The Sgrena-Calipari Case

3 ITALY AND WORLD AFFAIRS: THE SGRENA-CALIPARI CASE Marco Clementi On 4 February 2005, Giuliana Sgrena, the correspondent of Il Mani- festo in Baghdad, was kidnapped by Islamic Jihad, who asked for the withdrawal of Italian troops within 72 hours. On 4 March, Nicola Calipari, an official of the SISMI (Military Intelligence and Security Service) that ran the operation to liberate the Italian journalist, died under “friendly fire” at an American checkpoint while he was accom- panying Sgrena to the Baghdad airport. On 29 April, a joint statement was issued by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American State Department stating that the two countries “have not reached shared final conclusions” as to what happened.1 These facts represent the three chapters of the Sgrena-Calipari case, which has dramatically attracted the attention of Italian poli- ticians and the public because of its tragic ending and because it occurred in the course of a long Italian military commitment abroad. This operation took place in the most dangerous crisis zone for the present international system, and over which, moreover, Western and European countries are sharply divided. For these reasons, the Sgrena-Calipari case is one of the recent events with the greatest impact on Italian foreign policy, and it has stirred up debate on the international position of the country—i.e., the Italian presence in Iraq—on the international political alignment of the country—i.e., Italian support for the United States—and on the solidity of relations between the two countries. Consequently, this case has become very Notes for this chapter begin on page 103. 86 Marco Clementi significant as a reflection of the way in which the country confronts and debates foreign policy issues. In this chapter we will attempt to determine the characteristics of Italian foreign policy using the Sgrena-Calipari case as our starting point. We will do so in three parts. In the first part we will reconstruct the facts of the three chapters that form the Sgrena-Calipari case, keep- ing in mind that these facts are the nodal points of this dramatic event and are worth distinguishing for analytical purposes. The second part, based on this reconstruction, discusses the way in which Italy has responded in general to the politics behind the kidnappings and consequently will consider comparatively the issues that have emerged from other kidnappings of Italians in Iraq. The third and final part will discuss the issues that have surfaced as a result of these events to examine to what degree, in the present Italian political system, the limitations and constraints that have traditionally characterized the formulation and implementation of foreign policy still apply. The Sgrena-Calipari Case The Kidnapping of Giuliana Sgrena The news of the kidnapping of Giuliana Sgrena arrived in the middle of a debate that was raging in Italy on the utility and legitimacy of the Iraqi elections, and whether to vote funds to continue the “Antica Babilonia” (Ancient Babylon) mission in Iraq, on which Parliament was expected to make a decision within a few days. The political and emotional impact of the news was extremely strong, and it manifested itself in instantaneous reactions and in statements that continued throughout the duration of the abduction in which both political leaders and the public expressed solidarity, concern, and a desire for dialogue. The Italian public had mobilized by the following day. Crowds appeared in Rome, Milan, Turin, and other Italian cities to demonstrate for the liberation of the abducted journalist. Meanwhile, Al Jazeera, the principal Arabic television network, quickly became the medium of communication to the Arabic public. On 5 February, the minister of foreign affairs, Gianfranco Fini, launched an appeal to the kidnap- pers to release Sgrena on the grounds that “she is a woman who loves peace, a friend of Iraq.”2 On the 6th, an appeal by Il Manifesto was broadcast that, on the advice of Fini, among others, underlined the pacifist convictions of the journalist and her closeness to the Iraqi Italy and World Affairs 87 people. On the 7th, even the journalists of Al Jazeera took a stand, asking for her liberation. On the 8th, a video produced by Il Mani- festo was circulated, which was intended to let viewers know who Giuliana Sgrena was, to confirm her activities in Baghdad, reporting the point of view of the Iraqi population, and to explain why she was there—because of her love of peace. Shortly after, the voices of top religious and political authorities joined those of ordinary people and the representatives of civil society. On 13 February, the Pope asked for the journalist’s liberation; on the 19th, 500,000 people demonstrated in Rome for her liberation and the end of the “Antica Babilonia” mission; on the 23rd, the president of the Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, launched his first appeal; on 1 March, the Beati Costruttori di Pace, the Tavola Valdese, Un Ponte Per, and