The Politico-institutional Influence on Low Carbon Development in Chinese Cities: the Case of Guangzhou
A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of PhD in
Planning and Environmental Management
Faculty of Humanities
2019
Qianqian Wei
School of Environment, Education and Development
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TABLE OF CONTENT
LIST OF TABLES ...... 9
LIST OF FIGURES ...... 10
ABSTRACT ...... 11
DECLARATION ...... 13
COPYRIGHT STATEMENT ...... 15
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... 17
ABBREVIATIONS ...... 19
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 21
1.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT ...... 22
Environmental discourses and climate change mitigation ...... 22
The global response to climate change ...... 25
Multilevel governance and urban carbon governance ...... 27
Climate change mitigation in China ...... 29
1.2 RESEARCH RATIONAL AND SIGNIFICANCE ...... 33
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES ...... 35
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE ...... 36
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 37
2.1 SYSTEMIC TRANSITION: ELEMENTS, PROCESSES AND DYNAMICS ...... 38
Innovation system theory ...... 39
The multi-level perspective of socio-technical transition ...... 42
Co-evolutionary theory ...... 45
Typologies of transition pathways ...... 47
Systemic approaches to low carbon development: an evaluation ...... 52
2.2 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IN SYSTEMIC CHANGE ...... 55
Transition management ...... 56
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Governance arrangement and socio-technical transition – two ideal types ...... 59
Multi-level governance ...... 64
Governing low carbon transition: an evaluation ...... 69
2.3 STRUCTURE-AGENCY AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY ...... 72
Structure-agency theory ...... 72
Institutional theory ...... 76
New-Institutionalism in different forms ...... 77
The persistence and change of institution ...... 82
The implication of structural-agency and institution theory ...... 86
CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND OF CHINESE URBAN CARBON GOVERNANCE ...... 89
3.1 THE CHINESE GOVERNING SYSTEM: ORGANISATIONS, ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONAL
TOOLS ...... 90
Organisational set-up at the national level ...... 90
Five-Year-Plans (FYPs) ...... 92
Policy process ...... 93
The ‘carrots and stick’ approach to cadre management ...... 96
The role of non-governmental experts in policy making ...... 98
Civic society ...... 99
Guanxi ...... 102
3.2 CHANGE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT: NEW DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM AND
THE EMERGENCE OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA ...... 103
New development paradigm – towards a more balanced development path ...... 103
The emergence of a climate change agenda ...... 105
3.3 THE NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION ...... 108
Major policies and programmes related to climate change mitigation ...... 108
Statutory policies ...... 113
Economic incentives and market-based policies ...... 117
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The evolution of climate change mitigation policy framework: from 2005 to 2017 ..... 119
CHAPTER SUMMARY ...... 128
CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... 129
4.1 THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS AND RELATED METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES ...... 130
4.2 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ...... 132
The change of policy framework at the national level ...... 134
Governance dynamics for low carbon transition ...... 135
The characteristics of urban low carbon development ...... 139
Politico-institutional influence for low carbon transition ...... 140
4.3 RESEARCH AIM, OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS ...... 143
4.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN ...... 146
Case study strategy ...... 146
Case selection and introduction ...... 148
Research design and data collection ...... 153
Data analysis ...... 160
Ethical consideration ...... 163
CHAPTER 5: GOVERNANCE DYNAMICS BEHIND THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF LOW
CARBON DEVELOPMENT IN GUANGZHOU ...... 164
5.1 LOW CARBON POLICY COMMUNITY AND KEY ACTORS ...... 165
Municipal functional government departments and their afflicted organisations ...... 165
The formation of a low carbon policy community ...... 170
5.2 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND INTERACTION CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES ...... 174
Central-local (vertical) interaction ...... 174
Intragovernmental interaction ...... 182
Intergovernmental interaction ...... 187
Intercity interactions ...... 194
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5.3 THE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS BEHIND THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF LOW
CARBON DEVELOPMENT ...... 197
Actor interaction in different governance processes: a summary ...... 197
National-led reform - intragovernmental coordination - involvement of
nongovernmental actors ...... 198
Intragovernmental coordination-involvement of nongovernmental actors-centrally
entrusting programmes ...... 200
The strategic action of nongovernmental actors-intragovernmental coordination – local
initiatives ...... 202
CHAPTER SUMMARY ...... 205
CHAPTER 6: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT IN GUANGZHOU
...... 207
6.1 GUANGZHOU’S GHG EMISSION PROFILE ...... 208
6.2 THE LOW CARBON POLICY FRAMEWORK IN GUANGZHOU ...... 213
Response to the national targets (2005 to 2009) ...... 215
The rise of ‘low carbon’ discourse: a greater leadership concern (2010-2015) ...... 218
Retreat from a proactive position (2016 onward) ...... 221
6.3 LOW CARBON POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF DIFFERENT SECTORS ...... 226
Industrial carbon reduction ...... 226
Developing low carbon industries ...... 231
Low carbon building ...... 235
Low carbon transport ...... 238
6.4 APPROACHES AND DISCOURSES FOR LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT ...... 243
Low recognition of ‘low carbon’ discourse ...... 243
The instrumental framing of ‘low carbon’ ...... 244
The market-based approach ...... 246
CHAPTER SUMMARY ...... 248
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CHAPTER 7: CONSTRAINTS FOR A MORE TRANSFORMATIVE LOW CARBON
DEVELOPMENT IN GUANGZHOU ...... 249
7.1 CONSTRAINTS TO GOVERNING LOW CARBON TRANSITION AT THE CITY LEVEL ...... 250
Lack of a long-term vision and leadership ...... 250
Lack of innovation, cooperation and coordination ...... 252
Lack of continuous monitoring and reflection ...... 254
Limited agency for non-governmental actors to exercise influence ...... 256
Lack of recognition of environmental and social values ...... 258
7.2 THE CONSTRAINING INSTITUTIONS ...... 261
Design of organisational and incentive structure ...... 261
Administrative culture ...... 263
Growth and trade orientation ...... 264
CHAPTER SUMMARY ...... 266
CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION: THE ROLE AND CAPACITIES OF CHINESE CITIES WITH REGARD
TO GLOBAL LOW CARBON TRANSITION ...... 267
8.1 KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ...... 269
Conditions for enabling low carbon transition in a more transformative manner ...... 269
Level of institutionalisation: an endogenous perspective to explain the lack of
continuous progress ...... 272
Institutional framework for low carbon transition: fragmented and patchy progress . 274
Driving forces behind low carbon practices ...... 276
The gap between ‘proactive response’ expectations and actual practices ...... 277
8.2 EXPLOITING CITIES’ POTENTIAL IN THE CONTEXT OF LOW CARBON TRANSITION:
TOWARDS AN ENABLING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ...... 280
Circle one (blue line) ...... 283
Circle two (red line) ...... 284
Circle three (green line) ...... 284
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8.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 286
Long-term commitment and sustained policy framework ...... 286
Organisational policies ...... 287
Exploring value-driven as an incentive mechanism for change ...... 288
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION ...... 289
9.1 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNING LOW CARBON TRANSITION ...... 292
Increased analytical sensitivity to politico-institutional influence ...... 292
An integration of sectoral and territorial perspective ...... 293
A more critical approach to governing low carbon transition ...... 294
9.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 296
Research limitations ...... 296
Future research ...... 298
REFERENCE ...... 300
APPENDIX ...... 324
APPENDIX 1 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (TOTAL: 32 INTERVIEWEES) ...... 324
APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ...... 325
APPENDIX 3 ATTENDED ACTIVITIES ...... 327
APPENDIX 4 NATIONAL POLICY DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ...... 328
APPENDIX 5 DOCUMENTS COLLECTED FOR GUANGZHOU CASE ...... 338
APPENDIX 6 CITED STATISTICS INDICATORS AND SOURCES ...... 341
APPENDIX 7 UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS ...... 342
APPENDIX 8 LIST OF USED CODES ...... 343
WORD COUNT: 78233
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1: The ten most important activities in relation to the innovation system ...... 40
Table 2-2: ‘Functions’ of innovation system ...... 41
Table 2-3: Functional processes and regime change of transition pathways for typology A ...... 49
Table 2-4: Dynamics of multi-level interactions and the regime change for typology B ...... 51
Table 3-1: Target for energy consumption per unit of GDP ...... 114
Table 3-2: Target for carbon emission per unit of GDP ...... 114
Table 3-3: Target for total energy consumption ...... 115
Table 3-4: Target for non-fossil fuels consumption ...... 115
Table 3-5: Examples of laws, opinions and guidelines ...... 121
Table 3-6: Examples of supporting policies ...... 122
Table 3-7: Examples of policy showing development of policy areas ...... 124
Table 4-1: Key statistics of Guangzhou (2017) ...... 151
Table 4-2: List of individual cases ...... 152
Table 4-3: Research data sources ...... 153
Table 4-4: Outline of interview questions ...... 158
Table 4-5: Coding examples for interviewees ...... 161
Table 5-1: Key responsibilities of GZDRC in the context of low carbon development ...... 166
Table 5-2 Low carbon pilots in Guangzhou ...... 179
Table 5-3: Actor interaction in different governance processes and their respective roles ...... 198
Table 6-1: GHG emission (CO2 equivalent) in Guangzhou (unit: million tons) ...... 208
Table 6-2: GHG emissions in various fields between 2010 and 2013 (unit: million tons) ...... 209
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Table 6-3: Energy consumption ratio by economic sectors (percentage) ...... 210
Table 6-4: Total electricity consumption and purchased electricity (unit: billion kWh) ...... 212
Table 6-5: The trajectory of carbon reduction policies and practices in Guangzhou ...... 213
Table 6-6: Numbers of Chinese research articles under the key words ‘low carbon’ ...... 224
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1: A multilevel perspective of transition ...... 43
Figure 2-2: A co-evolution framework for low carbon economy ...... 46
Figure 2-3: A quadrant representation of transition typology ...... 49
Figure 2-4: Governance on the outside: intervening in the socio-technical object ...... 61
Figure 2-5: Governance on the inside: co-constituting socio-technical subjects ...... 63
Figure 4-1: The conceptual framework ...... 134
Figure 4-2: The geography of Guangzhou ...... 150
Figure 4-3: Research stage ...... 155
Figure 8-1: A self-reinforced model for more transformative urban low carbon transition ..... 283
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ABSTRACT
Despite cities have been increasingly tasked with governing a low carbon transition both in academic and policy context, empirical work has so far lacked both a consensus and a sufficient evidence base regarding cities’ roles and capacities in this respect. This research sets out to address this gap by examining the potential of Chinese cities in fastening low carbon development. Using an analytical framework drawing on insights from systemic transition studies, multi-level governance framework, structural-agency theory, and institutional theory, this thesis presents a qualitative case study of a low carbon pilot city in China (Guangzhou). Using data from 32 semi-structured interviews undertaken in 2017 and documentary analysis over the period of 2005 and 2017, the author conducted analysis on three interrelated themes: the dynamics of urban carbon governance; the characteristics of low carbon development; and the nature of politico-institutional influence. Through this, it advances existent understanding of the politico-institutional influence on low carbon development in Chinese cities.
This research highlights that Guangzhou’s achievement is a result of the interactions between different governance processes under a series of conditions. However, while Guangzhou has demonstrated its capacity to exert various interventions to deliver binding targets, the level of institutionalisation is arguably insufficient to enable a more transformative transition at city level. Two key arguments emerged from the findings. First, despite rigid standards are problematic given the contested nature of low carbon development, regulative rules beyond the city level are necessary to guarantee local political commitments. Second, informal rules and superficial concern pertaining to carbon reduction among key actors can have a strong influence on actors’ interactions and organisational processes. Therefore, any attempt to speed up low carbon transition needs to pay more attention to normative and cognitive rules because they have the capacity to shape regulatory institutions as well as mediating their influence at city level. 11
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DECLARATION
The author confirms that what portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning. This should include reference to joint authorship of published materials which might have been included in a thesis submitted by another student to this university or any other university or other institute of learning.
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COPYRIGHT STATEMENT
The copyright of this thesis and the ownership of intellectual property rights are regulated according to the following notes: i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and she has given The
University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time.
This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant
Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or
Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy
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(see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487), in any relevant
Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University
Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
When I hit a hard spot on my PhD journey, I always cheered myself up by imaging the moment of writing acknowledgement. I’m more than glad that I finally get to write it. I am strongly convinced that I cannot reach this stage were it not for support and help given to me by numerous people.
I would like to send special thanks to my supervisor Cecilia Wong for her invaluable advice and enthusiastic support, as well as for having confidence in me. I owe to her particularly for her positive attitudes which offered me continual motivation and kept me going over the past 3.5 years. She always engaged me in wider research environment and offered me an opportunity to work in her research project, which I benefited a lot from. I also need to thank my co-supervisor Sotirios Thanos for giving me useful advice and support all the time. Thanks also go to my internal examiner
Adam Baker and external examiner Fangzhu Zhang for reading my work carefully and giving me very useful comments.
I also need to thank all my interviewees who were willing to share their views, experience and knowledge with me. I am indebted to those participants who actively helped me arrange interviews, provided me with unpublished documents and willing to have follow-up conversations with me. Their participation and contribution formed an essential part of this project.
My friends and colleague both in Manchester and China are deserved sincere thanks:
Zijing, Jason, Derek, Xiaojie, Jack, Yangnan, Jiawei, Ziliang, Wenshi, Connie, Fifi, Layla and Fangliang. They have supported me on different stages during the past couple of years. Having conversations with them were the best stress solution for me. Their
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generous friendship and accompany is the source of joy which made my PhD journey much more manageable.
Special mention must go to my master dissertation supervisor Tilak Ginige. It was under his supervision that my thought of doing a PhD formed. He inspired me by his research enthusiasm and gave me the confidence to continue my study. For that I cannot thank him enough.
I am lucky to have a supportive family. I would like to sincerely thank my parents and grandparents for their unconditional support and for always believing in me. I also wish to thank my boyfriend Sirui, who is a source of strength. He shows his understanding and patience all the time, which I cannot appreciate more.
Finally, my thank is extended to the University of Manchester for giving me the
President Doctoral Scholarship and providing such a friendly and supportive research environment.
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ABBREVIATIONS
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CNCC Chinese National Climate Committee
CNCCP China National Climate Change Programme
CPC Communist Party of China
CER Certified Emission Reduction
ENGOs Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations
ESCOs Energy Service Companies
FIT Feed-in Tariffs
FYPs Five Year Plans
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GONGOs Government organised Non-Governmental Organisations
GZDRC Guangzhou Development and Reform Commission
GZETC Guangzhou Economic and Trade Commission
GZIITB Guangzhou Industrial and Information Technological Bureau
GZTC Guangzhou Transport Commission
GZURCC Guangzhou Urban-Rural Construction Commission
IEA International Energy Agency
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MLP Multilevel perspectives
NCCCG National Climate Change Coordination Group
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission
NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions
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NEMC National Environmental Model City
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
NPC National People's Congress
SC State Council tce tonne of coal equivalent
UEQES Urban Environmental Quantitative Evaluation System
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, global climate change has emerged from being a marginal scientific research topic to an internationally recognised political issue with an interdisciplinary research agenda. Identified as an anthropogenic environmental issue caused by increases in Greenhouse Gas (GHG) concentration, climate change mitigation embodies an increasing debate about the role of governance and political responsibility (Newell et al., 2015). This chapter starts with an introduction to the academic and empirical context of this research (Section 1.1). Thereafter it identifies research gaps and discusses why these gaps have to be bridged (Section 1.2) before noting how this study addresses these gaps (Section 1.3). At the end of this chapter, the thesis structure is presented (Section 1.4).
1.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT
Environmental discourses and climate change mitigation
Environmental protection became a salient issue in the 1970s. Since then, various discourses have emerged and interacted with the conceptualisation of environmental problems and corresponding solutions to these problems (Dryzek, 2013). Broadly speaking, these discourses range from ‘optimistic’ ecological modernisation, through
‘in-between’ sustainable development, to ‘radical’ eco-centric approaches; there is considerable overlap between each (Bailey and Wilson, 2009).
The ecological modernisation and sustainable development discourses are grounded the source of environmental problems in the growth paradigm of capitalism (While et al., 2010). The concept of ecological modernisation originated in the literature surrounding environmental governance, which started to dominate environmental politics from the mid-1980s (Hajer, 1996; Mol and Spaargaren, 2000). Rooted within the techno-economic paradigm, ecological modernisation advocates a reconciliation of environmental and developmental objectives (Dryzek, 2013). In its language, reconciliation can be achieved through, for example, promoting a ‘green growth’ utilising financial mechanisms and technological innovations to restructure the capitalist and industrialised economic system. Correspondingly, the prescribed policy framework is tasked with promoting win-win solutions which prioritise the promotion of green technologies using both regulatory approaches and market incentives (ibid). However, it has been criticised as being technocratic, overly reliant on the market as a solution, too optimistic, as well as being charged with overlooking changes in social values and the society-nature relationship (Bäckstrand, 2003; Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Bailey et al., 2011).
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Sustainable development refers to the need to integrate environmental, social and economic concerns. It is most famously defined as ‘meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’
(Brundtland Commission, 1987, p.8). However, limited power in target-setting under this conceptualisation has led to wide variations in approaches taken and a weak translation of ideas into concrete practices (While et al., 2010).
Despite criticism, the policy prescriptions to environmental problems have tended to be dominated by these two discourses, partly due to the fact that they offer politically acceptable solutions which can consolidate consensus between corporations’ expansion strategies and governments’ development priorities (Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Backstrand et al., 2010). On the contrary, solutions based on eco- centric viewpoints or strong environmentalist discourse, which advocate for society- wide transformation, stays mostly in the intellectual realm as critical tools or as marginalised social movements (Dryzek, 2013). No significant political and economic impacts have been identified by proposals prescribed by eco-centric viewpoints or strong environmentalist discourses, such as transforming social values and behaviour, re-localising economic activities, or changing the existing political system (Blühdorn and Welsh, 2007; Bailey and Wilson, 2009).
Climate change became one of the most influential environmental issues in the
1990s and was coined as a ‘new’ environmental challenge. From a scientific perspective, the urgency of the problem as well as the required level of emissions’ reductions have been well articulated. Namely, in order to mitigate the dangerous consequence brought by climate change, it is necessary to limit increases in global average surface temperatures to below 1.5 - 2 degrees compared to pre-industrial levels (IPCC, 2014). Similar to the situation of environmental discourses, there are
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multiple contesting framings of climate change issue and what to do about it
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2007; Reusswig, 2010; Grundmann, 2016). To a large extent, existent prescribed solutions surrounding climate change mitigation are also dominated by ecological modernisation discourse because it entails politically acceptable approaches which are relatively explicit in terms of ecological/economic gains and losses (While et al. 2009; Bailey, 2011). The term ‘low carbon economy’ which necessitates using less carbon for growth through adjusting energy structures, developing low carbon industries and adopting low carbon technologies, has been openly endorsed by governments, businesses, think-tanks and academia
(Fankhauser, 2013; Foxon, 2011; Bridge et al., 2013; Andrews-Speed, 2012;
Mulugetta and Urban, 2010).
Since the publication of IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014), the dominant frameworks and approaches adopted, which only led to incremental changes, have received increasing criticism (Gillard et al., 2016). In reality, various frames and approaches can co-exist and compete over time and space (Dahle, 2007; Stirling,
2011). Different localities may frame issues and solutions differently according to individual physical and cultural circumstances (Hulme, 2010). There is no reason to expect that there is a panacea for all. Rather, it requires a greater socially sensitive approach to understand the diversity and reasons behind that (Mulugetta et al.,
2010). It follows that a more appropriate response may involve analysis and mobilise diverse interpretations and approaches grounded in different contexts, rather than seeking to advance consensual framings and solutions (Bäckstrand et al., 2010;
Hulme, 2010; Stirling, 2011). Furthermore, once ‘low hanging fruit’ such as mature low carbon technologies were applied; more attention needed to be given to more systemic or transformative approaches. In any situation, the level of change required to combat climate change cannot be achieved through any single intervention. 24
The global response to climate change
When it comes to the governance of climate change mitigation, the importance of international relations and the role of national governments has long been acknowledged and debated (Okereke et al., 2009). For example, in the framing of green governmentality, climate change is viewed as an issue that should be addressed by the hegemonic power structure of nation-states at the global level through the establishment of multi-lateral agreements between different countries and involving business communities in a collaborative manner (Bäckstrand and
Lövbrand, 2007). The assumption behind such a view is that nation-states have access to unique power, legitimacy, and resources which enable them to accommodate the challenges of large-scale social-technical change within a limited timeframe (Andrews-Speed, 2016; Giddens, 2009; Grin et al., 2010; Voß et al., 2009).
Following this line, a large number of research activities and policy recommendations have been centred on international actions, based on coercion and/or cooperation, that emphasise the importance of getting commitments from nation-states to act collectively (Boasson and Wettestad, 2014; Nachmany et al., 2015; Jordan and
Huitema, 2014).
A large number of empirical studies have engaged with the development of national climate policies using comparative environmental politics and policy evaluation frameworks to examine different countries’ progress (Liefferink et al., 2009;
Nachmany et al., 2014; Nachmany et al., 2015). It has been found that many countries have introduced climate change related laws and policies. The number of climate change policies that exist globally started to soar after 1997 and have doubled every 4-5 years thereafter (Nachmany et al., 2015). By 2016, 39% of countries had published laws or strategies at the national level; this covers 67% of
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overall GHG emissions. In the 2016 version of The Global Climate Legislation Study, a totaliof 854 climate / carbon national level policies were found from those carbon- intensive industrialised countries (Nachmany et al., 2017). In the policy arena, the term ‘low carbon economy’ first appeared in the UK’s 2003 Energy White Paper—
‘Our Energy Future—Creating a Low Carbon Economy’ (Wang et al., 2018). At the international level, the concept of ‘low carbon economy’ or ‘low carbon development’ began to appear frequently after the 2007 Bali Roadmap was published (Mulugetta and Urban, 2010). However, the engagement and performance of countries and sectors vary greatly in terms of commitments, regulatory activities and bottom-up initiatives (Nachmany et al., 2015).
In addition, there appears to be a split between the strong political campaign for global engagement and the actual progress of national governments globally to make the efforts required to address climate change. There are some positive signals, such as the slowdown of global emissions increase at an aggregate level (UNFCCC, 2016) and the stringent target for an acceptable rise of temperature from 2 to 1.5 degrees under the 2015 Paris climate conference (COP 21). However, the cumulative efforts of governments have not been sufficient to guard against the adverse consequences brought by climate change. According to the latest United Nations Environment
Programme report (UNEP, 2017) the gap between national pledges in the Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the required reduction level of emissions is large, with the former only accounting for one-third of the latter.
Since 2000, the slow progress across democratic industrialised nations and the difficulties encountered in the negotiating process in the Copenhagen climate conference (COP 15) has resulted in questions arising relating to the legitimacy of continuing to prioritise political efforts at the international scale to address climate
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change (Jasanoff et al., 2004; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006). Questions have also been raised with regard to whether it is technically and politically feasible to coordinate and deliver the required level of changes in a top-down manner (Bäckstrand et al.,
2010). Gillard (2017), for instance, argues that politicians and senior decision-makers in democratic governments are risk aversion as a consequence of electoral considerations and that this leads to slow and inconsistent policy progress.
Moreover, longitudinal studies have identified that resource constraints may lead to political swings and policy retrenchment at the national level (Patashnik, 2014). In response to these arguments, more attention has been given to initiatives taken by subnational and non-state actors and the extent to which bottom-up activities have the potential to fill the ‘governance gaps’ left by the lack of progress of the nation- states (Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013; Lo, 2014).
Multilevel governance and urban carbon governance
Multilevel governance has been employed to seek alternative political strategies to advance policy interventions to tackle environmental issues (Betsill and Bulkeley,
2006; Andonova and Mitchell, 2010). Numerous attempts have been made to theorise the potential for bottom-up, locally-based actions and policy processes to influence the pace and direction of global environmental governance (Bulkeley and
Betsill 2005). Particularly, Hodson and Marvin (2010) explored whether urban infrastructure as a socio-technical system, can be steering towards a more resilient direction at an urban scale.
Following the discussions of these above-mentioned scholars, cities host a range of possible actors with different power, orientations and capabilities. These actors include but not limited to government and semi-government agencies, environmental groups, consultancy firms, investors and media. While these actors 27
may have different conceptualisations and solutions to the same issues, they all seek to accommodate their interests at the city scale. Through establishing partnerships between these actors across multiple scales, cities may provide an appropriate scale to coordinate experience-based social learning to address challenges that would not be resolved at a larger scale. Such advantages potentially enable cities to turn crises into opportunities (Ernstson et al., 2010; Evans, 2011).
Although it seems that there is significant potential for urban actors to act innovatively to fill existent emission gaps, recent studies began to reconsider the validity of assuming that cities are at the innovation front without probing the origins and underpinning conditions (Shearmur, 2012; Zhang and Wu, 2018). Meanwhile, empirical work in this field has so far lacked both consensus and a sufficient evidence base. For instance, while Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013) point out that urban actors are more active in initiating experiments and testing new policies, Westley et al. (2011) and Olazabal and Pascual (2015) argue that some urban authorities lack the capacities and resources to directly impact on key areas of low carbon transition such as energy policy or transport planning. Likewise, Lo (2014) identified a range of challenges facing urban carbon governance such as financial constraints, community opposition to low carbon projects, and weak institutional capacity. He also pointed out that many of urban carbon governance practices were fragmented and, at best, met minimum requirements, rather than delivering transformative changes (ibid).
Given this plethora of opinions, it is fair, as Bulkeley and Newell (2015) conclude, to suggest that urban carbon governance is a complex and largely fragmented phenomenon characterised by the various agencies that exert influence based on different interest and forms of interaction
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Climate change mitigation in China
Given the size of China’s population and economy, its commitment and approach to carbon reduction will inevitably have significant impacts on global climate change.
Since China became the largest annual emitter of CO2 in the world in 2007, (a position previously held by the USA), there has been increasing international attention focused on China’s low carbon transition. In 2017, nearly one-third of global annual CO2 emissions (32.5 Gt) came from China (9.1 Gt) (IEA, 2018). But at the same time, China’s progress is recognisable. Since 2014, a slowdown of emissions compared with earlier trends has been seen in China. At the end of 2017, China fulfilled the target of reducing carbon intensity by 45% compared to the 2005 level, more than 600 days ahead of schedule (UN Climate Change News, 2018). However, instead of this positive result being a direct consequence of effective interventions, its achievement should also be attributed to a range of external factors such as a reduced global demand for Chinese exports (Grubb et al., 2015).
In fact, the Chinese national government has set itself a series of overarching carbon- related targets. For example, in November 2009, the State Council announced a ten- year interim target of reducing carbon intensity1 by 40-45% from the 2005 level.
Later, at the 18th National Congress, low carbon development was confirmed as an important national strategy (Xinhuanet, 2012). The Chinese government also announced its determination to develop a low carbon economy at the UN Climate
Summit in 2009. Since then, the idea of low carbon development has started to interact with China’s overall policy framework (Hu et al., 2011). Key strategies derived include adjusting industrial structure, increasing the share of renewables, improving energy efficiency, developing low carbon industries and reforestation (ibid). In 2014,
1 Carbon intensity measures the carbon dioxide produced per unit of economic growth 29
China further created a longer-term framework (between 2015 and 2030) for carbon reduction through the joint US-China statement on climate change, by setting targets for reaching carbon emission peak and for increasing the share of non-fossil fuel energy consumption by 20% (People.cn, 2014). More recently, under the Paris
Agreement, China proposed a further reduction of 60–65% of carbon intensity by
2030 (compared with the 2005 level) and promised to achieve emission peak over the same period (Chinadaily, 2016).
In parallel to international commitments, the Chinese national government has made great strides in developing a series of institutional solutions to climate change, such as developing sub-national low carbon pilots and experimenting with carbon emission trading platforms. Among different climate change mitigation approaches, the development of low carbon cities has been a significant pillar of China’s overall climate change strategy (NDRC, 2010). Cities are taking an increasing account of
China’s national economy and overall GHG emissions (Dhakal, 2009). In addition to delivering policies, cities have become important governance units through which to organise reform and development activities (Wu, 2018). At the same time, appealing to cities to be agents of positive change has been a frequent feature of Chinese policy since the 1980s (Heilmann, 2008). Successful experiences in both economic reform and technological innovation have prompted the institutionalisation of pilot programmes as mechanisms by which to align national intentions and local interests, captured by Heilmann (2008)’s ‘experimentation under hierarchy’ model. Under such an incentive structure, municipal/provincial governments are expected to engage proactively in nationally-led pilot programmes by matching political endorsements and public expenditure allocations. In this sense, it would be captivating to analyse the extent to which low carbon pilots can bring in more radical changes that are failed to achieve at national and international scales. 30
A considerable body of literature in both English and Chinese language exists that has explored low carbon transition and environmental pilots in China. The Chinese- language studies focus on several perspectives including, the definitions and main features of low carbon economy, low carbon development and low carbon city (Dai,
2009; Fu et al., 2010; Li and Zheng, 2010; Li and Zhao, 2015); approaches to establish urban GHG inventory (Chen et al., 2010; Gu and Yuan, 2011; Cai, 2012); influential factors that affect GHG emissions in different Chinese cities (Lin and Liu, 2010; Sun et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2012); international practices and implications for China (Liu et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010; Xiao et al., 2009); the general situation and future pathways for China’s low carbon city development (Bi et al., 2009; Li et al., 2010); the development of low carbon indicator systems (Zhu et al., 2012; He et al., 2011; Hou and Gao, 2012); and description of normative roles of key actors (Li and Zheng, 2010;
Li, 2011; Li and Zhao, 2015). Generally speaking, these studies are largely technical, being descriptive, or comprised of economic analysis, in which cities are treated as a delivery entity. Few of them have taken a more critical approach to the analysis of governance arrangements, incentive structures, and the role of pilots and their performance.
Within the existent English-language literature, a number of studies have focused on the development and impacts of state-led environmental pilots. Kostka and Mol
(2013) found, for instance, that despite new institutional arrangements, many locally-based innovations are inconsistent and limited in terms of their scope, scale of impact and geographical spread. Addressing such concerns, some studies have looked at governance structures for explanations. For example, Eston and Kostka
(2014) found that high rotation or turnover of local leaders has tended to generate negative or unintended consequences for state-led green initiatives due to problematic incentive structures and the varying implementation capabilities of local 31
leaders. In contrast, Kostka (2016) and Shin (2018) challenged the efficacy of local environmental experimentations which are increasingly carried out through ‘state- led pilots’ and target systems between central and local governments. They argued that such institutional practices may be effective in terms of quantifiable and straightforward tasks, but are a ‘poor fit’ when it comes to driving ambitious environmental reforms and/or solving complicated problems.
Other studies have adopted a more actor-oriented perspective. For instance, Kostka and Hobbs (2010) analysed the implementation strategies and practices adopted by government officials in Shanxi Province (a major coal-producing and energy-intensive province), to meet national energy efficiency targets. They found that bundling together local business and political interests were key to successful implementation.
The interest bundling was achieved through formal explanation as well as informal persuasion and promises. Beyond being driven by the need to achieve national binding targets, Shin (2017) provided empirical evidence to show how mission-driven local agency can collectively account for local innovations in the case of Baoding.
These studies focusing on governance practices and local policy process have greatly improved understanding as to the roles and capacities of Chinese cities in environmental reform. Nevertheless, there remain significant knowledge gaps due to, amongst other factors, limitations in analytical scale, rapid changes in the field, and geographical differences. This creates a need for both further theoretical inquiry and empirical research to be undertaken.
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1.2 RESEARCH RATIONAL AND SIGNIFICANCE
The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014) demonstrates the need for a stronger call for more transformative changes at a social level. Meanwhile, there is an increasing concern as to the lack of social capacities to tackle climate change given wider political-economy pressures, institutional path dependency, strong influence from vested interest, and governance failures (Nalau and Handmer, 2015;
Gillard et al., 2016). Particularly, following a three-year stabilised period, global energy-related CO2 rose by 1.4% in 2017, contrasting the ambitious displayed in the
Paris Agreement (IEA, 2018).
Regardless of whether cities are currently seen as active or passive players in global climate change mitigation, their responsibility is significant as they are expected to have significant impacts on global energy demands over the next couple of decades
(Satterthwaite, 2008; UN habitat, 2011). In China, nearly 40% of energy use and CO2 emissions are from 35 largest cities (Dhakal, 2009). Recognising their prominence, research on cities’ roles and capacity to govern low carbon transition need to be deepened.
This research contributes to current discussions pertaining to the reasons for less transformative change in the climate change mitigation regime by examining the politico-institutional influence on urban carbon governance. Low carbon transition requires significant changes in material, organisational and cultural aspects across multiple sectors of society (Geels, 2014). Given its complexity, the internal mechanism of low carbon transition varies across spaces (Peng and Bai, 2018). To understanding such internal mechanism from a governance perspective, a more contextual-sensitive and process-oriented research is required to identify the way in 33
which low carbon policies and practices have emerged. Moreover, there is also a need to critically examine the motivations and ideas behind policies and practices so that to find out the extent to which they have redefined the rules of the games. This requires an in-depth understanding of key actors’ perceptions, values and interaction. To provide further insights and aid analysis in this respect, this research draws insights from structural-agency and institutional theories to develop an integrated conceptual framework and places its empirical focus on the Chinese context.
Despite there has been a growing number of studies turned to politico-institutional analysis to account for the less transformative change (Kern and Mitchell, 2010;
Nilsson et al., 2011), existent literature mostly focused on national and sectoral scale analysis based on intellectual tradition of western societies. So far little attention has been paid to politico-institutional influence on of low carbon development at city level in the Chinese context. Moreover, research that directly focuses on the level of institutional change since the start of the low carbon agenda is limited. Addressing these issues is the key contribution that this thesis makes in terms of enhancing existent academic knowledge. While emphasising the institutional and political contexts in which cities are tasked with governing low carbon transition, this thesis, through the case study of Guangzhou, enhances procedural and contextual understanding of low carbon development at a city level.
Addressing these issues is the key contribution that this thesis makes in terms of enhancing existent academic knowledge. While emphasising the institutional and political contexts in which cities are tasked with governing low carbon transition, this thesis, through the case study of Guangzhou, enhances procedural and contextual understanding of low carbon development at a city level.
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1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES
This research aims to advance the understanding of the role and capacity of the city
(as a governance unit) in steering a timely low carbon transition in the Chinese context. This study, via a case study of Guangzhou, focuses on understanding three interrelated themes: the dynamics of urban carbon governance; the characteristics of low carbon transition; and the nature of politico-institutional influence.
There are five specific research objectives:
1. To provide a critical review of key theories and ideas over different
approaches to analyse low carbon transition, with a focus on politico-
institutional implications;
2. To examine the characteristics of China’s governing system and the national
policy framework for climate change mitigation, with a focus on its influence
at the city level;
3. To identify key actors and understand how low carbon transition is governed
in Guangzhou by analysing the nature of interactions between key actors.
4. To examine low carbon policies and practices, as well as actors’ views,
perceptions and aspirations in the case study area of Guangzhou, focusing on
the changes that have taken place over the past decade.
5. To synthesise the research findings and discuss the role and capacity of the
city to promote meaningful change across society as well as draw out key
theoretical and policy implications.
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1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature review which focuses on the key concepts and theories that inform the empirical inquiry of this research; including transition studies, multi-level governance, structure-agency theory, and institutional theory. Chapter 3 sets out the context of studying low carbon governance at the city level by providing an overview of China’s governing system, as well as a historical review of key policies and institutions related to carbon mitigation at the national level. Chapter 4 develops a conceptual framework to structure the empirical enquiry and explains the methodology employed in the research. Chapters
5 to 7 are the empirical chapters and contain the key findings of the case study.
Chapter 5 presents an overview of how different actors are placed within the policy community of climate change mitigation in Guangzhou, as well as how they interact to institutionalise carbon reduction. Chapter 6 presents the characteristics of low carbon development in Guangzhou based on an examination of policy contents as well as key actors’ views on them. Cumulatively, this establishes a broader context for current discourse and understanding of low carbon development. Chapter 7 assesses constraints pertaining to fasten low carbon transition in Guangzhou and establishes their institutional roots. Chapter 8 synthesises the research findings and discusses how to better exploit cities’ role and capacities to accelerate low carbon transition.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the whole thesis and draws out key theoretical implications.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the whole thesis and draws out key theoretical and policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter critically analyses the key concepts and theories on which this research is predicated. The key concepts and theories are critically reviewed and organised under three categories:
(1) those which help to define systemic transitions and conceptualise their processes;
(2) the role of government or governance in systemic transitions;
(3) further insights from structural-agency and institutional theory.
These approaches are presented and integrated so as to deal with some of the criticisms and inherent limitations that each possesses. Specifically, this chapter starts by reviewing theories related to systemic changes (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), and suggests that, in order to make these theories more valuable to understand and inform an on-going transition, extra efforts are required to conceptualise the role of institution and politics (Scrase and Smith, 2009; Smith and Stirling, 2010;
Meadowcroft, 2011; Markard et al. 2012). Section 2.3 then reviews structure-agency theory and institutional theory to find out how they could make the transition studies more sensitive to the issues of institution and politics. The chapter concludes by suggesting that a critical integration of these theories is essential for gaining a better understanding of the politico-institutional dimension of the governance processes embedded in climate change mitigation and to make it more capable of informing urban carbon governance in an effective manner.
2.1 SYSTEMIC TRANSITION: ELEMENTS, PROCESSES AND DYNAMICS
A systemic perspective has been widely applied to facilitate knowledge accumulation in the field of social-ecological interaction with regard to rapid global environmental changes (Ostrom, 2009). Literature upon this describes the co-evolutionary dynamic between human systems such as culture, economy, and social practices, and ecological systems such as natural resources, biodiversity, and global climate
(Fischer-Kowalski and Rotmans, 2009). Three frameworks which explore the interactive social-technical processes have so far received much attention. These are: the innovation system theory (Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008); the multilevel perspective on socio-technical transitions (Geels, 2002; Smith et al., 2005;
Schot and Geels, 2008) and the co-evolutionary theory (Murmann, 2003; Foxon and
Pearson, 2008; Foxon, 2011).
Within this body of literature, the word ‘transition’ is adopted as an analytical term to describe sectoral, national and global technological system transformations (Smil,
2010). It follows that ‘transition’ is here understood as a gradual and continuous process of a whole-system change from one state or condition to another, in which structural features are transformed (Smith et al., 2005). Thus, a transition usually involves far-reaching and connected changes along different dimensions: technology, material, organisation, institution, politics, economy, and socio-culture rule, which can be induced by external pressures in society or endogenous innovations
(Loorbach, 2010). Generally speaking, systemic transition studies offer a set of analytical tools for explaining how historical technological transitions have been associated with changes in other dimensions. In what follows, these three frameworks are introduced to reveal how they contribute to an understanding of
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systemic transition processes.
Innovation system theory
Introduced in the late 1980s, the innovation system theory focuses on understanding the innovation processes for developing, diffusing and utilising new products from a systemic perspective (Bergek, 2002). The innovation system literature outlines three key components of the system; actors, institutions, and networks (Carlsson and
Stankiewicz, 1991; Bergek, 2002). Actors typically encompass private firms, government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), universities, research institutions, investors and associations (Bergek, 2002). The term ‘institutions’ relates to the rules of the game including, but not limited to, laws, regulations, socio-cultural rules, technical norms, and shared expectations (Edquist, 2004). Innovation system studies are rooted in evolutionary economics; this provides a useful remedy to the
(neo-classical) environmental economics paradigm which overly relies on market- based measures to deal with the social costs of environmental degradation (Smith,
2000).
Innovation system research, based on differences in system boundaries, can be sub- categorised into regional innovation systems (Cooke, 2008), technological innovation systems (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991), and sectoral innovation systems (Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2004). Edquist (2001) argues that these categories of knowledge complement rather than compete with each other. While regional innovation studies focus on exploring whether and how institution-based factors determine the comparative innovation performance of places, the sectoral and technological innovation system emphasises on how patterns of innovation activities and innovation processes differ across industrial sectors and technologic fields.
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In addition to analysing the characteristics of system components, Bergek (2002),
Jacobson et al. (2008) and Edquist (2011) captures the fundamental activities of innovation processes and, from that, proposed a ‘functional’ approach to the innovation system. Edquist (2011, p.1728) suggests that ‘the determinants which influence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations can be traced through identifying activities that take place within an innovation system’. Based on empirical mapping, he proposes the ten most important activities within innovation systems
(Table 2-1).
Table 2-1: The ten most important activities in relation to the innovation system
(1) Provision of R&D, contributing to creating new knowledge (primarily in engineering, medicine, and the natural sciences);
(2) Competence building, contributing to creating human capital through the provision of education and training;
(3) Formation of new product market;
(4) Articulation of quality requirements emanating from the demand side with regard to new products;
(5) Creating and changing organisations needed for the development of new fields of innovation;
(6) Networking through markets and other mechanisms;
(7) Creating and changing institutions that influence innovating organisation and innovation processes by providing incentives or obstacles to innovation;
(8) Incubating activities for new innovative efforts;
(9) Financing of innovation processes and other activities that can facilitate commercialisation of knowledge and its adoption, and
(10) Provision of consultancy services of relevance for innovation processes.
Source: Edquist (2011, p.1729) 40
Bergek et al. (2008), uses the term ‘system functions’ to describe all the activities which contribute to the development and diffusing innovations (Table 2-2). These
‘system functions’ are conceptualised as an intermediary element between the structural components of an innovation system and the system’s performance
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). They suggest that understanding the functions can help one to get a picture of the system’s present status. The interactions between the various functions form the internal dynamics of a particular innovation system which, in turn, lead to cumulative and circular causation (Hekkert et al., 2007). Moreover, by separating structure from content, the functions approach is able to identify ‘system failures', i.e. what is actually achieved in the system, and what performs poorly or is missing from it (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). Based on this analysis, structural constraints and system weaknesses can be extrapolated. This, in turn, allows policy- makers to formulate more effective process-oriented policy interventions to alter the functional patterns through adding (or reinforcing) inducement mechanisms, or offsetting (or removing) blocking mechanisms (Bergek et al., 2008).
Table 2-2: ‘Functions’ of the innovation system
• Entrepreneurial experimentation;
• Knowledge development and diffusion;
• Influence on the direction of search;
• Market formation;
• Resource mobilization;
• Legitimation;
• Development of positive externalities
Source: Bergek et al. (2008, p. 411)
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The multi-level perspective of socio-technical transition
The concept of the socio-technical system emerged from technological innovation system studies (Geels, 2002). Large technical systems are described by Hughes (1987, p. 137) as being ‘a seamless web comprising of artefacts, entrepreneurs, networks, regulators and others’. To inform our understanding of why and how structural changes take place, Kemp (1994) and Geels (2002) propose and develop a multi-level framework (Figure 2-1) to explain the transition process by focusing on the interactions at three levels: niches, social-technical regimes, and landscape. Among all scholars who are working in this field, Geels (2002, 2004, 2011, 2018) is one of the most often cited scholars, and he has been working in the past two decades to refine the theoretical perspectives by further engaging with sociological and political thoughts, as well as carry out empirical testing of its application.
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Figure 2-1: A multilevel perspective of transition
Source: Geels (2011 p. 28)
Figure 2-1 provides a graphical description of the three distinct levels as well as the process in which transition takes place. The primary rationale behind the separation of these three levels is the ‘structuration of activities in local practices’ (Geels, 2011, p. 24). To explain, a higher level such as landscape is more stable and slower to change given higher degrees of alignment between elements. On the other hand, the niches are least structured therefore radical changes are easier to take place (Geels,
2011).
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Niche (micro-level)
Niches-innovation can either be naturally-occurring or as a result of ‘strategic niche management’ (Kemp et al., 1998). Generally speaking, niches are seen as ‘protected spaces’ which allow for innovations which have poor cost-effectiveness to develop and grow without any selection pressure from the market (Smith and Raven, 2012).
In time, niches may gain momentum and become competitive in the market if certain conditions are met (Geels, 2002)
The socio-technical regime (meso-level)
Socio-technical regimes are defined as a system with established patterns and structures (Geels, 2004). Key elements of a socio-technical regime include technologies, rules, regulations, markets, institutions, organisations and networks, infrastructure, cultural meaning and routines (ibid). A distinctive characteristic of a socio-technical regime is that it can develop its core competencies and this leads to continued re-investment in the dominant field (Unruh, 2000). Such feedback mechanisms can create path-dependency effects and result in the lock-in of established technologies, which prevent newcomers from entering the market. If this viewpoint is accepted, it follows, ceteris paribus, that the market may not be efficient as the established advantages of the dominant field enable it to exert influence on the market (Foxon, 2011).
The socio-technical landscape (macro-level)
The macro-level of landscape indicates the existence of a structured exogenous environment in which regimes and niches are situated. Key elements within the landscape level are usually stable and changes often take place over decades, including material infrastructure, political ideologies and coalitions, cultural and 44
normative values, social patterns, worldviews and demographic trends (Kemp et al.,
2007; Geels, 2011). Moreover, these elements are generally out of reach from niche and regime actors (Geels and Schot, 2007).
Co-evolutionary theory
Co-evolutionary in the systemic study is defined by Murmann (2003, p. 124) as ‘two evolving systems coevolve if and only if they both have a significant causal impact on each other’s ability to persist'. While Murmann (2003) highlights mutual causality,
Kallis and Norgaard (2010) argue that widening the analytical perspective to account for the relations between multiple mutually influential systems is more beneficial to analysis. In response to this call, Foxon (2011) draws on insights from ecological economics and socio-technical transition to develop a co-evolutionary framework for low carbon economy, which contains five interrelated sub-systems, namely, technologies; institutions; business strategies; user practices; and ecosystems. The co-evolutionary theory defines that transition to a low carbon economy may be realised through ‘driving technological changes, forming new institutions, introducing carbon-friendly business strategies or changing user practices’ (Foxon, 2011, p.2263).
The framework is illustrated in Figure 2-2. The details for each system are introduced further below.
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Figure 2-2: A co-evolution framework for the low carbon economy
Source: Foxon (2011 p. 2262)
Ecosystem - Foxon (2011, p. 2262) describes ecosystems as ‘systems of natural flows and interactions that maintain and enhance living systems’. Human systems which are captured by the other four elements in the co-evolutionary framework have affected, and will continue to have profound impacts on such natural flows and interactions.
Technologies - For the co-evolutionary framework, Foxon (2011) uses an extended definition of technology, which includes functionalities, processes, and purposes of technologies. This followed what Beinhocker (2006, p.131) defined as physical technologies: ‘methods and designs for transforming matter, energy, and information from one state to another in pursuit of a goal’.
Institutions - Institutions were defined by Foxon (2011, p. 2262) as ‘ways of
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structuring human interactions’, which provide a social context for actions. In this way, the definition of institutions applied in this framework captures both formal ones such as regulations and organisations, as well as informal or unwritten rules such as values.
Business strategies - Foxon (2011, p. 2262) refers to business strategies as ‘the means and processes by which firms organise their activities so as to fulfil their economic purposes’. This definition can also be extended to other types of organisations if they also engage in profit-related activities.
User practices – user practices indicate behaviours that occur at individual, household, and social levels in the process of dealing with technologies. Such behaviours are usually influenced by cultural contexts (Foxon, 2011).
The co-evolutionary framework has been used to explain the ‘lock-in’ effect and different diffusion patterns in current carbon-intensive energy systems (Unruh, 2000;
Foxon and Pearson, 2008). For example, Stenzel and Frenzel (2008) apply this framework to reveal that different co-evolutionary patterns between regulatory set- up and respective organisational responses could lead to different technological diffusion patterns in different European countries. In a similar vein, Parrish and Foxon
(2006) used the framework to understand the mechanisms by which sustainability- driven entrepreneurs facilitate the sustainable transition.
Typologies of transition pathways
Initially, the work on niche and regime interaction merely focused on how innovative technologies can substitute the established ones (Smith et al. 2005). Using the language provided by multi-level perspective and co-evolutionary theory, a regime can be either reinforced or destabilised ‘by the interactions that occur between 47
constituent technology, institutions, business strategies, user practices, wider landscape factors and niche alternatives’ (ibid, p.1496). Accordingly, the occurrence of transition is a result of the interplay of development in several domains, which can take different forms based on the interaction patterns. The concept of transition pathways arose from the need for conceptual clarification and provides additional angles by which to understand the dynamics of ongoing transitions through distinguishing transition processes by type (Smith et al. 2005). Two key typologies are identified in the literature. Smith et al. (2005) are interested in the dynamics of agency and power in transition while Geels and Schot (2007, p.413) base their analysis on the ‘timing and nature of multi-level interactions’. These typologies take different analytical focuses and reflect different understandings of regime change.
Typology A
Smith et al. (2005, p.1497) describe regime change as ‘a function of two processes’:
(1) the availability of resources within or outside the regime that enables regime change;
(2) the coordination of resources (such as skills, capacities, and physical resources) that enable regime change.
Based on this, they develop a scheme to define the context of socio-technical transitions with these two processes lying on two axes. They focus on how internal or external resources are represented within a regime and the extent to which coordination is achieved. In so doing, they assume that various actors from either inside or outside the dominant regimes are able to take actions (‘referred to as agency’) and to exert influence on others’ action (‘referred to as power’) so as to affect the speed and scale of a transition. This gives rise to four ‘ideal types’ of transition pathways, which can be used as a tool to structure thinking about regime
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change. Figure 2-3 depicts this typology by putting the source of the resources and the level of coordination on the vertical and horizontal axis respectively.
Figure 2-3: A quadrant representation of transition typology
Source: Smith et al., 2005, p. 1499
Based on the source of resources and the level of coordination, four pathways are distinguished; reorientation of trajectories, endogenous renewal, emergent transformation, and purposive transition. Table 2-3 provides a summary of the function of processes in each transition pathway and the consequent regime change.
Table 2-3: Functional processes and regime change of transition pathways for typology A
Transition Function of Description of Regime Change Pathways processes
Endogenous The This arises in the context of regime members (firms, Renewal coordinated supply chains, customers, and regulators) making response, conscious efforts to find ways of responding to internal perceived competitive threats to the regime, by drawing on internally available resources, such as
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adaptation existing capacities.
Reorientation of The This type of transition arises through the conjunction Trajectories uncoordinated of a series of uncoordinated responses, relating to response, changes in technologies, institutions, business internal strategies, and user practices, but mainly drawing on adaptation internally available resources.
Emergent The This type of transition arises largely from Transformation uncoordinated uncoordinated pressures for change and responses response, based on through resources and capacities lying external outside the incumbent regime, such as previous adaptation energy transitions between dominant fuel sources, e.g., from wood to coal burning.
Purposive The This type of transition also draws on external Transitions coordinated resources but has been deliberately intended and response, pursued from the outset to reflect a specific set of external societal expectations or interests, such as the adaptation promotion of nuclear power.
Source: Smith et al., (2005, 1502)
According to Smith et al., (2005), this typology helps to guide analysis of transition dynamics. Once dominating transition pathway is ascertained, subsequent intervention can be introduced to accelerate transition.
Typology B
Geels and Schot (2007) criticise the typology of Smith et al., (2005) for assuming coordination of resources as an established process. In their view, coordination is a result of ‘the alignment of the visions and activities of different groups’ throughout a transition process (Geels and Schot, 2007, p.413). Therefore, instead of being put on an axis to characterise transitions, coordination should be seen as an achievement and its processes and conditions require investigations. To achieve their aim, five main transition pathways were purposed based on the timing and nature of
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interactions among the three levels of the multi-level framework (i.e., niche, regime, and landscapes). Table 2-4 summarises the conceptualisation of the five different pathways and the type of regime change based on the dynamics of multi-level interactions (Geels and Schot 2007).
