Imihigo: Decentralized Service Delivery in Rwanda, 2006-2010

THE PROMISE OF IMIHIGO: DECENTRALIZED SERVICE DELIVERY IN RWANDA, 2006-2010

SYNOPSIS In the wake of the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front inherited the remnants of a highly centralized state administration. For a number of years the government engaged in crisis management, attempting to meet the basic needs of a traumatized population. In 2000, in an effort to improve local service delivery, the RPF-led government began a program of decentralization. Under the new arrangement, mayors were responsible for implementing development programs. A chief concern for the central government was how to make mayors accountable. In response to this challenge, the government in 2006 launched an innovative system known as the imihigo process. Imihigo had its roots in a pre-colonial Rwandan cultural practice whereby leaders or warriors would publicly vow to achieve certain goals—and face public humiliation if they failed. The modern imihigo process linked this traditional Rwandan practice with planning, monitoring and oversight. By 2010, government officials believed that the imihigo process had resulted in improved service delivery in the districts.

Daniel Scher drafted this policy note with Christine MacAulay on the basis of interviews conducted in Rwanda in May 2010.

INTRODUCTION The president intervened and pointed out In March 2006, newly elected district that in Rwandan culture making bold claims mayors in Rwanda gathered in Murambi, a about accomplishments was no small matter. district just south of the capital, Kigali. At the He referred to the Rwandan traditional practice retreat they learned about their new of imihigo, a pre-colonial tradition whereby responsibilities and how their work in the warriors or leaders would publicly vow to districts fitted into the government’s national accomplish certain deeds. Failure to fulfill these development plans. President Paul Kagame promises would result in shame and addressed the mayors during an official embarrassment. Kagame challenged the mayors induction ceremony. One mayor from a district to come up with imihigo for their districts that in the Eastern Province, buoyant with his he would then follow up upon later in the success in the district’s first elections, shouted mayors’ terms. He assembled a small team from out to those assembled that his district was the Ministry of Local Administration to going to be the best performing district in the consider ways to integrate the practice of country. Another mayor quickly countered, imihigo into a comprehensive performance- saying that his was going to outperform the rest. management strategy for all district mayors.

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The technical committee, chaired by Népo oppression, occurred and thousands fled into Rugemintwaza, the director general of exile in neighboring countries. Sporadic attacks Territorial Administration at the time, set about against Tutsi continued for the next 30 years, developing a system that would transpose a with waves of exiles arriving in Uganda, traditional Rwandan cultural practice into a tool Tanzania, Burundi and other countries. A rebel for a modern public service. Rugemintwaza and movement, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, his colleagues, including the highly respected emerged among these exiles. The RPF launched minister of Local Administration at the time, an invasion in the late 1980s aimed at Protais Musoni, created a system that was overthrowing the Hutu dictator, Juvénal ambitious in both style and scope. By 2010, Habyarimana. Fighting between the RPF and imihigo had come to refer to a combined government troops continued throughout the performance-management system, planning 1990s. In April 1994, Habyarimana was tool, multi-layered oversight mechanism, and assassinated, and Hutu hardliners promoting a way of using social and traditional pressure to vicious brand of ethnic racism known as Hutu push mayors to greater levels of achievement. Power seized control. For 100 days, these Governors, some ministries and other hardliners directed an orchestrated genocide government units also signed imihigo. The against Tutsis, as well as Hutu moderates, killing government had also moved to introduce an an estimated 800,000 people. imihigo process for other levels of government. The RPF’s capture of the capital city of This memo concentrates on the imihigo Kigali in July 1994 and its consolidation of process for district mayors because this control throughout the country ended the application was the initial template and was the genocide. The RPF promoted non-ethnic most developed. Performance-management Rwandan nationalism and outlawed language or systems in the civil service in countries around actions that could promote ethnic tension and the world are often ignored or resented. In sectarianism. After 1994 the post-conflict Rwanda, there was compelling evidence in 2010 government sought to rebuild state institutions. that both mayors and their evaluators took When the RPF took over the government in imihigo commitments seriously. 1994, it inherited the tattered remnants of a highly centralized state administration. In the CONTEXT wake of the genocide, the RPF did what it could At the time of the first imihigo cycle, to reestablish state services, in many cases Rwanda had a population of about 10 million. modeling administration on either the structures In 2010, on a list of 227 countries ranked by per that had preceded them or on RPF party capita gross domestic product compiled by the structures. The needs of the post-genocide U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s World Rwandan state were so urgent and in many Factbook, Rwanda came in at 216th, just below cases so basic that there was little time to Sierra Leone and a few notches above consider long-term matters. However, in 1997 Afghanistan. Ethnic tensions between Hutu and 1998, leaders organized a series of Rwandans and Tutsi Rwandans have played a consultations about the government. Attendees significant role in politics of the contemporary included everyone from ordinary citizens to Rwandan state. When Rwanda gained those at the highest levels of government. An independence in 1962, a Hutu faction came to official decentralization document from the power. A widespread backlash against Tutsi, Ministry of Local Administration noted, “In who were viewed as agents of colonial those country-wide consultations, the citizens

