engaged

9 These handles visibly demonstrate love and devotion for the nation and are meant to be read as signposts for their ideological allegiance to the creation of a Hindu nation. 10 ‘Love jihad’ is a term that has come to be pejoratively associated with Muslims since 2014. It refers to the act of feigning love for non-Muslim women by Muslim men with the agenda of converting them to the Islamic faith. 11 Chaturvedi also points out that not every one of these trolls believed in Modi—some were also doing it for money.

67

in the dissemination of socio-cultural Pakistan. This again underscored his pro- idioms that have previously been weap- jected digitally mediated militaristic, mas- onized and imbued with an exclusive culine, ‘decision-making’ capacity. These Hindu consciousness by the BJP and tweets were generated simultaneously by their cultural ideologue, the RSS. other official BJP Twitter accounts and It becomes evident that through con- hired ‘cyber troops.’ certed, carefully calibrated messaging, Considering these accounts of these groups of social media influencers state-sanctioned narratives, both official- are aspiring for a performative transaction ly as mediated through official govern- between them and other netizens by imbu- ment accounts and individually through ing them with selectively designed infor- accounts of recognized trolls followed mation. They simultaneously bind them by the Prime Minister, it is instructive to a uniform affective register through re- to ask how these collective economies peated direct and oblique gestures to con- (state-sanctioned messaging) affectively ventional codes of masculine performanc- cast individual performances (like the es, such as muscularity and virility. While men Baisakhi encountered on the bus virility as a character trait was not directly and the ones who participated in the visible, Hindu-centric social media influ- online trolling of Rana Ayyub) embed encers are mostly engaged in disseminat- within a shared ecosystem, where ideals ing propaganda that police and relegate of aggressive, muscular manliness are sexuality to the private sector—some of solidified and Hindu masculinity emerg- these profiles did have family pictures es as its most aspirational articulation. depicting happy conjugal relationships. I What are the commonalities that emerge also noticed that tweets and retweets are from these transactions? shared with captions and hashtags that have direct allusions to Narendra Modi as 6. Individual Economy of Troll- a ‘strongman’ leader through cues such as ing and Its Affect ’56-inch chest’12 and ‘mard’ (man)—all of A survey of the Twitter accounts as- which are suggestive of a ‘strong mascu- sociated with the trolling of Rana Ayyub linity’ at the descriptive level. revealed repeated markers inflected with One of the accounts named ‘Hindu mood, diction, and speech traditionally Rashtra’ (literally ‘Hindu nation’), whose associated with cultural definitions of Twitter bio states that he is the social me- hegemonic masculinities. Some of the dia manager of the official BJP4INDIA -ac Twitter handles went by names like ‘al- count, shared repeated images of Modi— phacharlie,’ ‘mard,’ and ‘Gujaratichokro’13 sometimes on a tanker in the olive green (varying linguistic degrees of direct ref- khaki jawan uniform, sometimes in a erence to the word ‘man’) with expen- militaristic pose holding a stretched bow sive cars and motorbikes as display pic- and arrow, as identified in popular images tures. The hashtag mard ( word for of Ram. In the aftermath of the Pulwama man) appeared very frequently on their incident in February 2019,12 there was newsfeeds, followed by images depict- consistent usage of the hashtag Modihai- ing strength (in terms of lifting weights tohmumkinhai (‘It is only possible with or other kinds of muscular performanc- Modi’) with catchy captions stating that es) and virility through captions and Modi has given a fitting reply to Pakistan comment threads that could be directly after he carried out the Balakot attack on linked to the erotics of desiring women.

12 On 14 February 2019, a military convoy of Indian security personnel was attacked by a suicide bomber in the Pulwama region of Jammu and Kashmir. 13 While by no means exhaustive, I identified a common pattern in the Twitter handles that appeared to be most virulent, i.e. the ones who were actively engaged in social media trolling. They also repeatedly changed the names of their Twitter handles, but each version signaled an active display of toxic machismo. Most of it was explicitly visible through the names of the handles themselves.