Table 2-4: Dynamics of multi-level interactions and the regime change for typology B
Transition Multi-level Description of Regime Change Pathways Interactions
Reproduction Incremental This occurs within a regime aiming to optimise Path modification took a system without a fundamental change of place within the regime setting; existing regime
Transformation Regime actors take the This occurs when actors in the existing regime Path initiative to change modify the direction of development paths and innovation activities in response to moderate landscape pressures and niche innovations not yet sufficiently developed;
Reconfiguration Niche interact with the Groups of innovations, developed in niches, Path regime at a local level are initially adopted in the regime to solve local then expand the problems, and subsequently, trigger further influence to other adjustments in the basic architecture of the areas regime;
Technological Landscape change This occurs when a disruptive change or shocks Substitution enables niche to at the landscape level destabilizes the existing compete with the regime, and enables previously developed regime niche-innovations to break through and replace the current regime, despite the efforts of the regime to respond and adapt;
De-alignment Landscape change de- This occurs when divergent, large and sudden and Re-alignment alignment regime and changes at the landscape level lead to de- Path provide room for the alignment and erosion of the existing regime, niche to compete and but niche-innovations are not sufficiently replace developed, and so multiple niche-innovation co-exist and compete for resources until one
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becomes dominant.
Source: Geels and Schot (2007, p.414)
These two typologies take different analytical focuses and reflect different understandings of regime change. Smith et al. (2005) take a forward-looking perspective – through understanding the status quo characterised by source of recourses and level of coordination, policies can be subsequently designed to sustain or accelerate transition. Geels and Shot (2007), on the other hand, are more concerned about the drivers and governance practices in the transition process to answer the question of why transition took place and move on. Despite these differences, they both offer insights by showing how complex socio-technical phenomena can unfold in various forms using a limited number of concepts.
However, it should be kept in mind that these pathways are ideal types and not deterministic. Therefore, their application to empirical study requires further discussions and a balance of arguments (Geels and Schot, 2007).
Systemic approaches to low carbon development: an evaluation
The systemic approaches reviewed above were drawn from comparable theoretical roots. They all highlight structural influences, lock-in effects, the importance of networks of actors, and the role of learning in systemic change. But at the same time, these frameworks are characterised by different focuses. To begin with, the representation of key themes, such as actors, types of institutions, and ecosystems differ across the analytical frameworks. The innovation system and multi-level perspective display more tendencies to technology (Foxon, 2011). There are advantages to this – by placing technology at the centre of analysis, the favourable conditions and solutions to transition should be easier to ascertain. However, it
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scarifies analytical capabilities by taking account of potential solutions which may emerge within the wider context or through dimensions such as institution or user practices. By excluding end users in its analysis but in favour of larger actors, innovation system theory, therefore, overlooks the potential role of the demand-side for change. Generally speaking, these frameworks both show a tendency to focus on either the physical environment or a particular technology over social or institutional systems as drivers of change. It follows that it can be argued that the co-evolutionary framework has a more balanced view as it explores and acknowledges the existence of casual interactions between multiple systems in transition processes.
These frameworks have other limitations which also reduce their value as analytical approaches to inform analysis of on-going transitions. First, they display an overly structural set-up and conceptualise agency issues to a relatively shallow level (Smith et al., 2005; Shove and Walker, 2007; Genus and Coles, 2008; Musiolik and Markard,
2011). This leaves little room for scrutinising the diversity of competing framings
(Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Stirling, 2011), or potential political drivers or strategies at a more context-based or personal level (Smith et al., 2005; Shove and Walker, 2007).
Some scholars have responded to such criticism by emphasising the importance of analysing the values, intentions, and meaning-making of key actors in the transition process (Smith et al., 2010). It is argued that such a path should be followed and considered in greater depth to enhance our understanding of how perceptions and social interactions may affect the choice of certain solutions over others, leading to differences in scale, speed, and pathways of transition.
Secondly, the application of these frameworks tends to be sectoral specific or focus on the national level, while sub-national scales have been underdeveloped (Raven,
2007; Hodson and Marvin, 2010). Despite transition implies that there are changes in
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social functioning, there is a missing link between socio-technical transitions and overall system performances (e.g., sustainability or overall emission profiles)
(Turnheim et al. 2015). In other words, there is no clear indication of how a certain regime change may induce broader structural changes which are needed to secure a sustainable and low carbon future (Smith et al., 2010). These defects make it difficult to apply these frameworks to coordinate transitions at a higher level.
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2.2 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IN SYSTEMIC CHANGE
Historically, technological transitions were mostly triggered by innovations in end-use technologies and governments did not necessarily play a significant role in such transition processes (Andrews-Speed, 2016). However, given the urgency of tackling climate change within a limited timeframe, low carbon transition is considered to be different from previous cases (ibid). This is for two reasons. First, low carbon transition is not limited to a single technological replacement but a broad scale of structural change in various sectors. Secondly, the market is considered to be insufficient to bring about the scale of change required to address climate change within the perceived timeframe limitations (Fouquet, 2010). As a result, governments are often obliged to take actions to modulate such transitions despite unintended consequences could arise (Rotmans et al., 2001). Next, relevant concepts related to the governance of transition will be reviewed.
Discourses pertaining to the change of ‘from government to governance' indicates that government is no longer the only controlling actor in the society (Rhodes, 1997), and has been frequently mentioned in multiple disciplines. In the field of political science, the notion of ‘shifts in governance’ is used to account for new governing processes that have occurred in different social spheres alongside more traditional and institutional channels (Pierre, 2000; Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004). Within public administration literature, ‘government’ can be equated with regulatory approaches, while the term ‘governance’ is employed to indicate any other approaches which go beyond command-and-control (Rhodes, 1997; Jordan et al.,
2008). In the field of environmental studies, the debate on shifts in governance emerged in the late 1970s, and was characterised by wider stakeholder engagement,
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enhanced self-regulating capacities, and the expanded political space of non- governmental parties (Driessen et al., 2012).
Despite the concept of ‘governance’ being interpreted differently across various academic disciplines, three common features can be identified; the involvement of multiple actors (i.e. state, market and civil society actors) instead of a single authority in policy development and implementation processes; the connection and interaction of different (types of) actors; the existence of different types of institutions and their role in shaping actor interactions and reducing risks
(Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004). Governance is thus characterised by emergent networks, diverse leadership and self-sustainment relationships in society.
The arrangements and power relations between public, private and civic actors can be changed as a result of reflective evolution or as a consequence of passive responses to challenges posed by the wider environment such as the globalisation of world trade, the digitalisation of information, and threats from global environmental challenges (Hajer, 2009; Delmas and Young, 2009). The concept of governance provides a useful framework to understand dynamics and changes in policies and social processes which steer a low carbon transition.
Transition management
Grounded in an understanding of systemic transition processes, transition management literature moves beyond a descriptive analysis and provides practical policy guidance to facilitate socio-technical transition. ‘Transition management' literature considers transition as a purposive process and emphasises the role of government and governance in steering or modulating such transition (Loorbach,
2007). In other words, the government is assumed to play a major role in exerting
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strategic intervention to achieve a systemic change. It is also grounded in the assumption that through developing certain properties, such as enhancing adaptive capacity or reflexive learning, deliberate transitions can be enabled (Loorbach, 2010).
Several characteristics of transition management can be identified from existent literature. First, transition management seeks to destabilise existing regimes and nurture niche level innovation at the same time through combining various policies
(Smith and Stirling, 2010). Secondly, transition management is long-term oriented with a 25 year or more time span for the attainment of its objectives or visions
(Kemp et al., 2007). It is worth mentioning that, even though the visions are shaped at the beginning, they are subject to changes as a result of ongoing learning and reflection (Voß et al., 2009). Thirdly, the focus of transition management extends beyond targeting the promotion of cleaner technologies and instead focuses of transforming all related systems in a socio-technical regime, such as institution and user practices (Berkhout et al., 2002). Fourthly, the objectives and visions of transition management combine both quantifiable targets such as emission limits as well as qualitative goals relating to changing the nature of governance (Andrews-
Speed, 2012). That is to say, apart from setting quantitative targets, the government should also aim to create a favourable an institutional environment which facilitates the fulfilment of these targets. Lastly, given the complex nature of systems with non- linear nature of change (Ropohl, 1999), and the potential uncertainties caused by technological, economic and political changes in the long run, transition management is characterised by continuous experimentation, reflection and learning
(Kemp and Rotmans, 2005).
In principle, the management of transitions requires actors to be sensitive to existing dynamics and to carry out regular modifications of goals and practices to overcome
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conflicts between long-term visions and short-term practical challenges
(Meadowcroft, 2009). Several analytical tools have been widely applied to aid in the formulation of strategy, as well as the design of policy, the choice of policy instruments, and the monitoring of progress. For example, scenario study and cost- benefit analysis provides numerical simulation data for the design of strategy/roadmaps relating to the choice of technology and the speed of decarbonisation, which ensure that the strategy/roadmap is technologically and economically rational as well as consistent with the ultimate emissions’ objectives
(Harvey and Axelsson, 2010; Wang and Watson, 2010). Moreover, behavioural analysis can be applied to identify how policymakers can more effectively encourage behavioural changes at the individual, household, community and organisational levels through using policy programmes and instruments (Williamson et al., 2006;
Moloney et al., 2010). In an ideal sense, if the visions and strategies of transition management are informed by these studies, they can obtain a certain level of validity. However, the reliability of individual study is still questionable due to the inherent limitations of the methodology as well as the complexity of reality
(Meadowcroft, 2009). For this reason, learning and adaption are important mechanisms during the transition process in linking long-term goals, socio-technical pathways and experiments to achieve instrumental improvement and institutional reforms (ibid).
Translating the above-mentioned principles of transition management into practice is a demanding task. In addition to the inevitably unpredictable nature of complex socio-technical systems, transition management is also influenced by a range of socio-political processes (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012). For example, Boons et al.,
(2013), and Kivimaa and Kern (2016) found that economic pressures and simplistic assumptions about behaviour may result in a deviation of practices from the visions 58
of transition management. Moreover, as Grin et al. (2010) pointed out, given that transition management is grounded in complex system epistemology, it is usually dominated by elitism in reality. This means in practice, that only a limited number of experts are incorporated in the plan and policy-making process. In this sense, therefore, potential barriers to success stories may also feed into individual factors, such as beliefs, values and the behaviour of decision makers (Shove and Walker,
2010; Kern, 2011; Geels, 2013; 2014).
While transition management is built on a normative governance style featuring broadly consensual, long-term oriented, experimental, reflective and self-reinforced systems, it does not pay enough attention to how political structures, institutionalised ideas (paradigm), power relations, and values in different contexts may colour those pre-set principles which emerged from western societies.
Therefore, more understanding of the socio-political processes with reference to how
‘discursive struggles define visions and tasks’ (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013, p.138), is required. To inform the study in this field, Smith and Stirling (2007) has proposed two ideal frameworks of governance arrangements – ‘governance on the outside’ and
‘governing on the inside', which will be introduced in the next section.
Governance arrangement and socio-technical transition – two ideal types
Broadly speaking, ‘governance on the outside’ pre-defines transition goals and is managerially in approach whilst ‘governing on the inside' features reflexive learning and is experimental. To aid the illustration of the dynamics that exist within these two models, Smith and Stirling (2007) drew on two complementary concepts; social appraisal and social commitment. A social appraisal process can be understood as a way or a procedure by which to understand a socio-technical system. This process constructs knowledge and imbues it with meaning and develops it through social 59
learning (Nowotny et al., 2013). Social commitments, by contrast, refer to established relationships, existing tangible resources and concrete governance interventions (Feenberg, 2002). They are considered to have different roles and links in the two governance arrangements as explained below.
Governance on the outside
‘Governance on the outside’ perceives that a socio-technical system and governance as essentially separate and knowable. Based on such assumption, governance is sufficiently rational to generate strategies and plans for intervening and modulating the socio-technical transition. Under such a conceptualisation, the key governance mission is to make sure that stakeholders are informed and consulted properly in the policy-making process. The terms ‘sound science’ and ‘evidence-based policy’ both imply such a perspective. In these models, the process of social appraisal is less contested but serves as a learning process which is ‘orientated towards checking the efficacy of interventions and monitoring changes’ (Smith and Stirling., 2007, p.360).
Figure 2-4 presents a diagram illustrating the four key stages in this governance process.
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Figure 2-4: Governance on the outside: intervening in the socio-technical object
Source: Smith and Stirling (2007 p. 360)
As the appraisal process reveals specific objectives and courses of action, the commitment formation is straightforward. Therefore, in this conceptualisation, the political conflicts in the social commitment process are negligible as the engagement of actors in the appraisal process is assumed to reduce their resistance considerably
(Smith and Stirling, 2007). This is similar to the command-and-control of public policy approaches, which use policy incentives, regulations, and information to steer the society towards politically-defined objectives. The challenges of governance on the outside include the uncertainty and difficulties in coordinating different processes over different scales, and the lack of sufficient power to secure actor engagement
(Smith and Stirling, 2007). The main problems that arise from this approach are its
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legitimacy, effectiveness and implementation (Smith and Stirling, 2007).
Governance on the inside
‘Governance on the inside’ is built on the acknowledgement of the contested nature of sustainability and seeks to accommodate such challenges. It recognises that ‘there are multiple ways of knowing and approaching the socio-technical system’ (Smith and Stirling, 2007, p.362). The governance tasks, therefore, focus on forming networks, testing legitimacy, negotiating expertise, challenging power, and exerting facilitative influence (ibid). This perspective implies that governance practices will be fulfilled by forming social commitments based on negotiation. However, such a process may be chaotic for it will be influenced by diverse normative goals and wider political discourses without a dominant power. This process is much more complex and requires attention to question issues of power, authority and legitimacy (Smith and Stirling, 2007). As can be seen from Figure 2-5, the interactions and interpretations in this governance type are more diverse and complex.
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Figure 2-5: Governance on the inside: co-constituting socio-technical subjects
Source: Smith and Stirling (2007 p.364)
These two ideal conceptualisations of governance processes have their respective advantages and disadvantages. With reference to ‘governance on the outside’, its advantages lie in that it could more effectively mobilise resources to fulfil the agreed objective. Yet it remains concerns towards its stance of elitism and technological determinism. As argued by Grin et al., (2010), entrusting a small number of elites in society to envision and modulate society-wide systemic changes may not be effective in the long run and may also result in a series of unintended consequences. From a longer-term and broader perspective, ‘governance on the inside’ provides more flexibility in response to dynamic and uncertain environments. However, its source of failure can be the conflicts that exist between different governance objectives, such as those aimed at boosting international competitiveness and addressing inequality.
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Existing institutions that are concerned less with sustainability can also become constraints (Smith and Stirling, 2007). If that is the case, under such an arrangement, the process to reach a commitment may be extended which will delay actions that should be taken as early as possible. Therefore, it has been criticised as being too reactive to address climate change issues within the required timeframe (Smith et al., 2005).
However, in reality, the governance arrangement actually moves between the two poles and learns from both of them (Smith and Stirling, 2007). Moreover, the governance dynamics, public and political salience for climate change mitigation also vary greatly between societies and over time (Boykoff, 2008). It is well-recognised that the governance of low carbon transition covers more than one policy sector, and involves multiple types of actors. According to Kemp and Loorbach (2006), whilst the government actors take the lead, many transition initiatives are eventually carried out within the non-governmental space.
To date, governance arrangements in different social contexts and their impacts on low carbon development remain empirically understudied. Thus, empirically mapping governance practices to understand power relations and the nature of interactions between different actors will contribute to identifying the constraints that exist with regard to action more transformative changes and further inform how governance can be adapted to overcome such constraints. The multi-level governance framework which discusses next provides a guide for such analysis.
Multi-level governance
Research on climate change governance has transcended commonly accepted geographical and political boundaries, in which state institutions and policy
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framework are theorised as just one component among a network of various actors and rules (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; Bulkeley, 2006; Termeer et al., 2010). The concept of multi-level governance (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006) offers an insight by which to recognise the multiplicity of actors and rules. It is conceptualised beyond the hierarchical form of governance and instead considers the interactions between different levels of government as well as incorporating analysis of the relationships that exist between government and non-governmental actors in policy making and implementation (Smith and Stirling, 2007; Lo, 2014). Examples of which featuring the multilevel governance in the European context include the Covenant of Mayors in
European and European-American city-level climate change agreements, the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), and the UK’s Energy Company Obligation. These programmes are operating on voluntary agreement bases and involve either municipalities or companies from various countries. Such cross-border networks are also captured by human geographers as the ‘politics of scale' (Swyngedouw, 2004).
Recent studies in the wider field of environmental governance have also documented a series of alternative modes of governance, such as those arising from community level (O’Rourke 2004), professional networks (Shin 2017), and horizontal collaboration (Eaton and Kostka, 2018). This phenomenon indicates that environmental concerns and corresponding responses lie beyond the domains of individual territories.
Such a perspective offers a useful framework to understand the processes and reasons behind the diversity that exists in interpreting and shaping visions, strategies and policies across different localities. In other words, the multi-level governance perspective offers an alternative approach to identify the roles of different actors in shaping low carbon transition in different localities. However, it is also worth mentioning that while the spread of governance networks may create more 65
opportunities for social learning and bottom-up initiatives, their existence does not necessarily challenge the power of the state (Jessop, 2016).
Hierarchical governance: central-local interaction
The first level of governance examined here is the interaction between national and sub-national governments. It is found that in western societies, national government’s commitment is not a necessary condition for local actions. For example, in the American context, there are cases which show that the inertia of national government works as a driver for municipal actions (Rice, 2013). There are also studies found that it is desirable to foster multi-level governance arrangements for low carbon transition as it enables territorial differences to be captured (Nilsson et al., 2011) and promote a distribution of responsibilities which is conducive to capacity building (Lo, 2014). In contrast, in China, the central government which uses the target responsibility system to assign territorial carbon targets to subnational governments was considered as a key to success (Lo, 2014). As a result of the empirical results differing, further interest to empirically explore such dynamics and the source of influence has arisen. Different experiences between countries also suggest that the discussion of governance of low carbon transitions and their effectiveness cannot be separated from contextualised issues.
Transnational and regional municipal networks
The second governance level discussed here is the rise of transnational and regional municipal networks in the field of carbon governance. Despite a lack of statutory influence, Andonova et al. (2009) identify three key mechanisms by which municipal networks are able to place an influence on their participants: information sharing; capacity building; and rule-setting. In theory, networking is essential to enhance
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knowledge transfer and to facilitate interaction between different actors
(Geenhuizen et al., 1996). Indeed, this kind of interaction plays a key role in generating new knowledge and influencing practices. Yet empirical studies on the member cities of some municipal climate networks both confirm and challenge the impact that such networks have on low carbon transition. From a positive perspective, an international survey carried out by Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013) found that there is a substantial correlation between two phenomena: being a member of a municipal network and involvement in bottom-up carbon reduction initiatives. There is also evidence showing that cities from developing countries with limited resources and experience can benefit from joining such networks for capacity building (Romero Lankao, 2007). Moreover, joining such networks can be instrumental in creating a norm of engaging in tackling climate change whilst also enhancing the legitimacy of relevant practices (Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013)
Still, such a governance process is mainly based on voluntary commitments and, therefore, to a large extent lack formal processes in terms of enforcement and sanction. Therefore, it should be noted that knowledge sharing and capacity building can be sometimes symbolic in municipal networks, serving to show ‘what can be achieved, rather than how to make it happen’ (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004, p.133).
Bulkeley (2006) further points out that learning activities based on municipal networks often rely only on summarising lessons from some successful models or sharing best practices that are generated under certain contexts. Wang (2013) and
Rice (2013) also confirm limitations of the non-coercive mode of participation in such network settings by revealing that, in practice, a majority of members have failed to follow the framework promoted by the Cities for Climate Protection Program.2 In
2 The Cities for Climate Protection program (CCP), established in 1990 by the International Union of Local Authorities and the United Nations Environment Programme, is one of three major global transnational municipal networks aimed at reducing urban greenhouse gas emissions. 67
reality, factors such as communication and trust, sharing common interests and articulation of needs are all important in influencing interaction and implementation outcomes (Pressey and Mathews, 2000).
Public-private network and self-governance
The third aspect of multilevel governance is public-private networks and self- governance at the local scale. Compared with central-local interaction and municipal networks, the public-private networks operate mainly at the local scale (Lo, 2014).
With respect to governance for low carbon transition, there are cases showing that governments are increasingly in partnership with non-government actors to overcome political obstacles and to facilitate policy implementation (Rutland and
Aylett, 2008). For example, at a local level, cooperating with market actors can enable local authorities to tackle some practical challenges through a pooling of collective knowledge or raising additional funds (Shey and Belis, 2013).
There are also cases showing that self-governance can play a significant role. For example, in the case of Freiburg, Germany, informal networks formed by market and civil society actors played a primary role in initiating new approaches and experimentations to drive the transition forward (Rohracher and Späth, 2014).
However, such achievements are context-specific and require social capital which may be absent elsewhere.
In general terms, the leadership of local government at a local level was identified as one of the most important aspects to the formation and operation of local policy networks (Lo, 2014). It is noteworthy that although non-governmental actors who
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have their own agenda can participate in policy-making processes, they merely provide inputs to the decision-making (Khan, 2013). In a sense, the public-private policy network can be portrayed as a model of ‘shadow hierarchy’ where public actors continue to exercise power over private actors (Whitehead, 2003).
Governing low carbon transition: an evaluation
This session reviews and discusses some approaches and concepts related to the governance of low carbon transition. At the aggregate level, some normative principles are identified: long-term vision, reflectivity, experimentation, consensus building, social learning and multi-level governance – all of which are important for effective governance outcomes in the context of low carbon transition. However, there remains much debate over issues of authority, legitimacy, and accountability in this body of literature. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that transition management itself prescribes elitism, in which only a rather small number of actors are involved (Grin et al. 2010). Such elite-led deliberations over society-wide transformations face a series of challenges (Scrase and Smith, 2009). For example, powerful actors from the current regime can be conservative and resist change in different ways such as rebranding existing actions as low carbon practices rather than engaging in innovative actions for accelerating low carbon transition (Howlett, 2014;
Jordan and Huitema, 2014). Moreover, despite the fact that increasing the diversity of participants in the policy process can be seen as a strength in generating new ideas, policy networks may still strongly reflect existing power structures (Whitehead,
2003; Giddens, 2009).
On the other hand, it is also argued that the transition management framework mainly focuses on practical issues but does not accommodate the structural conditions and political processes to a proper level (Okereke et al., 2009; Scrase and 69
Smith, 2009; Meadowcroft, 2011). In this sense, it undervalued the influence of dominant policy paradigm, political institutions and social arrangements in shaping low carbon governance practices and discourses (Scrase and Smith, 2009). For example, it is challenging for societies which are entrenched with a dominant logic of economic growth to institutionalising the principles prescribed by transition management (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012). Even in developed countries, pressures from the political economy arena may challenge a government’s proactive position on climate change and subsequently lead to policy roll back or implementation failure (Fankhauser et al., 2015; Boykoff, 2015).
When it comes to the practical effectiveness of instruments or governance processes, results are also mixed. For example, market-based instruments and voluntary programmes can be complementary and competing (Jordan et al., 2005; Bailey,
2007); public-private partnerships can play a role in reinforcing existing political economic influences or diversifying climate practices (Bäckstrand, 2008; Pattberg,
2010); and city climate networks can facilitate resource distribution and knowledge transfer but may also be symbolic (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013). Thus far, available evidence shows that niche innovations and grassroots programmes are largely fragmented and do not accumulate towards concerted efforts to bring in transformative changes (Scrase and Smith, 2009; Manuel-Navarrete, 2010)
In this sense, while seeking potential social and technical solutions for climate change mitigation, recommendations cannot be prescribed in a general way for any given sector or society (Bergman and Eyre, 2011; Foxon, 2011) without critically considering the contexts. Recognised these limitations, a number of researchers have introduced concepts from the fields of human geography, political science, and policy studies to expand the analytical perspective by further considering scale, territory,
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institution, agency, power relation, and idea (Meadowcroft, 2011; Kern and Mitchell,
2010; Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; Markard et al., 2012; Avelino and Rotmans, 2009;
Coenen et al., 2012; Geels, 2014). Most notably, Geels (2014), Kern (2011) and
Meadowcroft (2011) have explored the politics and power dynamics in transition processes by examining how market mechanism, low carbon policies and actors’ interaction were shaped by institutions. Specifically, they accommodate the perspective of political structures and the power relations to make these frameworks more robust. However, these studies were largely conducted in western contexts and were technological or sectoral specific.
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2.3 STRUCTURE-AGENCY AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The above reviews reveal some defects of systemic epistemology and transition management. By far, many scholars have responded to these criticisms by drawing on insights from structure-agency and institutional theory to expand the analytical perspective for low carbon transition, either in an implicit or an explicit way.
However, existent studies have largely used these concepts in a selective way based on their respective research purposes; therefore, they do not afford to inform this research directly. In order to develop an integrative conceptual framework to aid research on urban carbon governance in the Chinese context, this section thus provides a review of structure-agency and institutional theory and discusses their relevance.
Structure-agency theory
Many social and political studies related to government and long-term social changes appeal to the structure-agency perspective. The governance of low carbon transition as an intentional wide-range socio-technical change can be supplemented by and benefit from the structure-agency perspective (Geels, 2014). Specifically, enhancing understanding of structure-agency interplay helps to improve understanding of on- going transitions (Kern and Rogge, 2016). In addition, by placing such analysis into a specific context and examining specific institutional frameworks and processes can expose context-related explanations for current situations (ibid). Such analysis is also more useful while seeking to extrapolate potential future direction, because it avoids single-focus interpretation either on structural influence or powerful agency (Geels,
2014).
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The relationship between agency and environment, namely the structure-agency dichotomy, originated within sociology but has since been widely discussed in political science (Hay, 2002). It has been well documented in the literature that structure and agency affect each other to different degrees (Hay, 2002). Based on criticisms of a tendency for research to offer a one-sided focus on either structure or agency, discussions have shifted to taking a dialectical position viewing structure- agency relationship. Among these views, Giddens' structuration theory (1979) is one of the most frequently cited theories of structure and agency (Bogason, 2000).
Before exploring the interaction of structure and agency on change, this sections provides an examination on the multiple interpretations on the term of ‘structure’. In terms of structure, Hay (2002, p.94) perceives that ‘structure basically means context and refers to the setting within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning'. As further emphasised by Hay (2006, p.12), the structure can also be conceptualised as ‘the continuation of the past'. Giddens (1979, p.12) proposes his structuration approach by arguing that to depict the nature of structure as ‘dual’ would provide a more precise indication to its essence, because the structure is ‘both the medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute social system'. In this sense, structuration approach further clarified the idea of the ‘duality of structure', by underlining that structure in the form of rules and resources is inherently both enabling and constraining (Giddens, 1984, p. 169).
Following Giddens’s structuration theory, many scholars have further developed the dialectical relationship between structure and agency by pointing out that the extent to which structure can constrain or enable people depends on how people recognise the structure and interpret some structural elements (Jessop, 2001). Even each new generation of agents is under the influence of structure which is not designed by
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them, such influence is not straightforward or in a mechanistic fashion (Archer,
1995). Archer (1995) also highlighted actors' initiatives and argued that in the process of pursuing their interests, people can actively define or redefine social norms and common values as well as their wider structural environment.
The dialectical relationship insights offer a more balanced view and inspire a series of inquiries relating to actors’ responses to the structural environment in which they are sited and how they place influences on structure. In order to reduce the abstraction of such relationships and to further understand actors’ real-world impact, Cerny
(1990) proposes to place a greater emphasis on investigating actors’ behaviours and their decisions against the immediate options they faced. It is important to note that different groups of actor may have different understandings and abilities toward the structural environment, and that this may, consequently, lead to different responses.
Moreover, individual actors can also have different responses in similar situations as time passes by (Cerny 1990). Following this research, Hay (2002 p.128) offered a
‘strategic-relational approach’ to understand the relationship between structure and agency by focusing on ‘the immediate interaction between the strategic actors and the strategic context’.
Jessop (2005) further informs the strategic-relational approach through raising two analytical concepts; ‘strategic calculation’ and ‘strategic selectivity'. The latter,
‘strategic selectivity’ suggests that the structures of different contexts at different time tend to encourage certain strategies over others. In contrast, Jessop's notion of
‘strategic calculation' highlights that actors are able to understand situations and to plan rationally at any given moment. It seeks, therefore, to measure the extent to which actors are reflexive and capable of planning strategically and acting tactically when facing a specific contingent situation. Jessop (2001, p.1226) believes that
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actors ‘maintain some freedom of manoeuvre to choose a path of action more or less skilfully and reflexively according to their varying thoughts and material capacities’ when facing a contingent situation. In other words, it is assumed by Jessop (2001) that, when facing choices, actors will implement their strategic views to seek to capitalise on opportunities or overcome constraints. Therefore, actors’ views would have a crucial mediating role for the outcome of structure-agency interplay. But it is worth mentioning that these strategic views are sometimes likely to be derived from imperfect knowledge or based on a more or less inaccurate understanding of the context (Jessop, 2011).
In this sense, the strategic-relational approach places more emphasis on actors’ perceptions and behaviours when facing choices, but gives much less consideration to actors’ specific positions or preferences. Instead, the term of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ which emerged in the realm of policy studies focuses on how key agents advocate a certain type of change offer insights to complement the strategic-relational approach
(Kingdon, 1984). Specifically, ‘policy entrepreneurs’, refers to those actors who use resources to draw attention to new topics by framing issues, influencing policy processes and guiding policy changes (Kingdon 1984). In other words, they are driven by different kinds of motivation to proactively shape the vision of an intentional change. In this sense, it is clear that to interpret these as ‘economically rational’ or
‘static upholders’ of specific cultural characteristics is inappropriate (Hay, 2002).
The ‘strategic-relational approach’ is also temporal specific, which enable us to capture the effects of social learning over time. As time passes, actors may deepen their understanding of structure and obtain more resources to make impacts (Jessop,
2005). This, in turn, results in them having a greater influence on the structure. Social or political outcomes are contingent on such dynamics. Moreover, from a policy
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study perspective, there are some transitory opportunities during which it is easier for new policy ideas to be taken up, captured by the term ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon,
1984). Specifically, while problems (i.e. crises or media-worthy events) are coupling with political importance as well as a policy solution, policy alternatives are more likely to be adopted (Kingdon, 1984). Overall, in terms of exploring the dynamics of change and path dependency, the dialectical nature of structuration approach informs us that the explanation of political effects, outcomes or some key events can be based on an examination of structural / contextual factors and key actors’ immediate actions / perceptions and discussions of their interconnectedness.
Institutional theory
In the field of transition studies, it has been recognised that the underrepresentation of institutional context may render responses to overcome lock-in effects ineffective, as well as limit the capacity to analyse and inform the governance for transition
(Meadowcroft, 2011; Markard et al., 2012; Geels, 2014). It follows, in recent years, the academic community has been increasingly drawn to perspectives from new institutionalism to aid its analysis of socio-technical transition (ibid).
However, the number of studies which explicitly draw on institutionalism to explore urban carbon governance is very limited. Furthermore, research that directly examines the extent to which institutions have been changed as a result of the rise of low carbon agenda is, to my knowledge, still absent. To inform these inquiries, this section compares different forms of new institutionalism and discusses how it can be utilised to explain how agency shapes and us being shaped by institutions in the governance process for low carbon transition.
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New-Institutionalism in different forms
Generally speaking, new institutionalism is a generic term for a research field which attempts to explain how social structures have emerged and shaped societies, as well as how they remain stable but also change over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
The body of new institutionalism literature was developed in the mid-1980s in response to an existent ‘overemphasis on agency without structure’ (Schimidt, 2008, p.278). Three long-lasting analytical approaches can be identified under the title of historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996). In more recent time, another lens of institutionalism ‘discursive institution’ has increasingly gained popularity (Schmidt,
2010). Each of these schools developed its own set of assumptions and concepts to explain how institutions remain stable and how they change, providing different insights.
Historical institutionalism emerged from the field of political science. It focuses on the distribution of power and asymmetrical relations shaped by institutions (Hall and
Taylor, 1996). Historical institutionalism defines an institution in a broad sense, including formal and informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions. It is eclectic by using both ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ approaches to specifying the relationship that exists between institutions and actions (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
There are three features of the historical institutional approach – substantive agendas; temporal arguments; and attentive to contexts and configurations (ibid).
Historical institutionalists often pay attention to substantive questions which are resonated by the broader public. In order to explain how important outcomes were reached, historical institutionalists specify sequences of ideas and events as well as tracing transformations (of varying scales) based on time dimensions. Historical
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institutionalists are also attentive to wider contexts and study the combined influence of institutions or processes instead of focusing on one particular institution or process at a time (Pierson, 2004). This means that, in historical institutionalism, institution is viewed as an important but causal force in politics among many other factors such as socio-economic development and the influences that stem from ideas
(Hall and Taylor, 1996).
It is argued by Pierson’s (2000) that historical institutionalism literature tends to view policy-making systems as conservative and self-reinforcing, i.e. a defence of the status quo. This explains why political changes are normally being incremental and path-dependent. Radical changes to a new path are often made possible when there are critical junctures such as disasters which create branching points (Mahoney and
Thelen, 2010).
Rational choice institutionalism emerged around the same period as historical institutionalism but is relatively isolated from it (Hall and Taylor 1996). Rooted in economics, rational choice institutionalism has also been applied to studying various phenomena as time passes, including cross-national coalition behaviour, democratic transitions, cross-national coalition behaviour and ethnic conflict (North, 1990; North et al., 2009). Rational choice institutionalists assume that actors are bounded rational, whose actions are driven by a ‘strategic calculus’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996). It proposes that people are inclined to have ‘a fixed set of preferences and tend to act instrumentally to obtain what they aim for’ (North, 1990, p.24). When individuals try to maximise their preference, their choices and behaviours are affected by their expectations of others’ choices and behaviours. In this sense, without commonly agreed rules in place, it is hard to expect the outcomes of actions. Therefore, aiming to reduce uncertainties, lower transaction costs, increase efficiency, different types
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of institutions, both in a formal or informal form, were reasonably constructed
(Williamson, 1996; North et al., 2009). In other words, the development or existence of a particular institution can be seen to be the result of collective efforts. By offering information pertinent to decision-making and providing a series of relevant enforcement mechanisms to reduce uncertainty, institutions may shape individuals’ future actions (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
Sociological (organisational) institutionalism mainly developed within the subfield of organisation theory. Given these concepts were widely applied to sociology studies, the terms ‘sociological institutionalism’ and ‘organisational institutionalism’ are often used interchangeably (Scott, 2013). Mindful of this, this thesis uses the term ‘sociological institutionalism’ to indicate both hereafter. The institution in the sociological institutionalism is conceptualised in a broader sense by including symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates in addition to formal rules and procedures (Campbell, 2004). Compared to other schools of new institutionalism, the distinctiveness of sociological institutionalism lies in the fact that it places most emphasis on the role of culture and assumes that culture plays a determining role in shaping social outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
Under sociological institutionalism, actors are considered to be under constant institutional pressure to conform to a series of cultural rules, norm, and expectations regardless of efficiency (Miller and Banaszak-Holl, 2005). This explains why some more efficient institutional forms and procedures are not adopted or cannot be well- implemented in some places. Instead of denying that individual actors can act rationally, sociological institutionalists consider ‘rational actions’ to be socially constructed (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Given this perspective, sociological institutionalists typically seek to answer a series of questions: 1) why there are
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striking similarities in terms of institutional structure and practices across the world despite different local conditions; 2) how particular practices are diffused across different places; 3) why different localities or organisations adopt specific institutional framework? (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
Sociological institutionalists also posit cultural imperatives within an ‘organisational level’ as oppose to wider environments. The concept of ‘organisational field’ incorporates human agencies and their immediate organisational structures, and offers a lens to conceptually separate them from the wider institutional framework that the agency and organisation belong to. The organisational field involves a broader range of actors beyond a mere ‘industry' or ‘market'. Instead, it is concerned with a full range of actors who are relevant to a particular issue, or the supply and consumption of goods or services (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Alternatively, the organisational field can also be conceptualised as a domain or network where participating actors’ or organisations’ behaviours are conditioned by their relationships (Wooten and Hoffman, 2016). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) summarise three types of isomorphism pressure provided by the organisation field, including coercive isomorphism – in compliance with rules, norms or laws; mimetic isomorphism – to adopt peer-recognised best practices and managerial principles; and normative isomorphism – to take up standards or principles proposed by experts.
In this regard, human agencies’ behaviours might not be shaped directly by a wider institutional framework as they are acting within their immediate organisational structures. Following this logic, it may be useful to understand and compare the behaviours of human agencies from different organisational structures under the same institutional framework (Miller and Banaszak-Holl, 2005). In other words, it
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advises to delineate the organisational field and distinguish actors by types when conducting empirical analysis.
Discursive Institutionalism was proposed by Schmidt (2008). It refers to ‘the process of exchanging and conveying ideas among actors’ (Schmidt, 2011, p. 56). Discursive
Institutionalism does not emphasise much on the equilibrium-focused institutionalism like other three schools of institutionalist thoughts (Schmidt, 2010).
Instead, it directs greater attention to understand how political outcomes and institutional changes are influenced by ideas and discourses. Generally speaking, it views change in a more dynamic way by focusing on finding out what ideas are carried by actors and how these ideas shape their interactions. This approach highlights some elements which have been largely underrepresented in previous institutional studies, such as how ideas constitute political actions, what is the role of persuasion in political debates, and how these effects construct and reconstruct of political interests and values (Schmidt, 2010).
To further aid an analysis of how ideas are conveyed amongst actors, Schmidt (2013) separated the process of ideas exchanges into two types: the coordinative discourse which takes place between relevant policy actors, and the communicative discourse which happen between political actors and the general public. In both types of process, the vehicles of interactions can take various forms including stories and scenarios. The relative significance of roles on the political outcome from coordinative discourse and communicative discourse, is partly dependent on the institutional environment (ibid).
Therefore, in discursive institutionalism, ideas and discourse are conceptualised as a form of power. In this sense, political and social outcomes can be modulated through influencing on other actors' normative and cognitive beliefs (Carstensen and 81
Schmidt, 2016). Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) further distinguished three processes through which ideas and discourses make impacts: namely power through ideas – use ideas to persuade; power over ideas – impose a dominant idea and exclude the rest; power in ideas – the idea itself holds a position and determines what is legitimate and what is not.
The persistence and change of institution
In a relative sense, historical and rational choice institutionalism are more attentive to the ways in which path-dependency restrain economic or political development
(Greif, 2006). There are three key implications of path-dependence. First, institutions are self-reinforced and inter-dependent (Campbell, 2004). That is to say, while one institution is changed or a new institution is developed, the enforcement of these new rules or mechanisms may subject to the operation of other related but unaffected institutions (ibid). Thus, the impact of new institutional practices may not be strong. Secondly, once radical changes do take place, new rules are not easily reversed (North, 1990). Finally, the further progress through one particular development path, the more limited in availability for options to change the path
(ibid). As a result, earlier decisions or changes would have more significant impacts than later ones.
Actors’ bounded rationality, which mentioned by rational choice and sociological institutionalism, is a source of institutional persistence despite dysfunctionality and/or inefficiencies (Eggertsson, 2009). In this field of policy studies, the concept of
‘policy paradigm’ proposed by Hall (1993) or ‘cognitive rules' proposed by Scott
(2014) can be applied to illustrate such effects. The policy paradigm works as ‘a framework of ideas and standards that specify not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them but also the very nature of the 82
problems they are meant to be addressing’ (Hall, 1993, p.232). The ‘cognitive rules’ on the other hand, guide the perceptions and actions of actors with regard to the way in which they look for a certain kind of solution in preference to others. In this sense, the ‘Policy paradigm' and ‘cognitive rules' can shape the way people frame a problem and what kinds of interventions are seen as politically feasible, possible and desirable, by filtering information and shaping attention (Hay, 2002). In other words, institutions themselves carry identities and roles which shape a polity’s characters and visions (March and Olsen, 2006). In this sense, the emerging problem may not be adequately addressed if it is beyond the capability of existing policy paradigm or its proper solution goes against existing cognitive rules.
Despite path dependency, institutions do change over time and new institutions can be created. Different schools of thought have also developed their own terminology to depict institutional change. For example, in historical institutionalism, an institution may become vulnerable to change if it fails to be self-reinforcing or is incompatible with other associated institutions (Lieberman, 2002). In rational choice institutionalism, an institution will subject to change if exogenous shocks break the equilibria status, and consequently increase transaction costs of the society (North,
1990). In sociological institutionalism, the adoption of new institutional rules may occur due to the enhancement of their legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In the discursive institution, institutional change will take place while ideas and discourses overcome existing obstacles (Schmidt, 2010). What makes discursive institution different from the other three strands is that its analytical focus is on change rather than stability (ibid).
Building on the common themes of the three schools (historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism), Mahoney and
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Thelen (2010) found that all of them comprehend institutional changes having some exogenous sources of influence. They argue that these frameworks overlook the features of institutions themselves and the importance of endogenous developments. For example, all institutions represent a certain level of tensions and compromises, which make them vulnerable to change to different extents.
Moreover, established institutions cannot afford to cover every aspect of social situations. Therefore, rules are under constant recreation or extension, during which they may be contested or reinterpreted. This also creates room for institutional change. On these views, they proposed that when attempting to analyse institutional change, researchers should simultaneously consider: 1) the features of targeted institution; 2) power relations between different actors; and 3) types of changing agents3 (ibid).
In measuring the adaptability of institution, North (1990) introduced the term
‘adaptive efficiency’. Adaptive efficiency measures the willingness and ability of a society to obtain new knowledge, to induce innovation, to undertake all sorts of risk and creative activities, so as to resolve problems and tackle the immediate challenges of society (North, 1990). Based on North (1990)’s concept, Andrews-
Speed (2016, p.218) highlighted two key elements to evaluate a society’s adaptive capacity, namely; ‘its ability to learn and its capacity for collective action’. It can be said that a society’s adaptive efficiency is highly dependent on how actors react to challenges.
However, the reaction of actors which may or may not induce institutional change is highly variable. That is to say, the above-mentioned elements (i.e. ability to learn and its capacity for collective action) are, in turn, depend on a series of contextual
3 As to whether these actors seek to preserve the institution or not, and whether these actors follow rules of institution 84
factors. For example, the political culture of a society will partly decide the nature of actors, their reactions to existing paradigms and new ideas, and the nature of their actions that bring about institutional change (March and Olsen, 2006). It is perceived that participatory policy-making processes, which involves a broad range of actors and well-connected social and professional networks are conductive to social learning (Reed et al., 2010). In addition, the higher tolerance of coexistence of multiple ideologies in society may also enhance its adaptive efficiency (North, 2006).
Moreover, the success of institutional entrepreneurs’ is dependent on their ability to understand current situations and drive collective actions. This in turn depends on the nature of trust and social capital within a society as well as the power relation embedded in existing institutional arrangements (Hall, 2010; Ostrom, 2007).
From a social learning perspective, Phal-Wostl (2009) distinguished three levels of institutional change based on the relationships that exist between types of learning and their corresponding outcomes. Firstly, single-loop learning is based on questioning existing routines, which can lead to an incremental change. At this level, radical alternatives are ignored either intentionally or unintentionally. The established formal and informal institutions will still be used to justify the prevailing system instead of being challenged. Secondly, double-loop learning will trigger a reflection on some guiding assumptions, the legitimacy of goals and the framing of issues. Such reflections can bring about a reinterpretation of issues and changes of measures. However, such a level of change is challenging given structural constraints including the strong influence of dominant frames, weak learning capacities, and power imbalances. Lastly, triple-loop learning is fulfilled when the paradigms and structural constraints which impede a more effective framing or governance practices are well recognised. In this sense, a substantial change of structural context, including regulatory framework, paradigm, underlying norms and values and 85
power structure, will be achieved.
The implication of structural-agency and institution theory
The above review highlighted the dialectical considerations of structural-agency interplay and compared the definitions and assumptions across the four different strands of new institutionalism. Different schools having their own individual perspectives on what constitutes an institution as well as how an institution works.
But overall, central to any institutional analysis is the need to explain the characteristics of political and social outcomes on the basis of institutional features
(Hall and Taylor, 1996). In recognition of the plasticity of institution, this study sets to explore the extent to which institutions shape behaviours, and, at the same time, the strategic actions targeting changing institutions.
Based on the premise that the government is perceived to be responsible for steering the low carbon transition, this study takes two kinds of formal institution; the low carbon policy framework and carbon governance arrangements, as the key sites of structure-agency interaction. Consequently, it can be assumed that the low carbon policy framework and carbon governance arrangement are conditioned by structure; but at the same time, what they look like and how they work is also dependent on actors’ response and their ability to reproduce rules. This conceptualisation offers a platform for analysing the interplay that exists between institutions and human action. Following this logic, the starting point will be to understand the features of wider political and cultural attributes of a society. It follows, attention will be paid to understand the characteristics of low carbon policy framework and carbon governance arrangements, to find out the extent to which they have redefined rules. To achieve this, there is a need to understand how actors recognise and respond to the existing institutions, and their ability to act to change 86
institution so as to fulfil their purposes. In other words, we need to have a better understanding of actors' values, views and strategic actions. Through tracing actors’ interaction processes across time, both the adaptive efficiency of a society and how the institutionalised rules that enable or constrain positive changes will be exposed.
A more balanced view in terms of conceptual selection is proffered in Section 4.2 following the review of the Chinese situation in the next chapter. changes will be ex
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
Low carbon transition requires transformational social change within a limited timeframe; a process that involves a broad set of interrelated processes that cut across social, technical, political, economic and personal realms (Markard et al.,
2016). A few models and perspectives have been developed to comprehend the dynamics of transition process. Based on (historical) empirical cases, these frameworks 1) provide useful analytical concepts to structure and describe how the transition processes may be unfolding; 2) identify key elements and their patterns of interaction in the transition process; and 3) inform how a systemic transition can be successful.
Based on these understandings, the transition management framework prescribes a series of normative principles to guide intentional changes. However, despite an intention to steer a low carbon transition, it is noted that in the real world most changes that have been taken place so far were less transformative (Kern and Rogge,
2016). To account for such reality, recent studies argue that the governance for socio- technical transition needs to be supplemented with attention to politico-institutional influence. This study also recognises that embracing these concerns allow a better observation on the constraints and their roots. It follows, the review of structure- agency theory and institutional theory provided insights into how institutions can shape behaviours, and, at the same time, how institution may change as a result of the strategic actions. With these insights in mind, the next chapter will move to examine the characteristics of the Chinese governing system, before constructing a conceptual framework for studying low carbon development in Chinese cities.
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND OF CHINESE URBAN CARBON
GOVERNANCE
This chapter reviews China’s political environment and national climate change policy framework, which sets the stage for studying carbon policies and governance at the city level. The first section reviews some key elements of China’s governing system.
This is followed by an introduction to China's new development paradigm and its implication on urban carbon governance. Lastly, the final section of this chapter provides an overview of the evolution of China’s national carbon reduction policy framework since the mid-2000s.
3.1 THE CHINESE GOVERNING SYSTEM: ORGANISATIONS, ACTORS AND
INSTITUTIONAL TOOLS
Organisational set-up at the national level
The national scale started to dominate Chinese administrative systems from 1949 onwards. In China, the central government has to make every effort to manage a large area characterised by extensive geographical and cultural diversity. At the national level, there are three main organs: The National People's Congress (NPC), the Communist Party of China (CPC), and the State Council (SC). Broadly speaking, one of the key responsibilities of the national government is to develop national plans and policies as well as provide articulation.
The NPC is the national legislature body with 2980 members in 2018 (International
Parliamentary Union, 2018). Between plenary sessions, a Standing Committee of 150 members is convened to carry out duties. The NPC is the highest authority in China to legislate, interpret laws, oversee the government’s operation, and elect key government leaders. The CPC, on the other hand, is the sole ruling political party with supreme political authority. Currently, the CPC is led by President Xi Jinping. In
China, the CPC retains its power across all levels through both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ approaches. ‘Soft’ approaches include engage with ideological education and use slogans to promote visions (Su, 2011). ‘Hard’ approaches include a number of formal mechanisms, i.e. controlling the appointment and career progression of key figures in important positions within the government, public organisations, and state-owned enterprises at different levels, sending inspection teams to monitor and evaluate major activities across the countries, and strictly monitoring the establishment of new organisations (Dickson, 2008). Generally speaking, the CPC has been flexible and resilient over the past 30 years. During the past three decades, the leadership of CPC 90
has repeatedly adjusted its strategies and policies according to the changing circumstances as well as restructuring the party’s and government’s organisational structures to tackle new challenges (Gilley, 2008). There are many studies which show that the CPC is considered to be willing to, and to some extent capable of, adapt itself to address prevailing environmental challenges (Qiu and Li, 2008; Lo,
2015). The SC is the executive organ and chief administrative authority in China. It mainly consists of 26 Ministers and Commissions and 10 key agencies, which is now chaired by Premier Li Keqiang.
All these three organs can issue policies. Policies issued by the NPC are laws with legal forces. The other policies issued by the CPC, the Standing Committee of NPC, the SC and its multiple ministries are, collectively, called opinions (yijian)4 and guidelines (banfa). 5 Opinions (yijian) provide general directions for overall development with the highest political backing and thus set a framework for further policy-making. Within the parameters of laws and principles, guidelines (banfa) provide more detailed and specific policy guidance which are backed by high administrative force. Those policies which are made by single ministerial departments are usually called department rules (bumentguizhang), 6 guidance
(zhidao),7 and policy clarifications (jieshi),8 all of which specify more detailed and practical instructions (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988).
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)9 is one of the highest- ranking commissions and is sited directly under the SC. It is a macroeconomic
4 意见 5 办法 6 部门规章 7 指导 8 解释 9 国家发展和改革委员会 91
management agency with broad administrative power and planning control over a wide range of activities. Generally speaking, the NDRC formulates and organises the implementation of national economic and social development strategies, is responsible for coordinating economic and social affairs, and promotes systemic reform. Prior to March 2018, the NDRC was the key agency responsible for a series of tasks related to the promotion of sustainable development, clean production, energy conservation, GHG emissions, and climate change. In the latest internal organisational restructuring of the SC, the tasks related to sustainable development,
GHG emissions and climate change have been passed to the newly established
Ministry of Ecological Environment10.
Five-Year-Plans (FYPs)
The nationwide FYP11 sits at the centre of the planning process. The FYP sets overall goals, establishes priorities, and spells out specific targets on a synoptic but time- limited basis (Young et al., 2015). China implemented its 1st FYP between 1953 and
1957 and subsequently renewed it on a five-year basis. In the first year of each five- year cycle, an overarching national FYP is released at the annual joint meeting of the
NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.12 The NDRC is the key department which responsible for drafting the FYP at the national level.
The national FYP can be seen as the ‘overarching plan’ for all aspects of China’s development on a five-year basis. Under the national FYP, there are sub-national
FYPs and dedicated FYPs (either sectoral based or issue based). The national FYPs are
10 生态环境部
11 Full name as: National Five-Year-Plan for Economy and Social Development
12 A political advisory body consists of delegates from a range of political parties and organisations, as well as independent members 92
considered as the most important framework for the different levels of sub-national governments (i.e. regional, 13 provincial, municipal, county, township, and development zones). Following the release of the national FYP, sub-national governments are obliged to develop more focused and specified FYPs for their areas.
The dedicated FYPs breakdown the general plan for specific sectors (e.g. the energy sector and the transport sector) or for specific issues (e.g. energy efficiency and carbon reduction), with more detailed targets and practical instructions being given to better guide implementation, government spending, and project planning.
FYPs are prepared in accordance to the CPC’s guidance. While FYPs are not defined as ‘law’ according to China's Law on Laws, the FYP reflects the wills of the CPC leaders and is scrutinised by the SC before being formally adopted by the NPC as
‘legally binding’ or ‘effective’ acts (Young et al., 2015). Across China's political institutions, this arrangement makes the FYPs sometimes override laws in terms of implementation. This is reflected in reality by the fact that laws are sometimes ignored while local governments face severe pressures to meet specific targets stipulated by the FYPs (ibid).
