REBELS AGAINST MINES? EXPLAINING REBEL RESTRAINT ON LANDMINE USE
HENRIQUE SINICIATO TERRA GARBINO Master’s Thesis Spring 2019
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Supervisor: Dr. Chiara Ruffa
Word count: 22,911 Abstract
Instead of state governments, rebel groups have become the most prolific landmine users. However, rebels display significant variation in the way they restrict the use of landmines. While some armed groups seek to limit their effects to government forces, some indiscriminately lay mines irrespective of collateral damage, and others directly target civilians with landmines. Furthermore, some rebels have renounced the use of anti-personnel mines and engage in mine action. In this thesis, I seek to explain this empirical variation. I argue that civilian victimisation caused by landmines creates significant legitimacy costs to rebels, thus increasing incentives to exercise restraint. It follows that the more legitimacy-seeking behaviour rebels display, the more likely they are to exercise restraint on landmine use. I test this hypothesis in a structured focused comparison of three rebel groups from the Philippines. The case studies support the hypothesis, as legitimacy-seeking behaviour had a positive effect on restraint on landmine use in the selected groups. This thesis contributes to the field mainly in two ways. First, I conceptualise and measure restraint on landmine use, which had been neglected in previous studies. Second, I develop a theoretical argument specifically explaining variation in restraint on landmine use. Keywords: non-state armed actor, legitimacy, restraint, landmine use, Philippines
2 Acknowledgments
First of all, thank you, Masumi Honda, for your insights and suggesting the theme of this research during one of many informal yet always inspiring conversations.
My sincerest gratitude to Chiara Ruffa, for your constant support, invaluable advice, and genuine interest in this research. Thank you for sharing your knowledge and experience and for pushing me always further.
Special thanks to Alfredo Lubang, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer and Soliman Santos, for your support and inspiring engagement in promoting a landmine-free world, mostly through the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines. Your enthusiasm was a key component of my motivation throughout this thesis. Thank you, former and current Geneva Call staff Anki Sjöberg, Christopher Rush and Pascal Bongard, for taking the time to discuss the framework of this research in its early stages.
Thanks to Carlos Bittencourt, João Maurício Valdetaro, Marthe Hiev Hamidi Abd Abad, and Yordanos Melake for reviewing and commenting this thesis’s drafts at different stages. Special thanks to Sofia Jarvis, who followed me through every step of this research and provided specific and detailed feedback as well as motivation to carry through the whole process.
I would also like to immensely thank Rotary International for making this experience possible through the promotion of the Rotary Peace Fellowship, without which I would not be able to attend this master’s programme.
Finally, I would like to refer to Armin Köhlt for inspiring the title of this master’s thesis through his article “Rebellen gegen Minen”, published in the Swiss newspaper Die Wochenzeitung, edition 42, on 16 October 2008 (Köhlt 2008).
3 Table of contents Abstract ...... 2 Acknowledgments...... 3 Table of contents ...... 4 List of abbreviations ...... 6 List of figures, graphs and tables ...... 8
1 Introduction ...... 10
2 Understanding the logic of restraint on landmine use ...... 13 2.1 Literature review: rebel restraint and compliance ...... 13 2.1.1 Previous literature ...... 13 2.1.2 Explaining restraint on landmine use: a research gap ...... 15 2.2 Conceptualising restraint on landmine use ...... 16 2.2.1 Strategy ...... 17 2.2.2 Type of device ...... 17 2.2.3 Trigger mechanisms ...... 18 2.2.4 Location ...... 19 2.2.5 Frequency ...... 19 2.2.6 Record-keeping, marking and information-sharing ...... 19 2.2.7 Direct restraint ...... 20 2.3 Explaining variation in restraint on landmine use ...... 20 2.3.1 Contextual factors ...... 21 2.3.2 Strategic incentives...... 21 2.3.3 Moral incentives ...... 23 2.3.4 Summary of incentives for restraint on landmine use ...... 25
3 The centrality of legitimacy-seeking in rebel restraint ...... 27 3.1 Theoretical argument ...... 27 3.2 Scope conditions ...... 30 3.3 Contribution to the literature ...... 30
4 Research design ...... 32 4.1 Method and case selection strategy ...... 32 4.1.1 Unit of analysis ...... 32 4.1.2 Conditions ...... 33 4.1.3 Background factors ...... 34 4.1.4 Population and selected cases ...... 34 4.2 Operationalisation ...... 36 4.2.1 Independent variable: legitimacy-seeking behaviour ...... 36 4.2.2 Dependent variable: restraint on landmine use ...... 37
4 4.3 Data sources ...... 39 4.4 Structure of analysis ...... 39
5 Legitimacy-seeking and landmine use in the Philippines ...... 41 5.1 Moro Islamic Liberation Front ...... 41 5.1.1 Legitimacy-seeking behaviour ...... 42 5.1.2 Landmine use...... 45 5.2 Abu Sayyaf Group ...... 48 5.2.1 Legitimacy-seeking behaviour ...... 49 5.2.2 Landmine use...... 51 5.3 New People’s Army ...... 52 5.3.1 Legitimacy-seeking behaviour ...... 52 5.3.2 Landmine use...... 56
6 Analysis ...... 59 6.1 Moro Islamic Liberation Front ...... 59 6.2 Abu Sayyaf Group ...... 61 6.3 New People’s Army ...... 63 6.4 Comparative analysis ...... 65 6.5 Alternative explanations ...... 68 6.6 Limitations and potential biases ...... 71
7 Conclusion ...... 73
References ...... 76
Appendix I: Data on selected cases ...... 90 Appendix II: Measurement methods ...... 92 Appendix III: Overview of interviews completed ...... 96
5 List of abbreviations
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines AP Anti-personnel APM Anti-personnel mine AT Anti-tank ATM Anti-tank mine ASG Abu Sayyaf Group AV Anti-vehicle BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces CISR Center for International Stabilization and Recovery CMC Cluster Munition Coalition CPP Communist Party of the Philippines GC Geneva Call GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines HRW Human Rights Watch ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines ICG International Crisis Group ICG-SPPP International Contact Group for the Southern Philippines Peace Process ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IEA Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) IED Improvised explosive device IHL International Humanitarian Law IMT International Monitoring Team IRRC International Review of the Red Cross IS Islamic State JMU James Madison University MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MNLF Moro National Liberation Front NDFP National Democratic Front of the Philippines NGO Non-governmental organisation
6 NPA New People’s Army NSA Non-state actor NSAD Non-State Actor Data NSAG Non-state armed group NSAWG Non-State Actor Working Group RGIL Rebel Groups and International Law RPM-P Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas (Revolutionary Workers’ Party of the Philippines) SCBL Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program UN United Nations USA United States of America USD United States dollar
7 List of figures, graphs, and tables
Figure 1. Contextual factors influencing reduction in landmine use...... 25 Figure 2. Influencing factors for restraint on landmine use...... 25 Figure 3. Causal chain...... 29
Table 1. Operationalisation of the independent variable: legitimacy-seeking behaviour...... 37 Table 2. Operationalisation of the dependent variable: restraint on landmine use...... 38 Table 3. MILF’s legitimacy-seeking behaviour...... 45 Table 4. MILF’s restraint on landmine use...... 48 Table 5. ASG’s legitimacy-seeking behaviour...... 51 Table 6. ASG’s restraint on landmine use...... 52 Table 7. NPA’s legitimacy-seeking behaviour...... 56 Table 8. NPA’s restraint on landmine use...... 58 Table 9. Legitimacy-seeking behaviour ranked per non-state armed group...... 66 Table 10. Restraint on landmine use per non-state armed actor...... 67 Table 12. Summary of extended analysis...... 68 Table 13. General data on the non-state armed groups...... 90 Table 14. General data on dyadic conflicts...... 91 Table 15. General data on rebel compliance to international norms...... 91 Table 16. General data on landmine use...... 91 Table 17. Conceptualisation of the variation of restraint on landmine use...... 92 Table 18. Attributed scores to observable variation on variables of interest...... 93 Table 19. Minimum and maximum variation of the dependent variable...... 93 Table 20. Minimum and maximum variation of the independent variable...... 93 Table 21. Scale of overall level of variables of interest...... 94 Table 22. Summary of assigned numeric values observed for the variables of interest...... 95
8
A landmine is a perfect soldier – ever courageous, never sleeps, never misses. Commander Saloth Sar (better known as Pol Pot), Khmer Rouge (Oldale 2012)
We used landmines more than the Government of Sudan and are paying the price for this now. We are victims of our own mines. Commander Edward Lino, SPLM/A (GC 2004, 55)
9 1 Introduction
Landmines threaten civilians both during and long after conflicts have ended. According to the Landmine Monitor, more than 122,000 people have fallen victim of landmines only in the last 20 years. Apart from their direct physical and psychological effects, landmines are responsible for yet another wide range of harms. They restrict access to basic resources such as food and water, limit the use of key infrastructure, and both force and restrict migration. Fortunately, new landmine contamination is limited as a growing number of states have signed and ratified relevant international treaties restricting the use of landmines and other similar devices1. Nonetheless, landmines remain a root cause of death and human suffering in more than 50 countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen (ICBL-CMC 2018).
Instead of national governments, however, non-state armed groups (NSAGs)2 have become the most frequent users of landmines and the main drivers of new contamination. An initial assessment by Geneva Call (GC) reported that, in 2005, at least 60 rebel groups had used mines in 24 countries across five geographic regions, namely sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Often portrayed as the “perfect soldier” due to their low cost, easy availability and high lethality, landmines became the weapon of choice of many rebel groups (Sjöberg 2004, 2005, 2006b). In contrast with state governments, rebels have considerably less incentives to comply with existing humanitarian norms. Engaging them in restricting or renouncing the use of landmines remains one of the most pressing practical obstacles towards a mine-free world.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of landmines and other explosive devices vary significantly in the level of restraint exercised by non-state armed groups. On one side of the spectrum, some rebel groups indiscriminately lay mines irrespective of the potential collateral damage to civilians (Sjöberg 2005), some even directly target children with booby-trapped toys (e.g. Holmes and van Heerden 2016), while others use landmines but restrict themselves to command-detonated anti- vehicles explosive devices against government forces. On the other side of the spectrum, some non- state armed groups have also committed to the total ban on landmines, by unconditionally renouncing the use of anti-personnel mines and similar victim-activated explosive devices. Even further, many
1 In recent years, only the government of Myanmar and Syria have planted new anti-personnel mines (ICBL-CMC 2017, 2018).
2 Throughout this thesis, the terms non-state armed group, armed group, rebel group, and rebels will be used interchangeably.
10 NSAGs even engage in mine action activities in one way or another (Sjöberg 2006a). The wide difference in rebel behaviour towards landmine use raises the question: what explains variation in the level of restraint of non-state armed groups on the use of landmines?
Even though previous literature has developed relevant theories on rebel restraint and compliance, landmine use has so far been left mostly unaddressed. Building on the legitimacy-based theory of rebel compliance (Jo 2015), I argue that civilian victimisation caused by landmine use creates significant costs to rebel groups by compromising their legitimacy, thus increasing incentives to exercise restraint. In short, the proposed theoretical argument leads to the hypothesis that the more legitimacy-seeking behaviour rebel groups display, the more likely they are to exercise restraint on landmine use. This hypothesis is then assessed in a structured focused comparison of three cases drawn from conflict contexts in the Philippines, namely the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the New People’s Army (NPA). This thesis found support to the theoretical argument, that is, legitimacy-seeking behaviour had a positive effect on rebel restraint on landmine use. An additional finding also suggests that not only the overall level of restraint increased with the rise of legitimacy- seeking behaviour across the cases, but it also qualitatively varied depending on which audience the armed group was mostly reliant on. The cases of MILF and NPA also show support to the causal mechanism, further suggesting that rebel groups learn the benefits of limiting the use of landmines and appropriate restraint and compliance into their own norms and culture. Nevertheless, insights into the decision-making processes of the armed groups remain a challenge.
By exploring a specific and underresearched area, this thesis contributes to the field of peace and conflict studies in four ways. First, based on technical and strategic aspects of landmine use, it conceptualises the dependent variable restraint on landmine use, which had been neglected in earlier studies. Second, it expands previous theories of restraint and compliance relating them to landmine use. Third, by doing so, it maps different influencing factors of rebel restraint on landmine use. Finally, this thesis develops its own theoretical argument explaining variation in rebel restraint on landmine use.
This paper aims at enhancing the understanding of different incentives and dynamics at play on NSAGs’ behaviour. Insights on this field could inform government authorities, civil-society organisations as well as humanitarian and mine action advocacy organisations engaging with non-state armed groups. More broadly, this research aims at contributing to the efforts of the International
11 Campaign to Ban Landmines and like-minded organisations in their struggle to limit the indiscriminate and unnecessary suffering caused by explosive hazards.
This thesis has seven sections. After this introduction (Section 1), I will first present the logic of restraint on landmine use (Section 2). Next, I will argue for the centrality of legitimacy in influencing rebel restraint behaviour towards landmine use (Section 3), followed by a description of the methodology used in this thesis (Section 4). Thereafter, I present the empirical data on legitimacy- seeking behaviour and restraint on landmine use under three case studies (Section 5). The following section includes both case-specific and within-case analyses and seeks to find support or refute the suggested hypothesis (Section 6). Finally, I provide an overview of the main findings and their implications for practice, as well as possible pathways for future research (Section 7).
12 2 Understanding the logic of restraint on landmine use
The aim of this section is threefold. First, it situates this thesis within the literature on rebel restraint and compliance with international norms, thus identifying a significant research gap in explaining restraint on landmine use. Next, restraint on landmine use is conceptualised based on the effects of mines on civilians depending on different patterns of use. Finally, I present an original typology and compilation of possible roots of restraint on landmine use, based on previous literature as well as practitioners’ inputs. Those steps are necessary to understand the logic of restraint on landmine use and then build my own argument on the centrality of legitimacy.
2.1 Literature review: rebel restraint and compliance
In the following subsections I will briefly describe the main theories on rebel restraint and compliance, highlighting the need for specific propositions explaining restraint on landmine use.
2.1.1 Previous literature
Significant academic attention has been devoted to the study of violence against civilians, more precisely on the causes and dynamics of one-sided political violence against civilians. However, scholars have given much less emphasis on explaining the cases when violence against civilians does not happen, i.e. cases of restraint and compliance to humanitarian norms (Straus 2012).
Throughout this paper, restraint is defined as deliberate actions limiting the use of violence (ICRC 2018), while compliance takes the meaning of adherence to humanitarian norms, more specifically International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Jo 2015). Because IHL explicitly calls for restraint in the use of violence, it is often hard to distinguish the two concepts both in practice and theoretically. Therefore, literature on both concepts will be addressed in this section. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that restraint can be exercised without compliance to humanitarian norms, such as when it is addressed only to specific groups.
Following the typology suggested by Straus (2012), restraint may stem from different micro-, meso-, and macro-level sources. Perhaps the most intuitive source of restraint – and relevant for Straus’s three levels – is compliance with international human rights and humanitarian norms. In this context, three main factors influence restraint, namely knowledge of the law, training in the law, or threat of
13 punishment under the law (ICRC 2018). While efficiency of IHL in restraining violence remains debatable (e.g. Jenks and Acquaviva 2014), Hathaway finds that international norms are more effective in restraining the use of violence in the presence of political competition, independence judiciary and private media (2002). Similarly, Jo (2015) and Stanton (2016) argue that rebel groups are more likely to comply with international norms when they are accountable to their constituencies as well as domestic and international actors.
Particularly relevant for understanding leadership decision-making processes, micro- or individual- level theories of restraint focus on values and morals, as well as social psychological processes, that limit violence. As a baseline, Collins argue that violence runs against the “basic mechanisms of emotional entertainment and interactional solidarity” (2008, 25). In his study about Nazi supporters, Monroe adds that individual support to violent actions is a function of personal moral choices shaped by self-identity (2011). In general, violence can be very costly to individual interests by inciting revenge and disrupting mutual-benefit systems (Straus 2012). Several studies point that individual violence is most often committed in situations of high risk and fear (e.g. Collins 2008; Straus 2006), or when faced with peer or vertical pressure (e.g. Milgram 1974; Zimbardo 2007; Browning 1998; Costa and Kahn 2008).
Meso-level sources of restraint follow a more institutionalist approach and focus on group dynamics. As such, a recurrent factor emphasised in the literature on restraint is the role of civilians in shaping armed actors’ behaviour. In their work on genocide, both Helen Fein and Timothy Longman argue that civil-society organisations, particularly religious institutions, can be instrumental in either facilitating or restricting violence, though they were not capable of supressing it neither in Nazi- occupied Europe (Fein 1984) nor in Rwanda (Longman 2011). Robinson (2009) shows that non- governmental organisations can offer a platform to de-escalate violence, mainly through information exchange between national and international actors. Dependence on material support from local communities, as argued by Weinstein (2007), is also a source of restraint. In comparison to what he calls “opportunistic rebellions”, “activist” rebel groups depend on cooperative interaction with civilians for material support, such as provisions, shelter, and recruitment, and therefore have more incentives for restraint. Similarly, Wilkinson (2004) found that dependence on political support (i.e. votes) from civilians creates incentives to protect the group’s constituency. International actors, such as peacekeeping forces, have also shown to be effective at limiting violence against civilians mainly by
14 increasing the costs of violence (e.g. Fjelde et al. 2018; Fortna 2008; Hegre et al. 2015; Hultman et al. 2013).
On the macro-level, studies in the realm of political sciences emphasize the costs of repressive violence (e.g. Robinson and Acemoglu 2006). Indiscriminate violence may trigger community, domestic and international condemnation and influence the level of support to violent groups. Mass-scale violence against civilians also entails opportunity costs, as significant resources have to be diverted from other efforts such as offensive campaigns against a military opponent (Straus 2012). Less obvious, however, are indirect costs of large-scale violence, such as decreased mutually-beneficial exchanges between groups (Chirot and McCauley 2010), impact on international trade (Harff 2003) or general economic disruption of economic activities (Straus 2012). Democratic political institutions may be an additional macro-level source of restraint. Democratic institutions, the argument goes, should be able to restraint the executive power in its pursuit of violent strategies (Horowitz 1976; Rummel 1994).
2.1.2 Explaining restraint on landmine use: a research gap
Previous scholarship has addressed the logic of violence and restraint for different patterns of violence against civilians, such as indiscriminate violence, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and gender-based and sexual violence. Similarly, scholars have concentrated in explaining compliance to humanitarian norms, focusing on, among other topics, child soldiering and the protection of prisoners of war, aid workers and other categories of non-combatants. While some scholars have developed general theoretical frameworks that could be generalized to other contexts, to my knowledge, only a small number of authors have just recently developed theoretical explanations of rebel restraint on landmine use (Gleditsch et al. 2018; Fazal and Konaev 2019). Those authors, however meaningfully contributing to the scarce academic literature on the topic, take a rather narrow measure of restraint as commitment and compliance to a total ban on landmines.
Landmines are inherently indiscriminate weapons which remain active long after conflicts have ended. By design, anti-personnel landmines aim not to kill but to maim the enemy, so that the wounded and agonizing soldier would further consume the enemy’s resources and decrease their morale. Coupled with its secretive and unpredictable nature, landmines are highly effective in creating a permanent condition of uncertainty and fear. Whether they are placed to directly target civilians or as the result of the fighting between the warring parties, landmines can cause significant harm to civilians and lead
15 to disruption in the social fabric of affected communities. In addition to the physical harm leading to death and permanent disabilities to survivors, psychological trauma, fear, and stress are widespread in mine-affected populations. Communities also suffer collectively by restricted access to livelihoods, key infrastructure, water sources, and either forced to move or impeded to return to their homes because of not only the actual presence of landmines, but also the fear of their presence (UN 2018b).
