Südosteuropa 63 (2015), no. 1, pp. 75-94
ThE RoManian PoliTiCal SySTEM afTER 1989
EMANUEL EMIL COMAN
Electoral Reform in Romania: From the Need for Party System Consolidation to Concern for Improved Quality of Representation
Abstract . This study looks at electoral reforms in Romania made since the end of the com- munist period. It identifies two broad periods of reform corresponding to two different types of pressures on the policy-makers . (1) In the 1990s, there was a need for party system consolidation, and this led to the adoption of a highly inclusive first electoral law, followed up by two increases in the electoral threshold . (2) In the 2000s, a vociferous movement de- manded more individual responsibility from parliamentary representatives . This led to the electoral reform of 2008, stipulating that candidates must run in single-member districts . The two different pressures outlined correspond to different stages of democracy and indicate a healthy evolution from the proto-democratic order of the 1990s, concerned with party system consolidation, to the more developed democratic order of the 2000s, when the public was concerned with the quality of representation and the power to unseat unresponsive MPs . In practice, however, as the academic literature shows, the 2008 reform has fallen short of its promises: the individual responsiveness encouraged by the reform seems instead to be leading to stronger political clientelism .
Emanuel Emil Coman is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations and a Tutor at Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford .
Introduction
In 2008 Romania undertook an electoral reform that changed the country’s method of voting from a classical closed-list proportional representation system to a system requiring all members of parliament to be elected in single-member districts. While this reform has received a lot of scholarly attention, little atten - tion has been given to the electoral arrangements before 2008 and the reasons behind them . This study is an excursus into the rules governing elections to the Romanian parliament in the post-communist period. The rules employed in the first two decades of democratic order are set out with explanations of why the policy- makers opted for them . I begin by explaining the rules established for the 76 Emanuel Emil Coman founding elections of 1990 and two significant changes in the electoral threshold that were adopted in the years that followed . I then focus on the major reform of 2008 and its implications for Romanian democracy . In the analysis of these electoral changes I identify two different types of concerns policy makers had to address, which strongly influenced the choices made – first in the 1990s and then in the 2000s. The concerns raised at these times pertained to two different effects electoral rules can have on political represen- tation: (1) the translation of votes into seats and the effects of this on the party system; (2) the ties between voters and members of parliament. Throughout the 1990s, policy makers responded primarily to domestic and international concerns for the stabilization and consolidation of the party system – a very legitimate concern in the first years of any new democracy.1 Accordingly, in 1990, they opted for a highly proportional system that allowed representation of the many parties and interests that had emerged in the aftermath of the fall of communism . Then, to reduce fragmentation in the system and to secure more efficient functioning of parliament, they twice increased the threshold of representation, first in 1992 and then in 2000. The 2008 reform, on the other hand, was a response to the voters’ demand to hold their representatives more accountable. As such, it is reflective of a different stage in the process of de - mocratization: concern for party system institutionalization (characteristic of every proto-democracy) had been replaced by a call to make elected officials accountable and thus improve the quality of representation . Judged from the perspective of established theories of electoral reform, the reforms in Romania can primarily be explained as action carried out by rational actors pursuing their own interests, but under constraints from both the interna- tional community and civil society . The role of the international community was important in the adoption of the electoral law of 1990, while pressure from civil society and public opinion were the main catalysts for the 2008 electoral reform .
Rational Calculus and Structural Constraints in the Selection of Electoral Rules
The existing literature on the creation and amendment of electoral rules em- phasizes both the rational interests of politicians and the structural constraints that limit what they can do .2 In a nutshell, rational choice theory proposes that
1 See Larry J . Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation, Journal of Democracy 5 (1994), no. 3, 4-17. 2 See for instance Alan Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy. New York et al. 2010; Kenneth Benoit, Models of Electoral System Change, Electoral Studies 22 (2004), no. 3, 363-389; Michael Gallagher / Paul Mitchell , The Politics of Electoral Systems . Oxford 2005 . Electoral Reform 77 electoral reforms are driven by political actors (mainly parties) who want to maximize their benefits. In the case of national legislative elections, these benefits are primarily measured in numbers of seats in the legislature, although parties may also be interested in maximizing their capacity to pursue the policies they champion .3 Among the first to emphasize the rational calculus of parties was Stein Rokkan, who argued that the choice of Western European countries to shift from single-member district (SMD) elections to proportional representation (PR) elections in the aftermath of the workers’ enfranchisement was determined by the rational calculus of politicians in power . These politicians were afraid that, in a SMD system, the growing power of the workers’ parties would seriously weaken their position in the legislature; a PR system, it was thought, would minimize the effect of their decreasing popularity.4 Carles Boix builds on Rok- kan’s theory, arguing that the ideology of the party in power in any country at the time of the workers’ enfranchisement has significance. In Britain, long periods of Conservative rule in the aftermath of World War I kept the SMD system in place, because the Conservatives were not concerned with the growing power of the workers’ movement, which was mainly threatening the centre-left Lib- eral Party .5 The manner in which electoral systems are the product of political actors’ intentionality is best summarized by Kenneth Benoit, who claims that “electoral laws will change when a coalition of parties exists such that each party in the coalition expects to gain more seats under an alternative electoral institution, and that also has sufficient power to effect this alternative through fiat given the rules for changing electoral laws .”6 When it comes to electoral reforms in post-communist Europe, the scholarly literature of rational choice has looked primarily at the interaction between the communist elites in power and the opposition forces on the eve of the first elections 7. Building on Rokkan’s theory, Arendt Lijphardt argues that PR was adopted in Eastern European countries as the compromise between these two groups . The communists preferred a proportional system that would allow them to maintain some power . Lijphardt admits, however, that the communists in these countries had little initial awareness of their potential electoral fortunes, a conclusion shared by Andrews and Jackman, for whom the decision-makers were “strategic fools”, having to make choices about electoral laws under
3 Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise . Congressional Choices About Administrative Procedures, American Political Science Review 89 (1995), no. 1, 62-73. 4 Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties . Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Process of Development . Oslo 1970 . 5 Carles Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game. The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, American Political Science Review 93 (1999), no. 3, 609-624. 6 Benoit, Models of Electoral System Change, 363 . 7 Arendt Lijphardt, Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Korrektur Hungary and Poland 1989-91, Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1992), no. 2, 207-223. wirklich so??? 78 Emanuel Emil Coman conditions of extreme uncertainty .8 Similarly, Birch, Millard, Popescu and Wil- liams argue that national leaders in the first days of democracy were primarily concerned with minimizing potential loss . The PR system emerged as the op- tion of choice as it minimized the risk that runs so high in an environment of uncertainty 9. Structural accounts of electoral choice do not deny the role of leaders’ self- interest, but these interests are constrained by country-specific peculiarities, such as the electoral systems in place before the communist period, the presence of ethnic minorities,10 the consensual nature of Eastern European democracies,11 and the nature of the interaction between the actors involved in the process of decision .12 My explanations for the electoral rules in post-communist Romania take into account both the rational calculus of political actors and the structural constraints in which they had to operate. The final forms of the electoral laws adopted are reflective of both aspects.
Electoral Rules of the 1990s: Efforts to Create a Strong Party System
The first democratic elections in post-communist Romania took place on 20 May 1990, less than five months after the fall of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s regime. The elections for the two chambers of parliament – the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate – took place under similar electoral rules . The country was split into 41 multi-member districts and, in both chambers, the number of seats per district was made proportional to the populations of these districts . Voters were asked to choose among closed party lists of candidates, and the allocation of seats was made using the Hare formula .13 There was no electoral threshold for parties, and the average number of seats per district was 9 .6 for the Chamber of Deputies and 2 .9 for the smaller Senate14 .
8 Josephine T .Andrews / Robert W. Jackman, Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice under Extreme Uncertainty, Electoral Studies 24 (2005), no. 1, 65-84; see also Bernard Grofman / Evald Mikkel / Rein Taagepera, Electoral System Change in Estonia, 1989-1993, Journal of Baltic Studies 30 (1999), no. 3, 227-249. 9 Sarah Birch et al ., Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe . Basingstoke 2002, 186 . 10 Lijphardt, Democratization and Constitutional Choices . 11 Csaba Nikolenyi, When Electoral Reform Fails: The Stability of Proportional Representation in Post-Communist Democracies, West European Politics 34 (2011), no. 3, 607-625. 12 Birch et al ., Embodying Democracy . 13 Decree law 92/14.03.1990 for the election of the parliament and the President of Roma- nia, published in Monitorul Oficial [The Official Gazette], no. 35, 18 March 1990. 14 This information is taken from the dataset by Jessica S .Wallack et al ., Particularism Around the World, The World Bank Economic Review 17 (2003), no. 1, 133-143. Electoral Reform 79
Such highly proportional election rules enabled ten different parties to be represented in the first parliament.15 The clear winner of the 1990 elections was the National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naționale, FSN), which obtained over 65 per cent of the seats in both chambers . Its leader, Ion Iliescu, also won in the presidential election, which was held on the same day: he gained an over- whelming 85 per cent of the popular vote . The two historical parties from the interwar period, the National Peasants Party (Partidul Național Țărănesc Creștin și Democrat, PNȚCD) and the National Liberal Party ( Partidul Național Liberal, PNL), came second and fourth – way behind the FSN,16 the party which had led the transitional government that took over on 22 December 1989 and had been in power when the elections were announced 17. From the political base gained in the election, Ion Iliescu and the other FSN leaders were in full control of legislation and could have opted for a less proportional and inclusive system that would have increased their power . They were, after all, writing the rules of the game . Regarded from a purely rational choice perspective,18 the chosen electoral rules make little sense. But in Romania’s special circumstances, additional con- siderations influenced the simple utilitarian calculus of parties. To understand what was happening, we need to grasp the political context surrounding the first months of Romanian democracy (see Table 1). When Romania began the transition towards democracy in December 1989, it stood out from other former communist countries both because of its low level of economic development and because civil society there was almost inexistent .19 There were severe economic problems throughout Southeastern Europe in the 1980s, primarily manifested in the scarcity of consumer goods; but nowhere were these problems as intense as in Romania . Also, while most of the leaders of communist regimes had adopted some liberalization reforms in the 1980s, Ceaușescu had refused to do so, and Romania had gained a name as one of the most severely authoritarian countries in the entire communist bloc .20 Civil