Policy process
China’s governing system is described by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988, p.137) as a
‘fragmented authoritarian’ state. On the one hand, according to Lieberthal and
Oksenberg (1988), China is an authoritarian state with a one-party system, (with ruling power held by CPC). The policy processes are largely top-down and within bureaucracies (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1990). On the other hand, China’s political system is ‘fragmented’ due to the different interests owned by different functional
13 Regional plans can be cross-provincial plans, cross-municipal plans, and cross-township plans 93
departments and levels of government (ibid). Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) argue that, to mitigate conflicts of interest, decision-making in the Chinese policy process follows the principle of reaching consensus through bargaining and negotiation. Such bargaining occurs both horizontally within each level of government, and vertically between different levels of government (ibid).
However, the nature and extent of such bargaining vary widely across the country, and the bargaining processes are deliberately kept internal (Zhou and Lian, 2011).
Two factors, namely, the ranking of an organisation or individual in the hierarchical system (Baum and Shevchenko, 1999), and individual's capabilities, personal links and his/her informal networks (Miller, 2008), are critical determinants to the political bargaining outcome. It is argued that the level of individual influence has been reduced over the past 20 years since the CPC introduced rules and procedures to constrain factionalism and enhance cooperation (ibid). Yet, there are still recent studies which suggest that the fragmented authoritarianism framework can still usefully account for the characteristics of policy-making processes in China (Mertha,
2009).
Another feature of the Chinese policy process is decentralisation. It is generally recognised that local governments have gained an increased level of autonomy to pursue local development paths since the process of economic decentralisation
China started in 1979 (Qian, 2000). In particular, since the mid-1990s, local governments’ decision-making power over fiscal revenues and expenditures have been enhanced as a result of tax sharing reforms in 1994 (Wong, 2000). From the expenditure perspective, the Chinese fiscal decentralisation ranks among the highest, globally, with around 70% of government spending being conducted by sub-national government (ibid). Although formal top-down planning still possesses a significant
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status in the Chinese governing system, the purposive decentralisation strategy has devolved considerable functional responsibilities and decision-making power to sub- national governments (Li, 2010). Without a command-and-control fiscal relationship between local and central governments, enhanced local discretion allows more room for different localities to pursue strategies which are more suited to their individual circumstances. Sometimes, local priorities do not align with national ones
(Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005). It is argued by Wu (2003) that Chinese local governments have transformed into local states which act entrepreneurially and engage in competition with peer cities under the combined forces of economic decentralisation and marketization. Such transformation has led to a regional scale regulatory deficiency, and a series of consequential issues such as damaged environment, excess production capacities, and fragmented land use (Wu, 2016).
Another form of decentralisation is categorised by Heilmann (2008) as
‘experimentation under hierarchy', in which national governments endorse local experimentation in addressing particular policy issues or emerging challenges. In terms of reform, existent literature has frequently pointed out that the CPC prefers and employs a gradual style of reform through local ‘pilots’ (Duckett, 2001). It is believed that in many cases local leaders operate in a less structured institutional framework; therefore, it is easier for them to overcome institutional constraints through utilising different types of resources and powers to achieve targets (Tsai,
2006). Such an approach has contributed to some successful reforms because it has encouraged local leaders to behave flexibly and tentatively (Liu et al., 2008). Under the nationally endorsed ‘pilot’ programmes, the experience generated through local experimentation can, thereafter, be accumulated and selectively integrated into national policy framework (Heilmann, 2008). However, as pointed out by Zeng
(2015), policy experimentations in China do not always seek effectiveness and local 95
governments may fake activities or only launch symbolic reforms which do not serve to tackle the core problems.
Currently, the central government is guiding and controlling sub-national governments through cadre appointments, reviewing and approving plans (e.g.,
FYPs, urban infrastructure plans, and land utilisation plans), offering preferential policies pertaining to investing in large urban infrastructure projects, setting technical standards, providing policy guidelines, training, inspecting and organising political enforcement campaigns (Van Rooij, 2006; Chien, 2013). Despite the fact that decentralisation can make a governing system more responsive and adaptive, it also aggravates horizontal fragmentation and increases regional inequalities (Li and Wei,
2010; Wu, 2016). In terms of horizontal fragmentation, the functional departments at each level are at the same administrative level, with no one department having authority over another. As functional departments are encouraged to be financially self-supported, such arrangements have ‘strengthened the tendency of bureaucratic units to work vigorously to promote and protect their own interests in the policy- making process’ (Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992, p.132). This leads to a functional division of authority, inter-department rivalries and complex political manoeuvring in practice (ibid). In terms of regional inequalities, a recent study suggests that that city- region governance has arisen since the mid-2000s with a focus to coordinate regional development (Wu, 2017).
The ‘carrots and stick’ approach to cadre management
For the national government, a decentralised structure can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, local discretion has been recognised as a useful engine for policy innovation (Mei and Pearson, 2014). On the other hand, the discretionary behaviours of local officials do not always serve the intentions of the national 96
government and this has frequently led to unintended consequences, such as an overheated economy or environmental degradation (Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005;
Wu, 2016). Under such circumstances, the target responsibility system and additional incentives were sought in order to align central-local discrepancies (Lo, 2014).
There are five levels of government in China: central, provincial, municipal
(prefectural), county and township. The target responsibility system was developed to ensure that sub-national level government officials make a consistent effort to follow national plans and fulfil goals stipulated by national governments (Lo, 2014).
This system binds different levels of government together by making each level
(except for townships) responsible for appointing and evaluating cadres of the immediate level below. The system is task-oriented and target responsible. In other words, local leaders are evaluated on an annual basis by a set of indicators set by the higher-level government, which includes a number of economic, social, environmental and political targets (Tsui and Wang, 2004). In this way, local cadres are encouraged to allocate resources to prioritise issues defined by higher-level governments (ibid).
As environmental issues gained increased attention at the national level, the central government attempted to enhance the position of environmental performance in the cadre management system. Specifically, an environmental quality administrative leadership responsibility system was introduced to make local leaders agree to a set of environmental targets at the beginning of each year (Lo and Tang, 2006). If, for three consecutive years, local leaders fail to meet these targets, then they will not be considered for promotion in the subsequent 3 to 5 years.
There are also programmes which have been established to provide incentives for local officials, such as the China’s Urban Environmental Quantitative Evaluation 97
System (UEQES) and the National Environmental Model City initiative (NEMC). Rock
(2002) found that the UEQES, through providing a ranking of major cities according to their environmental performance, played a useful role in boosting some local leaders’ interest in environmental protection, altering their industrial policies, and enhancing the institutional capacity of their environmental protection departments.
The NEMC programme is an honorary initiative. In order to be granted a NEMC status, participating cities are required to meet 25 specific criteria. During the application process, Economy (2006) found that the initiative had inspired some significant changes. For example, quite a few city mayors decide to increase investment in environmental protection. However, Economy (2006) also mentioned that such changes may not necessarily be triggered by enhanced environmental considerations but by instrumental intentions such as they want to attract foreign investment.
The role of non-governmental experts in policy making
In the policy process, there is an increasing demand for experts to provide innovative and integrative solutions for emerging challenges and problems that cannot be resolved within traditional bureaucracies (Shai and Stone, 2004). Zhu (2013) also suggests that the increasing number of challenging situations along with emerging new issues of the modern world have driven governments to seek advice and cooperate with experts who were previously policy outsiders. This has, created more room for experts to exert influence on policy-making process. Generally speaking, experts can exert impacts on policy process through building intellectual arguments and filtering information via administrative linkages or personal ties (Shai and Stone,
2004).
In the past decade, it has been observed that both Chinese national and local 98
governments have taken proactive steps to foster bigger roles for non-governmental actors in environmental governance (Shi and Zhang, 2006). Apart from the incapability of the state to control environmental degradation, the reason behind the decision of adopting a multiple-actor governance framework was also due to external influences, such as pressures from project donors and international investors. In many cases, these donors or investors from the Global North exerted pressure on China to follow worldwide trends (ibid).
However, creating more space for non-governmental actors in the policy cycle by no means indicate that they are empowered to confront the CPC’s political power or its decisions (Mertha, 2006). Although there is an argument that Chinese non- governmental policy entrepreneurs’ influences have been significant enough to transform the fragmented authoritarianism into a more pluralised state (Mertha,
2009), these experts are largely influencing policy-making by task-based invitation and in most cases, for technical issues rather than political ones (Pieke, 2012). When experts attempt to exert influence on government policies, it is very important that their proposals are aligned with the political ideology and the overall development strategy of the policies (ibid). Otherwise, the government is less likely to engage with them and accept their ideas. Therefore, even though the policy-making process has become more inclusive for non-governmental actors, the Chinese government and
CPC still retains overall power in decision-making.
Civic society
Here, civil society is defined as the sum of all civil organisations outside government organisations and firms. In other words, it is the third sector between the government and the business sector (Yu, 2006). Among them, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as key players, have drawn much research interest recently 99
(Howell, 2003). In the past two decades, following the nation-wide reform and opening, Chinese society as a whole has become increasingly diverse (Mertha, 2009).
Under such circumstances, citizens' policy preferences become more diverse as well.
This, in turn, has facilitated the emergence of NGOs to represent various public preferences (Tang and Zhan, 2008). Moreover, structural conflicts between multiple levels of government and different functional departments caused by the trend of decentralisation have also created opportunities for NGOs to expand to fill structural gaps (Cai and Treisman, 2006). For example, the central government has become more supportive of civil society as a vehicle for increasing the accountability of local government in terms of environmental issues (Tang and Zhan, 2008). On the other hand, the limited resources of public administration organisations to address social issues also make them seek external resources from NGOs and civic organisations
(Ho and Edmonds, 2007). For example, in some cases the government has relied on
NGOs and civic organisations to reveal environmental regulatory violations (ibid).
With these positive signs, NGOs appear to be more influential in government decisions and policy-making through various formal and information channels (Yu,
2006). However, there remain strict legal and administrative barriers to the establishment and operation of any type of NGO in China (Schwartz, 2004).
Moreover, in some cases the government has chosen to close the governance gap by extending government functions (i.e. setting up public organisations) rather than make room for civil society (ibid). Currently, there are three key types of NGOs in
China; the traditional NGOs, GONGOs (Government organised NGO) and ‘non-for- profit’ NGOs. To obtain ‘traditional NGO' status which enjoys tax-exemption in China, the founder must find a sponsoring public organisation (e.g. government department or government-affiliated organisation). Schwartz (2004) suggests that traditional
NGOs in China generally have limited abilities in terms of environmental policy 100
development and enforcement as many of them have to function in a constraining context with limited funding, talents, and autonomy.
Without public organisations’ sponsorship, civil organisations can only register as
‘non-for-profit' organisations, which brings with it high tax liabilities (Zhan and Tang,
2013). Such an arrangement led to a situation whereby many registered NGOs in
China have been in the form of GONGOs. By definition, GONGOs are not extended entities of government and they do not carry any direct legal mandate from formal administrative systems (Wu, 2003). However, in many cases, the ideas of setting up
GONGOs often originate within government entities which makes them intrinsically different from traditional NGOs. Generally speaking, there are two contradictory views on the establishment of GONGOs in China; one group view them as ‘an intermediate step towards a more mature civil society’ while the other group see them as ‘illegitimate frauds undermining the development of true social forces’
(Martens 2006, p. 214).
For ‘non-for-profit' organisation type NGOs, international funding from foundations, foreign governments or multi-national corporations is usually their major financial sources (Zhan and Tang, 2013). Out of concern relating to creating political controversies, these funds mostly only go to projects which are politically neutral, for example, environmental awareness education or species protection (ibid). On the whole, NGOs in China are less engaged in public policy advocacy and radical social movements compared with their western counterparts (Ho, 2007). Moreover, in terms of approach, they tend to adopt a non-confrontational issue-oriented stance instead of seeking power or attempting to challenge the political regime (ibid).
Therefore, it is fair to say that while Chinese civil society is exhibiting increasing influence on the policy process, its role is yet to be robust due to political and
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resource constraints.
Guanxi
Guanxi plays an integral part of China's political and economic spheres. It describes numerous dimensions of human relations either based on purely personal relationships or in the instrumental desire to seek consensus (Guo, 2001). In its beneficial form, informal institutions can provide a degree of protection and risk mitigation where the rule of law and formal institutions are deficient (McNally,
2011). In some cases, NGO leaders actively utilise their informal social connects to advance their organisation’s agenda through persuading policy actors and other stakeholders (Li, 2011). However, the existence of informal institutions can also be harmful. This is because it can enable corruptive practices, false reporting and feigned compliance (Zhou et al., 2013; Li, 2011). Specifically, Zhou et al. (2013) propose a model of ‘muddling through’ to describe the conspired behaviours of local government officials in the context of environmental policy implementation. In the absence of effective external audits, local government officials are easily tempted to conspire in the process of producing false statistics to show how they have attained required targets.
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3.2 CHANGE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT: NEW DEVELOPMENT
PARADIGM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE AGENDA
New development paradigm – towards a more balanced development path
The worsening environmental conditions and increasing resource constraints have been well perceived by CPC, which led to a change in its stance on environmental issues. Specifically, the discourse of sustainable development first appeared in
China’s national plans and strategies during the 1990s. This was marked by the publication of the first sustainable development strategy – China’s Agenda 2114 in
1994. China’s Agenda 21 covered 78 developmental issues related to population, environment, and development. Later in the 9th FYP (1996–2000), ‘building a sustainable society' was set as one of the development goals at the national level, and urban environmental protection was formally integrated into the national planning system (Si, 2012). At the 15th Party Congress in 1997, the word
‘environment’ first appeared in a national congress report (ibid). This highlighted the fact that the pressures posed by environmental and resource issues have to be properly addressed to mitigate any adverse effects that they might pose to the nation’s future development (NC, 1997).
Within the early 21st century, China has seen enhanced rhetoric of environmental protection and resource conservation. Since the 2000s, the concept of sustainable development has been repeatedly used in policy discourse, which emphasised the need for China to follow a more balanced development path (Lam, 2016). Central to such a development path was a series of proposed concepts such as ‘Scientific
14 中国21世纪议程: Agenda 21 is a comprehensive action plan adopted by more than 178 Governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992.
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Perspective of Development’,15 ‘Circular Economy’16and ‘Ecological Civilisation’.17 The introduction of these concepts to some extent reframed national strategies and goals around the themes of scientific innovation and ecological sustainability which underwrites the environmental aspects in the overall development goal. During this period, many focuses have also been paid to urban environment improvement; this was caused by rapid urban expansion and sever urban environmental degradation
(Bai et al., 2014). The Circular Economy Law enacted in 2006 also envisioned cities playing a key role.
The 12th FYP which started in 2011 further developed the concept of ‘ecological civilization’ by articulating the vision that China can ‘leapfrog' its western counterparts through innovative approaches. Such determination was echoed by the issue of a policy document called, ‘Opinions of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China and the State Council on Further Promoting the
Development of Ecological Civilisation’, 18 in 2015. This document restated the national government’s intention to clean up China's economic model. A top Chinese economic planner has described this policy document as a ‘breakthrough' instead of a vague rhetorical one (Geall, 2015). The significance of this document also lies in the fact that it acknowledges the demand for reforms in governance. It introduced
15 科学发展观: was formally written into the CCP Constitution at the 17th Party Congress in 2007
16 循环经济: The circular economy is an industrial ecology paradigm involving the closed-loop circulation of energy, materials and waste and the ‘three Rs’ (reduction, reuse, recycling), which was seen as simultaneously resolving the challenges of clean production and clean consumption (Geng and Doberstein, 2008).
17 生态文明: ‘Building an ecological civilisation’ is a slogan which first confirmed in 2007 at the 17th Party Congress. President Hu Jintao stressed five basic tasks for future development, which are 1) economic development; 2) political development; 3) cultural development; 4) social development; and 5) ecological civilisation. Later at the 18th Party Congress, President Hu again talked about building an ecological civilisation and put environmental issues higher up on the agenda than ever before by giving the construction of an ecological civilisation ‘a prominent place included in all aspects and processes of economic, political, cultural and social development' (NC 2013).
18 中共中央国务院关于加快推进生态文明建设的意见 104
mechanisms which aim to address policy implementation including a ‘lifelong accountability system’ 19 for government officials as well as promoting public participation and greater environmental transparency (ibid).
The emergence of a climate change agenda
Climate change was being introduced to the Chinese national government’s attention from the international arena (Wiener, 2007). The institutionalisation of climate change started in 1987 when the Chinese National Climate Committee (CNCC) was established, which aimed to organise research activities on climate change
(Beuermann, 1997). Later, in 1990, the first formal entity addressing the climate change issue — the National Climate Change Coordination Group (NCCCG), was founded under the China Meteorological Administration (Liu, 2011). However, during that time, climate change was viewed as a scientific topic by the Chinese government and to be one that belonged to the realm of foreign affairs; as a result, it was a relatively low national priority (Beuermann, 1997). It was not until the late 1990s that the climate change issue was transformed from a scientific and foreign affair concern to one that was developmental and domestic. The bureaucratic restructuring also reflected this change; the NCCCG was relocated to under the State
Planning and Developing Commission (Liu, 2011). 20
The year 200721 witnessed a significant elevation of climate policies in China’s policy agenda, and was marked by the publication of the National Climate Change
19 终身问责制: this means environmental black marks will affect government officials' chance of promotion and the record will stay along with their political career
20 State Planning and Developing Commission is the former National Development and Reform Commission
21 China became the largest GHG emitting country in 2007 105
Programme.22 Since then, climate change has become a distinct domestic policy issue in China (Liu, 2011). In this document, previous strategies related to addressing deforestation and energy consumption were incorporated and described as China’s contribution towards climate change mitigation. On the whole, the key measures for
GHG reduction spelt out in this document can also be seen as a continuation and strengthening of previous efforts such as technological development and energy restructuring.
In terms of organisational structure, the NCCCG was renamed as ‘National leadership group on climate change’, operating directly under the SC and chaired by then
Premier Wen Jiabao. Meanwhile, a dedicated Climate Change Office was established locating in NDRC to deal with its daily activities (Liu, 2011). Such restructuring also indicates the growing importance of the climate change issue in overall development strategies (Tsang and Kolk, 2010). As mentioned in Section 3.1, the NDRC is a macroeconomic planning and management agency, therefore such rearrangement indicated that climate policy has been granted a strategic position. This arrangement also meant that the climate change policy framework could easily be encroached upon by economic interests. Such an inherent defect of organisation set-up therefore lead to an understanding of climate change issue primarily from an economic perspective (Sautter, 2009).23
Since then, many subnational governments have institutionalised climate change issues by establishing ad hoc departments or leadership groups (Qi et al., 2008).
22 中国应对气候变化国家方案 23 In April 2018, the relevant functions of the Climate Division were officially transferred from the NDRC to the newly established Ministry of Ecology and Environment. This institutional reform is a major initiative to implement the Paris Agreement and promote low carbon transition (Renming Daily 2018). This may potentially enhance the bargaining power in the name of ecological protection, easing the direct conflict between economic and environmental issue within the policy-making process. 106
Accompanying the rise of climate policy in the government’s agenda, non- governmental actors also became active. International Environmental NGOs like
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) or Greenpeace have expanded their work in
China by setting up local offices. There was a further expansion of climate change policies in China in 2009 after China introduced a new medium-term carbon target.
The target was set to reduce China’s carbon intensity by 40–45% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels (People.cn, 2009). This goal was later submitted to the UNFCCC as a part of the ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’. The term ‘low carbon economy
/ development’ also began to be used frequently in policy documents and news reports. More details upon these aspects are provided in the next section.
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3.3 THE NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION
Based on the review in Section 3.1, the Chinese policy framework consists of numerous plans, regulations, opinions, guidance, and economic instruments. To identify and collect related policies and programmes in the field of climate change mitigation, literature review and government website scanning were carried out. A total of 116 national-level policies were collated. The list of compiled policy is provided in the Appendix 4 of this thesis. Though the list being by no means exhaustive, it provides a useful sample for understanding the backbone and evolution of the low carbon policy framework at the national level. It is found that a complex low carbon policy framework has been formed at the national level of
China. In the following, this section first offers a brief summary of some key legislation, policies, and programmes. Subsequently, it highlights the evolution of the policy framework by presenting changes in terms of policy functions, policy scopes, and governing techniques.
Major policies and programmes related to climate change mitigation
There are a series of pieces of legislation, policies and flagship programmes that relate to carbon reduction. The key ones include but not limited to the National
Climate Change Programme, Renewable Energy Law and Energy Conservation Law,
Ten Major Energy-Saving Projects, Top-1,000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Action,
Energy conservation centre, and Low carbon pilot. In that which follows, a snapshot of various pieces of legislation, policies, and programmes is provided.
China National Climate Change Programme
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The NDRC published China’s National Climate Change Programme (CNCCP) in 2007.
This was the first dedicated policy document issued by the Chinese national government to show China’s concern regarding global climate change and formally recognised climate change as a nationally important policy issue (NDRC, 2007).
Specifically, this policy document outlined six guiding principles (see below), and a series of specific objectives and measures in key policy sectors including transport, building, agriculture, and industry.
1) to address climate change issue following the principle of sustainable development;
2) to address both climate change mitigation and adaptation issues at the same time;
3) to integrate the consideration of climate change into interrelated fields;
4) to address climate change issue through improving innovation capacity of science and technology;
5) toifollowitheiprincipleioficommonibutidifferentiatediresponsibilities; and
6) to engage in international climate collaboration.
The CNCCP also emphasised the role of government in fostering public awareness of climate change, in strengthening both national and local leadership and in promoting institutional development. However, besides basic principles and key measures, the language in this policy document reads general. There is no specific indication in terms of how these objectives will be achieved.
Renewable Energy Law
In 2006, the Renewable Energy Law was enforced, which was the first comprehensive policy for renewable energy development in China. The Renewable Energy Law outlines a general framework covers six types of renewables, namely onshore and
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offshore wind, solar, water, geothermal, and high-efficient forms of biomass. Under the law, there are key components such as technical regulation and grid connection details require further detailed policies to be issued to strengthen their development
(Zeng et al., 2014). With the advent of the Renewable Energy Law, the renewable energy sector’s status has been elevated amongst other manufacturing and high-tech sectors (ibid).
Moreover, policy actions on feed-in-tariffs and encourage private investment are mentioned in the Renewable Energy law; these provide evidence of the fact that
China has embraced a market approach in supporting renewable energy development. During the process of implementation since 2006, it has been recognised that setting installed capacity instead of electricity generation as an overall target has led to a series implementation issues, particularly in the wind power sector (Schuman and Lin, 2012). Therefore, amendments were made to the
Law in 2010. The amendments included specific measures to tackle the inefficiencies during the renewable energy electricity generation process, and the implantation of a mandatory grid connection to renewable energy generators (ibid).
Energy Conservation Law
China’s Energy Conservation Law was first released in late 1990s and was, thereafter, amended in 2009. The 2009 Energy Conservation Law sought to improve energy efficiency across a broad range of areas throughout society, including buildings, industry, and transport sectors. A number of dedicated programmes were also incorporated in the Energy Conservation Law which target key energy consumption areas and key energy users, such as ‘Top-1,000 Enterprise Energy Efficiency Action
Plan’ and the ‘Ten Major Energy-Saving Projects’.
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In the latest 2009 version, the Energy Conservation Law explicitly indicates that the
State will introduce a target responsible system to evaluate policy implementation and ensure that all stipulated targets are met. In this way, the energy conservation targets are formally incorporated into a part of the cadre management system which made government officials at different level accountable.
Ten Major Energy-Saving Projects
The ‘Ten Major Energy-Saving Projects’ was designed to encourage energy saving in areas with high energy saving potential. The ten types of key projects include: coal- fired boiler renovation project; combined heat and power generation project; waste heat utilisation project; petroleum saving and replacing project; electrical machinery energy saving project; energy system optimisation project; building energy conservation project; green lighting project; public organisation energy conservation project, energy conservation monitoring project; and technical service improvement projects. The programme target was set as saving 240 Mtce (7.03 EJ) by the end of
2010 (NDRC, 2006). The national government provided both technical guidance and earmarked financial incentives for industries and public sectors to pursue energy efficiency in these areas. At the same time, it is reported in NDRC (2011) that sub- national governments also invested a large amount of funds on these projects.
Top-1,000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Action
The ‘Top-1,000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Action’ is based on the model of voluntary or negotiated agreement programme (Price et al., 2011). It was first launched in 2006, with an aim to reduce the energy consumption of the top 1000 energy-users in China by establishing an individual target for each enterprise. These top 1000 energy-users are industrial enterprises in nine industries, namely, iron and
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steel, petroleum and petrochemicals, chemicals, electric power generation, non- ferrous metals, coal mining, construction materials, textiles, and paper. According to a survey led by the Development Research Centre of the State Council, in 2004, these top energy-users represented 33% of national total energy use, and 47% of total industrial energy consumption (NDRC, 2006). This programme provided guidance
(e.g. energy auditing guidelines) and financial incentives (e.g. earmarked funds and tax rebate) for these large-scale enterprises to achieve the stipulated energy saving targets of 100 Mtce (2.9 EJ) between 2006 and 2010 (ibid). At the end of this programme, a total energy savings of 150 Mtce (4.40 EJ) was reported by the NDRC
(NDRC, 2011).
Energy conservation centre
The instruction to establish energy conservation centres at different level of governments (in the form of a public organisation) is a distinct approach to promote energy conservation in China. At the national level, an energy conservation centre was established in 2005 to collect energy consumption data; disseminate energy saving information and policy; and build capacity of energy stakeholders. It also intends to facilitate cooperation coordination and knowledge transfer between sub- national governments and establish and promote energy auditing and benchmarking systems in different sectors.
Low carbon pilot
The low carbon cities programme was first launched by the World Wildlife Fund
(WWF) and aimed to explore context-based low carbon development pathways for
Chinese cities. Under this initiative, in early 2008, Shanghai and Baoding city were selected for case studies. Later in late 2010, a nation-wide low carbon pilot
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programme was launched by the NDRC. Eight cities (Tianjin, Chongqing, Shenzhen,
Xiamen, Hangzhou, Nanchang, Guiyang, and Baoding) and two provinces
(Guangdong and Hubei) were chosen as the first batch of low carbon pilots.
According to the NDRC (2010), these pilot cities and provinces were chosen based on a wide range of criteria, including social and economic status, foundation work related to carbon reduction, and local actors’ interest. As part of the application process, each pilot area was asked to prepare a comprehensive low carbon plan.
During the implementation phase they were also asked to formulate a series of supporting policies, to identify and promote low carbon industries, to establish GHG emission inventory and carbon management framework, and to encourage low carbon lifestyles and consumption. However, no general guidance was provided by the NDRC; this left more room for local governments to decide what was appropriate for their given locale.
In the next section, further details of the low carbon policy framework are presented based on the group of 1) statutory policies; and 2) economic incentives and market- based policies.
Statutory policies
Statutory policies are characterised by command-and-control elements that are aimed at achieving strategies and targets. They are in the form of short-term or medium-term goals, limits, and targets, which are set by government.
Emission Restrictions
Emission restrictions are overall binding targets set for the GHG emission of countries, regions or sectors. In most cases, a CO2 equivalent is adopted as the common measurement of GHG (Reuters, 2009). Currently, China uses carbon 113
intensity (emissions of CO2 equivalent per unit of GDP) instead of the absolute amount to measure its progress. In addition, energy intensity is relevant to carbon emissions as the energy sector is the major source of carbon emission. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show the energy and carbon targets in different FYPs.
Table 3-1: Target for energy consumption per unit of GDP
Year FYP Target Achievement
2010 The 11th FYP 20% reduction 19.1% reduction
2015 The 12th FYP 17% reduction 18.2% reduction
2020 The 13th FYP 15% reduction n/a
Source: National Statistic Year Book 2011, 2016; 13th FYP
Table 3-2: Target for carbon emission per unit of GDP
Year FYP Target Achievement
2015 The 12th FYP 18% reduction 20% reduction
2020 The 13th FYP 15% reduction n/a
Source: 13th FYP
Emissions Targets for Key Carbon Emitters
Emissions targets for key carbon emitters are set to control large-scale enterprises’ total carbon emissions. The targets set aim to urge the major emitters to increase their investment in low carbon technologies and/or improve their management approaches so as to cut down the total amount of their emissions.
Stipulation for Power Generation
Improving standards and efficiency in the power generation sector forms an important part of China’s climate change mitigation strategy. For power generation 114
enterprises, targets were introduced which seek to encourage them to convert energy generation to less carbon-intensive sources (i.e. renewables or nuclear) and improve energy production efficiency. The implementation of these regulations will lead to either the closing down of small-scale and less efficient power plants or an upgrading of their existing technologies. Table 3-3 shows the total energy consumption targets stipulated in the FYPs.
Table 3-3: Target for total energy consumption (Billion tons of coal equivalent)
Year FYP Target
2005 End of 10th FYP 2.6
2010 End of 11th FYP 3.6
2015 End of 12th FYP 4.3
2020 The target of 13th FYP 5
Source: National Statistic Year Book 2011, 2016; 13th FYP
Mandatory Use of Non-Fossil Sources
Setting mandatory targets for using energy sources generated from low-carbon embedded production can help China move to low carbon energy mixes by making low carbon generation technologies more competitive. Such targets were stipulated in the Renewable Energy Law and have been reemphasised in FYPs. The 13th FYP sets a target of increasing the total power generation from non-fossil sources24 from 12% to 15% of total capacity by 2020. Table 3-4 shows the targets for non-fossil fuels consumption in different FYPs.
Table 3-4: Target for non-fossil of primary energy fuels consumption
24 hydro, nuclear and other renewables
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Year FYP Target
2005 End of 10th FYP 7.4%
2010 End of 11th FYP 9.4%
2015 End of 12th FYP 12%
2020 The target of 13th FYP 15%
Source: National Statistic Year Book 2011, 2016; 13th FYP
Energy Efficiency Benchmarks for End Users
Setting efficiency benchmarks for end users is among the most important approaches advanced in the low carbon policy framework. Such standards are applicable to industrial enterprises as well as the building sector. Specifically, industrial enterprises are required to purchase equipment or devices which with labels indicate meeting a certain level of energy efficiency standards. On the other hand, the building sector is expected to comply with standards such as adopting energy-efficient designs, using low carbon materials, installing low carbon technologies while under construction or refurbishment.
Low Carbon Electricity Transmission and Access
Setting targets for low carbon electricity transmission and access will help to support the installation of low carbon technologies. Having such binding targets in place is important for the growing of the renewable sector. So far, nearly one-third of generated renewables capacity cannot be connected to the grid due to their remote locations (Lu, 2014). To reduce such waste, it is important to improve grid connectivity to these remote locations and prioritise grid access for renewables; this has been written into the RE Law.
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Economic incentives and market-based policies
Economic incentives and market-based policies use price or other economic variables to incentivise stakeholders to act in accordance with policy objectives.
Grants, Subsidies and Tax Rebates
A significant amount of funds has been allocated to facilitate low carbon transition in
China. The funding for the low carbon sector has been predominantly applied to improving end-users’ energy efficiency, increasing electricity generation from low carbon sources, and upgrading transmission infrastructure (Wang et al., 2012).
Amongst available funding, public finance is currently the primary source of investment in China (ibid). Indeed, for large-scale capital intensive projects such as the installation of a new high-voltaic electricity grid are better carried out by governments. At the same time, subsidies and government loans at a discount to commercial financing also form an integral part to incentivise the stakeholders for carrying out smaller-scale programmes. This is different from many other places in the world, in which private investment dominates short to medium-term climate mitigation finance with public funding forming only a relatively small part
(Stadelmann et al., 2013). However, there are drawbacks to government-dominated funding, such as time delays due to the long decision-making and approval processes, which may discourage stakeholders’ initiative (Wang et al., 2012).
Emissions Quota and Trading Mechanism
Emission trading is a market-based mechanism which is designed to allow key emitters to trade their surplus quota of emission units for profits following agreed rules. In China, carbon trading was introduced as a pilot programme in Beijing,
Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Shenzhen (cities) and in of Hubei and Guangdong 117
(provinces) in 2012. However, it is argued by Lo (2016, p.114) that the carbon market is yet to play a vibrant role in terms of absolute carbon reduction due to ‘inadequate domestic demand, incomplete regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention’. What is more, the carbon trading mechanism only covers a limited number of key energy-users. Firms which are outside the realm of emission trading system generally have few motivations to engage out of a sense of purpose pertaining to social responsibility (Huang, 2013). Therefore, the carbon market is rather demonstrating political efforts in terms of institutional innovation than making substantive impacts by far (Lo, 2013).
Feed-in Tariffs (FIT)
The FITs are one of the most widely adopted policy instruments for achieving renewable installation objectives (REN21, 2014). By 2014, a total of 61 countries and
26 regional localities have been actively promoting FITs (ibid). Specifically, it is a subsidy which aims to incentivise the generation of renewable electricity by providing a stable price for suppliers who are selling renewable electricity to grids
(Fouquet and Johansson, 2008). Through such subsidies, governments guarantee a set price for renewable electricity production over a time period; this protects the suppliers from price fluctuations that are caused by demand fluctuations. In this way, it contributes to stimulating innovation in an indirect way as the suppliers have motivation to drive technological advancement to achieve cost reductions so that they can maximise their financial benefits by selling renewable electricity to the grid at a set price. However, according to Tamás et al., (2010) the FITs has two defects.
First, due to the high cost of low carbon generation, the subsidies will not have a positive impact on the environment if they are not set at a level which makes fossil fuel more expensive than sustainable energy generation. Secondly, the cost of FITs is
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borne by the whole of society as it uses public funding to subsidise the production of renewable energy. From an economic perspective, this increases energy costs to the whole of society (ibid).
The evolution of climate change mitigation policy framework: from 2005 to 2017
This section explains the evolutionary characteristics of the carbon reduction policy framework at the national level between 2005 and 2017. Choosing 2005 as the starting point is because the previous year 2004 witnessed the publication of
Medium and Long-Term Plan for Energy Conservation25 which set a new policy agenda and roadmap for promoting economy-wide energy conservation. It follows, a series of policy apparatus were created or strengthened to highlight key sectors and work priorities (NDRC, 2005).
When assembling policy documents related to carbon mitigation, it is found that policies and programmes in this field can be differentiated according to policy types
(e.g., law, opinion, and specific measures/actions); policy areas (e.g., industry, transport and building); and policy approaches (e.g., command-and-control and market-based). The analysis of the development and evolution of the low carbon policy framework draws insights from Hall (1993)’s understanding of policy change.
According to Hall (1993), there are three central elements of policy: overarching goals, policy instruments, and the precise settings of these instruments. It follows that policy change can be categorised into first-order change, second-order change and third-order change. For a first-order and a second-order change, new policies are seen as a continuation or update of their predecessors, or serve as extensions of existing policies (Greener, 2001). During the process, the overall policy objectives remain unchanged and coherence can be maintained. For a third-order change
25节能中长期专项规划 119
(paradigm change), policies are reconceptualised or restructured based on new ideas, which leads to a new hierarchy of objectives in policy making (Howlett and
Ramesh, 1998). Applying the language of Hall's policy change theory (1993), it is found that the policy development and evolution of the national low carbon policy framework mainly represented a first-order and a second-order change. Specifically, over the past 12 years, emerging policies became more specific and diverse and represented a shift in terms of policy approach.
Since the issue of the Medium and Long-Term Plan for Energy Conservation in 2004, the number of relevant policies has increased. Notably, after China adopted the first carbon-specific goal in 2009 (to reduce its carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels), the year of 2010 witnessed a significant increase in the number of policy documents; they nearly doubled compared to those issues in previous years. The increase in the number of policies was primarily driven by development in policy types (more supporting policies with details were issued), an expansion in policy areas (from energy specific to other areas) and an incorporation of new policy approaches (from government-led to market-led).
Firstly, development in policy types is reflected in the increased number of specific measures, including technical specifications, evaluation standards and action plans.
This complements the overarching guidance and target-setting policies. Secondly, following the recounting of the previous energy efficiency efforts into the carbon reduction policy framework, the policy area also expanded to the demand-side management of various sectors. Moreover, by launching a low carbon pilot programme at provincial and municipal levels, bottom-up innovations were encouraged. Thirdly, the policy approach has gradually shifted from a command-and- control to a mix of government-led and market, and displays a trend towards a pro-
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market paradigm.
Development of Policy Types
Following Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988)’s policy categorisation, low carbon policies can be classified by their functions. For instance, there are laws, opinions
(yijian) and guidelines (banfa) which provide legal forces and political commitments, spell out targets as well as outline general direction for development. These policies set an important foundation to move the policy development forward. Key policy samples of these functions include:
Table 3-5: Examples of laws, opinions and guidelines
Name of policy Date effective Responsible agency
Energy Conservation Law April, 2008 (revised) State Council
Opinions on Promoting Foreign October, 2008 Ministry of Commerce Investment Enterprises to Carry out Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction
Green Credit Guideline February, 2012 China Banking Regulatory Commission
Guidelines on Electric Vehicle October, 2015 NDRC Charging Infrastructure Development
Guidelines on promoting green February, 2016 NDRC consumption
Source: author
When looking at the policy content, it is found that the wordings in policies outlined above are usually ambiguous and do not provide a clear indication of how they are to be achieved. For instance, terms like ‘making rational plans for' or ‘guide and support innovation of' were often found in these types of policies. This conforms to the 121
Chinese policy-making tradition in which national-level policies are generally ambiguous and lower-level governments can interpret and adapt these policies based on their specific local contexts (Birney, 2014). Nevertheless, the national government reserves the right of final interpretation to mitigate against the consequences of selective implementation and deviation of policies (Ibid).
For national government, one way to provide further interpretation is to issue supporting policies such as work plans, specific measures, and information programmes. This type of documentation provides implementation details, methods, technical specifications, and evaluation standards, which facilitate the fulfilment of the overall targets. By clarifying central government’s expectations, indicating how programmes should be implemented at sub-national levels, and outlining available support and technologies, these supporting policies are important in enhancing policy implication capacity, reducing local deviation and enhancing the impact of laws, opinions and guidelines. Some examples of these supporting policies are outlined below:
Table 3-6: Examples of supporting policies
Name of policy Date effective Responsible agency
Interim Measures on Fixed Assets September, 2010 NDRC Investment Projects Energy Saving Assessment and Review
Interim Measures for the Collection November, 2011 NDRC, Ministry of and Management of Renewable Environment, Ministry of Energy Development Fund Finance
Industrial Energy Conservation and March, 2013 Ministry of Industry and Green Development Action Plan Information Technology
Technical Standards for Greenhouse August, 2014 China National Institute of Gas Emission Data Quality Standardization Management in Industrial Enterprises
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Directory of Nationally Promoted Key August, 2014 NDRC Low Carbon Technology26
Top-10000 energy-consuming May, 2011 NDRC enterprise program
Approach to Energy-saving and Low November, 2015 General Administration of Carbon Product Certification Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, NDRC
Source: author
Based on the collected policy sample, nearly 80% of national low carbon policies were issued from the beginning of 2010. This can be seen that while the development of the carbon reduction policy framework started by setting out targets and the general direction, the supporting policies which followed did so with increasing regularity and provided more details and interpretation to avoid deviation and enhance impact. In short, the overall low carbon policy content has become more concrete and specific.
Development of Policy Areas
Among all reviewed low carbon policies, eight key themes were identified; building, transport, carbon, energy (new energy increments and energy technology development), demand-side management, institutional improvement and reform
(pilot programme and green finance), and industry (phasing out unproductive plants, energy efficiency, structural adjustment and cultivate new clean industry sector).
These themes are not mutually exclusive, as it is difficult to provide a clear breakdown of a number of policies in each theme because many of the policies and programmes address more than one theme. However, broadly speaking, a majority
26 These policies which concern technology category or technical specification was updated on a yearly basis to include the most up-to-date information 123
of low carbon policies are focused on the industrial sector (more than 40% of the complied policies are related to an industrial sector). Examples of important policies represent each theme are provided in Table 3-7:
Table 3-7: Examples of policies showing the development of policy areas
Name of policy Policy area Date effective Responsible agency
Technical Code for the Building December, 2009 Ministry of Housing Retrofitting of Public Building and Urban-Rural on Energy Efficiency Construction
Guiding Opinions on Institutional August, 2016 People's Bank of Constructing a Green reform China Financial System
Guidance on Accelerating the Transport May, 2013 Ministry of Transport Development of Green Circular Low-Carbon Transport
Interim Measures for the Carbon, December, NDRC Emissions Trading industry, 2014 Management institutional reform
Interim Measures for Low Institutional February, 2013 NDRC Carbon Products Certification improvement, carbon, demand-side management
Guidance on Accelerating the Technology, July, 2014 Office of State Promotion and Application of industry, Council New Energy Vehicles carbon, transport
Opinions on Strengthening of Technology; April, 2010 Ministry of Industry Energy Conservation and industry; and Information Emission Reduction for SMEs carbon; energy Technology
Source: author
From a chronological perspective, the low carbon policy framework has expanded its scope over time. Prior to 2010, the policy focuses concentrated on energy efficiency 124
and phasing out unproductive plants. Until the end of 2012, relevant financial support and preferential policies have revolved around these themes. While the theme of energy efficiency remained a constant focus thought out the investigated period, other areas have obtained more attention. For example, since 2010, pilot programmes such as low carbon cities and low carbon industrial parks have been launched to mobilise local initiatives and encourage innovation. In 2013, new policies were issued to support and regulate the development of decentralised energy. In the same year, carbon capture and storage technologies also gained policy support. The years of 2014, 2015 and 2016 witnessed growing attention on the themes of new energy cars, demand-side management and a green financial system.
Change in Policy Approaches
In the context of policy-making for low carbon development, there has been an oscillation between ideas stressing the role of government and those that stress the role of the market (Lo and Howes, 2015). The policy approach at the beginning of the reviewed period heavily relied on command-and-control instruments through specifying GHG limits, efficiency standards for power generation and end users, as well as low carbon sources of generation. These targets were distributed down to sub-nation levels following the hierarchical government structure. Sub-national governments were required to ensure these targets were fulfilled. These policies, particularly concentrating on the industrial sector, specifically identified and expressed what kind of changes in behaviour were expected, leaving little flexibility for industries to make cost-effective choices (Sawyer and Thieriot, 2015).
During the 11th FYP period, China achieved its low carbon targets mainly by relying on administrative approaches (Qi, 2011). However, the legitimacy of such an approach and its implementation effectiveness were challenged as they brought 125
about a series of unintended consequences. For example, during the last few months of the 11th FYP, many local government officials were found to have used radical and unlawful actions such as blackouts to ensure that they obtained their targets
(Hannon et al., 2011). With the aim of reducing the high social costs created by short-term compliance behaviour, increased attention has been given to developing a more flexible policy environment through policy experimentation and adopting economic mechanisms.
The development of an economic mechanism was also built on the debate between two factions, a pro-carbon tax faction which was led by the Ministry of Finance, and a pro-carbon trading faction led by the NDRC (Lo and Howes, 2015). Despite an ideological challenge and insufficient institutional capacity to run a carbon market, the pro-carbon trading party won the debate, underpinned by the rationale of securing power to set the rules-of-the-game to avoid power displacement at a global scale (ibid). This has led to the establishment of seven emission trading pilot sites across the country since 2012.
Apart from policies related to the establishment of a carbon market, the overall low carbon policy framework has also seen an increased use of market-based instruments to complement administrative measures. The increased application of market-based instruments implies that stakeholders were given more room to decide how to comply with the targets set (Sawyer and Thieriot, 2015). This was partly a result of a key decision made in the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Third Plenum) held in 2013, which formally assigned the market a decisive role in allocating resources (Chinadaily, 2013).
The increased importance of market-based approach did not, however, entirely exclude the command-and-control approaches. Indeed, it is argued that the policy 126
direction will be dominated by a mixed approach combing these two approaches.
Such a mixed approach implies that policy-making relies on the past paradigm given that these changes were made during normal times. When a new perspective is introduced with uncertainties, the government tends to test at a small scale to find out which ways is more effective before changing the whole direction. Such a level of change is consistent with policy changes made in normal times (Howlett, 2009).
In summary, the low carbon policy is a cluster of policies. From 2005 to 2017, low carbon policy in China underwent both a first-order and second-order changes. The increased number of supporting policies can be seen as a first-order change as they complement to laws, opinions and guideline. The extension of policy scope from the themes of new energy increment, structural change and energy technology to incorporate a wider range of areas including demand-side management and institutional reform represented both a first-order and a second-order change. The introduction of market-based approaches changed both the role of government and the role of the market in low carbon development, which can be seen as a mixed of second-order and third-order change.
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter set up the stage for research on urban carbon governance in China by explaining key elements of the governing system and the development of the national low carbon framework. Section 3.2 reveals that the CPC has placed an increased emphasis on environmental issues together with other developmental goals such as economic development and social stability. Meanwhile, the past decade has witnessed the rise of climate change mitigation in the policy agenda and an institutionalisation of carbon reduction. It can be argued that the recently introduced policies have shown a strong determination on the part of the central government to drive a low carbon transition. However, from the perspective of policy change, the above review indicates that changes in the national policy framework are mainly a process of incremental adaption. Thus, the changes generally follow existing processes and occur within existing organisations or institutional structures.
Moreover, there remain some potential tensions in the governing system for low carbon transition. For example, the trend of decentralisation allows more freedom for sub-national governments to set their own priorities. This may lead to a misalignment between central and local priorities. On the other hand, under the
‘experimentation under hierarchy’ framework, the national government used a series of endorsed local experimentation programmes to encourage local government to address the carbon reduction issues in line with national will. While such governance arrangements emphasise proactive local responses, whether local policy and governance can deliver such visions or even afford to deliver a more transformative change remain unclear. This calls for a more nuanced and process-oriented approach to understanding urban responses to such leadership at the city level of China.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
This chapter develops a conceptual framework to structure the empirical inquiry of the role and capacity of cities in steering low carbon development. The conceptual framework proposed is grounded in the critical integration of various theoretical approaches reviewed in Chapter 2 but adapted to take account of the Chinese context discussed in Chapter 3. To recap, key theories reviewed include systemic transition studies, transition management, multi-level governance, structure-agency relations, and institutional theory. This chapter shows how these perspectives help to conceptualise and frame the research questions addressed in this study. Following the discussion of the conceptual framework, the methodological approach used in this thesis is explained. Subsequently, it presents the rationale for case selection and the strategies employed in both data collection and analysis.
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4.1 THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS AND RELATED METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The literature review in Chapter 2 presented three key theoretical propositions that inform the conceptualisation and methodological design of this research. Firstly, systemic transition study is employed with the theoretical proposition that a socio- technical transition, involving a co-evolutionary dynamic of related elements (i.e., technologies, business strategies, technologies, user practices and institutions) (Foxon, 2011), can be seen as a purposive process. Both government and governance can play a significant role in prescribing or modulating such changes. However, it is recognised that, in reality, the low carbon transition has not unfolded at a satisfactory speed to make it able to tackle the climate change challenges within the perceived timeframe. This highlights some methodological gaps in such an approach because it does not accommodate politics and institutional dimension to the level required to understand transition processes. As a result, it leads to problematic solutions. Such a gap makes transition theory less reliable for studying and informing an ongoing transition.
Secondly, the multi-level governance (Bestill and Bulkeley, 2004), transition pathways (Geels and Schot, 2007), and governance arrangement for socio-technical transition literature (Smith and Stirling, 2007) provide a useful framework to map the governance and transition dynamics. Yet, they suffer from the methodological issues of only revealing existing relationships and influences rather than exposing the causes of such relationships and distributions of influence. This is not afforded to ground the influence to a more context-related basis and to identify how governance can be improved to respond to constraints and bring in more transformative changes.
Thirdly, structure-agency and institutional theories provide the proposition that human actions can be perceived as being constrained by social structures or as reproducing social structures. In response to the criticism that systemic transition is
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paying insufficient attention to agency (Genus and Coles, 2008), this proposition makes up such a defect through conceptualising urban carbon reduction policy and governance arrangements as the field of structure-agency interaction. Moreover, institutional perspectives from different stances will be integrated to expand the analytical angles, which allow for examining factors that influence the dynamics of structure-agency interplay. In studying the process which actors interact to shape the urban carbon reduction policy framework and governance arrangements, it affords to develop an understanding of the level of institutionalisation and interdependence of the different institutions. This then helps us to address the methodological issues of the other theories by allowing us to assess to what extent path dependency and path creation dominate urban carbon governance.
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4.2 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In order to investigate cities’ roles and capacities in steering low carbon development, the research advances a dialogue between three themes; governance dynamics for low carbon development, the characteristics of low carbon development, and the nature of politico-institutional influence. There is not a single existing theoretical framework that can, by itself, account for these issues. Therefore, an integrative framework based on selected concepts of the aforementioned theories and China’s situation is proposed within this research. The conceptual framework is used to identify influential politico-institutional factors and to understand the way in which they shape low carbon governance dynamics and the characteristics of low carbon transition.
Figure 4.1 provides a graphical presentation of the conceptual framework. In this figure, the governance processes are conceptualised as both policy and political processes, where the structure-agency interaction takes place. The enabling and constraining role of the institutional framework can be exposed when critically comparing governance dynamics with those normative principles prescribed by transition literature. Specifically, the conceptual framework (Figure 4.1) consists of four main components:
1. The change of policy framework at the national level (as explained in Chapter 3);
2. The governance dynamics of low carbon development (Smith et al., 2005; Bulkeley 2006; Smith and Stirling, 2007; Andonova et al., 2009). Through empirical study, this research captures the roles and functions of different governance processes that shape carbon reduction policies and practices. This is done through analysing actors’ interaction in the carbon reduction context and singling out key actors’ perceptions and values.
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3. The characteristics of low carbon development at city level (Hall 1993; Foxon 2011; Geels and Schot 2007; Phal-Wostl, 2009). This is about understanding the characteristics of the policy framework, the level of institutionalisation and existent discourses. They are examined through an analysis of low carbon policies, practices, and key actors’ views.
4. The political and institutional influence on urban low carbon development (Giddens 1984; Scott 1995; Nilsson et al., 2012; Andrews-speed 2016). The characteristics of low carbon transition and the governance dynamics are interpreted in relation to the politico-institutional context. Such analysis enables the identification of key politico-institutional factors and understands the nature of their influence on shaping low carbon transition.
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Figure 4-1: The conceptual framework
Source: author
The change of policy framework at the national level
As Section 3.2 shows, the Chinese national government has realised that there is a need to shift towards a more balanced development paradigm. This is reflected in emerging environmental policies as well as organisational reforms. Within this context, the development of a climate change mitigation policy framework at the national level, accompanied by reforms that mandate and encourage local actions (through setting binding targets; issuing laws, regulations and guidance; reforming cadre evaluation; launching national entrusted pilot programmes), offer greater opportunities for municipal governments to engage in various forms of
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experimentation and stimulate innovation. This sets the background and wider context for understanding local interpretations and responses.
China is characterised by a system of hierarchical governing which possesses strong state intervention capabilities. In this sense, changes at the national level by which central government drives low carbon transition up the policy agenda, would provide a facilitative environment for low carbon development. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, despite a strong determination to reduce carbon emissions, the corresponding changes at the national level were generally made within the existing governing framework rather than radically changing the system of governance. The national policy framework of low carbon transition exhibits a strong regulatory tendency accompanied by economic instruments, while the policies related to governance remain relativity underdeveloped. Given the interdependence of institutions, the question remains as to what extent changes of national policy framework can effectively redefine the rules of the game (e.g. incorporate low carbon principles in the decision-making arena) at the local level and maintain legitimacy and impact over time. Moreover, we need to find out whether actual transformational low carbon initiatives are possible to emerge from bottom-up, under the current governance arrangement.
