The Changing Role of Civil Society in Zimbabwe's Democratic Processes

The Changing Role of Civil Society in Zimbabwe’s Democratic Processes: 2014 and Beyond

Eldred V. Masunungure The Changing Role of Civil Society in Zimbabwe’s Democratic Processes: 2014 and beyond Eldred V. Masunungure

… it is important to remind ourselves that the Parliamentary and Local Government – role of civil society – and especially NGOs – which ended the four-year quarrelsome is to fill in the spaces in a healthy democracy marriage of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, and not to substitute for government … Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC-T and Arthur (Edwards 2000: 15). Mutambara’s – later Welshman Ncube’s [C]ivil society has a role to play but I have the – MDC. All three were comprehensively impression that you are a little bit anchored won by ZANU-PF. The scale of the victory to the past where instead of seeing NGOs triggered questions about the continued one perceives AGOs, Anti-Government viability of opposition politics in Zimbabwe Organisations. And if you start catching the and the relevance and role of Civil Society flair of the time, the trend, there is an opening and strategic partners of opposition parties to be worked upon. (Aldo Dell’Arricia, EU during the previous one and a half decades. Ambassador to Zimbabwe, June 2014) One of the liveliest and most contested Introduction post-election issues is the ‘appropriate’ role of civil society. Increasingly, much of July 31, 2013 was a critical juncture in civil society speaks the language of active Zimbabwe’s socioeconomic and politi- ‘engagement’, i.e. working with, rather cal development. It sealed the fate of the than substituting the government. This is 2009–2013 three-party coalition govern- reflected in the point being raised by Bob ment. In fact, from the womb of 2013, two Edwards and Dell’Arricia, at the opening of mega processes were born. The first was this paper. A few civil society organisations the finalisation of the long drawn-out con- (CSOs) think it is still too early to engage stitution-making process. The new social the leopard; perhaps it is these which for- contract, which had been peacefully and mer EU Ambassador referred to as AGOs. overwhelmingly endorsed by Zimbabwe- The discourse rages on and perspectives ans through the March 2013 referendum, differ, sometimes sharply. This paper is an replaced the much-tattered founding attempt to join the debate and hopefully Constitution of 1980. The second relates add value to both the discourse and the to the tripartite elections – Presidential, practice.

1 Context: A Changing Political Economy civil society. Indeed, the subsequent convulsions in the MDC-T – the main opposi- Zimbabwe is undergoing seismic politi- tion party – were largely occasioned by the cal and economic shifts that leave no facet comprehensive and shocking defeat. To the of society untouched. While changes may extent that civil society has been embed- neither be visible nor palpable, their effects ded – consciously or inadvertently – in on civil society are both comprehensive the ranks of the opposition, the MDC-T’s and unmistakeable. This explains the embarrassing defeat was also humiliating pivotal movements taking place in some for civil society, not to mention a sober- social sectors, principally within the ruling ing experience and a prompt to introspect, ZANU-PF party. reinvent itself and recalibrate its role in a The results of the watershed July 2013 changed political economy. elections stunned many, including the This paper is a critical appraisal of civil victors, who appeared too shocked to cel- society post-2013 elections and an inter- ebrate. According to official results, Robert rogation of what its proper role should be Mugabe, ZANU-PF’s presidential election in the democratisation of the country as it candidate, won a resounding 61 per cent moves forward. It proceeds from the prem- (2,110,434) of the votes compared to just 34 ise that the biggest casualty of the super- per cent (1,172,349) garnered by his long- majority triumph of ZANU-PF is political time rival, Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T).1 accountability, both vertically and hori- In Parliament, ZANU-PF captured more zontally. It also proceeds from the related than the magic two-thirds majority (73 prognosis that an obstinate reality for Zim- per cent) that enables it to amend the new- babwe in the next decade is that the opposi- ly minted 2013 Zimbabwe Constitution. tion will be so fragile and weak such that it ZANU-PF also won the local authority will be unable to perform its official role in elections, claiming a resounding 76 per cent Parliament. In other words, the opposition (1,493) of the 1,953 local government wards; movement will be unable to effectively per- the MDC-T won only 23 per cent (442). form one of its cardinal roles, namely that ZANU-PF thus became a super-majority of extracting accountability from those party, effectively reinstalling its one-party who control the commanding heights of hegemony. The results also brought into the state. This burden now falls on other sharp focus the future of Zimbabwe’s oppo- stakeholders, of which the most important sition politics and governance-oriented is civil society. 1 The corresponding share of the votes for the two candidates in March 2008 was reportedly 48 per Lost in a Changing Political Economy cent (1,195,562) for Tsvangirai and 43 per cent for Robert Mugabe (1,079,730); turnout was 43 per ‘Political economy’ is a distinctive mode cent of all registered voters. of analysis that examines how political

2 power and economic resources are distrib- in 2003, and that unemployment in the uted and contested in particular contexts. formal sector was as high as 94 per cent, of In fragile and conflict-affected environ- which approximately 68 per cent were youth ments especially, it focuses on the risks and (Sitima and Hlatywayo 2013: 786). Further, opportunities facing actors, thus helping to besides quantity, there was also a decline inform feasible and realistic expectations in the quality of the formally employed of what can be achieved through various labour force and an increasing casualisa- courses of action (World Bank 2008; DfID tion of labour because of the ease with 2009). A distinctive feature of Zimbabwe which such labour can be hired and fired. in its crisis decade (1998–2008) was that its Of more importance was the informali- political economy changed fundamentally sation of the economy in general during this but some stakeholders/actors did not seem crisis period. Some of the features of the to have quickly and adequately recognised informal sector are that it is ‘unprotected’, this, or taken stock of the new reality and ‘excluded’, ‘unregistered’ or ‘unrepresent- thus responded appropriately and time- ed’. The massive informalisation as of 2004 ously. Those actors who were seemingly was again captured by Kanyenze et al.: ‘on blind to the fast-evolving political economy the basis of the job-based concept, 975,000 included most of civil society and their people had formal jobs, while 4.1 million strategic allies, the political opposition. The had informal jobs. This therefore implies irony was that it was the instigators of the that four out of every five jobs in Zimbabwe crisis, i.e. ZANU-PF, which first observed were informalised in 2004’ (2011: 277). Up the radical consequences in a reshaped to 90 per cent of these jobs were unskilled political economy. and nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of such Take, for instance, the labour force employees were in urban areas. Given that market. This underwent radical structural 80 per cent of the informal sector activities changes both quantitatively and qualita- were one-person concerns (autonomous tively. Godfey Kanyenze et al. (2011: 275) social actors) they could not afford to strike reported that formal sector employment or protest against the state, lest it affect shrank by half, ‘from a peak of 1.4 million them directly and where it would hurt in 1998 to an estimated 700,000 in 2007’ most – the pocket. Nor were such people and that the proportion of the population available for ZCTU2-convened stayaways employed in the formal sector ‘declined (which were very effective and widely sup- from 14 per cent in 1980 to around 6 per cent ported in the late 1990s) or to do voluntary by 2007’. Statistics on employment noto- work – civic or political – for CSOs and/or riously vary widely. According to UNO- political parties, except under duress. Such CHA (2008), only 480,000 were formally 2 employed in 2008, down from 3.6 million The ZCTU is the largest trade union apex body in the country.

