SPECIAL REPORT SERIES
THE CARTER CENTER
WAGING PEACE
◆
FIGHTING DISEASE
◆
BUILDING HOPE
OBSERVING THE 1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR OBSERVING THE 1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR
FINAL REPORT
DEMOCRACY PROGRAM THE CARTER CENTER ONE COPENHILL ATLANTA, GA 30307 (404) 420-5188 FAX (404) 420-5196 WWW.CARTERCENTER.ORG
JUNE 2000 THE CARTER CENTER
OBSERVING THE 1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR
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OBSERVING THE 1999 PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS IN EAST TIMOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EAST TIMOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION OBSERVERS AND STAFF 4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6
FOREWORD 7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EAST TIMOR 11
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 14
PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS 15 May 5 Agreement The Role of the United Nations Indonesian Military and Police Pro-integration Militias Falintil
CARTER CENTER OBSERVER METHODOLOGY 20 Personnel Geographic Coverage Schedule Research Methods Methods of Influence
MAJOR FINDINGS 28
CONSULTATION AFTERMATH AND OPPORTUNITIES 34 Democratic Assessment Trip
CONCLUSION 36
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 38
APPENDICES 40 Sample Ballot Polling Day Checklists Selected News Articles Press Releases Weekly Public Reports #1-12
ABOUT THE CARTER CENTER 86
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EAST TIMOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION OBSERVERS AND STAFF
LONG-TERM OBSERVERS
Annette Clear, Ph.D. candidate, Political Science, Columbia University, USA Matthew Easton, Independent Consultant for Policy Research, Human Rights, and the Environment, USA Gillian Flies, Co-director, Carter Center Observation Project in East Timor, USA Sophie Khan, Masters student, International Intercultural Management, School for International Training, Canada Nancy Lutz, Associate Professor, Anthropology, Southern Illinois University, USA John MacDougall, Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, Princeton University, USA Brent Preston, Co-director, Carter Center Observation Project in East Timor, Canada Frederick Rawski, J.D. candidate, New York University School of Law, and Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, State University of New York-Buffalo, USA
SHORT-TERM OBSERVERS
James Clad, Professor, Southeast Asian Studies, Georgetown University, and Director, Cambridge Energy Research Associates, New Zealand/USA Donald Emmerson, Professor, Political Science and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, and Associate, Stanford University Asia/Pacific Research Center, USA James Fox, Professor, Anthropology, and Director, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, USA Catherine Green, Ph.D. candidate, History, University of California, Los Angeles, USA David Hicks, Professor, Anthropology, and Chair, Anthropology Department, State University of New York, Stony Brook, USA Andrea Molnar, Assistant Professor, Anthropology, and Associate, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, Canada
CARTER CENTER STAFF
Douglas Archard, Diplomat-In-Residence, The Carter Center, USA Vincent Barnes, Intern, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, UK Charles Costello, Director, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USA Rachel Fowler, Program Coordinator, Democracy Program, The Carter Center, USA Kirk Wolcott, Program Coordinator, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center, USA
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KIRK WOLCOTT
Carter Center East Timor Mission Leader Charles Costello, standing at map, discusses deployment plans with observers and staff at The Carter Center office in Dili.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABRI Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
ASDT Association of Timorese Social Democrats
CNRT National Council of Timorese Resistance
Falintil Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor
Fretilin Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
INTERFET U.N.-sponsored International Force for East Timor
Kopassus Indonesian Special Forces Command
LTOs Carter Center Long-Term Observers
MPR Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly
Polri Indonesia Police Force
STOs Carter Center Short-Term Observers
TNI Indonesia National Armed Forces (from April 1999)
UDT Timorese Democratic Union
UN United Nations
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor
USAID United States Agency for International Development
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FOREWORD
ug. 30, 1999, was an extraordinary Although, technically, the United Nations treated the day for the people of East Timor. public consultation as part of the decolonization process After a long history of colonization from Portugal, the precedent of East Timor has broader ap- and external domination, they finally plicability. It stands for the proposition that the interna- were able to cast free ballots to deter- tional community will not allow wholesale, gross violations Amine their territory’s future. In the face of continuing vio- of human rights and denial of self-determination for a forc- lent repression designed to subvert the balloting, the ibly occupied people to be justified by a dominant power’s Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence. Their claims of national sovereignty. vote, however, came at a very high price. The experience in East Timor raises issues for those After the results of the United Nations-sponsored who work to protect human rights and support the right to “public consultation” were announced, East Timorese pro- self-determination in the decolonization process. Perhaps integration militia – supported by the Indonesian military foremost among them is whether the entire exercise was – embarked on a full-scale, deliberate campaign of vio- worth the Timorese people’s loss and suffering. lence. Hundreds of lives were lost, and families were forced East Timor’s vote for independence came at a great to flee into the mountains to neighboring West Timor and cost. The extensive post-consultation destruction was other areas of Indonesia. shocking and overwhelming. Consequently, East Timor While their homes, schools, and workplaces were now faces the formidable task of rebuilding both its physi- looted and burned, East Timorese refugees in West Timor cal infrastructure and social fabric. Although reconstruc- continued to suffer from harassment and intimidation by tion is slow, important progress is being made. Homes, the militia. The depth of the destruction in East Timor schools, and government buildings are being rebuilt. Com- shocked the world community and cast a dark cloud over munities are reuniting. the consultation process. East Timor’s transition offers an unprecedented oppor- There are several important lessons that the interna- tunity to design and build a democratic society. Timorese tional community can learn from this terrible experience. political and civil society leaders have expressed their com- The most critical relates to the security arrangement for mitment to creating an independent state grounded firmly the public consultation stipulated in the May 5 Agree- on democratic values. The international community ment. Allowing the Indonesian military to retain complete should assist the Timorese in reaching this goal. responsibility for security during the public consultation But, again, the question: Was it all worth it? Time and process was a serious flaw that opened the door to subse- again came the same response from the Timorese: “They quent problems. In retrospect, the international commu- have been killing us for decades, so this was nothing new, nity should have included a provision that allowed a multi- and it was what we expected from them. But now we are national force to have joint responsibility for security or free, and it is worth the sacrifice.” We must respect that take responsibility, according to defined criteria, if the gov- courage. ■ ernment of Indonesia proved unable or unwilling to fulfill its obligation to maintain security. Some people have questioned why so much attention and resources have been diverted to such a small territory.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
he May 1998 departure of Indonesian tion would be paid to the security climate, given the his- President Suharto, following a 32-year dic- tory of repression, intimidation, and violence in the terri- tatorship, raised hopes of independence for tory. The methodology used was regular fact finding East Timor, where some 200,000 people throughout East Timor on necessary preconditions for a had died since Indonesia’s 1975 invasion of free and fair ballot and the release of a series of weekly pub- Tthe Portuguese colony. In January 1999, Suharto’s succes- lic reports. sor, Bucharuddin Jusuf (B.J.) Habibie, in an effort to ap- The Center was concerned less with the actual vote, pease the East Timorese and international community, sug- which the United Nations would administer, than with gested that a vote would be held on autonomy with or in- monitoring and casting world attention on the political dependence from Indonesia. Details of this referendum climate and any human rights violations prior to balloting. were set forward in the May 5 Agreement, signed by Indo- As President Carter said in the July 8 press statement an- nesia, Portugal, and nouncing the ob- YURIAH TANZIL the United Nations. server mission, The Carter “True democracy Center’s involvement requires that people in East Timor began be allowed to cast in June 1999. Presi- their votes freely dent Carter, leading and without intimi- an international ob- dation or coercion.” server mission for All information Indonesia’s parlia- in the Center’s mentary elections, weekly reports was met with East gathered through Timorese leader José direct observation Alexandre “Xanana” or reliable eyewit- Gusmao, then under Carter Center involvement in East Timor began in June 1999, when ness accounts. President and Mrs. Carter, meeting here with President and Mrs. B.J. house arrest, serving These reports pro- Habibie, co-led an international delegation to monitor Indonesia’s parlia- a 20-year sentence mentary elections. vided information for subversion. Re- to the United Na- sponding to Gusmao’s request for international observers to tions, other policy-makers, and the press about human monitor East Timor’s ballot, and with President Habibie’s rights abuses in East Timor and Indonesia’s failure to up- support and official U.N. approval, The Carter Center hold the May 5 Agreement. Carter Center observers also opened an office in East Timor’s capital of Dili on July 4. were among those who publicly cited Indonesia for actively By mid-July, the Center had deployed eight long-term supporting, arming, and directing the armed pro-integra- observers to East Timor. The purpose of the Center’s mis- tion militias that led a campaign of fear and violence sion was to help ensure that the public consultation pro- throughout East Timor. cess was conducted fairly and transparently. Special atten- Based on this first-hand reporting, President Carter in
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RACHEL FOWLER
Nearly 99 percent of East Timor’s eligible voters cast ballots, many of them overcoming great fear and distances, to vote overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia. early August urged President Habibie to halt the militia served voting in 27 subdistricts and 43 of the 700 polling activity in East Timor. In a public statement, President stations across the territory. Carter said, “Some top representatives of the government At a Sept. 1 press conference, the Center delivered a of Indonesia have consistently failed to fulfill their main statement that both applauded the massive voter turnout obligations with respect to public order and security, and in and urged Indonesia to prevent new violence in the days many cases, have actively sought to undermine the popular before and after the announcement of results. The state- consultation process.” ment noted that the public consultation process, while In late August, Carter Center long-term observers marred by pre-ballot violence, was well administered by were joined by nine short-term observers and Carter Cen- the United Nations and allowed the people of East Timor ter staff members with experience managing election obser- to exercise their right to self-determination at the polls. vation missions. The full observer team continued to re- The United Nations announced the results on Sept. 4, port on pre-balloting conditions, especially the high level which revealed that 78.5 percent of East Timorese voters of intimidation and harassment perpetrated predominately had rejected autonomy. Within hours of the announcement, by Indonesia-backed, pro-integration militias. the pro-integration militias began a burning, looting, mur- For the Aug. 30 ballot, a 15-person Carter Center ob- dering, and raping rampage. Some 400,000 people, or half of servation team monitored the vote, in which nearly 99 per- East Timor’s population, were displaced, either fleeing to the cent of East Timor’s 450,000 registered voters went to the hills or across the border into West Timor, as their homes polls. Many of the voters, including old men and women, and most public buildings were torched. President Carter walked miles the previous day, putting aside their personal said in a statement, “The failure by the Indonesian govern- fears to cast their ballots. On polling day, Carter Center ment to take strong, swift action to stop the escalating vio- delegates visited seven of East Timor’s 13 districts and ob- lence of these lightly armed militias is inexplicable.”
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The three remaining Carter Center personnel and lo- releases. These documents detailed several major findings, cal staff were forced to evacuate Dili the following day after including: attacks against some of them by armed pro-integration mi- ✔ The results of the popular consultation reflect the will litia members and Indonesian policemen. Two days later, of East Timor’s people and demonstrate the overwhelming the Center’s staff residence and office was looted, and then preference for independence from Indonesia. burned to the ground by militia and the Indonesian mili- tary (TNI) troops. ✔ The United Nations Mission in East Timor The violence, which resulted in the deaths of perhaps (UNAMET) administered the vote in an unbiased, trans- hundreds, did not stop until the U.N.-sponsored, Austra- parent, and professional manner. lian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) ✔ TNI created, supported, directed, funded, and armed was deployed Sept. 20. Security conditions improved pro-integration militias in an attempt to influence the out- greatly thereafter, yet an estimated 170,000 Timorese refu- come of the popular consultation through violence and gees remained through December in camps in West Timor intimidation. and elsewhere in Indonesia. Here, they suffered disease, hunger, and continued intimidation and violence from the ✔ The Indonesian government, TNI, and the militias pro-integration militias and Indonesian military. bear primary responsibility for the fear and violence that After their evacuation, Carter Center observers con- prevailed during the public consultation process. tinued to collect information and release weekly public ✔ The Indonesian police failed to maintain law and or- reports from several locations in Indonesia and Darwin, der and in many cases actively colluded with violent pro- Australia. The Center re-established an office in Dili in integration groups. late October to complete its observation work and prepare for a December assessment mission to identify specific areas ✔ The TNI, police, and local government officials ac- in which the Center or others might assist East Timor dur- tively campaigned and provided resources in support of the ing its transition to full independence. integration option. The Carter Center’s experience in East Timor raises ✔ International observers, UNAMET staff, foreign diplo- many important questions for the institution and other or- mats, and international journalists were threatened and ganizations, including the United Nations, to consider as intimidated by TNI soldiers, police, and militia members other regions around the world struggle for their indepen- before and after the vote. dence. For instance, was the United Nations correct to pursue East Timor’s public consultation, knowing that vio- ✔ Refugees faced harassment, intimidation, and violence lence was present and likely to increase? What steps should in Indonesia-ruled West Timor and other parts of Indonesia the United Nations or others take to ensure that govern- after they fled or were forced out of East Timor. ments meet their obligations in similar situations in the future and what if those governments refuse to comply? A more comprehensive account of these findings ap- What role should international observers and other outsid- pears later in this report, following a brief historical over- ers play? view of East Timor and a detailed description of the meth- In all, The Carter Center’s observation mission pro- odology used by Carter Center observers throughout the duced 11 weekly public reports from July 4 through Oct. 6, public consultation process. This report concludes with an 1999, an equal number of internal confidential reports pro- assessment of post-ballot needs and opportunities as East vided to U.N., U.S., and Indonesia officials, and five press Timor makes its transition to full independence. ■
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EAST TIMOR
he history of East Timor – roughly one half region’s colonial governor allowed citizens to organize their of a small island off the northern coast of own political parties, which only strengthened East Australia with some 800,000 people – is Timorese desires for self-rule. In late 1975, Portugal’s au- full of dominance and repression by outside thoritarian government was overthrown, and three weeks forces. From 1512, when Portuguese sailors later East Timor began to de-colonize. Tfirst reached the island, until 1975, East Timor was ruled as Local nascent political associations played an impor- a Portuguese colony, prized for its sandalwood, coffee, and tant role in shaping East Timor’s future. The most promi- value as a trading route post in the Orient, with a brief pe- nent ones were the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) riod of Japanese occupation during World War II. The past and the Association of Timorese Social Democrats quarter century, Indonesia ruled the territory after its (ASDT), which was renamed the Revolutionary Front for armed forces forc- an Independent DWIGHT KING ibly invaded, and East Timor in 1976, annexed (Fretilin). UDT East Timor as its favored a contin- 27th province. ued association During the with Portugal and 19th and 20th cen- sought a more pro- turies, the Portu- gressive style of guese and Dutch, autonomy, whereas who had colonized ASDT members many of the neigh- voiced fiercely pro- boring islands, independence aspi- struggled for con- rations. The trol of Timor, until Timorese Popular in 1914 they Democratic Asso- signed an agree- ciation, Apodeti, ment to partition Nobel Peace Laureate Jose Ramos-Horta (left, wearing glasses) returns to established with the island to its East Timor in December 1999 for the first time since 1975, having support of the In- present day bor- championed the independence cause around the world for 24 years. donesian govern- ders. During World ment, favored the War II, Japan ignored Portugal’s neutrality and overran the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. island, killing thousands of Timorese. After a four-year war Strong relations between ASDT and UDT from Janu- to end Dutch colonial control, the independent state of ary to May 1975 deteriorated until fighting eventually Indonesia was born, and the western half of Timor became broke out in August between the two groups. Fretilin won part of the new nation in 1949. this brief conflict in late September and declared East Meanwhile, East Timor remained a Portuguese colony, Timor’s independence from Portugal on Nov. 28, but self- despite decades of agitation for independence. In 1974, the rule was short-lived.
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DWIGHT KING
The 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, in which Indonesia troops murdered 250 unarmed civilians during a funeral at this Dili cemetery, helped garner world attention for East Timor.
