Safedge for Residential Networks Privacy from the Bottom-Up
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Inside Dropbox: Understanding Personal Cloud Storage Services
Inside Dropbox: Understanding Personal Cloud Storage Services → Idilio Drago → Marco Mellia → Maurizio M. Munafo` → Anna Sperotto → Ramin Sadre → Aiko Pras IRTF – Vancouver Motivation and goals 1 Personal cloud storage services are already popular Dropbox in 2012 “the largest deployed networked file system in history” “over 50 million users – one billion files every 48 hours” Little public information about the system How does Dropbox work? What are the potential performance bottlenecks? Are there typical usage scenarios? Methodology – How does Dropbox work? 2 Public information Native client, Web interface, LAN-Sync etc. Files are split in chunks of up to 4 MB Delta encoding, deduplication, encrypted communication To understand the client protocol MITM against our own client Squid proxy, SSL-bump and a self-signed CA certificate Replace a trusted CA certificate in the heap at run-time Proxy logs and decrypted packet traces How does Dropbox (v1.2.52) work? 3 Clear separation between storage and meta-data/client control Sub-domains identifying parts of the service sub-domain Data-center Description client-lb/clientX Dropbox Meta-data notifyX Dropbox Notifications api Dropbox API control www Dropbox Web servers d Dropbox Event logs dl Amazon Direct links dl-clientX Amazon Client storage dl-debugX Amazon Back-traces dl-web Amazon Web storage api-content Amazon API Storage HTTP/HTTPs in all functionalities How does Dropbox (v1.2.52) work? 4 Notification Kept open Not encrypted Device ID Folder IDs How does Dropbox (v1.2.52) work? 4 Client control Login File hash Meta-data How does Dropbox (v1.2.52) work? 4 Storage Amazon EC2 Retrieve vs. -
NSA's Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Telecommunications Infrastructure
Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Telecommunications Infrastructure Susan Landau* INTRODUCTION When Google discovered that intruders were accessing certain Gmail ac- counts and stealing intellectual property,1 the company turned to the National Security Agency (NSA) for help in securing its systems. For a company that had faced accusations of violating user privacy, to ask for help from the agency that had been wiretapping Americans without warrants appeared decidedly odd, and Google came under a great deal of criticism. Google had approached a number of federal agencies for help on its problem; press reports focused on the company’s approach to the NSA. Google’s was the sensible approach. Not only was NSA the sole government agency with the necessary expertise to aid the company after its systems had been exploited, it was also the right agency to be doing so. That seems especially ironic in light of the recent revelations by Edward Snowden over the extent of NSA surveillance, including, apparently, Google inter-data-center communications.2 The NSA has always had two functions: the well-known one of signals intelligence, known in the trade as SIGINT, and the lesser known one of communications security or COMSEC. The former became the subject of novels, histories of the agency, and legend. The latter has garnered much less attention. One example of the myriad one could pick is David Kahn’s seminal book on cryptography, The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet.3 It devotes fifty pages to NSA and SIGINT and only ten pages to NSA and COMSEC. -
A Study of Cryptographic File Systems in Userspace
Turkish Journal of Computer and Mathematics Education Vol.12 No.10 (2021), 4507-4513 Research Article A study of cryptographic file systems in userspace a b c d e f Sahil Naphade , Ajinkya Kulkarni Yash Kulkarni , Yash Patil , Kaushik Lathiya , Sachin Pande a Department of Information Technology PICT, Pune, India [email protected] b Department of Information Technology PICT, Pune, India [email protected] c Department of Information Technology PICT, Pune, India [email protected] d Department of Information Technology PICT, Pune, India [email protected] e Veritas Technologies Pune, India, [email protected] f Department of Information Technology PICT, Pune, India [email protected] Article History: Received: 10 January 2021; Revised: 12 February 2021; Accepted: 27 March 2021; Published online: 28 April 2021 Abstract: With the advancements in technology and digitization, the data storage needs are expanding; along with the data breaches which can expose sensitive data to the world. Thus, the security of the stored data is extremely important. Conventionally, there are two methods of storage of the data, the first being hiding the data and the second being encryption of the data. However, finding out hidden data is simple, and thus, is very unreliable. The second method, which is encryption, allows for accessing the data by only the person who encrypted the data using his passkey, thus allowing for higher security. Typically, a file system is implemented in the kernel of the operating systems. However, with an increase in the complexity of the traditional file systems like ext3 and ext4, the ones that are based in the userspace of the OS are now allowing for additional features on top of them, such as encryption-decryption and compression. -