Given its nature, landmine use considerably differs from other forms of violence against civilians, such as indiscriminate or sexual violence. First, the use of landmines entails significant group capacity mainly in terms of logistic and coordination capabilities. It follows that landmine use should reflect some strategic, rather than opportunistic, reasoning. Second, due to their static nature, landmines mostly bring about geographically localized effects. In relation to violence against civilians, it means that landmines are more likely to affect specific groups of people depending on where they are placed. Third, most landmines remain active long after conflicts have ended, when virtually all mine victims are non-combatants. Accounting for this longstanding and usually delayed effect on civilians requires long-term perspective and strategic thinking. Fourth, taking all the previous points into consideration, civilians may be either the direct target of mines or the collateral damage of actions against the other warring parties; however, even in the latter case, the armed groups should have accepted the risk of civilians falling victims of their mines.
Having said that, existing theories on restraint and compliance need to be adapted or reframed when examining landmine use. For this purpose, however, it is first necessary to conceptualise what restraint on landmine use is and how it can vary.
2.2 Conceptualising restraint on landmine use
As a concept, restraint on landmine use can be divided in two components. First, landmine use reflects how landmines are employed by NSAGs. Landmine use varies in different categories, namely in its strategy, type of device, trigger mechanism, location, frequency, and record-keeping, marking and information-sharing, as it will be further discussed below. Second, restraint is understood throughout this thesis as deliberate behaviour to restrict the use of violence. Civilians are thus victimised by unrestrained violence either by direct one-sided violence or by the collateral damage of the conflict. Therefore, in this study, the level of restraint on landmine use should vary depending on how landmine use reflects restraint behaviour.
16 2.2.1 Strategy
The reasons behind landmine use may vary widely depending on the conflict context. Factors such as the level of power asymmetry, the phase of the conflict, the extent of territorial control, the availability of landmines, and the knowledge in producing improvised explosive devices may all influence the strategy behind the use of landmines. Nonetheless, a 2005 Geneva Call report identified four main strategies guiding mine use, namely defensive, offensive, economic gain and nuisance mining (Sjöberg 2005).
In defensive strategies, landmines aim to deter an enemy attack and restrict access to particular areas or routes of military value. Among non-state armed groups, landmines are usually used for defensive purposes in the protection of camps and arm caches, or for slowing down the movement of enemy troops. Mines may also be laid following a defensive rationale for the protection of group’s constituency, family members or key individuals (Sjöberg 2005). Landmines can also serve an offensive strategy, when their end goal is to kill or maim the opposing force. They also serve an offensive function when laid as part of an offensive strategy, such as to block escape routes during ambushes and counterattacks, or in direct targeting of government forces or individuals (Sjöberg 2005). When employed under an economic gain strategy, mines do not serve any direct military purpose, but economic interests. Landmines are often laid to protect an important source of revenue such as coca crops in Latin America or diamond and gold mines in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in some cases, NSAGs may use landmines to directly extract revenues from the population, such as charging road tolls or extorsion fees (Sjöberg 2005). Other types of mine use that serve no direct military or economic purpose are sometimes labelled nuisance mining. This strategy has been used to disrupt access to and the rebuilding of key infrastructure. Landmine use that is aimed deliberately at civilians in order to empty territories, deny use of basic facilities, displace communities, isolate a region, or simply spread terror also falls under this category (Sjöberg 2005).
In the spectrum of level of restraint, it follows that the offensive use of landmines represents the least harmful strategy towards civilians, followed by defensive, economic gain and nuisance mining.
2.2.2 Type of device
There are several possible categories used to identify landmines. Following the Ottawa Convention’s effects-based definition (UN 1997), mines may serve different purposes depending on their main target. The most common type of landmine are anti-personnel (AP) and anti-vehicle (AV, also referred to
17 as “anti-tank” or “AT” mines) and are respectively designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle. The so-called booby traps, usually put in the same category of anti- personnel landmines, are explosive devices disguised as otherwise harmless objects.
Although other types of mine exist, in this study I will limit the classification of the type of device to anti-personnel, anti-vehicle mines and booby traps, which are the focus of the main treaties restricting landmine use and are arguably more disruptive to civilian life than other types. Whether the device is factory-made or improvised will not be taken into account when discussing restraint on landmine use, as it is more likely to be a reflex of logistic capabilities and access to landmines than a strategic decision to limit their effects on civilians.
In this regard, it is implied that higher levels of restraint are exercised when rebel groups use anti- vehicle landmines, followed by anti-personnel, and lastly booby traps.
2.2.3 Trigger mechanisms
Mines can be activated by a wide variety of trigger mechanisms, such as pressure, pull, tension release, pressure release, vibration, magnetic, frequency, audio frequency, delayed action, electrical, or a combination of those (USA 1959). In relation to civilian harm, however, what matters most is whether the explosive device is victim-activated or command-detonated.
Regardless of the exact type of trigger mechanism, civilians face significantly more risk if the device is victim-activated, that is, if the device is designed to detonate by the victim only, without any external action. Command-detonated explosive devices, on the other hand, are monitored and set off by an operator at a given time, thus avoiding unnecessary collateral damage (USA 1959). That is not to say that command-detonated explosive devices present no risk whatsoever to civilians. First, they can be used to directly target civilians, for example, in terrorist attacks. Second, especially in the case of improvised devices, if they fail to detonate, the devices are left as an explosive hazard threatening the population (GC 2011).
Restraint on landmine use is thus reflected on the explosive device’s trigger mechanism, where the use of command-detonated devices represents a higher level of restraint in comparison with victim- activated devices.
18 2.2.4 Location
The location of landmines depends mostly in their strategic use. However, in comparison to government forces, non-state armed groups often have less capacity to lay large quantities of mines, and, instead of large and coherent minefields, NSAGs tend to place mines in strategic places (GC 2007b). Rebel groups are also more likely to deploy landmines more indiscriminately near civilian- dense areas (Kurklick and Wall 2010). Conversely, landmines resulting from interstate conflicts are more likely placed along national borders in more restricted areas, thus reducing their humanitarian impact (GC 2007b). It follows that whether landmines are laid in areas with higher or lower risk to civilians can thus indicate different levels of restraint by rebel groups.
2.2.5 Frequency
The frequency in use of landmines varies significantly among non-state armed groups. While some employ mines and other explosive devices as their weapon of choice, others use them only sporadically, given a specific “need” or context in the conflict (Sjöberg 2005). Again, frequency may be subject not to specific strategy or policy, but to contextual factors, such as group capacity, access to landmines, conflict dynamics, among others. Nonetheless, restraint on landmine use can also be demonstrated by the frequency rebel groups lay mines or other similar explosive devices. It follows that the lower the frequency of use, the higher the level of restraint.
2.2.6 Record-keeping, marking and information-sharing
When compared to professional militaries, non-state armed groups are less likely to follow international marking standards3 for their minefields (Sjöberg 2006a). For civilians, this means increased risk in inadvertently walking through minefields and increased costs in future mine clearance. Likewise, rebel minefields usually do not follow conventional patterns, as the mines are randomly laid (GC 2007b; Kurklick and Wall 2010). However, according to a Geneva Call report, at least 30 non- state armed groups had engaged in 2006 in some kind of information-sharing or mine risk education to affected communities (Sjöberg 2006a). Therefore, restraint on landmine use should be reflected
3 As per article 5 of the 1996 Mines Protocol (UN 1996).
19 also on whether minefields and mined areas are marked, and on how information about them is recorded and shared.
2.2.7 Direct restraint
In addition to the restraint in relation to the use of landmines, direct forms of restraint can also be found on the non-use of landmines. Direct restraint can be exercised by rebel groups in codes of conduct, internal policies, trainings, and doctrines, as well as in unilateral declarations, ceasefire arrangements or peace agreements. As an example, the Colombian National Liberation Army’s code of conduct explicitly mention the duty to inform the civilian population of the location of mined areas (Rojas 1998; IRRC 2011); and the Libyan National Transition Council’s internal procedures protects detainees from being used in mine clearance activities (IRRC 2011). Conversely, some rebel groups might not formally restrict their use of landmines but do so in practice. Other groups, however, might use landmines and other explosive devices in a virtually unrestrained way, as in terrorist tactics.
2.3 Explaining variation in restraint on landmine use
Current theories on restraint, i.e. the behaviour that indicates deliberate action to limit the use of violence, range from a rationalist to a more sociological approach. On the one hand, restraint may be the product of a rational examination of different economic, political, and military interests. In this calculation, armed groups consider factors such as their self-image as perceived by their constituency and other stakeholders (e.g. the international community) as well as the military advantage that the use of certain weapons or tactics may provide them (Bangerter 2011). On the other hand, restraint may be influenced by organisational factors, such as military culture, and both formal and informal socialisation mechanisms (Bell 2016). Likewise, recent research presented by the International Committee of the Red Cross found that NSAGs’ behaviour towards violence or restraint is the product of their sources of authority, beliefs, traditions and the group members themselves (ICRC 2018). Finally, contextual factors could lead to a lesser exercise of violence, but not necessarily mean genuine restraint. Because this study is ultimately intended to understand the reasons of restraint, it is important to point what restraint is not.
Accordingly, this section will first discuss contextual factors that may lead to decreased landmine use and then, mirroring the two main approaches, present potential restraint factors clustered as strategic and
20 moral incentives. This section is organised under an original typology developed for this study, based on different theories on restraint and compliance adapted to landmine use, as well as insights and intuitions drawn from practitioners.
2.3.1 Contextual factors
Not all non-state armed groups are able to employ landmines and not all reduction in landmine use necessarily means genuine restraint. A common example of this is the seasonal use of landmines, which are only seldom laid during winter in case of frozen soil or heavy snowfall (e.g. HRW 1997). Furthermore, as previously argued, the systematic use of landmines requires significant logistic capability and group cohesion; therefore, a non-state armed group with decreased group capacity could also display reduced use of landmines (ICRC 2018). Likewise, decreased access to landmines and other explosive components, as well as technical expertise in production of handmade mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), will limit landmine use. Finally, landmine use may be reduced due to evolving conflict dynamics, as non-state actors experiencing major victories are more likely to reduce landmine use (Sjöberg 2005). Unrestrained behaviour may also be subject to other dynamics, even if the rebel leadership is committed to limit the use of violence. Reasons for unrestrained behaviour and non-compliance include conflicting military training and doctrine (Carswell 2014), absence of political training (Green 2013, 2016, 2017; Oppenheim and Weintraub 2017), and principal-agent problems (Hooper 2004).
2.3.2 Strategic incentives
Although seemingly counterintuitive, landmine use may inflict significant military and economic costs on rebels. First, rebels are constantly victimized by their own mines, either during the production of improvised devices, when laying landmines, or unwillingly activating them after they have been laid. Own casualties are arguably largely underreported due to the rebels’ interests in portraying the image of a professional and cohesive group. However, the National Democratic Front in Myanmar, for example, stated that up to 80% of its handmade mine manufacturers died during when assembling improvised landmines (Moser-Puangsuwan 2001). Likewise, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s Army (SPLM/A) is believed to have suffered significant casualties from their own mines
21 (GC 2004). In those cases, exercising restraint on landmine use is a matter of safety and morale for the rebel group’s own ranks, continuity of operations, and the armed group’s very survival.
Second, particularly in the cases where non-state armed groups hold control of territory, using landmines in the land rebels are fighting for entails an inherent contradiction, as mine contamination and future mine clearance might be excessively costly (McGrath 2001). Furthermore, non-state armed groups may be economically dependent on the revenues of the land, in which case denying access to it with landmines would decrease their revenues. Thus, it is expected that rebels would avoid contaminating productive land in their own territory.
A second category of strategic incentives to restraint are political and reputational costs. Landmine use can influence how the non-state armed group is perceived by its constituency, as well as other domestic and international audiences. Civilian support has long been considered a central determinant of civil war outcomes (Duyvesteyn 2018), as civilians provide recruits, food, information, and safe hiding places. It follows that dependence on civilian support creates restraint on the level of one-sided violence (Weinstein 2007) as well as incentives to protect the armed group’s constituency (Wilkinson 2004). Under a similar logic, de la Calle (2017) argues that civilian victimisation is driven by rebel strength, in the sense that weaker rebels would seek civilian support.
Furthermore, local communities are particularly vulnerable to landmines and other explosive devices. Especially in rebel-controlled areas, civilians have less access to medical facilities, thus increasing the lethality of mine accidents (Walker 2001). A NSAG in Myanmar, for instance, has allegedly changed their mine use policy after realizing that up to 30 percent of the mine victims came from the rebels’ own ethnic group (Moser-Puangsuwan 2001). As a direct consequence of victimisation, individual and collective traumas, lack of access to livelihoods, and loss of property, local communities could decrease support to the armed group (McGrath 2001). It is possible that the decreased support is particularly targeted to the NSAG’s landmine policy and not the group as a whole, demanding the group to restrict their use of landmines and demine certain areas, as for example observed in Colombia (GC et al. 2009) and Senegal (GC and APRAN-SDP 2010).
Civilian victimisation also entails significant reputational costs to other domestic and international audiences, particularly towards “human rights-conscious audiences” (Jo 2015). Abiding to a shared legal framework – such as international law – plays in favour of rebel groups’ perceived political legitimacy. Exercising restraint on landmine use, therefore, entails compliance to international (and
22 sometimes domestic) law (Coronel-Ferrer 2001; Kurklick and Wall 2010) and could increase the likelihood of external support, political participation, and leverage in negotiations. As an example, Herr found that SPLM/A adhered to the landmine ban due to transnational pressure and fear of legitimacy loss (2010).
Likewise, compliance with a coherent legal framework may ensure practical and legal securities to the rebel group, in particular to its leadership, such as granting the legal status of combatants and reciprocity in treatment by government forces (Jo 2015). Accordingly, a recent study led by Kristian Gleditsch shows that decisions to commit to a landmine ban by both governments and NSAGs are mutually dependent. The authors propose a game-theoretic model to understand why both actors would first commit to the ban and, then, adhere to it in practice (Gleditsch et al. 2018). Likewise, Tanisha Fazal and Margarita Kovaev have demonstrated that groups that seek international recognition and have a strong military capacity are more likely to commit to a landmine ban (Fazal and Konaev 2019; Konaev and Fazal 2018). Similar to the previous points raised in this section, their argument focus on reputation costs and benefits of compliance to international norms in comparison to the military utility of landmines and other methods of war.
In the same vein, rebel leaders may fear criminal indictment for ordering the use of anti-personnel landmines. Accordingly, a report has found that rebel groups are more likely to exert restraint on landmine use in countries where the use of landmines and other similar victim-activated explosive devices has been criminalised by domestic law (Sjöberg 2005). The effectiveness of criminal justice in fostering compliance, however, is still debated (e.g. Jenks and Acquaviva 2014).
It is worth noting that the abovementioned strategic incentives are interconnected. Political and reputational costs may have direct impact on material support from both the rebel group’s constituency and domestic and international audiences, thus compounding to military and economic costs. Similarly, decreased military efficiency could lead to decreased political support.
2.3.3 Moral incentives
As suggested by Straus (2012), restraint may also derive from genuine commitment to humanitarian principles, whether they are based on humanitarian norms or the group’s own values, beliefs, and traditions.
23 As a baseline, indiscriminate violence is condemned in virtually all cultures, so it is expected that armed groups should avoid unnecessary civilian casualties, unless otherwise justified. Likewise, moral obligation has been found to influence decision-making even over material costs and strategic interests (Kreps and Maxey 2018).
Sanín and Wood (2014) explore the role of ideology in shaping rebel violence and restraint. Specific ideological and religious motivations can further influence increased restraint and compliance to humanitarian norms (Al-Dawoody 2017; ICRC 2018). The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA, commonly referred to as the Taliban), for instance, officially considered the use of landmines “an un- Islamic and anti-human act”, which “would be punished in accordance with Islamic Law” (IEA 1998, 1–2). Similarly, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army – Alex Buncayao Brigade and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of the Philippines issued a joint statement renouncing the use of landmines on ideological grounds:
We believe, therefore, that the destruction of lives and properties, as a consequence of armed conflict, is an antithesis to our desire for a better world. We believe that while we are fighting to achieve full human development and social progress, we must respect the lives of the people and of nature — uphold and promote human rights and protect the environment. So, based on our politico-military orientation, we always plan that there will be no single civilian that will be damaged in our military operations against the state, the oppressor. The use of anti-personnel mines, as a weapon for destruction, has been proven to have been extremely prejudicial to lives and safety (SCBL et al. 2001, 87–88).
Restraint may also be driven by interaction with potential victims. In Colombia, for instance, rebel groups oftentimes voluntarily marked mine areas or engaged in mine clearance to preserve the communities where they operated. Arguably, genuine interest in protecting civilians from the effects of landmines comes from ethnic and family ties, as well as continued interaction with the communities (GC et al. 2009).
Knowledge and acceptance of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law may also genuinely lead to restraint on landmine use. Practitioners have found that sustained engagement with non-state armed actors, in particular through education and awareness raising on humanitarian norms, constitutes an important step towards restraint on landmine use (Moser- Puangsuwan 2004; Reusse-Decrey 2005). State and non-state armed actors alike often lack long-term perspective on the humanitarian consequences of their own actions, hence the change in behaviour after engaging with human rights and humanitarian norms advocates (Sjöberg 2007). In Myanmar, for instance, the Karen National Union, a rebel group and landmine user, agreed to cooperate with mine
24 action organisations after a series of meetings conveying the relevance of international humanitarian law (Moser-Puangsuwan 2004).
2.3.4 Summary of incentives for restraint on landmine use
In short, reduced landmine use does not necessarily mean restraint, as it may be the result of other contextual factors, such as variation in logistics, technical expertise, weather, group cohesion and conflict dynamics (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Contextual factors influencing reduction in landmine use.
Genuine restraint may have different roots. In practice, it is unlikely that restraint is the product of only one influencing factor or that those factors act in isolation from each other. However, for the sake of simplicity, I have clustered the possible influencing factors for restraint on landmine use in strategic and moral incentives in the factors tree below (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Influencing factors for restraint on landmine use.
25 In this study, however, I will focus on one specific incentive influencing restraint which, I argue, has the most impact in non-state armed groups, i.e. legitimacy. In the next section I will present and develop the claim of why legitimacy plays a central role in influencing restraint over the other factors.
26 3 The centrality of legitimacy-seeking in rebel restraint
This section develops the main theoretical argument of this thesis and then focuses on one part of a broader causal chain, namely the relationship between legitimacy-seeking behaviour and rebel restraint on landmine use. It starts by arguing for the centrality of legitimacy-seeking as well as focusing on the main causal mechanism and its resulting hypothesis. Next, it conceptualises the independent variable influencing restraint on landmine use and explicates the scope conditions and contributions to the literature of the argument.
3.1 Theoretical argument
Among the different sources of restraint presented in the previous section, building on previous theories of rebel restraint and compliance (Fazal and Konaev 2019; Gleditsch et al. 2018; Jo 2015), I argue that the costs resulting from legitimacy loss are particularly significant to rebel decision-making and therefore should play a central role in influencing restraint on landmine use. As argued before, the systematic use of landmines depends on significant group capacity. It follows that landmine use – or restraint on it – is first a strategic choice stemming from the rebel leadership. Hence, to exert restraint, non-state armed groups should strategically decide that the costs of landmine use outweigh its benefits. In other words, the costs resulting from legitimacy loss should be perceived as higher than the military utility of landmines.
