Rosenbaum on Botzenhart, '"Ein Schattenköæ'ââ¶Nig Ohne Macht

H-German Rosenbaum on Botzenhart, '"Ein SchattenkÖÆ’ÂÂ¶nig ohne Macht will ich nicht sein": Die RegierungstÖÆ’ÂÂ¤tigkeit KÖÆ’ÂÂ¶nig Ludwigs II. von Bayern'

Review published on Friday, September 1, 2006

Christof Botzenhart. "Ein SchattenkÖÆ’ÂÂ¶nig ohne Macht will ich nicht sein": Die RegierungstÖÆ’ÂÂ¤tigkeit KÖÆ’ÂÂ¶nig Ludwigs II. von Bayern. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2004. xxxii + 234 pp. EUR 22.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-3-406-10737-5.

Reviewed by Adam Rosenbaum (Department of History, Emory University) Published on H-German (September, 2006)

Demystifying the Fairy Tale King

Within the field of Bavarian history, no other topic has seen as much ink spilled on it as the brief but colorful life of the region's most notorious monarch, Ludwig II. The common labels of "Swan King" and "Märchenkönig" begin to suggest the extent to which the life of this monarch has been romanticized since his death in 1886. Standard works have reinforced such images by focusing on the more extraordinary elements of the king's life, including his rocky patronage of composer Richard Wagner, his progressively more erratic behavior and rumored mental instability and, of course, the construction of his "fairy tale castles." Few works have challenged the dominant perception of the king as a detached and hopelessly idealistic man with neither a firm grasp on reality nor a discernible interest in everyday affairs of state.

While scholars like Wilhelm Liebhart may have scratched the surface by beginning to examine Ludwig's role in the government, Christof Botzenhart aims to shatter the dominant perception of the king with this monograph.[1] In this ambitiously revisionist work, based on his dissertation of 2003, more well-known episodes of Ludwig's life are bypassed in favor of an analysis of the Bavarian king's political activity and attitudes. Botzenhart's primary thesis is simple: Ludwig II was not the politically indifferent ruler we once took him for. On the contrary, from the very beginning of his reign in 1864, the young king busied himself with current political issues and cultivated regular contact with his ministers. Botzenhart argues further that Ludwig pursued a consistent, twofold agenda during his turbulent reign. First, he was unwavering in his advocacy of the notion that a monarch was the holy and unassailable head of state with absolute power (p. 41). Second, he was determined to protect all elements of Bavarian independence and sovereignty, even after the disheartening events of 1870-71.

In the end, the former concern had more of an impact on the king's attitudes toward the government, and Botzenhart posits that Ludwig's frustration over his diminished status as a constitutional monarch led him to withdraw into seclusion during the final years of his reign. Nevertheless, while he was politically active, the king made rational decisions in pursuit of an unchanging program and displayed no signs of mental deterioration. Ludwig was an astute observer of the political landscape, and according to Botzenhart, he actually recognized the signs of the times with more sensitivity than most of his contemporaries (p. 202). Like many other European monarchs during the latter half of the nineteenth century, Ludwig was distraught over the diminished status and powers of the monarchy.

What made him exceptional was his unwillingness to compromise with the forces of parliamentarianism and an increasingly defeatist attitude that led him essentially to abandon his post by 1886.

Botzenhart elaborates on these arguments by focusing on the political facets of the life of Ludwig II thematically, rather than chronologically. Admittedly, his goal is not to produce an exhaustive analysis of this largely unexamined dimension of Ludwig's life; he merely wants to shed enough light on the subject to build a new and clearer understanding of the king. To achieve this goal, he has turned to a wide variety of archival sources throughout Germany, although the majority of his material is located in the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich. There he had access to the private Wittelsbach collection, which includes the private papers of Ludwig II as well as his correspondence with family members like Ludwig I, Prinz Luitpold, and the future king Ludwig III. The same archives also house the files of the six Bavarian ministries, although much of this collection was damaged during World War II. In addition to this body of sources, Botzenhart turned to private documents such as the king's correspondence with Richard Wagner and his former governess, Sibylle von Leonrod. Botzenhart has also cleverly utilized the diplomatic reports of various ambassadors assigned to Munich, like Prussia's Georg von Werthern, to uncover a different perspective on Ludwig II's political activity.