Governance dynamics for low carbon transition
Governance dynamics for low carbon development involve processes of policy or rulemaking, implementation, adjustment and (maybe) discontinuation (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). Informed by the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, urban politics and policymaking include dialogues with higher level governments (e.g. provincial and national government) international institutions, local corporations and civil society leadership. In this way, the characteristics of low carbon development are orchestrated through the interactions and relationships that take place and exist between different types of actors including those at other scales and in other places outside the city.
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The review of Chinese governing systems in Chapter 3 provided an understanding of how governance processes are broadly played out in the Chinese political and institutional structure. Particularly, recent studies pointed out that China’s environmental regime has been increasingly recognised as ‘semi-authoritarian’ (Lo, 2015). In a similar vein, Shin (2017) also suggests that increased pluralised governance arrangement has emerged in China, despite the central-local model still maintains a strong explanatory power to environmental policy outcomes. Following these views, local agents may have more opportunities to exert influence in low carbon domain. Their influence can either be positive or negative for low carbon development. For example, local proponents for low carbon development can act proactively through forming networks, capacity building, and getting resources to reproduce rules and develop the meaning of systems (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). But at the same time, actors who want to preserve existing rules may also act passively and resist change. Therefore, it is useful to draw on the idea of multilevel governance to map actor interactions, and thence to provide a grounded understanding of the sources of influence.
Based on the review of China’s governing system, the multilevel governance framework was tailored to account for the Chinese situation. Four types of interactions are considered as typical in the context of Chinese urban low carbon transition; central-local interaction, horizontal intra-governmental interaction, inter- governmental interaction, and intercity interaction. It is believed that distinguishing the governance processes based on these four types will help to empirically clarify each governance processes’ roles and functions and their relative importance in shaping the characteristics of urban low carbon development. By doing so, we can also reveal how existing governance arrangements limit potential capable actors in the governance process and side-lines potential approaches to low carbon development. The following section further discusses the four governance processes.
Interaction between central and local government
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In the context of low carbon development, central-local interaction represents both a hierarchical control as well as a coordination relationship between different levels of government. The hierarchal control is reflected in top-down goal setting as well as policy diffusion – under the hierarchical governing structure, local government is obligated to implement decisions made by the central government. The cadre management system, in which cadre promotion is decided by the upper-level government, provides a mechanism for the upper-level government exerting influence over its subordinates. Under such a circumstance, in order to gain recognition from their superiors, urban leaders have to follow what is preferred by the upper-level government. However, since the opening up in the 1980s, provincial governors and city mayors have been mainly evaluated by their contribution to annual GDP growth (Li and Zhou, 2005). This has created a culture of economic competition across time and space (with preceding and neighbouring authorities). But with the introduction of new policy discourses, such as, ‘two-oriented society’ (2005) and ‘ecological civilisation’ (2007) together with a series of environmental reform, a more environmental-orientated change has been seen.
Meanwhile, decentralisation of state power in the marketization process since the 1990s has put Chinese municipalities in the enviable position of being able to make decisions and to implement them (Liu et al., 2008). Such a structural shift may result in selective policy implementation if the incentive structure is poorly aligned (O'Brien and Li, 1999). Moreover, urban leaders could play an active role in lobbying their upper government leaders to accept their bottom-up reforms (Tsai and Dean, 2014). This process is made easier if they all belong to the same Party faction (ibid). Therefore, coordination can be conceived as a process of negotiation and resource distribution in which municipal authorities aim to maintain autonomy under the enabling or constraining effects of national planning.
Interaction between functional governments
Horizontal intragovernmental relations emphasise the relationships that exist
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between local functional government departments. Since 1978 when local governments gained more autonomy in economic development, the functional units have had fewer controls compared to area controls (Lieberthal, 1997). Given that no one single department has power over another, interaction is manifested through collective decision making, which includes consensus building and joint rule-making (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988). In facilitating cooperation and coordination, the mechanism of a task-based working / leadership group is often adopted at different levels of government (Lai and Liu, 2011). However, their performance and impact vary greatly.
Interaction between government and non-government actors
Globalisation has increased the dependency and influence of non-state actors in China (Bai, 2007). Boarding speaking, non-government organisations can be broadly categorised into public organisations and private organisations. The former involves public organisations, universities, research institutions and any other organisations whose core mission is to promote the public interest. The latter incorporates those organisations which place economic maximisation at the centre of activities, such as corporations in the private sector. Overall, non-governmental experts have become more directly involved in policy making and are increasingly affecting policy choices (Wu, 2003). At the same time, urban citizens are generally richer, less trustful and more mindful of what the Chinese government does and does not do (Ho, 2007). These changes lay a foundation for an enhanced agency for non-governmental actors in the context of low carbon development. However, argues by Leiserowitz (2006), carbon governance largely remains an elite ruling game whilst the general public often lacks awareness and interest in this policy aspect.
Intercity competition and cooperation
Intercity relationships capture the interactions that take place between different cities. As cities have become largely fiscal independent owing to economic decentralisation, much research attention has been drawn to the well-recognised 138
phenomenon of urban entrepreneurialism and how to mitigate its negative impacts through coordinating regional governance and boosting inter-city cooperation (Li and Wu, 2012). From a policy perspective, regional plans, policies and alliances have reappeared in China since 2000 to promote an agenda of inter-municipality cooperation and coordination in various developmental issues (ibid). In the context of low carbon development, the provincial government may play an important role in facilitating cooperation and coordination between cities. Best practices may also horizontally transfer between cities as a process of voluntary learning facilitated by the mobility of government leaders, non-governmental organisations and municipal networks.
The characteristics of urban low carbon development
‘Low carbon development’ can be seen as a socially constructed issue (Hulme, 2010). Indeed, the meanings and values attached to the term, as reflected in policies, are the product of multiple discursive struggles (Feindt and Oels, 2005). While the term ‘low carbon economy’ or ‘low carbon development' has been frequently used in Chinese government policies, official reports, and academic works, it does not have a well-defined meaning. In fact, in many cases it has been woven into a wider context with its meaning related to other ideas and its representation related to other interests. For example, the term ‘low carbon' is combined with other nouns to form terms such as ‘low carbon industry’, ‘low carbon transport' and ‘low carbon building’.
Given the existence of local autonomy, unbalanced development levels, and under the pilot programme arrangements (as discussed in Chapter 3), more attention should be directed to local low carbon policies, practices, and the ideas that underpin them to reflect the specificity. At a municipal level, the development of a policy framework may be a result of a reactive response to changes in policy framework at the national level. It may also, however, be proactively constructed by agents (policy/institutional entrepreneurs) that have power and are willing to invest resources to exert their priorities against others. Currently, new ideas and discourses
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related to environmental protection and low carbon transition take place in an international context may also interact with local institutions. Therefore, analysing low carbon transition characteristics at the city level through policy content and actors’ views allow us to better understand the status quo as well as to trace the process of how it came about and discuss how it may evolve.
Moreover, in the context of low carbon transition, the extent to which policy actions adapt and improve over time can have a substantial impact on the rate and direction of low carbon transition (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). From a normative perspective, policy actions need to be reflexive to reflect the changing pathway of the socio- technical transition (Geels and Schot, 2007) as well as facilitate a co-evolution of different themes (e.g. institution, technologies, user preference and business practice) within a socio-technical system (Loorbach and Rotmans, 2010; Foxon, 2011; Weber and Rohracher, 2012). However, in reality, policy which deal with contemporary issues may be constrained by institutions which developed in the past (Hall, 1993; Scott, 1995). Furthermore, the stabilisation of an institutional change is often a long-term process involving wide-range changes in formal rules, governance arrangements, social norms and cognitive framings (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). To assess the adaptive efficiency of an institutional framework, I use ‘level of institutionalisation’ to describe the extent to which related low carbon ideas and practices are accepted, approved and adopted by actors as norms and willing to devote resources to improve them.
Politico-institutional influence for low carbon transition
Changes to policy framework at the national level exerted pressure and created opportunities for reshaping low carbon governance arrangements at the municipal level. However, in addition to formal rules such as laws and regulations, less formal rules such as conventions, values and social norms also shape political outcomes (North, 1990). Accordingly, changes to one set of institutions may not be well accepted by society if the changes do not align with existing ones (Campell, 2004). At
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the same time, the impact of new institution may also be mediated by other unaffected rules (Hall, 2010). Therefore, in order to clarify politico-institutional influence on governance dynamics and characteristics of low carbon development, it would be helpful to make a distinction between different types of institution. Among different strains and taxonomies of institutions, this research adopts Scott’s (2001, p.48) broad conception of the institutions which focuses particularly on the classification of rules:
Institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.
Here, regulative institutions indicate formal rules such as laws and regulations. Normative institutions are those rules that tend to guide individuals/groups in certain directions on the basis of what is perceived as desirable and worth aspiring. Cognitive institutions guide the perceptions and actions of actors with regard to the way in which they look for a certain kind of solution in preference to others (Scott, 2001). All these institutions are made through legal processes or emerged through the practices of political and societal actors which became customary behaviour or norms (ibid).
Specifically, the regulatory institution at a given time may be designed to support certain strategies or encourage specific actions over others. In this sense, regulatory institution can incorporate mechanisms which encourage innovation and accelerate low carbon transition (as happened at the national level). However, while one set of regulative institutions is undergoing transformation (as explained in Chapter 3), the changed institution may not compatible with other institutions. This would, ceteris paribus, make it less effective in managing interactions. Less formal and implicit institutions such as norms, values, search heuristics and conduct codes captured by the concepts of the normative and cognitive institution may fill such a gap and play a more significant role in structuring the interaction and determining social and
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political outcomes (Child et al., 2007). In this sense, while regulatory rules are enforced top-down, normative and cognitive rules at the local level may function independently and lead to unexpected interaction outcomes. Since the interaction characteristics vary across areas, the outcomes may also vary greatly. The mismatch between different institution pillars constitutes an important source for incremental and path-dependent institutional change (Eggertsson, 1998; Campbell, 2004).
Existent environmental governance literature provides some insights by acknowledging multiple types of reasons that account for the gaps between legislative intent and expected outcomes (Van Rooij, 2006; Economy, 2007; Zhu et al., 2014). For example, pro-growth local officials may compromise on the enforcement of environmental legislation for the sake of economic growth (Ma and Ortolano, 2000); insufficient uptake of environmental norms and values may marginalise environmental policies (Zhu et al., 2014); and weak institutional capacity of government’s functional departments of environmental protection may render implementation weak (Schwartz, 2004). These factors may also have different representation across different places.
Low carbon transition is an emerging field where rules and framing are rapidly developing and evolving along with the ongoing competition of ideas. While various knowledge and values exist, the institutional framework may condition information flows and may sometimes embody certain kinds of knowledge and norms which affect discourse building. In this sense, it is important to recognise the influential normative and cognitive institutions in the context of urban low carbon development and understand how they interact with regulatory rules in shaping the characteristics of low carbon development. This conceptual framework is grounded on the assumption that institutions, as a whole, can be both a constraint and an enabler to low carbon development. By understanding such dynamics, this research sheds light on how governance arrangements can be adjusted to better capture the potential additional capacity generated at the city level.
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4.3 RESEARCH AIM, OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS
This research aims to advance our understanding of the role and capacity of the city (as a governance unit) in steering a timely low carbon transition in the Chinese context through analysing the politico-institutional dimension of governance. The research, via a case study of Guangzhou, focuses on understanding three interrelated themes: the dynamics of urban carbon governance; the characteristics of low carbon transition; and the nature of politico-institutional influence.
There are five specific research objectives, each of which envelop a number of research questions:
1. To provide a critical review of key theories and ideas over different approaches to analyse low carbon transition, with a focus on the politico- institutional implications;
• What are the major theories and methods applied in the studies of low carbon transition?
• How do these theories recognise the role of politics and institutions in shaping carbon reduction policies and practices?
• What theoretical lens can be drawn to increase the sensitivity of the politico-institutional dimension in governing a low carbon transition?
2. To examine the characteristics of China’s governing system and the national policy framework for climate change mitigation, with a focus on their influence at the city level;
• What are the characteristics of the Chinese governing system and in what ways do they potentially influence carbon reduction policy- making and implementation at the city level?
• How does China shape environmental protection and the climate change issue in its development framework?
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• What does the national policy framework for carbon reduction look like?
3. To identify the key actors and understand how low carbon transition is governed in Guangzhou by analysing the nature of the interactions between key actors.
• How did Guangzhou come to give more priority to the carbon reduction issue?
• What platforms and mechanisms are used by different types of actors to coordinate and collaborate; how were they established, and how have they been maintained and evolved?
• What are the interaction characteristics between different actors and how do different types of actors influence and shape the low carbon policy framework in Guangzhou?
4. To examine low carbon policies and practices, as well as actors’ views, perceptions and aspirations in the case study area of Guangzhou, focusing on the changes that have been taken place over the past decade.
• What are the critical carbon reduction initiatives and events in key sectors and what are their impacts?
• To what extent have concerns relating to carbon reduction been incorporate into sectoral practices and how have they changed over time in response to the wider context?
• What are the constraints for governing a low carbon transition at the city level and how are these constraints linked to institutional contexts?
5. To synthesise the research findings and discuss the roles and capacities for cities to promote meaningful change across society as well as draw out key theoretical and policy implications.
• What are the nature of politico-institutional influence on low carbon development at the city level?
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• How can the limitations of urban carbon governance be addressed?
• What are the theoretical implications of this research for transition theories and governance theories in the context of low carbon transition?
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4.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN
The conceptual framework formed in the previous section represents a preliminary understanding of the research topic at more abstract level, which will be assessed and enriched through an empirical study. This section outlines and justifies the methodological routes which were undertaken in this research, before move on to present the research design focusing on targeted data sources and relevant data collection methods. Lastly, it summarises the processes of fieldwork, data collection and analysis.
Case study strategy
This research needs to investigate three interrelated and context-dependent themes to achieve the research aim: the dynamics of urban carbon governance, the characteristic of low carbon transition, and the nature of institutional influence. Moreover, this research focuses on an ongoing low carbon transition; a process that is both dynamic and evolutionary. Based on the nature of this research, it is believed that the case study strategy was considered to be the most suitable approach for this research because 1) it allows an in-depth study of a few instances of a complex phenomenon (Blatter, 2008); 2) it allows researcher to employ various methods to collect data from multiple sources over a certain period (ibid); and 3) it facilitates iterative analysis, as well as allows reflection and revision as new data and issues emerges within a research process (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
To assess the role and capacity of a city (as a governing unit) to steer a timely low carbon transition, the case type should be a ‘paradigmatic case’, that allows ‘the development of a metaphor or establish a school for the domain that the case concerns’ (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 230). More specifically, it means that the context- dependant knowledge gathered based on a ‘paradigmatic case’ would have potential to establish a knowledge base from which similar cases can be compared. In other
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words, this thesis presents a case study which is not only firmly rooted in a particular context, but also enables the theorisation of connections that go beyond the case itself (Flyvbjerg, 2001).
In terms of case numbers, a single-case approach with multiple units of analysis was selected in order to enable a more comprehensive analysis. The reason for choosing a single-case over a multiple-case approach was guided by the research angle and the required analytical depth of this research. As indicated in the introduction, the progress of bottom-up efforts to fill the emission gaps has been slow and fragmented in a western context (Lo, 2014) which has led some to question whether the potential to close the emission gap can be better exploited under ‘environmentally authoritarian’ or an ‘experimentation under hierarchy’ regime. Despite the existence of diverse local circumstances in China, there are, compared to western societies, more similarities than difference within the Chinese context. Therefore, it is considered that a phenomenological case study can also contribute to theoretical enhancement. Moreover, analysis of urban carbon governance involves analysis of multiple sectors. It follows, that an in-depth single case serves the purpose of this research better than a multiple case study approach would. The use of a single-case strategy within this research also accommodated practical concerns: 1) this is a piece of PhD research limited by time and financial resources; 2) the nature of this research requires access to government actors, which will be challenging if personal contact is absent.
It is recognised that a single case does not accommodate the diverse local circumstances in China and may struggle with the likely outcome of generating overly context-specific theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Nevertheless, the knowledge generated from the case study can be seen as part of the knowledge accumulation process for a specific field or in society as a whole (Yin, 2014). Lastly, a qualitative approach was adopted as this study aimed to explore different actors’ views and perceptions as well as their interaction characteristics without strong assumptions. A qualitative approach offered an open environment and afforded to 147
produce richer information therefore increasing the depth of explanation (Flyvbjerg, 2006).
Case selection and introduction
Case selection
As explained, this research seeks to examine a single ‘paradigmatic case’ in detail. Informed by the research questions, the selection of the individual city that would form the case study was influenced by a number of factors. First, the case study city should be one of the largest cities in China, as the 35 biggest cities in China account for 40% of the country's GHG emissions (Dhakal, 2009). These big cities’ aggregate carbon reduction performance will have a significant impact on China’s overall performance. In this sense, studying big cities represents a more realistic concern and of more practical significance. After deciding to focus on big cities, the status of the city formed the second consideration for case selection. This is because in China, policies and practices of high-status and international connected cities normally receive more attention from who have an intention to learn. Therefore, choosing a high-status city to engage intellectually could generate practical implication for wider audiences. Thirdly, as this study aims to explore the potential of city to bring in a more transformative change, the case study city therefore should be a prioritised region for carbon mitigation in China’s overall climate change strategy. In this regard, it would have the potential to demonstrate a proactive response and robust reforms. Lastly, due to the difficulty of accessing key actors, practical factors relating to carrying out fieldwork in China such as the availability of local contacts had to be taken into account. Taking the above criteria into consideration, the eligible cities were first narrowed down to three groups of cities: 1) 35 cities with high GHG emissions (see: Dhakal, 2009); 2) direct-controlled cities or vice-provincial cities (19 of them);27 3) low carbon pilot cities which displayed a satisfactory history of
27 Chinese cities are officially divided into four levels based on their importance to the central government. The first level refers to the municipality directly under the Central Government, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. The second level comprises 15 vice-provincial cities, who are either provincial capitals or regional 148
delivering carbon reduction targets and have proposed a certain number of policy initiatives.
Based on the above, Guangzhou city was selected as the case study locality. Guangzhou is one of the vice-provincial cities28 and one of the five national central cities29 located in the southern part of China. It was also selected as a ‘low carbon pilot city' in the second batch of the national low carbon programme in 2012. Moreover, Guangzhou is a mega city with good economic performance and developed industries. These characteristics suggest that it has a stronger bargaining power with the central government (Kang et al., 2004). In addition, Guangzhou is an internationally connected city. Being a commercial centre with intensive trade activities since 1978 (Xu and Yeh, 2003), Guangzhou promotes market and commercial activities most vigorously. As a large municipality, Guangzhou can provide important insights for other urban areas in China and even for other cities in the developing world.
Among literature and consulting reports, Guangzhou’s low carbon transition represents a typical ‘success’ case from both a policy/practice output and carbon intensity reduction outcome perspectives. On the one hand, Guangzhou slowed down its emission’s growth rate both in absolute and relative (to the business-as- usual) terms against the baseline set in the mid-2000s (Gilley, 2017). On the other hand, according to the iGDP report (2014) which surveyed 10 of the 36 low carbon pilot cities in China,30 Guangzhou’s carbon target-setting and policy implementation was, in many aspects, ranked first among other low carbon pilots. These features centres. The third level refers to another 17 provincial capital cities. The remaining cities were categorised into the fourth level. According to national policies, it is the responsibility of the municipal governments on the first two levels to take actions and develop local policies first.
28 Being a ‘sub-provincial’ city means that Guangzhou enjoys more administrative autonomy in social and economic planning than other prefectural level municipalities. The prefectural level municipalities are under direct control of their respective provincial governments.
29 The concept of ‘national central cities’ was proposed by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development in 2010 to highlight cities that at the apex of the Chinese urban system with strong ties to the world economy and important influence on domestic development. 30 Other case cities in the report include Guiyang, Beijing, Jilin, Wuhan, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Zhenjiang, Jinchang, and Yan'an 149
made Guangzhou a suitable case for detailed local policy and political analysis as it has the potential to display multiple sources of influence and conflicts between authoritarian control and market forces. In the following, a brief introduction of Guangzhou city is provided.
Guangzhou city
Guangzhou is the capital city of Guangdong Province with long history. The Pearl River Delta (PRD) is an integrated ‘economic zone' within Guangdong Province, and is a pioneer of China’s new practice of reform and opening (Vogel, 1989). Geographically, Guangzhou lies to the north of the PRD. Benefiting from a very good geographical location, Guangzhou has long been a regional transport hub and a key trading port in southern China. Economically, Guangzhou is among the fastest- developing cities in China. Since the economic reforms of the late 1970s, urbanisation has increased rapidly in Guangzhou accompanied by significant physical changes. The Guangzhou municipality currently has jurisdiction over 11 districts; Liwan, Yuexiu, Haizhu, Tianhe, Baiyun, Huangpu, Panyu, Huadu, Nansha, Conghua, and Zengcheng. Cumulatively, these cover a total area of 7,434.4 square kilometres and, at the end of 2017, the total population reached 89.78 million (Guangzhou Statistical Year Book, 2018). Politically, senior municipal leaders of Guangzhou have long been demonstrated concern on environmental issues and have expressed desires to provide Guangzhou with a greener image (Xu and Zhang, 2001). For example, it has embraced the designation of ‘green model city’ as a priority since its 10th FYP (ibid). Figure 4.2 shows the geography of Guangzhou, and Table 4.1 presents some statistics of Guangzhou.
Figure 4-2: The geography of Guangzhou
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Source: author (adapted from Google map)
Table 4-1: Key statistics of Guangzhou (2017)
Indicators Guangzhou
Area (km2) 7,434.40
Urbanisation rate 86.14%
Total Households (million) 29.50
Total Population (million) 89.78
Gross domestic product (billion RMB) 2150.32
23.44 (1.09%) • Primary industry (billion RMB)
601.44 (27.97%) • Secondary industry (billion RMB)
1525.43 (70.94%) • Tertiary industry (billion RMB)
Per capita GDP (yuan RMB) 150,678
Total investment in fixed assets (billion RMB) 591.98
270.28 • Real estate development (billion RMB)
Government finance
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594.70 • Public finance revenue (from Guangzhou)
153.30 • Local budgetary revenue (billion RMB) 31
218.60 • Local budgetary expenditure (billion RMB)32
Source: Guangzhou Statistical Year Book (2018)
Beyond choosing Guangzhou as a case study area, this research also targeted a series of individual cases (low carbon initiatives) that took place in Guangzhou as a means by which to deepen an understanding of characteristics of low carbon development and governance dynamics. This approach was also taken because experimentations and diversities were considered important principles for transition to be flexible and to avoid lock-in effects (Berkhout 2002; Stirling, 2009). Therefore, examining individual cases contributed to the understanding of how the principles of transition management were (not) reflected in either the policy process or in practices. The decision on selecting individual cases was made based on a purposeful sampling during fieldwork, taking into account the ages and types of projects, the areas that project cover and availability of information. The principal characteristics of the five selected individual cases are summarised in Table 4.2. Not all cases had detailed documentary data; therefore, primary data was collected to develop understanding.
Table 4-2: List of individual cases
Case Start Description Type year
Top-200 2007 Identify 200 major energy-consuming Provincial government enterprises enterprises for key energy-saving deployed programme retrofitting projects.
31 Include: business tax, local enterprise turn-off profit, city maintenance and construction tax, property tax, urban land use tax, land value-added tax, vehicle and vessel tax, cultivated land occupation tax, deed tax, tobacco tax, 25% of value-added tax, 40% of enterprises income tax, 40% of personal income tax, 3% of stamp duty on securities transactions, other resource taxes, and local non-tax income.
32 Include: general public services, public security expenditures, and other social expenditures 152
Low carbon 2012 This project aims to integrate the low Bottom-up: initiated by community carbon concept into community The World Bank Group management through reducing (Guangzhou Office) and energy consumption and achieving Guangzhou International low carbon emissions by building a Wetland Ecological climate-friendly environment, Protection Organisation, infrastructure, and lifestyle in with support from communities. Guangzhou Institution of Energy Conversion
Energy- 2013 An energy-information management National entrusted pilot – saving system including a real-time online in charged by Guangzhou information energy utilisation monitoring system Urban-Rural Construction systems for energy-intensive public buildings; Committee database of historical energy consumption; energy reporting system with monthly, quarterly, and annual reports for key energy users.
Carbon 2014 The first system design in China to Bottom-up: initiated by exchange improve the public's low carbon Ceprei Certification Body platform for awareness and encourage individual (Guangzhou) and individual and households to consciously reduce partners and family carbon emission by giving corresponding rewards.
Green 2016 Building a multi-level, multi-channel National entrusted pilot - finance green financial service system to China Carbon Exchange initiative support industrial upgrading and (China) and Huadu green technologies District Government
Source: author
Research design and data collection
There are different potential sources of case study evidence: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and physical artefacts (Yin, 2006). This study employed documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews as the main data sources (see Table 4.3). The data collection phase for this thesis was between March and August 2017.
Table 4-3: Research data sources
Documentation Policy documents
Websites for organisational profiles
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Published reports and news
Unpublished documents provided by interviewees
Guangdong and Guangzhou statistical year book
Interviews33 Total of 32 individual interviewed
Guangdong Provincial Government: (1)
Guangzhou Municipal Government: (4)
Experts from Public Organisations: (4)
Experts from private organisations: (6)
Experts from research institutes and universities: (8)
Experts from state-owned enterprises: (2)
Experts from NGOs and NPOs: (5)
Others (British Consulate General in Guangzhou and Bloomberg New Energy Finance): (2)
Source: author
Documentary analysis based on secondary source data was applied mainly to obtain an understanding of changes to carbon reduction policies and practices over time in Guangzhou, whereas the data gained through interviews provided an opportunity to understand the dynamics behind such changes which were not explicitly revealed in the policies. It also provided an opportunity for cross-checking. Figure 4.3 illustrates the research stages followed by a detailed explanation.
33 Detailed list of interviewees see Appendix 154
Figure 4-3: Research stage
•Qualitative data - desk research Pre- •Quantitative date - desk research fieldwork
•Qualitative data: semi-sturctured interviews; informal conversations; documents and reports recommended by interviewees Fieldwork •Quantitative data: Statistics collected from interviewees
•Qualitative data: follow-up desk research based on findings Post- •Quantitative data: update data from interviewee or other sources fieldwork
Source: author
The pre-fieldwork phase (March to April 2017) was desk-based research in which secondary data was collected. This provided a solid context for the fieldwork and further informed the process of first-hand data collection. The fieldwork took place between April and July 2017, and focused on gathering qualitative data from semi- structured interviews and to attend and observe various types of meetings to gain a better understanding of the policy community. Some useful secondary data which was not published were obtained from interviewees. In the post-fieldwork phase (July to August 2017), additional data was also collected through emails and instant messages.
Secondary data sources
Secondary qualitative and quantitative information covering the period of 2005 and 2017 was gathered. This provided a longitudinal analysis by which to describe the changes that took place. In addition, some further policy developments relevant to the research which published in 2018 were also included.
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Official policy documents are important sources of materials; these were mainly obtained from government websites. Since low carbon transition is a broad concept, many policy documents did not include that specific term in their titles. To prevent missing implicit policies in this field, policy documents listed in websites of five relevant government departments were scanned systematically. The first round of policy search produced a list of 19 policy documents. The policy list was used as a reference point for discussion during some interviewees. Based on interviewees’ feedback and recent update, 3 policies were removed34 from the list and 9 were added. Finally, 25 policy documents were selected for further analysis (see Appendix 5 for a summary of selected policy documents). Government and other organisations’ websites were also scanned for organisation profiles, past and recent activities, and for progress reports. This survey helped to identify major low carbon programmes in Guangzhou and key organisations involved; these were in turn targeted for further documentary analysis and interviews.
Secondary data sources also include unpublished documents provided by interviewees and media reports. A total of 15 unpublished documents in the form of internal notice, internal reports (in the form of power points and word documents), research reports, brochures and minutes of meetings were collected (see Appendix 7 for details). Statistical data was also gathered. The complied statistical data included: carbon intensity, GHG emissions in various fields, total electricity consumption, energy consumption by sectors, energy production data, and some economic data. This data was gathered through secondary sources from: the National Statistics Year Book (online), the Guangdong Provincial Statistics Year Book (website); the Guangzhou Municipal Statistics Year Book (online); the Guangdong Low Carbon Association (online), and the Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion Chinese Academy of Sciences (see details in Appendix 6 and 7). The use of this quantitative data was useful for understanding how low carbon transition has progressed and impacted on local development.
34 These policies were removed as they have ceased to be effective. 156
There are advantages to documentary analysis as the information in the records are detailed, with discourse and perspectives being relatively evident. This, to some extent, assisted me in understanding the views and rhetoric of government actors. Meanwhile, it was also clear that texts may conceal as well as reveal information and, as a result, cross-checking such data with first-hand interviews was considered necessary. Moreover, given the policy-making process is less open and rarely accessed by the public, the perspectives and values of the policy community that inform and underpin policymaking practice constitute are important to analyse if one is to understand the policy field fully.
Semi-structured interviews
Based on the types of questions I was asking and informed by my desire to understand actors’ views, perceptions and their interaction characteristics, semi- structured in-depth interviews were chosen to form one of the core method utilised in this research. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were an appropriate method to use in this context as China’s policy making and implementation sometimes based more on implicit assumptions and objectives, which varies from place to place (See Section 3.1). Semi-structured interviews allow for direct interaction between the researcher and respondents and enable emerging themes to be further addressed. Moreover, data can be checked for accuracy and relevance in the data collection process (Yin, 2006).
Key actors who were targeted for interviews were those people who formed part of the decision-making process or those whom at least well informed on issues related to carbon governance. Specifically, they were: government offices, academia, consultants, and managers from private organisations. Interview questions were designed to explore actors’ understanding and use of the term ‘low carbon’; their motivations and impacts; their interactions and relationship with other organisations; resources and constraints (see Table 4.4).35 These questions were
35 See Appendix 2 for detailed interview questions by actor group 157
tailored before each interview, integrating the interviewee’s organisational background and his/her expertise. The order of question during each interview was adjusted according to respondents’ emphasis and emergent themes.
Table 4-4: Outline of interview questions
The understanding - What is your understanding of low carbon and use of the development\economy? term ‘low carbon’ (Research - Why use this term in relevant policies and programmes? Objective 4) - How would you comment on Guangzhou’s achievement by far?
Motivations and - Are you interested in environmental or climate change impacts (Research issues before you work in this field? Objective 3 and 4) - Why do you choose to do what you do?
- What’s your comment on the prospect of this field?
- How successful do you feel that you have been doing so? Any changes have you made as a result of your involvement?
Interactions and - Could you tell me a bit your involvement (what, how and relationship with why) with low carbon development\economy? other organisations - What strategies or actions did you use to influence low (Research carbon development? Objective 3) - How important is it that the government (central/provincial/municipal) in promoting low carbon development?
Resources and - What are the sources of funding for your organisation? constraints (Research - How public funding is distributed in the field of low carbon Objective 3 and 4) development and what kind of programmes gets most of the funding?
- What resources/conditions do you think are important for low carbon development?
- What failures and challenges are you facing in your daily work?
- Can you explain how these barriers are affected by institutional context (communication styles, work styles, cultural characteristics, as well as political, historical, and 158
economic factor)?
Source: author
In terms of sampling, a combination of purposive and snowball sampling was employed to identify interviewees (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). I started with a few scholars and personal contacts to access contact information of potential interviewees that I wanted to arrange meetings with. After every interview, I asked my interviewees to recommend someone whom they thought I should talk to. Between April and June 2017, a total of 32 face-to-face interviews were carried out with 23 recorded. 9 interviews were not recorded due to refusal from the individual or because the interviewing environment was not suitable for getting a quality recording. The interviews lasted between 25 and 80 minutes. I also took notes during the interviews to supplement audio-recordings and wrote reflection notes right after each interview. In some cases, follow-up clarifications were conducted through emails or instant messages.
Generally speaking, the interviewees comprised various actor types with their aggregate experience cover the whole investigated period. Generally speaking, the interview processes with government actors and academics were smoother as they were more comfortable with those abstract questions that I asked, such as ‘How would you comment on Guangzhou’s achievement by far?’ or ‘Any changes have you made as a result of your involvement?’. For private sector actors, it was easier to start by asking them to describe their daily work and experience. Whenever relevant topics were mentioned, I took the chance to explore their views related to a specific context. Overall, their knowledge provided the depth of information necessary to explore and understand the topics under investigation within this thesis. The interviews were useful in clarifying issues which could not be found through the researcher’s initial desk-based research. For example, it is not very clear as to who have been engaged in a certain policy process and who have been excluded.
Participant observation
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Participant observation was not in my original fieldwork plan. During the fieldwork, I was informed and invited by an interviewee M-01 to attend a stakeholder engagement workshop for carbon capture and storage technology (CCS) held on 24 May, 2017, which was sponsored by British Consulate General (Guangzhou). Attendance at this workshop provided me with an opportunity to gain access to a government official (G-04) who is hard to reach and other interviewees (U/RI-04 and SO-02). It also offered me opportunities to observe speeches, to take part in workshop discussions and to carry out casual conversations with other participants on themes relevant to my research. Such experiences also contributed to my understanding of actors’ interactions in a general sense. Since then, I started to actively search for public information and consulted with interviewees for the existence of any workshop, seminar and conference. At the end of my fieldwork, I attended five different gatherings related to my research, which were useful for me to form a clearer vision on actor interaction, thereby providing valuable additions to the other evidence I collected (summary of attended activities can be found in Appendix 3).
Data analysis
Most of the empirical data were from Chinese sources and were examined in Chinese. During the data collection process (between March and August 2017), I have conducted a preliminary data analysis in parallel. To do this, three layers of evidence i.e. interview transcript /notes, documents and statistical information were organised by types and reviewed iteratively as collected. During the fieldwork phase, I began to create codes for collected data. This was done to remind me what were still missing and to inform further data collection (Charmaz and Belgrave, 2007).
The review of collected data during the fieldwork helped to define the investigation period and sectors. For example, the documentary analysis revealed that the low carbon concept was formally introduced in 2010, but relevant policy actions can be traced back to 2005 when the issue of energy efficiency started to rise in the political
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agenda. Therefore, the investigation period of local policies was set to between 2005 and 2017, which was consistent with the investigated period focused on national policy. Moreover, the sectors of industry, transport, and building were chosen for more detailed investigation since they possess the biggest potential for carbon reduction and could also provide a wealth of data. While the boundaries of low carbon development are not clear, the boundaries of these sectors and the relevant approaches were defined clearer. In this sense, from an analytical perspective, they were helpful to fix the floating concepts of low carbon development at the city scale.
Despite a list of provisional codes was prepared based on the conceptual framework, the initial coding during fieldwork was data-focused, aiming to highlight emerging issues and act as a guide for future data collection. After the fieldwork, I carried a second round of analysis starting with data organisation and description. Each interviewee, policy document and unpublished document was assigned a code identity. The code identity for interviewee was organised in the format of ‘organisation-numbering’ (see Table 4.5). The policy documents were numerical coding as ‘DOC-1, DOC-2, DOC-3…’ while unpublished documents were alphabetic coding as ‘DOC-A, DOC-B, DOC-C…’ (full lists can be found in Appendix 1, 5 and 7). Reflective notes, organisational profiles and some media reports were also collated for reference.
Table 4-5: Coding examples for interviewees
Organisation type Code Example
Government G G-01, G-02…
Public organisations Pub Pub-01, Pub-02…
University and research institutions U/RI U/RI-02, U/RI-02…
NGO/NPO N N-01, N-02…
Private companies Pri Pri-01, Pri-02…
State-owned companies SO SO-01, SO-02…
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Others (Media and British consulate) M M-01, M-02
Source: author
After data organisation and description, collected data was reviewed and arranged chronologically to facilitate understanding of the changes between 2005 and 2017. Following this, all text documents (including interview transcripts, policy documents, unpublished documents and media reports) were read and analysed again with an aim to decide focused codes (Creswell et al., 2007). During this secondary coding process, codes were added, changed, or removed and data was subsequently categorised according to new codes. The list of used codes is provided in Appendix 8.
As interviewees were from different backgrounds with different status, their views therefore reflected different interests. The varieties of views and interests reflected in different actor groups was a focus of analysis. When further analysis was conducted to establish links and connections between codes, I paid particular attention to: were the discourses used in official documents contested with or conform to those in interview transcripts? Is there any inconsistency between different actors (group)’s report? Through this I connected interviewees’ personal understanding with their group identity, and the wider policy and institutional context. Indeed, it was found that a large part of the motivations and opinions were highly influenced by official statements and administrative culture. Identifying connection like this is meaningful as it allowed me to cross check how a particular ‘type’ of views and practices related to their group identity. Until then, all data was categorised into five broad sets: governance dynamics; policy changes; characteristics of transition; constraints; and institutional influence. These five categories are not mutually exclusive. In many cases, the same piece of data was put under more than one category.
With regard to this research, official data that I could obtain was not sufficient. For example, collected official data only showed an overall number of government investment on supporting strategic emerging industries and energy efficiency
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projects, but fails to provide more details or to break down on how these investments were gone to certain industries or projects. Interview data to some extent helped to fill this gap. Interview data offered a general account of resource supply and distribution, which contributed to understanding the reality.
Ethical consideration
Following the Research Ethics Framework provided by the University of Manchester, the researcher has given proper consideration to consequences that may arise for participants as a result of involving in this research. In order to safeguard informants and avoid potential harm on them, all interviewees were informed of the research aims prior to the interview. They were also told that the conversation or any comments provided may be presented as a direct quotation in the researcher’s PhD thesis and journal articles. Prior to the start of each formal interview, consent was sought and all interviewees were informed that they are free to withdraw at any time without providing any reason. Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to interviewees by keeping the information strictly for the purpose of this research. All collected data was stored in the researcher’s personal laptop with password protection.
However, during the course of data analysis, the researcher realised that given the nature of this research, it was challenging to maintain strict confidentiality at all times. Due to the fact that this study adopts an institutionalist approach to understand low carbon development in the case study area of Guangzhou, it is necessary to present information involving interviewees’ views, perceptions and their interaction with others. Based on comments and information provided by some interviewees, it is possible for someone who is familiar with the context of low carbon development in Guangzhou to speculate the identity of certain interviewees. In recognition of this, the researcher took two practical steps to mitigate potential risks, including 1) making rigorously selection of data to present; and 2) hiding detailed organisational information of some interviewees.
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CHAPTER 5: GOVERNANCE DYNAMICS BEHIND THE
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT IN
GUANGZHOU
Chapter 3 provided the national context from which municipal institutional structures and policies for low carbon transition develop. This chapter presents empirical findings which unravel the governance arrangements and governance practices behind the institutionalisation of carbon reduction at the municipal level in the case study area of Guangzhou. Specifically, this chapter begins by identifying the key government and non-government actors and then shows how they placed within the carbon governance arrangement (Section 5.1). Applying the conceptual framework proposed in Section 4.2, Section 5.2 depicts the characteristics of actors’ interactions through four governance processes; each was distinguished by types of involved actors. By analysing the respective roles of different governance processes, Section 5.3 illustrates the mechanism by which these governance processes impinge on each other to institutionalise carbon reduction.
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5.1 LOW CARBON POLICY COMMUNITY AND KEY ACTORS
There are various actors with different responsibilities, powers and interests involved in the low carbon policy community who are responsible for interpreting, adapting and implementing policies in Guangzhou.
Municipal functional government departments and their afflicted organisations
Issues relating to carbon reduction are not confined to a single dedicated department in the government bureaucracy. In Guangzhou, four municipal functional departments are identified as working at the coalface for low carbon development.
They are responsible for translating national and provincial plans, guidance, and opinions into local practices. During the investigation period, the Guangzhou
Development and Reform Commission (GZDRC) held the most important institutionalised responsibilities for leading and coordinating all carbon-related activities at the city level. At the same time, a majority of the carbon-related tasks have been directly allocated to the Guangzhou Industrial and Information
Technological Bureau (GZIITB), the Guangzhou Urban-Rural Construction Commission
(GZURCC), and the Guangzhou Transport Commission (GZTC). This is because most of the low carbon policies and practices are tied to industry, building and transport sectors. Over time, these functional departments have institutionalised relevant responsibilities, which indicate in their department work description.36
GZDRC is a comprehensive administrative department responsible for the whole city development in Guangzhou. There are 27 offices inside the department taking charge of planning and coordinating different aspects regarding Guangzhou’s development. According to a government official from GZDRC (G-01), there are five offices within the GZDRC which directly deal with respective tasks related to low
36 Following the national organisational reform, key responsibilities regarding low carbon development have been relocated to the newly established Guangzhou Municipal Ecological Environment Bureau since the mid-2018. 165
carbon development. They are the Environment and Climate Office; the Resource
Conservation Office; the Energy Office; the Urban Development Office; and the Industry Development Office (details see Table 5-1). Generally speaking, the GZDRC has been the key responding agency; it has been at the frontline of planning, mobilising as well as picking up much of the slack for low carbon development (G-
01). Its coordinative activities include allocating tasks and targets to other functional departments and mobilising other functional departments to launch initiatives related to low carbon development (G-01).
Table 5-1: Key responsibilities of GZDRC in the context of low carbon development
Sectors Key institutionalised responsibilities
Industries - Formulate comprehensive industrial development strategies and key industrial plans;
- Promote strategic industrial adjustment and facilitate the upgrade of economic structure;
- Promote the development of high-tech industries;
- Coordinate the development of service industries;
Infrastructure - Organise and coordinate the formulation and implementation of the city's infrastructure development strategy;
- Coordinate comprehensive transport planning;
- Organise the energy efficiency assessment for fixed assets investment projects;
Energy - Formulate the energy development strategies, plans, and policies and organise the implementation;
- Coordinate the energy saving and emission mitigation planning and implementation;
- Supervise the implementation of energy conservation and emission reduction;
- Organise the implementation of low carbon city construction;
- Coordinate the energy conservation for the public institution;
- Oversee national-led energy-efficiency programmes.
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Source: website of Guangzhou Municipal Government: http://zwgk.gz.gov.cn/GZ02/1.3/201507/97b3b85f8d2d4164b2274d27d8690f5a.shtml
To enhance its institutional capacity in terms of planning and supervising, the GZDRC established, a dedicated public organisation called the Guangzhou Energy Conservation Centre37 (GZECC) in 2012. The GZECC works as an affiliated but independently function organisation, assisting with the promotion of energy efficiency, monitors energy use and undertakes other relevant routine work. Key responsibilities of the GZECC include: to supervise the implementation of energy saving laws, rules and regulations; to conduct regular inspections of the energy utilisation of key energy users; to conduct investigations and rectify illegal energy- related activities; to undertake energy-saving assessments for fixed asset investment projects; to promote energy saving demonstration projects; to carry out energy- saving publicity activities, to provide training; to disseminate information; and to provide general energy consultancy services for both public and private sectors.
The GZURCC is the sectoral leader in managing and coordinating works related to low carbon buildings; both for new constructions and existing building stock. In 2011, the
GZURCC proposed to set up a leadership group for promoting and coordinating its work with regard to building energy efficiency. This proposal was ratified by the mayor, and the deputy mayor Su Zequn who was in charge of urban construction was assigned to lead the leadership group. Later in the same year, to further enhance its institutional capacity, the GZURCC established a public organisation, which is called Office of Building Energy Efficiency and Wall Materials Innovation (BEEWMI)38 The
BEEWMI offers both policy and organisational support, whose key tasks include: to interpret and adapt policies from higher level governments and to formulate plans for local wall material renovation and building energy efficiency; to promote relevant
37 广州市节能中心 38广州市墙体材料革新与建筑节能办公室
167
guidelines, green building standards and technologies; being responsible for building energy consumption monitoring and auditing; having responsibility for energy efficiency inspection for public buildings; carrying out building energy efficiency publicity activities, training, and information dissemination; and conducting relevant research as well as developing external links.
The GZTC is responsible for the development of the transport industry as well as for transport planning within Guangzhou’s overall urban planning. Other key tasks of the
GZTC include: supervising and managing activities related to road freight and passenger transport, urban rail transit and ferry; organising and implementing road construction as well as maintenance; organising the development of near-term transport construction plans and coordinating implementation; organising and coordinating the key transport technology projects; policy making for major transport-related science and technology project development; responsible for environmental protection, energy conservation and emission reduction in the transport sector.
A government official (G-02) from the GZTC said that the commission has long been actively engaging in enhancing its institutional capacity since the late 1990s and that this is driven by local needs. The GZTC set up the Guangzhou (Public) Transport
Research Institute39 in 2005 as a subordinate research institute but allows this body to carry out research activities independently. At the same time, the GZTC also proactively establishes links with both domestic and international research institutes and international development agencies in order to keep a close track on good practices and the most up to date technological development.
Our leaders have been encouraging us to build networks with experts and scholars so that we can learn from international experience. We were asked to report our progress on a yearly basis by showing how many conferences, workshop, meetings that we attended. This helps us develop
39 广州（公共）交通研究所
168
networks so we can get to know the latest updates.
G-02
However, some approaches for decarbonising the transport sector lie beyond the direct administrative realm of the GZTC. For example, according to a researcher
(U/RI-06) from a university-based research institute, the direct impact that GZTC can make to reduce carbon emissions from road freight and private automobiles at this stage is limited.
For the transport sector, there are three key principles for carbon mitigation: avoid, transfer and improve. GZTC is able to contribute to the avoid strategy by working with other departments to reduce the travel frequency through urban planning; and contribute to the transfer strategy by promoting public transport and cycling through transport planning. […] But most carbon emission (in the transport sector) is generated from the road freight and private cars, accounting for nearly 80% of the carbon emission of the transport sector. Unless we could make a breakthrough in terms of new energy vehicle, otherwise the carbon emission of the transport sector will keep increasing.
U/RI-06
Another characteristic which distinguishes the transport sector from the industrial and building sectors is that the approaches and decisions taken to decarbonise the transport sector (such as developing a public transport project) are more concerned by the general public and more susceptible to their influence. One illustrative case is the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project. As introduced by the director from The Institute for Transportation and Development Policy40, Despite the fact that the BRT case is s a successful case with regard to how it enhanced inner-city mobility and reduced carbon emission, this project was challenged by both the public and many experts during its planning and construction stages. This made the GZTC realise the importance of public communication for these large-scale projects and the need to pay extra attention to public education (N-01).
40 交通发展与政策研究所 169
The key tasks for the GZIITB are generally related to decarbonising the industrial sector and developing low carbon industries. Specific tasks include: formulating and organising the implementation of energy conservation policies for the industrial sector; implementing national industrial energy efficiency and carbon mitigation programmes; organising performance assessments; promoting the development of renewable energytand energy efficiencytindustries; promoting the development of low carbon services sector; promoting the use of new energy conservation products, technologies, and materials for industrial sector; planning and organising the construction of low carbon industrial parks.
The formation of a low carbon policy community
In addition to government departments and their affiliated public organisations, five different types of non-governmental organisations are identified as key actors in the carbon policy community in Guangzhou. They are the (university-based) research institutes, commercial consulting companies (carbon/energy services companies), industry associations, foreign embassy, and non-for-profit organisations (NPO).41
They vary significantly from each other in terms of legal status, size, mission, resource endowment, level of autonomy from government and relationships with government. In terms of their involvement in low carbon development, many of them carry out research and consulting works related to plan making, policy advice, project/standard design based on research activities including reviewing best practices, interviews, calculation, and evaluation (Pri-06; U/RI-03; U/RI-05; U/RU-07;
N-02). Moreover, it is interesting to note that low carbon development was not a priority issue for many environmental organisations whose attentions were more focused on issues such as waste treatment, air and water pollution (N-03).
41 These organisations can be seen as NGOs according to the definition adopted by western society. But they were registered as businesses given it is difficult to obtain a NGO status in China (see Section3.1). But in practices, they operate on a non-profit basis.
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At an individual level, it is discovered that many of the experts in the policy community entered the low carbon industry at the beginning of the 2000s (U/RI-04; N-03; Pri-03). Since the early 2000s, the low carbon market size has started to develop and grow, largely driven by the popularity of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). 42 Between 2005 and 2012, the CDM was seen as a very lucrative industry with a return on investment can reach more than 10 times (U/RI-04). Therefore, it was able to provide relatively high salary packages and attractive working environments to attract many overseas graduates. However, since 2009, as a result of the financial crisis and the disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen conference, the industry’s prospects have been less promising. After 2012, the CDM market shrunk sharply so many people have either changed their career direction or had to work harder to exploit the market (Pri-03). To some extent, such circumstances left a valuable talent pool for low carbon development. These experts have acquired much knowledge and experience as well established connection with each other through participating in CDM projects. The existence of this knowledge, experience and network played an important role in facilitating urban low carbon transition. It is worth mentioning that these experts’ knowledge background is characterised by the market-based approach developed through their participation in the international carbon market. This contributes to shaping the debates and arguments that took place in choosing and designing policy instruments in
Guangzhou and other places.
Within the low carbon policy community, people are largely connected through shared educational experiences or interests. The formation of such social networks is also facilitated by the exchange of personnel, networking, and capacity building activities (M-01; Pub-03). To explain, in Guangzhou, when a government department,
42 The CDM allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by industrialised countries to meet a part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. The mechanism can contribute to stimulates carbon reductions while giving industrialised countries some flexibility in how they meet their carbon reduction limitation targets (UNFCCC, 2018). 171
public organisation or state-enterprise needs to work together closely on a specific task or programme, it is quite common for them to ‘second’ (Jie Diao43) staff from another organisation (SO-01). In addition to this, relationships can also be established through attending various seminars, workshops and networking activities organised by both government and non-government organisations or by arranged formal visits (M-01; Pub-03). There are also one-time large scale events (such as the Guangzhou Low Carbon Conference held in 2012), one-off topic based conferences/seminars (such as Green Energy Transition seminar held by Guangzhou
Institute of Energy Conversion Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2017), and regular meetings held every once or twice per month (such as the workshop series organised by the Guangzhou Carbon Exchange). These activities are essential for enhancing existing linkages, expanding the policy community, and accelerating information exchanges.
Furthermore, the wide application of instant message applications has also contributed to broadening existing linkages both at the organization level as well as at a personal level. Extended networks are usually based on instant message applications in the form of ‘group chat', which is loose and informal. Such a ‘group chat' can be initiated by someone who has extensive contacts in this area who wishes to discuss a specific issue or organise activities. The group may expand if the group members keep inviting their colleges, friends or alumnus to join. Moreover, it is common that when people attend a seminar or workshop, the organiser will ask all participants to join a ‘group chat’ at the end of the meeting by scanning a ‘QR’ code.
After joining the group chat, members will be asked to add their names and organisations in the group remark. In this way, participants can easily find contacts if they have further issues that need to be discussed or want to consult with other participants. These individuals in the wider policy networks are playing useful roles in
43 借调
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facilitating informal learning and information sharing, this is explained further in the following section.
However, it is also noted that these actors from the wider policy community do not necessarily share the same values or align with each other to push the climate change agenda forward. For example, they may only just focus on a specific technology (e.g., carbon capture and storage) or a specific topic (e.g., carbon trading) without paying much attention to what is happening outside their professional area.
Drawing from the non-governmental interviewees, it seems that their sense of ‘what low carbon it is’, emerged largely from their experiences instead of being based on their own theorisation at a conceptual level (U-04; Pri-02; Pri-05; SO-02). Therefore, such a policy community is loose and cannot be seen as a coalition. In fact, many actors are driven by a variety of different aims and beliefs and use the term ‘low carbon’ only as an instrument to fulfil their individual interests.
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5.2 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND INTERACTION CHARACTERISTICS OF
DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE PROCESSES
The responses of interviewees highlighted that the four governance processes influence the institutionalisation of carbon reduction in Guangzhou in different ways.
Specifically, central-local relationships impinged on political support and resource availability for carbon reduction at the municipal level, through the imposition of binding targets, the provision of ear-marked financial support, and general or technical guidance. Intragovernmental interactions are crucial for coordination, yet the collaboration mechanisms are weakly institutionalised and were sometimes identified as being symbolic or weak in terms of their operation. The non- governmental actors contributed to capacity building and knowledge production by providing solutions to designated issues, and facilitated coordination between functional governments. However, they were rarely able to shape the agenda, and their efforts often failed to have a significant impact if political endorsement from the municipal government was absent. Intercity relationships provided motivation to take action as well as contributing to capacity building.