4-BAY RACKMOUNT NAS Technical Specifications
4-BAY RACKMOUNT NAS Technical Specifications Operating System Seagate® NAS OS (embedded Linux) Number of Drive Bays 4 hot-swappable 3.5-inch SATA II/SATA III Processor Dual-core 2.13GHz Intel® 64-bit Atom™ processor Memory 2GB DDR III Networking Two (2) 10/100/1000 Base-TX (Gigabit Ethernet) • Two (2) USB 3.0 (rear) • Two (2) USB 2.0 (rear) External Ports • One (1) eSATA (rear) • One (1) USB 2.0 (front) Hard Drive Capacity Seagate NAS HDD 2TB, 3TB, 4TB for preconfigured models Total Capacity 4TB, 8TB, 12TB, 16TB Compatible Drives 3.5-inch SATA II or SATA III (see NAS Certified Drive list PDF for more details) Power 100V to 240V AC, 50/60Hz, 180W Power Supply and • Sleep mode for power saving • Scheduled power on/off Power Management • Wake-on-LAN Cooling Management Two (2) fans Transfer Rate 200MB/s reads and writes1 Network Protocols CIFS/SMB, NFS v3, AFP, HTTP(s), FTP, sFTP, iSCSI, Print serve, failover and load balancing and Services (LACP 802.3ad), Wuala file system integration (W:/ network drive), Active Directory™ • RAID 0, 1, 5, 6, 10 RAID • Hot spare • SimplyRAID™ technology with mixed capacity support, volume expansion and migration • Web-based interface through http/https • Hardware monitoring (S.M.A.R.T., casing cooling and temperature, CPU and RAM load) Management • Log management and email notification • NAS OS Installer for diskless setup, data recovery and restore to factory settings • Product discovery with Seagate Network Assistant 1 Tested in RAID 5 configuration utilizing load balancing for Ethernet ports. Actual performance may vary depending on system environment. -
The Application Usage and Risk Report an Analysis of End User Application Trends in the Enterprise
The Application Usage and Risk Report An Analysis of End User Application Trends in the Enterprise 8th Edition, December 2011 Palo Alto Networks 3300 Olcott Street Santa Clara, CA 94089 www.paloaltonetworks.com Table of Contents Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 3 Demographics ............................................................................................................................................. 4 Social Networking Use Becomes More Active ................................................................ 5 Facebook Applications Bandwidth Consumption Triples .......................................................................... 5 Twitter Bandwidth Consumption Increases 7-Fold ................................................................................... 6 Some Perspective On Bandwidth Consumption .................................................................................... 7 Managing the Risks .................................................................................................................................... 7 Browser-based Filesharing: Work vs. Entertainment .................................................... 8 Infrastructure- or Productivity-Oriented Browser-based Filesharing ..................................................... 9 Entertainment Oriented Browser-based Filesharing .............................................................................. 10 Comparing Frequency and Volume of Use -
Building Large-Scale Distributed Applications on Top of Self-Managing Transactional Stores
Building large-scale distributed applications on top of self-managing transactional stores June 3, 2010 Peter Van Roy with help from SELFMAN partners Overview Large-scale distributed applications Application structure: multi-tier with scalable DB backend Distribution structure: peer-to-peer or cloud-based DHTs and transactions Basics of DHTs Data replication and transactions Scalaris and Beernet Programming model and applications CompOz library and Kompics component model DeTransDraw and Distributed Wikipedia Future work Mobile applications, cloud computing, data-intensive computing Programming abstractions for large-scale distribution Application structure What can be a general architecture for large-scale distributed applications? Start with a database backend (e.g., IBM’s “multitier”) Make it distributed with distributed transactional interface Keep strong consistency (ACID properties) Allow large numbers of concurrent transactions Horizontal scalability is the key Vertical scalability is a dead end “NoSQL”: Buzzword for horizontally scalable databases that typically don’t have a complete SQL interface Key/value store or column-oriented ↑ our choice (simplicity) The NoSQL Controversy NoSQL is a current trend in non-relational databases May lack table schemas, may lack ACID properties, no join operations Main advantages are excellent performance, with good horizontal scalability and elasticity (ideal fit to clouds) SQL databases have good vertical scalability but are not elastic Often only weak consistency guarantees, such as eventual consistency (e.g., Google BigTable) Some exceptions: Cassandra also provides strong consistency, Scalaris and Beernet provide a key-value store with transactions and strong consistency Distribution structure Two main infrastructures for large-scale applications Peer-to-peer: use of client machines ← our choice (loosely coupled) Very popular style, e.g., BitTorrent, Skype, Wuala, etc. -
Mass Surveillance