Relying on standard, traditional sources that have been scrutinized numerous times already, Botzenhart nevertheless succeeds in defending his groundbreaking thesis. Over the course of six chapters that examine topics like Ludwig's political relationship with his family, his attitude toward the Bavarian constitution and his relationship with the three major political parties and his cabinet secretariat, the author paints the picture of a king who was hardly detached from reality. Botzenhart's Ludwig II carefully observed the political current, and often went against it as he desperately insisted on his role as an absolute monarch. For example, in the chapter on the constitution, Botzenhart explains how Ludwig's disapproval of the growing power of his ministers increasingly led him to avoid contact with them. As he could not rule absolutely, Ludwig withdrew and thus inadvertently gave more power to the ministers he rejected. But this step did not lead the king to give up on his dreams of absolutism completely. Early in his reign, Ludwig oversaw the formation of a "coalition" for the abolition of the current Bavarian constitution and the reestablishment of an absolute monarchy. Unfortunately, this organization's powerful enemies, the family of Prince Luitpold and the proponents of ultramontanism, ensured that its activities constantly verged on scandal. Ludwig effectively abandoned the coalition by the end of the 1870s, when he had seemingly given up on reestablishing absolute monarchy in Bavaria. Around this time, he began actively to seek a kingdom outside of Europe. Botzenhart contends that such endeavors were not evidence of insanity or anachronistic idealism; rather, they were the products of Ludwig's unwillingness to cooperate with the forces of parliamentarianism and his resolute desire to rule independently.

In spite of Ludwig's later pessimism, Botzenhart makes it clear that the king showed nothing but enthusiasm at the beginning of his reign. Just two days after his father's death in 1864, the young king requested that all his ministers choose regular times to meet with him to discuss pertinent matters (p. 68). Even though it is undeniable that his political activity slowed down during his final years, statistics easily reveal the degree to which Ludwig remained involved in the affairs of the state throughout his reign. For instance, per year, Ludwig II was presented with approximately seven

Citation: H-Net Reviews. Rosenbaum on Botzenhart, '"Ein SchattenkÖÆ’ÂÂ¶nig ohne Macht will ich nicht sein": Die RegierungstÖÆ’ÂÂ¤tigkeit KÖÆ’ÂÂ¶nig Ludwigs II. von Bayern'. H-German. 09-30-2014. https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/reviews/44799/rosenbaum-botzenhart-ein-schattenk%C3%B6%C3%A6%E2%80%99%C3%A2%C 3%A2%C2%B6nig-ohne-macht-will-ich-nicht Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 2 H-German hundred suggestions by the Ministry of Interior (p. 64). Further evidence of the king's active involvement in the government is simply the number of ministers appointed during his reign. Over the course of twenty-two years, thirty men occupied six positions, while the office of minister- president was held by seven different individuals (p. 74).

Ludwig II had hoped to build a cooperative and conservative Bavarian government that was not dominated by any one political grouping, as he felt that his government should be above political parties. "Kein Freund des Parlamentarismus," the king regarded all political parties with suspicion (p. 101). The pro-Prussia, liberal Fortschrittspartei constituted a clear threat to the independence of his country and was therefore to be monitored and strictly handled. The Bavarian Patriots' Party, which held a majority in the Bavarian Diet since 1866, actually held some priorities in common with the king, as both sought to protect conservative values and the sovereign rights of the kingdom of Bavaria. However, the Patriots' close ties with the Catholic Church and the Ultramontane movement concerned Ludwig, and the party was soon regarded as a dangerous combination of two of the greatest threats to the king's reign: parliamentarianism and ultramontanism. The third political grouping to trouble Ludwig, although it barely constituted a party during his reign, was the Social Democrats. Their revolutionary and anti-royalist rhetoric led Ludwig to demand regular surveillance of their activities, and the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881 only heightened the king's apprehension. Wherever Ludwig turned, he saw threats to his royal position. He was caught between the Scylla of growing Prussian dominance and the Charybdis of political Catholicism, while the inflammatory messages of the Social Democrats posed a threat to his very life.

