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The Relationship Between Ethical Justice & Practical Wisdom Ciência e Natura ISSN: 0100-8307 [email protected] Universidade Federal de Santa Maria Brasil Seyyed Ghoreyshi, Marieh; Nazhat, Ibrahim; Rezaee, Ghodratallah The Relationship between Ethical Justice & Practical Wisdom: Aristotle's and Ghazali's Viewpoints Ciência e Natura, vol. 37, núm. 6-1, 2015, pp. 437-444 Universidade Federal de Santa Maria Santa Maria, Brasil Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=467547682051 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative 437 Ciência e Natura, Santa Maria, v. 37 Part 1 2015, p. 437−444 ISSN impressa: 0100-8307 ISSN on-line: 2179-460X The Relationship between Ethical Justice & Practical Wisdom: Aristotle's and Ghazali's Viewpoints Marieh Seyyed Ghoreyshi1, Ibrahim Nazhat2, Ghodratallah Rezaee3 1Assistant Professor of Tehran University 2Assistant Professor of Tehran University 3 PhD student in Education Teaching of Tehran University Abstract The theory of justice is one of crucial principles of philosophical and rational principles in all Greek philosophical schools and then in Islamic morality and ethics. A large number of morality philosophers and exegetes use different concepts of justice interchangeably. They do not make any distinction between justice as a perfect virtue and justice as a component of virtues because they mix the true mediocrity with mediocrity of actions. Aristotle and Ghazali are of philosophers who concentrated on this crucial mixture. This study initially analyzes Aristotle's and Ghazali's mediocrity. Then, it highlights the practical wisdom status and examines justice as a perfect virtue from these scholars' viewpoints. Finally, ethical justice and practical wisdom identicality is evaluated. Keywords: Justice, practical wisdom, virtue, mediocrity, Aristotle, Ghazali. 438 1 The Study Significance: habits. There are three components in self: emotions (passions), powers (talents), and Justice is one of essentially crucial concepts for habits. The virtue is inevitably derived from personal and cumulative prosperity. It is one one of these components; nevertheless, of the most fundamental concepts in Aristotle's assumption underpins that virtues intellectual and philosophical ethics. Most and villainess are not likely based on passions ethics theories and schools attempt to examine and powers as regards ambiguous nature this concept theoretically and practically and (ibid: 1106a). Accordingly, virtues and attribute themselves to it. Equality theories are villainess are habits which are in turn observed in nearly all Greek philosophical sustainable manners of human self and are schools and then in Islamic ethics resulted from accurate and moderate philosophies. A large number of Islamic conducts. Aristotle inserts that no person is the scientists accept this viewpoint by doing holder of a virtue by doing it. Rather, that different analyses. Concept of equality person should display behavior patterns in conveys particular complexity. Accordingly, compliance with the virtue. some ethics philosophers and their exegetes mix different concepts of equality: Equality as After the virtue nature is highlighted in terms the true mediocrity and equality as a practical of nature, one question should be answered: rule & equality as a universal virtuosity and What a type of habits are virtues? As Aristotle equality as some components of virtues. These points out, the virtue is in mediocre level. mixtures are required to be accounted for Macintyre (1988:65), one of Western exegesis properly. As ethics and morality systems are of Aristotle ethics accepts that mediocrity is initially explained by accounting for the the only difficult concept of ethics. What does related concepts accurately, this study Aristotle mean by mediocrity? He introduces attempts to examine Aristotelian virtue ethics two types of mediocrity: Mediocrity as a truly and mediocrity and Ghazali's and Aristotle's virtue and mediocrity as a practical rule. practical wisdom, given that the true mediocrity differs from mediocrity of actions. Also, Ghazali's and Aristotle's equality and 2 The True Mediocrity: practical wisdom are evaluated. Specifically, a comparison is made between equality as a Prior to the analysis of this issue, virtue universal virtue and equality as a social typology is divided as follows in accordance performance by studying Aristotle's with Aristotle's division of human power. Nicomachus and Ghazali's Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn Accordingly, virtues are divided into andMizanal-amal. intellectual virtues and ethical virtues. Humans have two powers: (1) Power of reason (orator), and (2) power of non-reason (non- Aristotle's the theory of justice: orator). The latter has two dimensions: (I) vegetal self and animal self including wills As the virtue concept is directly interrelated and desires i.e. lusts and wrath. The vegetal with this theory properties and Aristotle self has no shared property with intellectual defines morality in terms of virtuosity (Crisp, dimension. Animal self is associated with p.622), this study initially analyzes this power of reason. He hears ration rule and concept. Aristotle describes virtuosity as observes it. Oratory virtues are called follows: A mediocre choice criterion in intellectual virtues, including speculative accordance with wisdom or scholars' wisdom and practical wisdom. The non- discretion (Aristotle, 1999: 1107a). He oratory power such as braveness, modesty, introduces habit and mediocre for referring to generosity, etc. is known as ethical virtue unclear essence of virtue (the ambiguous (Aristotle, 1999: 1103a). nature) and its typology (the acquired nature). Aristotle believes that virtue is derived from 439 The most excellent intellectual virtue is Accordingly, the virtue is a true mediocrity for speculative wisdom, which occurs in the reaching practical wisdom level without any reflection life. The other intellectual virtue is extremes. It is a sensual perfection, which is practical wisdom, which makes contribution created in humans as a subsidiary nature. This to accurate decisions in cases of varied minor concept of mediocrity is an absolute virtue and behaviors. This virtue is the ultimate a firm perfection. Therefore, the practical perfection of the practical wisdom (ibid: wisdom is a true mediocrity in terms of 1140b). acquired essence. One question arises here: How can humans determine their ethical and According to Aristotle, virtues are clear moral behavior in varied conditions for mediocre choice habits, which are determined reaching ethical virtues and perfect virtues (i.e. at the discretion of mind (bid: 1107a), because practical wisdom) without any practical the practical wisdom determines the wisdom and an awareness of equality? mediocrity and makes distinctions between Aristotle attempts to introduce a method for virtues and villainess. The mediocrity is determining virtues and villainess in actions sometimes determined by the subject i.e. an and emotions by describing a proper mediocre informed practical person and sometimes by rational rule. practical sages. In accordance with Aristotle's definition of virtue, the virtue is based on the practical 3 Mediocrity as a Practical Rule: wisdom and is a type of mediocrity in terms of essence and nature. In the other words, it is Since ethical virtues are associated with always affected by an intermediate level and actions and emotions, which in turn contain can precisely identify our mediocrity in varied three manners i.e. the highest extreme, the minor cases and choose an adequately lowest extreme, and mediocrity, the virtue is mediocre behavior. Therefore, it is important gained in a mediocre level. Aristotle believes to reach a mediocre level and identify that any value for helping humans gain adequately mediocre behavior patterns, no prosperity is transformed into anti-value by matter whether we ourselves possess this following extremes. The mediocrity avoids practical wisdom or imitate practical sages. removal of these values and virtues (ibid: 1106b). This mediocrity is defined in terms of As Aristotle points out, virtue (i.e. practical humans rather than objects. In the other wisdom) is a key factor for integrating words, this mediocrity is described in a intellectual virtues with ethical ones. Human relationship with us (ibid.). Accordingly, action is not completed unless practical reason Aristotle's mediocrity is much similar to the is associated with ethical virtues (ibid: 1144b). proportionality rather than identicality. It is Thus, ethical virtue is not the only determinant not equal to the geometric intermediate point of human prosperity. The practical wisdom between segments or the mathematical mean should also be taken into consideration for of two numbers. The extremes are discerned identifying properly virtuous conducts in by the mind without any standardization. For varied minor cases. Aristotle views the instance, somebody may be regarded as practical sage as a moderate human who talkative by speaking during 2 minutes while possesses an integrated virtue called practical the other person may be viewed a moderate wisdom, apparently or not. This virtue speaker in a 10-hour dialogue. This similarly contains all other virtues (ibid: 1145a). This occurs for actions and reactions. For example, person can discern braveness, generosity,
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