Legitimacy can be defined as “a particular quality that is conferred upon a social or political entity by those who are subject to it or part of it, thus granting it authority” (Bellina et al. 2009, 3). Thus, the most relevant “subjects” in understanding the sources of legitimacy for rebel groups are, as argued by Jo (2015), their constituency, domestic audiences, and international audiences. First, the importance of popular support to insurgencies has been widely studied. Rebel groups most often depend on their constituency for both material and non-material support, such as manpower, funding, materiel, intelligence, sanctuary and general compliance and obedience (Arjona 2017; Davis et al. 2012; Kitzen 2017). Second, building on Jo’s argument that “civil wars are more than armed conflicts” (2015, 16), more than purely military means, rebel groups need support from their domestic audiences in order to achieve their political goal, whether it is over territory or government issues. Relevant domestic stakeholders include the state government, political parties, civil society, private sector, among others. In practice, rebels’ perceived legitimacy allows them to engage in political negotiations, establish
27 political alliances, and enhance their public image (Schlichte and Schneckener 2015). Finally, rebel groups engage with international audiences for several reasons. Foreign sponsors can be not only a valuable source of material support, such as funding and weapons, but also political, ideological, and moral support. This is particularly relevant for non-state armed groups aligned with global movements and seeking recognition by and accession to the international community.
Echoing humanitarian and mine action practitioners (e.g. SCBL et al. 2001; ICBL/NSAWG and GC 2003), I argue that civilian victimisation caused by landmines leads to political and reputational costs for rebels, in particular on their perceived legitimacy. The relationship between civilian victimisation and decreased legitimacy of armed groups has been well recorded and studied in different contexts, such as Latin America (e.g. Wood 2003; Arjona and Kalyvas 2011) and Eastern Europe (e.g. Petersen 2006), although most often than not in explaining rebel recruitment due to violence perpetrated by government forces. Legitimacy has long been considered a key determinant of civil war outcomes, being central to most rebel and government strategies (Duyvesteyn 2018). In addition, legitimacy- seeking behaviour has shown significant influence on rebel compliance to international norms (Jo 2015).
In short, the effects of decreased legitimacy should spill over onto different other areas, including losses in both material and non-material support and decreased leverage in political negotiations. Thus, non-state armed groups will more likely perceive a decrease in the utility of landmines and exert restraint on landmine use. According to this argument, restraint is exercised in a direct relation to the armed group’s perceived political and moral legitimacy by its stakeholders. It follows that NSAGs should acknowledge the benefits of exerting restraint on landmine use to avoid related costs and maximize support to their cause.
Although landmines have been traditionally considered an indispensable weapon of war, especially given the power asymmetry between rebels and governments, the effectiveness to achieve their military purpose is largely overestimated. Evidence indicates that, even when used on a massive scale, landmines have usually yielded little or no effect on the outcome of hostilities (ICRC 1997). Considering that, in practice, landmines are not an essential weapon of war, legitimacy costs stemming from landmine use should decrease the perception of their effectiveness, finally leading armed groups to exercise restraint.
28 Implicit in this argument is the assumption that non-state armed groups have an initial perception of landmine effectiveness. This might come from the symbolic status of landmines, but it also follows from logical deduction. Even when disregarding the costs stemming from the effects of landmine use, the process of acquiring, producing, and laying landmines can be significantly costly to rebels and they would not undertake those efforts unless perceived to be in their favour.
It follows that after non-state armed actors do employ landmines, I assume some degree of civilian victimisation as a consequence of landmine use. The effects of landmines on civilians can of course be minimal, but I argue that even the most limited use of landmines – such as the offensive use of command-detonated anti-vehicle mines in unpopulated areas – still presents a threat to civilian life, due to the device’s intrinsic risk of failure and the permanence of an explosive hazard.
It is also expected that decreased legitimacy due to civilian victimisation could have a delayed effect on restraint on landmine use, given the conflict dynamics. Armed groups do not necessarily predict the full extent of the costs of landmine use and only realize it after civilians are victimised by their landmines. Restraint is, the argument follows, a delayed effect of landmine use, meaning that it does not necessarily require a change in legitimacy-seeking behaviour to occur. Figure 3 summarises the causal chain implied in this argument.
Figure 3. Causal chain.
In short, the rest of this thesis will focus on the relationship between the variables of interest, rather than on following the causal mechanism leading to restraint on landmine use. This focus is justified given the exploratory nature of this study and lack of previous research, in addition to time and resource constraints. The main argument of the causal mechanism is that rebel groups experience decreased legitimacy once civilians are victimised by landmine; in turn, the perception of landmines effectiveness is decreased. It follows that legitimacy-seeking groups would attempt to minimise legitimacy costs and thus exercise restraint on landmine use. Deriving from the proposed causal mechanism, I will assess the hypothesis that the more legitimacy-seeking behaviour rebel groups display, the more likely they are to exercise restraint on landmine use.
29 The definition of legitimacy-seeking behaviour follows Jo’s conceptualisation (2015). Rebel groups seek legitimacy as a strategic goal to obtain governing authority in local, national, or international politics. Rebels are also dependent on legitimacy to safeguard whatever material and non-material support is required to pursue their cause. In sum, legitimacy is both the goal and the means of a rebel group and is intrinsically connected to the group’s political goals, relationship with its constituencies, and sources of support. As argued by Jo, it follows that “the link between legitimacy-seeking behaviours and compliance behaviours lies in a rebel group’s governing history and their relationship with core constituencies both at home and abroad” (Jo 2015, 92).
3.2 Scope conditions
This argument should hold valid under specific scope conditions. Central to this thesis is the puzzle of why rebels exercise restraint on landmine use when there are incentives not to. Landmine use is often justified as a necessary weapon, given the military power asymmetry between rebel groups and government forces. Therefore, the suggested mechanism of rebel restraint on landmine use is more likely to work in intrastate conflicts, in comparison with interstate and non-state conflicts.
It has been previously argued that using landmines requires some degree of logistic capabilities, technical expertise, and group cohesion. Following ICRC’s typology for non-state armed groups (2018), mostly centralised – and not decentralised or community-embedded – NSAGs meet those conditions.
Finally, international law has experienced major developments in the previous decades, in particular regarding landmine use. Major benchmarks in this context are the adoption of the 1996 Mines Protocol (UN 1996) and the Ottawa Convention (UN 1997) by most countries. Because unrestrained use of landmines has become highly stigmatised, rebel legitimacy is more likely to be influenced by norm-compliant behaviour in recent conflicts. In short, I argue that the proposed argument is more likely to hold for post-Cold War conflicts, than for earlier conflicts.
3.3 Contribution to the literature
This theoretical argument expands previous analyses of rebel compliance and restraint to the often- overlooked phenomenon of landmine use. Even though landmine use shares many similarities with
30 other forms of violence against civilians, it deserves its own focus and theoretical propositions because of its unique nature. Landmine use requires significant group capacity, its collateral damage is assumed, and its effects on civilians are geographically localized, long-term, and often delayed. Moreover, this study further adds nuance to compliance to international norms by looking into other forms of restraint on landmine use. In this regard, the conceptualisation of restraint on landmine use offers a novel baseline for future studies.
31 4 Research design
Section 4 describes the research design used for this research. It starts by presenting and justifying the selected methodology and case selection strategy. Next, it operationalises the dependent and independent variables. The section then continues with a presentation of the data sources and structure of analysis to be used in this study.
4.1 Method and case selection strategy
In order to empirically test the suggested hypothesis, this thesis uses the method of structured focused comparison, where both the dependent and independent variables are measured according to a pre- defined set of questions across different cases. This method is appropriate for the current hypothesis given that it restricts the analysis to a particular aspect of interest in a particular time frame. It also allows for comparable data collection and analysis (George and Bennett 2005).
Furthermore, the comparative aspect of structured focused comparison is necessary to measure and analyse variation of restraint on landmine use among different cases. The case selection strategy for this thesis follows the exploratory most-similar design (or method of difference), i.e. cases with similar background conditions, but with different outcomes and unknown causal factors (Gerring 2006; Gerring and Cojocaru 2016). The choice of a qualitative design over a large-N study is based on the relatively scarce data on landmine use and the exploratory nature of this research. Because this thesis deals with a rather underexplored topic and aims to contribute to theory building, a qualitative design is used to allow for a more detailed analysis and opportunities to refine its theoretical propositions.
4.1.1 Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis of this study is the non-state armed group. In practice, this means that data on the dependent and independent variables will be measured and analysed aggregated up to the group level, and, for comparison purposes, viewed as existing at one single point in time. There are several disadvantages and advantages that arise from this.
To start with, rebel groups are often fluid institutions. Splintering factions, shifting leadership and changing organizational structures are inherent to most non-state armed groups (Jo 2015). While group-level aggregated data does not capture the nuance of different fronts or evolving dynamics, it
32 does provide a clearer baseline for comparison for several reasons (Kenny 1996). First, the main interest of this inquire is in group behaviour; second, I do not expect significant within-case variation in legitimacy-seeking behaviour, but rather a lagged effect of civilian victimisation in rebels’ perceived legitimacy; third, as an exploratory study, this research opts for simpler measurement and analysis methods. Nonetheless, case-specific analyses will be done to account for some of this nuance, though it does not allow for cross-case comparison.
It is not in the scope of this study to dive into individual-level explanations of restraint or violence, but rather focus on group-level decisions and collective action. The choice of the group as the unit of analysis thus implies that behaviour is attributed to a collective entity, rather than to its members. This is justified by the fact that decisions on restraint on landmine use are most likely taken by the rebel group leadership and therefore it can be assumed to influence group action.
4.1.2 Conditions
Following the scope conditions of my theoretical argument outlined in the previous section, the population of cases was selected from dyadic conflicts from the post-Cold War period involving one non-state armed group and one government – that is, intrastate conflicts – in which landmines were systematically employed as a method of war.
The post-Cold War period indicates the consolidation, proliferation, and expansion of international humanitarian norms, particularly in relation to violence in internal conflicts. The period experienced a growing number of rebel groups engaging with humanitarian and human rights organisations, as well as the criminal indictment of rebel leaders under new accountability norms (Jo 2015). Moreover, it is during this period that the public awareness rose against anti-personnel landmines and the most relevant legal instruments in limiting or banning their use were established (UN 1996, 1997, 2008).
In accordance with the most-similar case study design, the selected cases should present maximum variation of the dependent variable and minimum variation of background factors (Gerring 2006; Gerring and Cojocaru 2016). Ideally, the sample of cases should include rebel groups with both low and high levels of restraint on landmine use, which are similar in both contextual factors and strategic and moral incentives other than the main explanatory variable for this research, i.e. legitimacy-seeking behaviour.
33 4.1.3 Background factors
In order to maximize the effects of legitimacy-seeking behaviour on restraint on landmine use, other potential restraint sources should be controlled for in the case selection. The first of those are the contextual factors that might lead to the decrease of landmine use, but not necessarily genuine restraint. Those factors are: weather, logistics, technical expertise, group cohesion, and conflict dynamics. While holding the unit of analysis in the group level reduces the effects of weather conditions and evolving conflict dynamics, the selected cases should show sufficient levels of logistic capacity, relevant technical expertise, and group cohesion. Some aspects of conflict dynamics, such as government responses and military action, are also controlled by holding constant the government against the rebel groups fight against.
After realizing that their landmines are causing civilian victimisation, rebel groups could exercise restraint due to moral incentives or in pursuing legal securities. Therefore, the selected cases should present significant levels of one-sided violence or other cases of non-compliance with humanitarian norms, regardless the level of restraint on landmine use, meaning that the groups do not exercise restraint solely based on moral grounds nor for fear of criminal indictment.
The effects of other strategic incentives in restraint on landmine use, such as expected land use and rebels’ own casualties, are harder to isolate due to data collection challenges. First, rebel might have incentives for not laying landmine in areas they currently use or have interest in using in the future. Information on land use and how it may influence the decision of laying mines is barely available; and, although actual and expected land use could be measured and estimated by detailed conflict analyses, it deserves a study of its own. Second, rebels’ own casualties due to landmines are hardly reported by rebels themselves, who have incentives to omit their casualties, in order not to signal weakness to other warring parties. As such, those factors remain as potential alternative explanations for variation in restraint on landmine use.
4.1.4 Population and selected cases
The population of cases, i.e. landmine-user non-state armed groups, was drawn from the compilation of different databases on landmine use, non-state actors, and general conflict data. As a baseline, according to an initial assessment, at least 72 NSAGs were alleged or confirmed landmine users (Sjöberg 2005). Additional relevant data on group and conflict characteristics, rebel compliance and
34 landmine use for those groups were taken mainly from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Harbom et al. 2008; Pettersson and Eck 2018), the Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham et al. 2009), and the Rebel Groups and International Law database (Jo 2015).
Following a most-similar case selection strategy, I have selected three non-state armed groups active in the Philippines, namely, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the New People’s Army (see Appendix I). While this design is usually used only with two cases, the groups display a wide range of commonalities in terms of background factors, and an initial assessment shows significant variation on restraint on landmine use. Most significantly, all three cases are centralised non-state armed groups engaged in minor or intermediate conflicts against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP); they display moderate levels of command and control and low arms procurement and fighting capabilities (Cunningham et al. 2009; Harbom et al. 2008; Pettersson and Eck 2018). They all occur in the territory of the Philippines, which is signatory to the Ottawa Convention and the Mines Protocol (ICBL-CMC 2019; ICRC 2019) and has thus criminalised the indiscriminate use of landmines in its territory.
The cases differ, however, in type of incompatibility, ideology, group size, and relative strength in relation to the GRP. Likewise, all the three cases have a record of one-sided violence or non- compliance to international norms, but to different degrees (Jo 2015). Those differences, though certainly able to influence patterns of landmine use, should be reflected in the groups’ legitimacy- seeking behaviour, and thus indirectly accounted for. Whereas ideology and group size should reflect the relationship with its constituency; the type of incompatibility mirrors its relationship with the government and other domestic actors; and the relative strength of rebel groups is linked to the support received from foreign actors.
Regarding restraint on landmine use, according to an initial assessment (Sjöberg 2005; JMU/CISR 2004), MILF has shown a high level of restraint by committing to a total ban on landmines through Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment (MILF 2002); NPA displays a moderate level restraint, since it has agreed to respect human rights and humanitarian law (GRP and NDFP 1998), but still justifies the use of command-detonated explosive devices against government (Sjöberg 2005); finally, ASG displays a low level of restraint, since it has not shown any significant effort to minimise civilian casualties, and rather has directly targeted civilians using explosive devices (Sjöberg 2005).
35 4.2 Operationalisation
This subsection aims at operationalising the independent and dependent variables.
4.2.1 Independent variable: legitimacy-seeking behaviour
The operationalisation of legitimacy-seeking behaviour follows to a large extent Hyeran Jo’s (2015) conceptualisation, with slight modifications. Her model was designed for a mixed methods research design and employed four indicators for legitimacy-seeking behaviour, namely the existence of a legal political wing, political regime of opposing government, secessionist aim, and human rights influence in foreign state sponsorship. In this thesis, however, I take a less rigid and more nuanced conceptualisation of the independent variable, to allow for broader observation and analysis. In this sense, legitimacy-seeking behaviour shall be subdivided in three dimensions, namely the relationship of the armed group with its constituency, domestic audiences, and international audiences.
The relationship between rebels and their constituency has recently received a lot of attention by scholars on counterinsurgency. In this vein, I will borrow indicators of constituency support as suggested by Davis et al. (2012), namely recruitment, funding, and intelligence and sanctuary. Added to those, I include guidance from traditional or religious leaders, as pointed out in a recent ICRC report. (2018). The indicators for armed groups’ relationship with domestic audiences is fairly in line with Jo’s operationalisation of legitimacy-seeking behaviour (2015), with the added indicator for engagement in peace negotiations. Finally, building on Jo’s research design one more time, I divide her concept of foreign sponsors into states and non-governmental organisations. I choose to leave out support from diasporas given its recognised double-edged influence on peace and conflict (Smith and Stares 2007).
Each indicator may take the values yes, partially, or no, which are assigned a numeric value. The final overall level of legitimacy-seeking behaviour for each case will be determined by an average value of all indicators, according to a pre-determined scale (see Appendix II). Table 1 below summarises the operationalisation of legitimacy-seeking behaviour used in the empirical section of this thesis.
36 Table 1. Operationalisation of the independent variable: legitimacy-seeking behaviour.
In accordance with the operationalisation of the independent variable, the questions asked for each case are:
1. Is the group dependent on voluntary recruitment? 2. Is the group dependent on voluntary funding? In which ways? 3. Is the group reliant on civilian-provided intelligence? How is it usually obtained? Is the group dependent on sanctuary provided by local communities? 4. Is the group reliant on guidance from traditional or religious leaders? 5. Does the group have a political wing? 6. Is the group engaged in peace negotiations with the government or third parties? 7. Does the group have secessionist aims? 8. Does the group have human-rights conscious state sponsors? 9. Does the group interact with international NGOs?
4.2.2 Dependent variable: restraint on landmine use
Following the conceptualization of restraint on landmine use, variation in the dependent variable shall be measured by the level of restraint (low, moderate, or high), given specific indicators for landmine use, as specified in Subsection 2.2. The final level of restraint for each variation of landmine use is based on whether violence against civilians is inflicted directly or indirectly, and on whether collateral damage is accepted or avoided. The lowest observation for each indicator of restraint on landmine use will be taken as the aggregate-level value for that indicator. For example, if a rebel group employs landmines in both offensive (high level of restraint) and nuisance (low level of restraint) strategies, the value
37 considered for the indicator should be the lowest (low level of restraint). For the sake of cross-case comparison, each indicator will be assigned a numeric value, based on its level of restraint. The final overall level of restraint on landmine use for each case will be determined by an average value of all indicators, according to a pre-determined scale (see Appendix II). The operationalisation of restraint on landmine use can be summarised in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Operationalisation of the dependent variable: restraint on landmine use.
Reflecting the indicators above, the following questions will be posed for each case:
1. Which strategies on landmine use has the group applied during the conflict? 2. Which types of device were used? 3. Which trigger mechanisms were used? 4. Where were the landmines laid? 5. How often did the group employ landmines? 6. Were mine areas marked? 7. Does the group have restraint policies on landmine use?
38 4.3 Data sources
The focus of the empirical section of this thesis is to seek support for or refute the suggested hypothesis. This should be done by measuring variation in both the independent and the dependent variables. However, because of the exploratory nature of the research question, it is also important to look for evidence of the proposed causal mechanism.
The independent and dependent variables, i.e. legitimacy-seeking behaviour and restraint on landmine use, will be measured through a wide range of secondary sources, such as armed group profiles, official government reports, NGO and think tank publications, unilateral declarations, academic papers, journalistic accounts and others. This information can be complemented with primary data as descriptive statistics and interviews. Data on landmine use is by default inexact. It is always uncertain who laid it, when it was laid, what type of device exploded, and what has not exploded yet. Therefore, it becomes particularly important to speak to experts and other stakeholders to add nuance to hard data and tackle this uncertainty. The causal mechanism will also be investigated mainly through interviews with experts engaged in the Philippine context.
The main purpose of conducting interviews is to better understand the mechanisms leading to restraint on landmine use in each case. Six interviews were conducted with selected experts with considerable experience in engaging non-state armed actors in the Philippines and promoting restraint on landmine use. Participants were both expats and Philippine nationals (a list of the interviews conducted for this research is available in Appendix III). Interviews were conducted in English over Skype or in person, from 29 March to 17 May 2019.
4.4 Structure of analysis
Following the structured focused comparison method, the gathered data on each case will be presented and analysed in a structured manner. After a brief background on the cases, the same set of questions will be asked on the independent and dependent variables in order to determine the value of the indicators for each case. The presentation of the variables will follow the indicators established in their operationalisation in the previous section.