68 Amrita De Masculinities in Digital India

I noticed many images where users are the pre-existing mythology of the Hindu seen in the company of celebrity Bolly- nation that has always been associated wood heroines like Aishwarya Rai and with the RSS and, in turn, the BJP. A Feb- Katrina Kaif; as if proximity to celebrities ruary 2020 article in the Guardian report- amplified their aspirationality. Some of ed that the RSS, founded 94 years ago these accounts disappeared over the six- with clear fascist inclinations, filled with month window (May-November 2018) of men besotted by Mussolini’s fascism, is my research, presumably owing to accu- the present day holding company propel- sations of trolling against these handles. ling BJP’s mobilization of Hindutva pol- One of the tweeters had previously ap- itics (Subramanian 2020). Modi’s social peared on the radar for tweeting, “Barkha media public persona endorses religious Dutt is WHORE of #India” (Centre for So- signifiers, borrowed from a pre-existing cial Research 2016). In addition to tweets cultural repository, comprising signs and with aggressive slurs and abuse directed signifiers endorsed by the RSS with the at women journalists like Nidhi Razdan, goal of generating consensus for a brand Rana Ayyub, and Barkha Dutt, who are of Hindu masculinity that is now imbued recognized faces of the opposition, they with the affective charge of aspiration- also shared regular tweets praising Nar- ality; this can be directly linked to Brad- endra Modi’s leadership.14 bury’s (1978) theorizations on the science Two noticeable commonalities that behind semiotics: “The transference of are directly visible in this online ecosys- culture in time can, in large measure, tem were the repeated invocation of Hin- be described as the conservation of sign du gods and Hindu religious signifiers, systems serving as a control on behavior.” especially the figures of Ram and Hanu- The semiotics of online and offline Hin- man, and the depiction of Muslim men du nationalism in contemporary India as primitive, bestial misogynistic figures. are predicated on the successful transfer- Several critical works (Anand, 2007; ence of these religiously imbued signifi- Bannerjee, 2005) have elaborated on the ers to create an overpowering identity of connection of Ram with an idealized rep- the ideal Hindu man that is always seen resentation of Hindu masculinity; while in opposition to the Muslim man. the Muslim man has always been seen as In terms of the visible, anti-Muslim the “ravisher and active force compelling content, there is a direct exhortation to a a response from the passive and supine sense of fearmongering. Tweets dispens- Hindu” (Bahri 2004). One of the Twitter ing misinformation such as exaggerated accounts went by the name of ‘mandir numbers of the rapid growth of the Mus- wahi banayenge’15 (will build the temple lim population and fake news, suggesting here) with a cover photo of Modi’s face that they are instigating riots in different conflated with the faces of Ram and Ha- parts of India, are constantly circulated. numan—both widely recognized Hindu One of the accounts, ‘Alpha Charlie’, who deities. Bahri (2004) also notes that the consistently participated in this messag- mythological figure of Ram is connect- ing, shared statuses like, “If you see a co- ed to a deep-seated, colonial fantasy of a bra and M [short form for Muslims] kid, utopian time when the Hindu nation was you know whom to kill first.” Dibyesh at the helm as a marker of progress and Anand notes that the “inimical figure good governance. Hindu Gods and rele- used to mobilize the Hindu nationalist gious signifiers are actively disseminated, identity is a stereotyped Muslim mascu- serving as a cultural shorthand to activate linity” (Anand 2007). Efforts to compen-

14 Chaturvedi too was systematically targeted over a period of six months in a vicious online campaign that insisted she had had a sexual relationship with a politician. 15 A reference to Ayodha as the mythical birthplace of the Hindu deity Ram and the demand to build a Hindu temple on that land.

