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Aspasius on Nicomachean Ethics : an Ancient Example of ‘Higher Criticism’?

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Aspasius on Nicomachean Ethics : an Ancient Example of ‘Higher Criticism’? Created on 19 May 2007 at 10.02 hours page 347 ASPASIUS ON NICOMACHEAN ETHICS : AN ANCIENT EXAMPLE OF ‘HIGHER CRITICISM’? CARLO NATALI 1. Received opinions NE 7. 14 Aristotle seems to identify pleasure and happiness: Presumably it is even necessary, given that there are unimpeded activities of each state, and happiness is the activity of all of them or of one of them, that this activity, provided that it is unimpeded, is most desirable; but this is pleasure. (1153B9–12) On this passage, Aspasius notes in his commentary (In NE 151. 18–27 Heylbut):1 δι µν ον το των δοκε τατν ποφανεσθαι τγαθν κα τν δονν· ο µν οτως χει, λλ πρς το#ς λ$γοντας γ$νεσιν ε%ναι & φα λας τινς τ'ν δον'ν, ο(ς2 κα δι) ατ τ µ ε%ναι ατν3 τ γαθν *πιγνεται [κα]4 *πιχειρε *νδ+ξως .ς *νν ατν τ /ριστον λ$γειν, *πε ν γε το ς Νικοµαχεοις, νθα διεληπται κα περ δον2ς 3ριστοτ$λης σαφ'ς ε4ρηκεν ατν µ τατν ε%ναι τ52 εδαιµον6α λλ παρακολουθε ν “8σπερ το ς κµαοις τν 8ραν”. σηµειωτ$ον5 δ το: µ ε%ναι το:τ) 3ριστοτ$λους λλ) Εδµου τ *ν τ<'6 λ$γειν περ δον2ς .ς οδ$πω περ ατ2ς διειλεγµ$νου· πλν ε4τε Εδµου τα:τ= *στιν ε4τε 3ριστοτ$λους, ã Carlo Natali 2007 My thanks to David Sedley and David Charles for help with the improvement of my English text. 1 References are to G. Heylbut, Aspasii in Ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt com- mentaria [Heylbut] (Berlin, 1889). 2 ο(ς Rose: >ς codd.; del. Spengel. 3 ατν Spengel: ατ codd. 4 Secl. Hayduck. 5 σηµειωτ$ον codd.: σηµε ον L. Spengel, ‘Uber• die unter den Namen des Aristoteles erhaltenen Ethischen Schriften’ [‘Ethische Schriften’], Bayer. Ak. der Wiss., Sitzung phil.-hist. Kl., 24/4 (1841), 1–115 at 85, and all subsequent editors. I maintain the text of the manuscripts, on the basis of a similar passage in Olympiodorus (In Cat. 75. 11–12 Busse). 6 MS Z (Parisinus gr. 1903) has a lacuna here, supplemented with δεκ=τ<ω by Spengel and others; see Spengel, ‘Ethische Schriften’, 86. Created on 19 May 2007 at 10.02 hours page 348 348 Carlo Natali *νδ+ξως ε4ρηται· δι το:το λ$γεται τ /ριστον δον, ?τι σ#ν τ<' ρστ<ω κα χ@ριστον ατο:.7 With these words, then, he seems to say that the good and pleasure are one and the same. But this is not the case. Rather, against those who say that pleasure is a process or that some pleasures are base, for whom it also follows, for this reason, that pleasure is not the good, he argues on the basis of reputed opinion that it is possible to call pleasure the supreme good. For at least in the Nicomachean Ethics, in the place where he does make distinctions on pleasure, he says clearly that pleasure is not the same thing as happiness, but accompanies it ‘as the bloom accompanies the cheek of youth’ [NE 1174B33]. As evidence that this is not by Aristotle but by Eudemus one should cite the fact that in <book 10> he [ =Aristotle] talks about pleasure as if he had not yet discussed it. But whether those words express Eudemus’ or Aristotle’s view, this is an argument drawn from reputed opinion; he says that pleasure is the supreme good for the following reason: it accompanies the supreme good and cannot be separated from it. The passage attracted discussion in the nineteenth century,because it seems to attribute a section of the Nicomachean Ethics (το:το, 151. 24) to Eudemus and not to Aristotle. Spengel maintained that As- pasius was still close enough to the rediscovery of Aristotle’s works to be able to discuss the attribution of books of the Nicomachean Ethics, and suggested that the passage presents its argument as ‘nur ein dialektischer Versuch’.8 But a bolder interpretation emerged in the twentieth century. According to Paul Moraux, Aspasius in this passage touches on a problem of interest to ‘higher criticism’, one concerned, that is, with the attribution of authorship—in this case, the question whether the so-called common books (NE 5–7 =EE 4– 6) should be attributed to the Nicomachean Ethics or the Eudemian Ethics. He maintains that the author of the passage argues on the basis of common opinions (*νδ+ξως, 21 and 26), but also cites the Nicomachean Ethics as a work di·erent from the one that contains 7 This section of Aspasius’ commentary (150. 31–151. 