3 duress was not easily available to opposi- on the income it generated. Estimates tion parties but ZANU-PF could dispense around 2012 were that there were over half such coercion, either physically or through a million active small-scale gold miners denial of valued public goods and services and another two million who were directly such as land and food aid. dependent on gold mining (Singo 2012). These developments in the economy had A few months before the July 2013 elec- implications on politics and civil society tions, the Minister of Mines dangled a juicy work. It may be remembered that both civil carrot before them when he announced society and the labour-based MDC had government’s intention to regularise or more or less the same constituency base formalise their operations. For this target but, over time, its members migrated into group, such news was manna from heaven the invisible sector, where they escaped and must have elicited the expected politi- capture by both. During the Government of cal response at the ballot box. Civil society National Unity (GNU), ZANU-PF designed activists could not, or were unwilling to, specific strategies and incentives to capture connect with such a fickle sector of the pop- this constituency. These were centred in ulace even though they represented a large the Ministry of Youth, Indigenisation and proportion of the voting population. Cer- Employment Creation and included easy- tainly, this sector was no longer part of the access loans for the youth and women and cohort of people who had formed the bed- community share ownership schemes tar- rock of the MDC at its formation in 1999. geting rural communities. In urban areas, Things had changed, yet the opposition and the ZANU-PF-aligned youth militia, for its allies had remained more or less static, example Chipangano in Harare, ensured which was folly in a changed and changing that informal vendors were ‘captured’ by political economy. the party by availing market stalls and relat- In short, civil society did not have its ears ed services only to members of their party. ‘tuned in’ to the changing political econo- Then there were the vast artisanal miners my. Regrettably, academia was not of much (popularly known as makorokoza, unregis- help either. Several reasons may account tered or illegal miners) in many parts of the for this. To my knowledge, the current crop country, especially in Mashonaland West of graduates and young lecturers in the and East, Midlands and Manicaland. Most Humanities are not well-schooled in this were, and are, the rural poor, attempting to paradigm, which apparently lost its glitter eke out a living through gold and diamond in both theory and practice after the col- panning, are very mobile and move in large lapse of empirical socialism of the Soviet numbers. In 2003, some 400,000 people era. Political economy was thrown out were actively mining gold and almost two with the bathwater, mistakenly equated million people relied directly or indirectly with socialism when in fact it also has a

4 conservative/liberal stream or variant – the most seductive terms in the practice of de- public choice school. Consequently, few mocracy promotion and in social science Zimbabwean social scientists are conver- discourse. Yet it is, as will be shown, a shift- sant with this analytical approach. ing and contested concept. To put it in Win- The other reason has to do with the ston Churchill’s language, ‘civil society’ is a social distance between many CSOs and term that suffers from ‘definitional inexacti- academia. This is particularly true of the tude’. More often than not, civil society and activist wing of civil society, which tends non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to have a disdain for ‘armchair’ critics who are conflated. This is understandable, as are not in the ‘trenches’. Until recently, the both inhabit the same realm. This paper reflex reaction of much of the civic commu- considers civil society as a more inclusive nity to research was to dismiss it on account phenomenon, of which NGOs are a part. No of being ‘too academic’ and not ground- extensive conceptual discussion of civil so- ed. It must also be said that much of this ciety will, however, be attempted here; nei- reaction was due to the failure of civics to ther space nor mandate allows this. Even so, nurture a culture of research and evidence- a brief conceptual detour is in order. based analysis. This, however, is beginning For Goran Hyden, writers ‘typically to change. assume that civil society is made up of the Lastly, but of no less importance, is that associational life organised between fam- the restrictive political environment has ily and state’. For him, civil society is not discouraged the emergence of a critical a ubiquitous phenomenon found in every mass of public intellectuals who engage society but is associated with a particular with public issues and share their views context: ‘Such a society is inevitably mod- with various stakeholders, including civil ern, relies on a market based economy, and society, the media and public institutions rests on the principle of rule of law’. Fur- such as Parliament. This is tragic, but as ther, such a society thrives best where there long as the highly polarised social and is relative plenty: ‘Civicness’ is more easily political order continues, the phenomenon promoted in conditions of plenty than in of the disengaged intellectual will likely poverty’ (Hyden, 2012: 179). This concep- grow and even solidify as the ‘proper’ and tual approach has its roots in the politi- ‘expected’ conduct of the intellectual class. cal thought of nineteenth-century French This paper firmly believes that Zimbabwe is philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville and, the poorer for this attitude. according to Foley and Edwards, this perspective ‘puts special emphasis on the abil- Conceptual Considerations ity of associational life in general and the Conceptualisations of Civil Society habits of association in particular to pat- Today, civil society is perhaps one of the terns of civility in the actions of citizens

5 in a democratic polity’ (1996: 39). In other society, but rather as a separate sector. words, civil society is defined by its asso- Lloyd Sachikonye, however, seems to ciational life and its habits of association take a more encompassing view of civil and occupies any space between the family society that includes economic institutions. and the state. Foley and Edwards call this After surveying the various conceptualisa- perspective ‘Civil Society I’. The reality is tions of civil society, Sachikonye (1995: 7) that by following this conceptual approach, writes: it becomes problematic to talk about civil One working definition is that in the most society in most of present-day Africa. The abstract sense, civil society can be conceived question is whether these characteristics as an aggregate of institutions whose exist in present-day Zimbabwe. members are engaged primarily in a complex The other perspective, which Foley and of non-state activities – economic and Edwards call ‘Civil Society II’, ‘lays empha- cultural production, voluntary associations sis on civil society as a sphere of action that and household life – and who in this way is independent of the state and that is capa- preserve and transform their identity by ble – precisely for this reason – of energising exercising all sorts of pressures or controls resistance to a tyrannical regime’ (Ibid.). In upon state institutions. (1995: 7) other words, it emphasises the importance For Sachikonye, civil society is variegated of civil associations as a counterweight to and could include such organisations as the state. professional associations of different kinds, Civil society is also often discussed in student organisations, independent com- relation to three other domains: the family, munications media, business associations, the state and the market.3 For our purposes, trade unions, co-operatives and various Edwards’s conceptualisation is apt: NGOs. The church and its affiliated organi- At its simplest, civil society is the arena in sations constitute another important part which people come together to pursue the of civil society (Ibid). interests they hold in common – not for profit In the same vein, the EU’s broad concep- or political power, but because they care tion of CSOs is inclusive of all non-state enough about something to take collection. actors, not-for-profit structures and non- (1998: 2, emphasis in original) partisan and non-violent organisations Edwards also says ‘civil society includes through which people organise shared all associations and networks between the objectives and ideals, whether political, family and the state except firms’ (2000: 7). cultural, social or economic (EU 2012: 3). In this paper, the market is a sector that is According to this definition, CSOs operate not considered as an integral part of civil at various levels – local, national, regional and international – and comprise urban and 3 Some conceptions exclude the market (the economy). rural, formal and informal organisations,