Central-local (vertical) interaction
As mentioned in Section 3.1, China’s governing system is mainly characterised by centralised political institutions and policymaking processes, but also increasingly demonstrates a pluralised governance arrangement (Shin, 2017). With regard to governance process between central-local interaction, three key reasons are identified as to why municipal government leaders in Guangzhou are actively engaged in low carbon development: statutory influence; their desire to seek reform credentials; and their desire to enhance central-local communications.
Statutory influence: national binding targets and dedicated programmes
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The evidence collected suggests that a centralised governing structure with additional administrative interventions was important for local actions and target delivery under state-led reform. Various interviewees (G-04; Pub-03; N-04; U/RI-3;
U/RI-08) cited the introduction of the first economy-wide energy efficiency target in the 11th FYP44 as important initial stages in the process of nation-wide reform.
Accompanying the FYP targets were a series of high-profile dedicated programmes which targeted energy-intensive enterprises, outdated capacity, and key energy- saving projects. The implementation of these dedicated programmes primarily relied on administrative measures and tools, supported by implementation guidance and ‘ear-marked’ funds. Within each programme, the implementation tasks and targets were allocated down to the provincial and municipal functional departments. Within each level of government, a high-rank government official was assigned to responsible for policy implementation and target delivery (G-04).
Moreover, since 2007, ‘hard’ targets in the cadre responsibility system which was previously reserved for goals related to economic growth and social stability, were extended to incorporate issues related to energy conservation (Zhang, 2012). A government official (G-01) confirmed the impact of this reform by suggesting that late 2007 had been a turning point for Guangzhou. At the end of 2007, Guangzhou was found to be failing to meet the mid-term target and was, consequently, given a warning by the Guangdong provincial government. Furthermore, to avoid a ‘last minute effort'45 approach (Li and Wang, 2012), annual targets were implemented in the 12th FYP period to allow tracking of progress at both national and sub-national levels. Following the introduction of binding targets, the central government also introduced a series of enforcement campaigns and established operational procedures to assign targets and to supervise target fulfilment. For example, the
44 mandating a binding target that energy consumption per unit GDP to reduce 20% by 2010 for the 2005 levels
45 To meet the energy efficiency target, some local governments have chosen to cut the power supply during the latter stage of 11 FYP, which led to negative social impacts and public perception. 175
central government set out to sign responsible letters with provincial government leaders which indicated overall energy efficiency targets, sectoral and programme targets at the provincial level. This approach was in turn adopted by provincial governments to keep their lower level governments in line with provincial targets (G-
04). Moreover, the central government also carried out periodical reviews by sending inspection teams to different regions to check their performance. The inspection teams usually listened to local presentations, reviewed relevant reports and carried out site visits before deciding whether the locally claimed accomplishments were trustworthy and acceptable. The members from the inspection team also made suggestions and provided some general guidance for future work (U/RI-03).
Although the energy efficiency target is only one of several competing targets for municipal governments (Ran, 2013), a government official (G-01) commented that the Guangzhou municipal government realised and valued the importance and co- benefits of improving energy efficiency in the long run. As a result, it gives energy efficiency a strategic position in its government agenda. However, he also admitted that the impetus for municipal governments to take action at the beginning was primarily driven by the logic of meeting targets. Without pressure from higher levels of government; Guangzhou could not achieve such levels of improvement within the same timeframe.
According to Pub-03, in the mobilising meeting held by the Guangdong Development and Reform Commission (GDDRC), Guangzhou was also encouraged to mirror and expand national energy conservation programmes such as the ‘Top-1000 Energy-
Consuming Enterprises Programme’ to include top energy-intensive enterprises in Guangzhou. Following on from this guidance, the GZDRC and the GZETC worked together to launch a municipal level ‘Top-200 Energy-Consuming Enterprises’ programme and identified the top-200 energy-intensive enterprises in Guangzhou in addition to those enterprises that had been selected in national and provincial
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programmes. These programmes were also implemented through signing responsible letters based on negotiations between government officials from the GZETC and managers of energy-intensity enterprises. This stringent approach was considered by an interviewee from a public organisation (Pub-03) as both appropriate and necessary to achieve the national target.
It is the GDDRC that suggested us to do this (expand the programme) in the mobilisation meeting. […] I would not say that it is because we are very proactive. At that time, we have the overall target to deliver. Commanding those large energy users46 was the most direct and efficient way to deliver the overall target set by the upper-level government. Many other cities used this approach as well. Guangzhou is not the only city and not even the first one to launch such a programme to mandate energy-intensive enterprises. […] Moreover, we expected that some efforts would not be taken into account by the inspection team and some efforts will fail.
Pub-03
During the 11th FYP, the inspection teams which were organised by the NDRC could have a say in how the overall target was calculated. For example, part of the energy- intensive reduction which resulted from Guangzhou's industrial relocation47 was not adequately taken into account in the overall energy intensity reduction figure. This was raised in one meeting with the inspection group during the 11th FYP period. This comment is supported by leaders from Guangdong provincial government out of the concern of balancing regional development within Guangdong (Pub-03).
Now there are detailed methods and guidance for calculation. But at that time, it was a messy situation. We did not have a unified standard and procedure to do so. […] We have a rough framework; but it did not cover
46 commanding those big energy users (抓大头) 47 Guangzhou implemented the industrial upgrading and relocation strategy since 2005, aiming to adjust the economic structure by directing the focus from low-end manufacturing toward brand-based, capital-intensive manufacturing industries and service sector (Kuhn, 2009). The shift in developmental strategy in Guangzhou was driven by its internal dilemmas such as rising production cost and resource depletion, but also a response to the nation-wide industrial relocation programme, which set to move labour intensive and low value-added industries, energy and resource-consuming industries from coastal to less developed regions (NDRC, 2004).
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many details. So in practices, difference places use different methods to do the calculation. The inspection team was not happy about our methods and made some suggestions. […] Guangzhou relocated many of the energy-intensive enterprises to Qingyuan (a less developed city in Guangdong province). The Provincial government did not want to exert too much pressure on Qiangyuan in this aspect since it is a less developed area. Therefore, Guangzhou has to place more pressure on the key industrial energy users to fulfil the overall target.48
Pub-03
Relevant government officials learned from such experiences that extra efforts had to be made to ensure that the implemented results were accepted and verified by upper level governments. The above quotes also imply that the national binding targets and dedicated programme underpinned by the centralised governing structure is the source from which incentives were created for local government officials to take action. However, such arrangements only provided incentives for local government to deliver the targets to the minimum stipulated level. As mentioned in Section 3.3, the national carbon reduction policy framework can be categorised into two types, i.e. compulsory targets and programmes; and preferential or selective tasks. The compulsory targets and programmes were largely delivered through command-and-control governing approaches. On the other hand, the preferential or selective tasks which are in the form of visions, or just a set of very brief and general policy goals, do not mandate local responses or actions. They were outlined with the aim of providing guidance and encouraging sub-national governments to proactively mobilise local resources to fulfil these visions in an innovative way. Guangzhou is considered to be one of the most proactive cities in response to these calls by engaging in initiating low carbon initiatives and attempting to coordinate low carbon developments at the city level. Seeking reform credentials and developing closer interactions with the central government were identified as
48 Pub-03 refused to reveal detailed statistics in this aspect. I asked three other interviewees about this, but they either unaware of such situation (Pub-02; U/RI-03) or refused to provide data (G-03) as well for it is considered as a sensitive issue. 178
important factors for Guangzhou in its decision to take proactive actions in this aspect (U/RI-01 and U/RI-02).
Seeking reform credentials and central-local interactions
China has long been using ‘national entrusted pilot programmes’ as a tool for aligning regional development with national goals (Zhang, 2012), as well as a means by which to encourage local policy experimentation and bottom-up innovations. In Guangzhou, various low carbon related pilots both at city-wide and sectoral levels were launched in response to such calls with the intention of establishing best practices (see Table 5-2). The evidence collected through semi-structured interviews provided some explanations as to why Guangzhou has been proactive in this aspect from the perspective of central-local relationships.
Table 5-2 Low carbon pilots in Guangzhou
Pilot name Leading organisations
New-type Urbanisation Pilot49 GZDRC; GZURCC
National Smart City Pilot50 GZIITB
New Energy Vehicle Promotion Pilot City51 GZIITB
Low Carbon Transportation System Pilot City52 GZTC
Public Transport Demonstration City53 GZTC
Low Carbon City Pilot54 GZDRC
Green Financial Pilot55 GZFB
Energy-Saving Information Systems Pilot56 GZURCC
Source: iGDP (2014); U/RI-04 and government websites
49新城镇化综合试点 50国家智慧城市试点 51新能源汽车推广应用城市试点 52 低碳交通运输体系建设试点城市 53 公交都市建设示范工程 54 低碳城市试点 55 绿色金融改革试点 56 节能信息系统建设试点 179
As a developed international city, the level of economic achievement measured by
GDP, despite being important, is not enough to demonstrate Guangzhou’s unique advantage compared with other big cities (U/RI-01). At the same time, the ‘low carbon’ has been recognised as an influential discourse both at national and international levels. It follows that taking a step ahead in the field of low carbon development can be seen as an important approach in building reform credentials and city branding, which would, in turn, benefit local development. According to an interviewee from a local university (U/RI-02), the provincial government plays the most important role in allocating resources and bridging communication divides between the central government and lower tier governments. In this sense, the typical tasks left to municipal governments are specifying goals, daily operations, and maintenance. The communication channels between municipal government and central government are therefore limited to routine reporting, party conferences and visits from inspection teams or research groups. Under such circumstances, having nationally-led pilot programmes at the city or sectoral level can open up more room for vertical communication by increasing the chances for municipal government leaders to interact with central government officials both in formal and informal ways. This is vital for building consensus and cultivating relationships and may bring potential benefits beyond the programme level.
For example, the Guangzhou Knowledge City is a nationally designated programme—every time it holds conferences, Singapore will send a deputy minister to attend. Likewise, the national government will send an equally high-ranked leader to join. The government leaders in Guangzhou rarely have opportunities to meet with these central government leaders face-to-face. For municipal leaders, it is important for them to have the opportunity to invite central government leaders over here. There are many issues that you are not sure about what to do. Once you have an opportunity to have a face-to-face conversation, things then become different.
U/RI-02
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However, whether the political incentives for using the ‘low carbon’ concept to seek reform credentials is perceived as attractive, is contingent on a political leader's perception, preference and vision. In this sense, political endorsement for low carbon development is susceptible to personnel changes. Some pilot programmes were found to have been aborted or to have become symbolic after a given leader left the position (U/RI-02). It was pointed out by N-04 and U/RI-08 that the former municipal party secretary Wan Qingliang was an important figure in promoting
Guangzhou’s low carbon strategy, but that the situation had changed after he was arrested for corruption.
At that time (between 2009 and 2014) Wan Qingliang was very interested in the low carbon concept and personally in support of making Guangzhou a low carbon city. He also suggested that we should make the Guangzhou Knowledge City and Nansha New Town low carbon demonstration zones. At that time, low carbon is a popular term, but now we rarely refer these two new towns as low carbon demonstration.
N-04
And,
The former municipal party secretary Wan Qingliang was very proactive in building Guangzhou as an advanced world city. He tended to support those activities which have a potential to boost Guangzhou’s positive image. […] Low carbon city is one of these demonstrable titles.
U/RI-08
Despite there is no formal written national guidance is provided for the low carbon pilot programmes, the national government (NDRC in the case of low carbon pilot city) is responsible for reviewing and approving action plans submitted by local governments. The formal written replies serve as an indication of things to be followed if the action plans are to be approved (G-01). In this sense, the national government is able to exert a certain level of direct control over sub-national governments through the pilot approval process.
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Intragovernmental interaction
The majority of relevant interviewees agreed that cross-departmental cooperation and coordination were important but a challenging process in the context of low carbon development (G-01; G-02; G-03; Pub-03). In China, establishing a leadership group for a certain issue to some extent reflects the political importance of the issue.
From a practical perspective, this is an important approach to overcome cross- departmental fragmentation. In Guangzhou, there are four ad hoc leadership groups related to low carbon development, either initiated by the mayor or leaders of functional departments. In 2007, the first low carbon related ad hoc ‘Energy
Efficiency and Emission Reduction Leadership Group’ was set up in Guangzhou. The leadership group was led by the then mayor Zhang Guangning and consisted of 33 government officials from different functional departments. There were three sub- groups, with the comprehensive group located in the GZDRC, the energy conservation group located in the Guangzhou Economic and Trade Commission
(GZETC)57 and the emission reduction group located in the Guangzhou Environmental
Protection Bureau (GZEPB). The leaders of these three sub-groups reported to the mayor directly.
In 2010, the ‘Low Carbon Economy Leadership Group’ was set up, aiming to promote coordination among various departments to facilitate low carbon development. The leadership group was envisioned to be a central coordinating body and was entrusted to monitor all areas of economic and political activity across the institutional spectrum (DOC-C/2011). The overarching role was to make sure that the carbon reduction issue was appreciated and incorporated into the policy objectives of each separate government institution (DOC-07/2010). The leadership group consisted of 29 officials from 19 different functional departments within Guangzhou.
Among these 19 bureaus or commissions, the GZDRC played the leading role. Three
57 former GZIITB 182
other functional departments, namely the GZTC, the Economy and Trade Commission
(GZETC)58 and the GZURCC sat in the middle of the strategic planning and decision- making board, while the officials from other departments played a role of information channelling between their own departments and the leadership group
(Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, 2014).
Later in 2011, the GZURCC launched a leadership group called the ‘Building Energy Conservation Leadership Group’ for coordinating relevant building energy efficiency works. The leadership group was led by the then deputy mayor Su Zequn. More importantly in this case, a dedicated public organisation called the Office of Energy Efficiency and Wall Material Innovation was established later; this further enhanced the political significance and facilitated the daily operation of the leadership group.
As mentioned in Section 5.1, this organisation was established by the GZURCC in late 2011, and was dedicated to managing the tasks of building energy efficiency and wall material innovation. Within this organisation, there were newly appointed employees as well as researchers and officials transferred from other organisations under secondment. This arrangement allowed dedicated staff to work under the same roof on a daily basis. Formal meetings with GZURCC officials are convened on a monthly basis to deal with the problems that arise in the policy implementation process (Pub-01). Likewise, the ‘New Energy Car Promotion Leadership Group’ established in 2013, shared a similar arrangement. However, instead of launching a new organisation, a temporary office which was responsible for daily operation of this leadership group was set up and located in the GZIITB with two dedicated employees seconded from other organisations (G-03). In this sense, the latter two leadership groups were institutionalised at a deeper level.
In terms of effectiveness, the interviewees had mixed attitudes towards the function
58 After administration reform, the responsibilities of GZETC have been reallocated to two different departments, namely Guangzhou Commercial Commission (GCC) and Guangzhou Municipal Industry and Information Technology Bureau (GZIITB). The responsibilities related to low carbon development were assigned to the latter one, which was introduced in 5.1. 183
of the ‘Low Carbon Economy Leadership Group’ as a coordination mechanism.
Generally speaking, the role of the ‘Low Carbon Economy Leadership Group’ was considered to be that of a coordinator and a planner. From a normative perspective, the Guangzhou municipal government has a larger influence over other functional departments. It follows, that the leadership group which was led by the mayor should have exhibited strong political influence, and created a level playing field for the functional department to cooperate and coordinate. However, given the leadership group’s set-up and the powers it held, its actual impact was questionable
(U/RI-01; U/RI-02). To explain, although the launch of the leadership group represented a rise of the low carbon development issue up the political agenda, without legal status, its function was dependent on the capability of, and the attention paid to it by, the municipal leader. In Guangzhou, while the leadership group was assigned with planning and coordination roles, there was no correspondent organisational form and sufficient resources were provided to allow it to undertake its role effectively. Moreover, it seems that some of the functional departments were, to some extent, not keen on this issue, because the concept was too broad and vague (G-02; G-05). In general, the interviewed academics were quite critical about the function of this group. For example:
(The leadership group) is not a day-to-day operational body. I think it has a symbolic meaning rather than a substantial one.
U/RI-01
And,
It just a temporary working group and no authority is given to allow it exercises powers over any other functional departments. […] Let’s put it in this way, it cannot be empowered without cutting power from other departments.
U/RI-02
Their responses highlighted that the establishment of the ‘Low Carbon Economy
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Leadership Group’ did not effectively alter existing power relations. In this sense, it was not able to make a big difference at the strategic level, but only able to achieve in uncontested policy areas or in neutral spaces. Therefore, the way it functioned was considered to have limited power to overcome barriers created by structural issues. The interviewee U/RI-01 further commented that the ‘Low Carbon Economy
Leadership Group’ was created for a legitimate purpose, for showing determination and to build credential for Guangzhou to apply for the national-entrusted low carbon pilot city. U/RI-03 shared similar views:
The advantage is that it is flexible. The disadvantage is that you cannot expect that it could exert consistent influences. […] It is more a gesture shown by the municipal government, because both the central and provincial government have set up such a leadership group. So we’d better have one as well.
U/RI-03
The response of Pub-01 to some extent confirmed the view that the organisational set-up underpinning the leadership group determined its impacts.
Some leadership group may be formalised if they are effective or play a major role. […] (They can be formalised either) in the form of dedicated office or public organisation. It depends on the nature of the task and government leaders’ will. It seems that at this point the municipal government leaders do not seem to be keen on making any effort to the issues of low carbon development at the organisational level.
Pub-01
In reality, most leadership groups were in the form of temporary groups without dedicated staff and organisational level support. At that time, it is clear that the Guangzhou municipal government was not keen on taking any initiative that would result in significant organisational change. This was probably because existing governance arrangements represented an easy way to demonstrate a proactive local response without requiring much extra input. Such a setup is more likely to be
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successful in a context where there are more specific targets or tasks to be delivered.
During the period covered by this research, when the pressure from the upper-level government became salient, this mechanism was solicited (U/RI-08). Hence, it is argued that establishing such types of groups without supplying organisational support can be seen as a symbolic gesture whose purpose is primarily to achieve political credential. In this sense, instead of saying that the function of leadership group departed from what it was expected to achieve, it is more accurate to suggest that the design at the beginning determined its limited role.
Whilst the majority of interviewed academes held the view that this group had not been able to achieve anything significant at the strategic level because of its limited powers, the interviewees from government departments were of the opinion that it had improved coordination amongst functional departments and alleviated tensions to some extent. A government interviewee G-03 said that this arrangement helped to bring officials from different departments together to discuss issues before making decisions. Specifically, the agenda of the meetings is mainly to discuss useful issues and focuses on what is needed from each department, how each department can contribute to a certain issue, as well as how to resolve disputes (G-05). As a representative in the leadership group, government official G-03 commented that the meetings of the ‘Low Carbon Economy Leadership Group’ did demonstrate a problem-solving atmosphere rather than merely being symbolic. Another government official G-05 shared similar views and provided some descriptions of its functions:
Under such a mechanism, we brought together relevant departments of agriculture, forestry, industry, construction, transportation, together with statistical departments. We explain things that we need to do. We discuss what data do we need. For those data we do not have, how we could acquire it? We also take turns to present challenges facing each department and then discuss the potential solutions.
G-05
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However, the low carbon economy leadership group ceased to exist in 2014 after
Guangzhou carried out an adjustment/clean-up of this type of coordination agency (G-03). The closure of this group suggests that it did not play a significant role.
However, the working relationships established during the period of cooperation still play a vital role in channelling different departments.
The established working relationship still there. People are still connected. […] (But) we do not do things like what we used to do, such as holding formal meetings or issuing cross-departmental strategic documents. Some of the members still work together for certain purpose.
G-03
On the whole, the leadership group deserves some credit for provoking awareness among high-level decision-makers in different functional departments. However, while Guangzhou seems to understand the importance of intragovernmental coordination, the function and continuity of such groups reveals that, in some cases, the formation of such a group can be driven by publicity purposes and leaders' personal preferences rather than for practical actions. Moreover, while task-driven intragovernmental collaboration was easier to achieve, the coordination mechanism at a strategic level was only weakly institutionalised. Generally speaking, the set-up of the leadership group did not provide sufficient incentives and power for the functional departments to bring in and carry out strategic initiatives, and they have only weak and unstable powers to coordinate actions between departments.
Intergovernmental interaction
To a large extent, the expansion of non-governmental space in the context of low carbon governance in Guangzhou did not occur as a result of deliberate strategies or actions of non-government actors at the beginning. Rather, it was the other way around. To explain, the room for non-governmental actors to take part in the policy process was expanded when Guangzhou municipal government sought to identify
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and utilise the expertise they needed, and this was driven by the pressures placed upon it to deliver national binding targets. Since late 2007 when Guangzhou was found to be failing to fulfil its interim target, the administrative tasks related to energy conservation have become demanding as a consequence of the increased pressure exerted by the upper-level government. Moreover, given that these tasks were complex and technical in nature, their implementation inevitably required contributions from experts. For example, at that time the GZETC could not effectively reach out to all the energy-intensive enterprises and negotiate energy efficiency targets with each of them. The commercial consulting companies and industrial associations, therefore, were invited to take part in the policy process to help with standards and target setting (U/RI-03). Other tasks which required extra experts’ input included responding to requests from upper level government relating to identifying cost-effective energy efficiency technologies to assemble low carbon product categories to be promoted across the country; identifying key carbon emission intensive enterprises (2 tce 59 per year) and surveying their carbon inventories; and understanding the building energy use status (U/RI-03; G-03; Pub- 01; Pub-02). To fulfil these tasks, the municipal government required sufficient and accurate information for policymaking as well as an institutional capacity for implementation. Such challenges provided motivations for the Guangzhou municipal government to institutionalise non-governmental actors into the policy processes for low carbon development. This, at the same time, provided more motivation for non- governmental actors to engage. As mentioned in the previous section, the crash of the international CDM market around the year 2012 has led many experienced consultants who were skilled in carbon accounting and relevant business to look for new employment opportunities. Perceiving opportunities in this field, some of them chose to start their own business to provide consultancy services both for government and enterprises (Pri-03; U/RI-04).
59 tce: tonne of coal equivalent – unit indicating energy generated through burning one metric ton (1000 kilograms) of coal 188
This study finds that there are three formal platforms which were established for non-governmental actors to influence low carbon policymaking in Guangzhou. First, the Guangzhou municipal government appointed research institutes or consulting firms to carry out independent research for systemic learning so as to provide policy suggestions or help with programme design and programme launch preparations. To be eligible, all intended organisations had to apply for a qualification every two years under the rule of ‘public procurement' (Pri-03). Both private and public organisations were eligible to apply for the qualification. However, in many cases, it was easier for public organisations and domestic research institutions to get the qualification, which made them more likely to participate in the policy process (Pri-03; SO-01).
Secondly, at a smaller scale, the municipal government would directly call for external organisations to submit reports based on a specific theme or topic when drafting policies or government reports. Some selected non-government actors may also have been asked to provide internal comments on drafted policies which allowed them to feed their opinions into the political system. As an interviewee from a state-owned enterprise told me:
For example, the recent one is a notice sent by the GZFB asking several organisations, including us, to submit reports relating how to better engage commercial banks in green loans. […] Each organisation was allocated a topic based on its business focus and expertise and has to deliver a research report with 6,000 words.
SO-01
Thirdly, Guangzhou also established various Expert Advisory Committees based on different subject areas. These committees consisted of experts from different organisations, based on the principle of voluntary sign up and verification. The key responsibilities of these committees included carrying out reviews on government- funded research projects and providing direct policy and technical consultancy (Pri- 06; U/RI-04; U/RI-07).
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Despite these channels having greatly expanded participation room for non- governmental actors, the government still maintained the power in terms of deciding what kinds of expertise was needed and with whom it would like to work within the policy community. This, in turn, determined how different non-government actors could gain access to the policy process and at what levels. One non-profit organisation interviewee (N-04)’s comment reflects government’s control over the intergovernmental interaction.
I prefer to carry out projects supported by international funding because that leaves us more room and allow us to focus on solving the problem itself. When you are carrying out a government project, sometimes you have to pay extra attention to communicate with them about what is proper or not. […] Sometimes the research project is to support the decision made by the government.
N-04
Generally speaking, while there are standards or rules by which to judge the eligibility of experts, there were no such criteria as to how decisions were made upon each appointment. Therefore, in many cases, the selection of experts was made based on trust, which in turn depended on personal relationships or government officials’ subjective judgments (U/RI-08).
Compared with public organisations and domestic research institutions, it is found that industry associations and international organisations were relatively distant from the decision-making arenas. As pointed out by a researcher (U/RI-07) from a university-based research institute, this was due to the fact that the government considered relevant energy and carbon inventory data to be sensitive information.
Therefore, in many cases, the government tended to appoint public organisations and domestic research institutions rather than international organisations.
The government is cautious about the energy data. Even you can find all the final data online, you will never know the calculation techniques behind it. 190
U/RI-07
There were cases in which international organisations or foreign commercial consultants were preferred by the Guangzhou municipal government because it was believed that the municipality would benefit from more advanced techniques and innovative concepts that international organisations have (SO-01). Indeed, some of the international organisations were more flexible and able to access more resources than others based on their connections. This, in turn, provided them with comparative advantages in this knowledge-intensive field. For example, in the case of compiling carbon emission inventory and drafting the emission reduction roadmap for the transport sector, the World Research Institute (WRI) provided a lot of support through adapting their technical guidelines to local circumstances and facilitated model building (N-01). However, when participating in research or consultancy projects in relation to energy data, the international organisations had to sign a confidentiality agreement with the municipal government regardless of whether the research was funded by the Chinese government or international donors. Such agreements also prohibited them from releasing any information or research output to the public without consent from the Guangzhou municipaligovernment (M-01;
U/RI-07). During the fieldwork, it was found that interviewees from public organisations and local research institutes tended to talk about the research projects that they had been involved more openly, while interviewees from international organisations were more cautious when it came to revealing such information.
In some cases, international organisations can develop a very close relationship with functional government departments through long time cooperation at the project level. For example, the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP), an international NGO, has developed a very close relationship with the GZTC since
2005 by offering both technical and policy advice to the planning and management of the bus rapid transit (BRT) project. Trust and rapport were built during the project,
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which allowed the ITDP to have a direct influence on transport planning and policy in
Guangzhou (N-01). The respondent from ITDP (N-01) said that they had managed to maintain independence, perhaps owing to their independent funding sources and the trust that had been developed through their previous cooperation. Moreover, the respondent considered that they worked beside the government instead of working for them.
Despite the industry associations and international organisations had a fewer direct impact on the policy level, in the extended policy network based on social media group chats, experts from different kinds of organisations were able to share knowledge and information in both formal and informal occasions as well as sought for cooperation opportunities. It was observed that the availability of ‘group chat’ based on instant message app made it more convenient to search for information, as an interviewee from a commercial consultant firm (Pri-05) put it:
If I want to ask a question, for example, I want to know whether there is anyone knows a trustworthy organisation which is working on financial leasing for energy efficiency projects, I just ask it in the group chats. […] I got a dozen of these groups, and I always got some useful answers. It is better than an internet searching engine.
Pri-05
In this sense, the virtual community based on instant message applications extended the borders and scope of the policy community by facilitating and creating new associational forms. These informal networks based on the virtual community have been formalised in some instances. For example, such connections can lead to strategic memorandums between two previous unconnected organisations (M-01). In other cases, some organisations established their talent pool through identifying and inviting relevant experts to submit their profiles and interests for registration (N-
03). These exchanges of ideas within the community created opportunities for people who have relevant expertise but did not possess a close relationship with
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government to influence policy processes. The new associational form, therefore, contributed to a loosening of the boundaries between the government and other organisations, and lowered the barriers for non-governmental actors to take part in the policy process. Even so, the low carbon policy community is notably an elite- based network consisting of experts and policymakers, and the general public was found to have had only very limited interest and access to the policy process.
The evidence presented above revealed that non-governmental actors have formed a key link in the governance arrangements for low carbon development in Guangzhou.
Such established relationships also enabled some non-governmental actors to bridge the functional departments, thereby easing information and bureaucratic constraints (U/RI-02). By helping to unify thoughts and reach a consensus, such governance arrangement enhances administrative capacity. However, in a general sense, apart from some influential non-government actors wo were able to join the policy processes directly by offering research-based policy options, many more non- governmental organisations were not well-organised and differently resourced to influence policy decisions. Moreover, for those influential actors, having opportunities to engage in the policy process did not mean that their opinions were readily accepted. When asked about how research findings were integrated into the policy process, an interviewee from a local university (U/RI-05) explained that there was no guarantee and that the most direct way of influencing policymaking was to carry out government designated research projects. Even so, the impact may still be limited.
We once worked on a research project and produced an indicator system for green industries and enterprises. However, this is merely an academic report which makes a policy proposal. Until now, no such an evaluation system has been formally adopted by any government. But it is better than nothing. However, if the indicator system we proposed is not adopted by the government, it does not have any impact in reality. […] One day it may play a bigger role. I don't know. […] Carbon footprints at the product level is another example - there are a series of research on 193
database and standard certification, but there is no political support for them. So I would say these research have not made real life impacts as well.
U/RI-05
Another interviewee (N-05) from a non-profit consulting firm shared a similar view:
Getting recognition and support from the government is always not an easy task unless what you purpose align with what the government aims to achieve. But I think we should aim bigger. We are doing research for the benefit of society. So, we cannot just listen to the government.
N-05
In summary, the expansion of non-government space was led by the government at the beginning for the propose of facilitating policy implementation, but non- governmental actors have been actively engaged in exerting their influence. In the best scenario, these processes are ongoing, iterative and open-ended, which can lead to the recalibration of policy goals and the improvement of policy instruments as well as incentive mechanisms. However, it is found that the government still played a decisive role and decided the extent to which non-governmental actors can exert influences on political decision and policy making. Moreover, as observed, non- governmental actors have never been radical and confronted the government, and they rarely openly questioned the policymaking processes and implementation results. Arguably, such a situation may reinforce path dependency as it allows decision-makers to take suggestions or proposals from those people who shared similar ideas or interests with them.
Intercity interactions
Intercity relationships are manifested as providing incentives for government leaders to take action and offer opportunities for city-wide capacity building. For example, while interviewees (G-01; U/RI-02; SO-01; Pub-03) were asked about the motivation
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behind the initiation of city-wide or sectoral low carbon pilot programmes, the actions and performances of other peer cities, and Shenzhen in particular, were frequently cited as a reason for Guangzhou to proactively take part in the national entrusted pilot programme.
More than 200 Chinese cities have established low carbon development as their development targets. It is a trend in the future. […] As a nationally important city, Guangzhou cannot afford to fall behind in this area. Moreover, we have the obligation to take the lead and accumulate some experiences for others.
G-01
And,
Guangzhou is actually in a disadvantageous situation in developing a low carbon economy. […] Shenzhen has more financial capital to do this. Shenzhen does not have to pay tax to the Guangdong Province. If you look at the public budget, you will see that Shenzhen has a much loose budget than Guangzhou does, and the gap is increasing. […] Even in the competition process of Low Carbon Pilot City, Guangzhou was beaten by Shenzhen and only got entrusted in the second batch. […] The mayor of Shenzhen was very ambitious and he even managed to make Shenzhen a pilot city for carbon trading. […] I would say that Guangzhou is trying to catch up with Shenzhen, but the gap still exists.
U/RI-02
And,
We are under great pressure to innovate. Every time we had a meeting with municipal government officials, they always talked about improving innovation capacity and putting forward new ideas. Because Shenzhen is doing quite well in this aspect (green building). Guangzhou needs to be more proactive in developing bottom-up initiatives to demonstrate its innovation capacity.
SO-02
In addition, Guangzhou has been under the international influence and the municipal government has been proactively seeking cooperation with international cities to 195
build its capacities. It is believed that developing good relationships with international cities can lead to a series of benefits such as boosting international image, building capacities and enhanced business cooperation being obtained (G-04;
M-01; N-05). Guangzhou has signed memorandums with regards to low carbon development cooperation with Canada, the UK, and Switzerland to enhance its cooperation with cities in these countries. Influential individuals usually play a key part in facilitating such collaborations (M-01). Although establishing such platforms facilitated communication and provided more legitimacy for low carbon development, it is found that, so far, the collaborating activities have been mainly limited to the master planning stage, capacity building or technological assistance in a particular sector. There is no evidence to suggest that such practices have created a new routine for low carbon development or brought in any substantial physical changes.
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5.3 THE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS BEHIND THE INSTITUTIONALISATION
OF LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT
From the previous accounts, it is clear that four governance processes played different roles and that they partly impinged on each other in shaping low carbon policies and practices in Guangzhou. This section first provides a summary and comparison of key elements of the four governance processes. To provide further clarification of the interrelationships that exist between these governance processes, three models which demonstrate the linear relationship between different governance processes are outlined.
Actor interaction in different governance processes: a summary
Table 5-2 summarises key elements of all four governance processes. As explained in the previous section, both formal and informal political incentives and pressures from other cities motivated Guangzhou to work proactively in terms of delivering binding targets and engaging in pilot programmes. This, in turn, required a higher level of intragovernmental coordination as well as expertise from non-governmental actors to enhance institutional capacity. As policymaking and implementation in this field became increasingly complex and solutions less known, more and more non- governmental professionals were incorporated into the governance process for the expertise they possess. Coordination and collaboration were facilitated by both formal platforms and informal relationships between different types of actors. However, the political incentive for low carbon transition was not constant and it was subjected to the change of municipal leaders. Despite this, there were still many actors within the policy community who attempted to drive this issue forward (SO- 01; N-04; M-01).
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Table 5-3: Actor interaction in different governance processes and their respective roles
Vertical Intra- Intergovernmen Intercity interaction governmental tal interaction interaction interaction
Key actors Central, Functional Municipal International involved Provincial and government government and Chinese Municipal departments of actors and non- municipal governments Guangzhou governmental government actors
Interaction Target Joint Joint research; Formal and allocation; deliberation of official reports; informal regulation and plan and target; formal and meeting; signing guidance; joint problem- informal visits cooperation official reports; solving driven memorandum signing by tasks or responsibility programme letter; inspection; mobilisation meeting
Role Formal and Coordination Policy and Informal informal and technology incentive; access incentive; collaboration transfer; to best information knowledge practices; city diffusion production; branding; policy capacity evaluation; building mutual learning
Characteris Commanding, Cooperative and Networking for Networking for tics controlling; inertia a future the future guiding; purpose; boost purpose; negotiating information symbolic flow; hierarchical
Source: author
National-led reform - intragovernmental coordination - involvement of nongovernmental actors
Through collected evidence, it is found that the stringent energy conservation targets imposed by the central and provincial government since 2007 were the key
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motivational factor that drove the Guangzhou municipal government to take action.
At the municipal level, the GZDRC and the GZETC were responsible for target delivery at the beginning. However, policy implementation required coordination across different functional departments. Driven by the implementation pressure, the GZDRC and the GZETC sought to collaborate with each other on tasks at the programme level (G-03). For example, they worked together to expand the national programme by identifying local energy-intensive enterprises. To further enhance cooperation and coordination, the GZDRC also set up an energy efficiency leadership group. Similarly, the demanding tasks of building energy efficiency pushed the GZUURC to initiate a building energy efficiency leadership group. Moreover, target fulfilment needed further enhancement in terms of institutional capacity. As an interviewee from a public organisation (Pub-0160) reflected - lack of professionals to understand the current situation was a typical issue at that time.
The target was quite tough for us. […] You need to understand the baseline and then make a work plan based on that. Such type of work requires extensive site visits for data collection and a sound method to do that. […] We worked with the GZDRC and the Guangzhou University to launch a project to survey the energy efficiency level of existing residential buildings using random sampling. For those public organisations, we held several training sessions and asked each organisation to send a delegate to attend. We taught those delegates about how to report their energy consumption patterns and asked them to do so every six months.
Pub-01
In the absence of appropriate capacities to tackle the challenges, functional departments actively sought external links to enhance their capacity and this opened room for non-governmental actors to take part. This, in turn, attracted more experts to invest time and resources in this field. It is found that, while coercive force and regulatory institution played a significant role in policy implementation throughout
60 Pub-01 was a former government official from GZURCC but has been seconded to Office of Building Energy Efficiency and Wall Materials Innovation since 2011 199
the investigated period, policy learning facilitated by these non-governmental actors also played an essential role in solving practical issues in policy making and implementation. Generally speaking, there were more voluntary projects which sought to search for and test best practices in Guangzhou while the municipal leaders endorsed the low carbon development agenda (M-01; SO-01). This implies that central-local relationships can help to overcome bureaucratic inertia and drive collaboration both within and outside government space for policy-making and implementation.
Intragovernmental coordination-involvement of nongovernmental actors-centrally entrusting programmes
The intragovernmental collaboration was based either on a specific task or at the strategic level. In the 12th FYP, Guangzhou Municipal Government started to outline a series of key tasks for low carbon development and then appointed different functional departments to be responsible for these tasks (DOC-12/2013). Specifically, each task was led by one functional department with others being obligated to cooperate. Such task-led reforms provided a platform for intragovernmental cooperation and to some extent increased the legitimacy and flexibility of coordination.
In terms of intragovernmental collaboration at a strategic level, the interactions were usually led by a proactive government leader from one of the functional government departments. The motivation behind his/her actions could be one of the practical needs or political. From a practical perspective, in order to facilitate policy-making and implementation, there was a need to overcome existent functional differentiation to achieve better coordination. Establishing an ad hoc leadership group which involved members from other functional departments was a useful way to enhance cooperation.
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From a political perspective, having a sectoral pilot programme also opened up communication channels with their upper-level government and increased their legitimacy to seek coordination and collaboration with other functional departments
(U/RI-02). In preparing applications for pilot programmes or their subsequent implementation, increased workloads and administrative barriers inevitably emerged; this therefore created more room for non-governmental actors to take part. Moreover, it was important to demonstrate that the applicant had obtained sufficient supports from relevant government departments and non-government actors. Demonstration of the possession of a good multi-actor coordination capability was an important criterion when the national government was reviewing application materials and selecting pilots (U/RI-03). This highlights the way in which the municipal functional departments deployed intragovernmental relationships and non-governmental actors' support to win the national-led pilots or gain upper-level government’s endorsement on bottom-up initiatives. In fact, many of the interaction was driven by a desire to win a national-led sectoral pilot.
Although sectoral pilots are characterised as possessing a high political profile, their implementation and impact were dependent upon the other two governance processes (intragovernmental and intergovernmental interaction). On the positive side, the effort of making different government departments work together under the theme of low carbon development reinforced some existing linkages between departments and created stronger normative positions for carbon reduction. For example, a respondent noted that in his experience, driven by low carbon development, their connections with other departments and external organisations had been notably enhanced (G-03). Therefore, participating in these pilot programmes can contribute to enhancing network stability for low carbon development, as well as providing legitimacy and motivation for government departments to invest resources in such aspects. However, due to the bureaucracy culture, the intragovernmental relationship was also susceptible to the change of
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individual leaders (U/RI-02; Pub-01). That is to say; the cooperation could become symbolic if support from the leader of the functional government was absent.
The strategic action of nongovernmental actors-intragovernmental coordination – local initiatives
Non-governmental actors have advantages in terms of moving inside and outside government flexibly. From the interviews, it was found that the robust policy community cultivated during the 11th and 12th FYPs played an important role in increasing the efficiency of coordination.
There are many experts who are very knowledgeable. But one more important thing is that they are willing to work with each other to find solutions to a particular problem.
Pri-04
And,
There are many activities were organised by non-governmental actors. Similarly, many projects and many ideas were from non-governmental actors. In many initiatives, government only played a supporting role.
G-05
In addition to carrying out networking and capacity building activities, there are projects identified which were initiated by non-government actors. For example, the Ceprei Certification Body (Guangzhou) worked with partners to launch Carbon exchange platform for individual and family initiatives (DOC-F/2013). The Rockefeller
Brothers Foundation joined the GDDRC, the GZDRC and other stakeholders to develop a roadmap for Guangdong’s low carbon transition and provided a series of low carbon suggestions for major cities in Guangdong province (DOC-I/2014). The
World Bank Group (Guangzhou Office) also worked with the Guangzhou
International Wetland Ecological Protection Organisation to initiate the Guangzhou low carbon community initiative. This project was committed to promoting the
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participation of citizens by engaging them into the processiof developing a low carbon community as well as promoting behavioural change (DOC-D/2011). The success of this project was recognised by government officials from Guangdong
Provincial government who encouraged other communities to learn from this project experience (ibid). Another example was the British Consulate (Guangzhou), which facilitated a series of UK-China collaborative research projects61 in the field of low carbon transport, carbon labelling, carbon footprint, and offshore wind farm demonstrations in Guangzhou. Finally, the Switzerland-China Low Carbon Cities
Project which focused on city management, sustainable transport, and low carbon buildings is another city-wide programme that was launched by non-governmental actors.
By far, non-governmental actors have become an important part of the policy community and provide a series of support measures through carrying out scientific research, promoting international collaboration, and disseminating information and best practices. Even the political endorsement from the Guangzhou municipal government was arguably faded away in recent years, there are still proactive actors work with each other to launch initiatives. However, when an initiated programme cannot overcome barriers relating to being scaled-up or trusted, some actors may either change their working direction or leave the project and wait for another opportunity to arise (SO-01; N-04). When this occurs, such programmes will become symbolic. The Nansha low carbon demonstration is one such example. But once suitable resources are available, or a consensus is reached, it is still possible to reactivate these programmes (SO-01).
The three models outlined above can take place simultaneously or can occur at different stages of the governance for low carbon transition. Through these mechanisms Guangzhou strengthened its understanding of low carbon development
61 through the United Kingdom Strategic Programme Fund 203
and enhanced its institutional capability. However, through tracing the continuous of various governance practices, it also revealed that these mechanisms which facilitated the institutionalisation of low carbon development may be hard to sustain.
This is because they are vulnerable to sudden changes of leaders or insufficient resources. It is argued that these mechanisms can be seen as a reference point for evaluating governance effectiveness in the Chinese context.
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter disentangled governance dynamics based on the types of involved actors, and shed light on the governing mechanisms for institutionalising low carbon development. The interviewees’ feedback provided us with some concrete contexts to understand the roles and functions of different governance processes and their influence on each other.
Since the institutional environment for carbon reduction was altered in the 11th FYP period at the national level, a series of changes have been taken place in Guangzhou.
Driven by multiple incentives, including target delivery pressure, seeking reform credentials and enhanced vertical interaction, it is observed that the Guangzhou municipal government has institutionalised responsibilities for low carbon development, as well as setting up dedicated public organisations and absorbed the influence of non-government actors into governance arrangements. Such contextual changes provided opportunities for the policy community to expand, which enhanced the low carbon governance regime. Many non-government actors displayed strategic learning and, as time passed, such learning effects become more apparent. This, in turn, has led to a number of bottom-up initiatives in relation to low carbon development; these would not have been expected to materialise without the pre-existence of a robust policy community. The loose policy community which facilitated information exchange and cooperation also enabled non-government actors to maintain part of their influence even though political endorsement reduced. Overall, it is argued that Guangzhou has become equipped with a certain level of institutional capacity needed to facilitate a low carbon transition.
Non-government actors have become an important source of change by exerting influence on shaping technical standards, framing issues and demonstrating best practices at programme level. Even so, opportunities for these non-governmental actors to participate in the policy process rest with the need for target delivery and
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municipal leaders’ political endorsement. Success in delivering targets, developing policies and initiatives does not imply either a consistent performance or ongoing progress in the future. Though Guangzhou has begun to create an institutional structure for low carbon transition, it is argued that the level of institutionalisation has not yet reached the level necessary to ensure that the institutional structures function as designed. In the next chapter, a detailed review of the evolution of the policy framework and actors' interpretations is presented to substantiate this argument.
Non-government actors have become an important source of change by exerting influence on shaping technical standards, framing issues and demonstrating best practices at programme level. Even so, opportunities for these non-governmental actors to participate in the policy process rest with the need for target delivery and municipal leaders’ political endorsement. Success in delivering targets, developing policies and initiatives does not imply either a consistent performance or ongoing progress in the future. Though Guangzhou has begun to create an institutional structure for low carbon transition, it is argued that the level of institutionalisation has not yet reached the level necessary to ensure that the institutional structures function as designed. In the next chapter, a detailed review of the evolution of the policy framework and actors' interpretations is presented to substantiate this argument.
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CHAPTER 6: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LOW CARBON
DEVELOPMENT IN GUANGZHOU
This chapter focuses on the characteristics of low carbon development in
Guangzhou. Specifically, the characteristics of low carbon development is studied against Guangzhou’s overall GHG emission profile and how it has been changed (Section 6.1); the development of a low carbon policy framework over the period between 2005 and 2017 (Section 6.2); and the extent to which carbon reduction issue was incorporated across different sectoral practices (Section 6.3). Drawing together the policy contents and how the concept of ‘low carbon’ is interpreted and constructed in four domains, namely, industrial carbon reduction, industrial development, building sector, and transport sector, Section 6.4 provides a broad- based clarification of the characteristics of low carbon development in Guangzhou from the lens of path dependence and adaptive efficiency.
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6.1 GUANGZHOU’S GHG EMISSION PROFILE
Given differences in the selection and data scoping methods, there are different versions of Guangzhou’s GHG emission statistics. Although examining the legitimacy and accuracy of these statistics is beyond the scope of this research, reviewing such data provides a broad understanding of the trends and composition of GHG emission in Guangzhou; these facilitate discussion of the characteristics of an ongoing low carbon transition. In this section, the presentation of Guangzhou’s GHG emission profile mainly draws on statistics collated by the Guangzhou Energy Research Institute (Chinese Academy of Sciences) (DOC-N/2017), Guangzhou statistical year book and other government reports (DOC-C/2011; DOC-I/2016).
Guangzhou's total GHG emissions, measured by CO2 equivalent, reached 148 million tons by the end of 201362 (excluding land use change and forestry carbon absorption)
63 (See Table 6-1). Among all kinds of GHG emissions, CO2 is the main source in Guangzhou, accounting for 93% of the total amount. Between 2010 and 2013, total
GHG emissions increased by 10%, average at 3.3% annually. Over the same period, municipal GDP grew at an annual average rate of 11.13% and carbon intensity decreased by 23.93%.
Table 6-1: GHG emission (CO2 equivalent) in Guangzhou (unit: million tons)
CO2 equivalent Increased by
2010 134.55 N/A
2011 140.07 4.12%
62 This is the latest data available which is collected and calculated by the Guangzhou Energy Research Institute (Chinese Academy of Sciences). According to U/RI-07 there was a major change in the Guangzhou energy balance sheet since 2014. Given the new method is not available to them, they cannot update the GHG emission data since 2014 and make them comparable to the previous data set.
63 Including Carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) 208
2012 141.36 0.09%
2013 148.13 4.80%
Source: DOC-N - provided by U/RI-07 from Guangzhou Energy Research Institute (Chinese Academy of Sciences)
Table 6-2 shows that, of all activities that generate GHG, energy-related activities accounted for the largest proportion of emissions (around 90%). Emissions from industrial activities (excluding energy use activities), agricultural activities, and waste management activities accounted for only about 10% of total emissions.
Table 6-2: GHG emissions in various fields between 2010 and 2013 (unit: million tons)
2010 2011 2012 2013 Change rate (2010/2013)
Total emission (CO2 134.55 140.07 141.36 148.13 10.09% equivalent)
Energy activities 123.57 128.50 128.97 135.83 9.92%
Industrial activities 2.53 2.52 2.33 2.06 -18.57%
Agricultural activities 3.99 4.63 4.89 5.02 25.80%
Waste management 4.46 4.42 5.18 5.22 17.04% activities
Source: DOC-N - provided by U/RI-07 from Guangzhou Energy Research Institute (Chinese Academy of Sciences)
Emissions from energy activities in turn mainly came from the use of fossil fuels in four key sectors; the energy industry sector (thermal power generation and heating)
(22%), the industry and construction sectors (29% in combined), and the transport sector (30%). Between 2010 and 2013, the proportion of emissions from the energy sector, industrial and construction sectors declined whilst emissions from transport sector increased year on year (DOC-N/2017).
Across the three economic sectors in Guangzhou, the respective percentage
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contribution of the primary industry, the secondary industry, and the tertiary industry to the local economy were 1.09: 27.97 :70.94 in 201764 (Guangzhou statistics yearbooks, 2018). Looking from an economic sectoral perspective, it is found that the secondary industry is still the most important source of CO2 emissions in Guangzhou, accounting for over 50% of total CO2 emissions from its energy activities by the end of 2013 (DOC-N/2017). As can be seen from Table 6-3, energy consumption ratio across the three economic sectors largely remains unchanged between 2013 and 2017. It can be inferred that by 2017, the secondary industry is still the largest CO2 emitter. However, with the rapid development of tertiary industry, its CO2 emissions have also expected increased year on year (U/RI-07).
Table 6-3: Energy consumption ratio by economic sectors (percentage)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Primary sector 0.78% 0.7% 0.72% 7.2% 0.7%
Secondly sector 47% 45.2% 45.19% 43.65% 45.2%
Tertiary sector 37.88% 38.62% 38.37% 39.51% 38.62%
Source: Guangzhou Statistics Yearbook, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
Within the secondary industry, electricity and coal burning accounted for the largest proportion of energy sources (45% and 23% respectively), followed by the consumption of various types of oil (20%). When it comes to energy consumption, the traditional high energy consuming industries such as steel, cement, paper, petrochemical and textile consumed up to 50% of the total amount used by secondary industry as a whole. On the other hand, in the tertiary industry, building
64 In china, primary industry includes agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; secondary industry includes mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, gas and water, and construction. Tertiary production refers to all other industries not included in primary industry and secondary industry, which includes traffic and transportation, telecommunications, wholesale and retail trade, accommodation and catering trade, financial industry, real estates, education, social security and social welfare, cultural, sports and entertainment industry (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013).
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energy consumption took a 70% share. Together with domestic energy consumption, the building-related energy consumption accounted for about 43% of total energy consumption (DOC-I/2014).
The 12th FYP energy saving and emission reduction report (DOC-I/2016) only took account of CO2 emissions from energy consumption; it reported different and incomparable data from that calculated by the Guangzhou Energy Research Institute. However, it provides a reference for the carbon emissions covering a more recent timescale. According to DOC-I/2016, the total amount of CO2 emissions from energy consumption in Guangzhou has increased by 12.4% from 103.35 million tons in 2010 to 116.05 million tons in 2015. However, carbon intensity was 0.67t/unit GDP, 30.7% lower than the level recorded in 2010. This achievement has exceeded the target of
23% reduction proposed in the Guangzhou Low Carbon City Pilot Implementation Plan of 2012. The decline was mainly driven by year-on-year decreases in coal consumption.
On the other hand, the total electricity consumption in Guangzhou has increased from 635.9 billion kWh in 2010 to 77.932 billion kWh in 2015; an increase of 24.51%. In addition, as shown in Table 6-4, Guangzhou has been increasingly dependent on purchasing electricity generated outside the city. By the end of 2015, purchased electricity represented 68.3% of the total electricity consumption in Guangzhou. According to Guangzhou’s ‘13th FYP for Energy Development’ (2017), Guangzhou aims to improve its self-sufficiency rate of electricity to 45% by the end of 2020. Even if this target is achieved, Guangzhou will still be highly dependent on imported electricity. This implies that the carbon embedment of imported electricity will play a major role in Guangzhou’s carbon profile both in the present and the near future. In this sense, if Guangzhou wishes to further reduce its carbon emissions, it can either choose to buy electricity generated from renewable sources or to further improve its electricity demand side management.