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showed a remarkable desire to have a voice in at the local level had been manipulated and the affairs of the state. The decentralization misled by local leaders into participating in the policy is an answer to that call.” genocide. Ordinary citizens had no effective Musoni, cabinet minister and former way to exert influence over local leaders or permanent secretary of the Ministry of Local check their behavior. Decentralization was a Administration, noted in a paper on way of addressing the needs of citizens more decentralization in Rwanda that the process directly, while also making local leaders more represented a way to rebuild trust, give local accountable by giving ordinary citizens a greater people greater voice in governance processes, role in policy formulation and evaluation. increase transparency and maintain political In 2000, the government passed a National stability—all of which were vital in post- Decentralization Policy that presented a vision genocide Rwanda. In the new decentralized for a decentralized government centered on the state administration, local authorities would be concepts of good governance, service delivery the implementers of plans and policies drawn for the poor and sustainable development. The up at the national level. The national decentralization vision articulated by the government would play a smaller role in government had an explicit aim to “put people implementation and a larger role in planning at the center of service delivery” and improve and evaluation. the government’s effectiveness and There were two key reasons for this responsiveness in delivering services, according decision. First, those high up in the to a 2006 government report on making administration were concerned that they were decentralized service delivery work. out of touch with the demands and needs of The first phase of decentralization began in ordinary citizens. Alexis Dukundane, former 2004. The RPF had inherited a state system head of the Directorate for Community made up of 154 districts. By 2004, as part of the Development and Cooperatives at the Ministry National Decentralization Policy, the of Local Government, recalled that they were government had reduced the number of districts concerned that “the thinking you have at the to 30, grouped into six provinces. These new, national level is not the real thinking of the larger districts had more staff, and the resized people.” Many of the new government officials territories were easier to administer. During this were exiles who had never lived in Rwanda. phase of decentralization, mayors were Charles Munyaneza, former director general of appointed in the districts by the RPF-dominated Territorial Administration in the Ministry of central government. This was seen as a Local Administration, recalled, “Sometimes temporary situation, and the decentralization some of us might have had some implementation secretariat made plans to shift misconceptions. … I was a director in the to a system of direct election of mayors. At the Ministry of Local Government, but had not time, a government-wide initiative focused on lived in Rwanda … so I couldn't assume, staffing new posts with competent people, although I was a director, to know the realities raising salaries and attracting recent university on the ground. I would have deceived myself. graduates to technocratic positions in the … Most of us in the government shared this districts. problem. We had either read about Rwanda or By 2006, the groundwork was laid for the we had seen Rwanda, only for not many years.” districts to deliver services in alignment with Secondly, many in the RPF felt that citizens national goals. As Munyaneza put it, planners

