Appendix I
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water*
The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the 'Original Parties', Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances, Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or (b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial liinits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.
• Signed at Moscow by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America on 5 August 1963. 257 258 Appendix I
2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.
ARTICLE II
I. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.
ARTICLE III
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instru• ments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties- the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - which are hereby designated the Depository Govern• ments. 3. This Treaty shall enter in force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force ohhis Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, etc. 259
ARTICLE IV
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.
ARTICLE V
This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Govern• ments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three. Appendix II
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 'Parties to the Treaty', Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
•Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on I July 1968.
260 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 261
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
ARTICLE II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
ARTICLE III
I. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Pro• cedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The 262 Appendix II safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article. 3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article JV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co• operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble to the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agree• ments with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
ARTICLE JV
l. Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles J and 11 of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
ARTICLE V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with the Treaty, under appropriate international obser- Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 263
vation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non• nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear• weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agree• ments.
ARTICLE VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
ARTICLE VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
ARTICLE VIII
I. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 264 Appendix II
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
ARTICLE IX
I. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instru• ments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the 'Depositary Governments'. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated 'Depositaries of the Treaty', and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 265 indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight. Notes and References
NOTES TO THE PREFACE
1. H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London, 1961) p. ix. 2. The Key to Disarmament (London, 1964) pp. 7-8. 3. M. Wight, Power Politics, ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Lon• don, 1979) p. 258. 4. N. Sims, Approaches to Disarmament (London, 1979) p. 8. 5. R. Neild, What Has Happened to Disarmament? (London, 1968) p. 3
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
l. The Old Testament, Isaiah, ii, 4. 2. Wight, p. 258. 3. For examples see chap. 7 and the bibliography therein of J.E. Dougherty and R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations (Philadelphia, 1970) pp. 138-67. See also Wight, pp. 258-67. 4. E. Wiskemann, Europe of the Dictators 1919-45, 10th impression (Lon• don, 1977) p. 10. 5. J. Strachey, On the Prevention of War (London, 1962) p. 142. 6. H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, 4th ed. (London, 1971) p. 27. 7. M. Howard, 'Problems of a Disarmed World', Diplomatic Investigations, ed. Sir Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London, 1966) pp. 206-15. 8. Wight, p. 305. 9. C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815-22, pp. 97-8; J. Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History, pp. 255-8, quoted in Wight, pp. 267-8. 10. Wight, pp. 267-75. 11. Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: War-And Aid To Democracies, 1941, p. 672, quoted in B. G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotia• tions for Arms Control (Washington, D.C., 1961) p. 15. 12. US Department of State, Co-operative War Effort, Publication no. 1732, 1942, p. 4, quoted in Bechhoefer, p. 15. 13. US Department of State, Toward the Peace, documents, Publication no. 2298, 1945, p. 6, quoted in Bechhoefer, p. 16. 14. Bechhoefer, p. 6. 15. Ibid.
267 268 Notes and References
16. Ibid. 17. UN Charter, Article 1. 18. Wight, p. 217 19. UN Charter, Articles 24 and 43. 20. Nicholas, pp. 27-8. 21. Quoted in Gordon Dean, Report on the Atom (London, 1954) p. 16. 22. M. Gowing (with Loma Arnold), Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-52, vol. 1, Policy Making (London, 1974) p. 64. 23. Ian Smart, 'The Great Engines: The Rise and Decline of a Nuclear Age', International Affairs, vol. 51, no. 4 (Oct. 1975) p. 544. 24. The League of Nations Covenant, Article VIII. 25. M. Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-45 (London, 1964) p. 325. 26. A. J. R. Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London, 1974) p. 18. 27. Ibid. 28. Gowing, 1945-52, pp. 64--5. 29. The full text of Attlee's letter is in appx 3 to chap. 3 in Gowing, 1945-52, p. 79. 30. Ibid., p. 67. 31. Ibid. p. 69. The report was written by Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the British Ambassador. 32. Ibid. pp. 68-80. 33. Bechhoefer, p. 35. 34. Gowing, 1945-52, pp. 70-1. 35. Ibid. p. 71. 36. W. R. Frye, 'Characteristics of Recent Arms Control Proposals and Agreements', Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, ed. Donald Brennan (New York, 1961) p. 71. 37. Washington Declaration, 15 Nov 1945, para. 7, appx 4 to chap. 4, Gowing 1945-52, p. 83. 38. Frye, p. 71. 39. Washington Declaration, para. 6. 40. Ibid. para. 7. 41. Gowing, 1945-52, p. 72. 42. General Assembly Resolution 43 (1), 14 Dec 1946. 43. The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-70 (New York, 1970) p. 2. 44. Bechhoefer, pp. 3fr-7. 45. Ibid., p. 37; Bernard Baruch, The Public Years (New York, 1960) p. 361. 46. Gowing, 1945-52, p. 88. 47. W. R. Frye, 'The Quest for Disarmament Since World War II', Arms Control: Issues for the Public, ed. Louis Henkin (New Jersey, 1961) pp. 210-21. The author of one of the best studies available on postwar US nuclear weapon policy has commented: 'Whether the United States was comple• tely serious in proposing the Baruch Plan and whether the plan was technically or politically workable remain open questions to this day. Soviet resistance to the plan was understandable; Kremlin leaders could not have been expected to entrust their security to an international organisation dominated by the United States, to agree to open the Soviet Notes and References 269
Union to foreign inspection, or to remain a second-class nation in the crucial field of atomic weaponry.' J. H. Kahane, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C., 1975) p. I. 48. W. R. Frye, 'Characteristics of Recent Arms Control Proposals and Agreements', Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, ed. Brennan, p. 22. 49. Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission First Year, no. 2, second meeting, pp. 26-8. 50. Gowing, 1945-52, p. 89. 51. Ibid., p. 90. 52. Ibid., pp. 90-1. 53. Ibid., p. 92. 54. The United Nations and Disarmament, p. 14. 55. Ibid., pp. 21-4. 56. Ibid., p. 2. 57. Frye, 'Quest for Disarmament', p. 23; Bechhoefer, p. 135. 58. The United Nations and Disarmament, pp. 28-32. 59. Ibid., pp. 32-3. 60. The United States Participation in the United Nations, Report by the President to Congress for the Year 1950, Dept of State Publication 4178, July 1951, p. 112; quoted in Bechhoefer, pp. 152-3. 61. Frye, 'Characteristics of Recent Arms Control Proposals', pp. 74-5. 62. UN Resolution 715 (vn), 28 Nov 1953; quoted in Bechhoefer, pp. 208-9. 63. Frye, 'Quest for Disarmament', pp. 25-7. 64. Interview material. 65. Some idea of the thinking of a scientific panel appointed in 1952 to advise the US Department team can be seen from Robert Oppenheimer's appearance before his personnel security board in April and May 1954 - US Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearings before Personnel Security Board; quoted in Bechhoefer, pp. 245-6. 66. Frye, 'Characteristics of Recent Arms Control Proposals', p. 81. 67. L. Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London, 1980) pp. 2-3. On changing thinking in Britain about the political and military utility of nuclear weapons in the mid- I 950s, see in particular Richard Goold• Adams et al., On Limiting Atomic Warfare (London, 1956). Changing attitudes under the Eisenhower Administration are succinctly and surpris• ingly fairly described in William Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (London, 1964) pp. 21-40.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
I. See, for example, H. Marcuse in Science and Culture: A Study of Cohesive and Disjunctive Forces, ed. C. Halton (Boston, 1965); T. Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (London, 1970). 2. A description of the British nuclear test programme is given in Air Vice• Marshal, S. Menaul, Countdown: Britain's Strategic Nuclear Forces 270 Notes and References
(London, 1980) chaps. 1, 4, 5 and 6. An apparently comprehensive list of US and UK nuclear tests is given in M. W. Carter and A. A. Moghissi, 'Three Decades of Nuclear Testing', Health Physics, vol. 33 (July 1977) pp. 55---71. 3. J. D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science (London, 1939) pp. 185---6. 4. P. G. Wersky, 'The Visible College: A Study of Left-Wing Scientists in Britain, 1918-39', Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1974. 5. See, for example, J. Huxley's Scientific Research and Social Needs (London, 1934), J. Haldane's Marxist Philosophy and the Social Sciences (London, 1938), G. Hogben's Science for the Citizen (London, 1938). 6. Interview material. 7. E. H. S. Burhop, The Social Function of Science, The Sixth J. D. Bernal Lecture, delivered at Birkbeck College, London, 1975, p. 2. 8. See, for example, the special symposium on 'The Morality of Atomic Warfare', Atomic Scientists Journal, vol. 4, no. I (Sep 1954). 9. See, for example, Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, vol. I (London, 1974) p. 181. IO. A. W. Reid, Tongues of Conscience: War and the Scientists' Dilemma (London, 1969) p. 264. 11. See, for example, Michael Polonyi's 'Rights and Duties of Science' in Contempt of Freedom: The Russian Experiment and After (London, 1940); Walter E. Conn, 'Michael Polonyi: The Responsible Person', The Hey• throp Journal, vol. XVII, no. I (Jan 1976) pp. 31-49. 12. Interview material. 13. Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations, Dept of State Publication 7258, GPO, Washington, D.C., 1961, p. 3. 14. J. R. Arnold, 'Effects of the Recent Bomb Tests on Human Beings', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. x, no. 9 (Nov 1954) p. 347. 15. Arnold, 'Effects of the Recent Bomb Tests', p. 347. 16. 'Radiation Exposures in Recent Weapon Tests', condensed version of AEC 16th Semi-Annual Report, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. x, no. 9 (Nov 1954) p. 352. 17. See, for example, J. W. Gofman and A. R. Tamplin, testimony presented at Hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 9lst Congress, January 1970, and 'Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations', published by the Committee of the National Research Council, National Academy of Science, Washington, D.C., 1975. 18. Interview material. 19. C. A. Coulson, 'Atomic Energy: The Moral Issue', The Biological Hazards of Atomic Energy, ed. A. Haddow (London, 1952). 20. J. Rotblat, 'The Hydrogen-Uranium Bomb', Journal of the Atomic Scientists Association, vol. 4, no. 4 (Mar 1955) pp. 224-9. 21. Ibid., pp. 224-5. 22. Ibid., 227. 23. Ibid., p. 228. 24. Including: Sir Wallace Akers, Sir Geoffrey Taylor, and Professors Feather, Haddow, Lonsdale, Moon, Oliphant, Peierls, Poneth, Powell, Pryce, Rotblat, Schonland and Skinner. Notes and References 271
25. P. E. Hodgson, 'Atomic Scientists and the Public', New Scientist, 6 Aug 1959, p. 157. 26. Ibid. 27. Cmnd 9780 (London, June 1956). 28. Ibid., para. 359. 29. Ibid., para. 360. 30. Members: J. Rotblat (Chairman), J. W. Hoag, A. Haddow, W. M. Levitt, P. J. Lindop, S. 8. Osborne, L. S. Penrose, C. J. Salmon, P.A. Shepherd, G. Simon. 31. Atomic Scientists' Association, Statement on Strontium Hazards (Lon• don, 1957). Reprinted in US Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings on Fall-Out, vol. 2, pp. 1669-71, GPO, Washington, D.C., 1958. 32. US Congress, Hearings on Fall-Out, vol. 2, p. 1699. 33. G. Teller and C. Latter, Our Nuclear Future (London, 1958). 34. Interview material. 35. See, for example, E. M. R. Fucher, J. R. Keane, C. E. R. Toureau, and R. S. Cambray, Radioactive Fall-Out; Short-Lived Fission Products from the Russian Nuclear Explosion of 1961, UK Atomic Energy Authority Research Group Memorandum, Health Physics and Medical Division, Atomic Research Establishment, Harwell, Berks., HMSO, 1962. 36. To be considered in Chap. 5. 37. Resolution of Second General Assembly (Prague Section), 11-13 Apr 1951. Quoted in 'Action of the WFSW Leading Up to the lst Pugwash Conference', by E. H. S. Burhop, 'Chapter 7' of draft untitled book, p. 17. 38. General Meeting of ASWI, Hyderabad, 4 Jan 1954. 39. Burhop in letter to Joliot-Curie, 22 Nov 1954. Taken from the late Professor Burhop's Pugwash Papers. I am grateful to Professor Burhop and Gillian Slovo of The Open University for this source of informa• tion. 40. Ibid., Burhop to Biquard, 30 Nov 1954. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., P. Morrison to Joliot-Curie, 7 Dec 1954. 43. Ibid., Burhop to Biquard, 22 Dec 1954. 44. Ibid., 8. Segre to Burhop, 25 Jan 1955. 47. Ibid., Joliot-Curie to Russell, 31 Jan 1955. 46. Ibid., Russell to Joliot-Curie, 4 Feb 1955. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid., Burhop to Biquard, 1 Nov 1955. 49. Burhop Pugwash Papers, Russell to Burhop, 9 Dec 1955. 50. Ibid., Russell to Burhop, 26 Jan 1956. 51. J. Rotblat, Disarmament and World Security at the Pugwash Conferences (London, 1976) pt II, p. I. 52. Interview material. 53. Interview material. 54. Report of Conference of Experts, p. 2. 55. Interview material. 56. Interview material. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 272 Notes and References