On Dec. 7, Indonesia invaded in a full-scale military diately, but Indonesia refused. effort to overtake Dili. Tens of thousands of people were By the end of the 1980s, more than 200,000 people killed over the next six months, most of them directly by had died from disease, famine, and continued Indonesian the Indonesian military. Indonesian troops numbered attacks. While numbers vary, some sources claim that as 15,000 to 20,000 against the vastly under-manned and out- much as one-third of East Timor’s population was killed gunned military wing of Fretilin, the Armed Forces for the and a larger number displaced from their homes. Neverthe- National Liberation of East Timor (Falintil), which still less, East Timorese forces continued to wage guerilla at- inflicted high casualties on Indonesian soldiers. tacks, mainly from the island’s steep interior mountains, The United Nations and all Western countries, except and resisted acceptance of Indonesian rule. Australia, condemned Indonesia’s annexation of East In 1981, the United Nations issued a resolution calling Timor and continued to recognize the territory as a Portu- for the independence of East Timor, and beginning in guese colony. The United States, which viewed Indonesia 1982, successive U.N. Secretaries-General held regular as an important Cold War ally, tempered its actual tacit talks with Indonesia and Portugal to resolve the territory’s approval of the annexation with a recommendation for an status. However, while human rights groups around the act of self-determination for East Timor. The U.N. Security world continued to monitor and report on the situation, Council called upon Indonesia to remove its troops imme- East Timor remained a relatively minor issue in interna-
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tional affairs until two events in the 1990s captured world the other Indonesian territories calling for self-rule. attention. The East Timorese diaspora, long fractured by partisan The first was the Santa Cruz massacre of Nov. 12, disagreements and jealousies, anticipated the changes in 1991, when Indonesian troops shot mourners at a funeral Jakarta and came together in Portugal in 1998 to form the in Dili, killing some 250 unarmed civilians. Investigations National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). The into this incident and increased U.N. activity placed East CNRT elected a slate of individuals who intended to rejoin Timor more prominently on the international arena. The resistance fighters inside East Timor to govern their home- second event was the awarding of the 1996 Nobel Peace land. They chose Gusmao, the Fretilin guerilla leader cap- Prize to two East Timorese – pro-independence supporters tured and imprisoned by Indonesia in 1992, as president, Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the Catholic leader in and Ramos-Horta, in exile since 1975, as vice president. Dili, and Jose Ramos-Horta, a staunch activist in exile. In January 1999, Suharto’s successor and long-time The Asian economic crisis that began in 1997 struck associate B.J. Habibie offered East Timor a vote on accept- Indonesia particularly hard, adding instability to a nation ing autonomy within Indonesia or rejecting it as a prelude that faced at least seven localized insurrections. In May to independence. Under the May 5 Agreement, Indonesia 1998, President Suharto relinquished his 32-year grip on pledged to provide security in East Timor during a non- power amid a crumbling economy, student protests, and binding public consultation voting process to be adminis- urban riots. His departure prompted appeals for a new and tered by the United Nations. The offer also led to an up- more flexible attitude toward East Timor, whose unique surge in violence, as pro-integration, and to a lesser extent, history, use of the Portuguese language, and mainly Catho- pro-independence factions, launched attacks aimed at lic rather than Muslim religious faith differentiated it from swaying the results of the public consultation. ■
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1999 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
January 27 Habibie offers East Timor possibility of autonomy or independence
February 24 Pro-integration militia attack Catholic parish in Liquica, 25 people killed
April 17 Pro-integration militias go on a rampage in Dili, 20 people killed 21 Pro-integration and pro-independence leaders sign pact to end violence
May 5 Indonesia, Portugal, and U.N. sign Agreement on the Public Consultation 16 Pro-Indonesia militia attacks Atara village, southwest of Dili, 15 killed
June 8 President Carter visits East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao in prison
July 4 Carter Center opens office in Dili, begins public reporting initiative 16 Voter registration begins inside and outside East Timor
August 8 Voter registration ends; initial polling day delayed over security concerns 14 Two-week campaigning period begins; murders, house burnings follow 30 Polling day: Nearly 99 percent of registered voters cast ballots
September 4 U.N. announces results: 78.5 percent of East Timorese vote for independence; Indonesia-backed militias begin campaign of terror 6 Militias kill 39 people in Bacau; Bishop Carlos Belo flees territory; Carter Center staff forced to evacuate the day before 20 INTERFET peacekeeping troops arrive to stabilize East Timor
October 19 MPR passes decree that recognizes results of the Aug. 30 ballot 22 Gusmao returns to East Timor after seven years in an Indonesian prison 25 U.N. establishes 11,000-staff UNTAET to administer territory 30 All remaining Indonesian soldiers depart East Timor
December 1 Jose Ramos-Horta returns to East Timor after 24 years in exile 12 Gusmao meets pro-integration militia leaders to discuss reconciliation
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PUBLIC CONSULTATION PROCESS
MAY 5 AGREEMENT ACCEPT: Do you accept the proposed special au- n New York on May 5, 1999, representatives of the tonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the governments of Indonesia and Portugal and U.N. Republic of Indonesia? ISecretary-General Kofi Annan signed an agreement OR that created the legal framework for the popular consulta- REJECT: Do you reject the proposed special au- tion process. The May 5 Agreement on Modalities for the tonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separa- Popular Consultation initially set the date for the ballot, tion from Indonesia? both inside and outside East Timor, for Aug. 8, 1999. Due to poor security in the territory, Annan was forced twice to The May 5 Agreement stipulated that the Indonesian delay the ballot until it was eventually held Aug. 30. authorities would be responsible for “ensuring a secure en- Under the terms of the agreement and its appendices, vironment for a free and fair popular consultation process the public consultation was not technically a referendum and will be responsible for the security of the United Na- on independence but rather a vote for or against autonomy, tions personnel.” The U.N. security guards that were de-
RACHEL FOWLER
Indonesian police officers stand by at a polling site in Liquica on ballot day, one of the few days during the public consul- tation process that the police fulfilled their obligations in East Timor. the results of which would need to be ratified by ployed to East Timor and the international civil police Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) before corps sent to advise the Indonesian police during the op- becoming final. The question put before the voters read as erational phase of the popular consultation were forbidden follows: from carrying firearms.
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KIRK WOLCOTT
The Carter Center and other observers noted serious flaws in the May 5 Agreement. For one, Indo- nesia was granted complete control of security in the very territory it had forcibly occupied. The Indone- sian government also was required to remain neutral in its actions with respect to the ballot ques- tions. However, not only did Indone- sia fail to provide adequate security, elements within the Indonesian security forces, perhaps at the high- est levels, actively backed the pro- integration militias in their efforts to make the independence option fail. This security arrangement also prevented the earlier deployment of international peacekeepers who might have saved lives before and immediately after the vote. A second major flaw in the A young boy eyes a poster demonstrating voting procedures near East Timor’s agreement came in providing the border with Indonesian West Timor. MPR with the final authority on ratifying East Timor’s indepen- tainable at the time and desperately wanting the popular dence, rather than establishing a referendum from the out- vote. Having lived through the previous three decades of set. Given Indonesia’s concern over allowing any part of authoritarian rule, and not knowing what Indonesia’s up- the country to break away, there was no guarantee it would coming elections might bring, the CNRT and other East honor the ballot’s results. Timorese eagerly sought the opportunity to vote even un- This clause contributed to the intimidation and vio- der the conditions they were granted. lence committed by pro-integration militias, which oper- ated under the assumption that a close vote tally would THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS give the MPR a pretext for denying independence. Ulti- mately, the MPR, under considerable pressure from other n June 11, the United Nations Mission in East countries and international financial institutions, did Timor (UNAMET) was established to supervise honor the results, which were overwhelmingly in favor of Othe registration, campaigning, voting, and independence. counting activities. Among its many responsibilities, The CNRT privately concurred with the May 5 UNAMET disseminated and explained the content of the Agreement, in spite of its flaws, considering it the best at- May 5 Agreement, provided educational materials to vot-
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ers, and conducted voter registration inside and outside were determined not to relinquish a small territory where East Timor. UNAMET also proposed a code of conduct for many of them had served for years and seen fellow officers the campaign, administered balloting at approximately 700 and soldiers injured and killed. In addition, the Indonesian polling stations in 200 polling centers, transported and military and police officers living in East Timor wanted to counted the ballots after the vote, and determined and an- remain in the territory, where they wielded power and in- nounced the results. fluence. UNAMET adopted a unique procedure for counting Polri, which, since the founding of the Republic of Indo- the votes. To minimize acts of retribution by pro-integra- nesia had been a component of ABRI, now became a separate tion or pro-independence supporters against voters in a entity from the military. This separation enabled TNI to given village or polling district, all ballots were mixed to- claim, as stated in the May 5 Agreement, that “the police gether and then counted at UNAMET headquarters in [are] solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order” Dili. In addition, only one overall vote tally was recorded in East Timor, thereby freeing the military to carry out its and announced for the public consultation rather than sev- campaign in support of integration. At the same time, TNI eral tallies for each level of the process (i.e., polling sta- was able to disclaim responsibility for public security. It also tion, center, district, state, national), as is the case in most created considerable apprehension in Polri, which was reluc- elections around the world. tant to contradict or challenge the powerful TNI. This procedure required UNAMET officials to seal While Carter Center observers noted that the police and store the cast but uncounted ballots overnight and asserted their authority for establishing security in some transport them via truck or helicopter back to Dili the day instances, they also observed that the police responded tar- after the vote. This created opportunities for disruption of dily or remained passive in other instances. When violence the vote. In one instance, pro-integration militias in broke out, the police frequently stood by without acting or, Gleno, a town some 20 miles southwest of Dili, attacked a in many cases, actively assisted the perpetrators of the vio- UNAMET convoy carrying ballot boxes back to Dili. Two lent acts. In its Weekly Report No. 4, covering Aug. 2-8, local East Timorese working for UNAMET were killed in The Carter Center stated, “The Indonesian police have the clash. consistently failed to take the steps necessary to maintain law and order, and in some cases have colluded with pro- INDONESIAN MILITARY AND POLICE integration militias.” The Carter Center also stressed in its reports how the n April 1999, the Indonesian military changed its Indonesian government and TNI violated the May 5 name from ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Agreement, including: IIndonesia) to TNI to signal a split from the national ✔ Active support and direction of the armed pro-integra- police, Polri. TNI, like ABRI before it, however, remained tion militias, who were creating a climate of fear and in- strongly committed to protecting the unity of the country timidation. and keeping East Timor from breaking away. ✔ Active campaigning for the integration option, includ- TNI’s generals, led by Indonesian Armed Forces Com- ing providing resources and support to pro-integration mander General Wiranto, feared a “domino effect,” in groups. which a vote for independence in East Timor would set in ✔ Failure to fulfil its commitment to re-deploy TNI motion similar movements across Indonesia’s many con- troops and continuing to maintain posts in villages tentious islands. After President Suharto’s fall, the generals throughout East Timor. wanted to show that they remained firmly in control; they ✔ Threats of bloodshed and war if the autonomy option
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was rejected. and international observers. Militia members also burned ✔ Harassment of observers and local East Timorese staff. houses, drove thousands of East Timorese into the hills or across the border into West Timor, and threatened to start PRO-INTEGRATION MILITIAS a civil war if integration failed.
s part of its strategy to integrate East Timor into FALANTIL Indonesia, the TNI established, trained, and A supported armed pro-integration militias to hile TNI and pro-integration militias were threaten and intimidate pro-independence leaders and sup- responsible for the large majority of violence porters. Militias were not new to East Timor; they existed Win East Timor before the ballot, and practi- during the Portuguese colonial period, fighting for East cally all of it afterwards, pro-independence supporters were Timorese independence. One group formed as early as 1975 also guilty of a certain number of beatings and killings. and other later groups were established as pro-Indonesian Pro-integration supporters claimed that Falintil, the mili- forces by President Suharto’s son-in-law, General Prabowo tary wing of Fretilin and later the CNRT, was directing a Subianto, when he was a local commander in the early campaign to ensure independence that included threaten- 1980s. ing pro-integration sup- Around the time of porters and immigrants the announcement to On April 21, TNI, Falintil, and pro-integration from other islands to hold a public consulta- leaders agreed to end the violence in East Timor. leave the territory. tion, a rapid growth in Pro-independence gath- pro-Jarkarta militias be- erings sometimes turned gan. While militia membership represented a relatively violent. A campaign rally held in Dili in the days before small percentage of East Timor’s overall population, a core the vote resulted in the deaths of two civilians who were of 15 militia groups, and perhaps an equal number of killed by pro-independence supporters. smaller factions, built strong networks with wide spheres of On April 21, TNI, Falintil, and pro-integration leaders influence and significant local power. agreed to end the violence in East Timor. Three accords, The militias tended to be based in Dili and in the dis- signed by pro-independence leaders Gusmao and Leandro tricts along East Timor’s western border, yet few areas were Issac and by pro-integration leaders Joao Tavares and spared from their wrath. To bolster their numbers, the mili- Domingo Soares, stipulated that all weapons would be tia leaders recruited members from ordinary peasants, in- handed over to the Indonesian police between June 20 and cluding older men and boys. Militia leaders also forced pro- July 5. independence supporters, using intimidation and death On June 19, after repeated acts of TNI and militia vio- threats, to join pro-integration militias and take part in lence, Gusmao said that TNI must close down its posts in their activities. East Timor and confine its soldiers to the barracks before UNAMET and many observers accused the militias of he would hand over any weapons. Falintil held on to its killing, torture, disappearances, and sexual violence against weapons, yet agreed to a cantonment of its troops, who re- pro-independence leaders and supporters, as well as harass- frained from using their arms throughout the public consul- ment and violence against UNAMET officials, local staff, tation process. ■
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Children stand among the remains of their home in the village of Memo, where pro-integration militias killed two people and burned 22 houses three days before the vote.
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CARTER CENTER OBSERVER METHODOLOGY
he situation in East Timor required The the field for six weeks before the vote. While many elec- Carter Center to develop an observation tion missions require a presence months ahead of the vot- methodology unique to the circumstances ing day to ensure a free and fair process, this presence gen- of the public consultation process. To be erally includes Carter Center staff or partner organizations, effective in East Timor’s tense political cli- or takes the form of a pre-election mission of limited dura- Tmate, under insecure conditions, and in a small territory tion. For East Timor, the observers benefited from their with a limited in- sustained pres- RACHEL FOWLER frastructure, re- ence in the field quired an observa- by gaining a bet- tion mission that ter understanding began well before of the immediate the ballot, was political situation field-intensive, in- on the ground cluded a high fre- and building trust quency of report- with sources who ing, and had an provided key in- explicit link be- formation that tween elections added impact to and human rights. the real-time Early place- weekly reports. ment of observers: Field-inten- The Carter Center sive: Each week opened its office in the eight long- Dili on July 4, Carter Center East Timor Mission Director Charles Costello and a local staff term observers member meet with internally displaced people in the hills in Ermera District. nearly two weeks broke into teams before the July 16-Aug. 6 registration process began. This of two for fact-finding field trips across East Timor. During date was chosen to report comprehensively on the entire the week, the teams reported their preliminary findings consultation process, including the start of registration, back to the Dili headquarters, using satellite phones when rather than merely observing the vote on polling day. standard telephones were unavailable or not functioning. Gathering all information through direct observations or Each weekend, the teams returned to Dili to compile and by reliable eyewitness accounts, coupled with reporting draft the weekly public reports. East Timor’s small size al- throughout the entire consultation process, earned the lowed four teams of observers to conduct extensive cover- Center a high level of respect as a reliable, neutral, and age across the entire territory (except for the small nearby nonpartisan actor, and contributed to reports that received island of Atauro and the enclave of Oecussi in West wide local and international attention. Timor).1 The East Timor mission was unique for the Center Many observers were proficient in Bahasa Indonesian partly because it involved volunteer observers traveling in (the language familiar to most East Timorese) and familiar
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KIRK WOLCOTT with East Timorese po- security. litical history, as well as Human rights and de- possessed expertise on mocracy link: As part of human rights and demo- its overall mission, The cratic elections. This en- Carter Center seeks ways abled them to identify to incorporate human the most critical places rights into all of its pro- to visit and people to grams, including its eco- meet with, as well as to nomic development, know what questions to conflict resolution, and ask to elicit the most use- democracy initiatives. ful information. While The East Timor Public East Timor’s small size Consultation initiative was an advantage, the presented the Center the mountainous terrain and opportunity to explore poor roads meant that further the explicit link- these teams were not able ages between human Villagers describe for Carter Center long-term observer Sophie rights and democracy, to reach full coverage to Khan how pro-integration militia members killed a man the all areas. previous day in this house in Memo. and to address legitimate Frequent reporting: concerns that the human East Timor’s turbulent history, along with the flaws in the rights of voters before and on voting day would be violated. May 5 Agreement that entrusted Indonesia with security, The history of persistent and gross violations of human pointed to a high likelihood of violence and coercion in rights in East Timor, including torture, extrajudicial execu- the run-up to the vote. On the other hand, Indonesia’s tions, and various forms of intimidation and harassment, heavy reliance on economic aid, especially in the after- raised serious questions whether the pre-electoral environ- math of its financial collapse of 1997, made the govern- ment would be safe and conducive to genuinely democratic ment highly sensitive to international opinion. The Carter elections. A comprehensive, sustained, and explicit exami- Center determined that a series of public statements from a nation of human rights violations and intimidation in the neutral organization well respected for its human rights run-up to the elections was required. The Carter Center record would benefit the public consultation process. determined that an intensive human rights fact-finding, By establishing an early presence and reporting fre- documentation, and public reporting initiative was the quently, the Center helped draw attention to human rights best approach to assess and publicize pre-electoral condi- abuses in East Timor and Indonesia’s failure to uphold the tions so that the United Nations and others could respond May 5 Agreement. The first-hand reports enabled Presi- appropriately. dent Carter to make well-timed interventions when the With this in mind, long-term observers with specific public consultation process appeared to be in jeopardy. In human rights experience, in addition to regional and elec- mid-August, he urged President Habibie, first through pri- tion expertise, were chosen. Observer orientations in- vate correspondence and then through a press statement cluded specific training on relevant human rights prin- that received wide international press coverage, to halt the ciples and information-gathering techniques. In addition, militia activity in East Timor and ensure public order and the observer teams developed a reporting format that in-
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cluded specific headings for relevant categories of human The Short-Term Observers (STOs) had similar back- rights, including freedom from intimidation and harass- grounds and language abilities, and included more senior ment, and for the rights of internally displaced scholars with longer experience in the region. Three Carter persons. Center staff members arrived with the STOs in late August, The Carter Center devised a system of observation bringing considerable understanding of the Center’s opera- that included a carefully planned selection of personnel, tions and experience managing international observation mis- geographic coverage, scheduling, research strategy, and sions. A local staff of interpreters, drivers, and office personnel methods of influence throughout the public consultation provided critical skills and demonstrated a high level of per- process. This system is described below: formance at considerable personal risk.