Next, the analysis section will start with a brief examination of the determined levels of the variables, their relationship, and the validity of the causal mechanism. This initial analysis is case-specific and
39 serves to identify correlation between legitimacy-seeking behaviour and restraint on landmine use. It is expected that additional influencing factors will be highlighted in this process, helping paint a better picture of the causes of variation in landmine use in each case.
Following this brief overview, the cross-case comparison analysis will proceed in four steps. First, the degree of legitimacy-seeking behaviour and restraint on landmine use for each case will be put in perspective in relation to the others, thus establishing an empirical ranking of the cases. Second, the ranked cases will then be compared with predicted outcome based on the proposed theory, in order to assess the explanatory power of the theoretical argument and the extent to which the hypothesis holds true. Third, I will consider the weight of alternative explanations in accounting variation in restraint on landmine use. Fourth, the last step deals with some limitations and potential biases in terms of theory, research design, and empirics.
40 5 Legitimacy-seeking and landmine use in the Philippines
Since its independence in 1946, armed opposition groups have challenged successive Philippine governments. In this context, many non-state armed groups have operated in the Philippines, ranging from large ideologically-driven and militarily strong to small opportunistic and criminal groups. The major internal armed conflicts revolved around two main insurgencies, the Communist and the Moro. The Communist insurgency is officially represented by the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), the “revolutionary united front organization of the Filipino people fighting for national freedom and for the democratic rights of the people” (NDFP 2018, 1). The main armed group within NDFP is the Communist Party of the Philippine’s (CPP) New People’s Army. The Moro insurgency in the Muslim part of Mindanao has for long been represented by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its splinter groups. Most recently, the most prominent groups in the Moro front is MILF for its political engagement, and ASG for its violent tactics (Santos et al. 2010).
Although the Philippines signed the Ottawa Convention on 3 December 1997, that was not enough to stop rebel groups from using landmines. In particular, the first half of 2000 witnessed increased rebel activity, including landmine use by three non-state armed groups: MILF, ASG, and NPA (ICBL- CMC 2001). This section will cover a brief overview of each of those armed group, their patterns of legitimacy-seeking behaviour and landmine use.
5.1 Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Concentrated in central Mindanao in southern Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is currently the largest rebel group in the country, with a peak of approximately 15,000 members. Its founder, Hashim Salamat, broke away from the secular-nationalist MNLF in 1977 because of differences in ideological orientation, political strategy, and ethnic allegiances, as well as personality clashes (Santos et al. 2010). MILF was formally announced in 1984 and shared many similarities with MNLF, especially in terms of ethnical composition and self-determination goals. However, in contrast with its predecessor, MILF’s official ideology is radical Islamic revivalism, which places Islam in the core of all social and political institutions. In short, MILF’s long-term goal is the establishment of an independent Islamic state in its homeland (Salamat 2001; MILF 2019).
41 5.1.1 Legitimacy-seeking behaviour
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front enjoys significant civilian support in southern Philippines, even though it has waned over time (Abuza 2005c; Podder 2012). From its start, it has permeated society by setting up a parallel government within its controlled areas (Wilson Jr. 2009). MILF’s authority is exercised through provincial, municipal and village committees whose chairmen are appointed upon consultation with local communities. The armed group convenes general consultations to encourage unified political positions and to demonstrate the level of local backing (Taya 2007).
MILF’s constituency base is the Bangsamoro people in central Mindanao, in particular the Islamized4 Maguindanao, Maranao, and Iranun ethnic groups in the provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Sur, and Lanao del Norte. However, MILF is also influential in other parts of Mindanao, including non-Muslim regions, such as the Zamboanga peninsula and Basilan island (Santos et al. 2010). Combatants are mainly voluntarily drawn from Moro men living in those areas, especially those affected by the conflict, and from internally displaced communities (Santos et al. 2010). In addition, it is estimated that, as of 2008, child soldiers constituted up to 15% of MILF’s strength (Makinano 2001; Özerdem, Podder, and Quitoriano 2010; Swanson 2011). The use of child soldiers was, in most cases, in support roles (Jo 2015). Even though forceful recruitment happened on a minor scale, according to Fajardo (2003), youth involvement in the jihad was seen as a collective obligation or duty and aligned with local societal norms. Even though MILF’s armed forces, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) is organised as a regular army, most fighters operate part- time, rotating between duty and training in military camps, and family and farm work in their villages (Scarpello 2007). According to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, MILF’s main source of funding is the collection of zakat (obligatory alms of Muslims) and extortion. In addition, local farmers support the group by providing food and other supplies to nearby units (Scarpello 2007). MILF also receives remittances of the Muslim Filipino diaspora, who are members from the United Overseas
Bangsamoro (Santos et al. 2010; Peleo 2013).
Since mid-1980s, MILF has maintained a network of fixed military camps, in a “semi-conventional warfare” doctrine. However, after the “all-out war” waged by the Philippine government in 2000, MILF lost all its fixed camps and had to shift to more mobile guerrilla operations. This was only
4 Islamized Maguindanao refers to the Maguindanao ethnic group converted to Islam.
42 possible because of sustained community support, especially in terms of information gathering and sanctuary (Santos et al. 2010).
MILF leadership is embodied in its Central Committee. This collective leadership body reflects the Islamic principle of shura (consultation) and has included traditional, secular and religious elites, though the latter often outnumber the others (Lingga 1997). Although BIAF stands as a separate body in MILF’s organisational structure, both bodies are usually referred to as a single entity. Moreover, the chairman of the Central Committee is also the commander-in-chief of the BIAF (Santos et al. 2010).
From a domestic perspective, MILF had experienced a series of recurrent hostilities with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and had consistently refused to formally enter the Philippine political system, such as through elections and political parties. However, MILF has at times engaged with the government in a series of formal negotiations, such as ceasefire and framework agreements and joint statements (e.g. GRP and MILF 1997b, 1997a, 2001, 2012). This finally led to the signature of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2014, paving the way to the creation of a new Muslim autonomous entity, and the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of MILF rebels (GRP and MILF 2014). The conditions set by the comprehensive agreement were later put into the Bangsamoro Organic Law, which has been approved by the Congress of the Philippines in July 2018 and confirmed by the January 2019 plebiscite (Bukit 2019). Most recently, in February 2019, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority was established and remains responsible for implementing the conditions set out by the agreement (Arguillas 2019). In its struggle for self-determination, MILF’s original stated goal was to establish an Islamic state completely independent from the Philippines. Only recently MILF has changed its interpretation of the extent of self-determination, making it possible to reach a power-sharing agreement in 2014.
On an international level, until the 1990s MILF has allegedly received weapons and other kinds of material support from Libya and Malaysia, among other Muslim countries (Abuza 2005a; Caculitan 2005). Those countries also played a role in mediating MILF-GRP peace negotiations and ceasefire agreements, both directly and through the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (Labita 2011; Taya 2007). According to state military sources, MILF’s foreign funding sources come from Islamic nations, particularly Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (Santos et al. 2010). Even though some reports point to marijuana trafficking as a significant source of revenue for MILF (Wilson Jr. 2009), the group claims to be financially self-sufficient and denies any financial support from illegal sources. It acknowledged, however, the support from the “people of the world […] in sympathy for the Bangsamoro cause […]”
43 (Jaafar 1997). Nonetheless, key members of MILF have been linked to al-Qaida and, in 1999, Salamat himself admitted receiving “significant funding” from bin Laden (JMU/CISR 2004). MILF has also allegedly been supported by Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law, who would have funnelled money through charities (Wilson Jr. 2009). Similarly, MILF is accused of diverting funds of foreign Islamic NGOs intended for socio-religious and humanitarian purposes (Reyes 2000).
Following a ceasefire agreement between MILF and the Philippine government in 2003, the International Monitoring Team (IMT) was implemented to monitor compliance with the peace agreement. The team is staffed by nationals of six different countries, namely Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Libya, and Norway, and international personnel from the European Union (GRP and MILF 2011). Similarly, in 2009 MILF and the Philippine government established the International Contact Group for the Southern Philippines Peace Process (ICG-SPPP) to mobilise international support and leverage the peace process. ICG-SPPP is comprised of four states, namely the United Kingdom, Japan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia; and four international NGOs, the British-based Conciliation Resources, The Asia Foundation from the United States, Muhammadiyah from Indonesia, and the Swiss-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (DPI 2014). International NGOs have constantly engaged with MILF in an attempt to push the peace process and mediate the conflict between the rebel group and the Philippine government (Hofmann 2011). Regarding mine action organisations, MILF has engaged primarily with Geneva Call and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action.
The level of legitimacy-seeking behaviour for MILF can thus be defined as moderate-high, given its overall positive relationship with its constituency and domestic and international actors. Table 3 summarises MILF’s level of legitimacy-seeking behaviour.
44
Table 3. MILF’s legitimacy-seeking behaviour.
5.1.2 Landmine use
Practitioners have generally considered MILF a sporadic user of landmines and other explosive devices (GC 2002). Evidence of landmine use by the armed group is mostly drawn from mine incidents in MILF-controlled areas and from AFP seizures of weapons and stockpiles (JMU/CISR 2004; Santos et al. 2010). During the “all-out war”, for example, the Philippine military reported that “MILF stockpiles included millions of rounds of ammunition, stocks of C-4 explosives and dynamite, and landmines—both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle—usually improvised and contact-detonated [i.e. victim-activated]” (Santos et al. 2010, 388; Cal 2000).
Because of overlapping areas of operations among the different landmine users in the Philippines, it is uncertain whether landmines were laid by MILF or other non-state armed groups. Internal MILF regulations on landmine use, however, prohibit the “use, stockpiling, production and transfer of APMs [anti-personnel mines] near population centres, places of worship, schools, business establishments, residential areas, farm and farm-to-market roads, and even areas inhabited by working animals”
45 (ICBL-CMC 2001, 3). The same guidelines ordered MILF fighters to map and visibly signal mined areas5. AFP reports suggest that most mines were located in MILF-controlled territory close to MILF bunkers, trenches and former camps (Sjöberg 2005). However, some mines believed to be laid by MILF were found along roads in disputed territories close to AFP checkpoints (GC 2002), which indicates both a defensive and offensive strategic use of landmines.
MILF states that it does not use victim-activated antipersonnel mines, restricting its use only to command-detonated devices. However, allegations from AFP indicate a series of incidents involving both victim-activated and command-detonated explosive devices in MILF-controlled areas. Those allegations remain mostly unconfirmed, though in specific cases “substantial grounds” were found linking the incidents to MILF (ICBL-CMC 2011).
In 1976, MILF allegedly banned the use of anti-personnel landmines, arguing that they were contradictory to the teachings of Islam. However, despite this claim, the rebel group has publicly acknowledged the use of landmines in publications. For instance, after the Battles of Wato and Mal- Mar in 1996, MILF stated that it “fought back with mortar, anti-tank weapons and mined fields” (ICBL-CMC 2000, 7). Under those circumstances, landmine use was justified and restricted, according to MILF Central Committee Vice-Chairman for Political Affairs:
If needed for defence (self-preservation), MILF/BIAF, will use anti-personnel mines, but discriminately, only when the need of it arises or as the situation dictates, and upon order of the concerned MILF Commander on the ground during actual combat. MILF/BIAF APMs and ATMs [anti-tank mines], foreign and home- made, are command-detonated, tripwire, pressured triggered, or any of it (Jaafar 2000, 1).
MILF was amongst the first armed groups in the world to sign the Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action on 27 March 2000 (MILF 2000). The total ban, however, does not cover neither the use of command-detonated devices of all sorts, nor victim-activated anti-vehicle mines. A month later, in April 2000, the Philippine government, under Joseph Estrada, launched a military campaign against MILF. The group suffered around 1,000 casualties and lost all its fixed camps, including large portions of its arsenal (Pobre and Quilop 2008). This pressure arguably led MILF to lay new landmines as it
5 A 2002 Geneva Call verification mission, however, found that there were no regular minefields in the Philippines and no markings of explosive hazards except those placed by AFP’s explosive ordnance disposal units and the communities themselves (GC 2002).
46 defended itself from government forces, breaking away from their commitment to the ban (ICBL- CMC 2002).
After the all-out war, in 2001, the AFP registered at least 13 mine incidents attributed to MILF, including three victim-activated anti-personnel mines. A Geneva Call verification mission following these allegations could not independently assess the real nature of the mine incidents. However, the armed group acknowledged the use of “string-pulled” anti-personnel improvised explosive devices, under the justification that those were considered command-detonated and laid for defensive purposes only in response to the government-led offensive campaign against the rebel group. Those devices were improvised using mortar rounds and were activated by pulling a string when the enemy was thought to be within the device’s lethal range. One of MILF’s supposedly victim-activated anti-vehicle mine was also found to be activated by a lower pressure threshold, which made it possible to be activated by the weight of a person, thus becoming an anti-personnel device (GC 2002).
It was later clarified by the Geneva Call mission that, according to the internationally accepted concept of “command detonation”, string-pulled devices should not be considered command-detonated for three reasons. First, they were not electrically detonated; second, they did not allow for total control, because, if not under permanent surveillance, pulling strings could be turned into trip wires and triggered by accident, thus becoming victim-activated; and, third, the detonation was not directional. Furthermore, the mission explained that the Deed of Commitment calls for renouncing the use of anti-personnel landmines under any circumstances, including for defensive purposes (GC 2002). As a consequence of Geneva Call mission, MILF restated its commitment to the total ban of anti-personnel landmines by signing an expanded version of the Deed of Commitment (GC 2002; ICBL-CMC 2004; MILF 2002). In addition, following the signature of the Deed, MILF issued written orders and directives to its forces regarding the ban and conducted mine awareness and humanitarian law education programmes for its members (JMU/CISR 2004).
Despite the renewed commitment, further allegations of anti-personnel landmine use by MILF were made by the Philippine government between 2003 and 2012 (ICBL-CMC 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009), usually following AFP offensive campaigns. MILF denied involvement in all cases and many of these allegations are still unconfirmed. Finally, MILF unilaterally declared, in 2008, its adherence to International Humanitarian Law on landmines (MILF 2008), and, in 2010, signed an agreement with the Philippine government to undertake mine action and allow for community rehabilitation in areas of recent conflict in Mindanao (ICBL-CMC 2011; GRP and MILF 2010). In this regard, MILF has
47 since cooperated with the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL) and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (ICBL-CMC 2015).
Different sources interviewed for this research pointed to an added reason for MILF’s commitment to the landmine ban. The United States-led so-called “war on terror” following al-Qaida’s September 2001 attacks, led to an increased pressure on Philippine rebel groups. MILF in particular was concerned about being put in the same category as active terrorist groups in the Philippines, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group. Therefore, in order to protect its reputation, MILF leadership tried to make sure to demonstrate that the armed group abided to international humanitarian norms and was thus a legitimate armed group (Bongard 2019; Lubang 2019; Rush 2019).
In sum, the observed level of restraint for MILF is moderate-high. While the group displays high levels of restraint embodied in its commitments to the landmine ban, there is evidence of occasional use of victim activated devices, including anti-personnel landmines. In addition, MILF’s use of landmines mostly follows a defensive strategy, with sporadic offensive use. Table 4 summarises MILF’s level of restraint on landmine use.
Table 4. MILF’s restraint on landmine use.
5.2 Abu Sayyaf Group
Abu Sayyaf Group is often considered Philippines’s smallest yet most radical rebel group. Also called al-Harakatul Islamiyya (Islamic Movement), it focuses primarily in the southern Philippine islands and into Malaysia. It is estimated that ASG had at its peak almost 3,000 fighters in 2000 (Torres 2001), however, the group is currently believed to have around 650 members. ASG was organized by Abdurajak Janjalani in 1986, as a splinter group from the MNLF. Janjalani and other dissatisfied
48 members of MNLF questioned the parent group’s negotiation efforts with the Philippine government and its failure to appropriate Islamic concepts of jihad for the Moro struggle. The group’s stated aim is to achieve an independent Islamic state in the whole of Mindanao and employ tactics of terrorism to reach its goal. However, more and more the group has engaged in banditry and other criminal activities. ASG is still active and is often considered the top internal terrorist threat in the Philippines (JMU/CISR 2004; Santos et al. 2010; Tan 2003).
5.2.1 Legitimacy-seeking behaviour
Popular support to ASG is limited in number and has varied over time and across different regions of the Philippines, especially in face of the group’s excessive use of violence (Niksch 2002). Even though ASG follows an Islamic jihadist ideology, moderate Muslims mostly refute its interpretation of Islam and the means of jihad (USA 2002). The group nonetheless seems more concerned in pursuing its goals than winning popular mass support and relies mostly on individual leaders (Santos et al. 2010).
ASG’s political and constituency base is made up primarily by the youth, rural and poor Moros among the Islamized Moro tribes Tausug, Yakan, and Sama, in western Mindanao. Recruitment to the group is voluntary and often along lines of kinship and supported by family and village networks, including child soldiers Motivations to join ASG vary and include ideological commitment, opposition to the state, personal enrichment, machismo, and even physical survival (Makinano 2001; Santos et al. 2010; Hutchison 2009). ASG’s main source of funds, totalling almost 98% of the entire amount, is kidnapping and extortion of businesspeople, teachers, politicians, and other professionals, followed by shares of the zakat and diverted Islamic NGO resources (Mendonza Jr. 2008; Papa 2008; Peleo 2013; Santos et al. 2010).
Despite the enormous power imbalance between the two actors, ASG has been able to attack and resist government forces throughout its existence of over 30 years. ASG has until now avoided direct military confrontation and sought refuge in local communities, as “ASG fighters are able to merge back into their own environment, making military pursuit difficult […] [Their] movement is always under the cover of darkness, off established roads and trails, and with the support of the local population” (Turner 1995, 2003; Santos et al. 2010, 370).
ASG does not distinguish between its political and military leadership. Ideologically, ASG represents the non-conformist radical Islamic movement and rejects political negotiation in favour of jihad (Wadi
49 2006). Accordingly, ASG shows little inclination towards engaging in formal dialogue with the Philippine government (Stratfor 2014) and has instead used hostage and ransom negotiations to express some of its political demands (Aventajado and Montelibano 2004; Burnham and Merrill 2010). Historically, ASG emerged in the 1980s precisely because of its opposition to MNLF’s negotiations with the government, and has most recently sought to spoil the MILF-GRP peace process (Whaley 2014). ASG’s declared aim is to establish an Islamic state for the Moro minority in the Mindanao region, independent from the rest of the Philippines. The group also seeks to expel Christian settlers who have migrated to the southern Philippines since the 1910s with government encouragement (Kamlian 2011). Despite ASG’s stated goals, the group shows signs of becoming more materially motivated rather than ideologically driven, resembling more a criminal gang than a rebel group (Stratfor 2014).
Both state and non-state actors have reportedly supported ASG. In particular, Middle Eastern countries have provided substantial support to ASG (Torres 2001). For instance, Muammar el- Qaddafi’s Libya, traditionally supportive of the Moro separatist movement, might have secretly supported ASG in its early phases. Qaddafi has personally mediated ASG hostage negotiations – allegedly paying USD 6,000,000 for six hostages in 2000 (BBC 2000) – and funded charitable and humanitarian organisations in southern Philippines, purportedly funnelled to ASG funds (Fisk 2000; Niksch 2002). In addition to state actors, ASG has received support or declared allegiance to regional and international terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida, the Islamic State (IS), and Jemaah Islamiyah (ICG 2005, 2008). Al-Qaida is believed to have sponsored the formation of ASG, providing training and funding (Doyo 2008) as well as exposure to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation (Santos et al. 2010). Most recently, ASG key leaders and members have at least nominally pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (Ressa 2014). Experts assume that ASG’s alliance with the IS has primarily the purpose of promoting its own interests – such as increased visibility and political recognition – rather than those of the Islamic State. Likewise, the IS does not seem to have materially supported ASG (FlorCruz 2014; Romero 2015). Finally, on top of generally not cooperating with international NGOs, ASG have recurrently targeted aid workers for kidnap-for-ransom and extorsion (UN 2018a).