59. H. K. Jacobsen, and D. E. Stein, Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966) p. 218; interview material. 60. W. Epstein, 'The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', Scientific American (Apr 1975) pp. 22-3. 61. A good survey of this subject is provided in B. Bolt, Nuclear Explosions and Earthquakes: The Parted Veil (San Francisco, 1976). 62. Interview material. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Interview material. 66. Interview material. 67. I. P. Pasechnik, S. D. Kogan, D. D. Sultonor, V. I. Tsibul'skii, 'Results of Seismic Observations on Underground Nuclear and TNT Explosions', Transactions of the 0. Y.U. Shmidt Institute of Geophysics, no. 15 (182), Translation, Consultants Bureau (New York, 1962). 68. Interview material. 69. Interview material. 70. Interview material. 71. Interview material. 72. Interview material. 73. Interview material. 74. Interview material. 15. Interview material. 76. See Chapter 5 for further discussion. 77. Interview material. 78. Interview material. 79. UKAEA, Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, 1965. The Detection and Recognition of Underground Explosions, p. 15. 80. Ibid., p. 16. 81. Interview material. 82. Interview material. 83. UKAEA, Detection and Recognition, p. 18. 84. Interview material. 85. F. Hussain, The Impact of Weapons Test Restrictions, Adelphi Paper no. 165 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 47. 86. Interview material. 87. Interview material. 88. Interview material. 89. Interview material.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. A number of impressionistic accounts were published in the 1950s and 1960s including a collection of essays by Philip Toynbee, The Fearful Choice (London, 1958). Christopher Driver's The Disarmers (London, 1964) is a valuable first attempt at a history of CND. David Edwards's unpublished BA thesis, Swarthmore College, of 1962 remains a valuable Notes and References 273
compilation and analysis. Dr A. J. R. Groom's study, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London, 1974), is very comprehensive and gives considerable coverage to protest groups beyond the CND. Finally, with the publication of Philip Williams's long-awaited biography of Hugh Gaitskell (London, 1979) an additional valuable source, making use of a great deal of new material from private papers and interviews, becomes available. I have drawn heavily on these sources, although often I arrive at rather different conclusions. 2. See, for example, J. M. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York, 1961); G. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1960); V. 0. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1961). The evidence analysed and presented by David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London, 1969) would appear to support this general thesis. 3. D. Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy (London, 1968) p. 72. 4. D. Capitanchik, 'Public Opinions and Popular Attitudes towards Defence', British Defence Policy in a Changing World, ed. J. Baylis (London, 1977) p. 255; See also J. Baylis (ed.), Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy (London, 1983) p. I. 5. On the concept of political culture, a useful British text is R. Dowse and J. Hughes, Political Sociology (London, 1972). 6. Capitanchik, pp. 256-8. 7. Though see R. Terchek, The Making of the Test Ban Treaty (The Hague, 1970) chap. 6. 8. J. C. Garnett, 'Some Constraints on Defence Policy-Makers', The Management of Defence, ed. L. W. Martin (London, 1976) p. 35. 9. R. Rose, Politics in England (London, 1965) p. 135. 10. M. Jones, 'The Voice of an Era', Man of Christian Action, ed. Ian Henderson (London, 1976) p. 73. 11. See, for example, J. A. Hobson, Richard Cobden, The International Man (London, 1918); A. J. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers (London, 1957); R. Rose, 'The Relation of Socialist Principles to Labour Foreign Policy. (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1959) all quoted in Rose, Politics in England, p. 45. 12. D. V. Edwards, 'The Movement for Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament in Britain' (unpublished BA thesis, Swarthmore College, 1962) p. 2. 13. Driver, p. 22. 14. Edwards, p. 4. 15. The Economist, 11 Oct 1952, quoted in Groom, pp. 146-7. 16. J. Newman in New York Herald-Tribune, Apr 1954, quoted in Edwards, p. 4. 17. Driver, pp. 26-7. 18. Groom, pp. 148-50. 19. A. J. R. Groom, 'The British Deterrent', British Defence Policy in a Changing World, ed. J. Baylis (London, 1977) p. 127. 20. Statement on Defence (London HMSO, 1955). 21. Edwards, p. 79. 22. Groom, p. 173. 23. See Chap. 2, above. 274 Notes and References
24. H. Thomas, The Suez Affair (London, 1970) p. 175. It is noteworthy however, as Arthur Marwick has remarked, how quickly passions about Suez were spent: e.g. it was hardly mentioned during the 1959 General Election Campaign, A. Marwick, British Society Since 1945 (London, 1982) p. 105. 25. Edwards, p. 10. 26. Driver, pp. 35-7. 27. Sir Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the Nuclear Age (London, 1958). 28. Subsequently published as Russia, the Atom, the West (London, 1958). 29. See most notably J. B. Priestley, 'Britain and the Nuclear Bombs', New Statesman, 2 Feb 1957, quoted in Driver, p. 39. 30. Driver, pp. 43-7; Greer, pp. 27-8; Groom, pp. 333-4. 31. Driver, p. 54. 32. Ibid., pp. 108-10. 33. Ibid., p. 70. 34. Groom, pp. 326--8. 35. The journal which hosted the opinions of this group was the Universities and Left Review (later to re-emerge as New Left Review). Some of its contributing thinkers published notable books and collections of essays reflecting the anxieties of the time: see in particular John Rex, War and Peace (London, 1963). 36. Edwards, p. 157. Edwards interviewed a number of leading unilateralists in 1961. 37. Driver, p. 87. 38. Williams, p. 453. 39. Ibid. 40. Hugh Gaitskell to John Murray, 10 Apr 1957, quoted in Williams, p. 454. 41. V. Bogdanor, 'The Labour Party in Opposition 1951-64', in The Age of Affluence, ed. V. Bogdanor and R. Skidelsky (London, 1970), p. 78. 42. M. Walker, 'The Labour Party and Defence 1957-64', unpublished University of Wales M.Sc. thesis, 1974. 43. Anti-Americanism on the Left is a recurrent theme of post-war Labour foreign policy. See, for example, M. R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy, 1914-65 (Palo Alto, 1969) chap. l. 44. S. Haseler, The Gaitskellites (London, 1969) pp. 125-33. 45. E. Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe 1945-70 (London, 1971) pp. 60--3. 46. Crossman Diary, 3 May 1957, quoted in Williams, p. 454. 47. M. Foot, Aneurin Bevan, vol. 2 (1973) pp. 554-5. 48. Williams, p. 455. 49. M. Harrison, Trades Unions and the Labour Party since 1945 (London, 1960) pp. 237-8. 50. Williams, pp. 457-8. 51. Ibid., p. 483. 52. Groom, pp. 307-9. 53. Williams, pp. 496--7. 54. Ibid., p. 494-6. 55. Ibid., p. 499. 56. Groom, pp. 312-15. 57. Quoted in Groom, p. 315. Notes and References 275
58. Ibid. 59. Ibid., pp. 315-16. 60. Hugh Gaitskell to Arthur Hetherington, Hetherington Diary, 11 Nov 1958 and 22 Apr 1959, quoted in Williams, p. 498. 61. Crossman Diary, 28 Feb 1958, quoted in Williams, p. 498. 62. Hugh Gaitskell to Arthur Hetherington, Hetherington Diary, 11 Nov 1958 and 22 Apr 1959, quoted in Williams, p. 498. 63. Williams, p. 498. 64. Ibid., pp. 501-3. 65. Edwards, p. 50. 66. Williams, p. 504. 67. Edwards, p. 51. 68. S. Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism (Manchester, 1968) pp. 116--18. 69. Edwards, pp. 51-2; Williams, pp. 505-8. 70. Edwards, p. 52. 71. Driver, p. 93. 72. Harold Watkinson announced its cancellation in the House of Commons on 27 Apr 1960, Hansard, column 234. 73. R. Worcester, Roots of British Air Policy (London, 1966) pp. 189-91. 74. Williams, pp. 576--83. 75. Walker, pp. 17-27. 76. Williams, p. 579. 77. Edwards, pp. 62-5. 78. Anthony Crosland m a Jetter to Gaitskell, 4 May 1960, quoted in Williams, p. 584. 79. See Chap. 4, below. 80. Groom, pp. 426--7. 81. Quoted in Edwards, p. 65. 82. Groom, pp. 426--8. 83. New Statesman, 2 July 1960. 84. Quoted in Edwards, p. 67. 85. Groom, p. 438. 86. Ibid., pp. 435-7; Williams, pp. 610--12. 87. Edwards, p. 68. 88. Williams, p. 613. 89. Quoted in Groom, pp. 433-4. 90. Walker, p. 27. 91. The Economist, 5 Nov 1960. 92. Gaitskell to King-Hall, 17 Oct, Gaitskell Papers, quoted in Williams, p. 625. 93. Driver, p. 96. 94. B. Russell and N. Scott, Act or Perish, 25 Oct 1960, quoted in Edwards, p. 72. 95. Using questionnaires sent to 148 local parties where the CDS cam• paigned, two political scientists concluded that one in three of their sample of constituency parties moved from unilateralism to multilatera• lism between the 1960 and 1961 Party Conferences. Keith Hindle and Philip Williams, Political Quarterly (July-Sep 1962) pp. 306--20. 96. The Guardian, 20 Oct 1960. 276 Notes and References
97. Gallup Poll, quoted in Driver, p. 99. 98. Quoted in Groom, p. 444. 99. Ibid., pp. 444-5. 100. Walker, p. 28. IOI. Groom, p. 450. I 02. Ibid., p. 452. 103. Williams, pp. 646-53. 104. This is a view supported by one of Macmillan's biographers; see Anthony Sampson, Macmillan (London, 1968) p. 223. 105. Groom, p. 390. 106. Capitanchik, p. 274. 107. H. Young, 'Politics Outside the System', ed. C. Cook and D. McKie, The Decade of Disillusion (London, 1972) pp. 216-17. 108. Interview material.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
I. See Chap. 2, above. 2. See Chaps. 7 and 8, below. 3. Similar considerations lay behind the US 'New Look' defence policy of 1954. In the words of John Foster Dulles, a national security policy depending 'primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and at place of our choosing'. J. F. Dulles, 'The Evolution of Foreign Policy', Department of State Bulletin, vol. 30 (25 Jan 1954) p. 108. Quoted in Kahan, p. 12. This policy rapidly gained the title of 'Massive Retaliation'. 4. Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd 124 (London, 1957). 5. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 568, cols 1760-1, 16 Apr 1957. Most importantly at the December 1954 NATO Council of Ministers' meeting, the Alliance adopted a declaratory policy of being prepared to use nuclear weapons to defeat a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. J. Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom (London, 1983) p. 114. 6. The first successful ICBM flight test had already taken place in the Soviet Union in Aug 1957. D. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, 1983) p. 66. 7. It is perhaps easy to forget that it was only in late 1950 that US ground forces in Europe were significantly strengthened for the first time since the Second World War, and that a newly appointed SACEUR thought it would only be six to seven years before European conventional forces would be large enough to allow US forces to be reduced. T. P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Westport, Conn., and London, 1981) pp. 207-7, quoted in D. C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place 1900-1975 (Cambridge, 1984) p. 124. Brian Bond recently made the same point when he wrote: 'It was far from certain initially that the United States would make a large and permanent military effort in Europe'. B. Bond, War and Notes and References 277
Society in Europe 1870-1970 (London, 1984) p. 206. See also Kahan, pp. 11-17. 8. A. Buchan, The End of the Post-War Era (London, 1974) p. 23. 9. UN Sub-Committee of Disarmament Commission, 124th Meeting, Lan- caster House, London, 25 June 1957, pp. 19--20. 10. Ibid., PV125, 26 June 1957, pp. 21-2. 11. Ibid., PV126, 27 June 1957, p. 10. 12. UN, DC/SC, 3/PV126, p. 10. 13. UN, DC/SC, 1/PVl28, 29 June 1957, p. 3. 14. Interview material. 15. UN, DC/SC, l/PV128, p. 3. 16. See Chap. 2, above. 17. UN, DC/SC, l/PV128, p. 4. 18. UN, DC/SC, 1/PV56, 7 May 1957. The Soviet Union was the first nuclear power to propose the disconti• nuance of nuclear weapons tests, as part of a general disarmament plan put to the UN General Assembly in 1955. W. Epstein, The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (New York, 1976) p. 49. 19. UN, DC/SC, l/PV128, p. 6. 20. UN, DC/SC, l/PVl49, 21 Aug 1957, pp. 26--7. 21. UN, DC/SC, 1/PV128, pp. 13-14. 22. UN, DC/SC, l/PV150, 23 Aug 1957, pp. 3-4. 23. UN, DC/SC, l/PV350, p. 31. 24. UN, DC/SC, 3/PVl50, p. 31. 25. UN, DC/SC, l/PVl41, 25 July 1957, p. 11. 26. UN, DC/SC, l/PV142, 26 July 1957, p. 3. 27. The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests continued until 9 January 1962, after which, in March of that year, its work was transferred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. 28. See Chap. 2. Interview material. 29. Interview material. 30. Ibid. 31. GEN/DNT/PVI, p. 7. 32. Ibid., p. 6. 33. Ibid., p. 12. 34. Ibid., pp. 21-2. 35. GEN/DNT/PV2, 3 Nov 1958, p. II. 36. GEN/DNT/PVI, p. 32. 37. GEN/DNT/PV2, pp. 14-15. 38. Ibid., p. 16. 39. Interview material. 40. GEN/DNT/PV2, p. 21. 41. Interview material. 42. Ibid. 43. Interview material. 44. Interview material. 45. Interview material. 46. The most recent discussions of developments in Anglo-American nuclear co-operation are contained in John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence 278 Notes and References
Relations 1939-80 (London, 1981) pp. 58--{i(), and J. Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain, and the Military Atom (London, 1983) pp. 111--63. 47. Interview material. 48. Eisenhower to Hon. Sterling Cole, 27 May 1957, Presidential Office Files, Box 525, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereinafter cited as DDE Library). 49. 'Pre-Press Notes', 23 Apr 1958, Diary Series, Whitman File, Box 19, DDE Library. 50. H. Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (London, 1971) pp. 300-1. Stassen and Secretary Dulles were constantly at loggerheads over disar• mament policy. In presenting the 'cut-off' proposal Stassen appears to have acted unilaterally without consulting even the State Department. Simpson, p. 127. 51. Ibid., p. 302 52. Ibid., p. 316. 53. Memo for Secretary of State, 24 Oct 1957, Whitman File, Box 20, DDE Library. 54. Whitman Diary, 10 Jan 1957, Whitman File, Box 10, DDE Library. 55. A recent and detailed analysis of discussions leading to revision of the McMahon Act is contained in J. Simpson, chap. 6. 56. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 435. 57. Ibid., p. 489. 58. Macmillan, pp. 489-90. 59. Whitman File, Box 20, Telephone calls, 1045, 30 May 1958, DDE Library. 60. Macmillan, p. 490. 61. Interview material. 62. Baylis, p. 58. 63. US Public Law 479, 85th Congress, 72 Stat 276 (1958). 64. US Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts, Series no. 4078 (1958); see also Rear-Admiral Sir Ian McGeoch, 'The Polaris Programme', M.Phil. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1975. It was a co-operative not a strict exchange agreement. As Simpson (J. Simpson, p. 142) has noted: reciprocity was not the basis of exchange; the US would not transfer information to the UK 'unless this was judged to contribute to its own security'. 65. US Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts, Series no. 4267 (1959). 66. J. Simpson, p. 147. 67. A British test on 23 September was in fact to be the last British atmospheric test. See M. W. Carter and A. A. Moghissi, 'Three Decades of Nuclear Testing', p. 70, and J. Simpson, p. 106. 68. J. Simpson, pp. 144-5. 69. 'Question of the Cessation of Nuclear Tests', UN document A/3973. 70. H. K. Jacobson and D. Stein, Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966) pp. 130--1. 71. See Chap. 2, above. 72. GEN/DNT/25. Notes and References 279