PERSONNEL GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE
he Long-Term Observers (LTOs) included schol- he LTOs deployed in teams of two each week to ars and practitioners with language skills and ex- one of three regions: the western districts Tperience in the region, plus field directors chosen T(Bobonaro and Ermera); the southwest region for their expertise in organizing observation missions, in- (Covalima, Same, and Ainaro); and the eastern region cluding the Center’s international delegations for elections (Manatuto, Baucau, and Viqueque), which was large but earlier that year in Indonesia and Nigeria. A Carter Center typically had less militia activity. Liquica and Dili were diplomat-in-residence, seconded from the U.S. State De- covered from the Dili office. The Center decided not to partment for a year-long posting in Atlanta, and a Carter cover Atauro, due to the difficulties in reaching the island Center student intern joined the LTOs in late July to help and its relatively small population, or Oecussi in West manage the Dili office. Timor, due to the security risk associated with crossing the border, where militia ac- KIRK WOLCOTT tivity was especially high. Efforts were made to gather information about both areas from reliable sources. Each team in the field made coverage decisions based on observers’ exper- tise and understanding of a specific area and on where militia activity or other incidents seemed the most significant. This system of coverage provided compre- hensive reports that simul- Pro-independence supporters form a convoy in Dili during the final days of the pre-ballot taneously gave a sense of campaign period. the overall conditions in
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East Timor for any given week and noted specific incidents, briefings, including techniques for monitoring the vote. such as heightened tensions or violence, that were peculiar These meetings complemented information provided to all to any one region of the territory. observers in briefing books compiled at The Carter Center in Atlanta and sent out electronically via the Internet. SCHEDULE The “electronic briefing books” provided mission-specific information and “links” on the World Wide Web to sites he Carter Center adhered to the following sched- for the United Nations, U.S. and other governments, and ule of observation during the public consultation nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that contained Tprocess and in the weeks after the vote: documents relevant to the public consultation process.
Dates July 4 - 26 July 26 - Aug. 24 Aug. 24 - Sept. 1 Sept. 2 - 28
Phase Set-up LTO Mission STO Mission Post-consultation period
Activities Open office, make Comprehensive monitor- Continue LTO Report from Dili, until all contacts, begin ing and fact-finding to work, monitor observers and local staff comprehensive produce Public Reports 3-6, Aug. 30 balloting evacuated Sept. 5, then monitoring and which provided recom- day activities, and continue fact-finding from fact-finding, and mendations for corrective produce Public locations in Indonesia and draft Public Reports actions, plus high profile Report 7. Darwin, Australia. Pro- 1-2. attention to the problems duce Public Reports 8-11. identified.
Personnel 2 field directors, 10 LTOs, local staff 5 LTOs, 10 STOs, 5 LTOs, local staff local staff local staff
Pre-ballot period Within days of the STOs’ arrival, violence broke out Upon arrival, the LTOs received orientation briefings during a campaign rally in Dili and at least two local from several groups. These included UNAMET political, people were killed. The Carter Center team called their security, and electoral officers; the International Commit- contacts in the field and decided to carry out their initial tee of the Red Cross (ICRC); local organizations, such as deployment plans, wary of the potential for increased levels the Justice and Peace Commission and the human rights of violence. The STOs were paired with LTOs and NGO Yayasan Hak; Indonesia’s Commission for Peace and deployed to several regions throughout the territory, where Stability; church leaders; and international media. they received additional area-specific briefings and UNAMET officials and others provided additional brief- observed the final days of campaigning. ings in the field to the LTOs, who visited all but one of East Timor’s 13 districts during the pre-ballot period. Polling day The STOs arrived the last week of August, and all For the Aug. 30 vote, 15 Carter Center observers vis- Carter Center observers met in Dili for comprehensive ited seven of East Timor’s 13 districts and observed voting
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RACHEL FOWLER
UNAMET international and local staff members work at a polling station for East Timorese voters on ballot day. in 27 subdistricts and 43 of the 700 polling stations across arrived the previous night and waited for the polling sta- the territory. The districts visited were Baucau, Bobonaro, tions to open the next day. Thousands of voters, including Covalima, Kili, Lautem, Liquica, and Viqueque. The del- many elderly people, walked great distances to cast their egation felt the cross-section of polling stations visited was votes. indicative of the territory as a whole, but noted in its state- ment on the vote that the sites visited were only a sample Post-ballot period of the entire territory. To make a more accurate and com- The day after the vote, Carter Center observers re- prehensive assessment, the observers included in the pre- mained in the field to watch the transport of ballot boxes liminary statement information gathered from several by helicopter or truck back to Dili. The teams returned to sources in the field before, during, and immediately after Dili Aug. 31, encountering several checkpoints manned by the vote. pro-integration militia members that were established soon The Carter Center’s observers were impressed by the after voting had ended. relatively peaceful conditions on polling day compared to The observers debriefed and began drafting the pre- the pre-ballot period. However, serious acts of violence did liminary statement (Weekly Report No. 7), which was fin- occur. For instance, UNAMET staff closed seven polling ished in the early morning hours of Sept. 1 and faxed back centers as a result of well-founded fears of intimidation. to Atlanta. Here, it was edited and delivered to President Carter Center observers also witnessed instances of pro- Carter and senior-level staff for final comments. The final integration militia intimidating voters and saw individuals draft of the preliminary statement was sent back to Dili in instruct people on how to cast their vote. In most of these time to be read and distributed at a press conference held cases, UNAMET civilian police successfully intervened to later that morning. persuade these people to desist from this type of disruption. All observers, except six LTOs, left Dili that afternoon In many places, voters lined up hours before the 6:30 when reports of heightened pro-integration militia activity a.m. opening of the polls. In other locations, many voters raised concerns that staff would be unable to leave in the
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coming days. The departing group was forced to charter a their accounts from the beginning to make sure it was un- plane when their airline tickets to Jakarta were not hon- derstood correctly. ored. The six LTOs who remained watched the ballot Chronologies: The Center’s observers found it useful, counting process in Dili through the afternoon of Sept. 3, especially if there were multiple witnesses, to assemble a when three more observers left amid rising militia intimi- chronological description of events, where a person or dation and violence. group’s human rights were reportedly violated. By con- Following UNAMET’s announcement Sept. 4 that structing chronologies that covered incidents that occurred East Timor had voted overwhelmingly for independence, over several hours or a series of incidents that took place the pro-integration militia began their burning and looting over several days, the observers were able to present accu- rampage across East Timor. All expatriate staff were evacu- rate, easily deciphered accounts that were incorporated ated Sept. 5 but continued to monitor and report from Dar- into the weekly public reports. win, Australia, and several locations within Indonesia. Physical evidence: Wherever possible, observers took photographs of damaged buildings, scars or wounds on vic- RESEARCH METHODS tims, and other evidence of security breaches and viola- tions of human rights. Security risks and difficult terrain he observation methodology for East Timor inte- often made it impossible to document all such cases. grated a specific human rights component into Review of secondary sources: The observers met fre- Tthe broader activity of observing elections. The quently with the ICRC and local organizations, such as linkage between human rights and elections has two di- Yayasan Hak and the Justice and Peace Commission, mensions: political participation as a human right2 and which maintained lists of reported human rights violations human rights violations that prevent a free and fair elec- cases, court documents, and witness statements. This docu- tion.3 With this in mind, information-gathering methods mentation was useful for providing a background of the included: human rights conditions in a given area and for corroborat- Interviews and discussions: Observers regularly met ing information gathered from other sources. It also al- with a wide array of actors to gather first-hand information lowed observers to avoid putting informants at greater risk that focused predominantly on claims of human rights vio- by collecting information that was already documented. lations. To be comprehensive and fair to all parties, the observers would cross-check information gained against METHODS OF INFLUENCE several sources. In addition to UNAMET, interviews were routinely conducted with Indonesian officials, pro-integra- he observers devised a multitier reporting system tion and pro-independence leaders and supporters, militia to maximize the effectiveness and credibility of its members, and Falintil representatives, as well as several Treports. Each Friday, the LTOs returned to Dili other groups and individuals. from the field and conducted an oral debriefing before Witness statements: The observers recorded state- writing up their findings in an agreed upon format that ments from hundreds of ordinary East Timorese who were made crucial evidence easily accessible (see Appendices for not officially affiliated with any specific group. The observ- examples of the Weekly Reports). ers first explained their roles and the degree of confidenti- The field teams’ findings were combined to draft the ality that could be guaranteed and then invited witnesses public report, with all conclusions supported by evidence to tell their stories. Observers asked open, nonleading listed and kept in confidential internal reports. Copies of questions to fill in details and asked all witnesses to repeat the internal reports were provided each week to the Indo-
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nesian government, TNI, Polri, UNAMET, and the U.S. UDHR contains many of the basic human rights, including: government. The public, internal, and individual team re- the right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3); freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (Article 9); ports were also kept at The Carter Center in Atlanta. the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right in- The editing process each week in Atlanta included cludes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to initial reviews by staff members in the Democracy and seek, receive, and impart information and ideas (Article 19); Conflict Resolution Programs, followed by additional re- and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association views from the Public Information Office, director of Peace (Article 20). Programs, Carter Center executive director, and finally Some materials, such as the United Nations’ manual on hu- President Carter. After these reviews, the public report was man rights monitoring in Haiti, have included death threats sent back to Dili for comment and local distribution. The as violations of the right to life and of the right to integrity, Atlanta office distributed the report to U.S. and interna- security, and liberty of the person. Death threats are actions or tional media groups and placed it on The Carter Center’s declarations that produce a well-founded fear of arbitrary ex- ecution. Such threats were widespread in the run-up to the home page on the World Wide Web. ■ referendum in East Timor. Also of special relevance to East Timor, the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Offi- 1 In contrast, due to Indonesia’s vast size, observers for The cials is a practical guide for law enforcement officials in con- Carter Center’s monitoring mission of the June 1999 Indone- trolling crowds and demonstrations. Article 3 states that “law sian parliamentary elections were able to spend only two or enforcement officials may use force only when strictly neces- three days in the field. For that mission, 100 delegates in 42 sary and to the extent required for the performance of their teams monitored some 300 polling stations in 26 of duty.” Internal political instability or other special circum- Indonesia’s 27 provinces. stances cannot be invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles. 2 Participation in voting as a human right: KIRK WOLCOTT Provisions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) include participa- tion in periodic and genuine elections as a right in itself. Article 21 of the UDHR states: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by univer- sal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” Other conventions support this position. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) commits par- ties to ensure women an equal right “to vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all pub- licly elected bodies.”
3Rights relating to the broader political environment: Many of the rights laid out in the major human rights documents are pre- Carter Center observers gather information from members of a local human requisites for a free and fair vote. The rights group as part of a comprehensive briefing in Dili.
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KIRK WOLCOTT
To ensure secrecy and dispel fears of post-ballot retribution, the United Nations transported all ballot boxes by truck and helicopter back to Dili for a single count.
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MAJOR FINDINGS
his section includes a synopsis of the major integration side. Voters in all parts of East Timor were sub- findings collected by The Carter Center, jected to months of intimidation, threats, and violence with specific examples provided where aimed at forcing them to vote for integration. There were appropriate. A more comprehensive set of as many as 60,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
findings is in RACHEL FOWLER East Timor on Aug. 30, al- Tthe Weekly Public Reports in most all of whom were the Appendices. For a com- forced from their homes by plete set of findings, contact pro-integration militias and The Carter Center. To pro- Indonesian security forces, tect the safety of some of the yet nearly 99 percent of East Center’s sources, however, Timor’s registered voters certain information remains cast ballots. confidential. In the months preced- On a few occasions, In- ing the vote, Carter Center donesian officials and pro- observers interviewed hun- integration militia leaders dreds of potential voters challenged the evidence that throughout East Timor, and the Center collected. How- all of them stated that they ever, other international ob- would vote their con- servers, UNAMET, the U.S. science, regardless of the Embassy in Jakarta, interna- consequences. The popular tional human rights organi- consultation process was zations, Indonesian and East marred by violence, but it Timorese NGOs, and others allowed for a legitimate act have collected evidence that of self-determination, and corroborates and supports the results represent the will The Carter Center’s findings of the East Timorese. listed below: East Timorese voters, displaying registration cards and personal identification, wait to cast ballots on Aug. 30. ✔ UNAMET adminis- ✔ The results of the popu- tered the vote in an unbi- lar consultation reflect the will of East Timor’s people and ased, transparent, and professional manner. demonstrate the overwhelming preference for indepen- Carter Center observers visited more than half of all dence from Indonesia. registration and polling centers and interviewed hundreds More than 78 percent of East Timor’s 450,000 regis- of UNAMET staff during all phases of the consultation tered voters chose to reject the autonomy option. This de- process. The large majority of UNAMET staff interviewed cisive result was achieved despite widespread violations of appeared well trained, equipped, professional, competent, the May 5 Agreement that almost entirely favored the pro- and impartial in executing their duties. While a few
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KIRK WOLCOTT
A UNAMET official directs voters at a polling site in Bobonaro District, near West Timor’s border.