As summarised in Table 5 below, ASG’s overall level of legitimacy-seeking behaviour is low-moderate. The group does not show reliance on nor take initiatives to strengthen its relationships with its constituency base, nor with domestic and international actors. Nonetheless, ASG still depends on voluntary recruitment and, on a small scale, sanctuary from local communities.
50
Table 5. ASG’s legitimacy-seeking behaviour.
5.2.2 Landmine use
There is substantiated evidence of frequent landmine use by ASG, mostly based on AFP recoveries, mine accidents and hostage testimonials (JMU/CISR 2004). In August 2000, official estimates suggested that the group had laid about 3,000 landmines around its camps (ICBL-CMC 2002). ASG has employed booby traps and anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines in its struggle against the Philippine government. The group laid victim-activated landmines mostly for perimeter defence in its jungle and mountains camps, and command-detonated devices in offensive operations. Explosive devices are also used in terror attacks, directly targeting civilians (Santos et al. 2010).
Government sources and media reports have repeatedly linked ASG with mine incidents (ICBL-CMC 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011). Moreover, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have time and again recovered explosives and other components in raids against the group, indicating an increased technical capacity in manufacturing IEDs (Pazzibugan 2006; Abuza 2005b), even though ASG is also believed to have access to factory-made anti-personnel mines (Sjöberg 2005).
51 It seems that ASG has no formal landmine use policy (PCBL 2010) and attempts of engagement with ASG in promoting the landmine ban have been largely unsuccessful. In this regard, ASG has not responded to appeals from the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines and other civil-society organisations, nor from Islamic leaders or even other Islamic armed groups (Lubang 2019).
In conclusion, ASG’s overall level of restraint on landmine can be taken as low, as shown in Table 6 below. The group scores the lowest possible value for every indicator of restraint on landmine use.
Table 6. ASG’s restraint on landmine use.
5.3 New People’s Army
The New People’s Army is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. It was formed in 1968 and has been active since 1971, when it stood out as the radical Maoist alternative to pro- Soviet left-wing parties. With Bernabé Buscayno as the founding commander-in-chief, NPA wages a “protracted people’s war” against the government and operates in the whole Philippines, although concentrated in the rural and remote areas. The main objective of NPA is to overthrow the Philippine government and establish a people’s republic. The group is estimated to have more than 10,000 members and currently poses the greatest armed threat to the Philippine government, given its size, military capability and activity (JMU/CISR 2004; Santos et al. 2010).
5.3.1 Legitimacy-seeking behaviour
Membership to NPA is open to anyone over 18 years old, physically fit, and willing and ready to fight. Although NPA currently does not recruit children into its ranks, prior to 2000 child soldiers made up to three per cent of its regular fighters and a quarter of its recruits (Andag 2005; Makinano 2001).
52 Membership and public support for NPA has fluctuated over time. During the 1970s and 1980s, many educated, and ideologically motivated urban youth joined the insurgency. As those members progressively left the group due to NPA’s inability to advance their armed struggle, its ranks became mainly composed of poor rural youth. In recent years, however, NPA has found more support prompted by the expansion of mass organisations in response to government corruption and general inefficiency (JMU/CISR 2004; Santos et al. 2010).
Most of NPA funding comes from individual supporters as well as “revolutionary taxes” and “permits to campaign” during elections. While “revolutionary taxes” are a form of extorsion applied to locals in their areas of operations, NPA also profits from selling “permits to campaign” to politicians who wish to campaign in NPA-controlled territory (AFP 2006; Mogato 2003; Peleo 2013; Santos et al. 2010).
NPA wages a rural-based protracted war and, by definition, tries to engage local peasants in its struggle and has consistently worked in building relationship with rural communities. Members of the rebel group have provided security against criminals and taught and worked with peasants (ICG 2011; Santos et al. 2010). In return, some rebels allegedly receive support such as food and shelter (HRW 2011). Although NPA claims to act in the name of the Filipino people, ideological guidance for the group stems mostly from the Communist Party of the Philippines’ Central Committee and local communities seem to have a limited say in the group’s decision-making processes.
NPA is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines and forms part of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines. NDFP is a political entity which promotes “national unity for the revolutionary struggle […] [and] conducts proto-diplomatic and relations work abroad to gather moral, political and material support for the revolutionary movement” (NDFP 2018, 1). In other words, NDFP directly supports NPA in its political, diplomatic, and financial activities. Even though NPA’s main political base remains the rural communities, it is able to connect with political parties, civil-society organisations, and activists in urban areas through NDFP. Those organisations represent different sectors of the Filipino society, such as youth, women and urban workers, and some of them hold seats in the Congress of the Philippines (Santos et al. 2010).
Accordingly, NPA defers to three different pillars of authority: NPA’s National Operational Command, CPP’s Central Committee, and NDFP’s National Council. Nonetheless, it is believed that NPA fronts enjoy a high degree of tactical autonomy, mainly because of low levels of command and
53 control capabilities due to the communication challenges (Santos et al. 2010). Nonetheless, discipline and political ideology are kept through ideological and political training, including on human rights and international humanitarian law. NPA fighters are required to adhere to Mao Tse-Tung’s “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention”, which requires rebels “to always take the interest of the people at the heart and refrain from any action that may harm them” (Santos et al. 2010, 269; Tse-Tung 2008).
The record of NPA’s engagement in peace negotiation is mixed. Republic Act No. 1700, passed in 1957, banned the 1930 Communist Party and all its successors (GRP 1957). By default, CPP was also banned from the political scene in the Philippines. In any way, CCP and NPA leaders have often emphasized armed struggle in opposition to formal political engagement with the Philippine government, including through negotiations and electoral politics. However, despite consistently rejecting formal mechanisms for reform, the CPP has also sporadically engaged in peace talks with the Philippine government. Republic Act No. 1700 was repealed in 1992, thus allowing for the legal participation of the CPP in national politics. Regardless, the CPP continued to formally reject legal politics and still does not directly put forward its own political candidates in elections, rather doing it through NDFP (Santos et al. 2010; ICG 2011).
NPA’s main goal is to overthrow the government and replace it with a Maoist governance structure. It follows that, by definition, NPA challenges the very nature of existing political structures and thus avoid negotiating through them. Nevertheless, NPA has at times negotiated with the government. For example, the rebel group usually committed to ceasefires and suspended hostilities against Philippine and US troops helping villagers affected by natural disasters, or during Christmas truces (Labalan, Mallari, and Orbeta 2006; Mallari 2006). In addition, NDFP-led negotiations led to the signature of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (GRP and NDFP 1998), applicable to NPA, requiring fighters to abide to human rights and humanitarian norms. Throughout the 2000s, however, CPP and NPA alternated between attempted political negotiations and armed struggle. The inclusion of the armed group in the US Department of State list of foreign terrorist organisations in 2002 brought about additional challenges to political engagement with the government (ICG 2011; USA 2018).
In general, NPA receives little foreign support. While China allegedly provided external support to the group from its inception until 1976, it is also believed that Dutch agencies may also have inadvertently supported front organisations without knowing that their resources went to NPA (Santos et al. 2010;
54 Dawson 1993). In order to attract foreign funds, CPP and NPA attempted to establish working relations with a series of like-minded state and non-state actors, such as the Workers Party of Korea; Maoist factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization; the Japanese Red Army; the Nicaraguan Sandinistas; the Communist Party of El Salvador; the Peruvian Communist Party; and the Algerian military. CPP established an office in the Netherlands and sent representatives to Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Ireland, United States, Sweden, and the Middle East to gather support. The group also explored establishing relations with the governments of Albania, Libya, Tunisia, Tanzania, Poland, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Romania, Algeria, Panama, Peru, Brazil, and Cuba, without much success. While only a small number of these actors are believed to have provided financial aid, arms, training, or other types of support to NPA, most of its foreign support drastically decreased following the collapse of Communism in the 1990s (RPM-P 1999; Santos et al. 2010; Dawson 1993).
Through CPP and NDFP, NPA has had considerable influence and support from local left-wing NGOs. It went further to establish new front NGOs to attract funding and support their revolutionary cause, in addition to extracting funding from existing supportive NGOs to the armed rebellion (Araja 2019; HRW 2007). Nonetheless, the group does not seem to engage with international NGOs, since no record of this was found in this research.
In sum, NPA’s level of legitimacy-seeking behaviour is taken as moderate, according to Table 7 below. NPA shows some significant level of legitimacy-seeking towards its constituency and domestic political institutions within the National Democratic Front of the Philippines and like-minded organisations. However, NPA rejects formal political engagement with the government and does not have significant international outreach.
55
Table 7. NPA’s legitimacy-seeking behaviour.
5.3.2 Landmine use
The Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, signed between the Philippine government and NDFP, and thus applicable to NPA, precisely called for restraint on landmine use: This Agreement seeks to confront, remedy and prevent the most serious human rights violations in terms of civil and political rights [of non-combatants], as well as to uphold, protect and promote the full scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including: […] The right not to be subjected to forced evacuations, food and other forms of economic blockades and indiscriminate bombings, shellings, strafing, gunfire and the use of landmines (GRP and NDFP 1998, article 2, paragraph 15, emphasis added).
Accordingly, NPA claims to follow a discriminate strategy in the use of landmines, i.e. solely offensive use against government forces. According to an official CPP declaration, the armed group claims that landmines are only used as “legitimate offensive weapons against military vehicles of the AFP and Philippine National Police transporting troops and supplies across and within AFP-NPA battlefields”
56 (CPP 2005, 1). CPP further assured that NPA’s landmines “are carefully attended to by NPA fighters to ensure that these are fired only against legitimate military targets” (CPP 2005, 1). However, according to AFP reports, NPA strongholds and weapons production bases were found to be extensively mined (ICBL-CMC 2000). In addition, it is believed that NPA commonly uses improvised explosive devices against commercial targets owned by companies that have refused to pay “revolutionary taxes” (IHS Markit 2007). In short, evidence points to a predominantly offensive use of landmines, although NPA seems to have also employed landmines for defensive and economic gain purposes to a lesser extent.
The striking majority of mine accidents attributed to NPA, when the type of device is known, include command-detonated anti-vehicle landmines used against government forces (ICBL-CMC 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005). NPA, however, does acknowledge the use of anti-personnel devices as well, though they claim the mines are only command-detonated. In response to the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, a member of CPP Central Committee emphasized that command-detonated landmines are not covered by the Ottawa Convention and are therefore a legitimate and necessary weapon:
Command-detonated mines, the type we use, are not covered by the ban. They prove to be valuable in preventing armoured intrusions and attacks of enemy forces into NPA territories. Since we have no anti-armour weapons, we have to rely on such if we have to stop armoured tanks and vehicles from entering or going through NPA territories. Most of the time, we can do with just the use of rifles and grenades. But these have no effective stopping power against armoured tanks and vehicles (ICBL-CMC 2003, 4).
Nevertheless, several reports have indicated the use of booby traps. Following a clash with NPA in April 2007, AFP soldiers reported “difficulty retrieving the bodies of two soldiers because the rebels had laid four landmines around them” (ICBL-CMC 2008, 4), hinting to the use of booby traps. In addition, in June 2007, after an attack on a rebel camp, AFP reports referred to the camp as “booby- trapped” (ICBL-CMC 2009). Similarly, in a letter dated 27 October 2005, NDFP stated that NPA had used “contact-detonated [i.e. victim-activated] or command-detonated landmines […] for a limited time and limited range and under close supervision of NPA command concerned in order not to cause risk for civilians” (ICBL-CMC 2007, 4, emphasis added). While this statement is inconsistent with earlier ones, it concurs with AFP reports.
Earlier reports from the Philippine military also condemns the use of landmines by the New People’s Army around populated areas. A 1997 report from the Association of Barangay Captains, for example, accused NPA of planting landmines along roads used by civilians, villages and farms (ICBL-CMC 2000). Because NPA allegedly does not keep minefields, there should not be a need for marking
57 hazardous areas. However, according to government forces, mine areas discovered around NPA camps were not marked (ICBL-CMC 2000). Moreover, there is no information of NPA’s engagement in mine risk education to the local communities (Sjöberg 2006a). However, most of mine victims attributed to NPA are Philippine military and police personnel. The small number of civilians eventually killed in such incidents are family members travelling in military vehicles (ICBL-CMC 2007) or accidentally mistaken by government forces, in which case NPA has publicly apologised and offered to pay hospital expenses for the injured civilians (ICBL-CMC 2008).
Table 8 summarises the overall level of restraint on landmine use displayed by NPA. Its final score is low-moderate, reflecting the occasional use of landmines for economic gain and the use of booby traps6, despite the high level of direct restraint and NPA’s effort to avoid civilian casualties.
Table 8. NPA’s restraint on landmine use.
6 It should be noted that in this research I chose to consider the lowest observation as the final score for each indicator, even though those observations are often rare, as it is the case of NPA’s use of landmines in an economic gain strategy and its use of booby traps.
58 6 Analysis
After gathering relevant data for each case, this section aims at assessing if the proposed hypothesis holds against empirical evidence, i.e. if higher levels of legitimacy-seeking behaviour has led to higher levels of restraint on landmine use by the selected non-state armed groups. Secondarily, this analysis seeks to evaluate if there is support for the suggested mechanism leading rebel groups to restrict the use of landmines. This section first investigates each case separately and investigates whether legitimacy- seeking has been the main driver of restraint on landmine use, that is, if the causal mechanism was present in each case. Next, it assesses to what degree the hypothesis holds true across cases. Finally, it considers the plausibility of alternative explanations and discusses the limitations and potential bias of this study.
6.1 Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Empirical evidence presented in the case study shows that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front displays a moderate-high level of legitimacy-seeking behaviour. This also holds true for its three dimensions, namely MILF’s relationships with its constituency, domestic audiences, and international audiences. First, in relation to its constituency, MILF is highly dependent on voluntary recruitment, though there is evidence of minor cases of forceful recruitment. It relied on intelligence and sanctuary provided by local communities in order to undertake guerrilla warfare, especially after the all-out war in 2000. The group is also reliant on political support and guidance from both its ordinary supporters and populations under its control through general consultations and to traditional and religious leaders, embodied in its Central Committee. However, MILF is not dependent on voluntary funding and, instead, secures its financial resources through mandatory alms and extorsion. Second, in terms of MILF’s relationship with domestic audiences, even though the group’s political and military leadership is one and the same, MILF is highly politicized and engaged in formal negotiations with the government. In this regard, the group has reinterpreted its self-determination goal from total independence from the Philippine government to a compromised power-sharing solution. Third, addressing MILF’s international audiences, although most international support to MILF is provided by state governments and non- state actors with a record of human rights violations, the group has also been engaged in more human rights-conscious actors, such as the mediators and monitors (i.e. ICG-SPPP and IMT) of the peace negotiations with the Government of the Philippines. Likewise, it has been actively engaged with
59 international NGOs, particularly in promoting international human rights and humanitarian law. In short, these indicators show that MILF is significantly seeking to establish itself as a legitimate actor for its constituency, the Philippine government, and the international community.
Drawing on the case study, the final observed value for MILF’s dependent variable, restraint on landmine use, is moderate-high. The group has consistently and progressively restricted the use of landmines and most recently employed only command-detonated landmines against government forces. MILF laid landmines in both defensive and offensive strategies, therefore in both disputed and controlled territories. According to MILF’s internal policies, however, landmines should not be laid near populated areas and should be marked with clear hazard signs. Although the group used both anti- vehicle and anti-personnel mines, it has been a sporadic landmine user in general. Most significantly, in 2000, MILF committed to the total ban on anti-personnel landmines under Geneva Call’s deed of commitment. This pledge has been reinforced in different occasions and MILF seems legitimately committed to the ban, ensuring compliance among its rank and file and supporting mine action activities in the territories under its control. In summary, MILF’s landmine use pattern is restricted to the use against government forces and shows a significant effort to avoid collateral damage.
Therefore, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has shown a moderate-high level for both legitimacy-seeking behaviour and restraint on landmine use. This finding is in line with the hypothesis drawn from the proposed theoretical argument, which expected a positive correlation between the two variables. The case of MILF also provides support to the proposed causal mechanism, i.e. that civilian victimisation caused by landmines causes legitimacy costs, thus restraint is exercised to avoid legitimacy loss. Restraint has been officially justified by the group leadership in direct relation to the protection and identity of its constituency, as part of ceasefire and peace agreements with the state government, and the group’s commitment to international norms, especially after the US waged its so-called “war on terror”.
Beyond the focus of this thesis and looking into the broader causal chain leading to the commitment to a total ban on landmines, MILF’s case offers interesting insights. Reports from the 1970s indicate that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front used at least 1,000 victim-activated anti-personnel mines. However, as early as 1976, official statements from the group leadership defined the indiscriminate use of landmines as un-Islamic, directly appealing to the main identity of its constituency. Regardless the group’s 1974 statement, MILF has been accused on and off – mostly by government sources – of new use of anti-personnel mines, usually in response to offensive campaigns by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Following a ceasefire agreement in 1996, MILF engaged in negotiations with the
60 Philippine government and other international actors, demonstrating an increase in legitimacy-seeking behaviour in comparison to the previous period. In March 2000, MILF reinforced its restraint policies and adhered to the total ban on anti-personnel landmines by signing Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment. In the following month, the Philippine government started an offensive military campaign against MILF, the so-called “all-out war”. From April to June 2000, new allegations were made of anti-personnel mine use by MILF, contradicting its earlier commitment to the ban. A Geneva Call verification mission was sent in 2002 but was not able to verify the allegations on site due to security restrictions imposed by the Philippine government. In short, the mission found that MILF had used “string-pull”-activated devices, considered by the group to be in line with the Deed of Commitment. The mission clarified that those devices, when left unattained, could become victim- activated and therefore were prohibited under the Deed. The rebel group acknowledged the mistake and took action to avoid further use of such devices. Moreover, it signed a revised version of the Deed, allowing for more clarity and specificity in its wording. Renewed fighting in 2003 and 2008 led to another verification mission in 2009. Geneva Call found evidence of possible new landmine use by MILF, of which the group leadership was unaware. MILF leaders revealed difficulties in ensuring acceptance of the ban upon the group’s lower ranks. By assuming those challenges of command and control, MILF leadership exposed itself to legitimacy and reputation costs, arguably acknowledging the value of restraint. MILF’s leadership agreed to increment the dissemination of information on the mine ban and, accordingly, MILF integrated the provisions of the Deed into their internal policies and reportedly provided for disciplinary sanctions to non-compliant field commanders (GC 2007a). Throughout these verification missions, Geneva Call reported that MILF had been supportive and transparent, showing to a large extent a true commitment to restricting the indiscriminate use of landmines. In short, instead of a utilitarian decision made to achieve certain political goals at a specific time, MILF’s restraint on landmine use has been consistent and progressive, including when the military utility of landmines was more salient. This suggests that restraint on landmine use came from a principled, rather than purely utilitarian decision. It also exhibits a learning process facilitated by the engagement with international NGOs.