73. See, for example, J. J. Wadsworth, The Price of Peace (New York, 1962). p. 24. 74. GEN/DNT/PV29, p. 17. 75. Interview material. 76. GEN/DNT/PV52, pp. 4-8. 77. GEN/DNT/PV37, pp. 5-10. 78. For general scientific discussion, see Chap. 2, above. 79. Soviet Ambassador Smirnov to Chancellor Adenauer, 30 Nov 1958, quoted in Macmillan, p. 582. 80. Journal, p. 18 Jan 1959, Macmillan, p. 582. 81. Macmillan, p. 595. 82. Under-Secretary of State Livingston Merchant, interviewed by John Later, 12 June 1972, Columbia Oral History Project, DOE Library, p. 72. 83. Journal, 23 Feb 1959, Macmillan, pp. 59~. 84. Macmillan, p. 600. 85. Sir Michael Wright, Disarm and Verify (London, 1964) p. 137; T. E. Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace (Columbus, Ohio, 1960). 86. Macmillan, p. 601. 87. Jacobsen and Stein, p. 168. 88. See Chap. 3. 89. The Economist, 14 Feb 1959. 90. See Chap. 3. 91. J. Strachey, On the Prevention of War (London, 1962) p. vii. 92. The Times, 13 May 1959. 93. Guardian, 13 May 1959; Daily Worker, 31 July 1959; Daily Telegraph, 31 July 1959; Daily Telegraph, 31 July 1959. 94. Daily Telegraph, 8 Aug 1959. 95. New York Times, 28 Aug 1959. 96. New York Times, 30 Oct 1959. 97. Memo for John McCone. Discussion with Selwyn Lloyd, 23 Mar 1959, p. I. Project 'Clean Up', Box 10, DOE Library. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. Whitman Diary, 21 Mar 1959, Whitman File, Box IO, DOE Library. 101. Geneva Convention, 5; Jacobson and Stein, pp. 171-2. 102. E.g. US Senator Gore in Jacobson and Stein, p. 172. 103. GEN/DNT/PV83, pp. 3-11. 104. WS Congress, Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, Summary Analysis of Hearings: Developments in the Field of Detection and Identification of Nuclear Explosions (Project Vela) and Relationship to Test Ban Negotia• tions, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, 1962. 105. Jacobsen and Stein, 178. 106. Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Prince- ton, 1968) pp. 232-44. 107. Jacobsen and Stein, p. 181. 108. H. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961 (London, 1972) p. 62. 109. Ibid., p. 69. 110. Telephone calls, 16 June, 1959, Whitman File, Box 27, DOE Library. 111. Geneva Conference, pp. 363-7. 280 Notes and References
112. GEN/DNT/PV95, p. 13. 113. Interview material. 114. See, for example, GEN/DNT(TWGI/PVI, pp. 12-15. 115. Interview material. 116. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 86. 117. Ibid. 118. Ibid. 119. Ibid., p. 109. 120. New York Herald-Tribune, 23 May 1960. 121. See Chap. 8. 122. New York Herald-Tribune, 23 May 1960. 123. New York Times, 24 May 1960. 124. New York Herald-Tribune, 23 May 1960.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
I. See, for example, George Kistiakowski, A Scientist at the White House (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) p. 378. 2. A. M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston, 1965) p. 452; Wright, p. 120; Interview material. 3. Schlesinger, p. 453. On Kennedy's attitude to nuclear weapons and a test ban, see William Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (London, 1964) pp. 40--44. 4. 'Nuclear Testing 1962-3', Presidential Office Files, Subjects Collection, Box 104, John F. Kennedy (JFK) Library, Waltham, Massachusetts. 5. Memorandum undercover ofKistiakowski to the President, 18 Feb 1960, PSAC File, ODE Library. 6. Kistiakowski to the President, 18 Feb 1960. 7. See, for example, correspondence between Edmund Gullion and Presi• dent Kennedy on the organisation of ACDA, 15 Dec 1960, Presidential Office Files, Departments and Agencies Collection, Box 69, JFK Library. 8. Schlesinger, pp. 452-3. 9. Eisenhower reportedly told President-elect Kennedy that he favoured test resumption, G. T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khruschev and the Test Ban (Berke• ley, 1981) p. 25. IO. Daily Telegraph; The Times; New York Times, 16 Aug 1960. l l. Daily Express, 16 Aug 1960. 12. New York Times, 16 Aug 1960; Daily Telegraph, 18 Aug 1960. 13. Guardian, 29 Mar 1960. 14. Daily Telegraph, 18 Aug 1960. 15. Ibid. 16. Quoted in Daily Telegraph, 18 Aug 1960. 17. New York Times, 18 Aug 1960; Sunday Times, 21 Aug 1960. 18. None the less in the wider framework of defence policy, the Kennedy Administration quickly sought to effect changes: to emphasise greater reliance on conventional forces and more survivable strategic nuclear forces. See, for example, W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964); A. C. Enthoven, and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defence Programme, 1961--69 (New York, 1971). Notes and References 281
19. Schlesinger, p. 453. 20. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 311. 21. Ibid., p. 350; more generally, see David Nunnerly's study- President Kennedy and Britain (New York, 1972). 22. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 323. 23. The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-70, p. 216. 24. Schlesinger, pp. 358--66. 25. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 356. Kennedy would have been inter• ested in Khruschev's view of him: 'He impressed me as a better statesman than Eisenhower.... Even though we came to no concrete agreement, I could tell that he was interested in finding a peaceful solution to world problems and in avoiding conflict with the Soviet Union', Khruschev Remembers, ed. Edward Crankshaw (London, 1971), p. 458. 26. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 356-8. 27. Schlesinger, p. 455. 28. Wright, pp. 137-8. 29. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 391. 30. United Nations and Disarmament, p. 217. 31. Ibid., pp. 217-18. 32. Ibid. 33. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 397; interview material. 34. Underground testing proved more difficult than expected: 'We found it at first to be slow, costly, and replete with unanticipated complications', Seaborg, p. 90. 35. United Nations and Disarmament, p. 218. 36. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 405. 37. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 646, col. 16, 1961. 38. United Nations and Disarmament, pp. 220--1. 39. Interview material. 40. Letter to Kennedy from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 21 Feb 1961, Presidential Office Files, Departments and Agencies Collection, Box 70, JFK Library. 41. Ibid., p. 5. 42. Interview material. Schlesinger, pp. 430--3; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 153, 145--6; A. Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (London, 1968) pp. 224-5. 43. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 153. 44. Seaborg, p. 109. It has been argued that by 1961 and prior to discussion of US use of Christmas Island 'that all that the British had to offer in the nuclear weapon area had already been secured and that henceforth little reciprocity was likely', J. Simpson, p. 158. 45. 3 Jan 1962, Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 153. 46. Ibid. 47. Schlesinger, p. 493. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., pp. 493-4. 51. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 164. 52. Schlesinger, p. 494. 53. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 166. 282 Notes and References
54. Ibid. 55. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 653, cols. 627-8, 8 Feb 1962. 56. Schlesinger, p. 495; Examination of test schedules followed over the next few months - see, for example, memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy, 'Schedule for Atmospheric Tests', 20 June 1962, Presidential Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Box 62A, JFK Library. 57. The State Department argued that further testing at their customary site at Eniwetok Atoll could be a diplomatic embarrassment given that it was part of the Marshall Islands Trust Territory which the US administered on behalf of the UN. J. Simpson, p. 160. 58. Schlesinger, p. 495. 59. Memorandum from Adlai Stevenson to the President, 'Nuclear Testing 1962-3', 21 Feb 1962, Presidential Office Files, Subjects Collection, Box 104, JFK Library. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid., p. 3. 62. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 171; Schlesinger, pp. 49Cr7. 63. Macmillan,AttheEndoftheDay,p.171. 64. Ibid. 65. 'Disarmament and the Nuclear Test Ban', 7 Mar 1962, Presidential Office Files, Subjects Collection, Box 100, JFK Library. 66. Ibid., p. 2. 67. 'US Negotiating Position', undated (probably Mar 1962), Vice-Presiden• tial Security File, National Security Policy, Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) Library, Austin, Texas. 68. Ibid. 69. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 172. 70. Ibid., p. 173, quoting from his diary for 12 March 1962. 71. See Chap. 4, above. 72. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 174, quoting diary entry for 24 March 1962. 73. Macmillan, ibid., quoting diary entry for 7 Apr 1962. 74. United Nations and Disarmament, p. 222. 75. Ibid. 76. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 176. 77. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, 'Schedule for Atmospheric Tests', 20 June 1962, pp. 1-2. Presidential Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Box 62A, JFK Library. 78. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 177. 79. For example, see Memorandum on Disarmament dated 30 July 1962. Presidential Office Files, Subjects Collection, Box 100, JFK Library. 80. Memorandum on Disarmament dated 29 July 1962, 1. Presidential Office Files, Subjects Collection, Box 100, JFK Library. 81. Ibid., pp. 1-2. 82. Ibid., p. 3. 83. Ibid., p. 3. 84. Seaborg, p. 119. 85. Memorandum on Disarmament of 29 July 1962, p. 1. 86. Ibid., p. 3. Notes and References 283
87. Ibid., p. 3. 88. Review of International Negotiations on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests Sept 62-Sept 65, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) publication no. 32, May 1966, p. 12. 89. Ibid. 90. International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, Sept 61-Sept 62, ACDA publication no. 9, 1962, pp. 286-97. 91. United Nations and Disarmament, p. 223. 92. Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations, Department of State publication no. 7258, 1961, pp. 354--5; also GEN/DNT/PV, p. 73. 93. Geneva Conference, p. 620. 94. Ibid., pp. 4--5. 95. United Nations and Disarmament, p. 224. 96. Documents on Disarmament, ACDA, 1962, vol. II, p. 824. 97. United Nations and Disarmament, 224; Review of International Negotia• tions 62-65, p. 13; Documents on Disarmament, ACDA, 1962, vol. II, 820- 9. 98. United Nations and Disarmament, p. 224. 99. Ibid., pp. 224--5. 100. Documents on Disarmament, ACDA, 1962, vol. II, pp. 965--6. 101. See Memorandum on Disarmament, July 1962, Presidential Office Files, Subjects Collections, Box 100, JFK Library. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid., p. 3. 104. Ibid., p. 4. 105. US Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Inves• tigating Sub-Committee, Hearings, Arms Control and Disarmament, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1962, pp. 1-2. 106. Ibid., pp. 7, 22. 107. The Committee of Principals was established by Eisenhower in 1958. It comprised the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the AEC, Director of CIA, and Presidential Special Assistants for Security and Science. It was assigned responsibility for co-ordinating disarmament and arms-control positions in Geneva. See G. Kistiakowski, A Scientist at the White House (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) p. 8. 108. Hearings, Arms Control and Disarmament, pp. 4--7. 109. Ibid., pp. 11-13. 110. Ibid., p. 13. 111. Ibid., p. 14. 112. Ibid., pp. 15-17. 113. Ibid., p. 81. 114. Ibid., p. 106. 115. ENDC/SCl/PV30, p. 17. 116. Review of International Negotiations Sept 62-Sept 65, pp. 25-7. 117. Documents on Disarmament, ACDA, 1962, pp. 991-5. On Soviet attitudes see L. P. Bloomfield, W. C. Clemens, and F. Griffiths, Khruschev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954-64 (Cambridge, 1966). 284 Notes and References
118. Documents on Disarmament, ACDA, 1962, pp. 1000--1. 119. Quoted in The Times, 16 Oct 1962. 120. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, chap. vu; Schlesinger; Sorenson; interview material. 121. Hailsham, Rt Hon. The Lord, The Door Wherein I Went (London, 1978), p. 215. 122. Evidence of Alastair Hetherington's Diary (memoranda of conversations with Hugh Gaitskell) and Williams's interview with Denis Healey. See Philip Williams Hugh Gaitskell (London, 1979) pp. 693--5. 123. Ibid., 694. 124. Evidence from Hetherington's Diary and Williams's interview with Lady Berlin, who spoke with JFK at this time. Williams, p. 694. 125. Williams, p. 694; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 453--5. 126. Macmillan diary entry for 4 November 1962, quoted in ibid. 127. Ibid., p. 480. 128. L. W. Martin, British Defence Policy: The Long Recessional, Adelphi Paper 61 (London, 1969) pp. 1--2. 129. Quoted in the Guardian, 5 Dec 1962. 130. The Times, Guardian, Daily Telegraph, 17 Nov 1962. 131. The Times, Guardian, Daily Telegraph, 13 Nov 1962. 132. Williams, pp. 694--5. 133. The Times, 22 Apr 1963. 134. Conservative Party Central Office, Peace with Security, quoted in The Times, 18 Mar 1963. 135. Schlesinger, p. 895. 136. United Nations and Disarmament, pp. 225--30. 137. R. Ranger, Arms and Politics 1958--78 (Toronto, 1979) p. 63. 138. Schlesinger, p. 894. 139. Interview material; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 455. 140. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 456-64. 141. Interview material. 142. Interview material. 143. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 465. 144. For the text see Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 46fr8. 145. Ibid., pp. 468--9; interview material. 146. Harlech interview. 147. US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament 1963, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1964, p. 220. 148. US Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special studies series, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behaviour, 373. 149. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 472. On the mixed-manning (MLF) proposal, see Chap. 6, below. 150. H. B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity (Westport, Conn., 1973) pp. 129--30. 151. Schlesinger, p. 903; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 470. 152. Hailsham, p. 217. 153. Ibid. 154. Schlesinger, p. 903. 155. Hailsham, p. 217. Notes and References 285