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had created “viable administrative entities that Definitions varied on what constituted a can easily deliver services to the people.” traditional imihigo. Some suggested that it was simply a vow, usually made in public. Others THE CHALLENGE recalled it as having a basis in war, where Fred Mufulukye, director general of warriors would throw a spear into the ground Territorial Administration and Good while publicly proclaiming the feats they would Governance, recalled that officials at the accomplish in battle. All agreed that the implementation secretariat and the Ministry of consequences were serious for those who failed Local Administration were still concerned in to fulfill an imihigo. Dukundane put it simply 2006 with figuring out how to ensure that the when he said such a person would be districts delivered on the government’s considered an “incapable person,” a humiliating development programs. Their decentralization label that was anathema to Rwandans. goals, which saw the central government as Government reports suggested that planner and facilitator, relied heavily on the because the practice of imihigo was tradition- ability of the districts to actually implement the based, familiar and well understood, the concept projects they were assigned. generated enthusiasm and a sense of ownership Munyaneza recalled that while officials among the population. Dukundane recalled: were not specifically thinking about imihigo, “People wouldn’t understand if you talk about “What people had in mind was accountability performance contracts, but if you say imihigo, and performance and delivery. That’s what they understand.” people had in mind: to create institutions and to Musoni, former permanent secretary of the have leaders who would be accountable, who Ministry of Local Administration, noted that would deliver, and who would be responsible. imihigo targets should be aspirational. “You are … The issue of imihigo came as a way of not going to be acclaimed for doing what implementing that or achieving that anyone else has done or could do,” he said. “An philosophical understanding.” imihigo is supposed to be a stretching of the Desire Nyandwi, a member of Parliament abilities of both the leader and the people.” To and former secretary-general of the RPF, said, ensure appropriate goals as well as effective “If you work, there’s got to be a target. … follow-through, the civil service’s imihigo [Imihigo] creates an incentive for bureaucrats to system incorporated specific measures for get things done and not just sit in their offices planning, monitoring and evaluation, and with their arms crossed.” accountability.

Planning GETTING DOWN TO WORK The planning process, which included In addition to imihigo, Rwanda drew on a meetings at every level of government, gave number of other traditional practices to bolster central agencies and district governments a its decentralization efforts at the local level. chance to negotiate targets. The procedure These included gacaca, a traditional form of aimed to make targets measurable and dispute resolution in the justice system; achievable, and allowed the central government umuganda, or monthly community work projects to keep tabs on districts throughout Rwanda. such as planting trees and repairing bridges and A series of national plans guided the country’s roads; and ubudehe, or participatory planning and development priorities. The two main plans that budgeting at the village level. framed the work of the national government

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were Vision 2020, which outlined the broad the districts to have a clear idea of goals and development goals of the government, and the limitations. At these meetings, known as the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Forum of Central and Local Government, the Strategy. Development at the district level was districts were made aware of central- governed by another set of plans that were government priorities as well as budgetary designed to dovetail with the national plans constraints that might affect their planning. while taking into account local needs. Local For example, Ministry of Education demands were obtained by talking with representatives would inform the districts of the members of the various levels of community money and resources available to build schools councils that operated in the districts. Key or hire teachers. among the district plans in 2010 were five-year Most development activities in the district district development plans covering 2007 to were funded by the central government, using 2012. Based on these five-year plans, district budgets developed in the ministries but mayors developed three-year plans and, last, disbursed directly from the treasury. Districts annual action plans. did have the ability to collect certain taxes: Annual action plans were key documents in property tax, for which they set the rates, the preparation of an imihigo because they business trading licenses, and rental tax. Even contained all the activities that the mayor and though the districts had the legal authority to his staff pledged to complete during the year. raise funds on their own, tax collection on a These included rote administrative tasks such as local basis was a struggle. For this reason, the preparing budgets, hiring staff, completing districts were financially dependent on central paperwork and reports. From the annual action budget allocations and the annual central/local plan, mayors selected the substantive activities meetings were critical in the planning process that were going to have the most influence on and in the production of realistic imihigo. the government’s three priority areas, known as The district executive committees also set the three pillars: economic development, social up and met with a Joint Action Development welfare and governance. Activities included Forum (JADF). The JADF brought together all building schools, equipping health centers, agencies that were doing development work in building marketplaces, paving roads, building the district, including national and international bridges and electrifying villages, as well as one- nongovernmental organizations and civil-society time activities such as building a genocide groups. The purpose of these meetings was to memorial or resettling villagers who lived in eliminate any overlap between the work of the areas at risk from landslides or floods. government and the work of other agencies in Before finalizing annual action plans and the area. These meetings were formal and imihigo targets, district mayors engaged in an included full written minutes. The minutes extensive process of consultation. The district provided a record that aided district executive executive structure consisted of the mayor, a committees in monitoring the work being vice mayor for social welfare, a vice mayor for carried out in their districts by other agencies. It economic development and an executive also provided a mechanism for holding NGOs secretary. Together, they constituted the district and international actors accountable. executive committee. District executive committees also held Once a year all district executive extensive consultations with various local-level committees met with representatives from the councils, which wielded significant authority in central government’s line ministries in order for the districts. Each district was divided into