other groups and personalities promoted an all-out hunger strike for Sgrena’s liberation, for the withdrawal of Italian troops, and for the end of the war; on 2 March Ciampi launched a second appeal. Against this background of wide-ranging and continual activity, the political authorities attempted to control the effects of the kidnapping and to manage events. The news of 4 February met with a prompt reaction from the government, which immediately began negotiations. Gianni Letta, undersecretary to the prime minister, took into his confidence the leaders of the principal parties of the center-left, who in return cooperated in handling the issue. The leadership of the Left Democrats (Democratici di Sinistra, DS) tried to separate the kidnapping from the debate over the refinancing of the mission in Iraq and asked their allies not to discuss the request to withdraw Italian troops at that moment in the name of the principle “no to blackmail.” In fact, majority and opposition agreed on the necessity of a one-week post- ponement of the Senate vote on the mission. The push for a unified response that would not concede anything to the demands of the terrorists appeared serious and strong. For example, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Pierferdinando Casini, praised the two coalitions for their “remarkable display of national unity” during the long hours of Sgrena’s imprisonment.3 However, it was not enough to close fully the gaps between the two alliances or within each of them. The center-left was divided on the issue of which position to take in Parliament on the mission in Iraq: the Union of Democrats for Europe (UDEUR) was intending to support it; the reformist left was divided between the abstentionism of the Margherita and the opposition of the Left Democrats, which aimed not at the immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq, but at the redefinition of the mission; the Communist Refoundation (RC) party was determined to vote “no” 88 Marco Clementi without qualification. When on 15 February the Unione, the alliance of center-left parties, except for the UDEUR, decided to vote “no” in Parlia- ment, a top representative of the National Alliance (AN), Maurizio Gas- parri, declared that “ultimately, anyone who votes ‘no’ to the refinancing of the Italian mission in Iraq is on the side of the terrorists,”4 harshly revealing how easy it was for the Italian political class to create a short- circuit between the foreign policy of the country and the kidnapping. A few days before, the cartoonist Vauro, a symbol of the radical left, had followed the same sort of logic from the opposite side. Speaking on the causes of the kidnapping, he underlined the fact that “the situation in Iraq today is terrifying, the war has brought about terrorism, civil society is torn, there are 25,000 mercenaries about, there’s Al Qaeda, there’s Allawi, there are entities that are controlled by interests that are com- pletely against those of the resistance.… There’s the American ambassador, Negroponte, who is an old acquaintance from Honduras, from Nicaragua—there the death squads were prowling around, remember? But maybe this abduction was just a mistake. Let’s hope so.”5 In this climate of imperfect unity, on 16 February the majority in the Senate approved the refinancing of the mission, with 141 votes in favor, including those of the UDEUR. In the meantime, Italian television showed a touching video in which Sgrena begged for help and appealed to the government to withdraw the troops. The timing of its arrival was impeccable. On 26 February, buoyed up by the wave of emotion, the Unione gave its support to the requests of the Sgrena family and Il Manifesto to temporarily suspend the military offensive on Ramadi to facilitate negotiations with the terrorists. On 3 March, the negotiators received further proof that Sgrena was alive, and this gave the “green light” to the operation to bring the journalist back to Italy. The Death of Nicola Calipari On 5 March, the country received the long-awaited news of the liberation of Giuliana Sgrena. Shortly after, it learned that the head of international operations of the SISMI, Nicola Calipari, had lost his life protecting the journalist of Il Manifesto with his own body from the gunfire of an American patrol that was guarding the street to the airport. In a tragic combination of relief and dismay, Italians asked themselves how such an incident, in which one life was lost to save another, was possible. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi immediately summoned the American ambassador, Mel Sembler, to demand an explanation and affirmed in clear terms that “someone will have to assume responsibility for their actions.”6 The United States extended its condolences over what had happened and promised a thorough Italy and World Affairs 89 investigation, a promise that was reiterated in talks between the leaders of the two countries: the president of the United States, George W.

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