27) is very di¶cult and full of lacunae. It has been edited many times: by H. Hase, ‘Aspasiou scholi»on eis ta Ethica tou Aristotelous epitom»e’, Classical Journal, 28 (1823), 306–17, and 29 (1824), 104–18 at 117; Spengel, ‘Ethische Schriften’, 84–5; V. Rose, ‘Uber• die griechischen Commentare• zur Ethik des Aristoteles’, Hermes, 5 (1871), 61–113 at 107; and Heylbut. There is a modern translation only for the commentary on book 8, in D. Konstan, Commentators on Aristotle on Friendship [Commentators] (London, 2001) (Aspasius at 13–57). A complete translation of Aspasius’ commentary by Professor Konstan is in preparation. I would like to thank him very warmly for allowing me to read it in draft, and for many useful comments on a first version of the present article. 8 L. Spengel, ‘Ethische Schriften’, 84; ‘nich mehralseine Conjectur’, he adds(85). Created on 19 May 2007 at 10.02 hours page 349 Aspasius on Nicomachean Ethics 7 349 the present passage. Moraux takes lines 24–5 to mean that Aspasius is uncertain whether the common books belong to the Eudemian or Nicomachean Ethics.9 He adds that it is not certain whether Aspa- sius considered all the common books to belong to the Eudemian Ethics, or only the final chapters of book 7, 12–15. Further, Moraux quotes a comment by Aspasius on NE 8, 1155B 13–16, which states: ‘Even things di·erent in species admit of de- gree. We have discussed this matter [Aπρ ατ'ν] previously.’10 As- pasius’ comments: οικε δ εBρ2σθαι *ν το ς *κπεπτωκ+σι τ'ν Νικοµαχεων. (In NE 161. 9–10) It appears that they were discussed in the books that have fallen out of the Nicomachean Ethics. Moraux thinks that Aspasius is here referring to the lacuna that must be admitted to exist between NE 4 and 8, if the common books are attributed to the Eudemian Ethics. Moraux’s interpretation has been revived by Anthony Kenny, in an important book about the relationship between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics.11 Kenny claims, inter alia,that(i)the common books belong to the Eudemian Ethics, and (ii) before the second century ad,theEudemian Ethics was preferred to the Nico- machean Ethics by ancient authors. According to Kenny, the situ- 9 P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, ii. Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr. [Aristotelismus] (Berlin and New York, 1984), 258–61. 10 Modern editions of the Nicomachean Ethics have Aπρ ατ'ν.ThisuseofAπ$ρ is quite rare in Aristotle, and for this reason Ramsauer, Grant, Stewart, Tricot, and Gauthier think that it is a spurious interpolation. But Aspasius’ text here has περ ατ'ν. Regarding the point referred to, among those scholars who accept the passage as authentic Susemihl and Dirlmeier follow Aspasius, Irwin thinks that the allusion is to Cat. 6B10–17 or to NE 2. 8, Burnet and Broadie just say that the reference is uncertain. E. Berti, ‘Amicizia e “Focal Meaning”’, in A. Alberti and R. W. Sharples (eds.), Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics [Aspasius] (Berlin and New York, 1999), 176–90 at 178, thinks that the reference is to 1096B8–16. 11 A. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics [Ethics] (Oxford, 1978), 29–36. Shorter or more prudent versions of the same interpretation can be found in C. Rowe, The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 1971); R. Bodeus,• ‘Contribution a› l’histoire des ¥uvres morales d’Aristote: les testimonia’, Revue philosophique de Louvain, 71 (1973), 451–67 at 452–3; H. B. Gottschalk, ‘Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the Second Cen- tury ad’ [‘Aristotelian Philosophy’], in W. Haase and F. Temporini (eds.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der r•omischen Welt, 2.36.2 [Aufstieg] (Berlin and New York, 1987), 1079–174 at 1158; F. Becchi, ‘Aspasio commentatore di Aristotele’ [‘Aspasio’], in Haase and Temporini (eds.), Aufstieg, 5365–96 at 5368; J. Barnes, ‘An Introduction to Aspasius’, in Alberti and Sharples (eds.), Aspasius, 1–50 at 19–21. Created on 19 May 2007 at 10.02 hours page 350 350 Carlo Natali ation had radically changed by the time of Alexander of Aphro- disias, and since then the supremacy of the Nicomachean to the Eudemian Ethics has been taken for granted. In general, Kenny thinks (iii) that the Eudemian Ethics is the more important treatise, from both a philosophical and a historical point of view. In this paper I shall discuss only Kenny’s interpretation of the passage quoted above from Aspasius’ commentary. Kenny mainly follows Moraux’s interpretation, with just a few changes, and in- serts it into his reconstruction of the history of the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics in the period between the fourth century bc and the second century ad. He writes: In Aspasius’ writing we find the situation with which we have been fa- miliar for centuries: the Nicomachean Ethics is the undoubted treatise of Aristotle, the Eudemian Ethics is the problematic treatise whose attribu- tion fluctuates, regarded now as authentic Aristotle, now as the work of his disciple Eudemus.
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