156. Seaborg, p. 221}-8. 157. Memorandum to the President from William Foster, 12 July 1963, p. l, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Collection, Box 265, ACDA, Harriman Trip Part 11, JFK Library. 158. Foster memorandum, p. 2. 159. Ibid. 160. Ibid., p. 4. 161. Memorandum to the President from W. W. Rostow, 5 July 1963, p. 1, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Collection, Box 265, ACDA, Harriman Trip Part III, JFK Library. 162. Ibid. 163. Ibid., pp. 1-2. 164. Rostow memorandum, 8 July 1963. 165. Ibid. 166. Memorandum of conversation between the French Ambassador and William Tyler, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, Harriman Trip Part 11, p. 2, 10 July 1963, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Collection, Box 265, ACDA, JFK Library. 167. Ibid. 168. Ibid.; see also the general briefing book (vol. I) prepared for the Harriman trip, which contains 8 subsections discussing the possibility of a Russian• American nuclear non-diffusion agreement, Harriman Trip to Moscow, Briefing Book vol. 1, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Collection, Box 265, ACDA, JFK Library. 169. 'Points to be Covered in Preparation of Forthcoming 15 July Mission of Governor Harriman to Moscow', Harriman Trip Part III, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Collection, Box 265, ACDA, JFK Library. 170. Ibid., pp. 1--6. 171. 'Points to be Covered ... July 15 Mission', p. 7. 172. Ibid., p. 11. 173. Ibid., pp. 8-10. 174. Interview material. 175. Interview material. 176. Interview material. 177. Hailsham, p. 218. 178. US Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Congressional Research Service, Special Studies Series on Foreign Affairs Issues, vol. 1: Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy, p. 378. 179. Schlesinger, p. 906. 180. Interview material. 181. Schlesinger, pp. 906-7; interview material. 182. Interview material; W. A. Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World (London, 1971) p. 95. 183. Hailsham, p. 218. 184. Interview material. 185. Interview material. 186. Schlesinger, p. 908; interview material. 187. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 481-4. 286 Notes and References
188. E. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York, 1965) p. 736. 189. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 481-3. 190. Interview material; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, pp. 48~. 191. Seaborg, pp. 113-14. 192. Hailsham, p. 219.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
I. The Nassau communique, 21 Dec 1962, reprinted in Survival, vol. 5, no. 2 (Mar-Apr 1963) pp. 46--7. 2. Between 1953 and 1960 the Soviet Union began building a nuclear stockpile. Conventional forces were reduced: e.g. troop numbers fell between 1955 and 1958 and shipbuilding programmes were curtailed. Whereas in 1953 war was envisaged as primarily conventional, by January 1960 Khruschev declared 'that a future world war would inevitably be a nuclear rocket war'. D. Holloway, p. 35. 3. P. Buteaux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NA TO 1965-80 (Cambridge, 1983), p. l. 4. Quoted in Steinbruner, p. 175. 5. Allied 'war-games' involving the assumed use of tactical nuclear weapons by both sides produced a very high level of destruction and civilian deaths. R. E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 1962) 126. See also J. M. Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., 1983) pp. 6--7. 6. This study does not pretend to offer a full and exhaustive examination of the MLF episode; the best general account of the MLF probably remains, J. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision-Making: A New Dimension of Political Analysis (Princeton, 1974). On the origins of ideas for an MLF see T. C. Wiegel, 'The Origins of the MLF Concept', Orbis, Oct 1968. A useful analysis of US attitudes to the control of nuclear weapons in the Alliance in the 1950s and early 1960s is contained in R. E. Osgood, chaps. 8 and 9. 7. On the origins and evolution of Norstad's ideas for a European nuclear force see J. W. Boulton, 'NATO and the MLF', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 7, nos. 3 and 4 (July-Oct 1972) pp. 276--9. 8. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 Oct 1960. On German attitudes to nuclear-sharing in general and the MLF in particular, see C. M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1975). 9. Observer, 23 Oct 1960. 10. A. J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics (London, 1972) p. 244. Bowie was a former Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning and his report was commissioned by Gerard Smith, his successor in that post in spring 1960. The Bowie Report made two major recommendations: strengthened NATO conventional forces and a submarine-based Polaris missile force under NA TO command. In the first instance US Polaris submarines were to be assigned to SACEUR. SACEUR would have the right to fire the missile in the face of a major attack on Europe; if an attack was not Notes and References 287
obviously 'major' the North Atlantic Council would take the decision. If the European appetite were whetted then a follow-on force would be established which would be multilateral in character, mixed-manned and with a predetermined (by the Europeans) control method (J. Steinbruner, pp. 188-90). In an article published in the course of 1963 Bowie said: 'it would be foolhardy to suppose that a separate defence of either the United States or Europe is feasible. But this need not mean a monopoly of control in a single hand [emphasis added]', R. Bowie, 'Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance', International Organisation, vol. XVII, no. 3 (Summer 1963) p. 720. 11. Steinbruner, p. 153. 12. Quoted in Rostow, p. 77. 13. Interview with Thomas Finletter, Oral History Program, JFK Library, p. 6. 14. J. Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo Saxons (London, 1970) p. 221. 15. Ibid. 16. Henry Brandon, Sunday Times, 2 Apr 1961. 17. Memorandum 'Skybolt and Nassau', Richard Neustadt, National Secur• ity Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322, JFK Library, Nov 1963 (hereinafter 'Neustadt Memorandum'); interview material. 18. For Kennedy's views on European-American Co-operation see especially his 4 July Philadelphia speech, Public Papers, 1962, Washington, D.C., p. 538. 19. Interview material. 20. Interview material. 21. Interview material. 22. Interview material. For evidence of a similar German view point see Kelleher, p. 229. 23. Public Papers, 1961, Washington, D.C., 385. 24. Multilateral Force: General; 1/61-6/62 (withdrawal sheets), National Security Files, Box 316, JFK Library. On US thinking on centralised control of nuclear weapons see Buteaux, pp. 15-25. 25. Steinbruner, pp. 202-4. 26. Multilateral Force: General: vol. I, 1961-2, National Security Files, Regional Security, Box 216, JFK Library. 27. Ibid., 18 Jan 1962. 28. Rostow, p. 239. 29. Quoted in J. Simpson, p. 158. 30. George Ball, The Discipline of Power (London, 1968) chaps. VI and vu. 31. Interview material. 32. Interview material. 33. Neustadt. Memorandum; interview material. 34. The Times, 7 Dec 1962. 35. R. Morgan, The United States and West Germany 1945-73 (London 1974) pp. 128-9. 36. Neustadt Memorandum, p. 26. 37. Interview material. 38. Interview material. 39. Neustadt Memorandum, p. 27. 288 Notes and References
40. Interview material. 41. Interview material. In 1959 and 1960 the Fletcher Committee established by the Department of Defense to review the Skybolt programme had favoured its discontinuance, the Kennedy Administration was likewise tempted when it entered office in 1961. However, in order to preserve amicable relations with Britain the temptation was resisted until late 1962. See D. Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, Calif., 1980) pp. 226-7; and A. C. Enthoven and K. W. Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York, 1971) pp. 251--61. 42. Interview material. 43. Neustadt Memorandum, p. 28. 44. It is difficult to argue in detail on the basis of Neustadt at this point because his memorandum has been so brutally 'sanitised', but the inferences I have drawn do not seem without foundation when seen in the context of the document as a whole. 45. Neustadt Memorandum, p. 29. 46. Interview material. 47. Interview material. 48. Neustadt Memorandum, p. 31. 49. Interview material. 50. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 345, quoting diary entry for 14 Dec 1962. 51. Neustadt Memorandum, p. 73; interview material. 52. See especially Andrew Pierre's account, Pierre, pp. 232-7. 53. Interview material. 54. Rostow, p. 245. 55. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, p. 358. 56. Ibid., p. 359. 57. Ibid. 58. Neustadt Memorandum, p. IOI. 59. Ibid., p. 101. 60. Interview material. 61. Neustadt Memorandum, p. 106. 62. Admiral Rickover was instrumental in forcing a switch from submarines to surface vessels. See McGeorge Bundy to David Bruce, 29 Nov 1964, National Security Council Files, UK Box I, vol. 11, Memoranda, LBJ Library. 63. New York Times, 16 Jan 1963; interview material; interview with Roswell Gilpatric, Oral History Program, JFK Library. 64. Neustadt Memorandum, p. 106. 65. The West Germans and Italians in the aftermath of Nassau were quick to accept in principle the MLF scheme: respectively on 14 and 24 January. See Boulton, p. 285. 66. The Times, 35 Jan 1963. 67. J. Newhouse, p. 240. 68. For example, see memorandum from C. E. Johnson to B. K. Smith, 'A Multilateral Western Hemisphere Defense Force', 9 Jan 1963, National Security Files, Regional Security, Multilateral Force, Box 217, With- Notes and References 289
drawal Sheet, General, vol. II, Merchant (C), 9 Jan-15 Feb 1963, JFK Library; and Henry Owen, Memorandum for the Record on Visit by John Thomson (of the British Embassy), 17 Jan 1963, ibid. 69. State Department Memorandum from F. D. Kohler to D. K. E. Bruce: 'Soviet Reaction to Multilateral Force'. 70. Ibid., 6 Feb 1963, White House, McGeorge Bundy Memorandum to JFK: 'Your Talk with the Earl Mountbatten', 7 Feb 1963; State Department, Memorandum of Conversation between Henry Owen and John Thom• son. 71. INR Research Memorandum: 'Can France Frustrate Establishment of a NATO Multilateral Force?', National Security Files, Regional Security, MLF, General, vol. II, Merchant (D), 21 Feb 1963, Instructions, With• drawal Sheet, JFK Library. 72. Steinbruner, pp. 226-7; 232-3. The instructions contained in the National Security Council Action Memorandum given to the Merchant Team tacitly left open the possibility of unanimous agreement to any firing (i.e. a US veto) being dropped should a politically united Europe emerge at some future time, Steinbruner, p. 256. US archival material also points to the higher level attention directed to the control issue. See, for example, Merchant's paper on 'Control' and his memorandum to McGeorge Bundy under the same heading, 15 Feb 1963, National Security Files, Regional Security, Multilateral Force, Box 217, Withdrawal Sheet, General, vol. II, Merchant, 9 Jan-15 Feb, JFK Library. 73. Interview material. 74. W. W. Rostow to JFK, 'Germany and European Unity', and President's Office files/Staff Memoranda, Box 65, Rostow 1962-3, Feb 1963, JFK Library. 75. Ibid., p. l. 76. Ibid., p. 2. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. McGeorge Bundy to JFK, 'Possible Press Conference Remarks on Multilateral Force', 1, National Security Files, MLF, General, 9-28 Mar, 6 Mar 1963, JFK Library. Furthermore, some historians now argue that responsibility for the emergence at the end of the 1950s of a Paris-Bonn access 'rests squarely on American shoulders', D. C. Watt, Succeeding John Ball, p. 134. If so it might well be argued that apparent or real German aspirations in the nuclear field in the 1960s arose in part from American actions in the 1950s. 81. Interview material. 82. Bundy to JFK, 7 Mar 1963. 83. Bowie, 'Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance', p. 720. 84. Memorandum of meeting at Italian Foreign Office, 'Political and other problems relating to proposed NATO nuclear force', National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables 1-10 Mar, 4 Mar, JFK Library. It is noteworthy that US insistence on the Europeans paying in full for the force was dropped by President Kennedy when the selling of the MLF went into top gear in early 1963, Steinbruner, p. 253. 290 Notes and References
85. Secretary Rusk to Farley (Paris), National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables 1-10 Mar, 5 Mar, JFK Library. 86. Ibid. 87. Quoted in E. Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe (London, 1971) p. 199. 88. The Economist, I Mar 1963. 89. A. Buchan, The Sunday Times, 3 Mar 1963. See also his The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective, Adelphi Paper no. 13, 15 Oct 1964, pp. 11-14; and his NATO in the 1960s (London, 1963) pp. 90--2. Finletter (US Ambassador to NATO) recognised that the cost factor had to be kept low: it was no use staking high and then going down when 'all the candidates ... [have] ... died of initial fright!', Finletter to Secretary Rusk, 27 Feb, National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables, 21-28 Feb, JFK Library. 90. A. Buchan, The Sunday Times 3 Mar 1963. In a prescient article published more than a year earlier he put the argument equally well: 'If one analyses European fears, or examines the reasons why first Britain, then France, embarked on independent nuclear capability, it becomes clear that the basic European desire is not so much for operational control of bombers or missiles as pour controller American strategic policy, to gain some measure of control over the context of peace and war', A. Buchan, 'The Reform of NATO', Foreign Affairs, vol. 40, no. 2 (Jan 1962) p. 180. 91. Brussels to Secretary of State, 7 Mar, National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables 1-10 Mar, JFK Library. 92. Bonn to Secretary of State, 7 Mar, National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables 1-10 Mar, JFK Library. 93. Brussels to Secretary of State, 8 Mar, National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables, 1-IO Mar, JFK Library. 94. Libre Belgique, 7 Mar 1963. 95. Finletter to Secretary of State, 16 Mar, National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables 16-31 Mar, JFK Library. 96. Finletter to Secretary of State, 16 Mar, p. 2. 97. Kurt Becher in Die Welt, 17 Mar 1963. 98. Theo Sommer in Die Zeit, 18 Mar 1963. 99. Marcel Schulte in Frankfurter Neue Presse, 17 Mar 1963. 100. Bonn to Secretary of State, 18 Mar, National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables, 16-31 Mar, JFK Library. IOI. Ibid. 102. Buteaux, 25; Steinbruner, p. 278. 103. Brussels to Secretary of State 15 Mar, National Security Files, Box 218, MLF Cables, 11-15 Mar, JFK Library. 104. Rostow, p. 247. 105. Pierre, p. 245. 106. Particularly in Germany. One journalist in the FRG referred to ships of a surface MLF as 'swimming nuclear coffins'. Briefing item, 'Initial West European Assessment of US Multilateral Force Proposal', National Security Files, Box 217, MLF General, 9-28 Mar, JFK Library. 107. Pierre, p. 246. 108. Ibid. 109. Interview material. Notes and References 291
110. Steinbruner, pp. 280-1. 111. See 'Pressures on Britain to Join', Guardian, 20 Sep 1963; 'Whitehall Split over NATO Nuclear Force', Observer, 15 Sep 1963. The Times, 25 June 1963. Steinbruner argues that, in early May, President Kennedy decided not to allow any lobbying of Congress unless a prospective German-US MLF had been extended to include Britain, Steinbruner, p. 278. 112. See airgram from US Embassy, London, to State Department, 'Current British Foreign Office Thinking about France', Part 111, p. 3, the MLF, 15 Oct 1963, President's Office Files, Country Series, UK, Box 127, JFK Library. 113. Buteaux, p. 27. 114. Memorandum of conversation, Department of State, 'The MLF', 4 Oct 1963, President's Office Files, Country Series, UK, Box 127, JFK Library. ll5. Ibid. 116. Ibid. 117. Rostow, p. 247. 118. Interview material. 119. Pierre, pp. 248-9.