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Table 6-4: Total electricity consumption and purchased electricity (unit: billion kWh)
Total electricity Purchased Purchased consumption electricity electricity (%)
2010 625.9 292.5 46.7
2011 663.5 322.4 48.6
2012 694.1 383.0 55.2
2013 710.7 387.1 54.5
2014 765.8 461.5 60.2
2015 779.3 532.02 68.3
Source: 12th FYP energy saving and emission reduction report (DOC-I/2016)
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6.2 THE LOW CARBON POLICY FRAMEWORK IN GUANGZHOU
Table 6-5 highlights the development trajectory of carbon reduction policies and practices in Guangzhou by listing the key events that have occurred between 2005 and 2017. During this period, three waves of discourses underpinning low carbon development can be identified; ‘response to national target’, ‘win-win solution’ and ‘retreat to a practical approach’, resting on different ‘assumptions and judgements’
(Dryzek, 2005. P.9).
Table 6-5: The trajectory of carbon reduction policies and practices in Guangzhou
Response to the national energy efficiency targets (2005 to 2009)
Target setting
Reduce energy intensity by 20% by the end of the 11th FYP (2010)
Implement 50% energy-saving design standards on newly-built buildings
New energy utilisation65 accounts for 15% of total energy consumption by 2020
The annual output value of new energy industry reaches 400 billion yuan by 2020
Carbon reduction plans, policies, and practices
Promote energy saving in public sectors and establish an energy use reporting system
Promote energy-saving design standards on newly-built buildings
Conduct energy survey on existing public and private buildings and promote energy saving transformation
Issue Guangzhou’s Semiconductor Lighting Industry Development Plan
Establish the Leadership Group for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction
Issue Guangzhou’s New Energy and Renewable Energy Development Plan
Establish an energy efficiency assessment system for fix-asset investment project
65 New energy: renewables, nuclear and natural gas
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The rise of ‘low carbon’ discourse: a greater leadership concern (2010-2015)
Target setting
Reduce energy intensity by 19.5 % by the end of 12th FYP (2015)
Reduce carbon intensity by 19.5% by the end of 12th FYP (2015)
Implement 65% energy-saving design standards on newly-built buildings
New energy accounts for 20% of primary energy by 2020
Achieve forest coverage rate of 42%
Carbon reduction plans, policies, and practices
Issue a guidance on developing a low carbon economy
Listed in the second batch of Energy Saving and New Energy Vehicle Pilot city in 2010
Issue a dedicated 12th FYP for Guangzhou’s Energy Conservation
Issue a dedicated work plan for Guangzhou’s Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction
Establish a Leadership Group for low carbon development
Setting a special fund for Guangzhou’s Energy Saving Projects
Issue Management Measures on Guangzhou Distributed Photovoltaic Power Generation Project
Issue Guangzhou’s Action Plan for Developing New Energy Vehicles
Issue Interim Measures for the Promotion of New Energy Vehicles in Guangzhou
Issue Guangzhou’s Green Building and Building Energy Conservation Regulations
Issue a Three-year Action Plan for Building Green Public Institutions in Guangzhou City
Listed in the second batch of low carbon public transport pilot city in 2012
Listed in the second batch of national low carbon pilot city in 2013
Introduce a carbon trading scheme in 2013
Compile a GHG inventory at city scale between 2010 and 2013
Establish a GHG verification and reporting system for key energy users
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Retreat from a proactive position (2016 onward)
Target setting
Reduce energy intensity by 19.3% by the end of 13th FYP (2020)
Reduce carbon intensity by 23% by the end of 13th FYP (2020)
Implement green building planning and design standard on at least 40% of all newly-built building by 2020
Implement 7 million square meters energy saving transformation in existing buildings
Improve energy consumption in public institutions by 10% (based on construction area)
Carbon reduction plans, policies, and practices
Issue a dedicated 13th FYP for Guangzhou’s Energy Conservation and Carbon Reduction
Issue an Energy Management Measures for Public Organisations in Guangzhou
Issue a work plan for Guangzhou’s New Energy Automobile Industry
Issue a Plan for Building a Green Financial Reform and Innovation Pilot Area in Guangzhou
Establish a Voluntary-Based Carbon Saving Programme
Listed in the green finance reform pilot
Source: author
Response to the national targets (2005 to 2009)
Of the 11th FYP documents, the specific tasks to enable attainment of the energy saving and carbon reduction targets were found throughout the 11th FYP for
Environmental Protection in Guangzhou City (2007)66 and the 11th FYP for Energy
Development in Guangzhou City67 (2007). Key approaches summarised from these plans include:
1) facilitating technology adoption - promoting energy saving technologies in the industry and building sectors;
2) optimising energy supply structure - increasing energy supply from natural gas and renewable sources, as well as phasing out small coal-fired power
66广州市环境保护 “十一五”专项规划 67 广州市能源发展“十一五”专项规划 215
plants below 100,000 kW by 2010;
3) adjusting industrial structures - upgrading the secondary sector, stimulating the development of the tertiary sector and phasing out outdated industrial capacity; and
4) educating the public – enhancing energy saving awareness and promoting behavioural change.
However, these approaches are not new as similar statements can be found in the
10th FYP. Moreover, whilst the importance of energy conservation was recognised in these sectoral plans, it was subject to other policy issues such as energy supply capacity, energy consumption structure, circular economy, and clean production.68
Indeed, several interviewees (U/RI-01; M-01; Pri-02) reported that, influenced by economic-oriented thinking, Guangzhou municipal policymakers had not paid much attention to the energy-intensive target prior to 2007. Despite energy conservation having risen up the national political agenda since 2004, it remains one of many competing targets in Guangzhou.
As mention in Section 5.2, the year 2007 was a turning point for Guangzhou’s low carbon transition. To tackle the increased pressure that it faced from the upper-level government, an ad hoc leadership group led by the GZDRC was established and a series of administrative measures were adopted. This formally marked the start of the low carbon agenda in Guangzhou. Subsequently, Guangzhou municipal government issued the ‘Guangzhou Energy Conservation Implementation Plan’
(2008)69 and the ‘Action Plan for shutting down small thermal power plant’ (2008).70 In the ‘Guangzhou Energy Conservation Implementation Plan’ (2008), energy efficiency target was further divided to district and sectoral level. Other key approaches included implementing differential electricity prices for energy-intensive industries, and mandating the adoption of energy efficient technologies of energy-
68 The importance of tasks can be identified based on their sequence presented in the plan (G-02) 69 广州市节能工作实施方案 70 广州市小火电机组关停方案 (2008) 216
intensive enterprises.
During this period, subsidies for energy efficiency programmes and technology adoption were mainly provided by national government. Guangdong Provincial
Government also set aside a specific fund for to improve key energy users’ energy efficiency (G-01; G-03). The municipal level subsidies only formed a small part; but these have also been implemented at a larger scale since 2007. Guangzhou first implemented 0.61 million RMB subsidies for the adoption of energy efficiency technologies in 2006. In 2007 and 2008, the amount was raised to 11.3 million and
21.4 million RMB respectively. In 2009, a special fund of 20 million was allocated to energy conservation (distribute on a yearly basis); this accounted for 0.09% of fiscal revenue (DOC-12/2013).71 However, such a proportion is relatively small when compared with other cities in Guangdong Province (i.e. Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Foshan) (Pub-02).
During the latter stage of the 11th FYP (since 2008), Guangzhou municipal government began to view low carbon technologies as part of its industrial strategy and published dedicated industry plans to support new energy and renewable energy industry in 200872 and the semiconductor lighting industry in 2009.73 In these plans, Guangzhou prioritised and supported the development of a series of low carbon technologies including semiconductor lighting, solar photovoltaic, heat pump, hydropower, wind power, biomass, and alternative energy sources for transport.
Three high-ended manufacturing sectors, namely, nuclear power equipment, new energy automobile, and renewable energy equipment, were prioritised with their output value targets set, for the end of 2020, at 90 billion, 240 billion, and 50 billion
71 According to G-01, most of the subsidies are from the national and provincial government. Municipal government is responsible for facilitating key energy users to apply and (in some cases) supervise the use of the subsidies.
72 Guangzhou New Energy and Renewable Energy Development Plan 广州市新能源和可再生能源发展规划
(2008-2020) 73Guangzhou Semiconductor Lighting Industry Development Plan 广州市半导体照明产业发展规划（2010-2020） 217
respectively (DOC-03/2008). In these industrial development plans, an attempt was made to promote a link between energy policy, industrial development, and environmental protection. For example, the promotion of the semiconductor lighting and new energy industries was viewed as an important means by which to address multiple policy issues including energy conservation, energy supply, industry competitiveness and air pollution.
During the 11th FYP, Guangzhou’s total energy consumption grew at an average rate of 8.4% per annum. By the end of 2010, an energy intensity reduction rate of 20.34% was achieved. This exceeded the national stipulated target and was mainly achieved by phasing out unproductive capacity, adjusting industrial structures, and implementing key energy saving projects and programmes targeting energy intensive enterprises (DOC-C/2011). Specifically, Guangzhou shut down 23 small thermal power projects and 91 outdated cement production enterprises. These measures, cumulatively, eliminated 14.25amillionatonsiof unproductive capacity of the cement industry and approximately 57.5 million metres of outdated production capacity in the dyeing industry. Guangzhou also eliminated small coal-fired boilers in 1,139 enterprises. The total output value of the six most energy-intensity industries74 dropped from 29.75 to 27.20%. The total energy consumption from the industrial sector dropped by 10.2%; this is equivalent to 49.9% of total energy consumption (DOC-12/2013).
The rise of ‘low carbon’ discourse: a greater leadership concern (2010-2015)
As illustrated in the industrial development plans, Guangzhou has started to promote links between energy policy and industrial development since 2008. This framing has been applied with greater intensity since 2010 – as evidenced by the adoption of the
74 The six most energy-intensity industries are: Chemical raw materials and chemical products manufacturing; non-metallic mineral products industry; ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry; non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry; petroleum processing coking and nuclear fuel processing industry; power heating production and supply industry
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‘low carbon economy/development’75 concept in municipal policy discourses. The term ‘Low carbon economy’ first shown in the ‘Opinions on Developing a Low Carbon Economy in Guangzhou (2011-2015)’ policy document (2010).76 As described in the policy document, a low carbon economy indicates
An internationally recognised new economic growth pattern that addresses climate change and promotes sustainable development, characterised by low energy consumption, low emissions, low pollution, and high efficiency.
This policy further emphasis on the importance of improving energy conservation, optimising energy structures, and promoting renewable energy. Apart from these, other specific tasks listed in this policy document reflected many of the government’s concerns relating to wider political-economic issues, such as industrial structure upgrading, urban mobility and technological innovation. It explicitly stated that economic growth could be achieved by investing in low carbon technologies and cultivating low carbon industries. At the same time, ‘low carbon development’ also represented a potential opportunity to improve the urban built environment, mobility and the city’s image.
In this sense, the concept ‘low carbon economy’ suggests that ‘carbon reduction’ can be seen as an issue that is beyond being a solely administrative task (in the energy and environmental policy domain) imposed by the national government; it may also yield a series of co-benefits. This framing of carbon reduction as a ‘win-win’ situation created space for Guangzhou to take a proactive entrepreneurial position to deal with carbon reduction. These positives may, in turn, attract more inward investment as well as improving quality of life. However, this policy neither specifies any quantitative targets nor explains how exactly a low carbon economy could be achieved. Nevertheless, this was the first policy that set up a city-wide framework for
75 The term ‘low carbon economy' and ‘low carbon development' was used interchangeably.
76关于大力发展低碳经济的指导意见（2011-2015） 219
carbon reduction.
2010 was the year in which a period of fast policy development began. In addition to the rising importance of carbon reduction at both national and international levels, a number of factors were fundamental to the development of low carbon policies. For example, the timing of the introduction of the ‘low carbon development’ concept was related to the municipal leadership’s desire to enhance the city’s image. Therefore, such initiative was strongly endorsed and supported by the then party secretary Wan Qingliang (M-01; N-03; N-04; U/RI-03; U/RI-08).
Subsequent to ‘Opinions on Developing a Low Carbon Economy in Guangzhou (2011- 2015)’, the 12th FYP (spanning from 2011 to 2015) further developed the policy framework for carbon reduction in a number of areas. To begin with, a dedicated 12th
FYP for Energy Conservation77 and a cross-sectoral implementation work plan called Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction for 12th FYP78 were issued, which marked a significant step in institutionalising carbon reduction issue in
Guangzhou. The Work Plan of Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction for the
12th FYP identified 55 tasks around 12 key themes79 of energy conservation and emission reduction, and then relevant functional departments were appointed to work on each of these tasks. Guangzhou also strengthened its financial support by increasing the subsidies from 20 million to 70 million RMB per year (DOC-I/2016). 80 Meanwhile, many other policies and programmes were introduced during this period
77广州市十二五节能规划
78广州市十二五节能减排工作方案
79 These themes are 1) Strengthen the responsibility for energy saving and emission reduction goal fulfilment; 2) optimise industrial structure; 3) adjust structure of energy supply; 4) develop low carbon industry; 5) Strengthen industrial energy efficiency and carbon reduction; 6) Strengthen energy efficiency and carbon reduction in urban construction; 7) Strengthen energy efficiency and carbon reduction in transport sector; 8) Promote energy efficiency and carbon reduction in rural area and agriculture sector; 9) Promote energy efficiency and carbon reduction in public institution; 10) Promote circular economy; 11) Improve inspection and incentive mechanisms; 12) Promote energy efficiency and carbon reduction among citizens in everyday life. 80 60 million for energy saving and carbon reduction projects and 10 million for low carbon industry development
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(see Table 6-5). Particularly, in 2013, Guangzhou’s implementation plan for developing a low carbon city was officially approved by the State Council, which means that Guangzhou was officially selected in the second batch of national low carbon pilot cities.
During the 12th FYP, policies and practices related to carbon mitigation, which had previously been dispersed across sectors and different government departments, were gradually integrated into a unified framework. The policy framework also grew in terms of detail covering different sectors. Meanwhile, this period witnessed an increased emphasis on the role of private capital and the market in supporting low carbon technology adoption and a wide range of demonstration projects (DOC-
E/2012; DOC-13/2013). One government official interviewee from the GZDRC (G-01) commented that the market is more efficient in mobilising resources and that it has been generally accepted within government that the cost of carbon reduction should be borne by the market rather than by government from a long-term perspective.
At the end of 12th FYP, Guangzhou again outperformed the binding targets by cutting
21.01% of energy intensive and 30.7% carbon intensity from 2010. Looking at how this target was achieved, it is found that the reduction of energy and carbon intensity was still mainly driven by a government administrative approach that focused on the secondary industry, including shutting down or relocating of 314 energy intensive enterprises, improving energy efficiency and reducing the proportion of coal consumption from 32.4% in 2010 to 19.8% in 2015 (DOC-22/2017).
Retreat from a proactive position (2016 onward)
Looking at the policy documents, energy savings and carbon reduction continued to form an important part in the 13th FYP (2016 - 2020). Following the 12th FYP, the ‘13th FYP for Energy Efficiency and Carbon Reduction’81 retained a broad focus on issues
81 广州十三五节能降碳专项规划
221
related to carbon reduction. For example, technological adaptions in industrial, building and transport sectors and industrial structural adjustment remained as constant solutions throughout the plan (DOC-22/2017). Compared with the 12th FYP, which maintained a strong rhetoric surrounding the need to reduce carbon emissions from the industrial and energy sectors, the 13th FYP placed an increasing emphasis on the transport and building sectors. This is consistent with Guangzhou’s carbon emission profile (as indicated in Section 6.1), which is expected to be increasingly dominated by transport and building sectors. Meanwhile, more specific targets in the form of both binding and guiding targets for 2020 were found. For example, the binding targets included a rate of 19.3% for reduction in energy intensiveness and a rate of 23% for reduction of carbon intensity. Other guiding targets included, reaching the ‘peak point’ of total carbon emissions by 2020, making public transport account for 65% of the central city travel, and reaching a sales target of new energy vehicles of 120,000. A quote from a government official interviewee (G-01) suggested that such targets indicated Guangzhou’s determination to continue to display leadership in promoting low carbon transition:
The demand for energy will continue to grow in the 13th FYP period. But (Guangzhou’s) energy and carbon target in the 13th FYP is ambitious and challenging. This places much pressure to both the government and energy users. We hope these targets can provide a strong signal to the market and form a push mechanism for the transition.
G-01
Despite the policy document and government officials’ responses suggesting that the
13th FYP period would continue to see high-level government-led activities with political salience for energy efficiency and carbon mitigation, several other interviewees expressed different views. These dissenting voices suggest that political commitments to acting as a first mover on low carbon development had decreased at the municipal level.
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The momentum (for a low carbon development) becomes smaller. […] Between 2011 and 2013 the municipal leaders were happy if we have any new ideas. During that time, we have organised quite a few study groups to travel internationally to learn about latest development in terms of low carbon planning and technologies. […] Things will become much easier if you can get support from the governments leaders. But now it is different.
U/RI-03
Similarly, another interviewee from the British Consulate Guangzhou (M-01) challenged Guangzhou’s support and determination to provide a strong regulatory framework to drive the low carbon transition.
The 13th FYP does not include a specific roadmap showing how Guangzhou would peak its emission. […] Carbon reduction is still measured in a relative term using carbon intensity. We haven’t seen a target set for an absolute amount of emission reduction. […] I think if you want to provide a clear single, these targets are essential.
M-01
It is also noted that an interviewee from a local university held the view that ‘low carbon’ is an outdated concept and that the number of publications under this term is decreasing.
It is an outdated concept. People used to talk a lot about low carbon development or low carbon economy. But now we do not use this term anymore. [...] If you look at the number of publications, you will find that ‘low carbon’ is no longer a ‘hot word’. People invent different concepts, but they don’t actually mean very different things.
U/RI-08
His claim is underpinned by the volume of research articles found in CNKI82 under the keyword of ‘low carbon’ in Chinese publications. As can be seen from Table 6-6, the research articles with the keyword ‘low carbon’ witnessed a dramatic growth
82 中国知网 223
from 2009 to 2010 but has decreased gradually thereafter.
Table 6-6: Numbers of Chinese research articles under the keywords ‘low carbon’
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 201783
Quantity 944 1338 4312 25766 17843 13722 13476 12219 11598 10718 6765
Source: http://kns.cnki.net/kns/brief/default_result.aspx
Interestingly, a private sector interviewee Pri-01 mentioned that Guangzhou lacked a leading figure to shape the low carbon agenda and that the government also lacked determination to resolve some structural issues.
Guangzhou does not have a leading organisation or a person to drive this agenda forward. […] It does not have to be government organisation or government officials. In Beijing and Shanghai, you will find many market actors and academics are very proactive. I think Guangzhou is losing its talents in this area. […] Government support is sometimes superficial. For example, the GZDRC once organised a meeting and asked the participants what do they need and called for policy suggestions. But there is no much follow-up. No one knows what happen after that.
Pri-01
In terms of funding, Guangzhou does not indicate the amount of money which it will allocate to the area of energy saving and carbon reduction either in the 13th FYP or in the policy document Guangzhou Municipal Energy Conservation Special Fund
Management Measures84. Meanwhile, there is an increasing preference in cultivating the market as a supporting mechanism for carbon reduction. The 13th FYP for Energy Efficiency and Carbon Reduction indicated that ‘to make the market play a key role in promoting energy efficiency and carbon reduction’. The trend of market-based solutions was further strengthened by the issuing of the ‘Plan for Establishing a
83 Data up to 19 August 2017
84 广州市节能专项资金管理办法 224
Green Financial Reform and Innovation Pilot Area’ 85 in 2016. This document indicated that Guangzhou had been increasingly focusing on using the market to stimulate its development of green sectors. With intense trading and commercial activities, Guangzhou has always been more oriented to market tools (Xu and Yeh,
2003). While a government official G-01 claimed that Guangzhou’s municipal governments had provided a series of strategies to embrace private investment to enter the energy service market, he did not explain the detailed responsibilities shared by the government and the market and how such a change might affect the speed of low carbon transition. Moreover, as the conversation went on, he admitted that government expenditure was vital in securing the transition at this stage and that the scale of private capital was far from enough to bring significant impacts.
Another government official (G-03) from the GZIITB expressed similar views and emphasised that without enough subsidies, the functional department’s power was very limited in making impacts.
In summary, most of the municipal institutional practices in Guangzhou began in
2007. Since 2010, carbon reduction has risen further up the political agenda and the concept of ‘low carbon economy’ was introduced as a strategic tool aiming at connecting carbon reduction with a series of wider policy issues. However, since the mayor Wan Qingliang was arrested for corruption in 2014, the level of support from the new leadership team has not been as strong as it was in the past. The retreat from a proactive positive could not be clearly identified by reading the policy content, as the 13th FYP still displays a series of stricter targets. However, interview data reveals that, such a level of policy signal and government leaders’ attitudes reflected in interactive and procedural terms do not form a facilitative environmental for more progressive actions. This may pose a challenging context for a more transformative bottom-up development for low carbon transition.
85 广州市绿色金融与改革创新试验区实施方案
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6.3 LOW CARBON POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF DIFFERENT SECTORS
Having presented the characteristics of municipal low carbon policy framework as a whole, this section moves on to consider the extent to which concerns for carbon reduction were reflected in sectoral practices. Low carbon transition is not limited to change in one socio-technical system but involves changes in various sectors
(Turnheim et al., 2015). Therefore, governance and policy responses are needed to be cross-sectoral. As mentioned above, the low carbon discourse began to frequently interact with sectoral policies driven by the opportunities brought by the introduction of ‘win-win’ discourse in 2010. Through examining relevant sectoral policies combined with actors’ apprehension and visions, this section reveals the intentions behind, and meanings of, the term ‘low carbon development’ that developed within these different sectors.
Industrial carbon reduction
Based on the latest urban carbon profile, the carbon emissions generated by the industrial activities (including energy industry) still accounted for over 50% of Guangzhou’s total carbon emissions (DOC-N/2017). Aligned with this data,
Guangzhou has maintained a strong rhetoric surrounding the need to reduce carbon emissions from the industrial sector during the investigated period. The main approaches adopted towards decarbonising the industrial sector consist of promoting low carbon technologies, building low carbon industrial parks, phasing out backward equipment, and shutting down and relocating energy intensity enterprises
(DOC-09/2012; DOC-22/2017). In addition, many targeted actions on three key areas were carried out (G-03). The three key areas are: energy-intensive industries
(cement, glass, paper, textiles, iron and steel, petrochemicals, and non-ferrous
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metals), key energy users (enterprises with annual energy consumption over 5,000 tons) and new projects. Interviewee U/RI-02 explained the rationale and the importance of these focuses:
We pay a lot attention to the key energy industries and users. These energy-intensive industries consume around 70% of the energy from the secondary industry but only contribute to about 30% of the output value. So, commanding key energy industries and users to improve energy efficiency is the most efficient way to achieve the target. […] The progress has been quite well, but there is still a gap between their performance and the international standards.
U/RI-02
So far, 26 energy-intensive enterprises in Guangzhou86 have been included in the
China Emission Exchange (Guangzhou). 87 The Guangzhou Energy Conservation
Supervision Centre also traced the energy performances of enterprises whose emissions are over 5,000 tons of standard coal per annum. Some district level governments (e.g. Luogang and Tianhe Districts) also established their own energy centres to monitor enterprises with emission levels over 1,000 tons of standard coal within their judiciary. In addition to this, Guangzhou adopted a series of ‘soft approaches’ such as implementing an ‘energy efficiency forerunner’ system by publishing energy efficiency benchmarks for key industries as well as providing carbon management training for enterprises with annual GHG emissions over 13,000 tons of CO2 equivalent (DOC-E/2012). In terms of non-energy-intensive industries, interviewee Pub-03 said that their focus has been on enforcing and exerting higher energy efficiency standards for new projects as these industries are expected to grow.
However, while much attention has been paid to key energy users, small-sized
86 Six industries (electricity, cement, steel, petrochemicals, paper, and civil aviation) with carbon emission over 20,000 tons annual (or annual comprehensive energy consumption of 10,000 tons of standard coal) will be incorporated into the China Emission Exchange in Guangdong.
87 广州碳排放权交易所 227
enterprises88 were found to have been overlooked by both government and market actors. Generally speaking, small-sized enterprises lack interest and resources to take part in energy-saving projects.
SMEs cannot afford high upfront cost. […] Usually, ESCOs are generally reluctant to carry out energy-saving projects with long payback periods […] To be honest, without government regulation, factory owners or managers rarely have an interest or take initiative in energy efficiency projects. If they are not required to do so and being told that there will be a punishment if they do not do so, they will never take it seriously. There is a lack of internal motivation for energy saving investment. [...] We need a better promotion and incentive mechanism to engage both ESCOs and energy users.
SO-01
Based on a public-sector interviewee’s comment (Pub-03), this situation could be attributed to the government not paying sufficient attention to this issue and failing to provide resources to support decarbonising small-sized enterprises.
There are a large number of SMEs. It is time-consuming and difficult to carry out site-visit of these companies. Obviously, we do not have such resources. […] Even for large enterprise, government’s funding is sometimes not in place. In the near future, I don’t think government will dramatically increase spending in this respect.
Pub-03
In a follow-up contact with government official G-03, she blamed the poorer engagement with small enterprises on a lack of awareness and suggested that it was an ‘implementation issue.'
88 China defines SMEs more broadly than the rest of the world. For industrial enterprises, the medium-sized enterprises in China are those with 300-1000 employees, and with the annual turnover of £2m to £40m. Small- sized enterprises are those with 20-300 employees, and with an annual turnover of £300,000 to £2m. Enterprises who do not meet either of the above criteria are defined as micro-sized enterprises. During the fieldwork, it is found that some interviewees’ do not clear about the definition of SMEs. While they refer to SMEs, sometimes they indicate small-sized enterprises. Given the broad classification in China, many medium-sized enterprises are very energy-intensive. 228
Small-sized enterprises do not pay enough attention to energy saving issues. Some companies' energy saving enthusiasm were defeated by the difficulty in obtaining energy efficiency financing. As a result, many potential projects cannot be fulfilled. […] Many preferential policies issued by the provincial and municipal government fail to reach SMEs. That is why progress has been slowed.
G-03
However, comments from a private sector interviewee Pri-03 suggested that
Guangzhou municipal government does not have any preferential energy efficiency policies that specifically target small-sized enterprises. My later policy search also confirmed Pri-03’s comment. The only available energy-saving incentive was the energy saving fund, which can be accessed by any enterprises of any size.
Furthermore, the energy saving fund was in the form of awards that could only be received after a project has been completed – this approach, therefore, did not help to relieve financial burdens that could arise prior to the commencement of a given project. Pri-03 also expressed concerns that the current system of funding and incentives was too complicated, making factory owners think that it was not worth taking additional efforts to seek such funding. In general, small-sized enterprises were either reluctant to take initiatives or could not afford to pay upfront costs, unless they were pressured to do so or obtained support from international companies through supply chains; neither is a common occurrence (Pri-01).
Given the amount and diversity of smaller size enterprises, the market actors are assumed to play a more important role in targeting smaller size enterprises. However, the market actors such as financial institutions and energy service companies (ESCOs) 89 do not show enough interest in targeting smaller scale
89 ESCOs are commercial or non-profit business providing a broad range of energy solutions. They usually also provide financing methods for their clients to help them cover or greatly reduce the upfront costs. To explain, ESCOs are responsible for conducting site evaluation, providing a design plan, installing energy-saving technologies and maintaining facilities. After installation, the clients will be benefited from energy-saving and hence cost-saving. The clients are then required to pay a fee (lower or equal to the amount of cost-saving) to ESCOs for a certain period, so ESCOs can pay back their capital investment. 229
enterprises as potential targets because the risk is considered to be too high (SO-02;
Pri-02). Furthermore, the lack of mutual trust between ESCOs, financial institutions and manufacturing enterprises was a key barrier which prevented ESCOs from realising their potential. Firstly, it is difficult to avoid or mitigate credit risks. For example, some enterprises may refuse to perform a three-year contract after one or two years or they may go bankrupt before the contract is due (SO-02). Secondly, energy-intensive industries are also considered by financial institutions to be ‘high risk’ in terms of investment as a consequence of overcapacity concerns (Pri-01).
Therefore, it is challenging to get funding from financial institutions for such projects. Only state-owned ESCOs or those which have years of experience and good relationships with banks are able to access sufficient funding and bear the risks of running projects with small-sized enterprises.
Now after years of development, we have a good channel for finance. It is not difficult for us to secure loans for good projects, but it is tough at the beginning. I think having banks backing up is essential to start energy- saving service companies. If capital turnover is slow, it cannot carry out any projects.
Pri-03
In addition, as pointed out by a private sector interviewee Pri-06, a lack of trust and awareness can lead to unnecessary disputes and project postponement.
There was an energy-saving project that can achieve annual economic benefits of up to 5 million yuan. However, during the negotiation process, the factory owners wanted to cut the upfront payment of 500,000 Yuan. It took a year to settle this dispute, during which the factory owners lost money.
Pri-06
For a number of years there has been a strong call for establishing a risk sharing scheme between government, ESCOs and financial institutions (Pri-01; Pri-02).
Although ESCOs and some industrial associations have been lobbying government to
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take a lead in establishing a mechanism to pool risks between participating agencies, they cannot make themselves heard (Pri-02).
If we do not have a thorough understanding of the status quo of potential clients, we often choose to avoid risks. […] I think if a pool of safeguard funds can be established through cooperation between governments, energy-using enterprises and energy-saving service companies, mutual trust between energy-use companies and energy-saving service companies can be greatly enhanced.
Pri-02
When this issue was referred to the government official G-03 in a follow-up conversation, she commented that the Guangzhou government had taken such a proposal (establishing a risk sharing scheme) into consideration but was still looking for a proper way to do it. Based on this response, it may be argued that the government has yet to take effective action to fix the defects that exist in this aspect.
According to a local university interviewee U/RI-05, the current low demand of low carbon technologies and services among small-sized enterprises is such that the market size is unlikely to expand very quickly in the absence of active government involvement and investment. Based on this, it is argued that Guangzhou’s municipal policies and policymakers have paid much attention to cost-effective and do not want to derail economic efficiency in the pursuit of decarbonising its industries. As a consequence of the relatively low level of initiative on the part of financial institutions, Guangzhou has faced challenges in raising enough private capital to fasten carbon reduction among small-sized enterprises. In this sense, it could be suggested that the government’s normative role which assumed in the transition management framework, does not properly reflect in practices.
Developing low carbon industries
The development of low carbon industries was proposed as a core approach in Guangzhou’s low carbon development framework. As stated in the ‘Opinions on
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Developing a Low Carbon Economy in Guangzhou (2011-2015)’, low carbon industries were defined as ‘industries with high-tech elements and/or low resource consumption' and were seen as a potential new economic growth point. Taking a closer look, key aspects of developing low carbon industries included prioritising a wide range of industries including, finance, tourism, exhibition, logistics, biomedicine, high-end electronic information manufacturing, new energy automobile, software and information services, design, education, sports, healthcare, and green agriculture. In this sense, Guangzhou municipal government’s classification of ‘low carbon industry’ did not make a distinction between sectors which were directly related to carbon reductions (e.g., energy-saving / low carbon technologies and services), and those high-ended manufacturing and tertiary sectors. The finance, exhibition, logistics, education, sports, and healthcare sectors have not been mentioned in the national policies of low carbon industry, despite e- commerce and creative industries were found included in the plans of some other low carbon pilot cities (Khanna et al., 2014).
The framing of low carbon industries in this way is arguably flawed because it virtually covered the entirety of the tertiary industry. This enabled the establishment of a linkage between low carbon development and the established goal of economic restructuring. In this regard, the classification of ‘low carbon industries’ was allied to the pre-existing industry upgrading strategy which had been established as early as in 2005. However, as far as I am concerned, developing tertiary industry is in essence different from developing low carbon industries. Without treating these two terms in a discriminatory way, preferential policies and resources in the name of ‘low carbon industries’ were able to be used on wider political-economic objectives rather than benefit low carbon sectors in narrow sense (energy-saving / low carbon technologies and services). In other words, the broad classification of low carbon industries allowed Guangzhou to show its determination on low carbon development but at the same time carry on driving the development of the tertiary sector, which had been
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promoted in Guangzhou since the early 2000s.
In terms of government expenditure, the Guangzhou municipal government prioritised different industries and provided support mostly in accordance to their economic importance. A government interviewee (G-03) suggested that government expenditure was mainly distributed based on the importance of the industry which was, in turn, measured by its potential economic contribution and added value over the next five to ten years. Interviewee G-3’s response implied that the municipal government does not pay much attention to carbon embedment in industrial planning. Even so, when it comes to the most important industries in Guangzhou (i.e. information technology, equipment manufacturing, biology and health industry, renewables and energy saving technologies, logistics, finance and insurance, new materials, fashion creativity and automobile manufacturing), it is found that low carbon technologies were incorporated. Moreover, in the 13th FYP, Guangzhou has also set aside a total of 1.2 billion RMB per annum for five consecutive years to facilitate the development of strategic emerging industries (DOC-22/2017). Strategic emerging industries include: biology and health industry; new materials; high-end manufacturing; fashion creativity; renewables and energy saving technology; new energy vehicles; and information technology. The selection of strategic emerging industries and their corresponding financial support suggested that Guangzhou does pay attention to the development of low carbon technologies. When I discussed this situation in an interview from a local university (U/RI-06), he commented:
The priority is economic development and core competitiveness. If a low carbon economy cannot feed people, why do we need it? Automobile manufacturing has always been an important industry for Guangzhou. Developing new energy vehicle is a strategy attached to it. If you can find out how money is distributed to different strategic emerging industries, or how the money is used by car manufacturers, the result may be interesting. […] I bet you know why other countries don’t like China’s industrial policies. […] This also apply to situations within a country. Guangzhou’s government subsidy in the car manufacturing industry has a potential to
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make it outcompetes its counterparts in other areas. Yes, new energy vehicles are important, but there are more reasons to it than that. […] The contribution rate of the tertiary industries to economic growth is high and it is low carbon as well as provide job opportunities. So, developing tertiary industries fits Guangzhou’s situation well.
U/RI-06
The response of U/RI-06 suggested that there is more a political-economic consideration behind the selection of strategic emerging industries. His answer, which set out from an economic perspective, also to some extent explained why
Guangzhou did not provide additional targeted support to low carbon services among all tertiary industries.
Likewise, from the angle of innovation policy, the Guangzhou municipal government fell behind its peer cities in general. Specifically, in 2016, government expenditure on research development accounted for 2.48% of total GDP (Guangzhou Statistics Year Book 2017). Although it has reached the minimum standard for a national innovative city, there remained a relatively big gap in terms of expenditure when compared to peer cities such as Beijing (5.79%), Shanghai (3.16%) and Shenzhen (3.81%). Informed by a private sector interviewee (Pri-03), Guangzhou’s technology policies or subsidies have been targeting those most financially rewarding technologies, without giving priority to low carbon ones. Under the technological innovation policy framework, low carbon technologies have to compete for government support with other technologies (Pri-03). In seeking government financial support, low carbon enterprises did not receive any preferential treatment but were required to demonstrate their potential as well as the contribution that they made to the local economy (U/RI-04). In this sense, it is argued that low carbon enterprises’ potential role as the main source of increasing niche diversity have not been well exploited.
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Low carbon building
The building stock in Guangzhou continued to grow at a rate of 6% to 7.5% per year between 2010 and 2015 (DOC-24/2018). By the end of 2015, the total building area in Guangzhou was 481.85 million square metres, with residential buildings accounting for 51.8% (249.22 million square meters) (DOC-I/2016). As mentioned in
Section 6.1, the building sector takes up more than 40% of total energy consumption in Guangzhou. Considering Guangzhou’s population and economic volume, residential and commercial buildings in Guangzhou are expected to grow continuously in the short to medium term (DOC-15/2014).
Guangzhou started to target building energy efficiency in 2001. Since 2006,
Guangzhou has started to establish a monitoring system for public buildings by requiring regular reports on energy consumption from all government buildings and large public buildings (DOC-08/2011). Through collecting energy consumption data, the GZURCC is able to identify buildings with lower energy efficiency performances and set up targeted support for renovation. Such a monitoring system provided a foundation which enabled Guangzhou to achieve significant results in improving public buildings’ energy efficiency by the end of 11th FYP (DOC-08/2011).
According to U/RI-02 and Pub-01, during the 11th FYP period, a soar in the number of demonstration projects with support from international funding and organisations was seen. The existence of demonstration projects and their performance provided policymakers with some confidence to roll out a green building standard citywide
(U/RI-02). In 2012, 2013 and 2014, Guangzhou successively issued the ‘Notice on accelerating the development of green buildings’ (2012), 90 ‘Guangzhou Green Building and Building Energy Conservation Regulations’ (2013) 91 and ‘Guangzhou
90关于加快发展绿色建筑发展的通告 91广州市绿色建筑和建筑节能管理规定 235
Green Building Action Implementation Plan’ (2014) 92 to tighten up the regulatory framework for the city’s building sector. During the 12th FYP period, 176 green building certificates were issued, with a construction area of approximately 17.46 million square metres. Over the same period, the GZURCC also implemented energy audits of 101 public buildings and monitored their energy consumption data in real time. In terms of existing public building stock renovation, 2.5 million square metres were completed over the same period (DOC-L/2017).
When asked what aspects, and approaches, of these policies have had the most significant impact on architects and developers, a public sector interviewee Pub-01 and a private sector interviewee Pri-06 both remarked to me that two approaches, namely, 1) incorporating the low carbon consideration throughout the construction process; and 2) making low carbon practices indicators in the bidding process, were most innovative parts of the regulatory framework. Specifically, Guangzhou municipal government has established a planning and implementation mechanism for newly built buildings, which integrated energy efficiency inspection into the examination that is carried out when a project reaches completion. This was the first municipal regulation to integrate ‘green’ indicators and requirements throughout the entire process of project construction, 93 and extended the implementation of building energy efficiency towards the earliest stages of planning (DOC-14/2013). With regard to bidding processes, Guangzhou has made green building practices a bonus point within the enterprise integrity comprehensive evaluation system. This evaluation has a direct impact on bidding and tendering outcomes. These efforts have drawn increasing attention from architects and developers. As recalled by a public-sector interviewee (Pub-01):
These policies encourage commercial developer, architects and ESCOs to
92 广州市绿色建筑行动实施方案 93 There are eight phases of the project construction process: project establishment, land use application, land use approval, energy conservation design, construction management, construction process supervision, acceptance check, and operation management. 236
pay attention to this aspect. They started to actively search for successful cases, focusing on those demonstration projects in Guangdong province.
Pub-01
According to the same interviewee (Pub-01), in coming years, architectural green building practices are likely to move from the demonstration phase to an actual operational phase. Despite growing interest from architects and developers in green buildings, another interviewee from the university (U/RI-08) considered that high costs would continue to be a significant barrier to future expansion and uptake.
Still, many commercial developers are not taking green building seriously or being indifferent to such certification. Although there are many real estate projects called themselves low-carbon and green, they are actually not. […] The cost of the green building is relatively high. For home buyers, the housing price is high enough. I think many people will prefer a lower price rather than paying more for being green.
U/RI-08
There are also some other significant issues that still exist. For example, so far, most of the green certificates did not cover the life-cycle of buildings. They are design certificate which does not take into account following operation and management (U/RI-2). There are some criticisms that Guangzhou's building energy efficiency and green building evaluation standards do not fully reflect the development principles of local conditions, and that some standards do not adapt well to the local climate and geography (Qin et al., 2015).
Accordingly, it is suggested that despite the rapid formation of low carbon building policies, there is much room for policy improvement and to enhance policy impact.
Moreover, while the building sector is within the process of transition with extensive government intervention, the observed changes are much more significant in the public sector than the private sector. Apart from major refurbishment and demonstration projects, there has, thus far, been no particularly effective approaches
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advanced for targeting the existing civil building stock to bring about transformative changes. According to Pri-04 and Pri-05, dealing with the existing civil building stock is also challenging because many of these buildings’ daily operations are controlled by property management companies. Their main responsibility is to ensure that all systems and equipment in the building can operate normally. Energy-saving retrofits may damage the stability of energy-using systems; therefore, they usually will not take initiatives to carry out energy-saving renovations. This means that unless the building owners themselves have energy-saving awareness, otherwise energy-saving renovation work is difficult to implement. However, on the other hand, a public sector interview (Pub-01) argued that progress in civil building energy-saving renovation may be underestimated since there is no formal reporting system for civil buildings’ energy saving projects. Therefore, even if building owners have carried out some spontaneous and small-scale energy-saving renovation projects, such measures may not have been noticed by the governing body.
Low carbon transport
By 2014, the carbon emissions of road freight traffic and individual car traffic accounted for a relatively large proportion of the overall emissions, representing 57% and 19% of the total emissions respectively (DOC-N/2017). In terms of per capita emissions, Guangzhou's per capita traffic carbon emissions in 2014 were 1.8 tons/person (DOC-N/2017), higher than the level in developed cities such as London - 1.3 tons/person (Hickman et al., 2011). Both forward-looking model (Huang et al.,
2011) and responses from several interviewees (Pri-01, Pri-04, U-05) suggested that, in the future, both passenger traffic and freight traffic are expected to grow in
Guangzhou as the population grows and the economy develops. The transport sector then will become the largest energy consumer and CO2 emitter in Guangzhou making it the most critical sector for energy conservation and emissions reduction.
Guangzhou has been paying increasing attention and implementing various transport
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policies and measures to improve public transport system since early 2000, long before the introduction of a ‘low carbon’ concept in the transport sector. In 2012, Guangzhou was also listed in the second batch of the low carbon public transport system pilot cities. Specifically, measures which can contribute to carbon emission reduction included public transport (bus and metro) improvement, LNG clean energy vehicle replacement, car license plate restrictions and slow traffic improvement (bicycle lane and walking path). However, there are views suggesting that many of the policy reforms and the development of transport infrastructure would have taken place even in the absence of ‘low carbon’ discourses (U/RI-05).
In a relative sense, the government's control over passenger transport is easier. Likewise, it is easier to shift the fuel type of public transport from natural gas to electricity through administrative means. These measures were largely driven by concerns over congestion issues and local pollution, as well as the intention of improving urban mobility, but they also contribute to energy saving and carbon mitigation.
U/RI-05
The above quote suggested that carbon mitigation was a side benefit to the development of public transport infrastructure, rather than a key motivation behind it. An illustrative example is the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project. The BRT project was largely developed outside the carbon mitigation context, but was later reframed as a ‘low carbon’ infrastructure project.
BRT is a good case. By improving the public transport system, we encourage more people to travel on public transport. [...] Research has been shown BRT is useful in reducing carbon emission from the transport sector. I don’t know specific data about the subway or normal bus. But in general, improving the public transport system is important, not just for carbon reduction but for the whole city.
N-01
In this sense, ‘low carbon development’ in the transport sector seems well-
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established. This allowed stakeholders to find convergence and reframe existing sectoral practices or objectives under the ‘low carbon’ banner in a relatively easy way. On the other hand, it also found that the ‘low carbon’ discourse did not actively engage with transport planning. The term is found used in a casual manner by some actors in the transport sectors (U/RI-08; N-01). U/RI-08 did not consider ‘low carbon’ as a significant principle for guiding transport planning:
Low carbon is something nice to do. There is a value in using this term since it suggests environmental benefits. The government now really cares about protecting the environment. [...] But as you mentioned, we actually do not care a lot about whether (a project) is low carbon or not. There are many other important criteria worth more attention in transport planning. But you cannot keep changing stuff.
U/RI-08
One government interviewee G-02 from the GZTC shared similar views and commented that carbon reduction is a ‘by-product’ of many key transport projects such as the subway, the BRT and the replacement of the LNG bus.
Transport system is complex. Of course, low carbon is important. [… ] Let me put it this way, if a project design can demonstrate carbon reduction potential, it will get more support. But that is one of many criteria.
G-02
G-02’s response explained why actors tend to apply the label of ‘low carbon’ to projects or activities. However, these responses also imply that, while actors in the transport sector are driven to calculate how different approaches will contribute to carbon mitigation, carbon reduction may not be acknowledged as a strategic objective when they are coordinating multiple factors in transport planning or policymaking. This argument can be supported by further examples. For instance, the introduction of the ‘shared vehicle scheme’ has led to a large number of non-
Guangzhou vehicles entering Guangzhou and brought additional traffic-led carbon
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emissions. Among all shared vehicles, about 40% of them are from areas outside
Guangzhou (DOC-M/2017). The ‘shared vehicle scheme’ also had an impact on public transport, as the daily passenger numbers upon regular buses in Guangzhou have decreased, on average, from 7.44 million to 7.15 million since the start of the scheme
(DOC-M/2017). Another example is traffic volume in the core city area. The core city area transport accounts for more than 50% of the city's total traffic (DOC-19/2016). However, transport infrastructure construction and upgrading in the core area is still in its infancy as a consequence of the location of many historical buildings and other factors (Zhang, 2017). However, in these areas while conflicts exist, low carbon transport never forms a strong rationale in discussions and is used as a discursive strategy to approach issues.
While Guangzhou’s transport policies placed greater emphasis on developing new energy cars, the key rationale behind the policies lie in economic reasons (U/RI-06).
There are various new policy documents about new energy cars, including the
‘Guangzhou Action Plan for Developing New Energy Vehicles’94 in 2010, the ‘Notice on the Interim Measures for the Promotion of New Energy Vehicles in Guangzhou City’95 in 2014, and the ‘Guangzhou New Energy Vehicle Development Work Plan
(2017-2020)’ in 2017.96 All of these documents emphasised that Guangzhou will speed up the development of new energy cars. According to interviewee U/RI-06, the development of automobile manufacturing has long been the focus of
Guangzhou’s industrial development, and Guangzhou has to maintain the competitiveness of its automobile industry. In this sense, the political-economic perspective rather than carbon reduction is found to be the most significant factor behind the development of strategy.
Contrary to the building sector which introduced a series of new demonstrations in
94 广州新能源汽车发展行动方案 95 关于推广新能源汽车的中期计划 96 广州新能源汽车推广工作计划 241
the name of ‘low carbon,' the transport sector is arguably just added ‘low carbon' to their existing strategies and projects. In doing so, the potential progressive approaches were removed and replaced by what fits into a wider context. On the bright side, despite the fact that many low carbon policies and practices can be seen as mere rebranding and to have been in place before the issue of low carbon development was raised, such rebranding activities have provided additional political endorsement as well as enhancing publicity.
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6.4 APPROACHES AND DISCOURSES FOR LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT
The low carbon policy framework appeared to evolve to cover more aspects. New focuses, standards, regulations and strategies were published, along with new policy instruments to facilitate low carbon transition. However, this does not mean that
‘low carbon’ has secured the position of being a guiding principle or become an integrated part of Guangzhou’s overall development strategies. During the interviews, efforts were made to understand actors’ perceptions, visions and values.
A closer inspection of actors’ perceptions, visions and values with qualitative depth revealed that ‘low carbon’ was framed narrowly and instrumentally, and was being related to wider political-economic factors whilst remaining largely silent on climate change and environmental protection.
Low recognition of ‘low carbon’ discourse
When asked if Guangzhou municipal government had provided sufficient support to low carbon transition, ambivalent views emerged from conversations. Such ambivalence was partly due to the board nature of the term ‘low carbon development/economy’. Moreover, the definition of low carbon development was not considered as important among actors. As a consequence of the comments that emerged within some conversations, it is found that individual interviewees’ understandings and interpretations of ‘low carbon' primarily reflected insights from their professional perspectives rather than providing a conceptual understanding of what a low carbon economy/development should mean and how should it be achieved (Pri-01; U/RI-04; M-02). Currently, the term ‘low carbon economy / development’ is used most often by consultants and the GZDRC. One university respondent (U/RI-01) pointed out that it is not necessary to use such a term.
The concept is too broad. [...] Instead of clarifying it, why not just use terms such as industrial energy efficiency, low carbon building, and so on. 243
When I say industrial energy efficiency, you will know what I mean. But when you say low carbon development, you always need further clarification.
U/RI-01
Despite this, the low carbon discourse opens room for ideas and rationalities, with some of them having been translated into established rules and procedures (e.g. low carbon industrial park design specification). Yet, based on the findings presented in
Section 6.3, the ‘low carbon’ discourse evoked different levels of changes across the four examined domains. Particularly, actors in the industry carbon reduction and building sectors displayed a more positive attitude towards, and higher recognition of, the low carbon discourse. This suggests that the arrival of the ‘low carbon’ discourse changed the energy-intensive industries and the building sector in a relatively significant way. Although more regulatory interventions were seen, economic considerations also prevailed in these two domains. Short-term cost- effectiveness remained an important foundation for securing legitimacy for many projects. On the other hand, it is found that carbon reduction is more being treated as an ‘output’ variable under the discourses of ‘low carbon industry' and ‘low carbon transport.' The municipal policies do not correctly distinguish ‘low carbon industries' but attempt to foster a link between carbon reduction and industrial upgrading. In the transport sector, stakeholders add ‘low carbon’ to many pre-existed activities and adopt the ‘low carbon’ concept whenever it could help to justify their original purposes rather than taking it as a principle or target. In other words, ‘low carbon’ is yet to become an integrated principle in these two fields.
The instrumental framing of ‘low carbon’
It is found that in both actors’ interpretations and practices, ‘low carbon’ was seen mostly in an instrumental manner that conformed to target fulfilment or sectoral strategies. Moreover, the central idea permeated was that low carbon development
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has to cope with techno-economic considerations. In other words, Guangzhou was attempting to deliver a low carbon transition without changing the socio-economic status of the city significantly. Since Guangzhou began to make dedicated low carbon policies around 2010, policy actors have tended to understand low carbon transition from an economic-oriented perspective under the ‘win-win’ framework. Apart from fulfilling national targets, Guangzhou mainly measured the importance of the low carbon transition in economic terms and strong business profit-oriented thinking is reflected.
This thesis recognises that the instrumental framing of low carbon development has its productive force, but it could also limit the resource availability for some areas which cannot demonstrate cost-benefits in the short run. Such co-benefit orientation which attaches great importance to the business case for carbon reduction, has led to limited resources being allocated to either unlock the existent technological bottleneck or enhance the institutional capacity of ESCOs in exploiting the market of smaller-sized enterprises. A university interviewee (U/RI-04) pointed out that both market and government actors were risk-averse and that there was not much interest in technologies which were not aligned to present structures or those that possessed the limited potential to reduce carbon emission in the short-term such as the carbon capture and storage (CCS).
At this stage, there is still room for carbon reduction through installing energy efficiency renewable energy technologies. But near zero and net negative emissions can never be achieved if only relying on these existing technologies and approaches. After this stage, CCS and carbon sinks will become necessary. […] If we want CCS and carbon sinks to play a significant role in the future, we need to accelerate its R&D and deployment at this moment. Otherwise it is too late.
U/RI-04
Therefore, it can be argued that, low carbon transition in Guangzhou is generally represented as a practical discussion around binding targets and local development 245
that is strongly influenced by economic-oriented thinking without systemically addressing different themes proposed in the co-evolution framework (Foxon, 2011). This was also recognised by a public organisation interviewee (Pub-03) who was from a public organisation.
What we did so far have not led to the formation of a ‘liandong’ (joint force)97. [...] The low carbon transition requires a series of forces to push it forward. Strict regulation is one thing we call ‘wai li’ (external force), but we also need ‘neisheng dongli’ (inner motivation). This requires a series of preconditions, including raising awareness, increasing profitability and more successful experience that boost people’s confidence.
Pub-03
The market-based approach
Low carbon economy/development is a policy discourse imported from the western context. It is grounded in the assumption that early and clear mitigation approach of ‘putting a price’ on GHG emissions is necessary to stimulate technical innovations and social responses to address climate change in the long-term (Sijm 2004; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). In this sense, this discourse is characterised by a market-led paradigm.