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sectors, and each sector into cells. Each cell was Rwanda are on volcanic plates and prone to subdivided into a number of villages, each of flooding and landslides). which was made up of about 10 households. But resettlement of people involved a Committees were elected at every level, and number of imihigo targets, such as building new representatives from each sub-level were sent to houses, new schools and new health centers for the level above. For example, each village the affected community. In this case, the mayor committee, made up of the heads of the 10 might commit one year to resettling the villagers households in the village, put forward a into basic accommodations in a new area, and representative to sit on the cell committee. Each the following year he would commit to building cell committee in turn put forward a more facilities and amenities. Although this representative to sit on the sector-level step-by-step process was not ideal for the committee, and so on, up to the district council. resettled population, it reflected the limitations Individuals who sat on these councils were not of both resources and capacity in a poor full-time administrators but rather were country. respected members of the community who did At the end of the consultation process, this in addition to their regular jobs. The district having settled upon an imihigo and executive committees sought input from all measurement metrics, district mayors publicly these levels, and the draft imihigo were signed their imihigo with President Kagame. presented to the district councils for approval. The ceremonies were widely publicized on Upon receiving approval from the district Rwandan television and radio, and the imihigo council, an imihigo document would be sent to documents were made public on district a team known as the Quality Assurance websites and in the local press so that citizens in Technical Team, made up of representatives the districts knew exactly what their leaders had from the Ministry of Local Administration and committed to. Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance. The quality-assurance team vetted the imihigo Monitoring and evaluation document for feasibility and, if necessary, made Monitoring and evaluation ensured that suggestions on how the targets could be central-government scrutiny continued between improved. the planning and accountability stages. District Throughout the process, imihigo targets executive committees were required to keep were linked to metrics that would be used to accurate records of activities and expenditures. measure success or failure. For example, a Halfway through the fiscal year they prepared a district might commit to plant a million trees. detailed report for the central government on The number of trees planted in the district by the progress they had made toward achieving the end of the year would determine the their imihigo targets. Initially, the district mayors percentage of the activity completed. Similarly, were required to submit quarterly progress if a mayor committed to building a number of reports, but the requirement was scaled back schools, the imihigo score would be based on because it was too time-consuming. the number of schools that were actually built. The district council monitored progress Some more complicated projects could be throughout the year, as did the governor of the spread over a number of years. For example, a relevant province. At the end of the fiscal year, mayor may have committed to resettling two teams were assembled, each with a villagers living in a high-risk area. (Parts of representative from the Ministry of Local

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Administration, the prime minister’s office, the found in the paperwork. The team would economic planning and finance ministry, the consider any difficulties the mayor may have Rwandan Association of Local Government encountered while attempting to implement Authorities, the implementation secretariat and programs. The team then would present the an umbrella civil-society group called the Civil mayor with a list outlining the particular imihigo Society Forum. Each team was responsible for targets that the evaluation team decided to spot- 15 of the districts, visiting each district for two check. This would be the first notification the days. mayor had of the particular activities that would Leonard Rugwabiza, the director general of be checked. A sample list for a day could Planning and Research in the economic include the local land registry, the district police planning and finance ministry, noted that in crime statistics office, a genocide memorial, new 2010 the teams were made up of very high-level school buildings, resettlement sites for villagers individuals, including directors-general. in high-risk areas, health centers, community Rugwabiza remarked that it could be quite centers, or electrification projects. The difficult for the central government to have evaluation team would base its assessment not high-level, skilled staff spending a month out of only on the progress of the projects but also on their offices at a time. However, he and others the accuracy and completeness of the executive emphasized that it was vitally important to committee’s report on imihigo progress. stress the seriousness of the evaluation process. The evaluation scores made by the teams The presence of high-level government officials were based on the completeness of imihigo ensured that mayors treated the teams’ visits activities. For example, an activity that was with the appropriate degree of respect and 90%-100% complete would be graded a score preparation. This strategy seemed to work, of 10; 80%-89% would be scored a 9; 70%- according to one vice mayor. “We get really 79%, an 8; and so on. These scores were part of nervous for these evaluations,” he said. a weighted final overall score based on a A typical two-day evaluation would begin formula that assigned 60% to economic with the team in the district head office, activities, 30% to social-welfare activities, and auditing the district’s paperwork. These audits 10% to governance activities. could continue into the night, and involved Mufulukye, the director general of sifting through piles of reports and paperwork. Territorial Administration, said the relatively A vice mayor gave an example: “If we report small percentage allotted to governance that we have held a meeting of the JADF, they reflected the belief that good governance was an will want to see minutes from the meeting, a list inherent part of the other activities. To of who attended, a list of what decisions were successfully complete a project that contributed taken, and a report on the outcomes of the to economic development, effective strategic meeting,” he said. (The executive committee governance was essential, he said. was responsible for collecting information and Using the weighted score, districts were reporting progress on the implementation of assigned “traffic light” ratings. Green indicated imihigo targets and activities, and the evaluation 90%-100% of activities had been completed teams paid special attention to these reports.) satisfactorily. Yellow indicated that 50%-89% of On the second day, the evaluation team activities were completed. Red indicated that would meet with the executive committee, fewer than half of activities had been giving the committee a chance to explain any completed. discrepancies or problems the team may have