15 This number does not include the ethnic minorities parties, which had reserved seats and did not run under the same electoral rules . 16 The PNȚCD obtained 2.5% of the votes in the Senate elections and 2.6% of the votes in the Chamber of Deputies elections, while the corresponding scores for the PNL were 7 .1% and 6 .4% respectively . 17 At the time, the country was led by the Provisional Council for National Union (CPUN), a decisional body in which the FSN held a majority of seats . 18 See Benoit, Models of Electoral System Change; also Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game. 19 Mark Almond, Romania since the Revolution, Government and Opposition 25 (1990), no. 4, 484-496, 494. 20 Vladimir Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 38 (1991), no. 1, 85-99, 97; also Tom Gallagher, Romania after Ceaușescu: The Politics of Intolerance. Edinburgh 1995; Paul G. Lewis, Questions and Issues: The European 80 Emanuel Emil Coman
Table 1: Results of seven elections to the Romanian Senate and Chamber of Deputies . Sources: 1992-2008 – Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability; 1990 1990, 2012 – Adam Carr archive at
Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, in: idem / Zdenka Mansfeldová (eds .), The European Union and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe . Basingstoke 2006, 1-19 . 21 Whether the people who appeared on TV were indeed revolutionaries is still subject to debate .Tismăneanu , The Revival of Politics in Romania, for instance, argues that this group actually stole the revolution from those in the streets . 22 Liliana Mihuț, The Emergence of Political Pluralism in Romania, Communist and Post- Communist Studies 27 (1994), no. 4, 411-422, 412. 23 The Council of National Salvation Front refers to the provisional government that led Romania from December 1989 until February 1990; the National Salvation Front was the political party derived from this provisional government . 24 Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania; idem, The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents: Emerging Political Pluralism in Post-Ceaușescu Romania,East European Politics & Societies 7 (1993), no. 2, 309-348. 25 Alexandru Gussi, La Roumanie face à son passé communiste . Mémoires et cultures politiques . Paris 2011 . 82 Emanuel Emil Coman and control . Thirdly, because of the suppression of political organization during communism, there was no political alternative to the CFSN and thus no real political opposition 26. The first political parties did indeed emerge in the first month after the end of communism, but they had little resources and little political clout. The most important among them were the National Peasants Party (PNȚCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL), which had been the most important parties in the pre-communist period . Also, by January 1990, the Hungarian minority had formed its own party, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) .27 The emergence of these opposition parties was necessary in Romania’s path to democratization, but their mission was not an easy one . Because the CFSN had all the means of public control outlined above, it was difficu lt for the opposition leaders to make themselves known to the public . As historical parties, the PNL and the PNȚCD had had political followers, but this had been over forty years earlier . In January 1990 their political base was virtually non-existent and, with the CFSN controlling dissemination of information, it was difficult to build such a base 28. On top of these problems, the main obstacle to the formation of an opposition was the lack of any legislative body or forum where the opposition could make its voice heard and where, if it had good enough representation, it could get policy concessions. In the first months of democracy, Romania only had a provisional executive, the CFSN, but no legislative body . Despite all these advantages, the CFSN did not have a problem-free run in its first months. A series of protests broke out throughout the country, and especially in Bucharest . The protesters accused the former communists now at the head of the CFSN of having “stolen” the Romanian revolution . The protests intensified when, in January 1990, the CFSN officially announced that it would itself run in the coming elections as a political party, the National Salvation Front (FSN) . Many people had already assumed that this would be its inten- tion . It meant that the supposedly apolitical transitional government in charge of preparing the country for the first elections had now become a participant in a game whose rules it could write one-sidedly . For the protesters in the street, the announcement also had strong symbolic overtones: it made clear that the people were ruled by an unelected single authority composed of former com- munists, with no legislative forum in which the opposition could make its voice