6 inclusive of NGOs, faith-based organisa- ‘missing middle’ in democratisation and de- tions, foundations, research institutions, velopment generally. Indeed, Jeremy Rifkin trade unions and employer organisations, calls civil society ‘our last, best hope’ (Rifkin co-operatives, professional and business in Edwards 1998: 2). It is an essential though associations and the non-for-profit media. not sufficient condition for democratic tran- This paper also takes a three-pronged sition and consolidation. view of democratic society, of which two Foley and Edwards raise the intriguing legs are the state and the market. In this but uncomfortable prospect of civil soci- conceptualisation, a healthy democratic ety also being as a mechanism for stifling society is one in which each of the three democracy: legs is strong and performs its salutary If civil society is a beachhead secure function/s. The core function or role of civil enough to be of use in thwarting tyrannical society is that of promoting and defending regimes, what prevents it from being used the public interest or common good against to undermine democratic governments? real or potential abuse by the state and/or .... to understand the role of civil society in the market. No one pillar should exist in the modern world, we must discern how ‘splendid isolation’ from the other two. If and under what circumstances a society’s one leg is weak, the entire structure will organised components contribute to political likely collapse. Indeed, no viable democracy strength or political failure (1996: 45). has endured where one of the legs remains One of the most critical theoretical and weak over a period of time. The structure empirical questions is: Does civil society is destabilised and rendered brittle, result- promote democratisation or it is a demo- ing in a fragile situation similar to the last cratic order that gives rise to the emergence fifteen years in Zimbabwe. and development of civil society? Of this The focus of this paper is on explicitly ‘chicken and egg’ scenario, Clair Mercer governance-related CSOs. Of course, there (2002: 12) suggests that ‘NGO sectors are are many other organisations whose activi- indeed more vibrant in places where some ties have governance implications, but they form of democracy has been the political are not our primary interest. norm for some time.’ Civil Society and Democratisation Democracy is still a fragile plant in Historically, and in the contemporary Zimbabwe; so is civil society. Is this a coin- world, no sustainable democracy has been cidence? This takes us to what Michael crafted or developed organically without a Walzer calls ‘the paradox of the civil socie- vibrant civil society. It cannot be disputed ty argument’, which according to Foley and that civil society has emerged as the most Edwards means: widely discussed aspect of democracy in re- [A] democratic civil society seems to require cent years. It has also been celebrated as the a democratic state, and a strong civil society

7 seems to require a strong and responsive tendency to be part of partisan society and state. The strength and responsiveness of a conflate their roles. They want to be treated democracy may depend upon the character as non-partisan society but by behaving in a of its civil society, … reinforcing both the partisan manner and they are consequently democratic functioning and the strength of treated as such by the party-state. The advo- the state. But such effects depend on the prior cacy for, and promotion of, democracy are achievement of both democracy and a strong political functions; they are not necessarily state. (1996: 48) partisan functions. Civil Society and Partisanship Civil society is part of the non-parti- One of the perennially contested issues is san universe, while political parties, for whether civil society ought to be non-par- instance, are and ought to be integral to tisan. Most NGOs in many African coun- partisan political society. The problem tries are funded by, and often creatures of, arises, however, when civil society, whose foreign donors. The donors often call the raison d’être is the pursuit of public non- tune to which most CSOs seem to happily partisan causes, acts in ways that advance dance. Of this, Kamat (2003: 66) laments partisan causes. It is perfectly legitimate that ‘NGOs become more like the bodies for civil society to have common cause with from which they attract funding than like political parties or other partisan animals, the societies they intend to represent and but it is an entirely different and problem- from which they draw their legitimacy’. atic issue when civil society becomes an Foley and Edwards ask: ‘What is the sense appendage of political parties or becomes … and what is the nonsense in the frequent embedded in them. Such was the scenario demand that civil associations be “nonpar- in Zimbabwe post-2000 up to the 2013 elec- tisan”?’ (1996: 49). This paper’s departure tions. Thereafter, most civic organisations point is that while civil society is part of the seemed to have experienced a ‘Damascene political community it should not be part moment’, acknowledging the need to be of the partisan community. This is based objective and alive to their mandate in their on a fine-grained but significant distinction association with third-party organisations . between being political and being partisan; the two are not the same and should not An Overview of Zimbabwe’s be conflated. One can be political without Civil Society being partisan – many citizens worldwide are the former without being the latter. Thus The place of Zimbabwe’s civil society has we have a partisan political society and non- been dictated by the timing of its birth. partisan political society. This distinction is Chronologically, CSOs (interchangeably crucial in that many of the pitfalls of Zim- referred to as NGOs) fall into three roughly babwe’s civil society are associated with the delineated generations. The ‘first generation’

8 (hereafter called 1G) comprised predomi- them as allies or partners in development. nantly humanitarian NGOs that predate They often filled a vacuum left by the- gov independence and largely reacted to the ernment, providing health, welfare and predations visited on indigenous Africans educational and other services to a large by a colonial regime whose modus operandi number of the country’s population, espe- was racial exclusion and oppression. With cially the poorer segments in the rural the exception of a few, their mission was to areas. Most shied away from confronting alleviate the suffering of the natives and as the state, preferring to play a more back- such these NGOs tended to supplement, and stage role to advance and defend their at times and in some places even supplant, goals and interests. White-led economic the state in the provision of public goods organisations were also in this category, and services. Faith-based organisations most prominently the Confederation of such as the Catholic Commission for Justice Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), Zimbabwe and Peace (CCJP), the Zimbabwe Council of National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC), Churches (ZCC) and the Zimbabwe Catho- Chamber of Mines and the Commercial lic Bishops Conference4 (ZCBC) were excep- Farmers’ Union (CFU). Some 2G organisations to this, particularly the CCJP. tions worked in close collaboration with the ‘Second generation’ (2G) organisations state, though the latter often wanted a more were oriented towards development and paternalistic relationship or even co-opted were born in Zimbabwe’s Independence them (for example, the ZCTU and Afri- Decade (1980–1989), when the new black can farmers unions). The ZCTU rebelled regime delivered many developmental ben- against the state’s paternalism in the first efits to the previously marginalised popu- ten tears of black governance, and by the lation, especially in the war-ravaged rural end of the 1990s it had become the sharpest areas. Such benefits included education, and biggest thorn in the regime’s side. health centres, agricultural services and The ‘third generation’ (3G) organisa- roads. The exceptions to the rural focus tions belong to the governance sector and were organisations such as the Zimbabwe sprouted and flourished during and after Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU, the Adjustment Decade (1990–1999). Sig- formed in 1981 at the instigation of the nificantly, these later played midwife to the state) and the Women Action Group (WAG, MDC in September 1999 under trade union- 1983). ist Morgan Tsvangirai. In many respects, 1G and 2G NGOs were more or less these emerged to fill the institutional vacu- innocuous in the eyes of the post-inde- um caused by the weakness of political par- pendence government as the regime viewed ties. Leading the pack were the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU, formed 4 It also delved into matters that today would be in the arena of human rights and governance. in 1989); Media Institute of Southern Africa