6.2 Abu Sayyaf Group
From the case study of Abu Sayyaf Group, the overall empirical value found for the independent variable, i.e. legitimacy-seeking behaviour, was low-moderate, with similar levels for the constituency, domestic
61 and international dimensions. First, regarding ASG’s relationship with its constituency, the group does not depend on local communities for funding nor guidance. Abu Sayyaf is also only partially reliant on community compliance and support for its actions, given the small scale of its actions. The group is, however, dependent on voluntary recruitment, which usually follows kindship and family and village networks. Second, Abu Sayyaf’s final goal is to establish an independent Islamic state, has no specific political wing and seeks no formal political representation within the existing structures, nor does it engage with the Philippine government. On the contrary, ASG has been active in spoiling peace negotiations between the government and other rebel groups in the Philippines. According to the theoretical argument of this thesis, ASG’s secessionist aims should indicate legitimacy-seeking behaviour aiming at recognition from the international community. However, Abu Sayyaf’s terror tactics and discourse keeps it outside of the international order. Third, the group conforms to an international network of like-minded state and non-state organisations, with a record of human rights violations, including al-Qaida and, allegedly, the Islamic State. Likewise, ASG does not interact with international NGOs; instead, international aid workers have been targeted by the group for kidnap- for-ransom and extorsion. In sum, the indicators above show that Abu Sayyaf Group’s legitimacy- seeking behaviour is not broadly aimed at local communities and domestic and international audiences at large but focuses only in a minor group of like-minded individuals and organisations.
As for the dependent variable, empirical evidence shows that ASG holds an overall low level of restraint on landmine use. Abu Sayyaf has frequently used landmines and other explosive devices for different purposes, including defensive, offensive, and nuisance mining strategies. The devices used include victim-activated and command-detonated anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, as well as booby traps. Civilians are often directly targeted in ASG’s terror attacks, and mines and IEDs are laid in populated areas and left unmarked. In short, ASG’s shows a clear pattern of direct violence against civilians and does not show concern for collateral damage.
Because Abu Sayyaf’s landmine use is virtually unrestrained, it is expected that the suggested mechanism would not be present in this case. Accordingly, no evidence of the mechanism has been found during this research. However, the correlation between the independent and dependent variables is in line with the suggested hypothesis; that is, lower levels of legitimacy-seeking behaviour should lead to lower levels of restraint on landmine use. Finally, it is worth briefly discussing what ASG’s example means for the theoretical argument underlying this thesis. My main argument explaining restraint is that civilian victimisation due to landmine use leads to legitimacy costs. However, some
62 extremist groups, such as Abu Sayyaf, seek recognition precisely through the use of violence against civilians. By doing so, those groups appeal to a very narrow audience who is not concerned about human rights and humanitarian norms. Thus, even though civilian victimisation due to landmine use does decrease the armed groups’ overall level of legitimacy, it is not sufficient to change group behaviour.
6.3 New People’s Army
The case study of the New People’s Army found the group’s overall level of legitimacy-seeking behaviour to be moderate, with similar values for the constituency, domestic audiences, and international audiences dimensions. First, while NPA is dependent on voluntary recruitment and both material and non- material support from local communities, the group secures its funding mostly from “revolutionary taxes” and by selling “permits to campaign” to local politicians. Likewise, the group is not accountable to its constituents for ideological or political guidance. Second, although NPA is highly politicised and forms part of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines and has at times engaged in peace negotiations, the group has consistently rejected the political establishment. This approach stems from the very ideological foundation and political stance of the Communist Party of the Philippines, which seeks to overthrow the government and install a people’s republic. Third, even though NPA, mainly through NDFP, has sought support from a wide array of international actors, the group does not seem to receive support from human rights-conscious foreign sponsor nor have significant interaction with international NGOs. To summarise, because of its underlying ideology, NPA’s legitimacy-seeking behaviour is mostly directed to its constituency and partially to international audiences, while the relationship with the domestic actors is limited by the group’s rejectionist approach to formal institutions.
On restraint on landmine use, the overall level found for NPA was low-moderate. In general, the New People’s Army tries to restrict the collateral damage to civilians and rarely attacks civilian targets directly. The group has consistently stated its discriminate use of landmines, which according to them are only command-detonated and used against government forces. Even though there’s considerable evidence pointing to other uses, almost all victims of landmines attributed to NPA are government officials and military and police personnel. NPA fighters receive political education on human rights and international humanitarian law and are trained accordingly. Hence, NPA’s preferred use of landmines in offensive attacks against government forces, employing command-detonated anti-
63 personnel and anti-vehicle devices. Although landmines target military objectives, they are often placed in populated areas. There have also been occasional reports of use of booby traps and anti- personnel landmines used for defensive purposes around rebel camps and weapons factories, in which cases the mined areas were left unmarked. Moreover, evidence suggests that NPA uses explosives devices against civilian targets to obtain economic gains. Likewise, at times the type of devices and trigger mechanisms used by NPA do not match its official restraint policies.
The overall values found for NPA’s legitimacy-seeking behaviour and restraint on landmine use shows a negative direction, i.e. from moderate to low-moderate, challenging the suggested hypothesis. However, support to the hypothesis is found when NPA’s relationship with its constituency and domestic and international audiences is analysed. On the one hand, the group’s main support base is the marginalised and poor, who have suffered from social inequalities. On the other, NPA opposes the formal institutions and rejects the legitimacy of the Philippine government. In addition, the group is not bound to international institutions, except by voluntary alignment; that is, NPA is not accountable to any compliance assessment mechanism. Accordingly, returning to the concept of legitimacy, NPA’s most relevant subjects, or legitimacy-givers, are the people it claims to stand for. This explains the alleged, and to high extent actual, effort to spare civilians from landmines laid by the group. Against government forces and opposers to the revolution, however, the group has exercised a much lower level of restraint, using victim-activated anti-personnel landmines and even booby traps. Finally, while NPA complies to some extent with international human rights and humanitarian norms, it seems to also accept bending some rules when necessary. The lack of accountability mechanisms may then explain the occasional non-compliance instances on landmine use, i.e. the use of anti- personnel mines and booby traps or targeting civilian infrastructure.
NPA’s case also provides some evidence in line with the suggested causal mechanism. According to Santos (2013), even the use of command-detonated landmines against government forces had negative consequences in terms of public support, mainly in two ways. First, landmine attacks against the government eventually lead to civilian casualties, though minimal; and, second, those attacks are likely to trigger even more repression by the government, which further impact local communities. This explains why NPA often publicly apologised for civilian casualties and damage caused by its military actions (Santos 2013). However, in an interview for this research, Alfredo Lubang7 pointed out that
7 Current National Coordinator of the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines.
64 local communities are sometimes so alienated from government structures other than the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to the extent that they would hardly shift loyalty to government forces, regardless the collateral damage inflicted by NPA-GRP clashes. A certain level of community development, education, and engagement with government authorities and civil-society organisations are thus necessary for communities to hold rebel groups accountable (Lubang 2019).
6.4 Comparative analysis
This thesis primarily argues that restraint on landmine use is mostly exercised to minimise legitimacy costs. It follows that rebel groups which display higher levels of legitimacy-seeking behaviour should show higher levels of restraint on landmine use. Overall, the empirical evidence for all three cases supports this hypothesis. Before making the case for the support of the hypothesis, however, this section will first explain the variation of both the dependent and independent variables and what it means for the theoretical argument put forth in this thesis. Next, if will briefly assess whether the causal mechanism finds support across cases.
Across cases, the degree of legitimacy-seeking behaviour varied significantly according to the indicators, as shown in Table 9 below. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front displayed the highest value among the cases (moderate-high), followed by New People’s Army (moderate) and Abu Sayyaf Group (low- moderate). It is worth noting that there has not been significant variation in some indicators, namely dependence on voluntary recruitment, dependence on voluntary funding, reliance on intelligence and sanctuary by local communities, and human-rights-conscious foreign sponsors.
All groups were dependent on voluntary recruitment, though motivations to joining varied significantly. Recruitment to MILF followed to a large extent religious and ethnical identities. Volunteers also joined ASG for similar reasons, but the group attracted many new recruits with the offer of material rewards, such as shares of ransom money. Lastly, NPA’s recruitment relied heavily on ideological motivations, which flourished mostly among the poor and rural communities. This variation offers an interesting insight. Expanding on the indicator dependence on voluntary recruitment, it can be argued that the motivations for recruitment also matter in measuring legitimacy-seeking behaviour. Echoing Weinstein (2007), even in the case of voluntary recruitment, if new recruits are mostly attracted by economic gains, armed groups should be less reliant on its constituency than those whose recruits are motivated by ideological, ethnical, or religious reasons.
65 None of the armed groups in the sample were dependent on voluntary funding from their constituencies. Instead, groups relied on mandatory contributions, such as the zakat or “revolutionary taxes”, extorsion, and other illegal activities such as drug trafficking. Abu Sayyaf, in particular, collected most of its funding from kidnapping for ransom. Likewise, little variation was found for the indicator reliance on intelligence and sanctuary by local communities. The modus operandi of the three groups relied to a large extent on community support, requiring them to merge back into locals after ambushes and skirmishes against the government. Lastly, none of the groups relied on human rights-conscious foreign sponsors, although NPA has actively sought support from various foreign actors and MILF interacted with foreign government officials and international NGOs from the International Monitoring Team and the International Contact Group. Because there is no significant variation in those indicators, their relevance to restraint on landmine use remains to be examined in future research.
Table 9. Legitimacy-seeking behaviour ranked per non-state armed group.
As expected, the values of the overall level of restraint on landmine use of the three armed groups were consistent with early assessments on landmine use by NSAGs (e.g. Sjöberg 2005), as shown on Table 10 below. Accordingly, MILF displayed the highest degree of restraint (moderate-high), followed by NPA (low-moderate) and lastly ASG (low). Variation was observed in all but one indicator for restraint on landmine use, namely trigger mechanism, because all groups used to some extent victim-activated devices. It was previously argued that many of the indicators for restraint on landmine use might overlap. In particular, strategy was expected to influence type of device, trigger mechanism, location, and direct restraint patterns. While evidence shows some correlation between those indicators, it was not able to account for a perfect association. For example, the case of the New People’s Army shows a seemingly contradictory pattern of landmine use, scoring low for strategy and type of device, but high for direct restraint. This is due to the fact that NPA seems legitimately committed to limiting the effects on civilians of
66 its landmines and other explosive devices, and, at the same time, it has allegedly used landmines for economic gains by attacking civilian infrastructure and used booby traps against government forces. Therefore, the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the dependent variable has shown to be valuable in providing a more nuanced perspective on restraint on landmine use. However, by taking the lowest observation for each indicator as its final, the current operationalisation does not do justice to overtime variation nor the intensity or frequency of specific patterns of landmine use.
Table 10. Restraint on landmine use per non-state armed actor.
According to the suggested hypothesis, the higher the level of legitimacy-seeking behaviour rebel groups display, the more likely should they exercise restraint on landmine use. Based on the observed overall levels of the independent variable, MILF was expected to show the highest value of dependent variables, followed by NPA and, lastly ASG. Empirical evidence finds support to the hypothesis, as summarised in Table 11 below. While MILF and ASG displayed opposite patterns of legitimacy- seeking behaviour and restraint on landmine use, both in accordance with the direction of relationship suggested by the hypothesis, NPA’s case, respectively scoring moderate and low-moderate for its independent and dependent variables, was inconclusive in isolation. When ranked among the other cases, however, NPA’s case adds support to the hypothesis.
Table 11. Summary of cross-case analysis. When disaggregating the variable legitimacy-seeking behaviour, an extended analysis of the case studies also find support for all its dimensions, namely constituency, domestic audiences, and international audiences, which are individually correlated to the level of restraint on landmine use (Table 12). For all three dimensions, MILF ranks highest, followed by NPA and lastly ASG. While this shows that all
67 dimensions of legitimacy-seeking behaviour were relevant in influencing restraint on landmine use, it is not possible, with this research design, to identify which dimension matters the most.
Table 12. Summary of extended analysis.
In addition, comparing the legitimacy-seeking behaviour of the New People’s Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front offers some insights on how the relationship with the different subjects of legitimacy might influence restraint on landmine use. First, NPA puts its constituency at the centre of its identity and source of legitimacy. It can be argued that NPA’s notion of constituency, or potential constituency, includes the majority of the Filipino population, regardless of geographic concentration, ethnicity, and religion. This can explain why the group has been successful in avoiding civilian casualties from its landmines. In comparison, even though MILF presents an overall higher level of restraint on landmine use, it has a broader source of legitimacy and a more limited notion of its constituency, restricted to the Mindanao Muslim population. Accordingly, MILF’s record of violence against civilians is higher NPA’s (Pettersson and Eck 2018). Second, NPA displays a more rejectionist approach to the Philippine political establishment than MILF. Again, it might explain why NPA has at times shown less restraint on landmine use against government forces, making frequent use of explosive devices, including with the use of booby traps, and mining dead soldiers’ bodies. MILF, on the other hand, has limited its use of landmines against government forces to the sporadic use of command-detonated anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines. Finally, because MILF has a stronger relationship with international audiences, either via international NGOs, IMT, or ICG-SPPP, it has shown a more consistent compliance to its commitments to international norms. NPA, on the other hand, seems at times to flex its landmine use policy to suit its military needs.
6.5 Alternative explanations
As argued earlier, restraint on landmine use is in practice most likely the outcome of a combination of different strategic and moral incentives (Figure 2), several of which were outside the scope of this thesis. I argued that legitimacy costs play a central role in shaping the overall level of restraint, but it
68 might be the case that landmine use was influenced by other factors and mechanisms that were not studied here.
It is important to first rule out the contextual factors that might have led to a decrease or limitation in the use of landmines by the selected groups. First, MILF, ASG and NPA have all proven sufficient group capacity to lay mines, both in terms of logistics and group cohesion, primarily because they have done so in a systematic way throughout the years. Likewise, most landmines used by rebel groups in the Philippines are improvised explosive devices, indicating a high level of technical expertise in manufacture of explosives and different types of landmines. The use of IEDs also implies a higher procurement, production, and employment cost than factory-made landmines. Second, landmine use might vary depending on the phase of the conflict. Evidence from the Philippine context corroborates with this assertion, as landmine use generally increased following state military offensives. Third, although there was no information found on this regard, seasonal restrictions to landmine use might indeed be present in Philippines because of the monsoon season. However, the use of aggregated- level measurements minimises the effects of both the conflict phase and seasonal factors.
The contextual factors considered, perhaps the most pressing strategic incentives to exert restraint on landmine use after legitimacy costs are the group’s own casualties due to their mines. Rebel groups have strong incentives not to report own casualties, avoiding the perception of weakness and lack of technical capacity. As expected, not much information was found on own casualties, except two events involving at least 16 NPA fighters in April and March 2004, when landmines exploded prematurely when being laid (ICBL-CMC 2005). Nonetheless, it is possible to infer that more information would be available if rebels were highly victimised by their own mines in the Philippines. It might also be argued that restraint was exercised in order to avoid future clearance costs and not to restrict access to land. This does not seem to be the case for the rebels in the Philippines. First, none of the groups used landmines in a massive scale, especially when put in perspective with other NSAGs in Colombia and Myanmar. The most frequent users, i.e. ASG and NPA, employed landmines mostly in an offensive strategy, thus not contaminating large extensions of their territories.
Other possible explanations for the variation in restraint on landmine use include sheer respect to humanitarian norms and the search for legal securities, as in seeking for the status of combatants, the expectation of reciprocity and avoiding the possibility of criminal indictment. The Philippines signed the Ottawa Convention in 1997 and has thus prohibited the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines in all its territory. In addition, the Armed Forces of the Philippines had,
69 even before the signature of the treaty, followed an internal policy of not using victim-activated anti- personnel landmines in its own territory (Rush 2019). While some rebel groups made unilateral declarations restricting the use of landmines, there is consistent evidence of non-compliance. Moreover, all groups were non-compliant in other areas such as in the recruitment of child soldiers, not allowing ICRC access to prisoners of war, or straightforward criminal activities (e.g. ASG).
As discussed earlier, genuine restraint on the use of violence may stem from the values, beliefs, and traditions held by armed groups. Put simply, the armed groups investigated in this study can be categorised as either Muslim jihadist or Maoist Communist groups. First, NPA’s left-wing ideology revolves around empowering the masses, putting a great emphasis on safeguarding the people’s dignity and rights. This is reflected in NPA’s formal commitments to international human rights and humanitarian norms, as well as its low record of violence against civilians. To a large extent those norms were reflected in NPA’s restraint on landmine use, since civilians only rarely feel victims of NPA-laid mines. However, the type of device and strategies used against government forces and opposers to the communist movement, such as businesspeople and commercial companies, exceed customary humanitarian law principles. This shows that NPA’s restraint is mostly restricted to its constituency, and not towards its enemies. Thus, in NPA’s case, ideology converges with legitimacy- seeking behaviour.
Second, both MILF and ASG can be defined as Muslim jihadists groups, but their interpretation of jihad varies considerably. MILF has long announced that the indiscriminate use of violence, including by laying anti-personnel landmines, goes against the teachings of Islam. Likewise, its commitment to the landmine ban was justified on religious and moral grounds. Conversely, indiscriminate violence is the main tactic used by Abu Sayyaf Group, who frame as their enemy not only the Philippine forces, but also non-combatants, both Christian and Muslim, who oppose to the group’s extremist interpretation of jihad. As put by Janjalani himself, “the military and the civilians that support them are one and the same” (Santos 2018, 24). Violence is justified as the necessary means to achieve global dominance of Islam, at the same time IHL is portrayed as a Western norm which should be fought against (Santos 2018). Nevertheless, even after MILF’s announcement in the 1970s, it laid anti- personnel landmines which led to civilian casualties. This shows that, at times, the perceived military necessity of landmines was a stronger incentive than the moral argument. MILF’s leadership has also reported that local commanders showed resistance to enforce the landmine ban. Again, this shows
70 that moral incentives are usually not sufficiently strong to explain genuine restraint in the cases where landmine use is justified in military grounds.
Finally, it is hard to disentangle strategic and moral incentives in practice, because we can only analyse actual behaviour and not the real intention behind decisions and actions. However, legitimacy-seeking behaviour should to some extent capture moral incentives. In order to increase legitimacy, groups’ behaviour should mirror their legitimacy-givers’ values, beliefs, and traditions. Moreover, as suggested by MILF’s case, armed groups might learn to value the benefits of restraint and the appropriation of humanitarian norms, incorporating restraint on landmine use as part of their institutional identity.
6.6 Limitations and potential biases
The main challenges to this thesis come from limitations in its theoretical formulation, research design, and empirics. One of the main theoretical limitations of my proposed argument is the excessive focus on the non-state armed group, not accounting for the actions and conditions of the group’s constituency and the wide range of domestic and international actors. This is made clear by the case of the New People’s Army, whose intransigent posture against the government and low level of restraint on landmine use could be explained by the historical lack of trust between NPA and the Philippine government, and GRP’s aggressive position against the rebel group. Those factors are reinforced by an overall weak involvement of civil-society and international organisations in promoting peace between NPA and GRP (Lubang 2019). In addition, the theoretical argument presented in this thesis does not it integrate the other factors influencing restraint (Figure 2) and rather focus on the role of legitimacy-seeking. By doing so, it fails to assess which influencing factor is more relevant in practice and misses the opportunity of identifying and assessing interaction effects.
The choice of a three-case study design is essentially limited in terms of representativeness. Conversely, a larger sample would provide a more nuanced variation of the variables of interests, and therefore allow for a more fine-grained analysis on the causal relationship between them. Likewise, the most-similar method restricts the generalizability of the theoretical argument put forth in this research. In attempting to control for background factors, all cases were drawn from the Philippine context. While this allows for ruling out several alternative explanations, it might be that the findings presented above are context specific. Finally, the unit of analysis used in this research was aggregated
71 to the armed group level, and therefore did not capture cross-time variation of the variables of interest and sublevel variations between different fronts or regions.
