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INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS The future of Australian defence strategy A paper based on a presentation to the Institute on 29 August 2017 by Adam Lockyer Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University1

Defence strategists have developed a range of alternative defence strategies for Australia, but they point in different directions. Lockyer presents a conceptual framework for evaluating defence strategies; then applies this framework to the strategic options advanced by four leading Australian scholars and finds that no one option passes his test of ‘good’ strategy. Lockyer concludes by proposing a new Australian defence strategy that would pass his ‘good’ strategy test. Key words: defence policy; defence strategy; defence doctrine; strategic interests; strategic objectives; strategic options; strategy evaluation; Indo-Pacific Arc; Australia; China; India.

It is becoming increasing clear that Australia is in • Defence doctrine is the organisational culture of need of a new defence policy and strategy that better the military force. reflect the new distribution of regional military power and Defence policy is what, traditionally, is in Australia’s better respond to the changing threats. Fortunately, Defence white papers. It lays out what tasks Australia’s Australia’s leading strategic thinkers have made many military power will be directed towards achieving [e.g. persuasive suggestions; indeed, there is a smorgasbord upholding the ‘international rules-based order’ (Defence of different options. The problem is that they all point in 2016) or defending Australia’s ‘northern approaches’ very different directions. I will begin by suggesting a new (Defence 1987) etc.]. Defence policy also decides where means of evaluating defence strategy options. I will then finite resources will be directed – every procurement apply this framework to the leading alternatives. The decision includes an opportunity cost. evaluation technique finds that all the leading defence Defence strategy is how military power (created by options have severe limitations. Finally, I will begin to policy) will be used to achieve the strategic objectives build a new defence strategy for Australia that would (defined by policy). It is important to note that pass the test of a ‘good’ defence strategy. This paper is defence strategy is different from strategy. It would be based upon my recent book military Australia’s Defence awkward to describe Operation Desert Storm in 1991 as Strategy: Evaluating Alternatives for a Contested Asia a defence strategy. Defence strategy is the use of force in (Lockyer 2017). If you would like a fuller discussion of peacetime. Defence strategy is thus closely related to anything I touch upon herein, the book would be the different deterrence strategies (Lockyer and Cohen place to go. 2017). It is the use of force during peacetime that makes nasty things less likely to occur and, if they do, to be less Definitions severe. First, we must clarify what we mean by ‘defence strategy’. Despite defence strategy being different from Defence doctrine is how the force intends to fight. For ‘defence policy’ and ‘defence doctrine’, they are often example, Army has been doing a lot of good work on a treated as synonyms in the defence studies literature. It new ‘maritime strategy’ for Australia. Essentially, they is common, for example, to hear the ‘Defence of want to pump saltwater in the veins of our soldiers. It is a Australia’ approach (Dibb 1986; Defence 1987) referred good idea. But it is not a strategy. It is a doctrine – how to as a policy, and/or a strategy, and/or a doctrine – we intend to fight. Defence strategy, in contrast, is how sometimes even by the same author in the same paper. force is applied to make opponents less likely to threaten Which is it? strategic interests. • Defence policy is the translation of strategic interests into strategic objectives and the organi - Alternative Strategic Options for Australia sation of the military capabilities (e.g. decisions I will now briefly sketch some of the main defence around procurement, basing, budget and force options available to Australia. If you would like a more structure). nuanced discussion of each, I would point you towards • Defence strategy is application of available mili - the book (Lockyer 2017). tary power to mitigate threats to strategic interests. Option 1: Defence of Australia Policy The Defence of Australia policy argues that the 1E-mail: [email protected] Australian continent is the ultimate strategic interest and,