9 (MISA-Zimbabwe, 1992); the Zimbabwe so-called ‘strategic alliances’ with opposi- Human Rights Association (Zimrights, tion parties, especially the MDC (or the 1992); the Zimbabwe Lawyers Association MDC-T after the 2005 split that resulted (ZIWOLA, 1995); the Zimbabwe Lawyers in a breakaway MDC faction initially led for Human Rights (1996); the National by Arthur Mutambara and later by Welsh- Constitutional Assembly (NCA, formed in man Ncube). Leading 3G organisations of 1997); the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO the first wave included the Zimbabwe Peace Forum (1998); the Combined Harare Resi- Project (ZPP, 2000); the Zimbabwe Elec- dents Association (CHRA, formed in 1999); tion Support Network (ZESN, 2000); the and the Mass Public Opinion Institute Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIM- (MPOI, 1999). CET, 2000); the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coali- Stefan Mair and Masipula Sithole (2002: tion (CiZ, 2001); the Women in Politics Unit 11-12) described the conditions fertile for (Wipsu, 2001); the Bulawayo Agenda (2002); this generation of non-governmental enti- Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA, 2003); ties as follows: and the Progressive Residents Association The growing inability of the government (BPRA, 2007). Second wave organisations to provide social services, the increasing included Heal Zimbabwe (2008); the Harare corruption in the government coupled with Residents Trust (2008); the National Youth rising repression, the failure and social Development Trust (NYDT); the Centre costs of economic reform initiated a wave for Research and Development (2006); the of NGO start-ups the majority of them Election Resource Centre (ERC, 2010); the pursuing a political agendas, forced the Young Women Institute for Development established interest groups into politics (2013); and the Centre for Natural Resour- and confrontation with the government ces Governance (2013). and made the trade unions the backbone Most of the 200-odd governance-focused of the newly formed opposition movement. CSOs were formed between 1999 and 2008; The uniting and mobilising issues for this only a few others were established during heterogeneous coalition were constitutional reform and, later, the removal of Mugabe the GNU. As Zimbabwe was in crisis dur- from power. The lead agency in the latter ing this ten-year period a vast majority of became the MDC. these CSOs were thus born in crisis, were crisis-oriented,5 and under a leadership and Many other 3G organisations were born in had a membership that reached political Zimbabwe’s post-2000 period in two waves. maturitywhen Zimbabwe had plunged into The first wave was the so-called Crisis Dec- a prolonged crisis. This is an important fac- ade (2000 to mid-2008) and the second the tor, for it shaped the attitude and behaviour GPA era (mid 2008–2013). These organi- of these CSOs. sations mainly operated in the context of Indications are that, after the 2013

10 elections, Zimbabwe has ushered in a new vals and counterweights to existing CSOs generation, a ‘fourth generation’ (4G) of deemed to be anti-regime/pro-opposition. CSOs. This is not quite the case. Rather, They thus play a role of spoiler, under- some 3G organisations are transmuting/ mining the credibility and effectiveness of metamorphosing, and differentiated from mainstream civics. their predecessors by a new focus. Clearly, A classic example – and one of the first there is a new mood in the civic commu- such organisations – was the Zimbabwe nity defined not only by a new attitude and Federation of Trade Unions. It was created approach towards government but also by in 1998 as a rival to the ZCTU, which the what CSOs see as a need for scaling-up government accused of abandoning work- relationships with grassroots constituen- ers and having a political agenda after cies and with a new focus. 1G and 2G CSOs it organised crippling strikes and staya- focused more on ‘bread and butter’ issues ways in 1997 and 1998. Gilbert Tarugarira and working with government, whereas commented: 3G organisations seemed to veer towards The formation of the Zimbabwe Federation more abstract political and governance of Trade Unions (ZFTU) in 1998 raised issues, deliberately confronting the politi- eyebrows, amid wide speculation that it was cal regime. launched to counter the effectiveness of the ZCTU. The political alliance between the State-Sponsored CSOs ZFTU and the government could not be doubted because its proponents were ZANU This discussion would not be complete (PF) activists in the likes of war veterans. without highlighting the role of ZANU-PF (2011: 215) or Party-State in creating its own civil society community standing in opposition to In most respects, the ZFTU was the polar those agitating for democracy and human opposite of the mainstream ZCTU, and rights. Although ZANU-PF prides itself for its militant modus operandi concerning delivering and protecting democracy and employers was designed to demonstrate that claims that it is a strong defender of human it was there to produce results for workers. rights, it nevertheless emphasises socioeco- Hence, the Commercial Workers Union, nomic rather than political rights. To this the Associated Mine Workers’ Union, the extent, its own universe of CSOs embraced Zimbabwe Construction Workers’ Union this ideological stance. Such organisations and the Transport and General Workers’ are state-sponsored, receiving financial, ad- Union, for example, were attracted to its ministrative, political and moral support. radical and uncompromising discourse. Without exception, they are formed as ri- It also received wide and generous public 5 One prominent CSO was/is actually called Crisis in media coverage and escaped the arrests, Zimbabwe (CiZ) and was formed in 2001. persecution and harassment that visited the

11 ZCTU. Since its formation, it has organised stitutional architecture of the country. This rival May Day celebrations to counter those issue had been at the top of most CSO agen- of the ZCTU and senior government lead- das since the mid-1990s, but when the first ers normally give addresses at its functions. attempt at constitutional reform was made However, though the ZFTU initially suc- in 1999, mainstream civil society boycotted ceeded in causing considerable confusion the process, alleging that it was not suffi- and panic within the ranks of the ZCTU, it ciently people-driven. The second attempt still plays second fiddle to the latter. came in April 2009, following the estab- Other government-created NGOs (GON- lishment of the Parliamentary Constitution GOs) include: the Zimbabwe Congress of Select Committee (popularly known as CO- Students Union (ZICOSU), which stands PAC). The COPAC-led constitution making as a bitter rival to the mainstream Zimba- process saw civil society split with some key bwe National Students Union (ZINASU), CSOs – notably ZCTU and the NCA – con- which draws membership from universi- demning participation on the same grounds ties and colleges; the Zimbabwe Lawyers as in 1999. for Justice to rival the Zimbabwe Lawyers In order to avert falling apart, the civil for Human Rights (ZLHR). At the apex society community allowed its various there is the Zimbabwe Federation of Non- members to fall into three main categories Governmental Organisations (ZFNGO) to and approaches: counter the National Association of Non- • No participation but pressurise for Governmental Organisations (NANGO), an alternative process that brings which is the umbrella association for main- civil society on board stream CSOs/NGOs. The ZFNGO ‘houses’ rival CSOs/NGOs. • No participation but play monitoring It is notable that even faith-based organi- and oversight role, i.e. being a sations exhibit the same tendencies. What watchdog vis-à-vis political parties this amounts to is that Zimbabwe’s political (both ZANU-PF and the two MDC terrain possesses few institutions with the factions) and all other participants credibility and capacity to serve as neutral in the COPAC process, including mediators between contending political participating CSOs and social forces. • Fully participate and influence, for example by joining COPAC CSOs and the Dynamics of the committees. Constitutional Process In the end, most mainstream CSOs and all The GPA-mandated constitution-making GONGOs participated at varying levels of process was a strategic moment for those intensity. The process itself took some four desiring to shape and/or reshape the con- years of polarised, partisan contestation and