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN
I. D. Butler and D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London, 1969). 2. Interview material. 3. Interview material. 4. Thorneycroft interview, Oral History Archives, JFK Library, p. 25. 5. Interview material. 6. Memorandum from W. W. Rostow to the President, 13 May 1963, Presidential Office Files, Box 65, Staff Memoranda, JFK Library. 7. Memorandum from W.W. Rostow to the Secretary of State, 4 July 1963, National Security Files, aox 265, Departments and Agencies, JFK Library. 8. 'Current British Foreign Office Thinking About France', 15 Oct 1963, Presidential Office Files, Box 127, Country Series, JFK Library. As leader of the Opposition Wilson told The Times that the 'Opposition were completely opposed to any suggestion that West or East Germany, directly or indirectly, should have a finger on the nuclear trigger, or any responsibility for deciding that nuclear weapons were to be used', The Times, 1 Feb 1963. 9. General Lemnit.zer to Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor, 27 Feb 1963, National Security Files, Box 218, Cables on MLF, JFK Library. IO. Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, 24 Oct 1963, Presidential Office Files, Box 62A, Staff Memoranda, JFK Library. 11. Ibid. 12. 'Will Wilson Keep the Bomb?', New Statesman, 13 Dec 1963. 292 Notes and References
13. A. Verrier, 'Defence and Politics After Nassau', Political Quarterly (July• Sep 1963) p. 272. 14. R. Neustadt, Memorandum on the British Labour Party and the MLF, 6 July 1964 (subsequently printed in the New Left Review, vol. 51 (Sep-• Oct 1978). 15. Ibid., p. 14. 16. Ibid., p. 15. 17. Ibid., p. 17. 18. Ibid., p. 18. 19. Ibid., p. 8. 20. Interview material, including that with Henry Owen held in the LBJ Library, Oral History Project, Austin, Texas. 21. G. Williams and R. Read, Denis Healey and the Politics of Power (London, 197l)p.167. 22. Financial Times, The Times, Daily Mail, 13 Nov 1964. 23. Guardian, 13 Nov 1964. 24. The Times, 13 Nov 1964. 25. Williams and Read, p. 172. 26. Ibid., p. 173. 27. J. Morgan (ed.), The Crossman Diaries, vol. I (Jan 1965) p. 117. 28. Williams and Read, p. 172. 29. Ibid., p. 173. 30. Interview material. 31. The idea that land-based missiles and aircraft might form the basis of a collective multilateral NATO force had already been raised by the British in the Allied MLF Working Group in Washington in mid-1964. Buteaux, p. 29. 32. Williams and Read, p. 173. 33. R. J. Barnet, p. 242. 34. McGeorge Bundy to David Bruce et al., 29 Nov 1964, National Security Files, UK, Box l, vol. II, Memoranda, LBJ Library. 35. Bundy to Bruce, 29 Nov 1964. 36. Ibid., p. 2. 37. Ibid. 38. Neustadt to Bundy, Tyler, Smith and McNaughton (DOD/ISA), 30 Nov 1964, National Security Files, UK, Box 1, vol. II, Memoranda, LBJ Library. 39. Ibid. 40. Interview material. 41. Lord Wigg, George Wigg (London, 1972) p. 321. 42. C. Sulzberger, New York Times, 7 Dec 1964. 43. Ibid. 44. New York Times, 7 Dec 1964. 45. A. Kopkind, 'The MLF', New Left Review, vol. 51 (Sep-Oct 1968) p. 3. 46. J. Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (London, 1970) p. 240. 47. L. B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (London, 1977) p. 477. 48. 'US Comments on the UK Proposal of a Project for an Atlantic Nuclear Force', 8 Dec 1964, National Security Files, Box II, vol. xv, Memoranda, LBJ Library. Notes and References 293
49. Ibid., pp. 3-5. 50. Ibid., p. 6. 51. Ibid. 52. Interview material. 53. Interview material. 54. Gilpatric to J. H. Rubel, Roswell Gilpatric Papers, 28 Dec 1964, Box 10, JFK Library. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Interview material. 58. Crossman Diaries, vol. I, p. 94- 11 Dec 1964. 59. Ibid., p. 95. 60. Ibid., p. 117. 61. In Wehre Kunde, quoted in Williams and Read, p. 174. 62. Williams and Read, p. 174. 63. Johnson, p. 477. 64. To be considered in Chap. 8, below. 65. W. W. Rostow to the President, 13 May 1963, Presidential Office Files, Box 75, Staff Memoranda, JFK Library. 66. Crossman Diaries, vol. I. 67. Barker, p. 200, Buteaux, p. 39. 68. Williams and Read, p. 218. 69. Buteaux, p. 40. 70. Interview with Ambassador T. K. Finletter, 29 Oct 1968, Oral History Program, pp. 22-3, LBJ Library. 71. 'Memorandum of Conversation', John McNaughton, Asst Secretary of Defense, 27 Oct 1965, National Security Files, Box 11, vol. vm, Memoran• dum, LBJ Library. 72. Memorandum of McNaughton conversation. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid., p. 4. 75. Ibid., p. 3. 76. A very useful study of the origins of the Nuclear Planning Group and the early years of its operation is contained in Buteaux, chaps. 2 and 3. A more specialised study is J. M. Legge, especially, pp. 14--16.
NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT
I. Barnet, p. 239. After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 'the systematic expansion of the Soviet Union's strategic offensive capacity led to the loss of an overwhelming US nuclear superiority that had characterised the 1950s' (Kahan, p. 2). This emerging parity underlay the search for an NPT, and soon after, the start of the SALT talks. 2. See Chap. 3, above. 3. Interview material. 4. Sir Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70 (London, 1971) p. 11. 5. D. L. Clarke, Politics of Arms Control (New York, 1979) p. 236. 294 Notes and References
6. Wilson, p. 11. 7. Ibid. 8. H. Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London, 1961 ). 9. Interview material. 10. Interview material. 11. Interview material. 12. The Times, 21 Jan 1964. 13. Interview material. 14. Guardian, 22 Jan 1964. 15. Ibid. 16. New York Herald-Tribune, 24 Jan 1964. 17. Ibid. 18. The Times, 7 Feb 1964. 19. New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune, 24 Jan 1964. 20. Guardian, 24 Jan 1964. 21. The Times, New York Times, 3 July 1964. 22. The Times, 17 Sep 1964. 23. Interview material. 24. National Security Action Memorandum 239, 18 May 1963. National Security Files, Box 340, JFK Library. 25. Ibid., Annexures Band C, dated 23 May 1963. 26. Memorandum 239, Annex B. 27. Ibid., Annex C. 28. Ibid., p. 2. 29. R. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York, 1968) pp. 141-58. 30. A. Yarmolinski, The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society (New York, 1971) pp. 124--5. 31. US Congress, Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, pp. 274--5. 32. 'Points to be covered in preparation of forthcoming July 15 mission of Governor Harriman to Moscow', undated, p. 9, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies, Box 265, JFK Library. 33. Ibid. 34. Points for Harriman mission. 35. 'Possible Soviet Outlook', National Security Files, undated, 2, Depart- ments and Agencies, Box 265, JFK Library. 36. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 37. See Chaps 6 and 7, above. 38. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 704, col. 418, 16 Dec 1964. 39. Ibid., col. 573, 17 Dec 1964. 40. Ibid., col. 575. 41. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 704, col. 575, 16 Dec 1964. 42. Telegram London to Washington, 30 Oct 1964, Country Files, UK, Cables, vol. II, Oct 1964--Feb 1965, LBJ Library. 43. Interview material. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. See Chap. 7, above. Notes and References 295
47. Hansard, vol. 704, col. 578, 17 Dec 1964. 48. Ibid., cols 578-9. 49. Ibid., col. 595. 50. Ibid., col. 599. 51. 'Halting Nuclear Spread', New York Times, 10 Nov 1964. 52. T. Greenwood, H. A. Feiveson and T. B. Taylor, Nuclear Proliferation (New York, 1977) p. 135. 53. New York Times, 10 Nov 1964. 54. Ibid. 55. Letter from Glen Seaborg to the editor of the New York Times, 16 Nov 1964, Roswell Gilpatric Papers, Box 11, Task Force on Collateral Measures, Part II, JFK Library. 56. New York Herald-Tribune, 5 Feb 1965, New York Times, 7 Feb 1965. 57. New York Times, 7 Feb 1965. 58. The Times; Guardian, 25 Feb 1965. The Irish first inscribed the question of nuclear dissemination on the UN General Assembly agenda in 1959 and again in 1960. A useful guide to the early thinking of Irish and other non• nuclear powers at the UN is in Epstein, The Last Chance, pp. 61-5. 59. Ibid. 60. New York Times, 11 Mar 1965. 61. Le Montie, 26 June 1965; New York Herald-Tribune, 3-4 July 1965; Le Montie, 4 July 1965. 62. ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation, 7 Mar 1965, National Security Files, Country File, UK, vol. II, Memoranda Feb-Mar 1965, LBJ Library. 63. Ibid., p. 1. 64. ACDA Memorandum of 5 Mar 1965, p. 2. 65. Ibid. 66. New York Times, 14 July 1965; Daily Telegraph, 17 July 1965. 67. New York Times, 14 July 1965. 68. Guardian, 17 July 1965. 69. The Times, 19 July 1965. 70. Guardian, 19 July 1965. 71. Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-70 (London, 1971). 72. Spectator, 23 July 1965. 73. Observer, 25 July 1965. 74. US Embassy London to Department of State, 27 Apr 1965, National Security Files, Country File, UK, vol. II, Cables Feb-Apr 1965, LBJ Library. 75. ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation, 8 June 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK, vol. 1, Memoranda, July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 76. ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation, 11June1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK vol. v1, Memoranda, July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 77. Ibid., p. 2. 78. Indeed, in the opinion of one US official serving at the ENDC in Geneva, Britain's role in obtaining the agreement of the developing countries to the NPT was crucial. Interview material. 296 Notes and References
79. Guardian, 17 July 1965. 80. ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation, 9 July 1965 National Security Files, Country Files, UK, vol. VI, Memoranda, July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid., 9 July 1965. 83. 'Notes on the Canadian Draft Non-Dissemination Treaty', attachment to Memorandum of Conversation, 9 July 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK, vol. v1, Memoranda, July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 84. Ibid., p. 1. 85. Ibid., pp. 1-2. 86. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 87. Ibid., p. 3. 88. Ibid., p. 4. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid., p. 5. 92. ACDA, Memorandum of Conversation, 19 July 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK, vol. VI Memoranda, July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid., 19 July 1965, p. 2. 95. Ibid. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid., 22 July 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK, vol. v1, Memoranda July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 98. Ibid., p. 2. 99. Ibid. 100. Ibid. 101. Ibid. 102. Ibid., p. 3. 103. The Times, Daily Telegraph, 26 July 1965. 104. New York Herald-Tribune, 27-28 July 1965. 105. 'UK Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty', 4 Aug 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK, vol. v1, Memoranda July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 106. Manuscript note on White House notepaper from Spurgeon Keeny to McGeorge Bundy, 3 Aug 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK, vol. VI, Memoranda July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 107. New York Herald-Tribune, 17 Aug 1965. 108. Wilson, p. 130. 109. Lord Stewart in a letter to the author, 8 Aug 1976. 110. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 21 Sep 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK, vol. vu, Memoranda Oct 1965 to Jan 1966, LBJ Library. 111. Memorandum of Conversation, 12 Oct 1965, National Security Files, Country Files, UK, Memoranda Oct 1965 to Jan 1966, LBJ Library. 112. J. Reston, in the New York Times, 15 Oct 1965. 113. Ibid. Notes and References 297
114. The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-70 (New York; UN, 1970) p. 270. 115. Epstein, The Last Chance, p. 66. 116. The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-70, p. 270. 117. United Nations and Disarmament 1945-70, pp. 271--6. 118. Ibid., p. 271. 119. ENDC/174, Apr 1966. 120. Epstein, The Last Chance, p. 67.