UNAMET staff members were privately in favor of the in- sufficient to affect the outcome of the consultation. dependence option, in light of the violence and mistreat- ment of pro-independence supporters, there was no indica- ✔ The Indonesian military (TNI) created, supported, tion that these opinions affected the conduct of the vote or directed, funded, and armed pro-integration militias in an the outcome of results. attempt to influence the outcome of the popular consulta- The UNAMET leadership went to great lengths to tion through violence and intimidation. ensure the participation of all sides in the consultation pro- Abundant, first-hand evidence collected by Carter cess and remained flexible and receptive to complaints Center observers, the United Nations, and others shows a throughout the process. Senior UNAMET officials re- direct link between the Indonesian armed forces and pro- sponded in writing to criticisms and suggestions contained integration militia groups. On several occasions, TNI com- in many Carter Center Weekly Reports. Several major manders, soldiers, militia leaders, and militiamen told concessions, including the extension of the registration Carter Center observers that the militias were TNI surro- period, were made in response to concerns from the pro- gates. In Baucau, the Dandim (district military com- integration side. mander) told Carter Center observers that the TNI fully Immediately following the vote, the independent supported members of Saka, an organization he described United Nations Electoral Commission, which included as “pro-integration Timorese” and “part military and part three prominent international jurists and electoral officials, militia.” The commander of the Saka militia identified held two days of public hearings on alleged violations of the himself as a Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces Com- electoral rules. At least one Carter Center observer was mand) officer and carried Kopassus business cards with his present throughout these hearings. The commission gave name and title. each complainant a full hearing and considered all evidence TNI soldiers, militia members, and local government presented before determining that most of the allegations of officials in many districts told Carter Center observers that bias were baseless and that the alleged violations were not the TNI and local governments worked with armed pro-
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integration militias to provide security and promote the rying out operations. This persistent and widespread in- integration option. TNI’s deputy commander in East Timor timidation made many fearful to talk to observers or jour- told Carter Center staff that the TNI provided food, finan- nalists, forced some 60,000 people to flee their homes, and cial, and logistical support to pro-integration militias. prevented many pro-independence campaign activities. Carter Center observers witnessed TNI soldiers and militia members conducting joint exercises in several locations in ✔ The Indonesian government, TNI, and the militias East Timor and heard eyewitness accounts of TNI and mili- bear primary responsibility for the fear and violence that tia involvement in the arrest and subsequent disappearance prevailed during the public consultation process. of five internally displaced persons in Liquica. In addition to failing to provide law and order in East Carter Center observers frequently visited militia posts Timor, the Indonesian government and TNI erroneously during the registration and campaign periods and inter- portrayed the violence as fighting between the pro-inde- viewed several militia members and leaders. Many militia pendence and pro-integration camps. The Carter Center posts displayed obvious signs of military assistance and di- attempted to investigate acts of violence and intimidation rection, including the presence of military clothing and allegedly perpetrated by Falintil, the CRNT, and other pro- equipment, and some members wearing TNI uniforms. Ob- independence activists. servers witnessed the use Upon investigation, the RACHEL FOWLER of two-way radios in pro- large majority of the ac- integration militia posts cusations leveled against in several locations, the the independence side use of which by civilian proved unfounded. While organizations is illegal in pro-independence sup- Indonesia. Carter Center porters committed acts of observers also overheard violence in some cases, transmissions on militia the violence that charac- radios by individuals us- terized the pre- and post- ing military radio proto- consultation periods was col, suggesting that the almost always organized, militias used the same one-sided aggression car- radio network as the TNI. ried out by the TNI and Pro-integration militias, supported and directed by Indonesian Hundreds of its militia surrogates military, carried out a sustained campaign of fear and violence Timorese citizens inter- against pro-independence supporters before and after the vote. against unarmed civil- viewed by Carter Center ians. observers throughout the The TNI and militias territory said that the TNI and militias collaborated to in- directed acts of intimidation, violence, and murder at timidate the local population. IDPs and others reported UNAMET local staff, Timorese students, pro-indepen- frequent joint TNI-militia activities in their areas, includ- dence activists, and other East Timorese suspected of pro- ing patrols, attacks, intimidation, and disappearances. independence sympathies. Several East Timorese staff As early as June, UNAMET Chief of Mission Ian Mar- members working for UNAMET were murdered, and tin said his team had witnessed three separate groups of UNAMET local staff members were singled out for espe- militias accompanied by and directed by TNI soldiers car- cially intense and persistent harassment and intimidation.
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Carter Center observers documented several cases of posts that were located immediately adjacent to or within a UNAMET international and local staff being detained, few hundred meters of police stations. The police refused, interrogated, and threatened by TNI soldiers and militia however, to take any action against militia members even members. when they openly displayed weapons, set up roadblocks, intimidated observers, or harassed local residents. ✔ The Indonesian police failed to maintain law and On Aug. 10, Indonesian police participated in a militia order and, in many cases, actively colluded with violent attack on the office of a student activist organization in pro-integration groups. Viqueque during which two students were murdered. A On voing day, the Indonesian police cooperated with BRIMOB (mobile brigade) police officer shot and seriously UNAMET civilian police at nearly all the observed polling wounded a U.N. civilian police officer in Liquica on Sept. 3 stations to ensure a peaceful and orderly balloting process. during a joint militia/police attack on a UNAMET convoy. The Carter Center noted this in its final report, but also Indonesian police officers actively participated in a noted that aside from this day, the Indonesian police consis- militia attack on Carter Center observers and local staff tently failed to take the necessary steps to prevent or curtail members in Dili on Sept. 5 and forced a large number of acts of violence, or adequately investigate criminal activity international journalists from their hotels at gunpoint on associated with the popular consultation. the same day. They then took them to the airport in Dili During the initial registration period, the police dem- for a forced evacuation of East Timor. onstrated their ability to maintain security by providing well-organized protection for UNAMET operations. How- ✔ The TNI, police, and local government officials ever, thereafter the police actively undermined the consul- actively campaigned and provided resources in support of tation process by failing to respond to the security needs of the integration option. UNAMET or provide adequate protection to UNAMET Senior TNI officials admitted to Carter Center observ- local staff or ordinary citizens. ers that the TNI campaigned for “the autonomy package” Carter Center observers witnessed and collected evi- by distributing rice and building roads for those people who dence of militia members perpetrating acts of violence in said they would vote for integration, and by instructing full view of heavily-armed police and military personnel people on the benefits of remaining part of Indonesia. TNI who either stood by and watched or actively assisted the soldiers admitted in several instances that they provided militias. Observers documented a number of cases in which resources, training, and support to pro-integration militias militias attacked UNAMET registration posts, CNRT of- and worked together with the militias to promote the au- fices, or student activist headquarters in the presence of tonomy option. armed police officers. In each case, the Indonesian police Carter Center observers were present at several meet- failed to act or waited for up to two hours before interven- ings in which senior local government officials and pro- ing, even when serious injuries were reported. integration militia members discussed and planned pro- Carter Center observers also investigated murders of integration campaign activities. The observers also wit- pro-independence activists by militia members and gath- nessed or received credible reports of local Indonesian gov- ered detailed testimony from many eyewitnesses. The iden- ernment officials and TNI providing militia members with tity of the killer or killers was often widely known in the large quantities of rice, T-shirts, weapons, money, and communities in which the attacks took place, but the In- other commodities. On a number of occasions, local gov- donesian police failed to make any arrests. ernment officials working in their official capacity gave In several areas, Carter Center observers visited militia public speeches at pro-integration rallies.
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✔ International observers, UNAMET staff, foreign diplo- ✔ Refugees faced harassment, intimidation, and violence mats, and international journalists were threatened and in Indonesia-ruled West Timor and other parts of Indonesia intimidated by TNI soldiers, police, and militia members after they fled or were forced out of East Timor. before and after the vote. East Timorese refugees fleeing the post-ballot violence The Carter Center was among the many groups ha- suffered at the hands of militia members, TNI soldiers, po- rassed for its participation in the public consultation. lice officers, and local government officials. The large ma- Carter Center observers were threatened with death by the jority of those forced out of East Timor were confined in leader of the Saka militia in Baucau on several occasions in camps in West Timor, just over the border, where they were July and were violently evicted from a militia post in Dili denied adequate food, water, and shelter, and subjected to on Aug. 5. Carter Center local staff members received nu- intense harassment and intimidation by militia members merous threats from militia members. Meanwhile, the In- and TNI soldiers. donesian police consistently failed to adequately investi- Pro-independence leaders were hunted down, and gate threats made against staff members of international Carter Center observers received numerous credible reports organizations involved in administering, observing, or re- of individuals being removed from camps or murdered by porting on the popular consultation. militia and TNI soldiers. International journalists, U.N. Virtually all U.N. personnel, international observers, agencies, and humanitarian organizations were almost and journalists were forced by the Indonesian security completely excluded from West Timor by the Indonesian forces to evacuate East Timor within 36 hours of the an- government. nouncement of the ballot results. Heavily armed BRIMOB Refugees who were transported or made their own way officers and militia members fired upon UNAMET vehicles to other parts of Indonesia, including a number of Carter and a helicopter in Liquica district Sept. 3, resulting in one Center local staff members, were harassed and persecuted by UNAMET civilian police officer being seriously wounded militia, TNI, police, and local officials. In Bali, Sumatra, by an automatic weapon. Sulawesi, and major cities on the island of Java, East On Sept. 5, TNI soldiers fired automatic weapons into Timorese refugees were forced to move from house to house the UNAMET regional office in Baucau for more than an for safety and were repeatedly threatened with death. hour while staff lay on the floor. TNI soldiers then burned Carter Center observers who remained in Indonesia the office and more than 80 UNAMET vehicles after forc- after Sept. 4 documented several cases of refugees being ing the staff to evacuate. murdered by militia members on passenger boats leaving East Timor or West Timor. One case included approxi- mately 35 young men killed Sept. 7 on the Dobon Solo ferry. ■
Photo opposite page: Pro-Indonesia militia activity displaced more than half of East Timor’s population, with many people fleeing into the hills or across the border into West Timor.
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CONSULTATION AFTERMATH AND OPPORTUNITIES
fter the Sept. 4 announcement, the destruction, and looting that followed the vote. Only after Indonesian government repeatedly the U.N.-sponsored INTERFET troops arrived in mid- claimed that TNI and the police were Sept. did the violence end. doing all in their power to contain the The United Nations and Indonesian government es- widespread violence that swept the ter- tablished separate independent inquiry teams to investigate Aritory. Indonesian officials blamed the destruction and the allegations of human rights violations committed in population displacement on uncontrollable militias and East Timor during the public consultation and in its after- “rogue elements” of the military. However, evidence col- math. Their investigations, which included claims brought lected by Carter Center observers and local staff suggests against TNI’s top generals, would be used to determine TNI commanders long had been planning the destruction whether to conduct a war crimes tribunal. The Carter Cen- and depopulation of East Timor. ter met with members of the two investigation teams and Several months before the vote, militia members and made available to them all evidence compiled during the TNI soldiers told Carter Center observers that they would Center’s five-month human rights fact-finding work in East destroy East Timor, drive out UNAMET, foreign press, and Timor. observers, and kill supporters of independence if voters re- jected integration. Some militia members predicted the DEMOCRATIC ASSESSMENT TRIP violence and destruction that eventually engulfed the terri- tory in great detail during interviews with Carter Center ollowing their evacuation from Dili, Carter Center observers in July. People in all parts of East Timor reported observers continued to collect information and re- that soldiers and militia members repeatedly issued threats Flease weekly public reports from several locations in of bloodshed and destruction if integration were to be re- Indonesia and Darwin, Australia. In late October, after jected. INTERFET had stabilized East Timor, The Carter Center The Carter Center and other observers reported these re-established a temporary office in Dili to complete its ob- findings throughout the public consultation process. De- servation work and prepare for a post-consultation assess- spite the threats and actual violence that occurred, U.N. ment mission. peacekeepers were not sent to East Timor during the con- From Dec. 4-14, a five-person team traveled to East sultation because Indonesia stipulated when offering to Timor and Darwin, Australia. The goal of the assessment hold the vote that no armed outside forces would be per- mission was to analyze priorities for promoting democratic mitted in the territory. However, this soon changed when development and reconciliation in the territory and to it became clear that Indonesia was unable or unwilling to identify specific areas in which The Carter Center and stop the destruction that erupted after Sept. 4. other groups might assist the East Timorese during their Despite extremely heavy police and military presence transition to full independence. throughout the territory, the Indonesian security forces The assessment team met with a wide array of political took almost no action to prevent violence or to curtail the actors, including Sergio Viera de Mello, the newly ap- activities of armed pro-integration militia. Instead, TNI pointed head of the United Nations Transitional Authority and police officers openly colluded with militia members for East Timor (UNTAET), whose 11,000-person staff and actively participated in heightened acts of violence, would be responsible for administering the territory over
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DWIGHT KING
CNRT leaders Xanana Gusmao (center with beard), Jose Ramos-Horta (second from left), David Ximenes (far left), and other key actors in East Timor shared their ideas with Carter Center assessment team members. the next two to three years. The team also met with education, and other basic provisions. Gusmao, recently returned from seven years in prison, Based on this assessment, The Carter Center identified Ramos-Horta, recently returned after 24 years in exile, and many post-consultation initiatives that it or others, work- members of East Timorese civil society. All of the individu- ing with UNTAET and the CNRT, might pursue, includ- als and groups met urged The Carter Center to play a con- ing the following: tinuing role in East Timor’s transition from war to peace to ✔ Promoting greater awareness of democratic values. democracy and development. ✔ Facilitating the broadest participation of society. The Carter Center team noted in its assessment report ✔ Strengthening the capacity of local nongovernmental that the humanitarian effort being conducted by the organizations. United Nations and other international organizations to ✔ Empowering women and youth. assist East Timor, which had been devastated by the post- ✔ Drafting a new constitution. ballot violence, was impressive and comprehensive. None- ✔ Preparing for multiparty elections. theless, considerable relief and physical reconstruction ✔ Establishing the rule of law. were still necessary, including food security and agricultural ✔ Building free and independent local media. development, reconstruction of buildings and a reliable ✔ Ensuring justice and reconciliation. telecommunications systems, and adequate health care, ✔ Safeguarding against future human rights abuse. ■
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CONCLUSION
he struggle for independence in East Timor conditions should other dissatisfied regions around the began decades, if not centuries, ago and world be permitted to form their own nation states? And, cost thousands of lives and immeasurable if similar processes are undertaken in the future, what suffering. The final outcome highlighted should be the role, if any, of international observer groups? the courage and determination of the East The Carter Center ventured onto new ground for the TTimorese people who overcame great fear and violence to institution when it opened its office in Dili in early July. voice their overwhelming preference for freedom. The re- While the Center had observed 26 elections in 19 countries, sults of the Aug. 30 public consultation, in which nearly 80 this was its first wide-scale, long-term public reporting initia- percent of the East Timorese citizens rejected an offer of tive. Noting again that its mandate was to conduct fact autonomy, represent an indisputable mandate for indepen- finding throughout East Timor about the necessary precon- dence from Indonesia. ditions for a free and fair balloting, The Carter Center and Indonesian President B.J. Habibie must receive credit its observers achieved positive results, including: for agreeing to offer the possibility of independence, a pros- pect many people inside and outside East Timor doubted ✔ Establishing an early presence and reporting regularly would ever happen. The United Nations also must receive throughout and after the public consultation process. its due credit for conducting the ballot in an unbiased, ✔ Making information available to all interested groups transparent, and professional manner in the face of consid- based on first-hand observations and reliable eyewit- erable pressure and outright violence. ness accounts. Especially praiseworthy was the CNRT leadership, ✔ Serving as a neutral, nonpartisan actor that the both for the cantonment of Falintil troops and for keeping United Nations, the press, and others could seek for the pro-independence supporters largely from seeking retri- trusted evidence on human rights violations. bution against the Indonesia-backed militias. Also note- ✔ Spotlighting the insecure conditions in East Timor worthy were the ordinary men and women of East Timor, before and after the vote through the media and Presi- many of whom served as local staff, often at great personal dent Carter’s personal contacts and statements. risk, for UNAMET and the international observer groups. That the United Nations was willing to sign a clearly Looking back, perhaps The Carter Center and others flawed agreement that gave Indonesia nearly carte blanche might have done more to persuade the Indonesian govern- on security provisions in the territory raises a number of ment or the United Nations to stop the violence, both be- important questions. For instance, was the United Nations fore and after the ballot. Whether and how this might correct to pursue the public consultation knowing that vio- have been accomplished are questions that the Center, the lence was present and likely to increase? Should the United Nations, and others should examine. For just as United Nations have required a provision in the May 5 East Timor demonstrated that people are willing to fight Agreement that would automatically trigger the sending of and die to overcome great fear and considerable odds for peacekeepers to East Timor if Indonesia did not fulfil its independence, there are and will continue to be other commitments? What if Indonesia refused to comply? similar cases for the international community to address All of these questions beg the larger questions: What now and in the future. lessons should be learned from this exercise? Under what Looking forward, East Timor’s transition to full inde-
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KIRK WOLCOTT
Many challenges lie on the horizon for East Timor, including gaining full independence and consolidating democracy as the first new nation of the 21st century. pendence represents a unique opportunity to build a cul- tion, internal corruption, and eventual neglect that has ture of peace, democracy, and human rights. The next plagued other nations under similar conditions. three years will be critical to ensure that the territory con- Yet, there also exists a real potential to get it right this solidates democracy and avoids the type of backsliding that time, as East Timor has the opportunity to build its govern- many newly independent and emerging democratic nations ment and civic institutions from the ground up. Further- have suffered. more, East Timor could provide an example of how to ef- East Timor will likely become the first new nation of fectively promote democracy and human rights in a new the 21st century. While small in terms of population and nation. To do so, the international community must assist economic clout, its history and location will make it an the local people in establishing a society based on partici- important actor among regional powers, as well as with the patory democracy and universal human rights, while at the United Nations. A high level of world attention and do- same time providing the space for them to create their own nor dollars will be focused on East Timor over the next vision of the new East Timor. ■ three years, and with it, the potential for external domina-