12 hard bargaining to produce a draft constitu- Nonetheless, some CSOs feared that tion in July 2012. Thereafter another round there had been rigging in favour of the ‘Yes’ of intense contestation ensued, with the vote: the Election Support Centre (ESC), for two MDCs quickly endorsing the COPAC instance, speculated that ‘the referendum draft and ZANU-PF coming up with what could have been rigged and the high turn- amounted to a counter-draft. However, in out was manipulated through ballot staff- September 2012, ZANU-PF finally conce- ing [sic]’ (2013). The rigging thesis is given ded, allowing an unchanged COPAC draft some credence in the context of a potential- constitution to proceed to the next stage. ly large electorate that was not particularly Ultimately, the GNU leaders agreed on the knowledgeable about the draft constitution draft in January 2013 and set a tight dead- and/or had not even seen it. Apparently, line of 16 March 2013 for the referendum. although the ZEC printed as many as 12 Some CSOs – notably the NCA and the million ballot papers (almost the total pop- concerned affailiates of the ZCTU – con- ulation of Zimbabwe and twice the number demned the hurried referendum process, of registered voters), it had printed only with the NCA unsuccessfully taking the 70,000 copies of the draft constitution for government to court, seeking a postpone- distribution to the whole country. Clearly, ment of the referendum. this was fodder for fears and rumours of A critical juncture in Zimbabwe’s politi- ballot-stuffing. cal history was the enactment of the new This was the first time in Zimbabwe’s Constitution in May 2013, after a popular modern history that the people had been and peaceful referendum that overwhelm- actively involved in crafting their own con- ingly endorsed the draft in March 2013. stitution. The new social contract is by all Most observers (domestic and foreign) accounts a vast improvement on the old endorsed the referendum as free, fair and constitution, especially on citizen rights credible, but some had misgivings about (Chapter 4, the Declaration of Rights). the unexpectedly large turnout. Up to 95 Regrettably, the new constitution was soon per cent of the three million-plus voters overshadowed by another critical juncture, endorsed the draft in what was described the elections of July 2013. as the highest voter turnout since the independence elections of 1980. This was largely CSOs in the Coalition Government attributable to the cross-party consensus Historically, even back in the settler co- around the ‘Yes’ campaign and also to the lonial period, relations between the state easier and relaxed voting requirements and governance-oriented civil society were whereby anyone over 18 years of age and rarely cordial. Tension and even hostile con- with a national ID could vote; the voters frontation were its hallmarks. To be able to roll was not used, as was the case in 1980. properly grasp CSO–Government relations

13 during the GNU requires stepping back to COPAC. Though a minority among CSOs, the formation of the MDC and MDC–CSO they argued that the process of crafting the relations thereafter. new constitution was insufficiently ‘people- The most significant fact about the MDC driven’. By contrast, recognising that con- is that it was mothered by a disparate constitution reform required political power glomeration of civic organisations whose and technical expertise, other Zimbabwean shared consensus was improving Zimba- CSOs and NGOs participated in events bwe’s governance. This defined their future sponsored by Parliament. relationship and that with the ZANU-PF The divisions in civil society around the controlled Government. From the very constitution-making exercise remained beginning, civil society and the MDC unhealed at election day, with the NCA were inextricably linked and consequently becoming viscerally critical of the process viewed as ‘enemies of the state’ by ZANU-PF. and ultimately a sworn enemy of the MDC- In short, there was a consistent confronta- T. To this extent, the GNU was very costly tional relationship between civil society– to civil society as a collective community MDC and ZANU-PF– Government. with shared governance goals. Nonetheless, By embedding itself in opposition poli- civil society had important roles to play in tics, civil society placed itself in an invidi- monitoring the implementation of the GPA ous position when the MDC formed a and any donor benchmarks for re-engage- coalition government with ZANU-PF. The ment, as well as for preparing the ground dilemma was how to treat the GNU, whose for a free and fair election (voter registra- composition now included its own off- tion and education, tracking press freedom, spring? The temptation among the major- election observation using international ity of CSOs was to support the MDC side standards and parallel vote tabulation, for in the implementation of the GNU. This example). close proximity also cost civil society con- The bottom line is that CSOs could have siderable credibility and laid it open to played a more critical role in the special cir- legitimate accusations of lack of objectiv- cumstances of the GNU, where all the three ity in its role as a watchdog. It inevitably parties that had won seats in the March found itself in an unusual and highly com- 2008 elections were actively involved in the promised position, which in no small way coalition government. Theoretically, there contributed to serious fractures and ten- was no official opposition to the govern- sions within its ranks. Emblematic was the ment in power. For example, the Seventh rift over the constitution-making process, Parliament (2008–2013) had no opposition with key organisations such as the NCA, benches or opposition leader(s). This was a ZCTU and ZINASU vehemently opposed big gap that an alert and robust civil soci- to a leading role for Parliament through ety could have handily filled, but most were

14 handicapped by their past (and continu- publication, one can discern green shoots ing) ties to the two MDC parties and their emerging from the blocked transition. In policy stances were often informed by cues fact, a dynamic transition is underway. from the parties. Compounding the matter This is evident in many respects. For was that more than a few CSO leaders had instance, in terms of constitutional devel- their eyes on future government positions opment, the country is undergoing a transi- in the event of the one or other of the MDCs tion – albeit a reluctant one given the slow (especially the MDC-T) winning the elec- pace in the institutionalisation and imple- tions. Not surprisingly, then, few wanted to mentation of the 2013 supreme law. ZANU- damage their future political prospects by PF and the MDC-T are also undergoing assuming the role of an open and confron- painful and potentially violent leadership tational professional watchdog. transitions, these being more debilitating for ZANU-PF. In terms of the economy, Zimbabwe, CSOs and the post-2013 there is also a structural transition from Dynamic Transition a formal to an informal economy (accom- The working thesis of this paper is that panied by a decline in the quality of jobs), present-day Zimbabwe is now locked in a one in which Zimbabweans are now fear- transition far deeper, wider and seemingly ing deflation rather than hyperinflation, more irreversible than ever before. It can be as was the case in pre-GNU Zimbabwe. stated with considerable confidence that a On the diplomatic front, relations between new dawn is nigh in Zimbabwe, occasioned Zimbabwe and the international commu- by both macro- (national), and micro-level nity in the West frosty for more than a dec- changes. The former refers to the two mega ade, are less frosty, evidence of a transition processes of 2013 and the latter largely to dynamic. Last, but by no means least, civil the internal changes in both the ruling society is in a grand transition of its very ZANU-PF and opposition parties. Civil own, shifting the way it conducts its busi- society has had to adjust its work to this ness, especially in the drive away from con- new and dynamic environment. fronting to co-operating with the state and In 2002, a KAF publication (Mair and government. Sithole 2002) described Zimbabwe as a Transition is in the air, even if it is not ‘blocked transition’. This was despite the always visible to the naked eye, and its fact that one of the co-authors, the late dynamism explains why many Zimbabwe- Professor Masipula Sithole, had five years ans are so uncertain about their future and earlier (1997) enthusiastically declared that of their country. This is not unusual, that Zimbabwe was witnessing ‘eroding for uncertainty, both in process and out- authoritarianism’; it proved to be a pre- come, lies at the heart of any transition. mature declaration. Twelve years after that For instance, it is not certain whether the

