Politeiai and Reputation in Plato’s Thought Andreas Avgousti Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2015 © 2015 Andreas Avgousti All rights reserved ABSTRACT Politeiai and Reputation in Plato’s Thought Andreas Avgousti Despite the fact that reputation is a feature of Plato’s work and context, scholars have scarcely addressed the place of reputation in Plato’s thought. Herein I ask: ‘what is reputation (doxa) for Plato?’ and provide an answer by turning to the political orders (politeiai) described in the Republic, Laws, and Menexenus. In Chapter 1 I demonstrate the horizontal relationships of mutual dependence between rulers and ruled in the politeia of the Republic. It is in the epistemic configuration of the ruled where the economy of reputation is sourced and distributed. I argue that, first, the text explicitly engages with and seeks to correct the common opinions about justice and its relationship to political power and, second, that the philosopher must care about how philosophy appears to the city at large. I end with a consideration of how the Republic attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of philosophy. The images of the cave, the ship, and the bride show how and why philosophy’s bad reputation is contingent rather than necessary. In Chapter 2 I establish the role of reputation in the circumstances described and enacted in the founding of Magnesia, the politeia of the Laws. Through its exhortation to the incoming Dorian colonists to pursue a reputation for virtue, the law code exercises normative force over the disposition of human nature to excessive self-love and also transforms the colonists into Magnesian citizens. The legislator, voiced by the Athenian Stranger who is the principal interlocutor in the dialogue, urges each individual to appear as they are, and reinvents the undesirable features of Dorian constitutions. If this politeia is to come about, its founder and interlocutor in the dialogue, Cleinias the Cnossian, must become a Magnesian; the Athenian must succeed in exhorting the ambivalent Cleinias to seek a good reputation among the future Magnesians. In Chapter 3 I turn to how Magnesia is maintained. This politeia suffers from, and has to cope with, the pathologies of agonism. It does so via the operation of the social mechanisms of praise and blame that the law code sets forth and the citizens act out. The institutional practices such as the daily athletic contests encourage Magnesians to become similar in judgment and, therefore, to correctly distribute political honors and offices. I go on to argue that the city’s foreign policy aims at peace and at deterring aggressors. Such a policy is conducive to a more stable interpolis environment, which, in turn, maintains Magnesia. In Chapter 4 I argue that the vision of the politeia found in the Menexenus is best understood as an intergenerational multitude. Reputation is key to reconstituting order in these intergenerational relationships. In a dialogue that contains a funeral oration written by Aspasia and delivered by Socrates to the young Menexenus, reputation is a defining characteristic of the politeia with the multitude being the source of reputational judgments. Reputation also operates remedially at a critical juncture in the life of the city. I show the explanatory power of these claims by considering Aspasia’s role in the dialogue. I propose the Socrates-Aspasia fusion, a device that is symbolic of the correct understanding of what constitutes a good reputation in a politeia: men and women, citizens and non-citizens, locals and foreigners. As a device, the fusion functions to block a reputation from accruing to the orator. This brings into focus the dialogue’s explicit argumentative target: the Athenian orator-general Pericles. According to Plato, reputation is a permanent source of instability for politeiai; yet, not only can this disruption be mitigated, but reputation also acts as a boon to political affairs. Reputation is a liminal space between the subjective and objective and as such is under the sway of the multitude. Therefore, reputation is both an explanatory and political concept. With an eye to future research, I conclude with a critical discussion of the findings of the dissertation. ! Table of Contents Acknowledgements p.ii Dedication p.v Introduction p.1 Why Plato? Why Reputation? Chapter 1 p.26 The Economy of Reputation in Plato’s Republic Chapter 2 p.66 Reputation and the Challenge of Founding the Politeia of Plato’s Laws Chapter 3 p.101 Reputation in the Agonistic City: Maintaining the Politeia of Plato’s Laws Chapter 4 p.148 An Intergenerational Politeia: Reputation in Plato’s Menexenus Conclusion p.184 Theorizing Reputation Bibliography p.197 i Acknowledgements First and foremost I thank my sponsor in Political Science, David Johnston, and co-sponsor, Melissa Schwartzberg (now at the Politics Department at