Mass Surveillance Mass Surveillance What are the risks for the citizens and the opportunities for the European Information Society? What are the possible mitigation strategies? Part 1 - Risks and opportunities raised by the current generation of network services and applications Study IP/G/STOA/FWC-2013-1/LOT 9/C5/SC1 January 2015 PE 527.409 STOA - Science and Technology Options Assessment The STOA project “Mass Surveillance Part 1 – Risks, Opportunities and Mitigation Strategies” was carried out by TECNALIA Research and Investigation in Spain. AUTHORS Arkaitz Gamino Garcia Concepción Cortes Velasco Eider Iturbe Zamalloa Erkuden Rios Velasco Iñaki Eguía Elejabarrieta Javier Herrera Lotero Jason Mansell (Linguistic Review) José Javier Larrañeta Ibañez Stefan Schuster (Editor) The authors acknowledge and would like to thank the following experts for their contributions to this report: Prof. Nigel Smart, University of Bristol; Matteo E. Bonfanti PhD, Research Fellow in International Law and Security, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna Pisa; Prof. Fred Piper, University of London; Caspar Bowden, independent privacy researcher; Maria Pilar Torres Bruna, Head of Cybersecurity, Everis Aerospace, Defense and Security; Prof. Kenny Paterson, University of London; Agustín Martin and Luis Hernández Encinas, Tenured Scientists, Department of Information Processing and Cryptography (Cryptology and Information Security Group), CSIC; Alessandro Zanasi, Zanasi & Partners; Fernando Acero, Expert on Open Source Software; Luigi Coppolino,Università degli Studi di Napoli; Marcello Antonucci, EZNESS srl; Rachel Oldroyd, Managing Editor of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism; Peter Kruse, Founder of CSIS Security Group A/S; Ryan Gallagher, investigative Reporter of The Intercept; Capitán Alberto Redondo, Guardia Civil; Prof. Bart Preneel, KU Leuven; Raoul Chiesa, Security Brokers SCpA, CyberDefcon Ltd.; Prof. -
On Security and Privacy for Networked Information Society
Antti Hakkala On Security and Privacy for Networked Information Society Observations and Solutions for Security Engineering and Trust Building in Advanced Societal Processes Turku Centre for Computer Science TUCS Dissertations No 225, November 2017 ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR NETWORKED INFORMATIONSOCIETY Observations and Solutions for Security Engineering and Trust Building in Advanced Societal Processes antti hakkala To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences of the University of Turku, for public criticism in Auditorium XXII on November 18th, 2017, at 12 noon. University of Turku Department of Future Technologies FI-20014 Turun yliopisto 2017 supervisors Adjunct professor Seppo Virtanen, D. Sc. (Tech.) Department of Future Technologies University of Turku Turku, Finland Professor Jouni Isoaho, D. Sc. (Tech.) Department of Future Technologies University of Turku Turku, Finland reviewers Professor Tuomas Aura Department of Computer Science Aalto University Espoo, Finland Professor Olaf Maennel Department of Computer Science Tallinn University of Technology Tallinn, Estonia opponent Professor Jarno Limnéll Department of Communications and Networking Aalto University Espoo, Finland The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality assurance system using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service ISBN 978-952-12-3607-5 (Online) ISSN 1239-1883 To my wife Maria, I am forever grateful for everything. Thank you. ABSTRACT Our society has developed into a networked information soci- ety, in which all aspects of human life are interconnected via the Internet — the backbone through which a significant part of communications traffic is routed. This makes the Internet ar- guably the most important piece of critical infrastructure in the world. -
On the Security of Cloud Storage Services
FRAUNHOFER INSTITUTE FOR SECURE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ON THE SECURITY OF CLOUD Sharing of data was a problem for CloudMe, Dropbox, Team- Summary Individuals or companies considering to use cloud STORAGE SERVICES Drive and Wuala. Problems occur if fi les are shared with non- storage services are advised to check whether a cloud provider MANAGEMENT SUMMARY subscribers by a long, unpredictable URL. CloudMe does not meets these security requirements. obfuscate this URL adequately. Dropbox gives an unclear de- scription wrt to sharing details, TeamDrive is weak when disin- In addition, it is worthwhile to consider using more than one viting a group member and Wuala enables information gathe- service to reduce the impacts of service downtime. Further, ring by including the user name in public URLs. CloudMe does calculation of the time to recover all data from the cloud is re- not prevent search engines from accessing the workspace. commended. Depending on the individual amount of data, this may take several days. Having a plan for a provider Deduplication was a problem for Mozy and Wuala, because change in the future reduces the dependancy on a particular in some cases it is possible to ask the cloud storage provider provider (provider lock-in). This will be relevant, for example, if whether a fi le is already stored or not. the chosen provider is getting too expensive or is not longer compliant with governmental rules. As a major result, the stu- Data confi dentiality can be improved by users by encrypting dy shows that most of the analyzed cloud storage providers their data locally before uploading it to the cloud. -