In Guangzhou, the initial approach to low carbon transition was based almost exclusively on regulatory measures. As time passes, more and more government-led market approaches have been adopted. In 2008, the State Council proposed to develop Guangzhou into a regional financial centre (DOC-25/2018). From the national level, Guangzhou has been given a major mission to carry out financial reforms and innovations to lead regional economic development. According to the development target set forth in the ‘Guangzhou Regional Financial Centre
Construction Plan (2011-2020)’, by 2020, the added value of the financial industry in
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the city is expected to increase to 12% of regional GDP, and the financial and business services industry will enjoy steady growth. Partly driven by this, Guangzhou displayed a more market-oriented trend and actively developed green finance to promote low carbon transition. In other words, the policymakers in Guangzhou easily and readily embraced the market and promote its role in guiding low carbon transition.
The promotion of market mechanisms in Guangzhou for low carbon transition, on the one hand, reflected international discourse and national guidance; on the other hand, it was driven by a group of practitioners who have extensive knowledge developed from participating in CDM programmes (U/RI-04). Meanwhile, Guangzhou has been careful about the government spending efficiency (G-01), and market- based approach promoted by them mirrored Guangzhou municipal government’s intention to reduce their financial burdens. However, while the market approach is widely accepted by actors as a future direction, it is still underdeveloped, which may result in a gap with regard to the funding needed to keep the momentum of low carbon transition going.
Although Guangzhou is displaying a market-oriented trend to low carbon transition, the municipal government does not make all approaches subject to market forces and economic value but supports programmes related to target fulfilment, public good and the city’s image. Therefore, heading towards a market-based framework in no way indicates a whole scale retreat of the government’s role in the low carbon transition movement. For example, Guangzhou maintained a series of regulatory approaches targeting energy-intensive enterprises and the building sector to fulfil binding targets. In the process of market building, Guangzhou municipal government has also provided a series of government-led market facilitation activities and commanded state-owned enterprises to take part in market-related activities such as carbon exchange and purchasing green bonds.
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
To summarise, this chapter contributes to an understanding of the characteristics of low carbon development in Guangzhou by presenting its GHG profile, describing the changes of the carbon reduction policy framework between 2005 and 2017, and capturing the ‘low carbon’ discourse in four key domains.
Guangzhou started to highlight energy efficiency and alternative energy supplies in the 11th FYP and reactively complied to national binding targets. Even ‘carbon reduction' was not officially recognised in the political and policy realm, Guangzhou was, in fact, driving a series of approaches which contributed to carbon reduction.
Since 2010, the business case for carbon reduction with an emphasis on ‘win-win' situations has risen significantly within the political agenda. The concept of ‘low carbon economy/development' was then promoted as a solution to a series of established policy issues such as traffic congestion, weak R&D capacity, the underdevelopment of the third sector, and city branding.
Through examining the sectoral policies as well as eliciting key actors' views, evidence was found that, despite political endorsement, the ‘low carbon’ concept in some cases just ‘tags’ itself to many existing activities rather than becoming a guiding objective. In the energy-intensive industry and building sector, the regimes are less stable than they used to be, whereas in industrial development and transport sector the regimes are more stable despite that some cracks were identified. Generally speaking, low carbon development is subjected to economic consideration and in many cases represented as a practical discussion about national targets and local development rather than bringing in transformative changes.
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CHAPTER 7: CONSTRAINTS FOR A MORE TRANSFORMATIVE
LOW CARBON DEVELOPMENT IN GUANGZHOU
The co-existence of various framings and policy approaches makes governing low carbon transition a complex task. In the transition management narrative, policy actions are required to deliberate the transition by institutionalising some normative principles, such as long-term visions, reflectivity, experimentation and social learning to overcome multiple failures brought by either the market or path-dependent policies (Weber and Rohracher, 2012). To achieve this requires not only specific quantifiable targets but also qualitative ones which concerns the role of governance (Andrews-Speed, 2012). Despite the past record showed that Guangzhou has been quite successful in delivering national binding targets, the governance mechanisms which contribute to institutionalising carbon reduction and the governance practices that facilitate low carbon transition, are not necessarily sufficient and self-reinforced to bring in the required level of change or to keep the progress on track. The empirical data presented in both Chapters 5 and 6 indicated that institutional changes at the municipal level can only be described as ‘marginal adjustments’.
This chapter provides a clearer articulation of the constraints that urban carbon governance faces in promoting meaningful changes across society. As will be shown later, by interpreting the empirical findings in the light of previous conceptualisation of systemic transition and Chinese governing system, it is possible to identify a set of entrenched institutions which restricted effective responses to facilitate the necessarily co-evolution of different sub-systems (i.e. technology, institution, business practices and user practices) (Foxon, 2011), and prevented the realisation of a more transformative change. These are some of the significant issues that must be addressed or overcome if China is to create a favourable institutional environment for low carbon transition.
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7.1 CONSTRAINTS TO GOVERNING LOW CARBON TRANSITION AT THE CITY
LEVEL
Constraints here are understood as the difficulties that can be experienced in achieving a continued improvement, and scale out (or scale up) of low carbon policies, practices and initiatives. Through analysing actors’ perceptions, interaction characteristics, and their accounts of the constraints, five main constraints are identified, including:
1) lack of long-term vision and leadership;
2) lack of cooperation, coordination and innovation;
3) lack of continuous monitoring and reflection;
4) limited agency for non-governmental actors to exercise influence; and
5) lack of recognition of long-term environmental and social values.
These barriers are not mutually exclusive but interlinked. In the following, the relevance of these constraints to governing low carbon transition and their interrelations is presented and discussed. Some of these constraints were identified in the research grounded in an international context (Lockwood, 2013; Gillard, 2016); this study affirms their presence in the Chinese context and further brings in some context related insights.
Lack of a long-term vision and leadership
A central principle of governing low carbon transition is that all decisions have to be made on a long-term basis, even if this results in an additional effort (Loorbach, 2010). Despite low carbon development being well-established at the strategic level in Guangzhou, as an idea it did not secure a position in making meaningful impacts or receive a consistent buy-in among municipal leaders. The empirical examination of
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Guangzhou’s institutional choices suggests that Guangzhou tended to avoid major institutional restructuring but in favour of reaching a balance between meeting the regulatory requirements and achieving socio-economic benefits. Decision making in this respect can be characterised as target fulfilment-oriented, problem-oriented and co-benefit thinking. The institutional structure did not provide sufficient incentives encouraging performance exceeding the minimal level required.
Moreover, by emphasising co-benefits as a discursive strategy to promote low carbon development, economic evaluation in fact dominated the decision-making. This led to insufficient resources being allocated to enhance institutional capacity to address relevant issues that have longer-term implications. For example, the gap in exploiting small-size manufacturing enterprises’ carbon reduction potential can be attributed to a lack of long-term vision and leadership. Currently, many technologically viable cases can be implemented if a robust ESCO sector, proper contracts and proactive financial institutions are available. However, given these projects are only financially viable in a relatively long time frame (3 to 5 years) (Pri-01; SO-2), doing business small enterprises are therefore viewed as risky and challenging, as they may not survive until the end of the payback period. In this sense, without partners or mechanisms to manage the higher level of financial risk in the interim, many ESCOs were rather pursuing low risk investment, rather than profit maximising strategies (Pri-02). Such an institutional mismatch suggests that at least one type of actor needs to take the initiative. A quote from interviewee Pub-03 who works for Guangzhou
Energy Monitoring Centre commented that the lack of priority in the political agenda made them lack resources to perform better.
We can overcome many practical issues if we are backed up by government leaders. […] Addressing small enterprises’ carbon reduction is a very difficult task. Given their number and diversity, we can only rely on the market to do the work. But without government’s support, the market will not grow spontaneously. We have done some researches and tried to find out how we could spread the risk among different
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organisations. It seems that the banks are not very interested in taking the risks, which is understandable under the current situation. I think eventually we need the government to take an initiative to set up a risk- sharing mechanism. But it is not happened yet.
Pub-03
The analysis of the interview data reveals that this issue was to some extent being considered as ‘somebody else’s responsibility; municipal government actors tend to assume that such tasks should be taken by market actors or be addressed at the national scale while market actors argued that government should take the lead and provide more targeted support.
Moreover, when taking a closer look, it is found that many of the low carbon programmes are in the form of nationally or provincially endorsed city-based initiatives. In this sense, these projects were initiated by the higher level of government and the city was seen as a delivering instrument. Bottom-up local initiatives where local actors act as the agent of change rely more on whether the proposed project fitted with the overall local development strategies or not, such as the BRT projects. Therefore, it is argued that, currently low carbon arguments do not have an anchored position and were easily compromised and subjected to other more pressing socio-economic arguments in the short-run.
Lack of innovation, cooperation and coordination
That changes have only taken place in an incremental way can be explained by a lack of innovation, which can be further related to a lack of cooperation and coordination to nurture innovations. While the 12th FYPs indicate that functional departments should be actively involved in different detailed tasks related to low carbon development, a government interviewee (G-01) reported that there has been a lack of initiatives among functional departments. When the GZDRC took the initiative to lead relevant reforms, functional departments only contributed as participants but
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rarely acted proactively. It is also difficult to encourage government officials from functional departments to take initiatives. The nature of cooperation and coordination can be captured by the term ‘fire-fighting’ (G-01), indicating that cooperation and coordination only took place while there were emerging issues (e.g. target compliance or dealing with inspection).
Beyond the government sphere, the lack of innovation and cooperation can be illustrated by the business activities carried out with regard to low carbon consultancy. As mentioned in Chapter 5, after the termination of most of the CDM projects in the late 2000s, many CDM consultants started to turn their attention to the domestic market. At the municipal level, the launch of state-led low carbon city pilot and carbon market pilot provided many business opportunities for these consultants. These consultants provided a range of services including drafting on low carbon development action plans, providing policy suggestions to improve the carbon market, and compiling city-level GHG inventories. Additionally, with the rise of ‘low carbon’ discourse, carbon auditing at the organisational level became an emerging business since 2012 (SO-02). In Guangzhou, several consulting companies pushed hard to roll out their carbon audit businesses. However, competition is fierce while the market for this business grew relatively slowly (Pri-02; Pri-03; SO-02). This is because, from the demand side, apart from those compliance companies under carbon market, enterprises do not have much interest in purchasing carbon related services (Pri-02; Pri-03; Pri-06). From the supply side, consulting companies were accustomed to competing through both formal and informal relationships for limited opportunities rather than devoting energies to the creation and expansion of the market (SO-01). After all, exploiting a new market requires a large amount of resources. But the cause of this situation can be attributed to the lack of vision and leadership; because in these market actors’ eyes, it seems that the political endorsement of low carbon development was very important (Pri-01; Pri-03).
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Lack of continuous monitoring and reflection
It has been argued that experimentation and learning are the key to advance policy performance; particular in those complex areas with high uncertainties, including climate change mitigation (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). In Guangzhou, the overall number and complexity of low carbon policies, practices and projects have increased between
2005 and 2017. Many of the policies and projects examined in this thesis involved more research activities prior to decisions being made and there were general policy learning activities based on international and implementation experience (DOC-
F/2013; DOC-H/2014; DOC-J/2016; DOC-K/2016). However, the overall impact of some initiatives remained relatively weak. To some extent, this weak impact can be attributed to a lack of effective monitoring and reflection. On the one hand, the effort of project planning, implementation and monitoring varied greatly across demonstration projects and was usually dependent on the type of initiative. For example, in the project of the ‘Carbon exchange platform for individual and family’, relevant monitoring procedures and criteria were integrated into the project design, but in practices, they were treated in a cursory manner (DOC-F/2013; N-04).
On the other hand, there is a gap between the demonstration projects and their scale up and scale out. In Guangzhou, it is found that many demonstration projects were initiated by public organisations or by private sector actors who were able to received or won international funding (DOC-D/2011; DOC-F/2013; DOC-O/2018). However, according to a private sector interviewee Pri-04, it was very difficult to make use of the results generated from initiatives because it was difficult to find additional resources to scale out and scale up these projects. In many cases, the purposes of project donors were to help local actors establish a case and would not provide follow-up investment after projects were done (Pri-04). At the same time, many project leaders and participants did not have the power or willingness to engage in the political or market sphere to secure further investment for scaling out
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and scaling up projects (U/RI-03; Pri-05; Pri-06). U/RI-03 commented on the low carbon community project:
It is non-profit in nature and it is more about public welfare. District government and sub-district government offices’ support are essential for expanding the influence. But here is the case, when you are reaching them with external funding, they are more than willing to collaborate with you. But if you ask them to fund these projects, that’s a different story. […] It is more reasonable for the municipal government to set aside a special fund. This will make both district and sub-district government officials more willing to engage.
U/RI-03
In terms of monitoring and reflective learning, attempts have been made to develop more effective communicative channels by enhancing networks and setting up formal monitoring mechanisms such as advisory committees. However, it seems that the cultural ethos of seeking harmony also limits the functioning of advisory committees. In practice, the advisory committees are under no particular pressure to put through their suggestions (SO-01; U/RI-06; U/RI-08). Therefore, despite rules being set, they were sometimes violated or did fulfil their envisaged role as a consequence of the influence of informal rules. U/RI-06 who has been invited to take part in many project acceptance inspection meetings told me that:
Generally speaking, If recommendations (provided by the advisory committee) were not adopted in the first round of feedback, then they are not likely to be adopted in the second round, so is the third round. […] You will very likely receive a call from the project side, if you have been insisting on your recommendations. Sometimes, if the problem is not a very significant one, then we will not push it very hard.
U/RI-06
When taken together, it can be argued that other than shaping carbon reduction as an ordinary practice, some policies and practices can be better described as occasional high-impact decisions. The impact of some programmes (i.e. low carbon
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community and small-scale carbon trading platform) were made negligible or have yet to display a significant role because of constraints. According to the transition management framework, it is an essential requirement for stakeholders to be able to work together throughout the planning, implementing, monitoring and reflecting processes to achieve ‘continuous improvement' (Berkhout, et al., 2002; Kemp and
Rotmans, 2005). Such collaboration will allow them to adjust targets and improve processes to ensure that the goal is achieved. However, in Guangzhou, it is found that implementing such a comprehensive process has not yet become a norm.
Limited agency for non-governmental actors to exercise influence
In Guangzhou, many non-government actors are locked into a passive system of engaging in policy but not the political process. While breaking such a situation requires influential individuals to take the lead, in Guangzhou, it seems that the influential individuals were usually government leaders. Specifically, senior government leaders had sufficient power to enable change and their support played a significant role in those cases which had wide-impact (e.g. Top-200 enterprises and energy-saving information systems). In other words, key decisions generated from coordination between elite actors form a key force for change. However, the strong power or influence of government leaders was not always positive in the context of low carbon transition. Such arrangements may also negatively influence non- government actors' initiatives and motivations to put forward more ‘untraditional ideas’, as explained by U/RI-08:
No matter how much efforts we have put on the draft plan and proposal, the leader has a final say about how it will be proceeded. They may say, I have seen a successful case in Europe. You may take a look at it and add this and that […]. They have chances to visit many places and we just stuck in the office writing materials.
U/RI-08
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There was more room for active participation of experts in the decision-making process while political endorsement on a certain issue is high. However, if the leader does not show particular interest in a more fundamental reform, the role of experts would then retreat to passive engagement. In this sense, potential sources for more transformative change was removed under such governance dynamics. The government leader can change or disregard policies without providing a strong rationale (U/RI-08; SO-01). This exposes the fact that there is a lack of institutionalisation in the participatory policy-making process. The easy disregard of proposals and advice can be traced to the lack of an effective monitoring mechanism, which aggravates the personal influence in the decision-making process. U/RI-02 considered that high personal influence actually increased uncertainty.
Sometimes they (municipal leaders) make good suggestions and decisions. It really depends on how well the municipal leaders know about the current situation.
U/RI-02
On the other hand, the interviews also revealed that, while non-government respondents discussed operational barriers and views on policies, they tended to attribute the incremental progress to a lack of government attention (Pub-03; U/RI-
03; U/RI-04). While such responses reaffirmed the importance of government’s leadership, they also suggested that these actors did not have strong confidence and capacities to take initiatives to shape the agenda. Such responses implied that while government leaders used agency to make formal decisions and conscious interpretations, these decisions and interpretations could feed into informal beliefs of what is valued and, therefore, influence decision-making in the wider context. In this sense, experts tended to make their proposals relevant to government’s goals to increase the chance of being adopted, and in order that they could demonstrate that they had created ‘policy impact’. This required them to conform to predefined problem framing and understanding. This, in turn, further shaped the policy
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framework or project construction in the image of predefined framings. These influences led to a series of unintended constraints, including a lack of innovation. The long-term implications of this situation is that it may constrain effective social learning.
Lack of recognition of environmental and social values
Despite the wider range of benefits were mentioned in various low carbon policy documents and in the introduction of project briefs (DOC-07/2010; DOC-10/2012; DOC-F/2013; DOC-H/2014; DOC-25/2018), the non-monetary benefits of low carbon development related to the environment and social values were not fully recognised by key actors. Interesting, apart from a few, interviewees rarely linked their work with climate change, which echoed what Eberhardt (2015) mentioned, that climate change was seen as an ‘abstract and distant’ concept among Chinese. Generally speaking, the linkage between low carbon transition and climate change / environment protection was weaker than the linkage that existed between low carbon transition and the five-yearly interim targets stipulated by the FYPs or economic competitiveness. While there was an educational centre called
‘Guangdong Environmental Protection Publicity and Education Centre’98 set up at the provincial level, it mainly focused on managing promotional banner, organising educational programmes targeting primary, middle schools and the general public, and holding training courses (Pub-04). The following response from a public-sector interview (Pub-03) provides an illustrative example of how ‘climate change’ is perceived.
We mention it (climate change) when we are writing materials. In reality…emm…we know that climate change is a big threat. It is important. But it is not a topic that people would like to discuss at the practical level all the time. […] I don’t think people process enough knowledge about it. Tackling climate change is the fundamental reason
98 广东省环境保护宣教中心 258
for all these works. But the direct motivation behind this is to make sure that all targets are fulfilled.
Pub-03
It is also observed that many actors developed an opportunistic manner by following policy benefits rather than devoting efforts to exploit market potential. While
Guangzhou further emphasises the role of market actors in driving low carbon transition, the lack of recognition of non-monetary benefits by the institutional framework and the focus on profit maximisation acted as significant constraints for the future advancement of low carbon development. However, the non-monetary benefits were considered difficult to measure as well as being used to justify low carbon operation (SO-02; N-05).
We need to demonstrate our output in monetary terms, which is very difficult. You know about the carbon market. The reason why the launch of the national market has been postponed is because that it is hard to unify standards. As far as I know, there are many research projects related to the ecological compensation at the moment. These research output may lay a good foundation for sustainable development by taking into account the intrinsic value of the environment. But I think at this stage, it is too early for them to make a big impact.
SO-02
So far, there is a lack of understanding and appreciation, as well as a lack of measuring of the intangible environmental and social value benefits that will be brought by low carbon development in the long run. The emphasis on practical approaches that are geared towards target delivery and the preference for cost- saving actions over the attainment of fundamental reform was made quite clear during interviews. However, if these wider benefits are not being captured in the institutional framework, market actors are not encouraged to take actions and the market size will not grow as expected. At the same time, those projects that might generate lower levels of financial revenue but far greater levels of non-monetary
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benefits and long-term impacts will be out-competed in such a system that is dominated by an economic rationale.
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7.2 THE CONSTRAINING INSTITUTIONS
The barriers mentioned above would impede low carbon transition in any city or country. This section seeks to build on these barriers by linking them to their institutional roots. This is done because it allows us to discuss the likely implications of the existence of such barriers to China’s low carbon transition in the future. By interpreting respondents’ accounts in the light of previous conceptualisations of the
Chinese governing system, three key institutional elements that constraint a more transformative low carbon transition in Chinese cities are identified: the design of organisational and incentive structure, administrative culture, as well as growth and trade orientation. It is argued that the available options in the context of low carbon transition were constrained by these embedded institutions which were shaped in the past.
Design of organisational and incentive structure
The relative success of energy efficiency programmes since the 11th FYP can be attributed to the binding targets feeding into the cadre evaluation system. This echoed many previous studies which found that environmental authoritarian regimes have merit in the context of low carbon transition (Gilley, 2012). Meanwhile, evidence from this thesis suggests that local political commitments rather than decentralisation are the key to fuelling the transition. Generally speaking, when political endorsement is high, different stakeholders are more motivated to invest resources and cooperate.
The pilot programmes served as an additional incentive structure. However, such a mechanism has a limited role for bringing in more transformative change. Because, in essence, it is a programme-style approach which is not able to trigger significant changes in policy priorities. Local officials’ perceptions are still largely shaped by the
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institutionalised cadre management and evaluation system (Mei and Pearson, 2014).
Despite the fact that some informal incentives emerged through informal interactions, such incentives were selective, and case-specific, which were tied to personal relationships and interests. Moreover, while extra credits may be generated by taking a proactive position in the context of low carbon transition, no severe consequences will result from acting passively.
Moreover, the organisational design that exists within government has resulted in a policy hierarchy. This functional differentiation set-up often led to ambiguous policy making and made it difficult for officials in each department to view an issue from a broader perspective (Qian, 2000). To enhance communication and coordination in policy processes, it is quite common to establish cross-departmental leadership groups. Such working mechanisms provide a platform for multi-actor coordination and, therefore, to some extent compensate for the defects brought about by the rigid boundaries that exist between functional departments. However, the effect of such groups can be limited due to the campaign-style working culture or changes of government leaders. It seems that these arrangements are more useful in delivering regulatory targets than in creating opportunities for bottom-up innovation. In this sense, the institutionalisation of carbon reduction on a cross-departmental basis has yet to be achieved. While governance continues to operate in a sector-specific model, long-term and systemic planning is hard to realise.
To some extent, non-governmental actors were able to work as intermediaries to bridge the gaps that exist among the fragmented functional departments. However, this only provided ground for the selected non-governmental actors to engage in the policy, rather than the political process. The hierarchical nature of the existent administrative system hindered effective cooperation and joint decision-making which is necessary for problem-solving as part of low carbon transition. Bringing a certain type of solution forward in policy decisions required a broad base of political
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support. This was identified as challenging by non-governmental actors.
Overall, the design of the institution structure resulted in fragmented cooperation and coordination. The faltering attitude expressed by some interviewees serves as a reminder that constructive political conditions are required to be kept. Local discretion in this sense can be a double-edged sword for the national government.
Therefore, whilst the governing system is considered useful for addressing measurable binding targets, it is less effective in terms of bringing about more fundamental change (Kostka, 2016). In this sense, the real problem is not that low carbon transition cannot be rolled out, but how to maintain its significance between competing goals over time.
Administrative culture
Transitioning to a sustainable and low carbon city requires sufficient social and political space for collaboration between researchers, policymakers and community stakeholders (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Stirling, 2011). Actors need to acknowledge the need for change and to believe in their own abilities to act as drivers of the processes of change and transformation. In this sense, the socio-political context for decision-making is important. In the case of Guangzhou, the examination of interaction characteristics demonstrates the persistence of certain institutionalised power relations within the governance sphere. Specifically, the space for non- government actors’ participation was generated by institutional adjustments initiated by the municipal government which aimed to delivery top-down targets.
Therefore, one of the reasons that the non-governmental actors could enter the policy cycle was because they possessed the needed expertise and knowledge.
Among many of the non-governmental actors with professional competency, in the context of low carbon development, government leaders still determined what expertise they need and whether or not to accept certain experts into the policy
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process. In this sense, the institutionalisation of experts does not embody much of the substance of participatory policymaking. In addition, among non-governmental actors in the policy community, there was a hierarchy in terms of their influence. The experts who considered themselves to have a stronger capacity in shaping policies usually relied on personal relationships to establish trust with key policymakers (Pub-
01; N-01). It was found to be rather acceptable to manipulate and modify formal competition processes and mechanisms based on some informal rules of reciprocal or consensus. In other words, the overall social interactions and dynamics remained largely unchanged with the introduction of the ‘low carbon’ idea. Given this uncertainty, professionals who do not belong to the political hierarchy, therefore, have less confidence to invest resources and energy into this area.
Such an arrangement also led to a situation arising whereby advice could be filtered and selected based on short-term targets or aligned with existing goals which best fitted governmental leaders’ benefits. Such a filtered system results in a mentality that: it is important to find out ‘what the government wants' (to what extent the government tends to supply resources in one aspect and expects what sorts of outcome) and to avoid direct contradictions or confrontations with the government.
In other words, the policy process is subjective and proposals are frequently adjusted to get the perceived right answers. This, in turn, allows existing patterns to go unchallenged. Furthering through this comment, concerns are emerged with regards to ithe ability of the policy community to adequately express their ideas to shape policy framework which in favour of low carbon development.
Growth and trade orientation
That the implementation of low carbon policies has not faced much resistance in Guangzhou can be attributed to the fact that this development model converged with Guangzhou’s development stage. Therefore, it was relatively easy for
Guangzhou to integrate or reframe many pre-existing practices and strategies into its
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low carbon development framework. However, this inertia resulted from relatively stable normative and cognitive institutional pillars and has led to a reproduction of narrow and instrumental projects in the low carbon transition context. Specifically, the statements of interviewees appeared to attest to the fact that, in the eyes of key municipal leaders, social and economic considerations were the fundamental constructs dominating the political framework. Such a pro-grow perspective rendered low carbon issues an additional task, which was merely attached to overall developmental goals. This paradigm underrepresented the ecological and social benefits that benefit the whole society in the long run. In Chapter 5, the existence of many demonstrations and high-impact programmes was explained through the lens of multiple governance processes and their interactions. Yet besides statutory influence, economic benefits remained the key factors behind policies and practices that shape the policy-making for low carbon transition. Generally speaking, among multiple possible solutions, those ones which were able to generate co-benefits and contribute to growth and trade would be given priority.
This also explains why low carbon transition could gain popularity at the strategic level in Guangzhou; it was framed in a way which was aligned with the city’s overall economic development strategy. The rise of ‘low carbon’ discourse has been attributed, in part, to the need to finding a new economic growth point after the financial crisis, like many western societies (Hodson and Marvin, 2017). Moreover, it is based on an assumption that socio-economic status can be maintained through green growth. Despite this concept being designed to strike a balance between economic growth and environmental conservation, in practice, the importance of economic issues overtook any other aspects due to the embedded economic institution. In other words, when looking from a wider overall development point of view, it is found that carbon mitigation was often subject to economic development priority.
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter began by presenting the constraints identified in the case study area, revealing how the limitations of governance practices and policy actions resulted in incremental change. Through tracing their institutional roots, this chapter further explained how the governance practices and policy actions were under the politico- institutional influence. While the economic-dominant thinking embedded in the incentive structure should shoulder much of the blame for the only-incremental progress in low carbon development, other factors play a contributing role. The influence of constraining organisational and incentive structure design and administrative cultural, mirrored in interactive terms, slowed down the adoption of more progressive measures. Correcting these institutional practices, which have continued for years, required more focused and successive methods. Therefore, it is argued that Guangzhou has taken the necessary steps towards decarbonisation by creating formal institutional structures. Nevertheless, the structure remains path- dependent, especially with some long-lasting normative and cognitive institutions remain stable. This is not conducive to bringing about more transformative change.
Thus, the development of institutional structure still has a long way to go.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION: THE ROLE AND CAPACITIES OF
CHINESE CITIES WITH REGARD TO GLOBAL LOW CARBON
TRANSITION
After years of efforts to tackle climate change, globally, the emission rate is growing more slowly at an aggregate level. Despite this, the progress achieved has not been perceived to be sufficient in tackling the foreseen challenges (IPCC, 2014). As a consequence, incremental progress with regard to climate change mitigation has received increased attention from researchers. Previous research based on the western context have provided useful framework to structure the analysis of low carbon transition and identified a series of factors which constrained a consistent progress and more radical changes, such as pressures from the wider politico- economic environment, institutional path dependency, vested interests, and governance failures (Geels, 2004; Avelino and Rotmans, 2009; Scrase and Smith,
2009; Smith and Stirling, 2010; Meadowcroft, 2011; Lawhon and Murphy, 2012;
Nalau and Handmer, 2015; Fankhauser et al., 2015). Meanwhile, studies based on the Chinese context triggered some debates as to whether China's governing system can deliver better policy results with regard to low carbon transition (Gilley, 2012).
This argument was made based on China’s progressive legislative actions, its capacity to mobilise resources, and its achievements measured by energy/carbon intensity and the extent to which it has installed renewables (Kostka and Hobbs, 2012; Lo,
2014; Hua et al., 2016; UN Climate Change News, 2018).
Another layer to the carbon governance debate arises with regards to the legitimacy to take international agreements as a key solution and national governments as key actors to tackle climate change mitigation (Jasanoff et al., 2004; Bulkeley and Castán
Broto, 2013; Bulkeley and Newell, 2015). Despite stringent targets being agreed under the 2015 Paris climate conference (UNFCCC, 2016), accumulated efforts based
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on national commitments and pledges still only account for one-third of the required level of GHG reduction (UNEP, 2017). This makes it necessary to deepen understanding of the capacity of bottom-up, locally-based actions and policy processes to fill policy and practice loopholes.
This thesis argues that developing an understanding of the politico-institutional dimension of urban carbon governance provides a useful angle to analyse more in- depth the roles and capacities of cities with regard to global low carbon transition.
Focusing on the Chinese context, this research has analysed the governance dynamics and characteristics of low carbon development at the city level, under a governing system characterised by semi-environmental authoritarianism, economic decentralisation, and centrally coordinated local experimentation. This thesis argues that China has been faced with a series of challenges in maintaining continuous progress and speeding up its low carbon transition. The case study of Guangzhou has, throughout the thesis, offered insights into why this is the case.
The next section of 8.1 summarises the key findings of this thesis and draws out the relevant implications of the research findings. Section 8.2 further discusses how to better exploit cities’ potential for promoting more transformative low carbon transitions by integrating the theoretical insights and evidence that arise from empirical research. Thereafter, Section 8.3 outlines a series of reasoned and relevant policy recommendations.
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8.1 KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Conditions for enabling low carbon transition in a more transformative manner
Drawing insights from the multilevel governance framework (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006) and governance arrangement for socio-technical transition (Smith and Stirling,
2007), this thesis adds a qualitative understanding of how and why Guangzhou managed to institutionalise carbon reduction, deliver related targets and launch a series of bottom-up programmes, driven by a confluence of factors. In general terms, the Guangzhou municipal government can be seen to have played a crucial role in exercising its authority to overcome inertia and building capacities. Specifically, the Guangzhou municipal government was driven by the altered regulatory environment that arose since the 11th FYP period. Accordingly, it sought to enhance its capacities of policymaking and implementation through setting up intragovernmental leadership groups, establishing dedicated public organisations and actively consulting with non-government actors.
The political endorsement of municipal government leaders played an important role in determining the position of low carbon issue in the political agenda and subsequently the availability of resources for local initiatives. With salient political endorsement between 2010 and 2014, such opportunities were skilfully exploited by carbon experts who possessed extensive knowledge and networks established through participating in the international carbon market. This therefore opened a ‘policy window’ (Kingdon, 1984) for fast policy development and change. In
Guangzhou, the policy community was greatly extended to incorporate more members and this was further facilitated by social media networks. Despite being connected loosely, the extended networks were quite robust and accelerated information flows. Overall, non-governmental actors have displayed strategic learning and have been relatively successful in seizing reform opportunities provided 269
by both the national government and municipal leaders to introduce local initiatives.
The evidence of the Guangzhou case suggests that a range of opportunities arose for facilitating low carbon transition at this level of governance. In Section 6.3, three models were outlined which demonstrated the existence of linear relationships between different governance processes behind the institutionalisation of low carbon development. Reading these findings in a positive way suggests that if certain conditions are fulfilled, given time, a self-reinforced circle can be formed and that accumulated progress has the potential to lead to substantive changes. Four key factors were identified as essential conditions:
1) the development of a regulatory environment for low carbon transition at the national level;
2) municipal government leaders’ enthusiasm and leadership;
3) the institutional capacity to coordinate between functional departments and work with non-governmental actors, and
4) the availability of an appropriate talent pool.
Where these conditions are fulfilled, there is far greater opportunity for a city to act as an agent of change. This can be achieved by creating a self-reinforced positive feedback loop between strengthening regulatory rules, willingness to act, better coordination and social learning (further discussion see Section 8.2). However, some of these accomplishments on the ground may, in the case of Guangzhou, also be a consequence of specific factors and variables that reside therein; such as administrative capacity and active non-government actors. Moreover, the governance for low carbon development at the city level is part of the wider political and economic system. Over time, favourable conditions are subject to change and this suggests, all else being equal, that self-reinforcing mechanism is not easy to maintain over time.
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Different levels of stability in regimes
As indicated in Chapter 3, the regulatory environment has changed since 2005.
Empirical evidence provided in Chapter 6 reveals how such changes influence niche and regime dynamics in different sectors (i.e. Industrial, building and transport sectors). In energy-intensive industries, the landscape pressure is relatively high, playing an effective role in destabilising the regime. Meanwhile, the change of the regulatory environment in this sector was accompanied by external resources, which enable pre-existing niche innovations to compete with the regime. The building sector was under moderate landscape pressure. With landscape changes, regime actors have started to mobilise internal resources to seek to take advantage of pre- existing niche innovation. Yet regulatory pressures maintain the main source of motivation whereas niche innovation has not gained sufficient internal momentums to drive radical changes. The transport regime was facing the least landscape pressure and niche innovations are yet to be sufficiently developed. Despite there are some cracks, the regime remains largely stable.
These findings indicate that transitions across the three sectors are at different stages of transition and taking various pathways (Geels and Schot, 2007). Across the three sectors, a series of sporadic developments can be identified in multiple sub- systems prior to 2005 (i.e. technologies, industry, policy, business strategies and user practices) (Elzen et al., 2004; Geels, 2004; Smith, 2007). The change of the regulatory environment in 2005 played a role in coordinating these developments and led to a period of fast progress. Even so, looking from a temporal perspective, co-evolution dynamics between these sub-systems have yet to achieved in any examined sector to sustain the rate of transition. For example, while the external resources were insufficient to cover smaller energy-intensive enterprises, internal resources have not been effectively mobilised. This suggests governance and policy fail to be reflexive and adaptive over time to maintain ongoing progress (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). 271
The different levels of regime stability identified in the case study area also reminds us the importance of looking at the achievement of low carbon cities from a more critical perspective. As Grundmann (2007) suggests, the criteria of success are politically defined. In this sense, it is important not to let the level of achievement in an overall indicator at city level masks any unbalanced development within.
Level of institutionalisation: an endogenous perspective to explain the lack of continuous progress
In addition to exogenous politico-economic influences, this section attempts to interpret the lack of continuous progress and transformative change (Fankhauser et al., 2015; Boykoff, 2015) from an endogenous perspective, using the idea of ‘level of institutionalisation’. The level of institutionalisation of low carbon governance regimes measures not only the formation of formal structure and the implementation of policies, but also the extent to which related rules and values were accepted, approved and adopted by actors as a norm. If a systemic level of institutionalisation is achieved, ‘rules of game’ (i.e. norms, goals, and values) established within an ‘organisational field’ having the potential to shape actor behaviour as opposed to those from wider environments (see DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Scott, 2001). On the contrary, without a deep level of institutionalisation, contestations and conflicts emerge between the low carbon domain and other policy objectives can result in a weakening of low carbon policy outcomes and even policy roll-back.
During the investigated period, Guangzhou’s low carbon policy framework was developed to accommodate more areas and to be more specific. At a first look,
Guangzhou exhibited capabilities to promote how the term ‘low carbon’ should be adopted by different sectors. However, qualitative data collected from the semi-
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structured interviews undertaken as a part of the primary data collection for this thesis revealed that, perceptions and responses across different domains (i.e. industry, building and transport sectors) varied with regard to the intuitive term ‘low carbon'. In this sense, the adoption of ‘low carbon’ in strategic and policy content does not indicate that carbon reduction will be well-considered and integrated into planning activities and practices. Relevant practices under the ‘low carbon’ banner may fall short of integrating real concerns on carbon reduction and the term can be mobilised as a mean to ‘dress up’ pre-existing activities or policy goals. These activities and goals, would have taken place even without the introduction of a ‘low carbon’ discourse. In this sense, Guangzhou's success can be partly attributed to the wider social-economic contexts rather than being seen to have induced by effective designated policies centred on climate change mitigation concerns based on active learning and reflection. This implies that the level of institutionalisation of low carbon development is shallow.
It is admitted that the low carbon policy making did not start from scratch but have to layer its objectives upon existing policy frameworks in related areas. Thus, here the point is not to label such a situation as counterproductive, as most practices which have been tagged ‘low carbon’ do contribute to carbon reduction and have also enhanced the level of publicity in existence pertaining to low carbon development. Rather, what I intend to point out is that the insufficient level of institutionalisation of low carbon concern made it easy for economic objectives to triumph over environmental ones when it came to deciding priorities and policies within decision making.
The room for manoeuvre is further expanded by the adoption of the ‘win-win' framing of low carbon development. Under ‘win-win’ framing, the policy content is politically defined, which can be easily adjusted to accommodate political or sectoral priorities and marginalise those more radical options which would require additional
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resource input (Grundmann, 2007). In this sense, without securing a principled position, the ‘low carbon’ concept is readily manipulated or ignored by wider political and economic interests.
Therefore, established institutions continue to shape low carbon polity’s character instead of being challenged or redefined (March and Olsen, 2006). This would limit the range of policy solutions that can be considered whilst also marginalise those areas which need to be further developed if a transformative low carbon transition is to be realised. Without triggering a deeper reflection on these constraints, radical alternatives can be marginalised either intentionally or unintentionally (Phal-Wostl, 2009).
Institutional framework for low carbon transition: fragmented and patchy progress
Climate change remains a problem in search of effective framings and solutions
(Hulme, 2010). It follows that tackling this issue requires a high level of willingness and a societal ability to acquire new knowledge and act collectively to innovative (North, 1990). For this reason, attention has been paid to actors’ learning and innovative activities, as well as to the issues of how their willingness and ability to learn and innovate are enabled and constrained by institutional frameworks.
Guangzhou municipal government has established a series of platforms to capitalise on non-government actors' expertise. However, in practice, engagement and interaction through these platforms have been shaped by institutionalised power relations (i.e. municipal/party leadership has overtaken functional department policymakers, and government actors have overtaken non-government actors) and administrative rules (place great emphasis on conformity and standard). No obvious advocacy actions or direct confrontations were identified in the context of low carbon development within government, from either non-governmental experts or the general public in Guangzhou. At the same time, it is found that there was only a
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limited ability for local actors to deliberate and reflect on the meaning attached to the term ‘low carbon’ and to advocate alternative approaches which lie beyond the current paradigm. Instead, they tended to fit their interpretation or understanding into existing policy contexts and accepted existent concepts, routines and assumptions as standards. This reflects the limited role of experts in shaping political process (Pieke, 2012).
Given the extent to which these concepts, routines and assumptions were, to a large extent, readily accepted by actors, it can be said that low carbon politics only took place in the process of shaping concepts, routines and assumptions. Yet the shaping of these concepts, routines and assumptions was largely completed within core governing groups which only involved a small number of policy-makers and experts, and sometimes even took place beyond city scale. According to March and Olsen (2006), institutions are carrying specific identities, knowledge and roles. These institutions can significantly shape a polity’s character and visions which deal with contemporary issues (Hall, 1993; Scott, 1995). Such influence will be greatly enhanced when the policy making process lacks infiltration of more extensive views. This study testifies the explanatory power of institutional influence in this sense. By revealing how actors adapt their behaviours to political structures, administrative cultures, and economic-centred development paradigms, this research explains how space for more radical actions or alternative ideas was ring-fenced by the existent institutional framework.
From the above discussion, it is argued that in Guangzhou, institutionalised power and norms rather than knowledge and ideas, have a more prominent role in shaping governance outcomes. Although Guangzhou’s socio-political environment has constructed a strong base of experiential knowledge which makes it a site for some collective political actions that are focused on protesting for urban environmental issues, the motivations primarily surrounded private interest and were based on the
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organisation of property owners (Xu and Chen, 2013). Carbon reduction did not gain much collective interest. In this sense, while the target-based regulatory institution is useful for altering local government arrangements to some extent, it did not afford an opportunity for the provoking of corresponding changes to other normative and cognitive institution. This also explains why, in general, non-government actors’ willingness and capacity to engage were significantly affected by the level of government commitment, which was, in turn, contingent on the political leader’s perception. This is consistent with findings that suggest that the success or failure of low carbon policies can be fed into individual factors (Geels, 2013; 2014; Kern, 2011; Shove and Walker, 2010). In keeping with many other places, local government commitment is subjected to change of government leader under China’s governing system. There is no guarantee that a successor will follow existing paths or sustain input. Hence, I argue that reforming the governance arrangements which empower non-governmental actors to exercise their agency is necessary to keep the self- reinforcing mechanism in motion.
Driving forces behind low carbon practices
Following the previous discussion, this section further discusses the importance of addressing agential perceptions and values as attempts to speed up the low carbon transition. The empirical evidence revealed that while many interviewees mentioned the immediate national targets and economic incentives as their key motivation to act, few of them directly related low carbon practices with the ideas of climate change or highlighted the importance of value change. At the same time, while NGOs has been identified play an increasingly important role in Chinese environmental governance (Schwartz, 2004; Zhang and Tang, 2013), they are underrepresented in the context of carbon governance. Despite citizens’ environmental awareness has been growing gradually (Eberhardt, 2015), the low carbon transition does not seem to be treated as an environmental issue that raises much public concerns. While
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there has been in the recent past local educational programmes that have sought to raise environmental awareness among the public, there is, however, little evidence to suggest that such programmes have made a significant impact. Generally speaking, neither in the policy framework nor key actors’ mental construct, the role of value-based incentives for change have gained a significant role.
The disconnection of low carbon development from the environmental sphere can be explained by the mainstream policy prescriptions which is rooted in a techno- economic framework. In other words, it is systematically assumed that better financial instruments and advanced technologies provide an optimal solution to climate change. Returning to Bailey (2011)’s argument that policies and practices under a techno-economic framework have only a very limited ability to deliver the level of required change, this study suggests that a more transformative change is more likely to be achieved if the linkage between low carbon development and climate change /environmental protection is better established. Following this line, it is suggested that any attempt to speed up low carbon transition should pay more attention to normative and cognitive rules because they have the capacity to shape the regulatory institution as well as mediating its influence at the city level (Hall,
2011). To achieve this, the policy scope needs to be expanded to go beyond regulatory approaches (e.g. law and binding targets) and economic incentives, to incorporate those that address organisational reform to capitalise on environmental organisations which are currently underrepresenting in the low carbon governance arrangement. If this does not happen, carbon reduction will, at best, be reflected as a detached and target-driven issue; such an approach could only partially address the rooted issue.
The gap between ‘proactive response’ expectations and actual practices
There has been increasing evidence showing that the Chinese government is willing and determined to mitigate the environmental damages accompanied by economic
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growth (People.cn, 2009; Geall, 2015; Lam, 2016). As shown in Chapter 3, Chinese national government leaders have implemented a series of top-down political reforms to strengthen the position of environmental issues. Apart from statutory influence, the national policy framework also encouraged sub-national governments to act beyond minimum requirements; this has been achieved by providing numerous pieces of guidance and launching pilot programmes. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that these reforms were unprecedented, policies related to institutional governance conditions remained relativity underdeveloped. This allowed entrenched institutions including economic-oriented thinking and administrative culture exercised influence on actors’ interaction in a more significant way than low carbon policy structure. These findings to some extent support what
Kostka (2016) and Shin (2018) have argued; namely, that the existence Chinese governing system is capable of delivering straightforward targets through a top-down manner but is less effective in resolving more complicated issues. Such an approach has contributed to some successful reforms because it has encouraged local leaders to behave flexibly and tentatively (Liu et al., 2008). At the same time, it to some extent resonates to the concerns raised by Zeng (2015) that, policy experimentations in China could merely represent symbolic reforms.
Currently, the governance arrangement did not accommodate proper incentives for encouraging sub-national governments to maintain a ‘beyond minimum requirement’ performance. In this sense, it challenges the claim to use ‘local actors operate in a less structured institutional framework’ (Tsai, 2006) as the precondition to construct city as a changing agent in the context of low carbon transition. Under current governance arrangement, local leaders’ personal values, interest and enthusiasms became significant factors for bringing proactive responses. At the city level, while government leaders are willing to back up low carbon development, progress can be made without changing established norms and routines. However, without changing established norms and routines, policy ‘back-fire' could appear. In
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Guangzhou’s case, the immediate cause of such policy ‘back-fire' was the change of government leader which made Guangzhou’s municipal government appear to not support investing political capital that go beyond the minimum requirement. More fundamentally, it was due to the existent insufficient level of institutionalisation of low carbon development. This deficit makes actors easily subject to the influence of the wider institutional environment which is dominated by persistent power relations, and the overarching need to maintain economic growth as well as business profitability.
Under the growth-oriented urbanisation regime (Hsing, 2010; Wu, 2015), the government’s role in guaranteeing long-time consistent progress in this respect is challenged. It follows, therefore, that without a sufficient level of institutionalisation, the commitment to low carbon development would oscillate over time as wider (political economy) environment changes (Fankhauser et al., 2015) and consistent progress is highly unlikely to be systematically promoted. This would have various consequences for low carbon transition in the future, especially after those economic viable ‘win-win’ actions are taken.
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8.2 EXPLOITING CITIES’ POTENTIAL IN THE CONTEXT OF LOW CARBON
TRANSITION: TOWARDS AN ENABLING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The empirical evidence collected for this thesis collectively suggests that the insufficient level of institutionalisation of carbon reduction together with the entrenched institutions has created a challenging environment for accelerating progress in the field of urban low carbon development. This observation has worrying implications for the future of low carbon development despite China having demonstrated, to date, a relatively successful trajectory (Kostka and Hobbs, 2012; iGDP, 2014; Wang, 2014). To fasten low carbon transition at the city level and enable cities to fill the ‘governance gaps’ left by the nation-state, a question arises as to how to mitigate the constraints and better harness the potential of cities. After mapping out Guangzhou’s situation, this section rethinks cities’ roles and capacities, as well as offers some thoughts on how to better exploit cities’ potential in the context of low carbon transition. This is achieved by integrating theoretical insights with the empirical findings.
Under the Chinese governing system, there are precedents as to how cities were able to place themselves as ‘laboratories’ for more fundamental governance reform or generate innovative approaches which, in turn, be integrated into national policy frameworks (Heillman, 2008). Empirical findings from this research also identified governance mechanisms that have the potential to lead to substantive changes.
When looking for the driving forces that power the emergence of proactive actions, it was found that changes to the regulatory environment and political incentives beyond the city-level played pivotal roles. This confirmed what had been argued by
Gilley (2012) and Kostka (2016); that environmental authoritarian regime has its advantage in commanding target delivery. This suggests that it is necessary to maintain consistent regulatory pressure and political influence beyond the city level
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to ensure that municipal leaders take a longer-term perspective and better plan for low carbon development.
Moving to the roles and capacities of cities themselves – academics and policymakers who believe that city offers a useful context are based their arguments on the assumption that cities provide knowledge-policy interfaces which can coordinate more effective experience-based social learning (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2007; Ernstson et al., 2010; Evans, 2011). Kemp and Loorbach (2006) also argue that whilst government actors play a facilitating role, low carbon initiatives are ultimately carried out by non-governmental experts or the general public. At the same time, this thesis takes the position that there is no such panacea to climate change mitigation (Bäckstrand et al., 2010; Stirling, 2011; Hulme, 2010). Thus, all policies are to some extent experiments (Harrision, 2006). Given this, attention was directed upon the issue of whether the governance regime has the ability to adapt itself by testing new framings, tools, and working relationships effectively (Pahl-Wostl, 2009), as well as multiplying the influence of success experience (Laakso et al., 2017). From a normative perspective, urban scale governance which facilitates a closer relationship between different types of actors, increases the likelihood of working out how obstacles and path dependencies can be overcoming.
Yet, it is clear from the findings of this research that an adaptive and reflective governance regime has not been facilitated in the case study area. On the one hand, instead of being urged to critically evaluate concepts and assumptions displayed in policies, actors inclined to be enrolled by concepts and assumptions suggested by policies. On the other hand, while some actors well recognised the constraints, collective actions were rarely taking place. This is either due to limited agency or to actors’ mental construct in which perceived seeking conformity as appropriate. Such power relation and mental construct are thus unlikely to contribute to triggering constructive debates, and consequently led to a reconceptualization of current
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challenges and corresponding solutions. This echoes what Campbell (2004) argued, that is, if associated changes did not accompany changes to one institutional pillar, the new rule or mechanism might not be well implemented. Therefore, under current situations, cities represent more as a delivery mechanism rather than being a source of more radical change through facilitating active social learning, new understandings, or appreciation.
It has been well recognised that, in normal times without external shocks, radical institutional change does not take place easily (Chang, 2011). Even new institutions were introduced, their impacts are mediated by other unaffected rules (Hall, 2010). Therefore, if aiming to create an enabling institutional framework for low carbon development, attention should be paid to related rules. In addition, following
DiMaggio and Powell (1991)’s organisational field framework, human agencies’ behaviours might subject to direct influence from their immediate organisational structures as opposed to the wider environment. In this sense, attention can be paid to deepen the level of institutionalisation of low carbon development by enhancing
‘low carbon’ imperatives both at the organisational and personal value level. Particularly, both Mahoney and Thelen (2010)’s incremental institutional change framework and Carstensen and Schmidt (2016)’s discursive institutionalism highlight that spaces for institutional change can emerge from changing normative and cognitive beliefs of actors. Such changes can either be emerging or be facilitated into existing.
Currently, there are studies which show that environmental awareness has been significantly improved in China (Xu and Chen, 2013; Bai and Liu, 2013; Ernstson, 2014; Eberhardt, 2015). Following what has been discussed, it is possible to exploit enhanced environmental consciousness and further treat enhancing environmental consciousness as a source for more transformative change. From previous discussions, Figure 8-1 constructs a self-reinforced model that illustrates the
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interrelationships between different actor groups and emphasises the need to address different aspects simultaneously.
Figure 8-1:A self-reinforced model for more transformative urban low carbon transition
Source: author
Circle one (blue line)
The blue lines and arrows suggest that strengthening commitments and policy frameworks beyond the city level can encourage municipal leaders to invest more political capital in low carbon development. This could subsequently create more room for non-governmental actors and provide incentives for functional government departments to cooperate at a strategic level. Likewise, by engaging functional government departments, more room and incentives will also be provided for non- 283
governmental actors and this will further encourage them to take part. A proactive government would, therefore, increase non-governmental actors’ willingness to spend effort on low carbon development. Ultimately, the cumulative effect of all these extra efforts would lead to a strengthening of municipal low carbon policy frameworks. Some of these practices may be selectively integrated into national policy frameworks.
Circle two (red line)
The second circle also starts with a change in the national policy framework. A change in the national policy framework can also have a direct influence on municipal functional government departments. Following national guidance and in order to deliver sectoral targets or demonstrate initiative, municipal functional government departments would actively lobby municipal government leaders to support their proposals by investing more resources or upgrading the overall profile of low carbon development. Importantly, this process requires input from non- government actors, thereby enhancing intergovernmental cooperation. At the same time, in the process of cooperation, it is quite important as to whether government actors see non-government actors’ engagement as an opportunity for searching for better solutions or as a means of achieving their pre-set goals. If local actors have more freedom to participate and negotiate, then there is more room for problem- solving driven knowledge creation, social learning and value development. This will improve the chance of delivering to a more effective low carbon municipal policy framework which facilitates continuous progress.
Circle three (green line)
Non-government actors who take part in the policy process would, over time, develop strategic learning and acquire policy entrepreneurship skills and experience. This, in turn, could improve their ability to influence the policy process and their
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willingness to reinvest resources in this aspect, thereby making them more effective participants in the policy process. A robust group of policy entrepreneurs would have positive impacts on functional government coordination and facilitate policy experimentation and reflection. Effective social learning as a result of these interactions will reinforce a consistent policy framework.