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
he Carter Center is grateful to the volun- vided by the UNAMET security section and civilian po- teer observers and staff members who con- lice, the staff of the Australian Consulate in Dili, and ducted the East Timor project under diffi- Jonathan Head and Humphry Hawksley of the BBC. cult and sometimes life-threatening condi- In addition, the Center commends the work of the tions. The U.S. Agency for International UNAMET and other organizations involved in monitoring TDevelopment (USAID) and the government of Portugal the ballot. UNAMET officials provided vital information funded the project, and The Carter Center deeply appreci- and assistance, including Ian Martin, Geoffry Robinson, ates their collaboration and support throughout the mission. Colin Stewart, Elodie Carnier-Aristide, Jeff Fischer, John A large part of the credit for our work must go to the Bevan, and many election officials working at the polling courageous people of East Timor, including those who as- sites. UNAMET’s military liaison and civilian police offic- sisted the Center as local staff members and those who pro- ers also deserve praise for their assistance throughout the vided personal interviews and information. They shared public consultation process and especially on ballot day. their time, input, and expertise under dangerous and stress- Members of East Timorese and international human ful conditions. Many of our Timorese staff members con- rights organizations, such as Yayasan HAK, the Justice and tinued to provide vital information to the Center from Peace Commission, Amnesty International, and Human within East Timor and West Timor after the vote, while Rights Watch also provided valuable insight and informa- enduring terrible hardship and terror as displaced persons tion. These especially included Anecito Lopez, Manuel and refugees. Abrantes, Lucia Withers, and Sydney Jones. The Carter Center’s program would not have been The Center would like to thank several individuals possible without the dedication and commitment of local who managed the grants that made this initiative possible. East Timorese staff members. These include: Immanuel Dennis Wendel, Dawn Emling, Terry Myers, and other Tilman, Joaquim Reis Martins Gusmao, Hermingardo USAID Mission Jakarta officials assisted in many aspects of Albano Soars, Nicolau Tilman, Francisco Pinto, Adelaide the consultation process. Also vital to the project were Rose Gomes, Antero Da Silva Soares, Cristina Saramento, Jim Lehman, Eileen Wickstrom, and Karma Lively of the Delfina Rangel, Marcos da Cunha, Justiniano Fernandes, Office of Transition Initiatives, and Bruce Spake and Erika Jose Alexio Da Silva, Delio Afonso Nunes, Filomena Kirwen of Development Alternatives International, as well Gomes De Andra, Felismina Odte Dos Santo, Joao Paolo as several Portuguese government officials. Da Costa Rangel, and other local staff members who sup- In addition, we commend The Carter Center’s in- ported us. country staff for an outstanding job coordinating the long- The Center also would like to acknowledge the many and short-term observer operations and organizing moni- individuals who put themselves at risk while assisting in toring activities for the public consultation vote. These the evacuation of staff members from Dili and West Timor included co-directors of the Center’s International Obser- after the public consultation. These include: Father vation Program in East Timor, Gillian Flies and Brent Hilario of the Don Bosco Mission in Dili; Gary Gray and Preston, who established the Dili office and organized field Victoria Alvarez of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta; Scott operations. Carter Center Diplomat-in-residence Douglas Gilmore of the Canadian Embassy; and Capt. Mick Rookie Archard and student intern Vincent Barnes managed the of the Australian Army. Critical assistance was also pro- Dili office in August, while long-term observers Sophie
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Kahn and Fred Rawski re-opened the office in November Center’s student interns, who assisted on this initiative by and coordinated activities for the December assessment organizing and attending meetings, providing regular up- mission. dates and background information, and contributing to the We also would like to acknowledge our volunteer ob- production and distribution of briefing materials and re- servers individually for their time and efforts. These in- ports. They include Saiko Uno and Aziza Ahmed of the clude long-term observers Annette Clear, Matthew Easton, Democracy Program, and Andre Borgerhoff and Holly Nancy Melissa Lutz, and John MacDougall, and short-term Benner of the Conflict Resolution Program. observers James Clad, Donald Emmerson, James Fox, We also would like to recognize Indonesian experts Catherine Greene, David Hicks, and Andrea Molnar. In Dwight King and Clarence Dias, who served as consultants Atlanta, Center Democracy Program Director Charles to The Carter Center before and during the public consul- Costello was responsible for directing the Center’s East tation process, and as members of the Center’s post-consul- Timor initiative, while Rachel Fowler and Kirk Wolcott, tation assessment trip. The Center is grateful, during that program coordinators in the Democracy and Conflict Reso- trip, for the assistance and information provided by several lution Program, respectively, co-managed the initiative. individuals and organizations. These include UNTAET All three served as short-term observers. Chief Sergio Viera de Mello and other U.N. officials; Assisting them from Atlanta were Carter Center Di- Xanana Gusmao, Jose Ramos-Horta, and other CNRT rector of Peace Programs Gordon Streeb, Public Informa- members; INTERFET officers; and members of several lo- tion Senior Associate Director Deanna Congileo, Democ- cal and international NGOs. racy Program Associate Director David Carroll, Democracy Finally, for this report, we would like to acknowledge Program Administrative Assistant Tynesha Green, and In- Kirk Wolcott, who drafted several sections and managed stitutional Development Associate Director for Peace Pro- final editing and revisions. Gillian Flies, Brent Preston, grams Becky Castle. Public Information Communication Annette Clear, Matt Easton, and Rachel Fowler also drafted Coordinators Natasha Singh and Nadara Wade assisted in and edited sections, while Charles Costello, David Carroll, distribution of the Weekly Public Reports. Douglas Archard, Holly Benner, and Carter Center Publica- Special thanks must be extended to The Carter tions Manager Pam Smith assisted in editing the report. ■
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APPENDICES
A. Sample Ballot
B. Polling Day Checklists
C. Selected News Articles
D. Press Releases
E. Weekly Public Reports #1-12
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APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX B
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APPENDIX C
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APPENDIX D
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APPENDIX E
Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 1
July 11-17, 1999
Large Turnout for Registration despite Continuing Security Concerns
(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. The Center opened an office with two observers in Dili on July 4. They will be joined next week by eight long-term observers, who will travel throughout East Timor to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the first of a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).
Dili, East Timor…..The past week saw a significant decrease in the level of intimidation and violence directed at personnel of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) who are supervising the upcoming popular consultation. However, the security situation for the people of East Timor does not seem to have improved significantly.
Initial reports on voter registration, which began on July 16, indicate potential voters flooded registration centers all across East Timor during the first few days of voter registration. The Carter Center is greatly encour- aged by the opening of registration and the high turnout so far. Clearly, the large majority of the people of East Timor are committed to participating in a peaceful, fair and democratic consultation.
However, this commitment is being severely tested by an atmosphere of violence, intimidation, and insecurity that continues to pervade most areas of East Timor. Information gathered in direct interviews during field visits by Carter Center observers and from other independent reports from all parts of East Timor, indicate that pro- integration militias in many areas are threatening to harm or kill those who do not vote for autonomy. Similar reports indicate that the militias also are largely responsible for creating tens of thousands of internally displaced persons and preventing them from returning to their homes to participate in the consultation.
This report is based on field visits to Liquica and Ermera districts during the past several days, including observa- tion of the opening of registration, and on meetings in Jakarta and Dili with senior Indonesian Government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese non-governmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; members of pro-autonomy groups (which favor integration into Indonesia); and members of pro-independence groups.
The Carter Center is particularly concerned about the following problems, which must be addressed to ensure that conditions established by the May 5 New York Agreements for the popular consultation are met:
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✔ Intimidation of Voters. While all sides must accept some responsibility for the hostile climate that now prevails, our interviews and other independent reports indicate that responsibility for the large majority of incidents of intimidation and violence lies with pro-integration militias. These groups are subjecting potential voters to an intense and systematic campaign of intimidation in an attempt to influence the outcome of the consultation. Individuals interviewed by The Carter Center observers spoke uniformly about widespread harassment and intimidation by the militia, and described similar incidents of militia visiting people at their homes at night and threatening violence after the poll if autonomy is rejected. Similar reports from other independent groups indicate such incidents are occurring throughout East Timor.
According to paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement, the appropriate Indonesian security forces are respon- sible for ensuring a secure environment devoid of violence and intimidation. In addition, paragraph 4 provides that the Indonesian police are solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the consultation process. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the Indonesian Police have been successful in improving the security situation. For the conditions of the New York Agreements to be fulfilled, the activities of violent militia groups must be curtailed.
✔ Internally Displaced Persons. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has documented the existence of more than 32,000 internally displaced persons in East Timor, most of whom report having been driven from their homes in the past six months by pro-integration militias as a direct result of their pre- sumed political beliefs. It appears little is being done to facilitate their safe return to their homes. Some militia leaders have openly stated that they will not permit internally displaced persons to return home until after the completion of the consultation.
For internally displaced persons to be able to participate in the consultation as provided in the New York Agreements, it is essential that adequate security conditions exist for all of them to return to their homes immediately and to ensure that no others are driven from their home by violence and intimidation.
✔ Active Campaign for Autonomy. According to many credible observers, elements of the Indonesian Government and military continue to campaign for the autonomy option in violation of the New York Agreements. One senior army leader in Dili admitted that the military is actively promoting the autonomy package and distributing food and services to people to encourage votes for autonomy.
Such practices are in violation of paragraph 1 of the Security Agreement, which establishes that the abso- lute neutrality of the Indonesian armed forces and the Indonesian police is essential. Similarly, the “Agree- ment on Modalities for the Popular Consultation” provides that officials of the Indonesian Government will not participate in the campaign in support for either option. It is imperative that all sides abide by these commitments.
✔ Need for Redeployment. Although senior military commanders indicated to Carter Center observers that all military forces in East Timor will be confined to their barracks in advance of the consultation, no time- table for this redeployment has been established and military units continue to operate throughout the territory. To improve the current climate of fear, a timetable for completion of the redeployment of the Indonesia military should be established and implemented.
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Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 2
July 19 - 25, 1999:
Registration Continues to Run Smoothly, Security Issues Remain Key Concern
(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor through neutral, nonpartisan observers assessing preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign. Follow- ing is the second in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).
Dili, East Timor… During the past week, registration for the public consultation in East Timor continued with strong turnout of potential voters, and few reported incidents of violence. UNAMET operations are in full swing, but no date has been set for the consultation vote. While registration and other UNAMET activities are now proceeding well, The Carter Center is concerned that an atmosphere of fear and intimidation continues to prevail in many parts of East Timor.
The Center is particularly concerned about persistent reports of Indonesian military involvement in the activities of pro-integration militia groups. In direct interviews with local residents, self-proclaimed members and com- manders of armed pro-integration groups, Indonesian soldiers and senior military personnel in Baucau district, Carter Center observers were told that one Timorese pro-integration group known as Saka is being armed, trained, equipped, directed and paid by the Indonesian military.
This report is based on field visits to Baucau and Manatuto districts during the past several days, and on meetings in Dili with senior Indonesian Government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Govern- ment Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese nongovernmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of groups which favor integration into Indonesia as well as pro-independence groups.
The Carter Center is very encouraged by the following developments in East Timor and believes that the con- tinuation of such conditions will further enhance the opportunity for the fair conduct of the consultation.
✔ Voter Registration: Large numbers of people are registering at centers across East Timor. Carter Center observers witnessed long lines at all registration centers visited. Numerous interviews with potential voters indicate that the majority are satisfied with the conduct of registration and remain committed to participat- ing in a peaceful, fair, and democratic consultation. Carter Center observers received no complaints about the identification requirements for registration, but many people are unaware of the availability of a UNAMET Affidavit of Birth for those who do not have the required identification. With the notable exception of internally displaced persons, it appears that the large majority of eligible voters will have the opportunity to register for the upcoming consultation.
✔ The Pre-Consultation Role of UNAMET. UNAMET has nearly completed deployment of its personnel
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to East Timor. The mission was fully ready for registration to begin and registration is proceeding smoothly. The UN deployed rapidly for this mission. Indonesian police have provided good security for UNAMET personnel during the registration period.
The Center continues to have serious concern, however, about continuing intimidation of the East Timorese, violations of the New York agreements and the issue of redeployment of the Indonesian military. These con- cerns were noted in our weekly report released July 20, 1999. To date, these issues have not been adequately addressed.
The Carter Center remains particularly concerned about reports of Indonesian military support of armed pro- integration groups and the plight of internally displaced persons. Both of these issues must be addressed to ensure conditions established by the May 5 New York Agreements for the popular consultation are met.
✔ Military Support of Pro-Integration Groups. The Carter Center has received numerous reports of Indone- sian military (TNI) involvement in the activities of militias over the past several weeks, but until now has been unable to independently confirm a direct link between armed pro-integration groups and the military. Carter Center observers recently visited a number of camps in several districts that local residents claim are militia posts, and in several cases observers found evidence of Indonesian military involvement in these camps. Carter Center observers have now identified at least one group in Baucau district known as Pusaka or Saka that is being armed, trained, equipped, directed, and its members paid by the military. The exist- ence of this group and its ties to the Indonesian military have been confirmed through interviews with local residents, members of Saka, and local senior military personnel.
✔ Harassment and Intimidation Continues. Local residents in several different areas in Bacau complained of harassment and intimidation by pro-integration groups. Residents identified Saka and Rajawali as militia groups that work in cooperation with the TNI, and say armed members visit them at night, threatening violence and bloodshed after the vote if autonomy is rejected. Members of the militia groups who were interviewed described Saka and Rajawali as Timorese military groups that fight for autonomy and reported that they work with local TNI units to provide security and promote the autonomy option.
✔ Internally Displaced Persons. Poor security conditions continue to prevent tens of thousands of internally displaced persons in East Timor from returning to their homes. For internally displaced persons to be able to participate in the consultation as provided in the New York Agreements, adequate security conditions must exist for them to return to their homes immediately and to ensure that no others are driven from their homes by intimidation or violence.
Note: Paragraph 4 of the Security Agreement states that the Indonesian police are solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order during the consultation process. Paragraph 1 of the same agreement states that the Indonesian police and military must be absolutely neutral throughout the consultation process. It is essential that all support for Timorese groups of any description by the military cease at once and that all security functions are handed over to the police.
✔ Post-Consultation Security. Many of those interviewed by Carter Center observers fear that UNAMET will leave East Timor immediately after the vote, and are concerned about their safety. It is important, therefore, that UNAMET clearly explains the role the UN will play in East Timor after the consultation.
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The Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 3
July 26-August 1, 1999
(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. The Carter Center opened an office in Dili on July 4. An additional eight observers have now joined the team and have begun raveling throughout East Timor to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the third in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).
Turnout for voter registration remains strong as the end of the registration period approaches. The people of East Timor have shown great enthusiasm for participation in the consultation process with a large proportion of the eligible voters having already registered. Carter Center observers have noted an encouraging improvement in the security situation in some areas and the Indonesian police seem to be taking positive steps to create a peaceful climate for the campaign period and ballot day. However, many concerns remain, including ongoing harassment and intimidation of potential voters in many areas, the continued existence of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons and threats of wide- spread violence after the vote.
The Center is particularly concerned by clear evidence collected by its observers of Indonesian military and government support of armed pro-integration groups and continued involvement in pro-integration campaigning in violation of the New York agreements that govern the consultation process. There has also been a marked deterioration in the security situation in Dili over the past week, including at least two reported killings by pro- integration militias. In one incident, members of the Aitarak militia fired automatic weapons within a few hundred meters of the Carter Center office.
This report is based on field visits to Manatuto, Liquica, Ermera, Aileu and Dili districts during the past week, and on meetings in Dili with Indonesian government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese non-governmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organi- zations; diplomats; and members of pro-autonomy groups (which favor integration into Indonesia) and pro- independence groups.
✔ Voter Registration: The Carter Center is encouraged by the strong turnout for voter registration to date. UNAMET reports that more than half of the estimated population of eligible voters had registered by the tenth day of the registration exercise, and turnout continues to be strong at many registration centers visited by Carter Center observers. The use of UNAMET Affidavit of Birth forms seems to have ensured that those who do not have the required identification are still able to register. UNAMET has also taken steps to ensure that internally displaced persons (IDPs) are able to register and vote. Because eligible voters must vote at the same location where they have registered, the identification, and registration, of IDPs and voting by IDPs still represents a significant challenge. Much needs to be done to ensure that IDPs are able to fully and freely participate in the consultation.
✔ The Role of UNAMET: The presence of UNAMET personnel continues to have a positive impact on the
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security situation in many parts of East Timor, and most potential voters interviewed by Carter Center observers express satisfaction with the performance of District Electoral Officers (DEOs) and UN Civilian Police. UNAMET has also taken a number of steps to ensure that overcrowding at some registration centers does not prevent potential voters from registering. However, the Center is still concerned that not enough has been done to ensure that the people of East Timor clearly understand all phases of the consultation process. Many registrants expressed surprise and concern when informed that the voter list will be publicly displayed prior to the vote, and few understand that most DEOs will be withdrawn from voting centers immediately after the vote.