69

sate for the hypermasculinity of this fig- cal location. The semiotics of the person- urative ‘other’ are predicated on the drive al and collective affective economies of to re-masculinize or over-masculinize the networked media need to be considered Hindu male body by constantly weap- together to measure its capacity to pro- onizing the Muslim body as something duce guided embodied reactions that can that must be defeated for the safety of the transcend the mediated contours of the nation. Some of the other Twitter bios of virtual to affect the materiality of lived ex- accounts that participated in this messag- perience in real spaces. ing had descriptions like, ‘let’s unite to es- This is explicitly visible in the opening tablish a Hindu nation,’ ‘proud nationalist scenario, where the life of a diasporic im- works from Canada, patriot, die-hard 56 migrant, Baisakhi, is affected in the bus’s inch Modi supporter’, and ‘non-secular, a physical space by a group of young men, supporter of Hindu nation, no blocking who have been influenced by BJP’s polit- policy.’ These descriptions reveal that ‘in- ical messaging. Online cultures of toxic ternet Hindus’ are not just specific to the machismo digitally networked through Indian geopolitical space but are spread internet access to local public cultures across all quarters of the world. Ther- are thus reflected in offline actualities of wath’s (2012) incisive study on diasporic embodied space. Spreadable data, there- Hindu nationalism reveals that Hindu na- fore, interpellate both viewer and creator tionalist organizations like the RSS have in a constructed network. transferred the bulk of their online activ- The circulated image-texts shared on ities to North America, where the Indian Twitter deliver a message that is deeply diasporic population is over 3.2 million, felt and personalized, provoking a re- revealing the development of new strate- sponse from the viewer. The image-text’s gies of discretion to evade the gaze of au- affective force is rooted in the fleeting thorities back in India. Therefore, it is not immediacy of the moment when one surprising that several of the virulent pro- sees/reads it. Despite the spatial differ- files I encountered that engaged in troll- ence, due to geopolitical positioning, ing against Rana Ayyub and Chaturvedi there is a degree of commonality in this indicate a diasporic origin—they share initial affective viewing. Judith Butler images and posts in real-time from for- (2015) notes that “norms impress them- eign locations outside India. They also selves upon us, and that impression have allied handles that are strategically opens up an affective register.” Through deployed to escape detection. The relative the repeated deployment of images and anonymity dispensed by digital platforms texts that are semantically housed within enables these toxic engagements. discursive presentations of traditional, How, then, do these trolls produce em- Hindu masculinity/ies, generated affec- bodied, cultural experiences through on- tive masculinity/ies come to be housed line iterations of gendered performanc- within a Hindu cultural imaginary. It is es? More specifically, how do digitally important to clarify here that masculinity mediated texts generate a kind of ‘affec- is always conceived in the plural, even if tive masculinity’ that cannot be defined they appear to be monolithic in terms of but exists in the pre-subjective? If mascu- their capacity to exercise hegemony over linities are produced in the specificity of other kinds of non-normative masculin- class-caste locations, affect too operates ities (Connell and Messerschmit 2005). within that discursive register—an up- Multiple iterations of Hindu masculinity per-caste Bengali Hindu male, residing are therefore digitally transmitted. Com- in America, removed from the violence bined, they contribute to a kind of affec- of the political conflict in Kashmir, will tive Hindu masculinity, which can be read arguably not react to a digitally circulated in Srivastava’s (2015) words as ‘Modi image-text in the same way as someone masculinity.’ Digitally mediated images residing closer to the physical geopoliti- and texts available for free consumption

70 Amrita De Masculinities in Digital India

thus cater to a brand that can travel both and protectionism, Modi masculinity is spatially and temporally, existing in “a predicated on a perceived narrative of temporal sink, a hole in time as we con- strong, bold leadership, which takes the ceive of it and narrativize it” (Massumi form of model masculinity the consumer 2002). Through the composition and automatically aspires to emulate. Media dissemination of pre-planned images, discourses surrounding Narendra Modi texts, or audiovisual records, it is a spe- attend to the perpetuation of this image, cific kind of affect that is deployed—one projecting him as a strong-willed, effi- that has been conceived and narrativized cient, dynamic leader capable of writing before the real time of the act of viewing. a new history of dynamic progress and growth. His masculine, decisive im- 7. Modi Masculinity as Circulat- age—“that of an inflexible man of action” ed Affect (Jaffrelot 2015)—is further mediated by The semiotics of Modi masculinity as his political opponent, , an affect are directly imbricated in the who is presented as weak, inefficient, and neoliberal condition of global moderni- incapable. Gandhi’s inability to develop ty with thriving free markets. A spirit of decisive arguments and business models consumption governs everyday activities; is seen as the perfect contrast to Modi’s active social media consumption is also dynamic, powerful masculinity. symptomatic of this global modernity. A preliminary examination of Indian Guided by nationalistic ideas, the semiot- digital media also reveals a proliferation ics of “Modi-masculinity’s peculiar char- of memes that allude to Rahul Gandhi’s acteristic lies in its judicious presentation failed masculinity. Given the epithet ‘pap- of Indian manhood as both deeply na- pu’—a term that directly refers to his tional (and hence territorialized) as well ‘weak’ masculinity—, hashtags surround- as global (and de-territorialized)” (Srivas- ing Gandhi regularly trend in real-time, tava 2015). Directed at both local and di- further amplifying Modi masculinity. asporic audiences, ‘Modi masculinity’ Some of the popular memes depict Modi as a brand affectively travels to enable a and Gandhi in a wrestling match where Hindu cultural consciousness. Motivated Modi emerges as the clear winner. One by an air of desirability, Modi masculinity particular meme, shared by a user calling thus becomes aspirational, and in turn, himself ‘Gujarati Chhokro’ (‘lad from Gu- Hindu religious identity becomes aspira- jarat’), trended with the hashtag ‘mard ko tional. From his public speeches, where dard hoga’ (‘men will feel pain’). In this he quotes verses in his saffron meme, Rahul Gandhi’s face is superim- attire, Modi wears his religiosity on his posed on a muscular body. He struggles sleeve, and is quick to turn any opportu- to lift a clay vessel when Modi appears, nity into an endorsement of Hindu val- whose face is superimposed on a frail ues. All the pre-planned affects that are body. He lifts the vessel with ease, glee- strategically deployed by the BJP’s social fully walking away as the focus pans to media influencers contribute to the con- the dejected face of a disappointed Gan- stitution of Modi masculinity, which also dhi. In another meme, Rahul Gandhi’s becomes an idealized representation of face accompanies the hashtag ‘Pappu is a Hindu masculinity. Unsurprisingly, im- duffer’ with a limerick, ‘Amul is the taste ages depicting him as reincarnations of of India, Pappu is the waste of India.’ Ram are actively circulated. There are various memes where Gandhi Drawing from traditional concepts is shown hiding behind his mother, So- of familial masculinity such as strength nia Gandhi,16 an accomplished politician