As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tec
As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tec... https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/FEuXeA As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech Giants nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html By Gabriel J.X. Dance , Michael LaForgia and Nicholas Confessore December 19, 2018 For years, gave some of the world’s largest technology companies more intrusive access to users’ personal data than it has disclosed, effectively exempting those business partners from its usual privacy rules, according to internal records and interviews. The special arrangements are detailed in hundreds of pages of Facebook documents obtained by The New York Times. The records, generated in 2017 by the company’s internal system for tracking partnerships, provide the most complete picture yet of the social network’s data-sharing practices. They also underscore how personal data has become the most prized commodity of the digital age, traded on a vast scale by some of the most powerful companies in Silicon Valley and beyond. The exchange was intended to benefit everyone. Pushing for explosive growth, Facebook got more users, lifting its advertising revenue. Partner companies acquired features to make their products more attractive. Facebook users connected with friends across different devices and websites. But Facebook also assumed extraordinary power over the personal information of its 2.2 billion users — control it has wielded with little transparency or outside oversight. Facebook allowed Microsoft’s Bing search engine to see the names of virtually all Facebook users’ friends without consent, the records show, and gave Netflix and Spotify the ability to read Facebook users’ private messages. -
Lightweight Virtualization with Gobolinux' Runner
Lightweight virtualization with GoboLinux’ Runner Lucas C. Villa Real [email protected] About GoboLinux ● Alternative distribution born in 2002 ● Explores novel ideas in the Linux distribution ecosystem ● Introduces a rather diferent directory hierarchy How diferent? lucasvr@fedora ~] ls / bin dev home lib64 media opt root sbin sys usr boot etc lib lost+found mnt proc run srv tmp var lucasvr@fedora ~] ls /usr bin games include lib lib64 libexec local sbin share src tmp lucasvr@fedora ~] ls /usr/local bin etc games include lib lib64 libexec sbin share src lucasvr@gobolinux ~] ls / Data Mount Programs System Users GoboLinux File System Hierarchy /Programs Self-contained programs: no need for a package manager ~] ls /Programs AbsTk DifUtils GnuTLS Kerberos LibXML2 ACL Dit GoboHide Kmod LibXSLT Acpid DosFSTools GParted Lame Linux AGNClient E2FSProgs Gperf LCMS Linux-Firmware ALSA-Lib EFIBootMgr GPM Less Linux-PAM ALSA-Utils ELFUtils Grep LibDRM Lsof APR EncFS Grof LibEvdev Lua APR-Util ExFAT GRUB LibExif LuaRocks … /Programs Multiple versions of a given program can coexist ~] ls /Programs/GTK+ 2.24.22 2.24.30 3.10.6 3.21.4 Current Settings ~] ls /Programs/GTK+/2.24.22 bin doc include lib Resources share ~] ls /Programs/GTK+/2.24.22/bin gtk-builder-convert gtk-demo gtk-query-immodules2.0 gtk-update-icon-cache ~] ls /Programs/GTK+/2.24.30/bin gtk-builder-convert gtk-demo gtk-query-immodules2.0 gtk-update-icon-cache /Programs Easy to tell which fles belongs to which packages lucasvr@fedora ~] ls -l /bin/bash -rwxr-xr-x. 1 root root 1072008 -
Operating System Support for Run-Time Security with a Trusted Execution Environment
Operating System Support for Run-Time Security with a Trusted Execution Environment - Usage Control and Trusted Storage for Linux-based Systems - by Javier Gonz´alez Ph.D Thesis IT University of Copenhagen Advisor: Philippe Bonnet Submitted: January 31, 2015 Last Revision: May 30, 2015 ITU DS-nummer: D-2015-107 ISSN: 1602-3536 ISBN: 978-87-7949-302-5 1 Contents Preface8 1 Introduction 10 1.1 Context....................................... 10 1.2 Problem....................................... 12 1.3 Approach...................................... 14 1.4 Contribution.................................... 15 1.5 Thesis Structure.................................. 16 I State of the Art 18 2 Trusted Execution Environments 20 2.1 Smart Cards.................................... 21 2.1.1 Secure Element............................... 23 2.2 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)......................... 23 2.3 Intel Security Extensions.............................. 26 2.3.1 Intel TXT.................................. 26 2.3.2 Intel SGX.................................. 27 2.4 ARM TrustZone.................................. 29 2.5 Other Techniques.................................. 32 2.5.1 Hardware Replication........................... 32 2.5.2 Hardware Virtualization.......................... 33 2.5.3 Only Software............................... 33 2.6 Discussion...................................... 33 3 Run-Time Security 36 3.1 Access and Usage Control............................. 36 3.2 Data Protection................................... 39 3.3 Reference