✔ The Role of the Police: The Carter Center is encouraged by steps taken by the Indonesian police to increase their presence in East Timor and to assume responsibility for creating a peaceful and orderly pre- consultation environment. The police continue to provide good security for UNAMET activities and to cooperate fully with UNAMET personnel in most districts. However, most police personnel appear to remain close to their bases or to UNAMET offices, and few seem to have been deployed to less accessible areas. Carter Center observers have collected evidence of police officers collaborating with pro-integration groups and many incidents of politically-motivated violence or intimidation remain uninvestigated. The Security Agreement calls for the Indonesian police to maintain law and order throughout East Timor, not just to provide security for UNAMET personnel.
✔ The Role of the Military and Local Government: Indonesian government officials have informed The Carter Center that the Indonesian military (TNI) has withdrawn a number of troops from East Timor, but there is no evidence that the military has followed through on public commitments to re-deploy and confine the remaining soldiers to their barracks. First-hand observation in a number of different districts has con- firmed that the TNI is still widely dispersed throughout East Timor and there is a permanent TNI presence in many villages and towns. Carter Center observers have compiled additional evidence of TNI support for and cooperation with armed pro-integration groups, as well as close cooperation between pro-integration groups and local government officials. TNI soldiers and officers, leaders of armed pro-integration groups and local government officials in a number of districts have told Carter Center observers that they are working to- gether to provide security and to “socialize” the autonomy plan. Many residents in these areas have said that the pro-integration groups supported and directed by the military and local government are militias, and that militia members routinely harass and intimidate the local population.
The May 5 agreements that govern the popular consultation assign sole responsibility for maintaining law and order to the police, call for the strict neutrality of the military, forbid the use of government resources for campaign activities and do not allow campaigning for either option before the official campaign period.
✔ Harassment and Intimidation: Local residents in all districts visited by Carter Center observers complain of persistent harassment and intimidation. The Center has received a few reports of pro-independence groups perpetrating violent acts or intimidating potential voters, but Indonesian government and military leaders have confirmed that FALINTIL is respecting the cease-fire and does not represent an immediate threat to the TNI or the people of East Timor. Primary responsibility for the creation of a general climate of fear and intimidation in East Timor rests with pro-integration militias. While the overall security situation has improved in some areas, Carter Center observers have collected much evidence that intimidation tactics in many parts of East Timor have simply become more subtle and difficult to detect. Militia groups now maintain a lower profile, operate primarily at night and concentrate their activities in less accessible areas,
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but their threats and messages of intimidation remain largely unchanged.
✔ Internally Displaced Persons. Poor security conditions continue to prevent tens of thousands of IDPs from returning to their homes. Estimates of the number of IDPs in East Timor range from more than 35,000 by the UNHCR to more than 60,000 by church-based organizations. The Carter Center is encouraged by the fact that both the Indonesian government and UNAMET recognize the seriousness of the IDP problem, and by reports from at least one international humanitarian organization that some IDPs have started to return home. However, Carter Center observers have failed to find evidence of large numbers of IDPs returning to their homes, and have received credible reports of several hundred new IDPs arriving in Ermera district from Liquica and Bobonaro over the past week.
UNAMET regulations state that all voters must cast their ballots at the station at which they register. It is essential that steps are taken to ensure that all IDPs are able to participate freely in the consultation process and to vote, regardless of whether or not they return to their homes prior to polling day. The Indonesian police also have a responsibility to ensure that no others are driven from their homes by intimidation or violence.
✔ Security Concerns for Later Stages of the Consultation: Supporters of both independence and autonomy have told Carter Center observers that they fear an increase in violence during the campaign period and after the vote. Some pro-integration militia members have told Carter Center observers that they will engage in violent acts if the autonomy option is rejected. At the same time, non-Timorese civil servants and transmigrants have begun sending their families outside East Timor for fear of retribution from indepen- dence supporters.
The Security Agreement stipulates that the Indonesian police are responsible for maintaining law and order in East Timor before and after the consultation. Positive steps by the Indonesian police to prevent violence and intimidation during the campaign period and specific public commitments to remain after the vote by both the police and UNAMET might reassure the people of East Timor that the post-consultation period will be peaceful.
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Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 4
August 2-8, 1999
(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the public consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. Ten Carter Center observers have been traveling throughout East Timor since July 4 to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the fourth in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation).
Previous Carter Center reports noted a slight but encouraging improvement in the security situation in East Timor amid signs that the Indonesian police might take an active role in curtailing widespread harassment and intimidation of potential voters. Unfortunately, the past week has been marked by deteriorating security condi- tions, heightened pro-integration militia activity, and increased threats of violence and bloodshed if the au- tonomy option is rejected.
Top representatives of the Government of Indonesia have failed to fulfill their main obligations under the May 5 Agreements and in many cases have actively sought to undermine the popular consultation process. Carter Center observers have collected first-hand evidence of the following violations:
✔ The Indonesian military (TNI) and government are actively supporting and directing armed pro-integration militias who are creating a climate of fear and intimidation.
✔ The Indonesian police have consistently failed to take the steps necessary to maintain law and order, and in some cases have colluded with pro-integration militias.
✔ The Indonesian government and TNI are actively campaigning for the autonomy option and providing resources and support to pro-autonomy groups.
✔ The TNI has failed to fulfill its commitment to redeploy its troops and is maintaining posts in villages throughout East Timor.
✔ TNI and pro-integration militia members are threatening bloodshed and war if the autonomy option is rejected.
✔ Militia members have attacked several UNAMET registration centers with impunity, and both TNI and militia members have intimidated and threatened UNAMET local staff.
✔ Militia members and TNI personnel have threatened and intimidated Carter Center observers and local staff.
✔ Continued insecurity has prevented the return of up to 60,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes and threatens their ability to freely participate in the consultation process.
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The Carter Center believes that it is within the power of the Indonesian government to create the conditions necessary for a free, open, and democratic consultation in East Timor. However, failure to immediately redeploy TNI troops, bring pro-integration militias under control, and establish law and order in East Timor may jeopar- dize the entire consultation process.
This report is based on interviews with police, military, local government and church officials, local residents, internally displaced persons, militia members, and others in Bobonaro, Liquica, Ermera, Dili, Baucau, Lautem, Manatuto, and Covalima districts during the past week, and on meetings in Dili with Indonesian government, military, and police officials; members of the Indonesian Government Task Force for the Implementation of the Popular Consultation; the Commission for Peace and Stability; Timorese nongovernmental organizations; UNAMET officials; representatives of international organizations; diplomats; and members of pro-autonomy groups (which favor integration into Indonesia), and pro-independence groups.
The Role of the Military: Carter Center observers continue to collect direct evidence of TNI support for and cooperation with armed pro-integration militias throughout East Timor. During the past week, Carter Center observers documented several cases of TNI soldiers and militia members detaining, interrogating, and threaten- ing UNAMET local staff members and witnessed TNI personnel communicating with militia groups using two- way radios in a number of districts (the use of two-way radios by civilian organizations is illegal in Indonesia).
According to reports of international organizations, interviews by Carter Center observers, and the eyewitness account of a man who escaped, TNI soldiers also were implicated in the abduction and disappearance of five internally displaced persons in the Liquicia district. TNI personnel continue to tell Carter Center observers that they are providing security and “socializing,” or promoting the autonomy option, often in cooperation with armed pro-autonomy groups. There has been no evidence of redeployment of TNI troops, despite continued assurances from the Indonesian government that TNI soldiers will be withdrawn from the villages.
The May 5 agreements that govern the popular consultation assign sole responsibility for maintaining law and order to the police, call for the strict neutrality of the military, forbid the use of government resources for campaign activities and call for the redeployment of TNI forces in the territory.
The Role of the Police: The Indonesian police have consistently failed to fulfil their obligation under the May 5 Agreements to maintain law and order in East Timor. Pro-integration militias continue to perpetrate acts of violence and intimidation with impunity in many parts of the territory, including Dili, and several militia leaders have openly admitted to Carter Center observers that they direct their followers to commit illegal acts. In some areas the police are still providing good security for UNAMET operations, but in others the police have failed to adequately protect UNAMET personnel and have done virtually nothing to ensure the security of ordinary citizens.
Police officers took no action to protect UNAMET local staff as they were beaten by militia members in Bobonaro on August 5. No arrests have been made in that case or in the case of the killing of a pro-indepen- dence youth in Dili on August 1, despite the fact that the killing took place in front of several witnesses and that the identity of the killer is widely known. There is also clear evidence of police collusion with pro-integra- tion militia groups. Carter Center observers witnessed police officers communicating with militia groups using two-way radios in several districts and collected evidence of a militia leader who is also a serving police officer.
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Threats and Intimidation: Local residents in all districts visited by Carter Center observers complain of persis- tent harassment and intimidation by pro-integration militias and TNI soldiers. Local government officials in a number of districts have openly threatened a “return to war” if the autonomy option is rejected, and militia leaders have told Carter Center observers that they regularly make similar threats. Local residents in several areas have told Carter Center observers that TNI soldiers and militia members regularly threaten to kill anyone who votes to reject autonomy. UNAMET local staff members also have been detained, interrogated, and threatened by TNI soldiers and beaten by militia members over the past week. UNAMET local staff have been the target of an intense intimidation campaign in many areas and have been repeatedly threatened with death after UNAMET leaves East Timor. Carter Center observers and local staff have also been threatened and intimidated by militia leaders and TNI officers in a number of areas. Shots have been fired within a few hun- dred meters of the Carter Center office in Dili on six different occasions over the past week.
Internally Displaced Persons: The internally displaced persons situation in East Timor remains largely un- changed, with between forty and sixty thousand people still prevented from returning to their homes by insecu- rity and threats of further violence. Carter Center observers visited internally displaced persons in a number of districts over the past week, with many complaining of continued threats, harassment and attacks from TNI soldiers and militia members. Carter Center observers witnessed internally displaced persons living under extremely poor conditions in some areas. In one case, internally displaced persons said that they had to resort to drinking from irrigation ditches because local militias had cut off their piped water supply.
Voter Registration: Registration was scheduled to close on August 4. After a two-day extension, the voter registration closed on August 6 (registration was extended until August 8 for sites outside of East Timor). The total number of individuals registered far exceeds original UNAMET estimates, and it appears that a very high percentage of eligible voters registered, despite persistent harassment and insecurity. UNAMET preliminary registration figures show 433,576 individuals have registered within East Timor and 12, 680 have registered outside East Timor for a total of 446,256. The Carter Center is particularly encouraged by indications that the large majority of internally displaced persons were able to register and intend to vote.
The Role of UNAMET: UNAMET has successfully completed the voter registration exercise under difficult conditions, and DEOs and other UNAMET staff continued to exhibit a high level of professionalism and competence at registration sites visited by Carter Center observers. The Center is encouraged by UNAMET plans to conduct grass-roots voter education programs over the coming weeks. The Center is concerned, however, that UNAMET continues to operate in many areas under conditions that are clearly not conducive to a free and open democratic process. Intimidation of and attacks on UNAMET local staff are particularly worrying. It is essential that the UN and Indonesian police provide adequate protection for all UNAMET staff, especially the thousands of Timorese employees who have been put at risk by virtue of their employment.
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Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 5
August 9-16, 1999
(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the popular consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. Ten Carter Center observers have been traveling throughout East Timor since July 4 to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the fifth in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation.)
The popular consultation moved into a new phase this week, with the end of the registration process and the beginning of the political campaign period, which is scheduled to run through August 27. As the campaign period begins, The Carter Center notes no significant improvements in the security situation in East Timor or fulfillment by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) of its security obligations under the May 5 New York agree- ments. Indonesian Army, police, and civil officials have failed to intervene against or have actively participated in attacks on pro-independence supporters’ activities.
The Carter Center does note the recently announced change in military command in Dili. Further, the U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Jamsheed Marker has issued a statement concerning Indonesian military support for pro-integration militias, assuring that measures are being taken to correct the situation.
Nevertheless, of particular concern to The Carter Center observers during the past week were the following developments:
✔ Intimidation, including explicit death threats, of UNAMET personnel, which has continued in several districts. In one location, UNAMET CIVPOLs officials were assaulted while attempting to protect students who were being attacked by pro-integration militia.
✔ Harassment of pro-independence elements, particularly students and National Council of Timorese Resis- tance (CNRT) political party workers, which has increased sharply in some locations.
✔ A substantial increase in the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), with thousands of new IDPs in Viqueque, where an Aug. 11 attack resulted in two deaths, and a worsening of conditions of IDPs in Suai and Same.
Carter Center observers also collected further information that reinforces our previous reports. This includes continued examples of the Indonesian military (TNI) supporting and directing armed pro-integration militias and the police watching passively as militia attacked pro-independence groups, although in at least one case police protected the opening of a CNRT office.
New evidence also shows a strengthening of existing militias and a spread across East Timor of more aggressive pro-integration militias. GOI officials continue to actively campaign for the integration option, and to provide food, other resources, and support to pro-integration groups. Carter Center observers also have seen an un- evenly balanced distribution of campaign opportunities in some districts.
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Meanwhile, there has been no perceptible movement toward the concentration of TNI troops into district centers, nor has there been any reduction in TNI troops in East Timor. In fact, according to one authoritative report, troop strength is being reinforced.
To date, we have seen little demonstration of GOI behavior designed to create the necessary conditions for a free, open, and democratic consultation in East Timor. There remains widespread concern that continued insecurity could jeopardize the consultation process. ______
This report is based on interviews with the Commission for Peace and Stability, police, military, local govern- ment and church officials, local residents, internally displaced persons, students, and militia members. It also includes interviews with Indonesian Government civilian, military, and police officials; Timorese non-govern- mental organizations; UNAMET officials; diplomats; and representatives of international organizations. Addi- tional interviews were conducted with diplomats, members of pro-integration groups (which favor the autonomy option for East Timor), members of pro-independence groups, and others. All interviews were held in Bobonaro, Dili, Baucau, Lautem, Viqueque, Ainaro, Manufahi and Covalima districts during the past week.
Physical Attacks and Intimidation: The Aug. 11 attack on the newly-opened student office in Viqueque was the most serious act of intimidation since April. Two persons were killed and at least three wounded in the attack. Two international journalists had to take shelter for 45 minutes while firing continued. Some residents fled 10 miles to Ossu.
Meanwhile, security forces and pro-integration militias continued to threaten and intimidate others across East Timor. Center observers in Baucau noted the unusual presence of Aitarak militia in that district. Two Indone- sian air force fighter aircraft swooped low Aug. 12 over the church in the town of Suai (simulating a bombing attack). On Aug. 13, in Dili’s old market area, TNI soldiers and Aitarak militia reportedly fired scores of rounds into the air. Residents considered the firing as intimidation on the eve of the campaign period.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): Numbers of IDPs increased significantly this week. A reported 5,000 persons fled the Viqueque attack. Their flight is the largest such movement since April. Some of them who had taken refuge in Ossu sub-district told Carter Center observers that militia members threatened with death all young men over age 15. In Suai, some 700 new IDPs joined others at the church. They told Carter Center observers that pro-integration militia threats had caused them to leave villages elsewhere in Covalima district. In Ritabou, Bobonoro, 62 new IDPs fled in fear.
In Covalima, church officials reported that fear of militia on the roads prevented food convoys from reaching IDPs. In Covalima and Manufahi, church officials said supplies of food, water, and medicine were exhausted.
Political Campaign: Preparations for the campaign period proceeded through the week. On Aug. 8, the two sides agreed on a code of conduct and the two symbols (pro-independence and pro-integra- tion) to be used. While the symbols contain some similar elements, no one with whom Carter Center observers have spoken has expressed concern that this would lead to confusion. Plans for campaigning in the districts vary widely. In Bobonaro, three pro-integration groups have been allocated three days each for exclusive campaign- ing, while the pro-independence CNRT will have only three days in total. In contrast, in Baucau, the pro- integration party and the pro-independence party have agreed
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to share campaign days but in separate locations.
The Role of the Police: Failure of the Indonesian police to live up to their obligations under the May 5 New York agreements continues. Police units have not assumed responsibility for protecting the population, nor do they appear seriously to be investigating politically-related incidents reported to them. Police units failed to take action to protect pro-independence groups and foreign journalists during the Aug. 11 attack in Viqueque. The police should be commended, however, for successfully providing security at the Aug. 13 opening of the CNRT office in Suai.