26 For a detailed discussion of the campaign advantages see Almond, Romania Since the Revolution; Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania, 93 . 27 William E .Crowther / Oana-Valentina Suciu, Romania, in: Sten Berglund et al . (eds .), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe . Cheltenham3 2013, 369-406 . 28 This aspect was emphasized in a discussion between the PNȚCD leader Ion Raţiu and the then prime minister of Britain, Margaret Thatcher: Răspunsuri alunecoase ca un săpun, Adevărul, 9 March 1990, 1 . Electoral Reform 83 heard . It was like a return to the previous regime .29 Such a government lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and of the international community .30 The regime’s lack of political legitimacy led Iliescu and his colleagues to adopt two important measures . First, they tried to show that, unlike the previ- ous regime, they were willing to include other political forces in the decisional process . On 9 February 1990 they formed the Provisional Council for National Union (Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Naţională, CPUN), a new government replacing the FSN as a decisional organ (not as a party) . It included representa- tives of the other political parties . The move was meant to appease both the masses in the streets and the foreign donors to Romania, who were growing anxious 31. The CPUN functioned more or less as a miniature parliament-cum- cabinet in which all parties could express their views on issues; but it was still the FSN that made final decisions. This was because, as part of the protocol for the formation of the CPUN, the opposition parties had had to agree that the FSN would maintain a majority of the seats .32 As a second response to accusa- tions that they lacked legitimacy inside and outside the country, the leaders of the transitional government resolved to hold elections as early as possible 33. Elections were held in early May . This was to the FSN’s advantage since, at this time, most Romanians were still struggling to understand democracy and capitalism and, more importantly, the political opposition was weak and had little electoral basis.34 Given that the rules for the founding elections were chosen in this context – political dominance by the FSN – the choice of a fairly inclusive system seems odd . On a purely party-centered rational choice basis, Iliescu and the FSN should have opted for a less proportional system, rather than one that disadvantaged the small parties but benefited the big ones. For instance, a plurality system would have given the FSN a large majority of seats in the first parliament. Furthermore, following Duverger’s law,35 it is likely that a plural system would, in the long
29 William E .Crowther , Romania, in: Sten Berglund / Joakim Ekman / Frank H. Aarebrot (eds .), The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe . Cheltenham2 2004, 363-414 . 30 Mihuț, The Emergence of Political Pluralism in Romania, 414; Tismăneanu, The Quasi- Revolution and its Discontents . 31 Idem, The Revival of Politics in Romania, 93; Almond, Romania since the Revolution, 494 . 32 Crowther, Romania . 33 As Mihuţ, The Emergence of Political Pluralism in Romania, 414, puts it: “Early elections may have been necessary because of the immediate need to establish legitimate power .” 34 For instance, in the first Central and Eastern Eurobarometer that included Romania in the autumn of 1991, only 35% of respondents believed that the free market economy was a good thing for Romania, compared to an average of 58% for all countries in the survey . 35 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties . Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State . London 1954 . 84 Emanuel Emil Coman run, have led to a two-party system and that the FSN would have been one of the two parties that would alternate in power 36. Despite claims in some of the literature on Eastern Europe that results in the first elections could not be predicted, it is hard to believe that the FSN leaders were not sure of winning, since, as shown above, they had a wide range of ad- vantages over their adversaries . The FSN gained 67 per cent of the popular vote . This can hardly have come as a surprise in an election with so many parties . Why did the FSN leaders not want a less inclusive, less proportional system, which would more obviously favour them? Well, they did . On 1 February 1990, the CFSN launched a public debate on a proposal for what was essentially a single- member district law 37. Needless to say, given the results of the 1990 elections, the law would have brought tremendous advantages to the FSN. It is difficult to estimate these advantages precisely, as we do not know what the districts would have looked like, but it is conceivable that, of the opposition parties, only the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania – which had support concentrated in the Székely region – would have gained any parliamentary representation under this SMD system . However, the inclusive law used in the first elections was adopted shortly afterwards, not in the CFSN, but in the CPUN . The FSN had a majority in this mini-legislature, and could still in principle have passed an electoral law that, from a utilitarian point of view, would have been more favourable to themselves than the one actually adopted. They had their reasons for letting it pass . The CPUN was meant to function as a consensual organism countering allegations that Iliescu and his colleagues were acting in the same way as the previous regime . The international community, especially, was concerned about the weakness of the opposition and wanted more political pluralism, sending observers to be present at the debates the CPUN held in early March 1990 over the form of the law .38 As a consequence, the minimum winning coalition neces- sary, on a rational choice basis, became much broader . In fact the international observers pushed for full agreement and, with their coaxing, the final law was voted through on 15 March with only one vote against and one abstention . In an interview with the newspaper Adevărul, Ion Iliescu declared that the foreign
36 This logic is similar to the one used by Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game, to explain why the SMD system was kept in Britain . 37 Proiect în dezbatere publică: Consiliul Frontului Salvării Naţionale. Decret-Lege pentru alegerea parlamentului, a președintelui României și a consiliilor locale [Project of Public Debate: The Council of the National Salvation Front . Law-Decree for the Election of Parliament, President of Romania and the Local Councils .],Adevărul , 1 February 1990, 4-5 . The fact that the FSN wanted a SMD system is probably the single most important argument against those who claim that the PR system was the result of mere uncertainty about electoral fortunes . 