NOTES TO CHAPTER NINE
1. United Nations and Disarmament 1945-70, p. 280. 2. See Chap. 7, above. 3. United Nations and Disarmament 1945-70, p. 280. 4. Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, Document DC/228, annex 1, ENDC/178. 5. Ibid. 6. United Nations and Disarmament, p. 281. 7. Interview material. 8. A. D. McKnight, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: IAEA and EURATOM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Occasional Paper no. 7 (New York, June 1970) pp. 9-16. See also Ryukichi Imai, Nuclear Safeguards, Adelphi Paper no. 86, IISS, Mar 1972, pp. 8-11. It should be noted, however, that while EURATO M's charter required it to ensure that ores, source materials and special fissionable materials were not diverted from the purposes for which they were intended and that nuclear supply regulations were observed, it did 'not automatically exclude their employment to military ends', J. G. Polach, EURATOM: The Back• ground Issues and Economic Development (New York, 1964) p. 95. A useful guide to international safeguards is provided in W. Epstein, The Last Chance, chap. 11. 9. J. E. Gray, M. 8. Kratzer, K. E. Leslie, H. W. Paige and S. 8. Shantzis, International Co-operation on Breeder Reactors (New York, May 1978) pp. 3.4--3.7. EURATOM was charged to create 'conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries'. Article 1 of the EAEC, quoted in Polach, p. 26. 10. D. Fischer, International Safeguards (London and New York, 1979) p. 1. 11. M. A. Khan, Nuclear Energy and International Co-operation: A Third World Perception of the Erosion of Confidence (London and New York, 1979) pp. 8-9. 12. National Security Council History, The Non-Proliferation Treaty, LBJ Library. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., pp. 1-2. 15. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, 29 June 1966, National Security Files, National Security Council History, The Non-Proliferation Treaty, LBJ Library. 298 Notes and References
16. Letter from McNamara to Rusk, 5 July 1966, National Security Council History, NPT, LBJ Library. 17. Ibid. 18. Memorandum from Adrian Fisher to Committee of Principals, 8 July 1966, National Security Council History, NPT, LBJ Library. 19. Ibid., p. 2. 20. Attachment to Fisher Memorandum to Committee of Principals. 21. Ibid., p. 3. 22. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 23. Ibid., p. 4. 24. Memorandum from Foster to Rusk, 30 Aug I966, National Security Council History, NPT, LBJ Library. 25. Ibid., p. I. 26. Ibid. 27. Foster Memorandum of 30 Aug 1966, pp. 1-2. 28. Ibid., p. 2. 29. Memorandum of conversation between Vorontsov and Bunn, 9 Sep I966, National Security Council History, NPT, LBJ Library. 30. Conversation between Vorontsov and Bunn, p. 2. 31. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 32. Joint Communique 27 September 1966, National Security Council His• tory, NPT, LBJ Library. 33. Memorandum from Fisher to Foster, 9 Nov I966, National Security Council History, NPT, LBJ Library. 34. Ibid. 35. Epstein, The Last Chance, p. 69. 36. Memorandum from Rusk to President, 19 Dec 1966, National Security Council History, NPT, LBJ Library. 37. Rusk Memorandum to President, I9 Dec I966. 38. New York Times, 4 Jan 1967. 39. Ibid. 40. Financial Times, 6 Jan I967. 41. New York Times, 4 Jan I967. 42. Interview material. 43. The Times; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Guardian; New York Times, 28 Feb I967. 44. New York Herald-Tribune, 5 Jan I967. 45. Daily Telegraph; Daily Express, 4 January I967; New York Herald- Tribune, 7 Jan I967. 46. New York Herald-Tribune, 5 Jan I967. 47. Le Montie, 7 Jan I967. 48. Guardian, 8 Jan I967. 49. Guardian, 9 Jan I967. 50. New York Herald-Tribune, I I Jan I967. 51. New York Herald-Tribune, 11 Jan 1967; New York Times, I2 Jan 1967. 52. Daily Telegraph, 12 Jan I967. 53. Lord Chalfont at a press conference in the summer of 1965, quoted in Daily Telegraph, I2 Jan I967. Notes and References 299
54. Ibid. 55. See, for example, Japan Times, 5 Jan 1967; Le Monde, 6 Jan 1967; Guardian, 13 Jan 1967. 56. Financial Times, 13 Jan 1967. 57. New York Herald-Tribune, 17 Jan 1967. 58. Daily Express, 1 Feb 1967; Daily Telegraph, 2 Feb 1967. 59. New York Times, 2 Feb 1967. 60. The Times, 2 Feb 1967. 61. See, for example, reports of Robert Kennedy's talks with Brandt, The Times, 3 Feb 1967; and Dean Rusk's broadcast in West Germany on the need for nuclear control, reported in Frankfurter Al/gemeine Zeitung, 13 Feb 1967. 62. Guardian, 2 Feb 1967. 63. New York Herald-Tribune, 2 Feb 1967. 64. Le Monde, 4 Feb 1967. 65. See, for example, Guardian, 4 Feb 1967. 66. New York Herald-Tribune, New York Times, 2 Feb 1967; also Japan Times, 5 Jan 1967. 67. Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Daily Express, 21 Feb 1967. 68. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, New York Times, The Times, Guardian, 28 Feb 1967. 69. Guardian, 5 Feb 1967. 70. Ibid. 71. New York Herald-Tribune, 8 Feb 1967. 72. Christian Science Monitor, 9 Feb 1967. 73. Editorial in New York Times, IO Feb 1967. 74. A. Tucker, Guardian, 14 Feb 1967. 75. Ibid. 76. Financial Times, 15 Feb 1967. 77. Ibid. 78. ENDC/PV/237, 21 Feb 1967, p. 31. 79. Ibid. 80. ENDC/PV/288, 23 Feb 1967, p. 4. 81. Ibid. 82. Guardian, 22 Feb 1967. 83. Spectator, 24 Feb 1967. 84. Memorandum entitled 'Comments on UK Paper, 'The Problems of Safeguards for India Against a Chinese N-Threat', National Security Files, UK, vol. 5, Cables, July-Sep 1965, LBJ Library. 85. 'Comments on UK Paper', p. 3. 86. Ibid., p. 4. 87. ENDC/PV/228, 23 Feb 1967, p. 6. 88. Editorial in Financial Times, 20 Feb 1967. 89. Guardian, 21 Feb 1967. 90. Financial Times, 21 Feb 1967. 91. McKnight, pp. 12-16 and 27-34. 92. Ibid., p. 28. 93. Ibid., p. 32. 300 Notes and References
94. R. Ranger, Arms and Politics 1958-78 (Toronto, 1979) pp. 115-17. 95. G. Fischer, The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (trans. David Willey) (London, 1971) pp. 75-7. 96. Ranger, pp. 115-16. 97. Editorial in Financial Times, 21 Feb 1967. 98. Interview material. 99. New York Herald-Tribune, 22 Feb 1967. 100. Daily Telegraph, 22 Feb 1967. 101. New York Herald-Tribune, 23 Feb 1967. 102. G. Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore, 1973) p. 173; R. Gilpin, France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton, 1968) pp. 403-13; Guardian, 22 Feb 1967. 103. Le Figaro, 24 Feb 1967. 104. The Times, 24 Feb 1967. 105. Financial Times, 24 Feb 1967; New York Herald-Tribune, 24 Feb 1967. 106. The Times, l Mar 1967. 107. New York Herald-Tribune, 1 Mar 1967. 108. Interview material. 109. Guardian, 24 Feb 1967. 110. The Times, 4 Mar 1967; Guardian, 2 Feb 1967; interview material. 111. Guardian, 7 Mar 1967. 112. New York Times, 28 Mar 1967; Guardian, 29 Mar 1967; Die Zeit, 31 Mar 1967. 113. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 Mar 1967: New York Times, 28 Mar 1967. 114. Le Monde, 31 Mar 1967; Financial Times, 31 Mar 1967. 115. Lord Chalfont joined William Foster in Brussels to consult the other Allies, Frankfurter Al/gemeine Zeitung, 9 Mar 1967. See also Daily Telegraph and The Times, 13 and 14 Apr 1967. 116. Le Monde, 2 Apr 1967. 117. Frankfurter Al/gemeine Zeitung, 15 Aug 1967; New York Times, 16 Aug 1967; Guardian, 17 Aug 1967. 118. The United Nations and Disarmament, pp. 290-3, W. Epstein, pp. 7{}-80. 119. Ibid., p. 302.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TEN
l. Only recently Lord Zuckerman has drawn attention to this fact in his book, Nuclear Illusion and Reality (London, 1982) p. 83. Bibliography
I. PRIMARY SOURCES
A. Unpublished Official Documents a. United Nations
Official Records ofthe Atomic Energy Commission, First Year (New York, 1946). Official Records of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (Lon• don, 1957) (verbatim transcripts). Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (Geneva, 1958). Official Records of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (Geneva, 1958-62). Official Records of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference (Geneva, 1960). Official Records of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (Geneva, 1962-3).
b. United States The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. The Papers of John F. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Massachusetts. The Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
B. Published Oflicial Documents
a. United Nations The Charter. The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-70 (New York: UN, 1970). The United Nations Yearbooks 1957-68.
b. United Kingdom Command Papers 9075 Statement on Defence 1954. 9391 Statement on Defence 1955.
301 302 Bibliography
9555 Agreement for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information for Natio• nal Defence Purposes. 9691 Statement on Defence 1956. 124 Defence: Outline of Future Policy 1957. 537 Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes 1958. 859 Amendment to Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes of July 3 1958. 952 Report on Defence 1960. 1288 Report on Defence 1961. 1639 Statement on Defence 1962: The Next Five Years. 1936 Statement on Defence 1963. 1995 Polaris Sales Agreement. 2270 Statement on Defence 1964. 2592 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965. 2901 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Pt I, The Defence Review. 2902 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Pt II, Defence Estimates 1966-7. 3203 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967. 3357 Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1967. 3540 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1968. 3701 Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1968.
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Fifth Series (Commons) 1957-68. Fifth Series (Lords) 1957-68.
Other The Key to Disarmament (London, 1964). The Detection and Recognition of Underground Explosions (United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Aldermaston, 1965). c. United States of America
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt The Public Papers and Addresses of John F. Kennedy Department of State: Toward the Peace (Washington, D.C.: DoS pbn no. 1732, 1942). The United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President for the Congress for the Year 1950 (Washington, D.C.: DoS pbn no. 4178, 1951). Treaties and Other International Acts (Washington, D.C.: DoS pbn no. 4267, 1959). Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: DoS pbn no. 7258, 1961). Bibliography 303
Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: DoS pbn no. 7250, 1961). Atomic Energy Commission: In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1954). US Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Hearings on Fall-Out (Washington, D.C.: 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970). US Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigat- ing Sub-Committee: Hearings on Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: 87th Con• gress, 2nd Session, 1962). US Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Hearings on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Washington, D.C.: 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963). Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: International Negotiations on Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961 to September 1962 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA pbn no. 9, 1963). Review of International Negotiations on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1961 to September 1965 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA pbn no. 32, 1966).
Other: Glasston, S., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Oak Ridge: US AEC, 1957). Gofman, K. W., and Tamplin, A. R., Long-term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Science, 1975). Rodeon, H. C., Nuclear Explosion Seismology (Oak Ridge, US AEC, 1972). US Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, Congressional Research Service, Special Studies Series on Foreign Affairs Issues, vol. 1, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behaviour: Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy (Washington, D.C., 1981).
C. Private Papers
Professor E. H. S. Burhop's Pugwash Papers. Roswell Gilpatric's Papers (John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Massachu• setts).
II. SECONDARY SOURCES
A. Published Books (published in London, unless otherwise stated)
Almond, G., The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1960). Aron, R., The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy (New York, 1965). Bader, W. 8., The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1968). 304 Bibliography
Ball, D., Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, Calif., 1980). Ball, G., The Discipline of Power (Boston, 1968). Barker, E., Britain in a Divided Europe 1945-70 (1971). Barnet, R. J., Allies: America, Europe and Japan Since the war (1984). Baruch, C., The Public Years (New York, 1960). Baylis, J. (ed.), British Defence Policy in a Changing World (1977). - Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy (1984). Baylis, J., Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-80 (1981). Beaton, L., Must the Bomb Spread? (Hannondsworth, Middx, 1966). Beaton, L., and Maddox, J., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (1962). Bechshoefer, B. G., Postwar Negotiations/or Arms Control (Washington, D.C., 1961). Bell, C., The Debatable Alliance (1964). Beloff, N., The General Says No (Hannondsworth, Middx, 1963). Bernal, J. D., The Social Function of Science (1939). Blackett, P. M. S., Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations (Cambridge, 1950). Studies of War-Nuclear and Conventional (1962). Bloomfield, L. P., Clemens, W. C., and Griffiths, F., Khruschev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954-64 (Cam• bridge, Mass., 1966). Bogdanor, V., and Skidelsky, R. (eds), The Age of Affluence (1970). Bolt, B., Nuclear Explosions and Earthquakes: The Parted Veil (San Francisco, 1976). Bond, B., War and Society in Europe 1870-1970 (1984). Bowie, S., Shaping the Future: Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition (New York, 1964). Brennan, D. (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security (New York, 1961). Brodie, B., Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, 1959). Buchan, A., NATO in the 1960s (1963). The Multilateral Force: A Historical Prospective (Adelphi Paper no. 13, 1964). - The End of the Post-War Era (1974). Buchan, C., and Windsor, P., Arms and Stability in Europe (1963). Bull, H., The Control of the Arms Race (1961). Buteaux, P., The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-80 (1984). Butler, D., and Stokes, D., Political Change in Britain (1969; 2nd ed. 1974). Butterfield, H., and Wight, M. (eds), Diplomatic Investigations (1966). Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-39 (1939). Clarke, D. L., The Politics of Arms Control (New York, 1979). Cook, C., and McKie, D. (eds), The Decade of Disillusion (1972). Crankshaw, E. (ed.), Khruschev Remembers (1971). Crossman, R., The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister (ed. J. Morgan), vol. I, Minister of Housing 1964--66; vol. 11, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966-{)8. Dean, G., Report on the Atom (1954). Divine, R. A., Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1954-60 (New York, 1978). Bibliography 305