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In their scoring, the evaluation teams significant achievements of the system was the commented on the reasons for any failure fostering of competition between districts. ratings. The teams also provided “Now districts—both citizens and mayors— recommendations on how any failures could be want to compete and want to be best,” he said. addressed in the future, with particular emphasis “This competition drives development.” As on how they should be carried forward into the related by Leonard Rugwabiza at the economic next year’s imihigo. These final reports were planning and finance ministry, high-performing then publicly disseminated through the districts, districts could receive special funding for on websites run by the Ministry of Local projects. Administration and the economic planning and Because the rankings were presented at finance ministry, district councils, the JADF and public forums, citizens had simple information other forums. to judge the performance of their elected Final reports were officially presented to mayors. If a mayor was consistently the mayors at a ceremony with the president, underperforming, he could be removed by the the same ceremony where the mayors signed District Council. Under the laws governing their new imihigo. The end of one annual decentralization, the District Council, made up imihigo cycle thus also marked the beginning of of indirectly elected, non-paid a new one. members, had exclusive authority to dismiss a district mayor. If the mayor was removed before Accountability his term was up, a by-election was necessary in While the technical grading and weighted the district. scores were an important part of the process, According to one observer, 75% of mayors highly anticipated district rankings were more were removed from their positions between significant. Districts were ranked based on their 2007 and 2009. It was unclear how many were imihigo performance, both within their removed for imihigo-related reasons. Enige respective provinces and within Rwanda as a Rugamba, the director general of planning at the whole. This simple system translated the Ministry of Local Administration, stressed that complicated scoring and percentage weighting the high turnover of mayors must be viewed in calculations into a metric that was easily the context of other developments in understood by most of the population. governance in Rwanda during the period. A high-profile tour of all the provinces by General oversight had been increased, with the the prime minister, with a special emphasis on strengthening of the auditor-general’s office, the the rankings, drew even more attention to the Ombuds office that investigates cases of performance of the districts. Because districts maladministration, and the Public Procurement were rated on the basis of their individual Agency. Many mayors had been ousted, and in baselines, richer provinces had no edge over some cases jailed, due to corruption and poorer ones in terms of performance. In fact, irregularities in procedures. Rugamba and many government officials were eager to point others, such as Rugwabiza at the economic out that poorer provinces were in fact the high planning and finance ministry, saw the turnover performers. rate as an initial spike as people became A high ranking translated into bragging accustomed to new standards and procedures rights for district mayors and the governors in and increased scrutiny. Mufulukye added that he the districts. Mufulukye, the director general of attributed mayoral turnover to accountability Territorial Administration, said that one of the issues generally, of which imihigo was a part,