16 Sonia Gandhi took over as the party leader of the in 1998 and currently serves on the advisory board of the party after administering control to her son, Rahul Gandhi. She is regarded as the most influential voice in the party.

71

herself, once again drawing reference to the strategic deployment of pre-planned his ‘failed masculinity.’ All these images data both at macro and micro levels. In reside in a pre-constructed simulacrum, this context, it is necessary to consider which, to echo Baudrillard (1994), exists the limits of this digitally mediated con- as a pure simulacrum, sealing creator structed vigilante public sphere. and consumer within a fantastical projec- Most cyber-theorists have acknowl- tion directly imbued with meaning-mak- edged that the ‘virtual’ and the ‘real’ are ing codes that can be retroactively traced not exclusive categories (Nakamura 2013); back to cultural scripts of traditional man- virtual, digital communities are built from liness. Alongside Roland Barthes’s con- offline interactions between real, full-bod- viction to treat “collective representations ied people located in different geopolitical as sign systems” (Barthes 1972), any at- spaces. Therefore, it would be reductive tempt to demystify the semiotics of these to assume that masculine performanc- visual scripts must also take into account es in digital media are interchangeably the specific role this affective charge plays linked to masculine performances in the in the greater scheme of things. real world. While there are both predicta- Affect then opens up a “discursive reg- ble and visible links between the two, the ister of norms that is more forceful than physical male body operates with differ- it might appear without affect” (Reeser ent degrees of freedom in the ‘real’ world. 2017). A man might be affected after con- For instance, the individuals who monitor suming such images and then attempt dissent, acting as ‘vigilante publics’ like to make sense of that affect through feel- the trolls outlined by Chaturvedi, build a ings that translate into physical actions. hyper-masculine online persona to appear For example, when de-territorialized, aspirational to other digital consumers, non-resident Indian males living else- also, perhaps, putatively compensating where, like the group of men Baisakhi for a lack of something in the real world.17 encountered in the opening context, reg- Material practices in digitally mediated ularly consume nationalist images and environments operate through a constel- texts circulating through WhatsApp mes- lation of hierarchical networks; as Marvin sages, Facebook posts, or Tweets, they states, “the focus of communication is simultaneously become integrated with- shifted from the instrument to the drama in a generated national consciousness. in which existing groups perpetually ne- These images then serve the purpose gotiate power, authority, representation, of affectively mooring them to a sense of and knowledge” (Marvin 1988). Class national belonging and participation by caste regional vectors are more fluidly constructing a vigilante public sphere mediated in the digital platform, enabling where any subscriber can become an the production of traveling masculinities, equal participant. Circulated affect then where users are free to occupy different takes the form of feeling and emotion, subject positions that can appear impos- which is demonstrated through various sible within the physicality of bounded levels of interactions both in the real and regionalities in India, since class caste the virtual space. In Baisakhi’s case, this status is an important, immutable signi- prior affective rendering found expres- fier of physical embodiment. Therefore, sion in the real, physical space of the uni- these traveling masculinities are produced versity bus, where she was interrupted within an interconnected transnational by a group of angry men. Similarly, Rana homosocial digital space that has already Ayyub was virtually lynched by an online been charged by the pre-planned affective mob who had been similarly affectively deployment of Modi masculinity. With indoctrinated by trending hashtags and respect to individual economies, each

17 Chaturvedi notes that some of the trolls she interviewed cannot speak fluently in English but engage in social media exchanges in English. Engagement in English is seen as an aspirational quality.