And yet, Botzenhart demonstrates how Ludwig II, in spite of the difficult circumstances in which he found himself, remained devoted to the twofold agenda of advocating the absolutist rule and protecting the sovereign rights of his kingdom. More than a century later, it may appear as if Ludwig failed miserably at the second task, as Bavaria became part of the German Empire in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. Not only did the king allow this happen, but he also wrote the infamous Kaiserbrief, in which he requested that Wilhelm I of Prussia adopt the title of emperor. Consequently, Ludwig II has been accused of essentially selling out his country in exchange for cash payments organized by Bismarck. Botzenhart paints a different picture of the decision-making process behind the Kaiserbrief, claiming that Ludwig's choice was motivated by other factors. First, the king realized late in 1870 that there was no way to avoid integration in a Prussian-dominated German state. Any foot-dragging on his part would only work against Bavaria's best interests. Second, Ludwig saw that his willingness to offer the throne officially to his uncle would help to guarantee Bavaria a privileged position within the new empire, a position more favorable than those to be occupied by the other southern German kingdoms. For these reasons, Ludwig reluctantly penned theKaiserbrief on November 30, 1870. In exchange, the Kingdom of Bavaria was allowed to retain some vestiges of sovereignty--among them its own postal service and independent foreign policy. Botzenhart maintains that financial compensation played no role in Ludwig's decision to write the letter. In fact, the king did not receive the first payments until spring 1871, when Bismarck began to fear that Ludwig might have second thoughts about unification (pp. 194-195). Therefore, it must be assumed that Ludwig's decision in 1870 was not a result of indifference or selfishness. Instead, the king carefully weighed the alternatives and chose the most favorable option for Bavaria and its people. Here is further proof of Ludwig's consistently rational political activity.

This reevaluation of the motivation behind theKaiserbrief is also another example of how

Botzenhart's work has yielded a significant revision of the dominant Ludwig II myth. By shedding new light on Ludwig's involvement in politics, the author does much to demystify the "fairy-tale king." Botzenhart shows us that reason, and not a lack thereof, was the driving force behind many of Ludwig's decisions. Although it may be somewhat of a stretch to insist that Ludwig withdrew into seclusion during the later years of his reign solely because of his disenchantment with the parliamentary system, his frustration over the unrealized aims of pursuing an absolutist monarchy surely contributed to his declining participation in the government. Botzenhart may also be asking too much from readers by arguing that Ludwig's building projects were not simply flights into fantasy, but instead efforts to construct the symbols of a monarchy that could not be realized in the real world. This is an interesting point, but is it not likely that Ludwig's reconstruction of medieval fortresses and Bourbon palaces was more of a retreat from reality in general? If Ludwig had intended his castles to be physical manifestations of the monarchical tradition that he hoped to revive, than why, as Friedrich Prinz has asked, did he choose such remote locations for his building projects?[2] The palaces were constructed for the king alone, and the thought of the public having access to his beloved castles horrified him. In the end, his monarchical ambitions demystify much of Ludwig's behavior, but not all of it.

This tendency to overstate his case is a minor flaw in an otherwise valuable work for not just Ludwig II buffs, but historians of nineteenth-century Bavaria in general. Botzenhart's story does not concern a king alone, but an entire kingdom in transition. The political landscape changed dramatically during the course of Ludwig's reign and his calculated efforts to fight against numerous currents stand as testament to his exceptional devotion to the values of a rapidly-fading era. Botzenhart has given us a new way of thinking about Ludwig II and this work will surely serve as the foundation for further research on the political dimensions of Ludwig's reign (Botzenhart even offers some potential topics on page 200). In addition to a helpful bibliography, the author has also included an appendix of nearly thirty pages of documents, featuring the very interesting draft of a constitution for Ludwig's planned kingdom in the Canary Islands.

Notes

[1]. Wilhelm Liebhart, "Bayern zur Zeit König Ludwigs II.,"Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte 123 (1987): pp.185-223.

[2]. Friedrich Prinz, "König Ludwig II.--Entstehung einer Kultfigur," inLudwig II. Die Tragik des "Märchenkönigs", ed. Martin Gregor-Dellin (Regensburg: F. Pustet, 1986), p. 146.

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Citation: Adam Rosenbaum. Review of Botzenhart, Christof, "Ein SchattenkÖÆ’ÂÂ¶nig ohne Macht will ich nicht sein": Die RegierungstÖÆ’ÂÂ¤tigkeit KÖÆ’ÂÂ¶nig Ludwigs II. von Bayern. H-German, H-Net Reviews. September, 2006. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=12307

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