Donovan, R. J., Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York, 1956). Dougherty, J. E., and Pfaltzgraff, R. L., Contending Theories of International Relations (Philadelphia, 1970). Dowse, R., and Hughes, J., Political Sociology (1972). Driver, C., The Disarmers (1964). Enthoven, A. C., and Smith, K. W., How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program 1961--69 (New York, 1971). Epstein, W., The Last Chance; Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (1976). Fischer, D., International Safeguards (London and New York, 1979). Fischer, G., The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1971). Foot, M., Aneurin Bevan, vol. 2 (1973). Fox, W., The Superpowers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union and Their Responsibility for Peace (New York, 1954). Freedman, L., Britain and Nuclear Weapons (1980). - The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1982). Garthoff, R. L., Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1958). George-Brown, Lord, In My Way (Harmondsworth, Middx, 1972). Gilpin, R., American Scientists and Nuclear Weapon Policy (Princeton, 1968). - France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton, 1968). Goold-Adams, R., On Limiting Atomic Warfare (1956). Gordon, M. R., Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914--65 (Palo Alto, 1969). Gowing, M., Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-45 (1964); Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-52, vol. 1, Policy Making (1974). Gray, J. E., Kratzer, M. B., Leslie, K. E., Page, H. W., and Shantzis, S. R., International Co-operation on Breeder Reactors (New York, 1978). Greenwood, T., Feiveson, H. A., and Taylor, T. B., Nuclear Proliferation (New York, 1977). Greer, H., Mud Pie: The CND Story (1964). Grodzins, M., and Rabinowitch, E. (eds), The Atomic Age: Scientists and National and World Affairs (New York, 1963). Groom, A. J. R., British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (1974). Hailsham, Lord, The Door Wherein I Went (1978). Haldane, J., Marxist Philosophy and the Social Sciences (1938). Halperin, M., Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1963). Halton, C. (ed.), Science and Culture: A Study of Cohesive and Disjunctive Forces (Boston, 1965). Harrison, M. R., Trades Unions and the Labour Party Since 1945 (1960). Haseler, S., The Gaitskellites (1969). Hogben, E., Science for the Citizen ( 1938). Holloway, D., The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn., 1983). Huntingdon, S. P., The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York, 1971). Hussain, F., The Impact of Weapons Test Restrictions, Adelphi Paper no. 165, IISS (1981). Huxley, J., Scientific Research and Social Needs (1934). Imai, R., Nuclear Safeguards, Adelphi Paper no. 86, IISS, (1972). Jacobsen, H. K., and Stein, D. E., Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1966). 306 Bibliography
Johnson, L.B., The Vantage Point (1977). Kadt, E. J. de, British Defence Policy and Nuclear War (1964). Kahan, J. H., Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C., 1975). Kaufmann, W., The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964). Kelleher, C. M., Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1975). Kennan, G., Russia, the Atom and the West (New York, 1958). Kennedy, J. F., The Strategy of Peace (New York, 1960). Key, V. 0., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1961). Khan, M. A., Nuclear Energy and International Co-operation: A Third World Perception of the Erosion of Confidence (London and New York, 1979). Killian, J. R., Sputniks, Scientists and Eisenhower (Cambridge, Mass., 1977). King-Hall, Sir Stephen, Defence in the Nuclear Age (1958). Kissinger, H., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957). - The Necessity for Choice (New York, 1960). Kistiakowski, G., A Scientist at the White House (Cambridge, Mass., 1977). Kohl, W., French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, 1971). Liddell Hart, B. H., Deterrence or Defence (l 960). McKnight, A. D., Nuclear Non-Proliferation: IAEA and EURATOM (New York, 1970). Macmillan, H., Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (1971). - Pointing the Way 1959-1961 (1972). - At the End of the Day 1961-1963 (1973). McNamara, R., The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (1968). Martin, L. W., British Defence Policy: The Long Recessional (Adelphi Paper no. 61, 1969). Martin, L. W. (ed.), The Management of Defence (1975). Marwick, A., British Society Since 1945 ( 1982). Menaul, S., Countdown: Britain's Strategic Nuclear Forces (1980). Morgan, R., The United States and West Germany (1974). Moulton, H. B., From Superiority to Parity (Westport, Conn., 1973). Mulley, F., Politics of Western Defence (1962). Murray, T. E., Nuclear Policy for War and Peace (Columbus, Ohio, 1960). Neild, R., What Has Happened to Disarmament? (1968). Neustadt, R., Alliance Politics (New York, 1970). Newhouse, J., De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (1970). Nicholas, H. G., Britain and the United States (1963). - The United Nations as a Political Institution (4th ed. 1971). Noel-Baker, P., The Arms Race (1958). Nunnerley, D., President Kennedy and Britain (New York, 1972). Osgood, R. E., NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 1962). - The Case/or the MLF: A Critical Evaluation (Washington, D.C., 1964). Parkin, F., Middle Class Radicalism (Manchester, 1968). Pierre, A., Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-70 (1972). Polach, J. G., EURATOM: Its Background, Issues and Economic Development (New York, 1964). Quester, G., Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years (New York, 1970). - The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore, 1973). Bibliography 307
Ranger, R., Arms and Politics 1958-78 (Toronto, 1979). Reid, A. W., Tongues of Conscience: War and the Scientists' Dilemma (1969). Rex, J., War and Peace (London, 1963). Richardson, J. L., Germany and the Atlantic Alliance (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). Rose, R., Politics in England (1965). Rosecrance, R., Defence of the Realm (New York, 1968). - The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1964). Roseneau, J.M., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York, 1968). Rostow, W.W., The Diffusion of Power (1972). Roszak, T., The Making of a Counter Culture (1970). Rotblat, J., Disarmament and World Security at the Pugwash Conferences (1976). Sampson, A., Macmillan (Harmondsworth, Middx, 1968). Schlesinger, A. M., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965). Seaborg, G., Kennedy, Khruschev and the Test Ban (Berkeley, Calif., 1981). Sims, N., Approaches to Disarmament (1979). Simpson, J., The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom (1983). Slessor, Sir John, The Great Deterrent (1959). Snyder, W. P., The Politics of British Defence Policy (Columbus, Ohio, 1964). Sorensen, T. C., Kennedy (New York, 1965). Steinbruner, J., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision-Making: A New Dimension of Political Analysis (Princeton, 1974). Strachey, J., On the Prevention of War (1962). Taylor, A. J.P., The Troublemakers (1957). Teller, E., and Latter, A. Our Nuclear Future (1958). Tercheck, R., The Making of the Test Ban Treaty (The Hague, 1970). Thomas, H., The Suez Affair (Harmondsworth, Middx, 1970). Toynbee, P., The Fearful Choice (1958). Vital, D., The Making of British Foreign Policy (1968). Wadsworth, K. J., The Price of Peace (New York, 1962). Watt, D. C., Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-75 (1984). Wigg, Lord, George Wigg (Harmondsworth, 1972). Wight, M., Power Politics (ed. H. Bull and C. Holbraad) (Harmondsworth, Middx, 1979). Williams, G. L., and Read, R., Denis Healey and the Politics of Power (1971). Williams, P., Hugh Gaitskel/ (1979). Wilson, H., The Labour Government 1964-70: A Personal Record (1971). Wiskemann, E., Europe of the Dictators 1919-45 (Fontana, 10th imp., 1977). Wolfe, T., Soviet Power and Europe 1945-70 (Baltimore, Md, 1970). Worcester, S., Roots of British Air Policy {1966). Wright, Sir Michael, Disarm and Verify (1964). Yarmolinski, A., The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society (New York, 1971). York, H., Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York, 1971). Zuckerman, Sir Solly (now Lord), Scientists and War: The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs (1956). - Nuclear Illusion and Reality (1982). 308 Bibliography
B. Articles
Arnold, J. R., 'Effects of the Recent Bomb Tests on Human Beings', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists x: 9 (Nov 1954). Atomic Scientists Association (symposium) 'The Morality of Atomic Warfare', Atomic Scientists Journal, 4: 1 (Sep 1954). Blackett, P. M. S., 'Nuclear Weapons and Defence', International Affairs. XXXIV: 4 (Oct 1958). Boulton, J. W., 'Nato and the MLF', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 7, no. 3 and 4 (July-Oct 1972). Bowie, R., 'Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance', International Organization, XVII: 3 (Summer 1963). Brodie, C., 'The Development of Nuclear Strategy', International Security, 2: 4 (Spring 1978). - 'On the Objectives of Arms Control', International Security, 1: 1 (Summer 1976). Buchan, A., 'Britain and the Nuclear Deterrent', Political Quarterly, xxx1: 1 (Jan-Mar 1960). - 'Partners and Allies', Foreign Affairs, xu: 4 (1963). - 'The Choice of British Defence Policy', International Journal, XVIII: 3 (Summer 1963). -'Their Bomb and Ours: Some Concluding Remarks on the Nuclear Para• dox', Encounter, XII: 1 (Jan 1959). - 'The Reform of NATO', Foreign Affairs, US/40, no. 2 (Jan 1962). Bull, H., 'The Arms Race and the Banning of Nuclear Tests', Political Quarterly, xxx: 4 (Oct-Dec 1959). - 'Arms Control and World Order', International Security, 1: 1 (Summer 1976). Burns, A., 'Disarmament and the Balance of Terror', World Politics, XII: 1 (Oct 1959). Buzzard, Sir A. W., 'Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence', World Politics, VIII (Jan 1956). Capitanchik, D., 'Public Opinion and Popular Attitudes Towards Defence', in Baylis, J. (ed.) British Defence Policy in a Changing World (1977). Carter, M. W., and Moghissi, A. A., 'Three Decades of Nuclear Testing', Health Physics, vol. 33 (July 1977). Conn, W. E., 'Michael Polonyi: The Responsible Person', The Heythrop Journal, XVIII: 1 (Jan 1976). Coulson, C. A., 'Atomic Energy: The Moral Issues', in Haddow, A. (ed.) The Biological Hazards of Atomic Energy (1952). Crossman, R., 'The Nuclear Obsession', Encounter, XI: 1 (July 1958). Davies, D., 'A Comprehensive Journal', Science Journal (Nov. 1968). - 'Monitoring Underground Explosions', Nature, 241 (5 Jan 1973). Dulles, J. F., 'Challenge and Response in US Policy', Foreign Affairs, xxxv1: 1 (Oct 1957). Epstein, W., 'The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', Scientific American (Apr 1975). Frye, W.R., 'The Quest for Disarmament Since World War II', in Henkin, L. (ed.), Arms Control: Issues for the Public (New Jersey, 1961). Bibliography 309
- 'Characteristics of Recent Arms Control Proposals and Agreements', in Brennan, D. (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security (New York, 1961). Garnett, J.C., 'Some Constraints on Defence Policy-Makers', in Martin, L. W. (ed.), The Management of Defence (1978). - 'British Strategic Thought', in Baylis, J. (ed.), British Defence Policy in a Changing World ( 1977). Goldschmidt, B., 'A Historical Survey of Non-Proliferation Policies', Interna• tional Security, 2: I (Summer 1977). Groom, A. J. R., 'The British Deterrent', in Baylis, J. (ed.), British Defence Policy in a Changing World (1977). Hodgson, P. E., 'Atomic Scientists and the Public', New Scientist (6 Aug 1959). - 'The British Atomic Scientists Association 1946-59', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Nov 1959). Hopkind, A., 'The MLF', New Left Review, 51: 3 (Sep-Oct 1968). Howard, M., 'Problems of a Disarmed World', in Butterfield, H., and Wight, M. (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (1966). Jones, M., 'The Voice of an Era', in Henderson, I. (ed.), Man of Christian Action (1976). Kissinger, H., 'Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack', Foreign Affairs, xxxvm: 3 (Apr 1960). Martin, L. W., 'The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain', American Political Science Review, LVI: I (Mar 1962). Neustadt, R., 'Memorandum on British Labour Party and Defence', New Left Review, 51: 3 (Sep-Oct 1968). Pasechnik, C. P., Kogan, S. D., Sultonor, D. D., and Tsibul'skii, J., 'Results of Seismic Observations of Underground Nuclear and TNT Explosions', Transactions of the 0. Y. U. Shmidt Institute of Geophysics, no. 15 ( 182) (New York, 1962). Rotblat, J., 'The Hydrogen-Uranium Bomb', Journal of the Atomic Scientists Association, 4: 4 (Mar 1955). Smart, I., 'The Great Engines: The Rise and Decline of a Nuclear Age', International Affairs, 51: 4 (Oct 1975). Verrier, A., 'Defence and Politics after Nassau', Political Quarterly, xxx1v: 3 (July-Sept 1963). Wiegele, T. C., 'The Origins of the MLF Concept', ORBIS (Oct 1968). Wohlstetter, A., 'Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N +I Country', Foreign Affairs, XXXIX: 3 (Apr 1961). York, H., and Wiesner, J., 'National Security and the Nuclear Test Ban', Scientific American (Oct 1964). Young, H., 'Politics Outside the System', in Cook, C., and McKie, D. (eds), The Decade of Disillusion (1972).
C. Pamphlets
Statement on Strontium Hazards Atomic Scientists Association (London, 1957). Direct Action by A. Carter. Peace News Pamphlet (London, Mar 1962). 310 Bibliography
Radiation Exposure in Recent Weapon Tests (Condensed Version of AEC 16th Semi-annual Report in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, x: 9, Nov 1954). The Social Function of Science (Sixth J. D. Bernal Lecture, E. H. S. Burhop, London, 1975).
D. Newspapers Consulted
Christian Science Monitor Daily Express Daily Mail Daily Telegraph Daily Worker Die Welt Die Zeit Financial Times Frankfurter A/lgemeine Zeitung Frankfurter Neue Presse Guardian Japan Times Le Figaro Le Monde Libre Belgique New Statesman New York Herald-Tribune New York Times The Economist The Observer The Spectator The Sunday Times The Times
E. Unpublished Sources
Edwards, D. V., 'The Movement for Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament in Britain' (B.A. thesis, Swarthmore College, 1962). McGeoch, Sir I., 'The Polaris Programme' (M.Phil. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1975). Walker, M., 'The Labour Party and Defence 1957-64' (M.Sc. thesis, University of Wales, 1974). Wersky, P. G., 'The Visible College: A Study of Left-Wing Scientists in Britain 1918-39' (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1974). Index