72 Amrita De Masculinities in Digital India

user can be identified as discrete named and memes. The bios on their Twitter entities occupying distinct digital spaces; accounts sometimes mention they are however, their individual gendered perfor- government employees who are not of- mances coalesce together to form a great- ficially affiliated with any political party. er collective. This collective dynamically As Mukherjee points out, it also speaks participates in the project of nation-build- to a culture of leisurely consumption, ing engendering an “imagined commu- using the time outside work to indulge nity” (Anderson 2006), which performs in the “high-tech consumption of smart- the task of producing the BJP’s goal of a phones and the most recent software Hindu nation for mass consumption. apps to receive and forward the message of Hindutva” (Mukherjee 2020). The 8. Conclusion continuous proliferation of these social While digital media does offer enor- media transactions cast the online digital mous potential in terms of the produc- ecosystem into a dominantly heteronor- tion of different masculine subjectivities mative masculine space. Non-normative that can exercise hegemony over other representations of masculinities are ei- variants through its intrinsic fluidity, in ther side-lined through active forms of the context of the present political land- censorship or given visibility through scape, traveling masculinities are pro- the mediated gaze of the heterosexual duced within a classed matrix.18 Both subject, who inadvertently portrays these ground-level majoritarian Hindu poli- performances as caricatures that should tics and their vocal supporters on digital be ridiculed and repressed (Shah 2015). media inform and strengthen the other The digital homosocial space that existing in a mutually symbiotic rela- emerges out of these affective subjective tionship. In another article document- transactions is thus exclusively based ing the rise of cow vigilantism through on performing masculine roles that can WhatsApp messaging, Rahul Mukherjee be reverted to essentialist descriptors of (2020) highlights the consumption prac- strength and machismo grounded in a tices of cow vigilantes, pointing to the Hindu-centric discourse. This perfor- commoditization of religious practices mance hinges on an enactment where through new media affordances, which dissenting voices are routinely harassed, is tightly braided with a consumerist as in the cases of Chaturvedi, Rana Ayyub, performance of manliness: “Such perfor- and Baisakhi. Binary essentialized rep- mances involve riding fancy motorbikes, resentations of gendered identities are donning sleek sunglasses in pitch-dark privileged, and toxic hypermasculine night, incorporating the latest hip-hop performances are exalted and expand- music in entrapment videos, and inscrib- ed in sync with the “muscular national- ing a vande mataram tattoo” (Mukherjee ism” (Bannerjee 2005) endorsed by Hin- 2020). The Twitter landscape also reveals du-centric right-wing groups. Through a similar semiotics; personal profiles en- planned affective rendering, Modi’s mas- gaged in Hindutva messaging appear to culine figuration emerges as the ultimate be continually performing an inscription aspirational articulation of contemporary of aspirational manliness that is simulta- Hindu masculinity. neously religious and modern, effortless- This article has demonstrated how ly imbued in technological literacy that digital media’s power is effectively har- allows for the easy tweeting, retweeting, nessed to produce a masculinist Hindu creation, and dissemination of mashups nation for mass consumption. Going be-

18 Most hetero-cisgendered Indian men who populate digital media, across different geopolitical spaces, also have access to some form of material wealth. This figure is mainly located within the socio-cultural matrix of an up- per-caste Hindu. All other masculine performances are therefore constructed in relation to the upper-caste, heter- osexual Hindu man.