The Role of the Military: Deployment of TNI units across East Timor down to small hamlet-based units has not changed. Repeated promises from government sources that such units will be “cantoned” at the district level have not been met. Carter Center personnel have observed TNI trucks filled with armed soldiers on full alert, apparently on patrol. Furthermore, a senior international observer reported that TNI personnel from West Timor have reinforced locally-based troops. Meanwhile, intimidation by the Indonesian military also continued, including TNI soldiers participating in an Aug. 11 attack on pro-independence activists in Viqueque.
The Role of UNAMET: UNAMET’s successful coordination of the approval of a campaign code of conduct and polling symbols is a mark of the respect which most parties accord it. In the two districts for which we have evidence, UNAMET and The Commission for Peace and Stability (KPS) have played supportive roles in getting the parties together to plan for the campaign. Still, UNAMET’s ability to function during the rest of the consul- tation will remain dependent on the perceived security of its local staff, many of whom are being put at risk by their employment. Thus it remains essential that UN and Indonesian authorities allocate increased attention to the matter.
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Carter Center Weekly Report on East Timor, No. 6
August 16-22, 1999
(Background: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and The Carter Center are closely monitoring the popular consultation process on autonomy in East Timor. Ten Carter Center observers have been traveling throughout East Timor since July 4 to assess preparations for the vote, the security environment, and the fairness of the campaign, while remaining strictly neutral and nonpartisan. The following is the sixth in a series of weekly reports to be issued by The Carter Center observer mission before and after the consultation.)
The first full week in the campaign phase of the East Timor Popular Consultation was completed but marred by escalating violence, especially in the western districts. While there was some positive signs that the Indonesian police had begun to establish security, there also were accounts of violence that again implicated the Indonesian military in support of pro-integration militia forces. This ongoing violence is particularly troubling as the cam- paign phase, which began August 14, has less than one week remaining ahead of the August 30 vote.
The Campaign Process: In many areas, pro-integration and pro-independence organizations were working closely with UNAMET to address potential obstacles in the campaign process. For instance, in Ermera, pro-integration and pro-indepen- dence leaders have signed a memorandum of reconciliation in which they promise to conduct a safe, orderly campaign. Although many of the campaign rallies have run smoothly in some districts, militia attacks and intimidation keep many citizens from participating in others. Carter Center observers in several districts have collected evidence that pro-integration militias have threatened and assaulted those who have participated in pro-independence rallies.
Over the last week, pro-integration rallies held parades and convoys throughout East Timor. Pro-integration stickers, posters, and banners have been placed on vehicles and public spaces. Some pro-integration organiza- tions distribute rice and building materials to villages as part of their campaign strategy to win support from the rural Timorese poor. In many areas, pro-integration organizations such as the East Timor Popular Front (BRTT), the Unified Forum for Justice and Democracy, (FPDK), and Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi (PPI), have organized under the party umbrella, UNIF.
CNRT, the political arm of the pro-independence resistance, has opened several new offices, including those in Los Palos, Baucau, and Covalima. Efforts by CNRT to open offices in other districts continue to be met with resistance. In Bobonaro, the district government continues to refuse the establishment of a CNRT branch in that district. After the disturbances in Maliana on August 18, part of the CNRT leadership in Bobonaro has sought refuge in the district police headquarters. Existing CNRT offices and the offices of student groups which have common pro-independence aims have been attacked in several areas during the past week. On August 19, the CNRT office in Manatuto was attacked by pro-integration militias. In Suai, the day after the CNRT held a large procession on August 18, militia members threw a hand grenade (which did not explode), attacked inter- nally displaced persons (IDPs) and upset market stands, church officials told a Center observer.
Indonesian Police: There were some signs that the Indonesian police (POLRI) have begun to assert the authority for establishing security that the May 5 New York Agreements assign to them. In village Libaloa, Liquica district, for example,
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police established a post that enabled a group of IDPs to return to their homes. Further, in Bobonaro on August 19, police reportedly attempted to intervene when pro-integration supporters attacked a student office. None- theless, police responded tardily or remained passive in several instances. In Suai, for example, police only intervened after pro-integration militias had destroyed market property, damaged an UNAMET vehicle, beaten IDPs, wrecked a church office, and the Church priest and nuns physically put themselves between the attackers and the IDPs.
Physical Attacks and Intimidation: Militia-led attacks and intimidation continued in some districts escalated this week, most noticeably in Bobonaro and Suai. An August 18 militia attack on student groups in Bobonaro district left several injured. Center observers also interviewed two men who were beaten by Dadurus Merah Putih (DMP) militia members on the day before the attack. On August 19 in Suai armed Laksaur and Mahidi militias attacked a group of 2,400 IDPs gathered on church grounds.
Accounts of violence once again implicated the Indonesian military (TNI) in the support of militia activity. Apparent attempts to intimidate UNAMET foreign and local staff continued in Bobonaro and Suai and in some cases became more violent. There were first time reports of attacks against UNAMET staff this week in Lautem. Carter Center observers found no evidence to substantiate pro-integration allegations of attacks and intimidation by the pro-independence CNRT and student organizations.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): The plight of IDPs continued to worsen in some places. In Viqueque, UNAMET officials reported that 1200- 1500 people were still in Ossu or the surrounding mountains. Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa students reported that food and medicine were critically low for the 50-80 persons whom they had registered. In Suai, the numbers of those sheltering at the Catholic church increased substantially for the second consecutive week, to about 2,500. Following the disturbances of August 19, the leader of the Laksaur militia, who is a government official, forcibly stopped the supply of water to the IDPs, whose condition became even more critical. The district chief, UNAMET sources report, would not give permission for the planned relief convoy on August 20. A delegation of U.S. Senators Harkin and Reed and Congressman James McGovern went to Suai on August 21, talked with the refugees and discussed their conditions with local officials. As of August 22, the water supply has been resumed.
Observers: The number of consultation process observer groups, both domestic and foreign, continued to build, with some 2,000 have been accredited by UNAMET to date. A spokesman for the pro-integration organization, FPDK, said he planned to bring in 400 persons from outside East Timor, but UNAMET says no action was taken to seek accreditation. Still, 23 new groups, who will be coordinated by the Indonesian Government’s East Timor Task Force, are expected to arrive soon.
Falintil: On August 20, Falintil held simultaneous ceremonies in its three cantonments to celebrate its 24th anniversary. The celebration went smoothly, without violent incident, and attracted thousands of supporters. Many pro- independence supporters also explained that these celebrations conveniently drew thousands of youths from the towns, thereby minimizing contact between opposing parties and decreasing likelihood of clashes during the campaign period. Falintil’s non-confrontational posture remains unchanged. While the pro-integration side told
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us that Falintil members were responsible for provoking attacks in Bobonaro, Suai and Viqueque. Carter Center observers who were in these areas during of after the incidents, however, found no credible evidence to support these accusations. At the Region 2/3, however, Carter Center observers saw about 150 Falintil members armed with modern rifles and others using two-way radios (both are illegal in Indonesia).
Post-Ballot Period: Post-ballot arrangements as provided by the May 5 Agreements are assuming more importance. A political leader reported that a meeting was planned in Jakarta among Timorese political leaders, GOI officials, and UNAMET on August 22 that is expected to lead toward establishment of an advisory commission. The Agree- ments call for an advisory council to be named after the ballot and before the result is announced. Political leaders report also their increased communications with members of opposing parties, militias, and Falintil.
This report is based on field visits to Covalima, Ainaro, Bobonaro, Ermera, Liquica, Manatuto, Baucau, Viqueque, and Dili districts, and on meetings with Indonesian civil, military and police officials, East Timorese pro-integration (favoring continued links with Indonesia) and pro-independence political leaders and support- ers, militia members, Falintil representatives, UNAMET officials, representatives of Timorese and international non-governmental organizations, diplomats and journalists.
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Carter Center Report on East Timor, No. 7
Preliminary Statement Assessment of the East Timor Public Consultation Process September 1, 1999
The popular consultation on the future of East Timor, held Aug. 30, 1999, was marred by numerous instances of intimidation and violence prior to the vote. Nevertheless, on balloting day eligible voters turned out in impres- sively large numbers - more than 95 percent according to preliminary reports - to express their opinion in a well- administered and largely peaceful exercise. At the same time, however, violence or the threat of violence overhangs a process of which the consultation was only an early part.
Consistent with its mandate, the Center has taken a strictly neutral and non-partisan approach toward the substantive questions involved in the act of popular consultation organized by UNAMET and held on August 30. The Center’s long-term observers produced six weekly reports documenting their findings during the registration and campaign phases. Nine short-term observers joined them after August 24 to monitor even more closely the final campaign period leading up to the popular consultation.*
SPECIFIC FINDINGS
Peaceful Conduct on Ballot Day The Carter Center’s observers were impressed by peaceful conditions and the lack of violence either witnessed directly or reliably reported to them at the majority of polling stations visited on the day of the popular consulta- tion in East Timor.
This finding has specific significance for the sub-districts of Dili, Los Palos, and Maliana, where security condi- tions in recent days had deteriorated and violent acts had been widely anticipated by UNAMET.
In Suai, reconciliation organized by local priests and presided over by Bishop Belo diffused hostilities between opposing factions in the district of Covalima. This could provide a model for other areas of East Timor.
High Voter Turnout Preliminary reports state that voter turnout across East Timor was more than 95 percent of nearly 450,000 registered voters. This extremely high level of participation occurred even in the context of serious pre-electoral intimidation, harassment, and violence (including murders) reported by The Carter Center in earlier public statements and attributable primarily, but not exclusively, to pro-integration militia.
In many places, voters lined up hours before the 6:30 a.m. opening of the polls. In other locations, many voters arrived the previous night and waited for the polling stations to open the next day. Thousands of voters, includ- ing many elderly people, walked great distances to cast their vote.
UNAMET Administration of the Ballot In general, Carter Center observers reported that UNAMET staff did an excellent job in administering the ballot. With a few exceptions, polling stations opened on time, with all electoral materials present in sufficient
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quantity. UNAMET staff, with very few exceptions, ensured the secrecy of the vote, with voters being processed in an orderly, efficient, and timely manner.
Of particular note, the Indonesian police cooperated with UNAMET civilian police at nearly all the observed polling stations to ensure a peaceful and orderly balloting process.
UNAMET’s East Timor local staff appeared well-organized and dedicated. Their conduct in circumstances of considerable risk and tension remained highly professional.
Incidents of Violence Even before the registration period, and through campaigning, the popular consultation process was marred by unacceptable levels of violence and threats of violence, which included killings, injuries, house burnings, and intimidation.
While the reality of balloting day fortunately did not match earlier fears, serious acts of violence did take place. The Center’s observers found that armed militias favoring the pro-integration position were more responsible for these abuses than supporters of independence. Nonetheless, abuses unquestionably occurred on both sides.
Of great concern was the murder of a local UNAMET staff member in the Ermera region, immediately after the closing of the ballot. In several instances, The Carter Center’s observers witnessed UNAMET local staff banding together to travel out of the polling area after receiving threats to their safety.
Apart from tension and violence on polling day itself, casualties and violence occurred during the four days leading up to the ballot, including the following:
✔ In Dili on August 26, fighting erupted between pro-integration and pro-independence supporters. At least five people from both sides died as a result, some of whom were killed by pro-independence elements
✔ In Los Palos on August 27, a prominent supporter of the National Timorese Restistance Council (CNRT) was murdered. The Center’s observers received credible reports that the killing was the work of pro-au- tonomy elements: possibly even including the government district chief. Local CNRT leaders fled the town, and by midday on the 30th they had not returned to vote.
✔ In Memo, just outside the town of Maliana, pro-integration militia killed two men and burned down at least 22 houses on August 27. Arsonists also burned down houses in Ailco, Dili, and Liquica during the week leading up to the ballot.
Intimidation and Harassment On polling day itself, UNAMET staff felt obliged to close seven polling centers as a result of well-founded fear of intimidation. In none of these cases, however, did the affected polling stations remain closed for more than two- and-a-half hours.
In some areas Carter Center observers directly witnessed instances of pro-integration militia intimidating voters. In others, in others they saw individuals instruct people how to cast their vote. In most of these cases, UNAMET civilian police (and on occasion, the Indonesian police as well) successfully intervened to persuade
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these people to desist from this type of disruption.
Several occasions amounted to improper influence. In Liquica, for example, the start of a funeral procession organized to mourn a pro-autonomy supporter killed during the previous day coincided with balloting underway in an adjacent building. The presence in the procession of at least 40-50 militia members was intimidating to voters waiting nearby.
In another example, a villager in the Tapo area rang a village alarm bell after being threatened by pro-integration militia members. As a result, at least 300 voters fled the area. The polling station closed for nearly half an hour. UNAMET officials later reported that most of those who fled later returned to the polling station.
Technical Irregularities In some polling stations throughout East Timor, Carter Center observers witnessed various problems involving the control of enthusiastic crowds waiting to vote, especially during the early morning hours. UNAMET officials generally requested help from the Indonesian police to control the crowds - a step that appeared to violate UNAMET rules requiring police and others to remain at least 100 meters from polling station perimeters at all times. (In The Carter Center’s view, however, the beneficial cooperation between UNAMET and local police outweighed any negative impact of the police intrusion.)
In a few areas, UNAMET did not have equipment necessary to check voters for indelible ink. In one station, UNAMET officials told Carter Center observers that nine duplicate ballots had been cast - a result of clerical errors by local staff.
In the village of Maliubu, Carter Center observers on two occasions witnessed UNAMET local staff guiding elderly voters into the polling booth and doing the voting for them. When made aware of this serious violation, UNAMET election officials repeatedly instructed local staff to cease such activity.
POST-BALLOT RECONCILIATION EFFORTS While gratified by the absence of major disruption to the August 30 vote, The Carter Center takes the view that the just-concluded act of popular consultation must be seen within a larger context of political transition in East Timor. Democracy, let alone reconciliation, does not arise from one credible act of electoral participation. The basic task is reconciliation: contending groups, long at loggerheads, must seek new and peaceful ways to achieve democratic governance.
Despite underlying tension and a climate of fear, UNAMET and the Indonesian police achieved a considerable degree of security for the electoral exercise conducted August 30. The next steps, however, and whatever the result of the voting may be, point toward a more demanding period - one in which old adversaries must begin to accommodate themselves to a new and hitherto untried environment - one in which the Indonesian govern- ment, the international community, and local political forces must construct an orderly transition process.
Up to now, the performance of the various consultative mechanisms has been mixed. In some areas, district- level Commissions for Peace and Stability (known as Sub-KPS) created to reach accord on local codes of con- ducts and other confidence-building measures have exceeded expectations. In Baucau, for example, the Sub- KPS achieved a distinct improvement in relations between contending forces. In other districts, however, the KPS has been almost entirely absent.
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What is clear is that future reconciliation remains a matter that the East Timorese must achieve among them- selves. Outsiders cannot dictate the result. In particular, the encouraging degree of cooperation achieved with the Indonesian police force in many localities on polling day points to new opportunities to try to consolidate on-the-ground security in East Timor.
CONCLUSION As we reflect on the importance and largely peaceful conduct of the August 30 ballot, we cannot ignore the violence and intimidation that permeated the pre-ballot period and then resumed in some areas immediately after the polls closed. Such acts are unacceptable and must cease. Not to do so amounts to a betrayal of the courage displayed by the East Timorese people on August 30th and fails to fulfill the obligations agreed to by all parties.
* End Note: Carter Center personnel visited all but one of East Timor’s 13 districts during the pre-ballot period. On polling day, the 15 Carter Center election observers, comprising seven teams, visited seven of East Timor’s 13 districts, 27 sub-districts, 43 polling stations of the 700 stations located within those centers. The districts visited by Carter Center observers included Baucau, Bobonaro, Covalima, Dili, Lautem, Liquica, and Viqueque. While the delegation believes that the cross-section of polling centers visited was indicative of the territory as a whole, it is important to acknowledge that the sites visited are only a sample of centers in the territory.
In both Dili and the regions, observers met with representatives of Indonesian civilian, military, and police officials; East Timorese pro-integration and pro-independence political leaders and supporters; militia members; Falintil representatives; UNAMET officials; representatives of Timorese and international non-governmental organizations; diplomats; and journalists.
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Carter Center Report on East Timor, No. 8
September 6, 1999
Carter Center Staff Evacuate East Timor; Center Joins Call for International Intervention if Indonesian Government Fails to Act
The Carter Center has been forced by militia attacks in East Timor to evacuate its remaining three international staff members from the territory. Their reports from Jakarta of the events they witnessed just prior to leaving the East Timor capital of Dili conclusively show complicity of Indonesian forces, both police and military, with the armed gangs terrorizing and displacing the local East Timorese populace. This includes militias’ efforts to drive international observers, journalists, and U.N. staff out of East Timor.