Acheson, D., 160--l 11-12, 14--15, 63-4, 83, 97, Acheson-Lilienthal Report, 13-14 104--5, 112, 124--5, 130, 208, Adenauer, K., 53, 84, 93, IOI, 167, 226--7 249 report on Bikini Atoll tests, 26 Agreement for Co-operation on the response to Roblat article, 28 Uses of Atomic Energy for Atomic Scientists' Association Mutual Defence Purposes, 89 (ASA), 25, 27-8 Air Force Technical Analysis Centre conferences, 30 (AFTAC), 39 1957 Strontium Hazards Report, Aldermaston March Committee, 50, 31 52, 57, 59, 61, 66, 68 publications, 29 Anderson, Sir J., 8 Radiation Hazards Committee, 31 Anglo-French Plan of 1954, 19 relation to World Federation of Anglo-French Plan of 1956, 76, 78 Scientific Workers, 35 'Anti-missile missile', l I l-12 Atomic Scientists of Chicago, 25 Arms Control and Disarmament Atomic Weapons Research Agency (ACDA), 104, 122, Establishment (A WRE), 40-2, 131-2, 140, 143, 200, 202, 49--50, 61 205--6, 2IO, 214--16, 219, 227-9, Atoms for Peace Plan, 18, 225 233 Attlee, C., 9-- l l, 52, 268 Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (ACDRU), Ball, G., 164--7, 186--7, 218 196--7 Baruch, B., 13, 225, 268 Aron, R., 249 Baruch Plan of 1946, 13, 16, 78, 202 Arrays, 42 Beam, J., 206 Arrowsmith, P., 51 Becquerel, C., 26 Athens Guidelines of 1962, 183 Berkner, L., 40 Atlantic Charter, 6 Berkner Panel (US), 40, 92, I 00 Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), 89, Berlin, 84, 93, 99--100, I07-9, 113, 175, 185 143 ANF/MLF proposition, 213-19 Summit of 1960, 113 British proposals, 189, 191, 196 Bermuda Talks of 196 l, l l l see a/so Multilateral Force (MLF) Bernal, J. D., 24, 34--5 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 85 Beswick, F., 49 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 85--6, Bethe, H., 116 89, I06, 227, 252 Bevan, A., 53-5 see also McMahon Act Bevin, E., IO, 185 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 'Big Hole' theory, 40, I06
311 312 Index
Bikini Atoll Tests of 1954 Castlereagh, Lord, 4 stimulated public debate among Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), scientists, 25-7 123, 200, 204 'Black Boxes', 147 Chadwick, Sir J., 29 Blackette, Professor P. M. S., 24, 29 Chalfont, Lord, 184, 196--7, 205-7, Blue Streak, 60, 62 209-10, 212, 217-19, 235, Born, M., 35 238-40, 244-5, 248 Bowie, R., 162-4, 170 see also Gwynne-Jones Brandt, W., 233-4, 237, 246--9 Chequers, 184-5 Bridges Committee, 10 Cherwell, Lord, 32 British Association for the China, 6, 136--7, 139, 144, 207, Advancement of Science 209-10, 242-3 (BAAS), 29 Christmas Island, use of, 23, 49, 86, Brock, H., 51 112-15, 117, 120--1, 123-5 Brown, G. (Lord), 52, 60--1, 180, Churchill, Sir W., 30, 76 200,206,237 on Britain's possession of atomic Bruce, Ambassador D., 181, 206 bomb, 7-8 Buchan, A., 171, 173 Cleveland, Ambassador H., 194, 236 Bull, Professor H., xi, 197 Cockcroft, Sir J., 29, 32 Bundy, McG., 114, 123, 163, 186--7 Collins, Canon, 51, 59 Bunn, G., 231 Commission for Conventional Burhop, E. H. S., 34-5 Armaments, 16 Butler, R., 87, 96 Committee of Principals, 132, 143, 227 Caccia, Sir H., 110 Common Market, 188 Callaghan, J., 206 see also European Economic Camp David, 97-8 Community (EEC) Campaign for Democratic Socialism, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 64-6 (CTBT), 42-4, 57, 59, 71, 74-5, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 77, 80, 90, 96--8, 103-4, 106--7, (CND), 54, 69-70, 95, 137-8, 110--11, 115-17, 122, 125-33, 143, 179, 245, 253 135-41, 146, 148-9, 198, 202, challenge to Labour Party, 63 206, 209-10, 224, 242, 254, 256 characteristics, 50--1 April 1961 draft treaty, 118 Committee of 100, 62, 65-70, 137 Conference of Experts, 37, 39-41, dissatisfaction with 'non-nuclear 77, 79-80, 82, 91-2, 98-100, 111 club', 58-9 Conference on the Discontinuance effect of Suez, 48 of Nuclear Weapons Tests growing support in 1959, 57 (DNWTC), 90, IOI growth of, 33 Conservative Governments, 20, 53, influence on Labour Party, 46 70, 86, 143, 166, 205, 254 left-wing roots and formation, 49 Conservative Party, 138, 143, 161, limits, 44 166, 178-9, 182, 185, 188, 198 political attitudes, 44 'Control Posts', 75, 91-2, 98 praise from Gaitskell, 64 Coulson, C. A., 27 protest to A WRE in Essex, 61 Cousins, F., 55, 58-9, 64 union recruitment, 55 Crossman, R., 53, 56--7, 60, 185, 191 Carpenter, E., 41 Cuban Missile Crisis, 134-6, 137-8, Castle, B., 49 192 Index 313
Dantas, L., 121 European Economic Community Darwin, Sir C., 29 (EEC), 102, 136, 161--4, 166, Davies, D., xiv 173,223, 236, 244-5, 247, 255 Davy Crockett, 106 'European option', 216--17, 226--7, Dean, Ambassador, 119, 122, 229, 232, 240, 249 214-16 'European clause', 240 Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, 6 Federation of Atomic Scientists, 25 'Decoupling' Theory, 92, 97, 99 Fedorov, Dr, 93--4 see also 'Big Hole' Finletter, Ambassador T., 172 Defence Atomic Support Agency, Fisher, Ambassador A., xiv, 148, 125 200, 217-18, 227, 231 Defence Ministry (UK), 71, 176, Foot, M., 64, 274 196, 211 Foreign Office, 71, 77, 146, 174, 176, Defense Department (US), 83, 105, 197, 211-13, 218, 235, 239 115, 122, 127-8, 130--1, 133, Foster, W., 131-2, 143, 200, 214-17, 161-2, 164-5, 167, 200 229--30, 233 De Gaulle, President C., 102, 108, France, 106, 139, 148, 159, 166, 169, 115, 136, 169, 173 174-5, 195, 203, 208, 223, 237, Direct Action Committee (DAC), 242, 245, 252, 254 50--1, 54, 57-8, 61, 66,68 Freedman, L., xiv Disarmament Commission of 1957, Freund, R., 216 17-18 Frisch, Professor G. R., 29 five-power sub-committee, 74, 76 Fuchs, K., 32 Dulles, J. F., 80, 83--4, 86 Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon), 26 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 6 see also Bikini Atoll Tests
Eaton, C., 48 Gaitskell, H., 52-8, 60--5, 135 1957 Pugwash meeting, 36 Gates, T., 105--6 Economist, The, 41, 95, 171 General and Complete Disarmament Eden, Sir A., 87, 94 (GCD), xi, xii, 78, 115, 195, 252 Eighteen Nation Disarmament Anglo-French Plan of 1954, 19 Committee (ENDC), 111, 113, Bertrand Russell, 35 115--20, 125--7, 133, 138, interwar years, 4 197-99, 215, 217-19, 210, 220, shifting British attitudes towards, 222--4, 230, 235,238, 240, 245, 20 247, 249-50 Soviet Plan of 1955, 19 ENDC Memorandum, 126--7, 209 Unified Disarmament Committee Eisenhower Administration, 74, ofl950, 17 103--4, 156, 158, 269 Germany, 140, 145, 157, 159, 166, Eisenhower, President D. D., 18, 37, 168-70, 174-75, 177, 180, 182, 83, 87-9,93--4, 96, 98-9, 101-2, 184-5, 190, 192, 195, 200, 203, 254 207, 210, 212-19, 221-3, 227, Emergency Committee for Direct 229--31, 233--41, 244, 246--9, Action Against Nuclear War, 254-56 49 Gilpatric, R., 190 Erhard, Chancellor L., 195, 230 Gordon-Walker, G., 181 EURATOM, 221, 225, 235--9, Grand Coalition, see Brandt, 245--8, 250, 255 Kiesinger 314 Index
Gromyko, A., 13-14, 119-20, Johnson, President L. B., 86--7, ll9 215--16, 233, 247 Joint Chiefs of Staff (US), 200, 202, Gwynne-Jones, A., 196 226--7 Joliot-Curie, Professor, 34-5, 271 Haddow, A., 29 Hailsham, Lord, 142, 149-50 Kant, E., 33 Haldane, J. C. S., 24 Kaysen, Dr C., 115, 123, 150, 200 Hankey, Lord, 14 Kennedy Administration, 103, 116, 'Hardtack' Test Series, 38-41, 91, 118-19, 127, 131, 140, 146, 148, 100 159, 161-2, 188 Harlech, Lord, xiv, 142 Kennedy, President J. F., 90, 103-4, see also Ormsby-Gore 106--19, 122, 131, 134-6, 138-9, Harriman, A., 140, 142, 145--6, 149, 141-2, 146, 156, 160, 168, 200 174-6, 200, 254 1963 mission to Moscow, 203 Kennedy, R., 140, 219 Harwell, 29, 33 Kennet, Lord, 207 Healey, D., 135, 181, 184-5, 187, Khruschev, N., 37, 62, 87, 94, 96, 191, 193, 206 99, 101-2, 108, 116, 120, 138-9, Heath, E., llO, 170--1, 206 141, 145, 148-9 Herter, C., 88, 99, IOI, 104-5, 158, Berlin speech, 146 160 Kiesinger, Chancellor, 233-4, 237, Hiroshima/Nagasaki, 7-8, 11, 23, 27 247-9 Hound Dog, 106, 163-4 see also Grand Coalition Home, Sir Alec Douglas, (later Killian, Dr J., xiv, 97 Lord), xiv, 107-9, 119-20, 137, King-Hall, Sir S., 49, 65 171, 176--8, 208 Kistiakowski, Professor G., xiv Howland Island, 124 Kitchen, J., xiv, 162, 164, 166 Humphrey, Senator H., 95, 249 Knappstein, Dr, 234 Huxley, Sir J., 24 Korean War, 18, 73 Hydrogen Bomb National Kosygin, A., 236 Campaign, 48 Labour Government, 9, 58, 178, India, 137, 140, 207, 213, 220, 224, 180, 183, 196, 210, 236, 254 236, 240-4 Labour Party, 51-70, 87, 95, 135, International Atomic Energy Agency 138, 157, 161, 169, 177-9, 180, (IAEA), 18, 201, 226, 246--8, 182, 191, 197-9, 205--6, 245, 253 255 Laos, 107-9 basis for establishment, 18 Latter, A., 40, 92, 106 safeguards, 208, 221, 225--7, see also 'Big Hole' Theory, 238-9, 245--8, 250,255--6 'Decoupling' Theory see also Atoms for Peace Plan Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 92 International Congress of League of Nations Radiology, 26 Covenant of, 4 disarmament plan, 4, 7-8 Japan, 242 Lee, Admiral, 166 Jarvis Island, 124 Levy, H., 24 Johnson Administration, 181, 184, Lloyd, Sir S., 76--7, 83, 96--7 186, 188-9, 191-2, 195, 216, London Disarmament Conference, 86 230,243, 247,249 Long, Dr F., 123 Index 315
McCone, J., 83, 97-8, 104, 106, 279 Nassau meeting, 155-{), 159, 164-7, Macmillan Government, 68, 70, 253 169-72, 178 Macmillan, H., 58-9, 62, 78, 84, Agreement, 139-40, 254--5 8&-9, 93-104, 107-18, 120, 122, renegotiation, 175, 179, 180, 182, 134-6, 138-42, 150, 155-{), 19&-7 164-5, 174, 176, 180, 253-4 National Council for the Abolition McMahon Act, 85--88 of Nuclear Weapons Tests McNamara, R., 131, 161, 163, 167, (NCANWT), 49 181, 192-4 National Security Council, 105, 161 McNamara Committee, 193, 227, National Union of General and 229, 231-2, 235-{i Municipal Workers see also Nuclear Planning Group (NUGMW), 55 McNaughton,J., 115, 122, 193-4 NATO, 60, 67, 93, 155-{), 161, Makins, Sir R., 106 163-4, 166, 170-1, 192, 196, 201, Manhattan Project, 24--5, 27 203, 205, 211-12, 216, 222, 227, Marshall Plan, 168 229-31, 233, 236, 240-1, 24&-7, Martin, K., 63 256 Maud Report, 9 Atlantic Alliance, 188-91 Medical Research Council (MRC) 'Near-nuclear states', 214 report on radiation, 30-1, 76 Neustadt, Professor R., 161-2, 180, Merchant, Ambassador L., 105, 113, 182-3, 18&-7 167, 169, 171-2 Neutron bomb, 112 Mikardo, I., 54 Nevada test site, 113 Minister for Disarmament, 19&-7, 'New Left', 51 205-{), 209, 239-40 'New Look' defence policy, 156 'Mixed-manned Minuteman', 186 Nitze, P., 122, 132-3, 200 Mixed-manned ship proposal, 17&-7 Noble, M., 75--8 'Mixed-manning', 189, 230 Noel-Baker, P., 54 Moch, J., 78 'Non-nuclear club', 56, 58, 60-1 Monnet, J., 167 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), xi, Montgomery, Field Marshal, 176 xii, 132-3, 146, 148-9, 255-{) Moscow Negotiations of 1963, see also Chapters 8-9, Appendix II 142-51 Norstad, General, 157 Harriman probe, 145 North Atlantic Council (NAC), 170, Mountbatten, Lord, 135, 184, 187, 173, 175, 214--17 196 Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee, Multilateral Force (MLF), 47, 50, 194 52-64, 67, 95, 143, 148, 156, Nuclear Planning Group, 192, 194, 256 161-85, 201-8, 212, 214--17, 220, 231-3, 235, 237, 240, 247, O'Neil, Sir C., 106 249, 254, 256 'On-site' inspection, 97-8, 132-3, 'MLF episode', 157, 150-60 138-9, 141, 14&-7, 149, 210 MLF/AMF package, 190-2, 223 Operation Gandhi, 47 Multinational Inter-Allied Nuclear Operation Deadline, 90 Force (INAF), 173 Ormsby-Gore, D., 24, 77-9, 81-3, Murray, T. E., 94, 279 92-4, 100, 104, 110, 112-13, 115, 139, 142, 150 see also Harlech Nailor, Professor P., xiv Owen, Henry, xiv, 162-4, 166 316 Index
Paris Working Group, 189 Schroeder, Dr, 235, 237 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), xi, Schumann Plan, 168 xii, I HH I, 122, 12&-7, 12&-7, Seaborg, G., 123, 151, 208, 226 130, 132-3, 137-8, 142, 14&-9, Seismology, 3--43 passim, 92, 119, 197-8,202, 254,256 147 see also Appendix I Senate Armed Services Committee, Peace Pledge Union, 47 131, 133 Penney, Sir W., xiv, 40, 43, 112, 120, Shadow Cabinet, 53, 67 148-9 Shuckburgh, Sir E., 194 Pentagon, 19, IOI, 112-13, 120, 176, Skybolt, 60, 106, 136, 155, 160--4, 202 187 see also Defense Department (US) Smith, B., 123 Polar~,66, 106, 155, 158,254 Smith, G., 166 submarines, 13&-7, 160, 163--4, Smith-Lee surface ships, 164-6 169, 173, 177, 184, 187, 189 Social Relations of Science Powels, C. F., 34, 55 Movement (SRS), 24-5 Powers, G., 102 Society for Freedom in Science, 25 Projects Vela and Cowboy, 99 Sommer, T., 173, 238 Pugwash Conferences, 30, 33-37, 48 Soper, Dr D., 49 Soviet Union Quebec Agreement, 9 Conference of Experts and 'Quota' proposal, 98-9 scientific debate, 25, 39--40 and disarmament, 6, 9-11, 13-14, 'Rainer' Test Series, ~I 16, 19 Rand Corporation, 92 and Multilateral Force (MLF), Read, B., 233 175, 182 Rickover, Admiral H., 187 and Non-Proliferation Treaty Rontgen, 26 (NPT), 198-9, 203--4, 207, 209, Roosevelt, President F. D., 5--6 211, 213-15, 217, 219-20, Roschin, V., 231, 233 222-5, 229, 231, 234-6, 238, Rostow, W., xiv, 145, 162, 168-70, 240, 24&-7, 249-55 192 and test ban, 73--4, 7&-8, 80, 82--4, Rotblat, Professor J., xiv, 27-8, 32, 87, 90--3, 9&-100, 105--6, 35, 49 108-11, 115--16, 118-19, 120, Rowen, H., 161, 163 126, 130-1, 133--4, 137, 144, 148 Rusk, D., 114-15, 117, 119-20, 122, Spaak, P.H., 171, 173 133, 140, 161, 163, 165, 171, Spiers, R., 194 186, 22&-7,229-30, 233 Sputnik, 73, 78, 84 Russell, B., 35--6, 48, 65 SS4, 156, 158 Stassen, H., 19, 86 SACEUR, 157-8, 160, 173, 175, 177, State Department, 19, 53, 104, 122, 180, 185, 189, 193 133, 141, 159-67, 188, 200, 203, Sandys, D., 60, 72-3 215, 236, 248 Scarborough Conference, 63--4, 69 'cabal', 159--60, 194, 218, 227 Schaetzel, R., 161-3 Stennis, Senator J., 131-2 Schlesinger, A., 114 Stevenson, Ambassador A., 114, Schnippenskoettur, Ambassador, 117, 140 239, 248 Stewart, Lord, xiv, 206, 218-19 Index 317
Stockholm International Peace Article 11, 7 Research Institute (SIPRI), xii Charter, 6-9 Strachey, J., 95 Security Council, 16-17, 214 Strauss, F. J., 237 16th General Assembly of 1961, Street, J., 239 109 Sub-Committee of Five 1953, 18-19 Subcommittee on Disarmament, Suez,48, 74, 84, 274 18 Summit Meeting of 1960, 94-6, Test Discontinuance Talks of 99--103 1959, 120 Summit Meeting of 1961, 108-9 US Geological Survey, 39 Szilard, L., 36 Victory for Socialism, 54 Taverne, R., 19 Vietnam, 208-9 Technical Working Groups I and II, Von Hasse, K., 234 99, 100 Von Hassell, K., 173 Teller, Dr E., 32, 40, 84, 92, 106, 131 Vorontsov, J. M., 231-2 Thirlaway, Dr H. I. S., 41 Thompson, Ambassador, 200, 218 Thomson, Sir G., 29 Wadsworth, Ambassador, 80, 83, Thor, 50-1, 54-6, 62, 89 91-2, 98 Thorneycroft, Lord, 138, 173, 176, Wallace, H., 10 179, 182 Watson, S., 64 Trades Union Congress (TUC), Weiss, S., xiv, 162--4 54-5, 61-2, 64 Wiesner, Dr J., 119, 123, 200 Transport and General Workers' Wigg, G., 56, 60, 184 Union (TGWU), 55, 58, 6~, Wight, Professor M., xii, 3 67 Wilson Government, 207-8, 218, Treaty of Western European Union, 245, 247 237 Wilson, H., xiv, 61, 65, 135, 178-81, Trevelyan, Sir H., 148-9, 215--6 184-5, 187 Tsarapkin, S., 81, 98-9, 110, 134 World Disarmament Conference Tsar Alexander, 4 (WDC), 24 Tyler, W., 148, 161 World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), 33-5 UK Atomic Energy Authority Wright, Sir M., xiv, 94, 279 (UKAEA), 29 United Nations, xii, 11-16, 18-19, 37, Zorin, V., 74-5, 81, 199 79, 114-15, 117, 126, 138, 212 Zuckerman, Lord, xiv, 120, 248