73

yond the suggestion that digital media is Banaji, S. (2018). “Vigilante Publics: Oriental- a key component of the present adminis- ism, Modernity and Hindutva Fascism in tration’s infrastructure, I have illustrated India.” Javnost – The Public 25, 4: 333–350. Banerjee, S. (2005). Make Me a Man! Mascu- how the dissemination of digitally net- linity, Hinduism, and Nationalism in India. worked pre-planned images, texts, and Albany: SUNY Press. memes produce a uniform idea of Modi Barthes, R. (1972). Mythologies. Trans. Annette masculinity that affectively stitch togeth- Lavers. New York: Hill and Wang. er disparate registers of class, regions, Baudrillard, J. (1994). Simulacra and Simulation. and religion into a uniform articulation Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Bradbury, D. (1978). “The Science of Semiot- of Hindutva as the ultimate goal and ics.” New Literary History 9, 2: 199–204. structuring structure of Hindu Rashtra, Brosius, C. (2005). Empowering Visions: The leaving Muslim voices, dissenting figures Politics of Representation in Hindu National- who do not subscribe to this imperative, ism. : Anthem Press. vulnerable to relentless trolling. I have Butler, J. (1988). “Performative Acts and Gen- also shown how this affective rendering der Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenol- transcends the virtual to have direct cor- ogy and Feminist Theory.” Theatre Journal 4, 4: 519–531. poreal ramifications in physical spaces, Butler, J. (2015). Senses of the Subject. New York: as the opening incident suggests. The Fordham University Press. connection between the digitally mediat- Centre for Social Research. (2016). “Violence ed affective inscription of an aspirational Against Women on Social Media – The Hindu masculinity as a response to the New Reality?” Gendermatters, 20 May 2016. projected ‘dangerous masculinity’ of the https://gendermatters.in/trolling-to-be-a- crime/. Muslim man fortified through trolling Chakraborty, C. (2011). Masculinity, Asceticism, and general behavioral patterns by pur- Hinduism: Past and Present Imagining of In- veyors and consumers— is key to under- dia. Delhi: Permanent Black. standing the vigilante nature of contem- Chatterjee, R. (2018). “‘I couldn’t talk or sleep porary online Indian ecosystem. for three days’: Journalist Rana Ayyub’s No conflict of interest was reported Horrific Social Media Ordeal Over Fake Tweet.” DailyO, 26 April 2018. https:// while writing this article. www.dailyo.in/variety/rana-ayyub-troll- ing-fake-tweet-social-media-harass- References ment-hindutva/story/1/23733.html. Anand, D. (2007). “Anxious Sexualities: Mas- Chaturvedi, S. (2016). I Am a Troll: Inside the culinity, Nationalism and Violence.” The Secret World of the BJP’s Digital Army. New British Journal of Politics and International Delhi: Juggernaut Books. Relations 9, 2: 257–269. Connell, R. W. and Messerschmidt, J. W. Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities: (2005). “‘Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethink- Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na- ing the Concept.” Gender & Society 19, 6: tionalism. New York: Verso Books. 829–859. Appadurai, A. (2019). “A Syndrome of Aspira- Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1987). A Thou- tional Hatred is Pervading India.” The Wire, sand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophre- 10 December 2019. https://thewire.in/pol- nia. Trans. B. Massumi. Minneapolis: Uni- itics/unnao-citizenship-bill-violence-india. versity of Minnesota Press. Athique, A. (2012). Indian Media. New York: Govil, N. and Baishya, A. K. (2018). “The Bully Polity Press. in the Pulpit: Autocracy, Digital Social Me- Babu, R. (2019). “Sabarimala Explained: Su- dia, and Right-Wing Populist Technocul- preme Court Verdict, Protests and Con- ture.” Communication Culture & Critique 11, troversy.” , 13 November 1: 67–84. 2019. https://www.hindustantimes.com/ Gudipaty, N. (2017). “Gendered Public Spaces. india-news/sabarimala-explained-su- Online Trolling of Women Journalists in In- preme-court-verdict-protests-and-controver- dia.” Comunicazione politica 18, 2: 299–310. sy/story-FtwmVlSbfa3tQuIOuTEQVP.html. Jaffrelot, C. (2015). “The Modi-centric BJP 2014 Bahri, D. (2004). “Arguments to Kill and Die election campaign: New techniques and for Colonial Fantasy, Postcolonial Masculin- old tactics.” Contemporary South Asia 23, 2: ity, and the Rhetoric of Hindu Fundamen- 151–166. talism.” South Asian Review 25, 2: 23–42. Jaffrelot, C. and Therwath, I. (2012). “The Glob- al Sangh Parivar: A Study of Contemporary