38 Crowther, Romania; Daniel Gheorghe Luchian, Cu un vot împotrivă și două abţineri a fost votată legea electorală, Adevărul, 15 March 1990, 1 . Electoral Reform 85 observers from the US and France were very happy with the almost unanimous consent of all parties in the CPUN 39. The electoral rules used in the first elections thus ensured the representa- tion of as many political parties as possible and, in this way, satisfied the early needs of the Romanian democracy . Pressures from the street demonstrators and the international community were determinant . It was the street demonstra- tors who (with outside backing) became the main catalysts for the formation of the CPUN; and, once the debate over the form of the law was moved from inside the CFSN to this new body, it was the foreign observers who pushed for a consensual agreement that could satisfy all actors . This is what lay behind the highly proportional solution . It soon became apparent that such a fragmented system could potentially result in high cabinet volatility, an unwanted situation for any country and especially for a young democracy . Though the 1990 elections, despite the diver- sity of parliamentary representation, had brought in a one-party cabinet, this was seen as an idiosyncratic event unlikely to be replicated . Furthermore, the splitting of the FSN into two political parties, one led by president Ion Iliescu and the other by former prime minister Petre Roman, demonstrated that the party system was fragile and needed consolidation 40. This split happened in June 1991, a few months before the 1992 elections . The introduction of a 2 per cent threshold for the 1992 elections is reflective of the general belief among the political class that the existing system was not suf- ficiently robust.41 From the perspective of rational choice theory, the move was beneficial for most of the parties in parliament. As a general rule, an increase in the threshold makes the parties that decide on it better off than they were before. The votes wasted on parties that do not reach the threshold are redistributed among the parties that do . By 1992 most of the small parties that made it to the first parliament had disappeared, and had been incorporated into the bigger parties, especially the FSN, and this meant it was no longer difficult to form coalitions to gain majority votes 42. As the literature has shown, when drafting electoral laws, party leaders think in terms of future government coalitions,43 so it is likely that both the FSN and the main opposition parties were also think- ing forward to possible government coalitions that might be to their advantage
39 Ibid . Iliescu declared that “[…] foreign observers from the USA and France have appreciated the collaboration with the other political parties” . 40 Crowther, Romania, 372 . 41 The adoption of the threshold was done through Law 68 of 1992, published in Monitorul Oficial no. 164 of 16 July 1992. 42 According to Tismăneanu, The Revival of Politics in Romania, 93, around 40 of the 80 parties that ran in the first elections were FSN offshots which soon disappeared or became incorporated within the larger parties . 43 Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise . 86 Emanuel Emil Coman after the 1992 elections . Reducing the fragmentation of the system was thus in the interest of most of the main politicians . The goal of the reform was at least partially fulfilled: the number of parties (and coalitions) that entered the Romanian parliament was reduced from ten in the 1990 elections to seven in 1992 . Unfortunately, because the electoral rule was new to them, the voters did not act as strategically as they could have done, so that nearly 20 per cent of the votes in the 1992 elections were wasted (see Table 1). The 1996 elections took place under the same rules and brought the first shift in power . In the presidential elections the winner was Emil Constantinescu, candidate of the centre-right coalition Convenţia Democrată (Democratic Con- vention) which brought together the National Liberal Party (PNL), the National Peasants Party (PNȚCD), the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) and a few other smaller parties . The cabinet was formed from an alli- ance of the Democratic Convention and the centre-left Uniunea Social-Democrată (Social Democratic Union) . The coalition in power between 1996 and 2000 was thus a “coalition of coali- tions”, including in its ranks no fewer than nine individual parties . As such, it was plagued by numerous internal conflicts, which resulted in two changes of prime minister and numerous cabinet reshuffles. As a consequence the Democratic Convention urged further consolidation of the party system, and this culminated in the introduction of a five per cent threshold for individual parties, and even higher thresholds for party coalitions 44. This increase in the threshold was effective, as it brought the number of parties represented in the legislature down to five (see Table 1). Oddly enough, the Democratic Convention (the main coalition of parties in cabinet) itself failed to pass the high threshold for coalitions imposed by the new rules . The party within it that had initiated the law was the National Peasants Party (PNȚCD), the leading party in the governments between 1996 and 2000,45 and, after the 2000 elections, it virtually disappeared from the political scene 46. To sum up, the electoral systems tried out throughout the first decade of Romanian democracy were designed to consolidate a multi-party system . To this end, the first elections were run under a highly proportional system to
44 For the first extra party in a coalition an extra 3% was needed, then an extra 1% for each additional party, up to a maximum of 10%; see Ordonanţa de urgenţă nr. 63 din 26 mai 2000 [Emergency Government ordinance no. 63 of 26 May 2000], published in Monitorul Oficial 240 of 31 May 2000 . 45 See Alexandra Ionescu, La résurgence d’un acteur politique en Roumanie . Le Parti National Paysan Chrétien Démocrate, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 2 (2002), no. 1, 141-202. 46 This is one rare example of miscalculation and uncertainty about results, but the failure of the PNȚCD and their partners in the Convention to enter parliament is primarily explained by the departure from it of the party that was arguably strongest, the PNL . Electoral Reform 87 allow the multitude of new parties representation and visibility – necessary conditions for their societal entrenchment . The main party at the negotiation table, the FSN, would have preferred an electoral law much less slanted to proportional representation, but pressure from the streets and, especially, from the international community constrained what it could demand . Later, when party leaders were faced with fragmentation inside parliament, they decided to introduce electoral thresholds to reduce the number of parties and thus stabilize the system . In the next section I discuss the 2008 electoral reform, which aimed to achieve a different goal: that of increasing the responsiveness of elected of - ficials to the wishes of their voters.