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and that separating the causes was difficult. For imihigo were feasible and that the mayors were example, the increased scrutiny of the imihigo able to plan better as they became familiar with process may have resulted in the exposure of a the system. Mushinzimana noted that both corrupt mayor and his subsequent removal. central and local governments were “engaged in Thus while his removal was not for failing to deep reflection on how to design realistic meet imihigo targets, it was instigated by a plans.” component of the imihigo system. The system did have critics. Frank Habineza, chairman of the opposition ASSESSING RESULTS Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, drew a Although government officials insisted in sharp distinction between decentralization and 2010 that the imihigo process had resulted in deconcentration. He believed that institutions better service delivery in the districts, no may have been decentralized, but that decision comprehensive data were available. Rugwabiza, making and planning were still very much a Mufulukye and Rugamba were careful to stress central-government activity and not as localized that the system was not perfect and that they as the process might appear. were constantly working to streamline it. Habineza said the government lacked the Apollinaire Mushinzimana, coordinator of the capacity to truly monitor performance in the decentralization implementation secretariat, districts and “swallowed whole what the mayors noted that the system had created “a strong say.” However, a tour of the Nyabihu district perception from local government that the with the central-government evaluation team central government is looking at us.” demonstrated a genuine evaluation process that Rugwabiza, of the economic planning and was taken seriously by both the district finance ministry, recounted a story he had heard executive committee and the evaluation team. circulating about the pressures of scrutiny as a In 2010, the success of district councils mayor: “People were saying, you know, when also was unclear. The idea behind vesting so you're the mayor you’ve got a contract of one- much authority in an indirectly elected local day renewable. So it means that every day you committee was that such a group would be in can leave. Every 24 hours you can be removed.” touch with local demands and wield significant Munyaneza, who in 2010 was serving as chief oversight powers. However, these committees electoral commissioner, said that whenever he were voluntary, and some members failed to had to organize a by-election for a district attend the council’s quarterly meetings. Some mayor who had been ousted due to poor members of district councils in rural areas performance he saw it as a vindication of his worked in Kigali and so might have been as out earlier work on decentralization and the of touch with local priorities as central- decentralization team’s emphasis on government officials. Also, some members of accountability. district councils were employed by local Mushinzimana noted that in 2006 district governments, for example, as teachers. Because mayors inherited newly structured districts and a schools were dependent on allocations from raft of new responsibilities. The imihigo process mayors, providing real oversight might be gave these mayors a place to start and a way to problematic. structure their work. Initially, some of their The system’s strong requirements for plans were overly ambitious, but both Rugamba planning, monitoring and reporting placed and Mufulukye emphasized that they worked heavy burdens on government at both the local closely with the mayors to ensure that their and national levels. Rugwabiza of the economic

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planning and finance ministry said he expected “preliminary results show us great general the monitoring burden to ease as the system performance, especially in: education became a part of standard procedures. Planning (construction of [a new system of] nine-year was aided by the establishment in 2010 of fully basic education), health (health insurance staffed planning offices in each ministry and the coverage above 90% nationwide, construction addition of a planning officer in each district. of health centers, etc.), road construction, high agriculture production through land REFLECTIONS consolidation, environmental protection and While statistics on service delivery before governance.” and after the introduction of imihigo were not Despite criticisms, the ambitious imihigo available in 2010, anecdotal accounts suggested process in 2010 appeared to be delivering on improvement. A 2010 U.S. Agency for much-needed development targets in Rwanda’s International Development report on family districts. The system’s sustainability, particularly planning in Rwanda asserted that the inclusion in terms of the pressure placed on district of family-planning issues in the imihigo for the mayors, remained to be seen. district of Nyamagabe more than doubled the While Rwanda is nominally democratic, its adoption rate for modern contraception, to government is dominated by a single party 18.4% from 7.2%, between 2006 and 2007. whose interests are closely aligned with national Protais development and the goals of the central Musoni, in his paper on decentralized government. Because of this, some observers service delivery, noted that the introduction of have presumed that parallel RPF party imihigo had resulted in fewer administrative structures exist at all levels of government. In conflicts in the local government from 2006 to any event, an extremely well-organized party 2007 and in improvements in local development structure is able to step in and enforce central projects, such as malaria eradication and tree priorities whenever the official system of planting. government struggles. Some observers have Finally, Fred Mufulukye, director general of suggested that this may account for some of the Territorial Administration, observed that apparent success of the imihigo process.

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