74 Amrita De Masculinities in Digital India

International Hinduism.” In Religious Inter- Studies: Intersections and New Directions, nationals in the Modern World, eds. Green, eds. Armengol, J. M. et al., 109–117. New A. and Viaene, V., 343–364. London: Pal- York: Routledge. grave Macmillan. Shah, N. (2015). “Thrice Invisible in its Visibility: Lal, V. (2014) “Cyberspace, the Globalisation Queerness and user-generated ‘Kand’ videos.” of Hinduism, and Protocols of Citizenship Ada: A Journal of Gender, New Media, and Tech- in the Digital Age.” In Indian Transnation- nology 8. https://adanewmedia.org/2015/11/ alism Online: New Perspectives on Diaspora, thrice-invisible-in-its-visibility-queer- eds. Sahoo, A. K. and De Kruijf, J. G., 121– ness-and-user-generated-kand-videos/. 146. Farnham: Ashgate. Sinha, S. (2017). “Fragile Hegemony: Modi, Marvin, C. (1988). When Old Technologies Were Social Media and Competitive Electoral New: Thinking about Electric Communica- Populism in India.” International Journal of tion in the Late Nineteenth Century. New Communication 11: 4158–4180. York: Oxford University Press. Sirur, S. (2019). “India among 70 nations Massumi, B. (2002). Parables for the Virtual: hiring ‘cyber troops’ for propaganda, says Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham, NC: Oxford University study.” The Print, 30 Duke University Press. September 2019. https://theprint.in/in- Megarry, J. (2014). “Online Incivility or Sexu- dia/india-among-70-nations-hiring-cyber- al Harassment? Conceptualizing Women’s troops-for-propaganda-says-oxford-univer- Experiences in the Digital Age.” Women’s sity-study/299042/. Studies International Forum 47: 46–55. Srivastava, S. (2015). “Modi-masculinity: Me- Mohan, S. (2015). “Locating the ‘Internet Hin- dia, manhood, and ‘traditions’ in a time of du’: Political Speech and Performance in consumerism.” Television & New Media 16, Indian Cyberspace.” Television & New Media 4: 331–338. 16, 4: 339–345. Subramanian, S. (2020). “How Hindu Su- Mukherjee, R. (2020). “Mobile witnessing on premacists are Tearing India Apart.” The WhatsApp: Vigilante virality and the anato- Guardian, 20 February 2020. https://www. my of mob lynching.” South Asian Popular theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/20/hin- Culture 18, 1: 79–101. du-supremacists-nationalism-tearing-in- Nakamura, L. I. (2013). Cybertypes: Race, Ethnic- dia-apart-modi-bjp-rss-jnu-attacks. ity, and Identity on the Internet. New York: Taskin, B. (2020). “‘Remember Gauri Lank- Routledge. esh’: Rana Ayyub receives death & rape Ninan, S. (2019). “How India’s Media Land- threats after posts on Kashmir.” The Print, scape Changed Over Five Years.” The India 3 July 2020. https://theprint.in/india/ Forum, 8 June 2019. https://www.theindia- remember-gauri-lankesh-rana-ayyub-re- forum.in/article/how--media-land- ceives-death-rape-threats-after-posts-on- scape-changed-over-five-years. kashmir/453884/. Paasonen, S. (2019). “Bit on Networked Af- The Quint. (2015). “Twitter Trolls Among #Su- fect.” https://susannapaasonen.org. per150 Invited by PM Modi.” The Quint, 6 Rai, S. (2019). “‘May the Force Be with You’: July 2015. https://www.thequint.com/tech- Narendra Modi and the Celebritization of and-auto/tech-news/twitter-trolls-among- Indian Politics.” Communication, Culture & super150-invited-by-pm-modi. Critique 12, 3: 323–339. Therwath, I. (2012). “Cyber-Hindutva: Hindu Rajagopal, A. (1994). “, Nationalism, the Diaspora and the Web.” Consumer Identity and Image-Based Poli- Social Science Information 51, 4: 551–577. tics.” Economic and Political Weekly 29, 27: Udupa, S. (2018). “Gaali Cultures: The Politics 1659–1668. of Abusive Exchange on Social Media.” New Reddy, D. (2011). “Hindutva as praxis.” Religion Media & Society 20, 4: 1506–1522. Compass 5, 8: 412–426. Vijayan, P. K. (2019). Gender and Hindu Nation- Reeser, T. W. (2011). Masculinities in Theory: An alism: Understanding Masculine Hegemony. Introduction. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. London: Routledge. Reeser, T.W. (2017). “Theorizing the Masculin- ity of Affect.” In Masculinities and Literary

75