The 2008 Reform
The two changes in the electoral threshold made in 1992 and in 2000 were part of a general trend to consolidate emerging party systems and strengthen existing parties that can be seen in East Central and Southeastern Europe throughout the 1990s 47. For instance, the 1993 Polish electoral reform introduced electoral thresholds for parties and party coalitions,48 and the 2000 reform in the Czech Republic established the rule that candidates could only run if nominated by parties or party coalitions .49 Both these reforms made it harder for small parties to enter the legislature. Similar efforts to consolidate party systems were taken in Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania – countries that shifted from single-member district plurality elections to more proportional systems encouraging the de- velopment of party loyalties rather than loyalty to individuals 50. What set the electoral law in Romania apart from the laws of other countries was the extremely important role given to parties in the political process and the lack of accountability parliamentarians had to their voters . Electoral rules that emphasize the role of parties as opposed to individual candidates may con-
47 David M. Olson / Gabriella Ilonszki, Two Decades of Divergent Post-Communist Parliamentary Development .The Journal of Legislative Studies 17 (2011), no. 2, 234-255; Sarah Birch, Lessons from Eastern Europe: Electoral Reform Following the Collapse of Communism, paper presented at the conference on “Electoral Reform in Canada: Getting Past Debates about Electoral Systems”, Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, 10-12 May, 2005, available at
51 John M . Carey, Legislative Voting and Accountability . New York et al . 2008 . 52 Emanuel Emil Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws . The Consequences of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform, The Journal of Legislative Studies 19 (2013), no. 4, 467-489. 53 Ibid . 54 Mihail Chiru / Ionuţ Ciobanu, Legislative Recruitment and Electoral System Change . The Case of Romania, CEU Political Science Journal 4 (2009), no. 2, 192-231, available at
The early efforts of the Pro-Democracy Association Pro-Democratia( ) split those involved in politics. Some MPs were supportive; others were wary about a reform whose declared goal was the renewal of the political class . Among the political parties, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) claimed to be in favour of some degree of reform that would in- crease accountability .56 In 2006 parliament created a commission charged with making proposals for electoral reform, but its work was thwarted by disagree- ments among the parties .57 A similar committee had held back work on a new electoral law before the 2004 elections .58 The efforts of the reform initiators received a boost in 2007 when the Roma- nian president, Traian Băsescu, began to campaign for their cause and pushed parliament to adopt a new electoral law before the elections scheduled for the autumn of 2008 .59 In November 2007, Băsescu called a referendum on his pro- posal to adopt the French two-round system of elections . Even though a large majority of those who participated voted in favour of the proposed system, the referendum was declared invalid due to low turnout. In putting forward the two-round system, the president was, at least partially, guided by a seat- maximizing strategy, since his party (the Democrat Liberal Party, PDL) was leading in the polls and a two-round system would have helped it win . The prime minister at the time, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, saw things differently, as he was the leader of a less popular party, the National Liberals (PNL) . Rather than the French system, Popescu-Tăriceanu advocated a mixed-member sys- tem similar to the one found in Germany . This system has some MPs elected in single-member districts and some elected from central party lists; it assures proportional translation of votes into seats and does not disadvantage smaller parties, while still ensuring that half of the MPs are elected in single-member districts. Significantly, by the end of 2007 the issue of increasing individual ac- countability through electoral reform had become so salient that all proposals had put this objective to the fore . However, the prime minister’s proposal was rejected by the Romanian Constitutional Court, which held it unacceptable because it violated the constitutional provision that all members of parliament be chosen directly by universal, equal, and secret vote . The court came to this
56 Sergiu Gherghina / Larenţiu Ştefan / Mihail Chiru, Electoral Reform – Cui Bono? Attitudes of Romanian MPs to the Electoral System Change,The Journal of Legislative Studies 19 (2013), no. 3, 351-369. 57 Asociaţia Pro-Democraţia, Istoria unui dezacord: Uninominalul [The History of a Discord: the Uninominal] . Bucharest 2008, 21 . 58 Gherghina / Ştefan / Chiru, Electoral Reform – Cui Bono?, 353 . 59 Emanuil Emil Coman, Legislative Behavior in Romania: The Effect of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform, Legislative Studies Quarterly 37 (2012), no. 2, 199-224. 90 Emanuel Emil Coman conclusion because the candidates on the party list in Popescu-Tăriceanu’s proposal did not have to stand in the uninominal election .60 As a consequence of these setbacks, a unique alternative emerged: a law which aimed at increasing the connection between MPs and their voters while still ensuring that there was a proportional translation of the popular vote into seats in the legislature .61 What distinguishes the Romanian system from other mixed systems is the fact that it has no list element and thus all members are elected in single-member districts, while at the same time it yields highly pro- portional results obtained through two rounds of redistribution at the county and country levels 62. This law was adopted in March 2008 . The electoral rules of the 1990s had the consolidation of a party system as their main objective and, judging from the electoral results following the im- plementation of these rules, it can be said that the objective was met . The aim of the 2008 electoral reform was different: the initiators came from civil society and were primarily concerned with strengthening the connection between voters and their elected representatives . They wanted to increase the accountability of MPs to the people who elected them . From its initiation until its eventual enactment, the reform idea underwent changes reflecting the wishes of the vari- ous parties . But the need for increased accountability remained the crux of the political discourse . The two main characteristics of the proposals – individual single-member districts and full proportionality – reflect both the driving idea behind the reform movement and the rational calculus of the political leaders (especially the prime minister) whose parties would most probably have lost seats under the law proposed by the president .63 In the final part of the study, which draws on existing scholarly work on the effects of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform, I assess the extent to which the new electoral law fulfilled the desiderata of its promoters. I evaluate the success