15 leadership transition in ZANU-PF will fol- changing paradigm governing civil society. low a democratic or a more authoritarian Remarks made in his address to a civil soci- trajectory; that is a big unknown. This is ety gathering in June 2014 provoked a sharp the part of the larger context and terrain for and almost hysteric outcry and rebuke civil society. from Zimbabwe civics, especially those in A clear and present mood in the civil the Diaspora, with some even demanding society leadership in post-election Zim- that he be recalled by the European Union babwe is that the sector needs a new and (Mathuthu 2014). And yet, in reality, far expanded role. The language of socioeco- from trying to instigate a new paradigm, nomic rights and activities is in the air. Dell’Arricia was merely articulating what One of the most common terms now used was already happening on the ground. By to describe this new expanded role is ‘rel- early 2014, most local CSOs were already evance’. There is a palpable and pervasive ‘engaging’ with the new post-election sense that civil society has rediscovered its ZANU-PF government, even if they did relevance, which presumably was the miss- not endorse the electoral process that had ing link in its activities in the recent past. produced it. Unmistakeably, a new mood Most donor-funded organisations were was in the air and it was one of pragma- crestfallen after the election results, forcing tism (kushanda nezviripo, literally meaning most of them into near-meditation, reflect- ‘working with what is there’). ing on what went wrong, at the end of which The new paradigm has several related they seemingly discovered the new formu- facets, the first of which involves engage- la. This entailed reconnecting with commu- ment in a dual direction: upward engage- nities in a ‘relevant’ way by engaging with ment with the Government and downwards and addressing communities’ ‘basic’ needs engagement to grassroots level through and concerns. The new wind of change had community-based organisations (CBOs). thus reached civil society. Though rarely As a sector of civil society, CBOs had been explicitly mentioned, there is a belated rec- neglected during the last decade or so. ognition of a changed and changing politi- There is also the increasingly felt need to cal economy that civil society had neither engage horizontally through co-ordinated identified nor understood and that there and co-operative action. is need to respond to it in new ways. There The second facet is a reassessment of the is what amounts to a belated admission by relationship of CSOs with political parties, civil society that it had somehow got lost on especially those that are in opposition to the journey to the harmonised elections of the ruling party. As noted earlier, the pre- 2013. vious relationship between civil society Former EU Ambassador Dell’Arricia’s and the opposition was like that of Siamese controversially but accurately captured the twins. The heavy and embarrassing defeat

16 of the two MDCs in the July 2013 elections However, hardly any such networks actu- necessitated a critical review of the value of ally work as such. The lead organisation such an intimate relationship, with many or hub of the so-called network is in fact CSOs subsequently advocating an arm’s- a fully fledged, independent entity in its length relationship with political parties in own right, with a Secretariat and Execu- general. This meant maintaining a healthy tive Director (ED) that brook little or no distance from partisan politics and their interference from other organisations. Far organisations. from playing a facilitating role, the hub A third aspect of the new paradigm is a competes with its member organisations in broader perspective on building capacity. programme delivery and hence funding as This entails going beyond improving mere well. Further, each of the formal network technical or administrative competencies member organisations jealously guards (budgeting, accounting, reporting, crafting its autonomy and ‘organisational sover- organisational policies and so on) to more eignty’.6 One of the cardinal flaws of civil expansive capacity building that includes society in the past had to do with this lack strengthening CSO competencies to devel- of co-operation and co-ordination. More op and deliver programmes on the basis of often than not, there was more competi- the prevailing political and socioeconomic tion – especially for funding and recogni- conditions. Another capacity deficit area tion from donors, sometimes the same one that constrained the effectiveness of CSOs – than co-operation and collaboration. As was the ability to undertake research (or a consequence, there was an unnecessary utilise that done by others) and critically duplication of activities in a given sector or analyse the political landscape, the events sub-sector, and sometimes in the same geo- taking place within it, the actors involved graphical area, a typical example of there and their motives and work the findings being too many cooks in the kitchen. into policy formulation, programme devel- At the organisational level, more serious opment and implementation. In short, there problems of internal governance stuck out is a compelling need to move towards an (and still do) like a sore thumb. With few evidence-based approach to programming. exceptions, most governance and human There is yet another debilitating issue rights CSOs are registered as ‘Trusts’ at the afflicting civics and NGOs generally. A High Court, and invariably the Deed of serious and almost ubiquitous problem Trust (the organisation’s constitution) has that strikes a nerve among CSOs concerns 6 I coined this term in ‘Zimbabwe at the crossroads: internal governance, whether as individ- Challenges for civil society’, and used it in ual entities or as networks of like-minded referencence to ‘oversensitivity to organisational organisations. In terms of the latter, a turf and the felt need to defend such territory’. See http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/sup_files/ number of CSOs claim to act as networks. Zimbabwe%20at%20the%20crossroads.pdf.

17 two governance organs: the Board of Trus- best be done by helping with the formation tees that makes policy and the Secretariat, of a critical mass of citizens beyond voters; under an ED, that implements policy. Yet more about this below. In the last 15 years, this is only the legal and formal structure; and especially towards the elections held the empirical reality is often vastly different in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013, many from the juridical position, for the relation- 3G organisations, with active support and ship between the Board and the Secretariat funding from donors, all-but stampeded is typically inverted. The ED – usually the to create a critical mass of voters. Recent founder of the organisation – makes and discussions with the leaderships of numer- implements policy that the Board rubber- ous CSOs revealed that many had partici- stamps at its meetings, which are held about pated in elections-related work, often as an three times a year. The founder does not appendage to their traditional mandate, in only ‘own’ the organisation but is also its order to capture the financial booty that life director and accountable only to him- came through supporting donors. This self/herself.7 If s/he is externally account- reached epidemic proportions in the run- able, it is to the donor rather than the Board up to the 2013 elections. The pervasive fad or the organisation’s constituency. One of was voter mobilisation (voter registration), our interlocutors described this situation with a distinct bias towards urban areas. as one of having a donor but no constitu- For instance, in 2012, a loose coalition of ency. In fact, the governance deficits that youth organisations came together and CSOs consistently accuse the Government formed the First Time Voters Campaign, of committing equally afflict them, namely which focused on getting young people poor or non-existing accountability and a (18-35 years) to register as voters and then lack of transparency and responsiveness. to vote. In the same year, a related coali- Donors, on their side, seldom cast a sharp tion started the ‘X1G Campaign’ that also eye at the internal institutional govern- targeted the youth, this time using urban ance of the organisations they support, culture to increase voter turnout in urban preferring to strengthen the technical and areas. Organisations that participated in administrative aspects. As already noted, this campaign claim that it was successful and sadly so, most CSOs take offence when in that some youth did make the effort to it is pointed out. vote in the 2013 elections. The overarching challenge for past, pre- Most of these activities took the project sent and future civil society is promoting rather than programme approach and were the democratisation of national govern- therefore treated as short-term interven- ance. The opinion herein is that this could tions of a six-month duration or less. Many CSO leaders acknowledge, with regret, that 7 Critics of this phenomenon have referred to such organisations as ‘MOOs’ (My Own Organisation). they only started such interventions after