This violent situation is not chaotic, but rather appears to follow a plan, since Indonesian forces openly tolerate or even support assaults and killing of unarmed civilians by the militias. The Indonesian government has repeatedly pledged to take steps to stop the violence and has sufficient forces in East Timor to do so, but no action to stop the rampaging militias is evident in Dili or elsewhere in East Timor. At the very least, insubordi- nation of military forces in the territory to higher command officials is occurring. Immediate changes in com- mand and public issuance of orders to the military to use force to stop the militias are required.
If the U.N. ambassadorial delegation determines that the Indonesian government is not prepared to reverse this situation immediately, every step should be taken to get President B.J. Habibie to agree to the introduction of armed international peacekeeping forces.
Carter Center observers, now stationed in Jakarta, have confirmed the following incidents through direct observation or reliable reports from eyewitnesses in East Timor:
✔ Since the vote results were announced on Saturday, armed pro-integration militia members have erected roadblocks throughout Dili and control the streets of the capital at all hours of the day. Militia members are: terrorizing and murdering unarmed civilians; intimidating, threatening, and attacking international personnel; burning houses; and displacing large numbers of people. Carter Center observers have on numer- ous occasions witnessed militia members perpetrating acts of violence in full view of heavily-armed police and military personnel who either stand by and watch or actively assist the militias.
✔ On Monday afternoon, Sept. 6, in Dili, reports were received that thousands of internally displaced persons were being taken from their places of refuge in Dili by police and loaded on trucks headed for West Timor.
✔ Over the weekend, militia members attacked and burned the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the residence of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Bishop Carlos Belo, and other places of refuge, forcing thousands of internally displaced people sheltered in those places to flee.
✔ Carter Center observers contacted officials at one Catholic mission in Dili that was sheltering several thousand internally displaced persons. They said armed militia had removed all young men from the compound on Monday evening. Their current whereabouts and condition is unknown.
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✔ Carter Center observers were attacked by militia at the port of Dili as they attempted to evacuate the Carter Center’s local East Timorese staff on Sunday. After being pursued through the city by armed militia and by Indonesian police, the Center’s international observers were evacuated to Jakarta with the help of the Australian consulate and the U.S. Embassy. Carter Center local staff are still scattered in Dili and unac- counted for.
✔ International press and observers were forced at gunpoint by Indonesian police to evacuate their hotels and residences on Sunday and Monday and driven to the airport. A small number of international journalists refused to leave and some are now taking refuge at UNAMET headquarters.
✔ There has been almost constant automatic weapon fire around and over UNAMET headquarters since Saturday evening. On Sunday night several thousand internally displaced persons sheltered in a school adjacent to UNAMET headquarters were forced to flee into the U.N. compound after automatic weapons with tracer bullets were fired over their heads. An estimated 2,000 people have now taken refuge in the U.N. compound.
✔ UNAMET has been forced to evacuate all eight of their regional offices and on Monday evacuated a large number of international staff from UNAMET headquarters in Dili. U.N. vehicles carrying evacuees to the airport on Monday were fired upon.
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Carter Center Report on East Timor, No. 9
September 13, 1999
Indonesian Armed Forces Continue Campaign of Murder, Violence, and Massive Forced Deportation in East Timor as Militias Terrorize Refugees in West Timor
The Carter Center is encouraged by the decision of the Indonesian government to allow the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in East Timor. However, the Indonesian military and police, with the assis- tance of their militia surrogates, continue to murder and terrorize the people of East Timor, destroying buildings and infrastructure and forcibly expelling tens of thousands of unarmed civilians from the territory. The city of Dili, the capital of East Timor, has been almost completely destroyed over the past week, and reports from other parts of the territory indicate widespread destruction, looting, and murder. It is clear that the Indonesian armed forces are executing a deliberate, planned campaign under the direction of senior military commanders to destroy and forcibly depopulate East Timor.
In West Timor armed pro-integration militias are now operating with official support, openly terrorizing the more than 100,000 East Timorese refugees who have been forced over the border. Those displaced by the violence, both in East Timor and West Timor, now face the threat of malnutrition and disease as domestic and interna- tional humanitarian efforts are hampered by militia and military activity and Indonesian government efforts to block access to refugee camps.
Carter Center staff and observers, forced at gunpoint to evacuate Dili Sept. 5 and now reporting from several locations throughout Indonesia, have confirmed the following through eyewitness accounts from reliable sources:
✔ Refugees fleeing East Timor have been subject to extreme intimidation and acts of violence. The Carter Center has confirmed that pro-integration militia members murdered approximately 35 young men traveling on the Dobon Solo ferry from Dili to Kupang on Tuesday, Sept. 7, and dumped their bodies overboard.
✔ In the attack at Bishop Belo’s compound last week, militiamen hacked to death with machetes some 40 refugees in the courtyard while TNI soldiers fired into the bishop’s residence from the street. A military ambulance later came and removed all but two of the bodies.
✔ In an Indonesian television interview, Rui Lopez, a militia leader, admitted that Indonesian civilian police and military officials in Suai, East Timor, held a meeting before announcement of balloting results and were given instructions to attack UNAMET offices, burn the town of Suai, and drive the population into West Timor.
✔ There are now more than 100,000 refugees from East Timor in West Timor and on the islands of Flores and Alor, and estimates of the total number of people displaced from the territory range from 120,000 to 200,000 (nearly one-fourth of the entire population). Refugees have been transported by Indonesian military ships and aircraft to a number of locations within Indonesia, including Irian Jaya, Ambon, Sulawesi, Surabaya, and Bali, some of which are thousands of kilometers from East Timor.
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✔ Pro-integration militias are now active throughout West Timor, particularly in the towns of Atambua and Kupang. Eyewitnesses report that militia members have entered refugee camps with lists of names of sup- porters of independence, and that a number of individuals have been removed from camps or executed in the camps by militiamen. Militia members armed with automatic weapons also have been seen stopping and searching vehicles in central Kupang and driving looted UNAMET vehicles in and out of the provincial police headquarters.
✔ The Indonesian military and police have prevented international aid workers, journalists, and observers from visiting refugee camps in West Timor and from interviewing Timorese refugees.
✔ Eyewitnesses report that the Indonesian military and police have joined in the looting and destruction of Dili. Indonesian soldiers and police officers have frequently sold looted food and other basic necessities to refugees under their control at exorbitant prices.
✔ It is now apparent that militia violence has been targeted at political, social, and religious leaders, and a number of priests and nuns have been murdered during militia and military attacks on churches sheltering those seeking refuge from the violence.
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Carter Center Report on East Timor, No. 10
September 22, 1999
Indonesian Security Forces Persecute East Timorese Refugees in Java and Bali.
The carefully planned campaign of violence and terror carried out by the Indonesian security forces and their militia surrogates in East Timor and in West Timor over the past several weeks has spread throughout Indonesia. Carter Center observers have gathered first-hand evidence of systematic efforts by the Indonesian military, police, local government officials, members of Timorese pro-autonomy groups, and armed militias to harass and terrorize refugees from East Timor who have taken refuge in Bali and several cities on the island of Java, includ- ing the Indonesian capital of Jakarta.
Reports from East Timor indicate that the Indonesian security forces and paramilitary militias continue to loot, burn, and destroy houses and infrastructure throughout the territory, including areas outside Dili. The capital city of Dili was already laid waste by these activities. A steady stream of refugees continued to cross the border into West Timor over the past week, and armed militias control refugee camps in Atambua, Kupang, and on the island of Alor, frustrating the efforts of both domestic and international relief agencies.
Carter Center staff and observers, forced at gunpoint by militia and Indonesian police to evacuate Dili on Sept. 5 and now reporting from various locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia, have confirmed the following through eyewitness accounts from reliable sources:
✔ Indonesian police officers and militiamen murdered at least one refugee from East Timor who was travelling Sept. 13 by sea from Kupang to Bali. A group of armed police officers wearing the t-shirts of Kontingen Lorosai (the special police contingent sent to East Timor to oversee security for the consultation) dragged two Timorese refugees from their room on the passenger ferry “Anu” and beat them severely before taking one of the refugees away. A self-proclaimed member of the Aitarak militia entered the room a short time later and boasted to the wife of the missing man, “I wouldn’t bother looking for your husband because I killed him myself.”
✔ Refugees from East Timor continue to be harassed, intimidated, and forced to flee from places in which they have sought refuge in the cities of Denpasar, Surabaya, Malang, Solo, Yogyakarta, and Jakarta. Indonesian military and police, with the assistance of local government officials, members of the FPDK (a pro-au- tonomy umbrella organization), and suspected militia members, have ordered churches, hotels, boarding houses, and neighborhood residents to report the presence of Timorese refugees and have threatened those people who shelter refugees.
✔ Prominent Indonesian officials have made public statements designed to arouse public sentiments against East Timorese refugees and residents in Java. Several hundred Timorese refugees and students have been driven out of Yogyakarta and other Javanese cities over the past several days, and many have sought shelter in Jakarta.
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✔ In Bali, Indonesian police and military officials have visited places where refugees are sheltering and threat- ened that a “sweeping operation” is underway to arrest and drive refugees out of their places of refuge. Indonesian soldiers and FPDK members also have approached and threatened Timorese residents in neigh- borhoods with a high concentration of refugees, barring access to banks, shops, and telephone bureaus. Soldiers, FPDK members, and militiamen have even carried out open acts of intimidation in popular tourist areas such as Kuta and central Denspar.
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Carter Center Report on East Timor, No. 11
September 28, 1999
Refugees from East Timor Face Continuing Campaign of Terror and Intimidation Throughout Indonesia
The Indonesian security forces and their pro-integration militia surrogates are continuing their relentless cam- paign of intimidation, terror, and forced relocation of East Timorese refugees, more than three weeks after the announcement of the results of the popular consultation. Timorese refugees face ongoing intimidation and violence in East and west Timor, Java, Bali, Irian Jaya, Flores, and Alor, and are now being driven from their places of refuge or held in militia-controlled camps in Sumatra and Sulawesi. Refugees continue to flee or be forced out of East Timor, despite the presence of the multinational force in Dili. A large number of refugees from Liquica District arrived in Atambua, west Timor several days ago.
Reports of atrocities continue to emerge from East Timor as security in the territory slowly improves. The Carter Center has received a growing number of credible accounts of killings, abductions and disappearances committed by the Indonesian military, police and pro-Indonesian militias throughout East Timor, as well as descriptions of refugees being singled out and killed in west Timor.
Carter Center staff and observers, reporting from various locations in Indonesia and Darwin, Australia, have confirmed the following through eyewitness accounts from reliable sources:
✔ The condition of many East Timorese refugees in camps in west Timor is deteriorating as continued militia and military activity prevents international aid organizations from providing adequate assistance. Eyewit- nesses report that refugee camps near Atambua and Kupang remain under the effective control of the militias, with a heavy military and police presence. Pro-independence refugees are being held in camps with virtually no sanitation, fresh water or access to the food that the Indonesian government is providing to pro- autonomy refugees. International staff members of aid organizations continue to be virtually barred from the entire Atambua area, where more than 100,000 refugees are thought to be sheltering, despite public assur- ances from President Habibie that groups such as the UNHCR and UNICEF would be given full access to all refugee camps in west Timor.
✔ The Indonesian military and members of pro-integration militias are reported to be forcing East Timorese refugees and local residents to join militia groups in the Atambua area of west Timor. This forced recruit- ment is occurring in an environment in which armed militias continue to operate with impunity in the refugee camps, interrogating, beating and abducting refugees and searching out pro-independence activists whose names appear on militia blacklists.
✔ Armed members of the Aitarak militia are now in control of three camps housing more than 3,600 East Timorese refugees in Ujung Pandang on the island of Sulawesi. Refugees arriving in Sulawesi have been met at the dock by officials of the Indonesian Transmigration Department and some have been immediately moved to transmigration schemes where the Indonesian government says they are now permanently re- settled. The local government and militias have barred both domestic and international organizations from interviewing or assisting refugees in Sulawesi, and it is unclear if those sent to transmigration sites are willing participants in the resettlement scheme.
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✔ Timorese refugees, students and local residents in Bali, Java, and Sumatra face continued harassment and intimidation by Indonesian security forces, local government officials, and suspected militia members. A large number of Timorese residents in Sumatra have been forced to flee to Jakarta to escape ongoing intimi- dation, and many refugees in Jakarta, Denpasar, and other Indonesian cities are forced to move frequently from house to house to avoid repeated visits and threats from soldiers and police.
✔ The Carter Center has received a number of credible reports of killings and other atrocities committed by the Indonesian security forces and pro-integration militias over the past few days. These reports describe the abduction, disappearance or murder of suspected supporters of independence, priests, nuns and unarmed civilians in both East and west Timor.
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Carter Center Report on East Timor, No. 12
December 15, 1999
Carter Center Sends Mission to East Timor for Final “Public Consultation” Status Report and to Asses Democratic Governance Needs in the Transition to Independence
Members of a Carter Center assessment team recently completed a mission to East Timor to prepare a democratic governance needs assessment study in support of the transition to a democratic and independent East Timor. The seven person team included human rights and democratic development experts, academics, Carter Center staff members and members for the Center’s observation mission to East Timor that monitored and reported on the popular consultation process from July to October this year. The team met with representatives of Timorese non-governmental organizations, women’s groups, students, media workers, church representatives, members of the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) and members of the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), as well as CNRT President Xanana Gusmao CNRT vice-president and Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos Horta and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sergio Vieira de Mella.
Preliminary observations of the mission indicate that:
The security situation throughout East Timor has improved greatly and INTERFET peacekeepers have firm control of all parts of the territory. The threat of militia violence within East Timor has virtually disappeared.
In addition to the need to rebuild from scratch all governance structures, East Timor faces a looming health crisis and humanitarian concerns remain very high. The large majority of the Timorese population does not have adequate shelter, and diarrheal diseases have increased with the arrival of the rainy season and a continuing shortage of medical supplies. A serious outbreak of tuberculosis threatens the lives of thousands of people as poor road conditions and a lack of adequate transportation hinder the work of international and local aid agencies that are struggling to reach remote areas with food and medical assistance.
Though the team did not visit Indonesian Western Timor, all credible reports indicate that more than 150,000 East Timorese refugees remain in Indonesia, with many living under extremely poor conditions in militia and military-controlled camps. UN and international aid agencies feel the need to employ armed military guards to visit many camps due to constant harassment, threats and intimidation by armed militia. The flow of returning refugees has slowed to almost nothing in recent weeks, despite assurances from the Indonesian government and military that militias would be disarmed and refugees would allow to return home unhindered.
Relations between UNTAET and CNRT have improved markedly in recent weeks, with effective cooperation and coordination at the national level. UNTAET has made progress in bringing personnel and resources to Dili, but the creation of a transitional administrative structure outside the capital has only just begun.
The leadership of the CNRT and UNTAET have stated their commitment to a participatory and reconciliatory transition process, and CNRT in particular has expressed its support for the creation of a democratic, pluralist, state in East Timor.
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Timorese non-government organizations are eager to play a prominent role in the transition process and to reactivate their networks of activists that existed before the destruction and depopulation experienced in Sep- tember. Many NGO leaders feel marginalized by the overwhelming presence of international organizations and NGOs, but coordination of between national and international groups has improved in recent weeks. While the NGO presence is heavy in Dili, many rural areas have yet to receive outside humanitarian assistance or support for their reconstruction efforts.
International assistance in the area of democratic governance has to date been directed at activities with political and intellectual elites in Dili and Darwin, Australia. This is understandable, given the great disruption experi- enced over the last three months and the lack of adequate transportation and communication infrastructure in the territory: but many Timorese NGOs fear that fundamentally important decisions might be made in the near future without the effective participation of the Timorese people.
The Carter Center opened an office in Dili in early July after being invited by then President of Indonesia, B.J. Habibie, to observe the popular consultation of the future status of East Timor. Carter Center staff and observers were forced to evacuate the territory September 5 by armed militia and Indonesian police but continued to report on the situation in the territory and the plight of the Timorese refugees from several locations in Indoensia and Darwin, Australia. The Center reopened an office with field staff in Dili in November.
The Carter Center released a series of weekly reports on the consultation process from early July until the end of September. A comprehensive final report on the Center’s monitoring program for the popular consultation process will be released in the near future. All Carter Center reports and statements on East Timor are available on its home page on the World Wide Web at www.cartercenter.org under “On-Line Reports”.
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