60 Romanian Constitutional Court, Decizie nr. 1.177 din 12 decembrie 2007 referitoare la sesizarea de neconstituţionalitate a Legii pentru alegerea Camerei Deputaţilor și a Senatului și pentru modificarea și completarea Legii nr. 67/2004 pentru alegerea autorităţilor administraţiei publice locale, a Legii administraţiei publice locale nr. 215/2001 și a Legii nr. 393/2004 privind Statutul aleșilor locali, available at
Effects of the 2008 Electoral Reform The Renewal of the Political Class
One of the declared objectives of the initiators of the electoral reform was the renewal of the political class 65. The closed-list system, it was believed, al- lowed corrupt individuals into parliament . Some of them had been associated with the old communist regime and were able to get themselves put at the top of party lists because of their connections and money . Studies made to date of the profiles of MPs elected under the new rules yield a mixed picture. Protsyk and Lupsa Matichescu find that MPs elected under the new rules have differ- ent occupational profiles from their predecessors.66 Similarly, incumbent MPs running in the 2008 elections were less successful than incumbent MPs running in the previous elections, and this suggests that, for the first time, voters were able to express their dissatisfactions with the political class in a direct fashion through the ballot box 67. Only 37 per cent of the deputies and 24 per cent of the senators elected in 2008 had served in the previous term of parliament . The same study also finds that candidates associated with acts of corruption have been less likely to find themselves on the ballot list at all. 68 Stan and Vancea argue that the electoral campaign discourse for the 2008 elections saw a change in themes: there were fewer references to nationalism and decommunization .69 Gherghina and Chiru find that MPs’ experience and parliamentary positions have now become less important predictors of party loyalty: the MPs seem to have become more concerned about their popularity with the voters 70. Chiru and Ciobanu conclude that in the 2008 elections there were fewer “parachut- ists” on the ballot than in previous elections . “Parachutists”, usually old-school politicians with party connections or money, are candidates who run in safe
64 See Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws . 65 See Asociaţia Pro-Democraţia, Istoria unui dezacord. 66 Oleh Protsyk / Marius Lupsa Matichescu, Clientelism and Political Recruitment in Demo cratic Transition: Evidence from Romania, Comparative Politics 43 (2011), no. 2, 207-224. 67 Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws, 478 . 68 Ibid . 69 Lavinia Stan / Diane Vancea, Old Wine in New Bottles, Problems of Post-Communism 56 (2009), no. 5, 47-61. 70 Sergiu Gherghina / Mihail Chiru, Determinants of Legislative Voting Loyalty under Different Electoral Systems: Evidence from Romania,International Political Science Review 35 (2014), no. 5, 523-541. 92 Emanuel Emil Coman districts without residing there . However, the same authors have also found that the 2008 elections brought in more candidates with financial means of their own – able to support their personal campaigns – than was previously the case. It seems here that the 2008 reform had the opposite effect on the role of money in politics than might have been expected 71. This apparent anomaly can be explained through a rational choice perspective . Under the new elec- toral rules, candidates have stronger incentives to invest their own money in campaigns because the money helps them directly as individuals . Under the old electoral law, private money could be of benefit to individual candidates only indirectly, through the list system; while under the new law, money spent in a single-member district supports the candidate’s own campaign (and only indirectly, the party) .72
Accountability of MPs
Increasing the accountability of MPs appeared as a leitmotif throughout the campaign for electoral reform. President Traian Băsescu’s call for higher ac- countability of MPs was especially notable . This came after his suspension in 2007 and the subsequent referendum showing that the MPs’ decision to suspend the country’s president was at odds with the will of the populace .73 When it comes to this second popular desideratum, accountability, the indica- tions of success are also mixed . The degree of voting independence MPs have in the Romanian parliament has not changed since the 2008 reform, and they are still very likely to toe the party line when voting inside the legislature .74 The determinants of voting behaviour have remained fairly similar too .75 Increased independence in parliamentary voting would signify that MPs have become more concerned with the needs of the constituencies they represent, as opposed to the demands of their parties . However, MPs do appear to be more likely to initiate legislation since the reform and are also more likely to address questions to the prime minister – a course of action now regarded as less dangerous to their careers . The increased activity of politicians in parliament may be a sign of genuine concern for the needs of their constituencies or could be mere theatre meant to help them at re-election .76
71 Chiru / Ciobanu, Legislative Recruitment and Electoral System Change . 72 Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws . 73 Cosmin Gabriel Marian / Ronald F. King, Plus ça change: Electoral Law Reform and the 2008 Romanian Parliamentary Elections, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43 (2010), no. 1, 7-18, 10. 74 Coman, Legislative Behavior in Romania . 75 Gherghina / Chiru, Determinants of Legislative Voting Loyalty . 76 Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws, 470 . Electoral Reform 93
The representation of constituencies is still patchy . Interviews with Roma- nian MPs show that there are few viable means of transmission through which they can learn about constituency needs .77 The only voter-MP interaction takes place in the weekly consultation hours (“surgeries”) which are used by voters for personal gains as opposed to gains for the districts the MPs should be sup- porting . This situation may well lead to the development of clientelistic ties between the elected officials and their voters – ties that are detrimental to the welfare of the districts and to the country as a whole . The problem is not one faced by Romania alone: there is a broader debate about whether making MPs more accountable increases the overall quality of representation .