18 the March 2013 referendum, and some used to describe the relationship, rings only after the election date was declared – rather hollow in practice. The unequal unilaterally – in May 2013. As such, most ‘partnership’ often translates into chronic of the activities were in the form of rapid dependence upon the donor or group of response actions to quickly fill existing gaps donors. As a result, autonomy is severely in the election phase of the election cycle. circumscribed and the organisation has Usually, such interventions were only made little freedom when it comes to decision- because there was funding for them and, making and action, especially in terms of like bees, CSOs went to the source of the agenda-setting. nectar. Once the elections were over, donor Further, and most humiliating for CSOs, funding shrank or even dried up and many donor priorities frequently shift, forcing partner organisations that had gone into the recipient to follow the dollar. As a con- election programming found themselves sequence, the local partner is compelled by in a crippling or terminal financial crisis. the law of necessity to tailor make its pro- The project approaches, and the associated grammes and projects to suit those of the short-termism, are now acknowledged by funder, even when this might be outside its many CSOs as a major flaw. Having had registered mandate. In short, funding is the their fingers burnt, many now advocate Achilles heel of many a CSO. long-term programmes that are closely For various reasons, particularly eco- aligned to the elections cycle approach. nomic and political, local funding is not a While this would be a significant improve- viable option as there are few local donors ment, the focus would still be narrow, being outside the State. The bottom line is that on the voter (and the elections infrastruc- no CSO – whether foreign or locally fund- ture generally) rather than the more expan- ed – can stand on its own two feet, for it sive aim of developing the citizen. cannot generate its own funding from its own activities. To that extent, both groups CSOs and Sustainability of CSOs suffer from the same debilitating With the exception of the State-sponsored disease, namely high dependency levels. family of CSOs, most mainstream organi- Further, Zimbabwe, and indeed many Afri- sations are wholly dependent on foreign can countries, has no tradition of raising or donor funding. It is difficult to identify any granting funding from endowments. Some CSO in the governance and human rights CSOs have this provision in their constitu- sector that has an independent source, i.e. tion, and even in their strategic plans, but membership fees, for financing its activi- few, if any, ever use this as a source of fund- ties. This has created an asymmetrical ing sustainability, knowing they would relationship between donor and recipi- most likely fail if they tried. ent, such that ‘partnership’, the word often Some civil society organisations define

19 sustainability in terms of diversifying democratic citizenry from an assemblage donor funding in order that the local of atomistic voters. This paper’s perspec- organisation depends on ‘basket funding’ tive – admittedly contestable – is that in rather than one funder alone. Regrettably, terms of the democratic development of this is no path to self-sustainability, because the country, Zimbabweans have acted more the local partner still has to operate within as voters than citizens. Only when voters all funders’ parameters and a major disa- become citizens is there hope for a success- greement with one could invite collective ful and sustainable democracy. The core punishment whereby all withdraw funding. argument here is that Zimbabweans (and In the final analysis, and for the foreseeable perhaps other Africans) still have a shal- future, local CSOs – whether pro- or anti- low or underdeveloped sense of citizenship. regime – will depend almost entirely on Hence, the cardinal role of civil society donor (foreign or State) funding. today is to promote the development of citizens out of voters or to deepen citizen- The Way Forward: ship where it already exists. The argument An Agenda for Action is elaborated below. There is general agreement that civil soci- Post-2000, Zimbabweans felt increas- ety remains in a state of flux following the ingly demobilised, both as individuals and 2013 elections. This arises from some of as communities. Due to a convergence of the unfortunate mistakes, including errors factors, they grew disillusioned, felt power- 8 of omission, it made during the previous less and even impotent to make a change. 15 years. Still, it must be acknowledged People disengaged from politics and with- that CSOs braved a repressive environ- drew from the world of public affairs. In ment under an intolerant and monopolistic short, they became acquiescent subjects of regime and remained vocal and active under their political world. Rather than protest- the hard authoritarianism that character- ing injustices, they were prepared to turn ised the post-March 2008 election period. the other cheek. Survey evidence attests to And they have great potential, despite being this trend (Figure 1, right). An individual- traumatised by the outcome of the most ist orientation developed and consolidated recent elections. The greatest challenge they itself in a harsh political and economic face is how to channel the right causes in environment. It was each one to their own the right way. CSOs must also renegoti- and God for all. It was and is inconceiv- ate how they work with communities and able that democracy can be built on such CBOs and with the Government and other an atomistic social base. And yet one of the 8 partners. As this fatalism grew, there was a correspondent surge in active membership of faith-based From voters to citizens: At commu- prophetic churches, where many sought divine nity level, the challenge is to develop a intervention to their problems.

20 Figure 1: Protest Participation in Zimbabwe, 1999–2012 Question: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you have personally done any of these during the past year: Attended a demonstration or a protest march.

Source: Afrobarometer.org surveys for the years indicated. major interventions of CSOs was focusing when the survey was carried out. The 2009 on Zimbabweans as voters, equipping them survey also indicates a significant but tem- to vote and, not infrequently, ‘advising’ porary surge in respondents saying they them how to vote ‘wisely’. would demonstrate/protest if they had the Figure 1 clearly reflects the decline in pro- chance, but it subsequently dropped to an test action among Zimbabweans, even in all-time low of 19 per cent in the July 2012 the face of rapidly diminishing standards survey. of living between 1999 and 2008. Participa- This picture of a demobilised Zimbab- tion rates dropped sharply and consistently wean is despite the same person continu- from 24 per cent in 1999 to just 5 per cent in ally expressing a fondness for democracy 2012. Likewise, the unwillingness to protest as a form of government (Figures 2 and 3, rose steadily, from 50 per cent of the adult overleaf). Figure 2 shows that the prefer- population in 1999 to 76 per cent in 2012. ence for democracy did hold steady from The euphoria that initially characterised 1999 to 2012 and that at no time did less the response to the formation of the GNU than two-thirds of Zimbabweans express largely accounts for the decline in unwill- this inclination. Further, a more complete ingness to protest registered in May 2009, picture of the public mood on the state of

21 Figure 2: Popular Attitudes toward Democracy in Zimbabwe

Figure 3: Preferences for Democracy among Zimbabweans Question: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? STATEMENT 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. STATEMENT 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. STATEMENT 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.

22 Figure 4: Satisfaction with Democracy

democracy in the country is revealed in point for civil society engagement with the Figure 4 (above), which shows that, since masses, namely helping them with convert- 1999, at least half of the electorate said it was ing these desires into deeds. dissatisfied with the country’s democratic Further, it appears that at best, most credentials. Figure 3 excludes those Zimba- Zimbabweans define their citizenship bweans who stated outright that ‘Zimbabwe largely in terms of being able to vote. This is is not a democracy’. This proportion was 9 a highly restrictive view of democracy and per cent in 2012, meaning that two-thirds is clearly inhospitable ground for democ- (57 per cent + 9 per cent = 66 per cent) of the ratisation. It is this paper’s view that the populace either dismissed the idea of Zim- major challenge facing civil society today is babwe being a democracy or were unhappy expanding Zimbabweans’ sense of self from with the existing state of democracy in the being voters to full citizens with all the country. This is a damning report card. accompanying rights. Is citizen education The purpose of presenting this data is to the bridge that will carry the mass of people demonstrate that Zimbabweans feel they do from democratic deprivation to democratic not have democracy; yearn for it; and feel gratification? powerless to fight for it, especially outside The paper argues, as do other observers the electoral arena. In other words they are and writers,9 that elections do not make a aspirational democrats who believe they 9 See, for instance, contributions in Michael Bratton lack the competency to make their politi- (2013), especially Chapter 11, and Masunungure cal ideal(s) reality. This could be the entry (2013).