NYU). David and Melissa allowed me to find my way to this topic, and directed this dissertation in an effective and unobtrusive manner. David’s clarity of mind and Melissa’s sharpness made the final product something of which I could be proud. Absent the mentorship of Katja Vogt, I would have not written this dissertation on Plato. Upon my arrival at Columbia’s Political Science Department, Katja made me feel equally at home in the Philosophy Department; this made the distinction between political theory and political philosophy a distinction without a difference. My relationship with Susan Meyer was unplanned but nevertheless formative: her welcome to the Philosophy Department at the University of Pennsylvania in 2012, her consistent congeniality, and her encouragement to work on the Laws. I thank Nadia Urbinati for her goodwill to chair my defense committee, for the opportunities she provided during my time in graduate school, but mostly I thank her for her contagious enthusiasm for the history of political thought. I also thank Robert Jervis for chairing my dissertation proposal committee. Finally, for their good humor and for their unfailing presence both in person and online, I thank the administrative team at Columbia Political Science Department. Part of the constitution of the dissertation as well as its final form came into being during my time as a Preceptor for Contemporary Civilization in the Core Curriculum at Columbia, the foundational text for which is Plato’s Republic. I would like to thank Matthew Jones and Roosevelt Montas for this opportunity, as well as my students from ii whom I continue to learn. At various and multiple points during my research I had the pleasure of being in conversation with the following scholars: Jill Frank, Andrew German, Jeffrey Green, Ayten Gündoğdu, Etienne Helmer, Melissa Lane, Rebecca LeMoine, Jennifer London, Nickolas Pappas, Joel Schlosser, and John Wallach. They openhandedly shared their expertise, taking time to read and comment on my work. Earlier drafts of these chapters were presented at APSA 2014, APT 2013, MPSA 2013, the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 2013 and 2014, and NPSA 2012, 2013, and 2014, WPSA 2012 and 2015. Conferences are often the first port of call for a young scholar and they did much to validate my own work. In this respect I should also thank the Society for Greek Political Thought, not least its former and current chairs, Leslie Rubin and Mark Lutz, respectively. Presenting my work at two homegrown workshops – one at Columbia in 2012 and another at UPenn in 2014 – made for comments that proved formative. I am grateful to my mother, Anthi, for her unconditional support; I witness but I do not understand what fortitude such support demands from a mother whose child lives on the other side of the world. I thank my father, Andreas, for his lively support during my years of tertiary education in London, New York, and Philadelphia. I am especially fortunate to have had the support of my parents-in-law, George and Ana Maria. I settled on this dissertation topic in the summer of 2011, that is to say, too late for my friend, Giancarlo Doria, to have known anything about it. Giancarlo’s indefatigability, intelligence, and generosity left an indelible mark on my time in graduate school; above all, Giancarlo lived for other people. I am glad to acknowledge the efforts of the Department of Political Science at Columbia to ensure that his memory lives on in iii the form of an essay award and a summer grant in his name; in this regard, Department Administrator Kay Achar, Business Manager Emily Prince, and Giancarlo’s adviser John Huber deserve special mention. I am proud to count Costantino Pischedda and Bjorn Wee Gomes among my closest friends. The innumerable lunches shared with Costa, were an oasis of sanity and hilarity alike; I would label these conversations a ‘gay science’, but I know Costa would object. Bjorn, however, would not. Bjorn did much to affect my understanding of political theory. A constant companion and a sincere friend, Bjorn is a treasure. In Philadelphia and at UPenn, I had the good fortune of encountering Jan Maximilian Robitzsch. Always a ready and openhearted interlocutor, Max did much to make Philadelphia home. Researching and writing a dissertation is a process that I have shared with Daphne. I did not expect to come to graduate school to find a partner for life, but I did. Daphne changed the story of my life and therefore my life itself: completing the Ph.D. program at Columbia is what I came to New York City to do, but to say that is to leave out the most important thing. I therefore dedicate this dissertation to her. iv For Daphne ‘My working week and my Sunday rest’ v ! Introduction Why Plato? Why Reputation?1 What is reputation (doxa) for Plato? Reputation is a permanent source of instability for political order (politeia).