As informed by Andrews-speed (2016), the extent to which path dependency can impinge on future trajectories is subject to individuals and groups’ creativity and capacity to take active interventions. Therefore, to sustain such a virtuous circle, more opportunities and incentives should be conscientiously provided to private/international/environmental organisations who are currently periphery actors in the field of low carbon development. In addition, an engagement platform should be designed to empower policy experts and entrepreneurs to critically exert influence instead of accepting pre-set rules or assumptions. In the best case, the governance regime should enable a constant questioning of existing routines and guiding assumptions (Phal-Wostl, 2009). In this sense, paradigms and structural constraints which impede a more effective framing or governance practices could be well recognised.
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8.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above discussion, it is advanced that low carbon policies should expand their scope if an on-track low carbon transition which can keep pace with the challenges that we face, is to be facilitated. Accordingly, policy recommendations focusing on three different areas are out forward so that the government may maximise the potential of urban carbon governance to quickly deliver low carbon transition.
Long-term commitment and sustained policy framework
The first recommendation relates to the need to strengthen sustained regulatory frameworks both within and beyond the city level. The findings of this research highlight how municipal level political endorsement can have a positive impact on institutionalising low carbon development. This insight should encourage municipal leaders to be more optimistic about potential successes and to engage in a long-term oriented framework for low carbon transition. For national policymakers, a long-term and stable policy framework should be provided to hold sub-national government officials more accountable and in order to motivate them to deliver low carbon transition. Moreover, sector-based targets should be separated-out from overall targets to enable better performance evaluation and coordination at the regional level.
A high level of commitment and the good performance of the policy framework do not emerge from nowhere. Even in countries which demonstrate leadership, there is an increasing amount of evidence that shows how the political significance of low carbon development can be adversely impacted by immediate economic and social pressures (Fankhauser et al., 2015; Boykoff, 2015). In this sense, it is worth remembering that the criteria of successful climate change mitigation approaches
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are inherently political (Grundmann, 2007); therefore, it is important to conceptually separate influence from targeted policies and emission changes which are influenced by wider social and economic trends. Moreover, it is important to clarify any trade- offs and not let the level of achievement in an overall indicator mask any unbalanced development or ‘muddling through' activities that occurred in other areas/aspects.
How to achieve this brings forward the second recommendation of this thesis; the need to improve the efficacy of multi-actor governance.
Organisational policies
This thesis considers that a proper governance structure for low carbon development is key to securing long-term commitments and achieving continuous improvements to the policy framework. In order to keep the low carbon transition in motion, organisational policy for low carbon development should be considered as a fundamental field to be strengthened. The identified governance mechanisms behind the institutionalisation of low carbon development, which highlights mutual influences between government leaders, functional government department and non-government, offer a basis for policymakers to formulate organisational policies.
There are three key fields which require policy makers to pay attention to. Firstly, within the government, the profile of the policy unit for low carbon development should be enhanced which allows it to better coordinate relevant work at a strategic level. Secondly, incentive structures beyond the municipal level need to be adjusted to ensure municipal government leaders commit to low carbon development.
Thirdly, organisation policy should focus on providing appropriate infrastructure to improve the quality of multi-stakeholder self-governance and experts’ participation in the policy making process. Particularly, the advisory and monitoring mechanisms should be granted an independent status to reduce the chance of ‘muddling through’ or corruption, as well as making it possible for them to challenge current assumptions and paradigms. In addition to providing appropriate structures, it is also
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necessary to enhance administrative cultures to avoid their negative impact on the functioning of structure.
However, it is concerning that government does not have enough impetus or capacity to carry out such organisational reform. As noted by Hall (2010), support for institutional reform in one area is very often conditioned by prevailing institutions in other areas. In the context of low carbon development, many aspects of organisational reforms are beyond the realm of low carbon governance. Therefore, these recommendations may be overly optimistic. Moreover, if we aim to facilitate such levels of reform, then a change at the ‘backstage’ level regarding social dynamics may be necessary. This leads to the third policy recommendation.
Exploring value-driven as an incentive mechanism for change
Policy interventions which attempt to modulate awareness change are inevitably gradual processes which face high levels of uncertainty. It is also important to address awareness-behaviour gaps before awareness changes bring about significant impacts. At the same time, given the limited capacity of techno-economic based approaches to bring about the necessary level of change, government should move beyond the techno-economic paradigm and draw on alternate framings of problems and solutions. Importantly, policies should focus on improving environmental consciousness to create value-based motivational hooks as important mechanisms for change. At the same time, attention should also be paid to establishing or enhancing the linkages between low carbon development and climate change or environmental regimes. The cultivation of environmental consciousness requires a better understanding of the intrinsic value of environment and human-nature relationship. This cannot be achieved merely through government intervention. Therefore, government should mobilise social agency and provide targeted support to encourage them to contribute.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
Driven by insufficient aggregated efforts at the national level, this research originated with the purpose of enhancing the existent understanding of the potential contribution from subnational action in the context of global climate change, which so far remains uncertain (UNEP, 2017; Hsu et al., 2018). To achieve this, it sought to examine the politico-institutional influence on low carbon development in Chinese cities. In so doing it contributes to empirical research literature of urban carbon governance, as well as to provide insights into current discussions on slow progress at an aggregate level.
The starting point of this research was to review how transition processes were theorised and to consider how the politico-institutional oriented approach can help to improve understanding of urban low carbon development and the role of governance (Research Objective 1). In order to deepen the understanding of how, and to what extent, institutional change actually took place, I introduced structure- agency and institutional theory which provided the analytical tools necessary to aid analysis in this aspect. Guided by the theoretical insights provided in Chapter 2, attention was paid to examining the features of China’s governing system and change to the national policy framework in Chapter 3 (Research Objective 2). These provided a background for understanding the roles and capacities of Chinese cities in the context of low carbon transition.
Given that existing socio-technical studies often focus on national or sectoral scales, establishing a new conceptual framework for guiding empirical study at the city level is necessary. The conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 4 premised that changes to the national policy framework created a series of incentives which altered municipal level governance dynamics. By conceptualising multiple governance processes as fields of structure-agency interaction and regime stability in four
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different sectors as the interaction outcome, it created a field for the dialogue between systemic transition and institutional change at the city level. Drawing on the multilevel governance framework and governance arrangement for socio-technical transition, it also provided a more nuanced analysis of actor interactions and enabled the understanding as to how such interaction dynamics are related to the characteristics of low carbon development. A case study analysis was employed to examine governance dynamics, and the characteristics of low carbon transition.
Given the focus is on actors’ views and their relationships, a qualitative approach was therefore applied.
Following the empirical research protocol designed in Chapter 4, two strands of research were carried out to fulfil research objectives 3 and 4, which are:
Research Objective 3: To identify key actors and understand how low carbon development is governed in Guangzhou by analysing the nature of interactions between key actors.
Research Objective 4: To examine low carbon policies and practices, as well as actors’ views, perceptions and aspirations in the case study area, focusing on the changes that have taken place over the past decade.
First, in-depth interviews with different types of actors involved in the policy community were undertaken, which produced informed and context-based information on actors’ values and perceptions, as well as how they interact to shape low carbon policies and practises. Second, multiple sources of documents (i.e. policy documents, academic articles, and published/unpublished reports) were used throughout to underpin much of the policy analysis and as a constant counterpoint for triangulating the claims and interpretations made by interviewees. The empirical results were presented in Chapters 5 to 7. Based on these findings, several widely relevant topics related to the governance of low carbon development were discussed in Chapter 8. Based on the implications of the findings, how to better exploit cities’ potentials in the context of low carbon transition was discussed (Research Objective
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5).
The overall conclusion drawn based on this study is that whatever potential cities may have in the context of low carbon transition, constructing cities as agents of more transformative change is unlikely to be realised merely through enhancing top- down regulatory and economic approaches, though they are necessary instruments.
More importantly, it is necessary to enable and sustain a self-reinforced feedback loop which maintains high local political endorsement, proactive engagement of non- government actors and continuous improvement of the policy framework.
Otherwise, what can be achieved would merely be a practical response driven by top-down targets and local socio-economic development. This only forms a fragmented and partial solution to climate change challenges.
It is worth reiterating at this juncture that low carbon development is a nascent topic. As pointed out by Thelen and Streeck (2005), the processes of constructing new institutions are marked by backwards and forward. Defining this concept, as well as developing policies and overcoming implementation problems are all allied issues which take time. Therefore, time must be held as a significant contributory factor to existent levels of institutionalisation as well as inconsistent performances. It is recognised that there have been endogenous developments in this field. This makes it important to deepen the understanding as to how such developments took place and how to accelerate such development. In the next part of this final Chapter, I will highlight the theoretical implications of this research, before commenting on the limitations of the research and proffering a series of recommendations for future research that would build on the insights developed herein (Research Objective 5).
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9.1 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNING LOW CARBON TRANSITION
Increased analytical sensitivity to politico-institutional influence
This study has extracted and presented insights for urban carbon governance from a
Chinese context through a conceptual framework which brought the fields of systemic transitions, multilevel governance perspective, institutional theories and urban studies together in closer dialogue. Through this framework, it provides evidence that the emerging institutional structure that manages climate change mitigation at the city level reflect the dominant and long-lasting political-economic goals. Based on the evidence presented, it argues that this kind of power imbalance has important consequences for the less transformative low carbon transition. In this sense, the analysis conducted throughout this thesis has validated the necessity to articulate and address the politico-institutional influence if we want to construct cities as agents for more radical changes. These findings also highlight concerns on viewing cities at the innovation front without understanding political struggles and underpinning conditions, as put forward by Shearmur (2012) and Zhang and Wu
(2018) in wider urban study literature. Therefore, in the future, a more politico- institutional sensitive approach is needed when exploring the roles and capacities of cities in bringing in reforming to address long-term policy issues.
In a broader field, this research adds nuances to current debates that focus on whether China’s governing system is more effective with regards to low carbon transition than those that exist within a western context (Gilley, 2012). The analyses demonstrate that some characteristics of the Chinese governing system do enable effective target delivery. At the same time, however, as the low carbon policy did little to challenge governing structure and norms. Therefore, it must be concluded that the system does not guarantee either consistent or robust progress over time.
This also reminds researchers of the need to pay more attention to the time dimension when examining governance dynamics. 292
An integration of sectoral and territorial perspectives
The second theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it shows the necessity to integrate the territorial perspective to complement the analytical lens in the socio- technical transition framework (Geels, 2002; 2011; Foxon; 2011). So far, the empirical application of the burgeoning field of socio-technical transition has largely focused on sectoral analysis rather than addressing coordination between different sectors at a regional level. This reduces its practical value for planning and coordinating transition beyond the sectoral level and indicating how regime changes can contribute to avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change.
Moreover, while there is a consensus that the transition studies need to be more sensitive to institution, politics and agency issues, most existent contributions only add politico-institutional sensitivity to the social-technical transition framework (Scrase and Smith, 2009; Kern and Mitchell, 2010; Meadowcroft, 2011; Markard et al., 2012; Coenen et al., 2012; Geels, 2014). This thesis addresses this gap by incorporating insights from a multi-level governance perspective (Bulkeley et al., 2011; 2014) and emphasise on examining and comparing politico-institutional influence on different socio-technical regimes within/across territories.
Applying this framework at a city scale provided arguments and specific evidence that national and sectoral level analysis cannot display. Through this, it is able to highlight how governance of transition at regional level involved contests and negotiations between multiple policy goals and involved various actors across scales and sectors. For example, it provides an essential structure to reveal why particular sectoral practices were prioritised and others were not, driven by long-lasting political economic priorities. It also provides more clarity in identifying influential factors and mechanisms that are useful in institutionalising low carbon development at the city level across various sectors. By elaborating upon the linear relationships that exist between different governance processes, a self-reinforcing mechanism based on the interrelations between these governance processes is postulated. This provides a foundation for policy coordination at the city level.
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A more critical approach to governing low carbon transition
Through presenting the low carbon governance dynamics and the characteristics of low carbon development, this thesis also underscores the importance of looking at the current progress in a more critical light. By tracing how the idea of ‘low carbon’ emerged and how it has, thereafter, existed and changed over the past decade, it provides evidence that how local political agenda and power relations colour the structure of the emerging field of low carbon development and marginalise proactive climate change mitigation solutions.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, despite criticism, the policy prescription for low carbon transition is dominated by the discourse of ecological modernisation, for it offers politically acceptable solutions which align to many governments’ development priorities (Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Backstrand et al., 2010; Bailey et al., 2011). The finding of this study highlights the relevance and importance of the criticism to the ecological modernisation discourse in the context of global climate change mitigation. Despite policies and practices prescribed by the ecological modernisation framework can usefully contribute to carbon reduction, they have limited roles in bring in the required level of change. Therefore, there is a need to guard against the assumption that the techno-economic framework which produces co-benefits is the optimal solution. In particular, once ‘low-hanging' fruits that captured by ‘win-win’ scenarios no longer exist, the promotion of low carbon transition would face increasing financial and political challenges.
The findings of this research also act as a reminder as to the extent to which researchers need to be more cautious about the content and motivation of practices that are heralded under the ‘low carbon’ banner, so that they can meticulously distinguish which aspects of ‘low carbon development' were embraced by local actors, and which were disregarded or manipulated. In other words, attention should be paid to whether practices represent a genuine innovation or just a further rolling-
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out of pre-existing practices. A critical approach which goes beyond political realism may be required to allow reflection on the current policy paradigm and power relation (Manuel-Navarrete, 2010). In order to challenge existing social dynamics and utilise them as a source of change, more insights which focus on redefining social value, social-nature relation or state-society relation, need to be drawn from so far marginalised critical intellectual perspectives. For example, framing climate change as a moral priority may bring in more impactful solutions (Brown et al., 2018). These insights provide guidance for future policy analysis and improvements that seek to remove constraints to the realisation of more transformative changes.
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9.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
Research limitations
There are a number of issues inherent within this research which limit the contributions that it can make to the furtherance of existent knowledge. To begin with, the arguments in this research are generated from a single case study, focusing on four domains (low carbon industries, industrial carbon reduction, low carbon building and transport). The use of a single case research design has advantages and limitations. In this instance, the decision to focus on one city was justified by virtue of the research questions. Tracking governance dynamics, the characteristics of low carbon transition and understanding the nature of political-institutional influence required a significant depth of qualitative data over a relatively long time span. Using a single case study was, therefore, appropriate for gaining an in-depth understanding of the mechanisms behind the institutionalisation of carbon reduction issues and for exploring linkages to contextual factors. It would have been difficult to achieve the same level of detail had there been more than one case; especially given the time and finance constraints of a PhD project. Nevertheless, this does not preclude comparative or multiple case study analysis approaches being pursued in the future. Moreover, despite the lack of a direct comparative case to test the validity of the arguments advanced in this thesis, the findings pertaining to governance mechanisms and the ways in which different governance processes impinge on each other, can be seen in other contexts. In the future, therefore, it is suggested that more could be done to compare the case of Guangzhou to other inland Chinese cities or international cities. This would strengthen the transferability of the findings herein to other settings.
Secondly, this study adopted an institutionalist approach and the construction of the case study relied heavily on the personal opinions of interviewees. Much effort was taken to triangulate data, and to interpret the transcripts with sensitivity to the 296
context and interests of the organisations which the interviewees belonged to.
However, in some cases, validating the actors' accounts of the policy process was challenging because many aspects of the policy process were not formally documented or available to the public. In addition, the use of snowball sampling could not fully mitigate against the potential for bias as interviewees would tend to introduce researchers to people with whom they are familiar. It is also likely – though not a certainty, that such people may share similar views. Furthermore, the interviewees were asked to recall and comment on what had happened over a period of time that exceeded a decade. This can weaken the validity of some comments given as a consequence of the potential for memory not always accurately reflect reality.
Lastly, due to a lack of transparency in China, the researcher could not access enough official data. Likewise, since the research subject involves sensitive information and political issue, the fieldwork did not enable the researcher to access all the detailed information that would ideally have liked. For example, I did not get access to internal assessment reports for low carbon programmes or initiatives whilst the collected data also failed to provide details on issues such as how much government expenditure has been allocated to specific sectors or projects during different periods and how much private capital has been raised for low carbon sectors. In order to counteract this limitation, I tried to find as much as evidence as possible from various resources including news reports or interview data to make the arguments advanced within this thesis stronger.
Overall, this research address some of the existent information gaps and has done so by collating some descriptions from both oral communication and written work.
Nevertheless, these perspectives may not be wholly representative. Therefore, the degree of generalisation of arguments should be consciously considered. That said, it is believed that the research findings do help to bring the issue of politico-
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institutional factors into focus and has also directed attention to a more critical perspective by which to assess the unfolding low carbon transition process. It is hoped that this work will encourage others to carry out further research in this direction.
Future research
Given that this thesis is exploratory in nature, further research is required to consolidate the representativeness of the findings that have been presented. Based on these reflections, three general recommendations for future research are made.
The first is a straightforward calling for more case studies to be conducted across more cities which also take into account more sectors (such as waste management). At the same time, there are some emerging issues which could be explored at a more in-depth level in the future. For example, under a more recent strategy of regional development, the governance process of intercity relationships may have a bigger role in shaping the characteristics of urban low carbon development. Moreover, more attention could be paid to examine the role of loose and informal extended networks based on instant message applications and find out how such informal networks can be utilised to better facilitate information flows.
Secondly, using the term ‘low carbon’ in an all-inclusive manner will not facilitate knowledge accumulation and policy progress. Whether ‘low carbon’ is incorporated as a ‘real concern’ or just attaches itself to existing policies and practices will have significant impacts on the future. Therefore, there is a need to conceptually clarify what is meant by ‘low carbon’ as an allied need to deepen the understanding level of institutionalisation. This can be done through enhancing analytical perspectives and collecting richer empirical materials. For example, it would be useful to pay more attention to distinguishing local actors’ willingness and ability to promote more transformative low carbon developments. To achieve this, future research might wish to draw on insights from cognitive science (North, 1996) to explore motivational 298
mechanisms, psychological processes, search heuristics and the belief systems of actors in governing low carbon transition. Meanwhile, a more diverse data collection approach such as stakeholder engagement workshops, action research or questionnaire survey could be applied to produce more in-depth data.
Lastly, further research needs to be carried out to ascertain what specific changes should be made to the institutional structure and administrative culture to hold government leaders more accountable, improve the institutional status of non- government actors, and enhance coordinating capacities. One possible angle may be on: how to exploit social media to provide better interaction platforms which empower and engage wider actors? Given there is still limited understanding as to how to enhance cities’ roles and capacities to bring in a more transformative low carbon transition, these are particularly relevant points and future studies should be rigorously guided by more robust theoretical frameworks.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (TOTAL: 32 INTERVIEWEES)
CATEGORY CODE DATE OF ORGANISATION RECORDED INTERVIEW
Government G-01 9-May-2017 Guangzhou functional government A YES G-02 9-May-2017 Guangzhou functional government B YES G-03 15-May-2017 Guangzhou functional government C NO G-04 19-June-2017 Guangdong functional government A NO G-05 23-June-2017 Guangzhou functional government D YES Public Pub-01 11-May-2017 Office for Building Energy Efficiency and YES organisations Wall Material innovation Pub-02 19-May-2017 Guangdong Energy Conservation Centre NO Pub-03 22-May-2017 Guangzhou Energy Conservation Centre YES Pub-04 19-June-2017 Guangdong Environmental Protection NO Publicity and Education Centre Private Pri-01 26-April-2017 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank YES organisations (Guangdong)
Pri-02 27-April-2017 Guangdong Avi Low Carbon Technology YES Co., Ltd Pri-03 8-May-2017 Green Future and Low Carbon Co., Ltd YES Pri-04 17-May-2017 Ceprei Certification Body YES Pri-05 9-June-2017 SGS Group (Guangzhou) Limited YES Pri-06 9-June-2017 Consultant firm A YES Research U/RI-01 17-April-2017 Sun Yat-Sen University YES institutes and U/RI-02 18-April-2017 Sun Yat-Sen University YES universities U/RI-03 20-April-2017 Jinan University YES U/RI-04 25-May-2017 Edinburg University YES U/RI-05 28-May-2017 Research Centre of Low Carbon YES Technology and Economy U/RI-06 28-May-2017 Sun Yat-Sen University YES U/RI-07 8-June-2017 Research Institute A YES
U/RI-08 22-June-2017 Guangzhou Planning and Design Research YES Institute State-owned SO-01 17-April-2017 State-own enterprise A YES enterprises SO-02 29-June-2017 State-own enterprise B NO Non-profit N-01 26-April-2017 The Institute for Transportation and YES organisations Development Policy N-02 6-May-2017 Harmony Community Foundation NO N-03 7-June-2017 Greenovation Hub (Guangzhou) NO N-04 7-June-2017 Green and Low Carbon Development YES Foundation N-05 26-June-2017 Cross-border Environment Concern NO Association Others M-01 13-April-2017 British Consulate (Guangzhou) YES M-02 2-June-2017 Bloomberg News (New Energy section) NO
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APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Government actors:
1. What are the opportunities, advantages, and challenges for Guangzhou in terms of low carbon transition?
2. What is the motivation in developing a low carbon economy?
3. What are the prioritised fields in terms of low carbon transition?
4. What are the critical initiatives, events and milestones in the context of low carbon economic transition?
5. How the carbon emissions target interacts with economic growth target at a strategic level?
6. How the strategies and policies were formed and where were the ideas from?
7. What kind of specific knowledge do you think is useful in the policy making process?
8. How do you look for new knowledge and what approaches have been carried out to obtain such knowledge (and other resources)?
9. What are the new process and tools are introduced in the policy process?
10. How do you evaluate the current approaches/policy framework of low carbon development?
11. What are the role of your organisation in the policy process?
12. What resource are the most important and how do you get it?
13. Who are the most influential actors?
14. Are there anything you want to do but fail to do so?
15. What are the role of central/provincial government in the policy process?
16. To what extent have the government established collaborative networks within government and with other organisations?
17. What are the common objectives and interests for collaboration?
18. Do you have any suggestion for policy and governance improvement?
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Public interest actors:
1. What are the organisational registration status of your organisation?
2. What are the main organisational activities and what role do you play in the context of low carbon transition?
3. What are the human and financial resources status of your organisation?
4. What are the motivation, goals and challenges for taking part in low carbon development?
5. How do you evaluate the current approaches/policy framework to low carbon economy transition, what are the advantages and disadvantages?
6. What are the new process and tools are introduced in the policy process?
7. Are there any mechanisms around to make you feel easier to take part in the policy process?
8. What kind of specific knowledge do you think is useful in the policy making process?
9. To what extent have you been establishing collaborative networks with other organisations?
10. What are the common objectives and interests for collaboration?
11. How do you take part in the policy process?
12. What are the strategies to influence policy process?
Private sector actors:
1. How does low carbon development bring opportunities and/or burdens to your organisations?
2. Does the policy context clearly show what is required and indicate how the private sector should response?
3. How do you evaluate the current approaches/policy framework to low carbon economy transition, what are the advantages and disadvantages?
4. What are the motivation, goals and challenges for taking part in low carbon economy development?
5. What kind of specific knowledge, platforms and resources do you think is useful for your organisation in the context of low carbon transition?
6. Do you have experiences of networking activities with government, universities or other
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research institutions?
7. Do you have any strategy to influence policy process?
APPENDIX 3 ATTENDED ACTIVITIES
Name of activities Date Held by
Guangzhou energy efficiency and carbon 2017.6.20 GZDRC; GZECC reduction annual conference Stakeholder engagement workshop for 2017.5.24 British Consulate (Guangzhou) Carbon Capture and Storage Technology Carbon accounting practices seminar 2017.6.9 China Emission Exchange (Guangzhou) Guangdong Green Finance Forum 2017.6.16 GZFB
Guangdong Green Development seminar 2017.6.23 Harmony Community series Foundation
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APPENDIX 4 NATIONAL POLICY DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Policy title (Chinese) Policy title (English) Year Sector Policy type
十大重点节能工程实施 Opinions on The Ten Key Energy- 2006 Industry- Guidance 意见 Saving Projects energy efficiency
国家中长期科学和技术 National Medium- And Long-Term 2006 Technology Work 发展规划纲要(2006- Science and Technology plan 2020 年) Development Plan (2006-2020)
重点耗能企业能效水平 Guidelines on Implementing 2007 Industry- Regulatio 对标活动实施办法 Energy Efficiency Benchmarking energy n Activities for Key Energy- efficiency Consuming Enterprises
节约能源法 Energy Conservation Law 2007 Energy Law efficiency
节能减排统计监测及考 Guidelines on Monitoring and 2007 General Regulatio 核实施方案和办法 Assessment of Energy n Conservation and Emission Reduction
中国应对气候变化科技 China's Special Action on Climate 2007 Technology Action 专项行动 Change Science and Technology plan
建立政府强制采购节能 Notice on Establishing a 2007 General Regulatio 产品制度的通知 Compulsory Purchasing System of n Energy-Saving Products for Government
关于进一步规范重污染 Notice on Enhancing Regulation 2007 Industry- Work 行业生产经营公司申请 and Environmental Verification on general plan 上市或再融资环境保护 Heavy Pollution Industry for 核查工作的通知 Listing or Refinancing
生态工业园区建设规划 Guidelines to The Preparation of 2008 Industry- Guidance 编制指南 Eco-Industrial Park Construction general Planning
城市轨道交通建设项目 Environmental Protection 2008 Transport Specific 竣工环境保护验收技术 Technical Specification on measure 规范 Completion Acceptance for Urban Rail Transit Projects
国家可持续发展实验区 Management Measures on 2008 Pilot Regulatio 管理办法 National Sustainable n
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Development Experimental Area
循环经济促进法 Circular Economy Promotion Law 2008 Industry- Law general
关于推动外商投资企业 Opinions on Promoting Foreign 2008 Industry- Guidance 开展节能减排工作的若 Investment Enterprises to Carry energy 干意见 Out Energy Saving and Emission efficiency Reduction Work
关于加强外商投资节能 Notice on Strengthening Energy 2008 Industry- Regulatio 环保统计工作的通知 Conservation and Environmental energy n Protection Survey on Foreign efficiency Investment Projects
公共建筑节能改造技术 Technical Specification for Energy 2009 Building- Specific 规范 Saving Renovation of Public energy measure Buildings efficiency
居住建筑节能检测标准 Residential Building Energy-Saving 2010 Building- Specific Testing Standards energy measure efficiency
关于开展低碳省区和低 Notice on Piloting Low-Carbon 2010 Pilot Work 碳城市试点工作的通知 Provinces and Low-Carbon Cities plan
合同能源管理技术通则 General Opinions on Contract 2010 Industry- Specific Energy Management energy measure efficiency
关于进一步做好支持节 Opinions on Further Supporting 2010 Energy Guidance 能减排和淘汰落后产能 Energy Conservation, Emission efficiency- 金融服务工作的意见 Reduction and Outdated Capacity finance Elimination Through Financial Services
关于开展重点用能行业 Notice on Implementing Energy 2010 Industry- Regulatio 能效水平对标达标活动 Efficiency Benchmarking Activities energy n 的通知 for Key Energy-Consuming efficiency Enterprises
关于进一步加强中小企 Opinions on Further 2010 Industry- Guidance 业节能减排工作的指导 Strengthening Energy energy 意见 Conservation and Emission efficiency Reduction Work of SMEs
关于促进节能服务产业 Notice on Promoting the 2010 Industry- Regulatio 发展增值税营业税和企 Development for Energy-Saving development n 业所得税政策问题的通 Service Industry Through Taxing 知 Policies
329
合同能源管理项目财政 Interim Measures of The Financial 2010 Industry- Regulatio 奖励资金管理暂行办法 Reward on Contract Energy ESCO n Management Projects
关于发挥试点示范作用 Notice on Enhancing the Role of 2010 Pilot Guidance 为实现“十一五”节能减 Pilot To Realize The 11th FYP Goal 排目标作贡献的通知 Of Energy Saving And Emission Reduction
关于财政奖励合同能源 Supplementary Notice on 2010 Industry- Regulatio 管理项目有关事项的补 Financial Reward on Contract ESCO n 充通知 Energy Management Project
关于立即组织开展全国 Notice on National Electricity 2010 Energy-price Work 电力价格大检查的通知 Price Inspection plan
关于清理对高耗能企业 Notice on Cleaning Up 2010 Industry- Regulatio 优惠电价等问题的通知 Preferential Electricity Prices for energy n Energy-Intensive Enterprises efficiency
关于完善差别电价政策 Opinions on Improvement of 2010 Energy-price Guidance 意见 Differential Electricity Price
电力需求侧管理办法 Measures for Power Demand Side 2010 Demand side Guidance Management
关于进一步加强淘汰落 Notice on Further Strengthening 2010 Industrial- Work 后产能工作的通知 the Work of Eliminating Outdated phasing out plan Production Capacity
关于加快推行节能服务 Notice on Accelerating the 2010 Industry- Work 产业发展的意见 Development on Energy Saving esco plan Service Industry
民用建筑绿色设计规范 Civil Design Green Design Code 2011 Building Specific measure
固定资产投资项目节能 Interim Measures for Energy 2011 Energy Specific 评估和审查暂行办法 Conservation Assessment for efficiency- measure Fixed Asset Investment Projects investment
可再生能源发展基金征 Interim Measures for The 2011 Renewable Specific 收使用管理暂行办法 Collection and Use of Renewable energy measure Energy Development Funds
关于做好工业领域电力 Guidance on Improving Power 2011 Industrial Guidance 需求侧管理工作的指导 Demand Side Management in The 意见 Industrial Sector
330
淘汰落后产能中央财政 Management Measures for The 2011 Industrial- Economic 奖励资金管理办法 Central Funds for Eliminating phasing out Outdated Production Capacity
节能技术改造财政奖励 Management Measures for The 2011 Industry- Economic 资金管理办法 Government Funds for Energy energy Saving Technology Upgrade efficiency
关于“十二五”期间流通 12th FYP Guidance on Energy 2011 Service Guidance 服务业节能减排工作的 Saving and Emission Reduction sector- 指导意见 Work in Circulation Service energy Industry efficiency
关于开展碳排放权交易 Notice on Launching the Pilot 2011 Pilot Work 试点工作的通知 Work on Carbon Emissions plan Trading
万家企业节能低碳行动 Implementation Plan For ‘Top 2011 Industry- Work 实施方 10,000’ Enterprises Energy Saving energy plan and Low Carbon Action efficiency
电网企业实施电力需求 Responsibility Assessment Plan 2011 Energy Regulatio 侧管理目标责任考核方 for Power Grid Enterprises to n 案(试行) Implement Power Demand Side Management (Trial)
th “十二五”节能减排综合 12 FYP Energy Saving and 2011 Energy Work 性工作方案的 Emission Reduction efficiency plan Comprehensive Work Plan
th “十二五”控制温室气体 12 FYP For Greenhouse Gas 2011 Carbon Work 排放工作方案的 Emissions Control plan
绿色信贷指引 Green Credit Guidelines 2012 Finance Guidance
关于加强化工园区环境 Opinions on Strengthening 2012 Industry- Guidance 保护工作的意见 Environmental Protection Work in general Chemical Industry Parks
电力需求侧管理城市综 Interim Measures for The Central 2012 General Economic 合试点工作中央财政奖 Financial Incentive Funds for The 励资金管理暂行办法 Pilot of Power Demand Side Management Cities
关于开展第二批国家低 Notice on Launching the Second 2012 Pilot Work 碳省区和低碳城市试点 Batch of National Low Carbon plan 工作的通知 Provinces and Low Carbon Cities Pilot
331
关于进一步加强万家企 Notice on Further Strengthening 2012 Industry- Regulatio 业能源利用状况报告工 the Reporting On ‘Top-10,000’ energy n 作的通知 Enterprises efficiency
万家企业节能低碳行动 List and Targets Of ‘Top-10,000’ 2012 Industry- Regulatio 企业名单及节能量目标 Energy-Saving and Low-Carbon energy n Enterprises efficiency
万家企业节能目标责任 Implementation Plan For ‘Top- 2012 Industry- Regulatio 考核实施方案 10,000’ Enterprises Responsibility energy n Assessment efficiency
温室气体自愿减排交易 Interim Measures for The 2012 Carbon Regulatio 管理暂行办法 Voluntary Emission Trading n
关于加强万家企业能源 Notice on Strengthening the 2012 Industry- Guidance 管理体系建设工作的通 Energy Management System For energy 知 ‘Top-10,000’ Enterprises efficiency
百项能效标准推进工程 100 Energy Efficiency Standards 2012 Energy Work Promotion Project efficiency plan
th “十二五”国家战略性新 12 FYP For Strategic Emerging 2012 Industry- Work 兴产业发展规划 Industries general plan
关于组织开展国家低碳 Notice on Organizing the Pilot 2013 Pilot Work 工业园区试点工作的通 Work of The National Low-Carbon plan 知 Industrial Park
首批10个行业企业温室 Notice on First Batch Of 10 2013 Industry- Informati 气体排放核算方法与报 Industries’ Enterprise Greenhouse general on 告指南(试行) Gas Emission Accounting Methods and Reporting Guidelines (Trial)
国家重点节能技术推广 National Key Energy Conservation 2013 Technology- Informati 目录 (第六批) Technology Promotion Catalogue energy on (Sixth Batch) efficiency
低碳产品认证管理暂行 Interim Measures for The Low 2013 Industrial Regulatio 办法 Carbon Product Certification n
全国生态保护与建设规 National Ecological Protection and 2013 General Work 划（2013-2020） Construction Plan (2013-2020) plan
分布式发电管理暂行办 Interim Management Measures 2013 Decentralise Regulatio 法 for Distributed Generation d energy n
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十二五绿色建筑和绿色 12th FYP Green Building and Green 2013 Building Work 生态城区发展规划 Ecological City Development Plan plan
国家碳捕集与封存科技 Carbon Capture and Storage 2013 Carbon Work 发展专项规划 Technology Development Plan capture plan
加快推进绿色循环低碳 Guideline for Accelerating the 2013 Transport Guidance 交通运输发展指导意见 Development Of Green Recycling And Low Carbon Transportation
中共中央关于全面深化 Decision of The Central 2013 General Guidance 改革若干重大问题的决 Committee Of The Communist 定 Party On Several Major Issues Concerning Comprehensive Reform
能源发展战略行动计划 Energy Development Strategic 2014 Energy Work (2014-2020年) Action Plan (2014-2020) plan
工业企业温室气体排放 Industrial Enterprise Greenhouse 2014 Industrial Specific 数据质量管理技术规范 Gas Emission Data Quality measure Management Technical Specification
关于运用价格手段促进 Notice on Using of Price Means to 2014 Industrial Economic 水泥行业产业结构调整 Promote Industrial Structure 有关事项的通知 Adjustment Of The Cement Industry
2014-2015年节能减排低 Action Plan for Energy 2014 Energy Work 碳发展行动方案 Conservation, Emission Reduction efficiency plan and Low Carbon Development Plan For 2014-2015
关于开展低碳社区试点 Notice on Launching Low Carbon 2014 Community Work 工作的通知 Pilot Communities plan
能源发展战略行动计划 Energy Development Strategic 2014 Energy Work Action Plan plan
加快新能源汽车推广应 Opinions on Accelerating the 2014 Industry- Guidance 用的指导意见 Application of New Energy development Vehicles
企业绿色采购指南 Corporate Green Purchasing 2014 Demand side Guidance Guidelines
碳排放权交易管理暂行 Interim Measures for The 2014 Industrial Regulatio 办法 Management of Carbon Emissions n Trading
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重点地区煤炭消费减量 Interim Measures for Substitution 2014 Energy Regulatio 替代管理暂行方法 of Coal Consumption in Key Areas n
关于开展2014年度单位 Notice on Carrying Out the 2014 Carbon Regulatio 国内生产总值二氧化碳 Assessment on Domestic Carbon n 排放降低目标责任考核 Emission Reduction Target In 2014 评估的通知
国家应对气候变化规划 National Climate Change Plan 2014 General Work 2014-2020 2014-2020 plan
关于做好国家电力需求 Notice on Improving National 2014 Demand side Work 侧管理平台建设和应用 Power Demand Side Management plan 工作的通知 Platform Application
关于印发第二批4个行业 Notice on Issuing the Second 2014 Industrial Informati 企业温室气体排放核算 Batch of Accounting Methods and on 方法与报告指南（试 Reporting Guidelines for 行）的通知 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Of Four Industries (Trial)
2014能源工作指导意见 2014 Energy Work Guidance 2014 Energy Guidance
全国工业能效指南 National Industrial Energy 2014 Industry- Guidance Efficiency Guide energy efficiency
关于加快推进生态文明 Opinions on Accelerating the 2015 General Guidance 建设的意见 Construction of Ecological Civilization
国家重点推广的低碳技 National Key Low-Carbon 2015 Multiple Informati 术目录 Technology Catalogue on
党政领导干部生态环境 Method for Investigating the 2015 General Regulatio 损害责任追究方法 Responsibility of Ecological and n Environmental Damages of Leading Cadres
节能减排补助资金管理 Interim Measures for The Energy 2015 Energy Regulatio 暂行办法 Saving and Emission Reduction efficiency n Subsidy
关于加快电动汽车充电 Opinions on Accelerating the 2015 Industry- Guidance 基础设施建设的指导意 Construction of Electric Vehicle development 见 Charging Infrastructure
工业领域煤炭清洁高效 Industrial Clean Coal and Efficient 2015 Industrial Action 利用行动计划 Use Action Plan plan
关于改善电力运行调节 Opinions on Improving the 2015 Renewable Guidance 促进清洁能源多发满发 Regulation of Power Operation energy 的指导意见 and Promoting the Full Supply of
334
Clean Energy
关于促进智能电网发展 Opinions on Promoting the 2015 Energy Guidance 的指导意见 Development of Smart Grids
关于开展可再生能源就 Notice on Launching Local 2015 Renewable Guidance 近消纳试点的通知 Renewable Energy Pilots energy
绿色债券发行指引 Green Bond Issuance Guidelines 2015 General Guidance
关于完善陆上风电光伏 Notice on Improving the 2015 Renewable Work 发电上网标杆电价政策 Electricity Price Policy for Onshore energy plan 的通知 Wind and Photovoltaic Power Generation
关于做好2015年煤炭行 Notice on Improving the 2015 Industrial- Work 业淘汰落后产能工作的 Performance Of Eliminating phasing out plan 通知 Backward Capacity In Coal Industry In 2015
关于推进新能源微电网 Opinions on Promoting the 2015 Energy Guidance 示范项目建设的指导意 Construction of New Energy Micro 见 Grid Demonstration Projects
2015年光伏发电建设实 Notice on Implementation Plan 2015 Renewable Work 施方案的通知 for The Construction of energy plan Photovoltaic Power Generation In 2015
国家能源局关于做好 Notice of The National Energy 2015 Renewable Work 2015年度风电并网消纳 Administration on Doing a Good energy plan 有关工作的通知 Job in Wind Power Grid Connected In 2015
发电企业煤电节能减排 Upgrade and Reconstruction Tasks 2015 Industry- Work 升级改造目标任务 for Coal-Fired Power Generation energy plan Enterprises for Energy Saving and efficiency Emission Reduction
关于下达2015年电力行 Notice on Eliminating Backward 2015 Industrial- Work 业淘汰落后产能目标任 Capacity in The Power Industry In phasing out plan 务的通知 2015
电动汽车充电基础设施 Electric Vehicle Charging 2015 Industry- Guidance 发展指南2015-2020 Infrastructure Development Guide development 2015-2020
2015年工业绿色发展专 2015 Industrial Green 2015 Industrial Action 项行动实施方案 Development Special plan Implementation Plan
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关于做好淘汰落后和过 Notice on Improving the 2015 Industrial- Work 剩产能相关工作的通知 Performance of Eliminating phasing out plan Backward and Excess Capacity
关于十三五新能源汽车 Notice on the 13th FYP New 2015 Industry- Work 充电基础设施奖励政策 Energy Vehicle Charging development plan 及加强新能源汽车推广 Infrastructure Reward Policy and 应用的通知 Strengthening the Promotion of New Energy Vehicles
关于开展新能源汽车推 Notice on Carrying Out 2015 Industry- Work 广应用核查工作的通知 Verification Work on The development plan Promotion and Application Of New Energy Vehicles
关于2016-2020年新能源 Notice on The Financial Support 2015 Industry- Guidance 汽车推广应用财政支持 For The Promotion Of New Energy development 政策的通知 Vehicles In 2016-2020
关于加快推动生活方式 Opinions on Promoting Green 2015 Demand side Guidance 绿色化的实施意见 Lifestyles
关于组织开展低碳节能 Implementation Plan for 2015 Demand side Action 绿色流通行动的实施方 Organizing Low-Carbon Energy- plan 案 Saving Green Circulation Actions
2015工业绿色发展专项 Implementation Plan of the 2015 2015 Industrial Action 行动实施方案 Industrial Green Development plan Special Action
构建绿色金融体系的指 Opinions on Building a Green 2016 General Guidance 导意见 Financial System
城市适应气候变化行动 Urban Climate Change Action Plan 2016 General Work 方案 plan
低碳产品认证目录（第 Low Carbon Product Catalogue 2016 Technical Informati 二批） (Second Batch) on
“十三五”控制温室气体 13th FYP Of Greenhouse Gas 2016 Comprehensi Work 排放工作方案 Emissions Control ve plan
产业结构调整指导目录 Industrial Structure Adjustment 2016 Industrial Guidance 2011 （2013修订） Catalogue 2011 (Revised 2013)
关于健全生态保护补偿 Opinions on Improving the 2016 General Guidance 机制的意见 Compensation Mechanism for Ecological Protection
关于切实做好全国碳排 Notice on Improving National 2016 Carbon Work 放权交易市场启动重点 Carbon Emissions Trading Market plan 工作的通知
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关于促进绿色消费的指 Guidance on Promoting Green 2016 Demand side Guidance 导意见 Consumption
十三五控制温室气体排 13 FYP For Controlling 2016 General Work 放实施方案 Greenhouse Gas Emissions plan
国家重点节能低碳技术 National Key Energy Saving Low 2017 Technical Informati 推广目录 Carbon Technology Promotion on Catalogue
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APPENDIX 5 DOCUMENTS COLLECTED FOR GUANGZHOU CASE
Policy title Policy title (English Year Code Source (Chinese) translation) 广州市环境保护 十 11th FYP for 2007 DOC-01 www.gz.gov.cn/gzgov/s 一五专项规划 Environmental 2884/200612/2662754. Protection in Guangzhou shtml City
广州市能源发展十 11th FYP for Energy 2007 DOC-02 www.gz.gov.cn/gzgov/s 一五专项规划 Development in 2884/200612/2662754. Guangzhou City shtml
广州市新能源和可 Guangzhou’s New 2008 DOC-03 https://wenku.baidu.co 再生能源发展规划 Energy and Renewable m/view/5d2afe3467ec (2008-2020) Energy Development 102de2bd897d.html Plan
广州市节能工作实 ‘Guangzhou Energy 2008 DOC-04 http://www.gzplan.gov. 施方案 Conservation cn/gzplan/s15717/2013 Implementation Plan 05/2LIWM3KN58Q5CSL Y9EA9UJVZKJH06JVZ.sh tml 广州市小火电机组 Action Plan for shutting 2008 DOC-05 http://www.gdep.gov.c 关停方案 down small thermal n/zlkz/wzlkz/201008/t2 power plant’ 0100806_79774.html
广州市半导体照明 Guangzhou’s 2010 DOC-06 https://wenku.baidu.co 产业发展规划 Semiconductor Lighting m/view/48885166f533 （2010-2020） Industry Development 5a8102d220a2.html Plan 关于大力发展低碳 Opinions on Developing 2010 DOC-07 http://www.gz.gov.cn/g 经济的指导意见 a Low Carbon Economy zgov/s2811/201009/69 in Guangzhou (2011- 4228.shtml 2015) 广州市公共机构建 Three-year Action Plan 2011 DOC-08 http://www.gzplan.gov. 筑节能三年行动方 for Building Green Public cn/gzplan/jnfgbz/list2_ 案 Institutions in 4.shtml Guangzhou City
广州市十二五节能 12th FYP for 2012 DOC-09 https://www.gz.gov.cn/ 规划 Guangzhou’s Energy publicfiles/business/.../ Conservation 5/doc94487.doc
关于推进低碳发展 Implementation 2012 DOC-10 http://www.gz.gov.cn/g 建设生态城市的实 Opinions on Promoting zgov/s2884/201210/10 施意见 Low-carbon 05195.shtml Development and Building an Ecological City 关于加快发展绿色 Notice on accelerating 2012 DOC-11 https://wenku.baidu.co the development of m/view/383fef64caaed 338
建筑发展的通告 green buildings d3383c4d3c5
广州市十二五节能 work plan for 2013 DOC-12 http://www.gz.gov.cn/g 减排工作方案 Guangzhou’s Energy zgov/s2884/201306/24 Conservation and 18465.shtml Emission Reduction 广州新能源汽车发 Action Plan for 2013 DOC-13 https://www.d1ev.com 展行动方案 Developing New Energy /news/zhengce/21549 Vehicles
广州市绿色建筑和 Guangzhou Green 2013 DOC-14 http://www.gz.gov.cn/g 建筑节能管理规定 Building and Building zgov/s8263/201303/21 Energy Conservation 34605.shtml Regulations
广州市绿色建筑行 Guangzhou Green 2014 DOC-15 http://www.gz.gov.cn/g 动实施方案 Building Action zgov/s2812/201410/27 Implementation Plan 63877.shtml
广东省碳排放试行 Guangdong Province 2014 DOC-16 http://www.cnemission 管理办法 Carbon Emissions .com/article/zcfg/gdszc Management Measures wj/201401/201401000 (Trial) 00638.shtml
广东省国家低碳省 Investigation Report on 2015 DOC-17 http://www.ncsc.org.cn 区试点工作调研报 National Low Carbon /yjcg/dybg/201505/t20 告 Pilot Province of 150529_609606.shtml Guangdong
广州市节能专项资 Guangzhou Municipal 2016 DOC-18 www.gz.gov.cn/sofpro/ 金管理办法 Energy Conservation otherproject/.../doc_13 Special Fund 02060665565_0.doc Management Measures
广州市交通运输行 Guangzhou Energy 2016 DOC-19 http://www.gzjt.gov.cn 业节能减排低碳发 Saving and Emission /gzjt/dtjt/201703/a5aaf 展工作方案 Reduction Work Plan for 5e125d442fdaa386b5f Transport Sector 1338a632.shtml
2017年广东国家低 Key points for National 2017 DOC-20 http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/ 碳省试点工作要点 Low Carbon Pilot dtjj/201704/t20170426 Province in Guangdong _845464.html
广州新能源汽车推 Guangzhou New Energy 2017 DOC-21 http://www.gz.gov.cn/g 广工作计划 Vehicle Development zgov/s2812/201711/3b Work Plan (2017-2020) 174f8a3bc543e9ada32 5e79509b08a.shtml 广州市十三 五节能 13th FYP for Energy 2017 DOC-22 www.tanpaifang.com/z 降碳规划 Efficiency and Carbon hengcefagui/2017/050
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Reduction 459245.html
广州市十三 五 能源 13th FYP for Energy 2017 DOC-23 http://www.gz.gov.cn/g 发展规划 Development zgov/snzc/201711/b3a 452cf66a9480f8f83ef9 8d29dc6d0.shtml
广州市公共机构合 Notice of Guangzhou 2018 DOC-24 http://www.gz.gov.cn/g 同能源管理办法的 Municipal Public zgov/s2812/201803/91 通知 Institute Contract Energy c1ee0d68a84ec181017 Management Measures a2a4df627f3.shtml
广州市绿色金融与 Plan for Building a Green 2018 DOC-25 http://zwgk.gd.gov.cn/ 改革创新试验区实 Financial Reform and 006939748/201805/t2 施方案 Innovation Pilot Area in 0180516_765150.html Guangzhou
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APPENDIX 6 CITED STATISTICS INDICATORS AND SOURCES
Indicators:
- overall GHG emission (CO2 equivalent) in China
- energy intensity level in China
- overall GHG emission (CO2 equivalent) in Guangzhou
- GHG emissions in various fields in Guangzhou
- break down of emissions from energy activities in Guangzhou
- energy consumption by sectors in Guangzhou
- carbon intensity in Guangzhou
- total electricity consumption and purchased electricity in Guangzhou
Sources:
- National Statistics Year Book
- Guangzhou statistics yearbooks
- Website of Guangzhou Statistics Bureau
- Guangdong statistics yearbooks
- Guangzhou FYPs
- Website of the Guangdong Low Carbon Association
- The China Low Carbon Yearbook from Guangzhou Library
- Published reports by government departments and research institutes
- Unpublished reports provided by interviewee U/RI-07
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APPENDIX 7 UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS
Name of document Name of document (English Year Code Source (Chinese) translation)
针对重点耗能单位 Guidelines for energy-saving work 2008 DOC-A Provided by 节能工作的指引 in key energy-consuming units Pub-03
广州中新知识城规 Guangzhou Sino-Singapore 2010 DOC-B Provided by 划咨询与服务专题 Knowledge City Planning Pub-05 研究 Consulting Research Report
十一五政府工作报 11th FYP government report – 2011 DOC-C Provided by 告-节能减排（幻灯 energy efficiency and emission Pub-03 片） reduction (PowerPoints)
广州市低碳社区宣 Guangzhou Low Carbon 2011 DOC-D Provided by 传册 Community Brochure N-02
十二五节能工作动 Minutes of the 12th Five-Year 2012 DOC-E Provided by 员大会会议纪要 Energy Conservation Work Pub-03 Mobilization Conference
碳普惠启动方案 Start-up plan for Carbon exchange 2013 DOC-F Provided by platform for individual and family Pri-04
广州市低碳社区项 Guangzhou Low Carbon 2013 DOC-G Provided by 目验收报告 (幻灯片) Community Project Acceptance N-02 Report (PowerPoint)
节能信息系统建设 Interim report on energy-saving 2014 DOC-H Provided by 中期报告 information system construction Pub-03
十二五节能减排工 Reporting Materials for 12th FYP 2016 DOC-I Provided by 作汇报材料 Energy Saving and Emission G-01 Reduction Work
碳普惠技术性设计 Seminar minutes on the technical 2016 DOC-J Provided by 方案研讨会会议纪 design of Carbon exchange Pri-04 要 platform for individual and family
关于开发性金融支 Research Notice on Making 2016 DOC-K Provided by 持广州市绿色发展 Inclusive Finance Support Green SO-01 的调研通知 Development in Guangzhou
广州市节能工作成 Summary of Guangzhou’s energy- 2017 DOC-L Provided by 果(幻灯片) saving work (PowerPoint) G-01
广州网约车新政实 Guangzhou Shared Vehicles 2017 DOC-M Provided by 施效果评估报告 Evaluation Report N-01
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广州温室气体排放 Report on Guangzhou’s GHG 2017 DOC-N Provided by 报告 emissions U/RI-07
中英央行绿色金融 Minutes of the Sino-British Central 2018 DOC-O Provided by 联合研讨会会议纪 Bank Green Finance Joint Seminar M-01 要
APPENDIX 8 LIST OF USED CODES
Communication platform Challenges Policy guidance
Influence of leader support Network stability Implementation issues
Market actors’ business strategies Risk-adverse Incentives
Additional administrative efforts Monitoring Internal resources
Design of leadership groups Intrinsic values External resources
Effectiveness of leadership groups Co-benefits Conflict of interests
Reasons for involving experts Consensus seeking Binding targets
Collaboration between cities Public buildings Policy roll back
Bottom-up Economic efficiency Economic growth
‘Low carbon’ consideration in policy making Residential buildings Personal relationship
Scale up/out of demonstration projects Reasons for additional work Small-sized enterprises
Low carbon technologies Motivation and interest Responsibility and tasks
Strategies to influence policy -government actor -government actor
-public organisation -public organisation
-private actor -private actor
-research institute -research institute
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