23 democracy. Voting is a cyclical political to power outside of electoral contests, even activity that, in Zimbabwe’s case, takes on non-political issues that are relevant to place every five years. During the interven- the community and to local development. ing years, voters withdraw, returning to the This type of citizen involvement may well safety of their cocoon, seemingly oblivi- be more critical to democratisation than ous to the external world of public affairs, citizen participation at the polls. It could the need to engage with it and collectively take the form of engaging relevant local with others. To engage in collective action, authorities regarding the delivery of public the voter needs to become a citizen, and this goods and services. In order to build and/or is where the new, expanded role of civil strengthen civic orientation vis-à-vis pub- society enters the scene. Here, CSOs need lic affairs, CSOs must work with CBOs and to start small and go local, dealing with communities. issues that matter to the communities with This kind of developmental work is whom they are working. Grassroots con- painstaking, requiring the kind of patience cerns tend to supersede issues pertaining to that CSOs seemed to have lacked over the political and civil rights. For example, to a last 15 years or so. Delivering democracy rational peasant in present-day Zimbabwe, cannot be done in a hurry, as CSOs (and the hierarchy of needs will seldom place donors) have learnt to their cost. It needs political rights above the need for adequate to be built from below and it is at best a food. Indeed, ‘abstract’ rights make sense medium-term process and certainly never and have meaning only when they are tied a short-run exercise. to those that are more substantive, when Towards engaging the regime and other there is a demonstrable nexus between the partners: Civil society can play multiple political/civil rights and the belly. It can be roles in addressing the challenge of broad- asserted that it was the failure of the oppo- ening and deepening engagement with sition and its civil society allies to show how Government and other strategic partners. the former are linked to or feed into socio- Going forward, one of the issues at the top economic rights that stole the glitter from of the agenda is redefining the role of civil their campaign. society, as well as their relationship with the CSOs must reset their relationship with government of the day. This demands posi- those at grassroots level, ideally via CBOs. tive engagement without being co-opted – These include residents’ associations (urban an ever-present danger. Relations between areas), faith-based organisations, women civil society and government need to be and youth groups (rural and urban), co- recalibrated given the restoration of de- operatives and farmers’ associations (rural facto one-party domination in Zimbabwe. areas). The idea should be to mould an The paper asserts that the role of civil active citizenry that is able to speak truth society will be more critical in a Zimbabwe

24 under one-party hegemony. The decimation reform and youth or women empowerment, of the organised opposition in Zimbabwe even if they have different opinions as to has elevated the role of the non-state sec- the most appropriate models and method- tor, including, if not especially, institutions ologies. In other words, civil society should of countervailing power. This requires nei- find it possible to praise a policy where and/ ther confrontation nor capitulation; rather or when appropriate and vice versa. Oppos- it necessitates positive and mutually ben- ing government cannot be raised to the lev- eficial engagement. A gravely wounded and el of ideology; that borders on doctrinaire weakened opposition leaves a wide account- anachronism. ability gap that other societal actors have to However, any engagement needs to be fill. Civil society can play this role without targeted. For instance, media organisa- either becoming an enemy of the state or its tions should target the relevant government lapdog. Will it rise up to the occasion? ministry/department and/or the applicable In a sense, there is need for a paradigm Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. CSOs shift, to do new things in new ways. Car- thus need to identify a niche issue area rying on in the same manner will not take and anchor themselves in it. Those CSOs anyone anywhere anytime soon. If CSOs around the globe that are most effective do not leave the patterns of the last 15 years are issue-oriented and do not try to spread behind them, it will signal a refusal to learn themselves over multiple issue areas. There from the past, something understandable is no point in trying to be a jack of all trades. given the traditional culture and orienta- Being issue-focused may in fact explain the tion of mainstream CSOs. relative effectiveness of a few local CSOs, It is true that the present CSO leader- such as the NCA (before its transformation ship was raised in the tradition of being into a political party), which succeeded in anti-Government and that an effective compelling government to respond to its civil society is one that stands opposed to agitation for a new constitution in the late government on anything and everything 1990s. regardless of its merits. It was honourable Civil society engagement also needs to to be ideologically opposed to government be broadened while still remaining focused. and dishonourable to be supportive. Given Government should not be the only object their ‘upbringing’, such CSOs might find of its attentions. There is considerable it difficult to open lines of communication unharnessed scope for working with the with Government, but there is no viable private sector where it is supportive of a alternative. Moreover, it is not necessary specific issue. In fact, it should be feasible to to become a lapdog in order to agree with have issue-based policy communities com- ZANU-PF on certain national policies that prising government, civil society, private are of national interest, for example land sector and other cognate partners.

25 Conclusions: Is the Glass Half Full about the ruling party. This myth exploded or Half Empty? during the GNU period, a situation that placed CSOs in a highly invidious and often The paper ends on a subdued yet neverthe- embarrassing position when the MDC less optimistic note. By the standards of proved ‘too ZANU-PF’ in its conduct. In most other African countries except South both contexts, CSOs acted without a critical Africa, Zimbabwe’s civil society is robust. It mass of civic-minded citizens. It also chose is a heterogeneous community, thematically the narrow, easier and short-term strategy spread across the spectrum of humanitar- of developing voters rather than taking the ian charities and CBOs to developmental broader, more arduous and long-term goal NGOs and governance-oriented civic asso- of cultivating a citizenry that could then ciations. Granted, after the shock of the engage – together with others and perhaps July 2013 elections, civil society is pres- under CSO leadership – with the long-term ently disoriented, fragmented and feeling democratising project. degraded. It is battling to find its place in a Happily, civil society has recognised the context where its long-time strategic part- need for a new way of doing things and is ner – the MDC – is almost on its knees and re-strategising with a view to undertak- battling serious internal convulsions. These ing broader re-engagement, vertically and two pillars – civic society and the opposi- also horizontally, with other CSOs. In tion movement – are at the weakest they doing so, civil society will become part of have been since the late 1990s, though the the dynamic and comprehensive transition former is gradually showing signs of recov- unfolding in Zimbabwe, one which seems ery and, after deep introspection, seem to to portend the end of an old order and the be finding a new path out of the woods. birth of new era. In this process, a reconfig- From the 1990s onward, civil society has ured civil society has a salutary role to play had to operate in a harsh authoritarian state. and a stock of lessons learnt that it can use Although it fought valiantly, it misdirected to guide its future programming. It is on itself – or was misdirected – into thinking it this basis that this paper concludes that the could democratise the country from above, glass is half full. and on its own, by targeting the repressive regime and taking the stance that the more References confrontational and uncompromising it Afrobarometer, Rounds 1 to 5 (1999–2012). Data was, the more effective it would be. It also available at: www.afrobarometer.org/results/ misdirected itself in another important results-by-country-n-z/zimbabwe. Accessed sense, namely by choosing to be embedded 15 July 2014. with the opposition as if there was some- Bratton, Michael (ed.). 2013. Voting and Demo- thing inherently saintly about opposition cratic Citizenship in Africa. Boulder, CO, and parties and something intrinsically evil London: Lynne Rienner.

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