Another source of limitations for this research is the reliability and validity of the data on the dependent variable. Landmine use data were mostly drawn from mine accidents, recoveries either from government-led raids or mine clearance activities, and unilateral declarations from the armed groups. In the case of mine accidents, i.e. cases when landmines were activated, it is often difficult to assess which type of device and trigger mechanism has been detonated. This is often estimated due to the circumstances of the accidents and the damage caused by the explosion. In the Philippine context, however, most landmines are improvised and vary in explosive content and type of mechanism, thus adding uncertainty in assessing the nature of the device. Furthermore, information from mine accidents depends on reporting. In rebel-controlled areas, it is expected that civilians have less access to official reporting mechanisms and suffer considerable pressure from the rebel groups not to report mine accidents. For mine accidents and recoveries alike, there is hardly any available data on the mines that did not detonate or were not recovered. Because of the delayed effect of landmines coupled with often changing conflict dynamics, attributing with precision which armed groups laid a specific mine is a constant challenge. In addition, groups have different incentives for acknowledging the use of landmines or not. For example, for NPA and MILF, it is expected that the groups would avoid claiming mine accidents involving anti-personnel victim-activated landmines, in order to maintain the perception of compliance to their previous commitments; ASG, on the other hand, might even claim attacks and mine accidents that were not carried out by the group, because it seeks political recognition mostly through armed violence. Likewise, unilateral declarations do not necessarily conform to actual behaviour.
72 7 Conclusion
This study has sought to explain variation in the level of restraint of non-state armed groups on the use of landmines and other similar explosive devices, contributing to the efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and affiliated organisations. Deriving from different theories of rebel restraint and compliance to international humanitarian norms, I argued that non-state armed groups exert restraint on landmine use in order to avoid legitimacy costs or, conversely, to gain legitimacy in relation to different actors, namely their own constituencies, domestic audiences, and international audiences. It followed, as the empirical expectation of my argument, that the more legitimacy-seeking behaviour rebel groups display, the more they should exercise restraint on landmine use. This argument was tested in a structured focused comparison of three rebel groups in the Philippines, i.e. the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group and the New People’s Army. Results reveal that legitimacy-seeking behaviour had a positive influence on rebel restraint on landmine use for the selected cases. Besides, all the dimensions of legitimacy-seeking behaviour individually correlated with restraint on landmine use, although it was not possible to point out which dimension mattered the most in the case studies.
Moreover, an additional finding suggested that not only the overall level of restraint increased with the rise of legitimacy-seeking behaviour across the cases, but restraint also qualitatively varied depending on which audience the armed group was mostly reliant on. First, stronger relationships with rebel groups’ constituencies led to a more discriminate use of landmines to avoid civilian casualties. Second, weak government-rebel relationships led to a less restrained use of landmines and similar explosive devices, even when collateral damage to civilians was avoided. Finally, weak relations with international audiences seems to allow for inconsistent commitment to human rights and humanitarian law-abiding agreements and unilateral declarations. In addition, the cases of MILF and NPA provided further insights on possible learning processes triggered when non-state armed groups exert restraint and, in turn, experience increased legitimacy.
To my knowledge, no academic study has thus far specifically addressed the question of why rebel groups decide not to use landmines. In this regard, the current study contributes to the field of rebel restraint in four ways. First, this thesis explores a specific and underresearched area within studies of restraint on the use of violence. Specifically, it provides a novel conceptualisation of restraint on landmine use, based on technical and strategic aspects of landmine use. The focus on restraint, instead
73 of merely compliance to international norms, may disclose unobserved details in the use of violence. Second, it builds on previous research on rebel legitimacy and expands the outreach of current theories to the use of landmines, in particular the legitimacy-based theory of rebel compliance. Third, this thesis offered a broad range of potential drivers of restraint on landmine use organised in an original typology. Finally, it put forward and assessed with empirical evidence an original theory explaining variation in landmine use among rebel groups.
Rebels have been the most prolific users of landmines in recent years; however, little has been studied on what may drive non-state armed groups to exercise restraint on the use of landmines. This thesis offered only but a small contribution to the field, while much more research is warranted. Specific to the argument on the centrality of legitimacy as a driver for restraint, future studies should focus on larger samples and most-different case selection strategies, aiming at increasing the generalizability of the current findings. Likewise, within-case studies should investigate longitudinal variation of the variables of interest. The operationalisation of legitimacy-seeking behaviour and restraint on landmine use also deserves further elaboration, since some indicators for both variables did not significantly vary across the selected cases. Finally, future research could focus on the suggested causal mechanism and look deeply into decision-making process within the rebel group leadership. In relation to broader theories on restraint, future propositions should account for interaction effects between the different influencing factors of restraint on landmine use. Finally, the theoretical framework put forward in this thesis alongside the conceptualisation of restraint on landmine could inspire future research on specific patterns of violence against civilians more broadly, adding nuance and specificity to theoretical explanations to those phenomena.
The findings of this thesis suggest that the broader the sources of legitimacy, the higher the overall level of restraint on landmine use. Relevant to policymakers and practitioners, this finding academically reinforces an already acknowledged double-edged insight from the practitioner community (e.g. SCBL et al. 2001). On the one hand, this thesis first highlights the importance of conflict analysis and mapping when trying to influence the behaviour of armed groups. Second, engagement with the armed groups themselves and their legitimacy-givers are a useful tool for achieving rebel restraint on landmine use. Implied in this assertive is the idea that, although engagement should not legitimise armed groups, it can educate and convince rebels that abiding to international human rights and humanitarian norms may become an added source of legitimacy. Likewise, external actors might promote mine awareness in local communities, as well as to domestic actors and foreign sponsors,
74 which, in turn, should put extra pressure on rebel groups to exercise restraint on landmines. Of course, this should be done following the “do no harm” principle. On the other hand, non-state armed groups with broader legitimacy sources are more likely stronger and more resilient in their fight against the government. It follows that rebel groups might capitalise on the engagement with various actors over the landmine ban to gather more support and foster their armed struggle. Therefore, current, and future engagements with non-state armed actors should be done in an open and transparent manner, and constantly reinforce the humanitarian nature of the landmine ban.
Although this thesis offers no conclusive answer on how to engage rebels in the landmine ban, it has highlighted the value of legitimacy-seeking behaviour in influencing restraint to various degrees. It remains the task of future researchers, policymakers, and practitioners alike to enhance the understanding of rebel motivations to stop using landmines.
75 References
Abuza, Zachary. 2005a. ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Security in Southeast Asia’. Summary of remarks presented at the Presentation at the United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C., United States, June 9.
———. 2005b. ‘Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf’: Fort Belvoir VA, United States: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA439349.
———. 2005c. ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (6): 453–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500236881.
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). 2006. ‘In RP, Cost of Doing Business Includes Paying Tax to Rebels’. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 January 2006.
Al-Dawoody, Ahmed. 2017. ‘Islam and International Humanitarian Law: An Overview’. Humanitarian Law & Policy (blog). 14 March 2017. blogs.icrc.org/law-and- policy/2017/03/14/ihl-islam-overview/.
Andag, Ramil Añosa. 2005. Deadly Playgrounds: The Phenomenon of Child Soldiers in the Philippines. Manila, Philippines: Philippine Human Rights Information Center.
Araja, Rio N. 2019. ‘Euro NGOs Hit for Funding Reds’. Manila Standard, 16 March 2019, sec. Top Stories. http://manilastandard.net/news/top-stories/290182/euro-ngos-hit-for-funding- reds.html.
Arguillas, Carolyn O. 2019. ‘Bangsamoro in Transition: So Who Took Their Oath as BTA Members?’ Mindanews, 24 February 2019, sec. Peace Process, Bangsamoro. https://www.mindanews.com/peace-process/2019/02/bangsamoro-in-transition-so-who- took-their-oath-as-bta-members/.
Arjona, Ana. 2017. ‘Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance’. Small Wars & Insurgencies 28 (4–5): 755–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1322328.
Arjona, Ana, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. 2011. ‘Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia: A Survey of Demobilized Fighters’. In Understanding Collective Political Violence, edited by Yvan Guichaoua, 143–74. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave MacMillan.
Aventajado, Roberto N., and Teodoro Y. Montelibano. 2004. 140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Abu Sayyaf. Anvil Pub.
Bangerter, Olivier. 2011. ‘Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law or Not’. International Review of the Red Cross 93 (882): 353–84. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383111000385.
76 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2000. ‘Philippine Hostages Head for Libya’. British Broadcasting Corporation, 28 August 2000, sec. Asia-Pacific. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia- pacific/898190.stm.
Bell, Andrew M. 2016. ‘Military Culture and Restraint toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars’. Security Studies 25 (3): 488–518. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1195626.
Bellina, Séverine, Dominique Darbon, Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, and Ole Jacob Sending. 2009. ‘The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations’. Norad Report 20/2009. Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
Bongard, Pascal. 2019. Interview with Pascal Bongard, Head of the Policy and Legal Unit of Geneva Call. Interview by Henrique Garbino. Skype.
Browning, Christopher R. 1998. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. Reprint edition. New York,NY: Harper Perennial.
Bukit, Mathew. 2019. ‘In Mindanao, BARMM Is Only the Beginning’. The Diplomat, 12 March 2019, sec. ASEAN BEAT.
Burnham, Gracia, and Dean Merrill. 2010. In the Presence of My Enemies. Enlarged edition. Wheaton IL, United States: Tyndale Momentum.
Caculitan, Ariel R. 2005. ‘Negotiating Peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines’. Doctoral Dissertation, Monterey CA, United States: Naval Postgraduate School.
Cal, Ben. 2000. Gallantry in Mindanao: Preserving the Republic. Quezon City, Philippines: Mabuhay Communications Services. http://books.google.com/books?id=UnfbAAAAMAAJ.
Calle, Luis de la. 2017. ‘Compliance vs. Constraints: A Theory of Rebel Targeting in Civil War’. Journal of Peace Research 54 (3): 427–41. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316686823.
Carswell, Andrew J. 2014. ‘Converting Treaties into Tactics on Military Operations’. International Review of the Red Cross 96 (895–896): 919–42. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383115000703.
Chirot, Daniel, and Clark McCauley. 2010. Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder. Paperback. Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.
Collins, Randall. 2008. Violence: A Micro-Sociological Theory. Princeton University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt4cg9d3.
Coronel-Ferrer, Miriam. 2001. Interview with Miriam Coronel-Ferrer of the Non-State Actors Working Group. Interview by Margaret S. Busé. Published on the Journal of Mine Action, 5(3), 110-114.
Costa, Dora L., and Matthew E. Kahn. 2008. Heroes and Cowards: The Social Face of War. Princeton NJ, United States: Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/titles/8734.html.
77 Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). 2005. ‘Clarifications on the Issue of Land Mines’. Philippines: Communist Party of the Philippines. https://philippinerev.wordpress.com/2005/01/06/clarifications-on-the-issue-of-land- mines/.
Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. ‘It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (4): 570–97.
Davis, Paul K., Eric V. Larson, Zachary Haldeman, Mustafa Oguz, and Yashodhara Rana. 2012. ‘A Conceptual Model’. In Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism, 11–33. RAND Corporation.
Dawson, Alan. 1993. ‘Scandal Rages over Dutch Aid Diversion to NPA’. Manila Chronicle, 19 August 1993.
Doyo, Ma. Ceres P. 2008. ‘KFR in Zambasulta’. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 November 2008.
Democratic Progress Institute (DPI). 2014. ‘International Contact Group for the Southern Philippines Peace Process’. London, United Kingdom: Democratic Progress Institute. http://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Brief-International- Contact-Group-Philippines.pdf.
Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, ed. 2018. Rebels and Legitimacy: Processes and Practices. 1st ed. Routledge.
Fajardo, Nonoy. 2003. ‘Children in the Crossfire: Prevention and Rehabilitation of Child Soldier’. In . Washington D.C., United States: United States Department of Labor.
Fazal, Tanisha M, and Margarita Konaev. 2019. ‘Homelands versus Minelands: Why Do Armed Groups Commit to the Laws of War?’ Journal of Global Security Studies 4 (2): 149–68. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz005.
Fein, Helen. 1984. Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust. Chicago, United States: University of Chicago Press.
Fisk, Robert. 2000. ‘The Double-Edged Sword of Gaddafi’s Links with the Philippines’. The Independent, 22 August 2000, sec. Asia. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-double-edged-sword-of-gaddafis- links-with-the-philippines-711595.html.
Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman, and Desirée Nilsson. 2018. ‘Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians’. International Organization 73 (01): 103–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000346.
FlorCruz, Michelle. 2014. ‘Philippine Terror Group Abu Sayyaf May Be Using ISIS Link For Own Agenda’. International Business Times, 25 September 2014, sec. World. https://www.ibtimes.com/philippine-terror-group-abu-sayyaf-may-be-using-isis-link-own- agenda-1695156.
78 Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War. Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.
Geneva Call (GC). 2002. ‘Seeking Rebel Accountability: Report of the Geneva Call Mission to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Central Mindanao, Philippines, 3-8 April 2002’. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call.
———. 2004. ‘Mine Ban Education Workshop in Southern Sudan: Report of Proceedings and Recommendations’. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call.
———. 2007a. ‘Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: The Geneva Call Progress Report (2000-2007)’. Progress Report. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call.
———. 2007b. ‘Landmines and Armed Non-State Actors’. Jane’s Intelligence Digest, November, 2.
———. 2011. ‘Geneva Call’s Experience Engaging Armed Non-State Actors on Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosive Remnants of War’. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call.
Geneva Call (GC), and l'Association pour la promotion rurale de l'arrondissement de Nyassia/Solidarité, Développement, Paix (APRAN-SDP). 2010. ‘La population casamançaise se mobilise contre les mines: rapport des séances de plaidoyer communautaire pour l’interdiction des mines antipersonnel en Casamance, Sénégal’. Zurich, Switzerland: Geneva Call.
Geneva Call (GC), Government of Colombia (GOC), and Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación (CNRR). 2009. ‘Acción integral contra minas antipersonal en Colombia’. Workshop Report. Bogotá D.C., Colombia: Geneva Call, Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, and Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación.
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. MIT Press.
Gerring, John. 2006. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge University Press.
Gerring, John, and Lee Cojocaru. 2016. ‘Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A Diversity of Goals and Methods’. Sociological Methods & Research 45 (3): 392–423. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124116631692.
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Simon Hug, Livia Isabella Schubiger, and Julian Wucherpfennig. 2018. ‘International Conventions and Nonstate Actors: Selection, Signaling, and Reputation Effects’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (2): 346–80. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716650924.
Green, Amelia Hoover. 2013. ‘Learning Restraint: The Role of Political Education in Armed Group Behavior Toward Civilians’. Simons Papers in Security and Development, no. 30 (December): 39.
———. 2016. ‘The Commander’s Dilemma: Creating and Controlling Armed Group Violence’. Journal of Peace Research 53 (5): 619–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316653645.
79 ———. 2017. ‘Armed Group Institutions and Combatant Socialization: Evidence from El Salvador’. Journal of Peace Research 54 (5): 687–700. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317715300.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). 1957. An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and for Other Purposes.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 1997a. Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities.
———. 1997b. Agreement by the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
———. 2001. Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
———. 2010. Guidelines for the Implementation of the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines-Fondation Suisse de Déminage (PCBL-FSD) Project Pursuant to the Joint Statement of the GRP-MILF Peace Panels Dated 15 November 2007.
———. 2011. Terms of Reference of the International Monitoring Team (IMT). https://peace.gov.ph/2016/11/terms-reference-international-monitoring-team-imt/.
———. 2012. Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.
———. 2014. Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), and National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP). 1998. Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines.
Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen. 2008. ‘Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007’. Journal of Peace Research 45 (5): 697–710.
Harff, Barbara. 2003. ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’. The American Political Science Review 97 (1): 57–73.
Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ The Yale Law Journal 111 (January): 1935–2041.
Hegre, Håvard, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård. 2015. ‘Peacekeeping Works: An Assessment of the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations’. PRIO Conflict Trends Policy Brief (January). https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7613.
Herr, Stefanie. 2010. ‘Binding Non-State Armed Groups to International Humanitarian Law: Geneva Call and the Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines: Lessons from Sudan’. PRIF Report 95. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF).
80 Hofmann, Claudia. 2011. ‘Peace Negotiations in the Philippines: The Government, the MILF, and International NGOs’. 91. Peace Brief. Washington D.C., United States: United States Institute for Peace.
Holmes, Michael, and Dominique van Heerden. 2016. ‘Booby-Trapped Toys: How ISIS Targets Mosul’s Children’. CNN, 16 November 2016, International Edition. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/15/middleeast/mosul-isis-mines-boobytraps/index.html.
Hooper, Christopher. 2004. ‘NSAs in Africa: The Call to Action’. Journal of Mine Action 8 (2): 62–64.
Horowitz, Irving Louis. 1976. Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder. New Brunswick, United States: Transaction Publishers.
Human Rights Watch (HRW). 1997. ‘In Its Own Words: The U.S. Army and Antipersonnel Mines in the Korean and Vietnam Wars’. Vol. 9, No. 3. New York, United States: Human Rights Watch.
———. 2007. ‘Scare Silent: Impunity for Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines’. The Philippines. New York, United States: Human Rights Watch.
———. 2011. ‘“No Justice Just Adds to the Pain”: Killings, Disappearances, and Impunity in the Philippines’. New York, United States: Human Rights Watch.
Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 2013. ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War’. American Journal of Political Science. https://works.bepress.com/megan_shannon/3/.
Hutchison, Billye G. 2009. ‘Abu Sayyaf’. The Counterproliferation Papers 49. Future Warfare Series. Maxwell Air Force Base AL, United States: United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center.
International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC). 2000. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (1999)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2001. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2000)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2002. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2001)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2003. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2002)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2004. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2003)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2005. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2004)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2006. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2005)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2007. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2006)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2008. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2007)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
81 ———. 2009. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2008)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2011. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2010)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2015. ‘Country Profile: Philippines (2014)’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2017. ‘Landmine Monitor 2017’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2018. ‘Landmine Monitor 2018’. Austria: Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor.
———. 2019. ‘Mine Ban Treaty’. Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. February 2019. http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/the-issues/mine-ban-treaty.aspx.
International Campaign to Ban Landmines / Non-State Actor Working Group (ICBL/NSAWG), and Geneva Call (GC). 2003. ‘Looking Back, Looking Forward: Lessons Learned in Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban’. In Workshop on Lessons Learned in Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban, 241. Bangkok, Thailand: International Campaign to Ban Landmines Non-State Actors Working Group and Geneva Call.
International Crisis Group (ICG). 2005. ‘Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts’. 110. Asia. Jakarta, Indonesia; Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.
———. 2008. ‘The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao’. 152. Asia. Jakarta, Indonesia; Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.
———. 2011. ‘The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks’. 2002. Asia. Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 1997. ‘Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe?’ Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross.
———. 2018. ‘The Roots of Restraint in War’. Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross. https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/roots-restraint-war.
———. 2019. ‘Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries’. IHL Databases. February 2019. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/575.
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). 1998. ‘Statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Problem of Landmines’. Kandahar, Afghanistan: Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. http://theirwords.org/media/transfer/doc/ut_af_taliban_1998_01- d631e9853b6909a692f10408438eda18.pdf.
Information Handling Services (IHS) Markit. 2007. ‘Non-State Armed Groups Study: Study of Non- State Armed Groups in the Philippines’. Background Document Prepared for the Small Arms Survey. Jane’s Strategic Advisory Services.
International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC). 2011. ‘A Collection of Codes of Conduct Issued by Armed Groups’. International Review of the Red Cross 93 (882): 483–501. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383111000427.