Translation of Votes Into Seats
One of the most vaunted features of the 2008 electoral law was the high degree of proportionality it provided. In this area the law is unique, for it offers the prospect of combining electoral proportionality with elections in single-member districts for all seats in the legislature . This combination cannot be found in any other mixed-member system . The proportionality of the Romanian system has remained almost intact .78 Nevertheless, the literature on the 2008 elections has identified some flaws in the translation of votes into seats. Two of these flaws became apparent to voters immediately after the 2008 elec - tions . On the election night, the then president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), Mircea Geoană, celebrated the electoral victory he assumed was his on the basis of exit polls taken some hours earlier . The following day it became clear that, although the PSD had won the most votes, the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL), which came close second, had gained more seats in parliament . This odd occurrence was a consequence of the multiple redistribution stages of the electoral law, a process most voters did not know about .79 Another surprise to many voters was the fact that candidates were able to win seats even if they finished second, third, or even fourth in the district they contested. In fact only three-quarters of the MPs elected in 2008 had come first in the votes cast in their districts. Interviews with MPs conducted in 2010 revealed that those elected first on the list felt they had more legitimacy, when it came to legislation, than their peers who had won their seats through redistribution 80. Since the candidates of small parties are more likely to gain their seats without coming first in the popular vote of their district, this upshot of the electoral law is more likely to plague the small parties .
77 Ibid . 78 Marian / King, Plus ça change. 79 Gherghina / Jiglău, Where Does the Mechanism Collapse? 80 Coman, Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws . 94 Emanuel Emil Coman
Small parties may also be disadvantaged by another feature of the electoral law . Although the law translates the proportions of votes into proportions of seats fairly accurately, supporters of small parties may consider voting for their preferred party a wasted vote and instead opt for larger parties ideologically close to them . A vote for the preferred party is not wasted in the sense that it helps the party in one of the two rounds of redistribution, but for the voters concerned primarily with the fate of their own districts, voting for the candidate from a larger party gives them a greater feeling of control 81. Additionally the new system may have discouraged voter participation, since there is some confu- sion whether to vote on party lines or according to candidate characteristics .82
Concluding Remarks
This excursus into changes in the electoral law of post-communist Romania has identified two broad periods of reform. These arose from two different kinds of pressures to which policy-makers had to respond: in the 1990s electoral rules primarily reflected pressures from the international community, and the main concern was the establishment of a strong party system able to offer viable op - position to those in power . This concern was initially addressed by adopting a very inclusive system in the first free elections, allowing a wide range of parties with different views to participate in the first parliament. The follow-up was the imposition of electoral thresholds to reduce the number of parties, consolidate the party system and reduce political volatility. In the 2000s there were different pressures . The push for electoral reform arose from people’s concern that MPs were not sufficiently accountable to their voters. These two quite different waves of pressure suggest positive development in Romania’s struggle to implement democratic order: they correspond to needs characteristic of different stages in the process of democratization. The fact that the 2008 electoral reform emerged as a bottom-up civil-society movement led by a non-governmental organization dissatisfied with the low level of MPs’ re- sponsiveness to their voters is especially encouraging . It shows that Romanian society has developed aspirations associated with more mature democracies . Yet evaluation of the 2008 reform based on the existing literature yields a rather sombre picture . The representational aims that drove the reform have clearly not reached full fruition . We can only hope that, as the electoral law becomes more entrenched, the imperfections identified in scholarly works will be eliminated. This would in turn strengthen the ties between voters and elected representa- tives, and hence the overall quality of Romania’s new democracy .
81 Ibid . 82 Gherghina / Jiglău, Where Does the Mechanism Collapse?