82 Jaafar, Ghazali. 1997. Jaafar interview by MPCPD Interview by the Mindanao People’s Congress for Peace and Development (MPCPD). In Crossing Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao (now Shariff Kabunsuan).
———. 2000. ‘MILF Views on Landmine Use’. Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao, Mindanao, Philippines: Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Jenks, Chris, and Guido Acquaviva. 2014. ‘Debate: The Role of International Criminal Justice in Fostering Compliance with International Humanitarian Law’. International Review of the Red Cross 96 (895–896): 775–94. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383115000363.
James Madison University / Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (JMU/CISR). 2004. ‘Non-State Actors in the Philippines’. Journal of Mine Action 8 (2): 72–74.
Jo, Hyeran. 2015. Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Kamlian, Jamail A. 2011. ‘Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southern Philippines: A Discourse on Self-Determination, Political Autonomy, and Conflict Resolution’. Global & Strategis 5 (1): 1– 13.
Kenny, David A. 1996. ‘The Design and Analysis of Social-Interaction Research’. Annual Review of Psychology 47 (1): 59–86. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.47.1.59.
Kitzen, Martijn. 2017. ‘“Legitimacy Is the Main Objective”: Legitimation in Population-Centric Counterinsurgency’. Small Wars & Insurgencies 28 (4–5): 853–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1322331.
Konaev, Margarita, and Tanisha M. Fazal. 2018. ‘Can International Humanitarian Law Restrain Armed Groups? Lessons from NGO Work on Anti-Personnel Landmines’. Lawfare (blog). 30 September 2018. https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-international-humanitarian-law- restrain-armed-groups-lessons-ngo-work-anti-personnel-landmines.
Köhlt, Armin. 2008. ‘Rebellen gegen Minen’. Die Wochenzeitung, 16 October 2008, 42 edition, sec. International.
Kreps, Sarah, and Sarah Maxey. 2018. ‘Mechanisms of Morality: Sources of Support for Humanitarian Intervention’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (8): 1814–42. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717704890.
Kurklick, Cory, and Zach Wall. 2010. ‘Non-State Actors and Mine Action: Complications and Solutions’. Journal of Explosive Remnants of War and Mine Action 14 (2): 50–53.
Labalan, Bobby, Delfin Jr. T. Mallari, and Nino Jesus Orbeta. 2006. ‘NPA Declares Ceasefire in Mt. Bulusan Villages’. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 June 2006.
Labita, Al. 2011. ‘Where Gaddafi Is Still Loved’. Asia Times, 29 April 2011.
83 Lingga, Abhoud Syed Mansur. 1997. ‘Sheik Salamat Hashim: The “Amir” of the Bangsamoro Jihad’. Homeland 4 (2).
Longman, Timothy. 2011. Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda. African Studies. Vol. 112. New York, United States: Cambridge University Press.
Lubang, Alfredo Ferrariz. 2019. Interview with Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang, National Coordinator of the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines. Interview by Henrique Garbino. Skype.
Makinano, Merliza M. 2001. Child Soldiers in the Philippines. Manila, Philippines: International Labor Affairs Service, Department of Labor and Employment.
Mallari, Delfin Jr. T. 2006. ‘Agta Folk Flee from AFP Operations’. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 May 2006.
McGrath, Rae. 2001. ‘Minefields and Non-State Actors’. In Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: A Pioneering Conference, 27–30. Quezon City, the Philippines: Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, Mines Action Canada, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmine, UK Group on Landmines and Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Mendonza Jr., Roberto B. 2008. ‘The Evolution of Terrorist Financing in the Philippines’. presented at the International Workshop on Countering the Financing of Terrorism, Quezon City, Philippines, July 8.
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 2000. Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action.
———. 2002. Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action.
———. 2008. Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines.
———. 2019. ‘About Us’. Luwaran. March 2019. http://www.luwaran.net/home/index.php/about-us.
Milgram, Stanley. 1974. Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. Harper & Row.
Mogato, Manny. 2003. ‘To Fund a Revolution’. Newsbreak, 31 March 2003.
Monroe, Kristen Renwick. 2011. Ethics in an Age of Terror and Genocide: Identity and Moral Choice. Princeton NJ, United States: Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/titles/9608.html.
Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua. 2001. ‘Working with NSAs in Burma’. In Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: A Pioneering Conference, 55–59. Quezon City, the Philippines: Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, Mines Action Canada, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmine, UK Group on Landmines and Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines.
84 ———. 2004. ‘Mine Risk Education in Kawthoolei Liberated Area: An Experiment in Creating a Program of MRE in a Non-State-Controlled Area of Burma’. Journal of Mine Action 8 (2): 56– 58.
National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP). 2018. ‘About NDFP’. National Democratic Front of the Philippines. 2018. https://www.ndfp.org/about/.
Niksch, Larry. 2002. ‘Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation’. Report for Congress. Washington D.C., United States: Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress.
Oldale, John. 2012. A World of Curiosities: Surprising, Interesting, and Downright Unbelievable Facts from Every Nation on the Planet. Penguin.
Oppenheim, Ben, and Michael Weintraub. 2017. ‘Doctrine and Violence: The Impact of Combatant Training on Civilian Killings’. Terrorism and Political Violence 29 (6): 1126–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1131156.
Özerdem, Alpaslan, Sukanya Podder, and Eddie L. Quitoriano. 2010. ‘Identity, Ideology and Child Soldiering: Community and Youth Participation in Civil Conflict – A Study on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao, Philippines’. Civil Wars 12 (3): 304–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2010.509566.
Papa, Alcuin. 2008. ‘Terror Netted Abu P1.4B since ’92’. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 July 2008.
Pazzibugan, Donna. 2006. ‘Abus Now Have Hi-Tech Bomb-Making Capacity’. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 September 2006.
Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL). 2010. Primer on the Landmines Issue and Bill in the Philippines. 2nd ed. Quezon City, Philippines: Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Peleo, Amador. 2013. ‘Out of the Shadows: Violent Conflict and the Real Economy of Mindanao’. Philippine Political Science Journal 34 (2): 219–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2013.851495.
Petersen, Roger D. 2006. Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. 1 edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettersson, Therése, and Kristine Eck. 2018. ‘Organized Violence, 1989-2017’. Journal of Peace Research 55 (4).
Pobre, Cesar P., and Raymund Jose G. Quilop, eds. 2008. In Assertion of Sovereignty, Volume I: The Campaign against the MILF. Quezon City, Philippines: Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Podder, Sukanya. 2012. ‘Legitimacy, Loyalty and Civilian Support for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Changing Dynamics in Mindanao, Philippines’. Politics, Religion & Ideology 13 (4): 495– 512. https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2012.725663.
85 Ressa, Maria A. 2014. ‘Senior Abu Sayyaf Leader Swears Oath to ISIS’. Rappler, 4 August 2014, sec. Philippines.
Reusse-Decrey, Elisabeth. 2005. ‘The Struggle against Landmines: An Opening for Peace Talks in Colombia’. Conciliation Resources Accords, no. 16: 4.
Reyes, Angelo T. 2000. ‘The Mindanao Peace Process: What’s the Future’. presented at the Speech to the Makati Business Club, Manila, Philippines, June 27.
Robinson, Geoffrey. 2009. ‘If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die’: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor. Paperback. Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press.
Robinson, James, and Daron Acemoglu. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Rojas, David Arce. 1998. Petróleo y Derecho Internacional Humanitario. Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
Romero, Alexis. 2015. ‘ISIS Has Not Penetrated Phl – AFP’. Philippine Star, 25 April 2015. http://ph.news.yahoo.com/isis-not-penetrated-phl-afp-000000655.html.
Revolutionary Workers’ Party of the Philippines (RPM-P). 1999. ‘History: Introduction’. Rebolusyonaryong Partido Ng Manggagawa Ng Pilipinas (RPM-P). 1999. http://www.angelfire.com./rpg2/rpmp/history.htm.
Rummel, Rudolph Joseph. 1994. Death by Government. New Brunswick, United States: Transaction Publishers.
Rush, Christopher. 2019. Interview with Christopher Rush, former Senior Programme Officer of Geneva Call. Interview by Henrique Garbino. Skype.
Salamat, Hashim. 2001. The Bangsamoro People’s Struggle against Oppression and Colonialism. Mindanao, Bangsamoro Darul Jihad: Agency for Youth Affairs, Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Sanín, Francisco Gutiérrez, and Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2014. ‘Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond’. Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): 213–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313514073.
Santos, Soliman M. 2013. ‘The Law on the Use of Landmines and the Case of the NPA’. Balay Mindanaw | Group of NGOs (blog). 6 November 2013. https://balaymindanawgroup.wordpress.com/2013/11/07/the-law-on-the-use-of- landmines-and-the-case-of-the-npa/.
———. 2018. ‘Jihad and International Humanitarian Law: The Case of Three Moro Rebel Groups in the Philippines’. Article. Naga City, Philippines.
Santos, Soliman M., Paz Verdades M. Santos, Octavio A. Dinampo, and Diana Rodriguez. 2010. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
86 Scarpello, Fabio. 2007. ‘Drawn to the Fray’. South China Morning Post, 5 March 2007, International edition. https://www.scmp.com/article/583826/drawn-fray.
Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL), Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, Mines Action Canada, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, United Kingdom Working Group on Landmines, and Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines. 2001. ‘Full Conference Proceedings’. In Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: A Pioneering Conference, 188. Quezon City, the Philippines: Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, Mines Action Canada, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmine, UK Group on Landmines and Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Schlichte, Klaus, and Ulrich Schneckener. 2015. ‘Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy’. Civil Wars 17 (4): 409–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2015.1115573.
Sjöberg, Ann-Kristin. 2004. ‘The Involvement of Armed Non-State Actors in the Landmine Problem: A Call for Action’. In Nairobi Summit on a Mine Free World, 35. Nairobi, Kenya: Geneva Call.
———. 2005. ‘Volume I: A Global Report Profiling NSAS and Their Use, Acquisition, Production, Transfer and Stockpiling of Landmines’. Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call the Geneva Graduate Institute’s Program for the Study of International Organization(s).
———. 2006a. ‘Volume II: A Global Report of NSA Mine Action’. Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call the Geneva Graduate Institute’s Program for the Study of International Organization(s).
———. 2006b. ‘Armed Non-State Actors: The Main Users of the “Poor Man’s Weapon”’. Journal of Mine Action 10 (1): 73–75.
———. 2007. ‘Volume III: Towards a Holistic Approach to Armed Non-State Actors?’ Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call the Geneva Graduate Instute’s Program for the Study of International Organization(s).
Smith, Hazel, and Paul Stares. 2007. Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? UNU Press. https://collections.unu.edu/view/UNU:2481.
Stanton, Jessica A. 2016. Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law. Cambridge University Press.
Stratfor. 2014. ‘In the Southern Philippines, the Peace Process Stumbles Forward’. Austin TX, United States: Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/southern-philippines-peace- process-stumbles-forward.
Straus, Scott. 2006. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Cornell University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt24hg8g.
87 ———. 2012. ‘Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Restraint’. Perspectives on Politics 10 (02): 343–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712000709.
Swanson, David. 2011. ‘Moves to End Use of Child Soldiers, but Problem Persists’. The New Humanitarian (Formerly IRIN News), 8 April 2011, sec. Human Rights. http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2011/04/08/moves-end-use-child-soldiers- problem-persists.
Tan, Samuel K. 2003. Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle. Revised. Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines, Center for Integrative and Development Studies.
Taya, Shamsuddin L. 2007. ‘The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self- Determination in the Philippines’. Intellectual Discourse 15 (1): 59–84.
Torres, Jose. 2001. Into the Mountain: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf. Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines: Claretian Publications.
Tse-Tung, Mao. 2008. Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. Miami FL, United States: BN Publishing.
Turner, Mark. 1995. ‘Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayaff’. Contemporary Southeast Asia 17 (1): 1–19.
———. 2003. ‘The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf’. Public Organization Review 3 (4): 387–401. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PORJ.0000004816.29771.0f.
United Nations (UN). 1996. Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby- Traps and Other Devices to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, as Amended on 3 May 1996 (1996 Mines Protocol). http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/protocol.htm.
———. 1997. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention). https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVI- 5&chapter=26&clang=_en.
———. 2008. Convention on Cluster Munitions. http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf.
———. 2018a. ‘Abu Sayyaf Group’. Narrative Summary of Reasons for the Listing for Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Included in the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List. New York, United States: ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, United Nations Security Council. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/a bu-sayyaf-group.
88 ———. 2018b. ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’. S/PV.8264. New York, United States: United Nations Security Council.
Government of the United States of America (USA). 1959. FM 20-32: Land Mine Warfare. Washington D.C., United States: Department of the Army.
———. 2002. ‘International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Philippines’. Washington D.C., United States: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2002/13907.htm.
———. 2018. ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’. U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action. 2018. www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
Wadi, Julkipli. 2006. ‘Islamic Nationalism and Philippine Politics’. In Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democratization and Development, by Teresa S. Encarnación Tadem and Noel M. Morada. Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines: Institute Southeast Asian Studies, University of the Philippines Diliman.
Walker, Susan. 2001. ‘Victim Assistance’. In Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: A Pioneering Conference, 106–7. Quezon City, the Philippines: Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, Mines Action Canada, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmine, UK Group on Landmines and Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines.
Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. New York, United States: Cambridge University Press.
Whaley, Floyd. 2014. ‘Filipino Rebels Kill 21 Villagers over Peace Deal’. The New York Times, 28 July 2014, sec. Asia Pacific.
Wilkinson, Steven I. 2004. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Wilson Jr., Thomas G. 2009. ‘Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: A Catalyst for Peace’. Monograph, Fort Leavenworth KS: United States: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA506642.
Wood, Elisabeth. 2003. Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. 1st edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zimbardo, Philip. 2007. The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil. The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil. New York, NY, US: Random House.
89 Appendix I: Data on selected cases
In this appendix, relevant data from the selected cases is presented. First, Table 13 presents general data on the non-state armed groups, as draw from the Non-State Actor Data (NSAD) (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009) and the Rebel Groups and International Law (RGIL) database (Jo 2015). Second, Table 14 presents general data on the dyadic conflicts involving the non-state armed group and the government of the Philippines, according to previous datasets as well as on UCDP (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Pettersson and Eck 2018). Next, data on rebel compliance to international norms is drawn from NSAD and RGIL and presented on Table 15. Finally, a preliminary assessment of landmine use by the three non-state armed groups in presented on Table 16, as drawn from ICBL-CMC, ICRC and Geneva Call reports (ICBL-CMC 2019; ICRC 2019; Sjöberg 2005).
Table 13. General data on the non-state armed groups. Source: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Jo 2015.8910
8 Maximum estimation.
9 In comparison with government forces.
10 Even though Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) code “no” for presence of a political wing, Jo (2015) understands it differently. Because of the Islamic orientation of MILF, there is no official segregation between political and military leadership. Nonetheless, MILF specifies the existence of a military component – the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces – in its structure.
90
Table 14. General data on dyadic conflicts. Source: Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Pettersson and Eck 2018; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009.
Table 15. General data on rebel compliance to international norms. Source: Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Jo 2015.
Table 16. General data on landmine use. Source: ICBL-CMC 2019; ICRC 2019; Sjöberg 2005.
91 Appendix II: Measurement methods
This appendix seeks to explain how the main variables of interest, i.e. restraint on landmine use and legitimacy-seeking behaviour, have been measured and compared in this study.
First, the level of restraint on landmine use is established based on two components, namely violence against civilians and collateral damage. While violence against civilians varies between direct and indirect, collateral damage varies between avoided and accepted. Mathematically, this set-up allows for four possible combinations, that is: direct/avoided, direct/accepted, indirect/avoided, and indirect/accepted. However, collateral damage cannot be avoided when violence against civilians is inflicted directly by rebel groups, therefore the combination direct/avoided is excluded from the possible variation of the dependent variable.
It follows that the level of restraint is high when violence against civilians is indirect, and collateral damage is avoided; moderate level of restraint implies indirect violence against civilians, but accepted collateral damage; finally, low landmine use applies for cases when violence against civilians is direct and collateral damage accepted. Table 17 below summarises the conceptualisation of variation of restraint on landmine use:
Table 17. Conceptualisation of the variation of restraint on landmine use.
The indicators of the independent variable, legitimacy-seeking behaviour, follow a more straightforward logic. Each indicator can be answered as yes, partially, or no. The answer partially allows for a more nuanced measurement when contradictory observations are found for the same indicator.
In order to allow for cross-case comparison, each indicator of both the dependent and independent variables are assigned a score from 1 to 3, depending on the qualitative empirical observation, according to Table 18 below.
92
Table 18. Attributed scores to observable variation on variables of interest.
On the one hand, because some indicators for the dependent variable do not allow for a low (1) score (i.e. trigger mechanism, frequency, and marking), the overall value for restraint on landmine use would be inevitably positively skewed. Therefore, I decided to correct the overall value for the whole variable considering the minimum and maximum possible variation, according to my operationalisation. On the other, all indicators for the independent variable can assume the values no (1), partially (2), and yes (3), not requiring any adjustments in scale. To make it explicit, Table 19 and Table 20 below summarise the maximum and minimum variation for each variable.
Table 19. Minimum and maximum variation of the dependent variable.
Table 20. Minimum and maximum variation of the independent variable.
93 Nonetheless, for the sake of comparison, I decided to transform the overall values for both variables into a zero-to-one scale, where zero represents the minimum possible variation, and one the maximum possible variation. For both variables, the corrected value x is transformed according to the following formula:
푂푏푠푒푟푣푒푑 푇표푡푎푙 푆푐표푟푒 − 푀푖푛푖푚푢푚 푃표푠푠푖푏푙푒 푉푎푟푖푎푡푖표푛 푥 = 푀푎푥푖푚푢푚 푃표푠푠푖푏푙푒 푉푎푟푖푎푡푖표푛 − 푀푖푛푖푚푢푚 푃표푠푠푖푏푙푒 푉푎푟푖푎푡표푛
To exemplify, let us take the case of MILF’s restraint on landmine use (Section 5.1.2, Table 4). MILF scored high (3) in three indicators and moderate (2) in the remaining four indicators. If follows that the final corrected value for MILF’s overall level of restraint on landmine is 0.64, as per the calculation below:
(3 + 3 + 3 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2) − 10 푥 = = 0.64 21 − 10
The correct value for each variable is then compared to the pre-determined scale on Table 21 and a final overall level is then assigned. Continuing with the example above, the average value 0.64 stands for a moderate-high overall level of restraint on landmine use.
Table 21. Scale of overall level of variables of interest.
For the sake of clarity, Table 22 below summarises the values observed for both variables in this study, keeping the assigned score for each indicator, the corrected overall value, and final level the independent and dependent variables for each case.
94
Table 22. Summary of assigned numeric values observed for the variables of interest.
95 Appendix III: Overview of interviews completed
Interview #1: Expert interview with Christopher Rush, former Senior Programme Officer of Geneva Call, conducted over Skype on 29 March 2019. Interview #2: Expert interview with Ann-Kristin Sjöberg, former Programme Manager and Desk Coordination for Near and Middle East of Geneva Call, conducted over Skype on 8 April 2019. Interview #3: Expert interview with Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang, National Coordinator of the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, conducted over Skype on 2 May 2019. Interview #4: Expert interview with Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, former Co-coordinator of the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines and Co-chair of the Non-State Actor Working Group of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, conducted in Uppsala, Sweden, on 5 May 2019. Interview #5: Expert interview with Pascal Bongard, Head of the Policy and Legal Unit of Geneva Call, conducted over Skype on 17 May 2019. Interview #6: Expert interview with Soliman M. Santos Junior, former Co-coordinator of the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines and Geneva Call representative in the Philippines, e-mail exchanges, from 2 April to 8 May 2019.
96