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thus, should also be the primary strategic objective of in Syria, Russia in the Ukraine, or China in the South defence policy and strategy. There are two subsequent China Sea. defence strategy options. The first has historically been The ‘threat-oriented’ approach, in contrast, focuses on advanced by Paul Dibb (1986, 2006) who has argued China as the regional revisionist power and suggests that that Australia should deter other states from threatening Australia should partner with other status-quo Australia by making it physically impossible for them to democratic regional powers (namely, the United States, do so: “Don’t try because you can’t do it”. Australia can Japan and India) to maintain the regional power balance use its favourable geography (air-sea gap) and tech - (Brown and Medcalf 2013). nological edge to shoot-down or sink any attacking force The distinction between ‘order-oriented’ and ‘threat- as they try to cross Australia’s northern moat. This is oriented’ status quo is important as they prescribe very essentially an ‘anti-access’ strategy and attempts to different defence strategies. Evans’ approach would achieve sea control. focus on fighting alongside the United States on Hugh White (2012) agrees broadly with Dibb, except expeditionary operations and, thus, the Australian thinks that the bar is unnecessarily high and un- Defence Force should focus on a ‘maritime strategy’, achievable in a far more military-capable region. White amphibious warfare and a large expeditionary army. The submits that all Australia needs to achieve is ‘sea denial’, ‘threat-oriented’ approach is more concerned with sea not ‘sea control’. An aggressor will be deterred from and air power (Exercise Malabar2 during peacetime and attacking if the seas are too unsafe for them to project Australia’s contribution to ‘Air-Sea Battle’ in war as high-value surface ships into the waters around Australia. described further on). This is an ‘area denial’ strategy: “Don’t try, it is too risky”. Note: discussion of Chinese strategy normally groups Option 4: Security-based Defence Policy anti-access/area-denial together, but as the Dibb-White Alan Dupont (2003) argues that the Australian military distinction makes clear, they are different defence should be equipped and readied to perform the tasks that strategies. they actually do: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, hybrid warfare3 and confronting ‘new’ security chal - lengers. Dupont has long asked: “who exactly is going to Option 2: Flexible Deterrent Policy Ross Babbage (2008) has long argued that Aust- attack Australia?” The answer, according to Dupont, are ralia’s long coastline, small population and relatively terrorists and non-state actors, not China, India or small defence forces makes defending the Australian Indonesia. continent futile. An enemy will always be able to find an unprotected stretch of coastline. If you cannot rely upon How would we know a good defence strategy from the shield, you must lean more heavily upon the sword. a bad one? Babbage advocates for a defence strategy based upon The reason why all these alternatives have been deterrence by punishment. Australia should equip itself influential for so long is that they are all persuasive and with capabilities that could “rip an arm off a giant” ( none are easily dismissed out-of-hand. But we need e.g. some way of evaluating good and bad defence cyber, long-range special forces, ballistic missiles, strategies. I argue that we need to draw upon the Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, ). etc. fundamental definition of stra tegy to test the essence of The deterrent message is clear: “Don’t try, because our each approach. The defi nition of strategy has remained response will hurt you more than any gain you can pretty consistent for hundreds of years, most definitions possibly achieve”. typically explain that it is the marshalling of available resources to achieve a high-end policy goal in the face of Option 3: Status Quo Defence Policy a thinking opponent who will . Consequently, there The defence policy argues that Australia is react status quo is not one, but three tests for a good strategy. not under any immediate threat of attack. Consequently, 1. Goal Consistency: How closely do the goals of the it breaks from Options 1 and 2 by not making the defence defence strategy pair with the defence policy of the Australian mainland its primary strategic objective. objectives? Instead, it argues that as long as the United States 2. Foil Test: Has the defence strategy taken into remains the sole remaining superpower and the balance consideration the likely counter-strategies of of power in the region remains stable, Australia will friends and opponents? remain secure. It is called the ‘status quo’ policy because it aims to maintain the international status quo – not because it is arguing for the in Australian status quo 2Exercise Malabar is an annual naval exercise involving India, Japan and defence policy. There are two associated defence the United States. The Howard Government committed Australia to strategies. participating in the 2007 Exercise Malabar and the Quadrilateral Security The ‘order-oriented’ defence strategy is most closely Dialogue. The Rudd Government, however, withdraw Australia believing – correctly – that the exercise is part of India’s and Japan’s containment linked to the work of Michael Evans (2005). Evans argues strategy of China. The Abbott Government (a keen supporter of the order- that challenges to the liberal international order need to oriented status quo approach) was apparently very keen for Australia to be confronted. Australia’s military power should buttress re-enter the exercise and security dialogue – but was removed from power before anything came of it. United States power, by helping it confront ideological 3Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, and strategic challengers – whether they be Islamic State irregular warfare and cyberwarfare.

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3. Workability Test: Can the strategy feasibly achieve 3. the Melanesian Arc; the aim of the policy with the resources that have 4. continental South-East Asia; and been made available? 5. a favourable international order upheld by an amicable superpower. Evaluation of Australia’s Alternative Strategic The Australian mainland will always be the ultimate Options strategic interest. The Indo-Pacific Arc (sometimes called When we apply these three tests to the current suite Australia’s northern approaches) is the maritime gateway of defence options (Table 1), it emerges that Hugh between the Indian and Pacific oceans and captures White’s area denial is the only ‘good’ defence strategy Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. The Melanesian Arc and, even then, it is because the defence policy that is curves around from East Timor, to Papua New Guinea, associated with the strategy is incredibly generous – the Vanuatu and Fiji. These two arcs are to Australia what the defence budget is imagined to double to 4 per cent of “Low Countries” are to Britain or the Korean Peninsula is GDP; and it would also double the number of Australia’s to Japan. If a great power were to establish a base, or attack submarines and air-superiority fighters. gain access to a base, within these regions, then the threat of a conventional military attack on Australia would Table 1: Good and bad Australian defence strategies (adopted from Lockyer 2017: 114) significantly increase. Next, no great power should gain control over continental South-East Asia. The final strate - gic interest is a stable global order.

Strategic Objectives To this point, we are tracking along a similar geopolitical logic used by both Paul Dibb and Hugh White. Except, both Dibb and White say that because the Australian mainland is the ultimate strategic interest it ought to also be Australia’s primary strategic objective. This misunderstands how strategic interests are converted into strategic objectives. Formulating a New Strategic Option Strategic objectives are the ultimate ends of defence from First Principles policy and strategy. Defence planners decide which So, despite the smorgasbord, we are left without a strategic interests should become the primary strategic good defence strategy option. How would we build a objective, secondary strategic objective, tertiary strategic defence strategy from first principles? Let us begin objective . Not all strategic interests will be converted with two definitions, strategic interests and strategic etc into strategic objectives as: 1) the threats are beyond the objectives. military power of the state to mitigate; or 2) there is no credible threat to the strategic interest. Strategic Interests Clearly, there is no credible threat to the Australian Strategic interests are those elements within a state’s mainland of a conventional military attack within the time geopolitical outlook that, if threatened, would significantly horizon of the current strategic guidance. increase the likelihood of a conventional military attack. The same, however, is not true of the Indo-Pacific Arc Strategic interests tend to be enduring, if not per ma- (Map 1). China is currently expanding its sphere of naval nent, realities of a state. It never ceases to surprise me influence through the South China Sea. India is when walking the battlefields of Europe how many have cementing its sphere of naval influence in the Bay of been fought on the same pieces of dirt – decades or Bengal. These two emerging great power rivals look even centuries apart. destined to compete for influence through the Indo- Britain’s strategic interests, for instance, have Pacific Arc. Indeed, the maritime gateway between the remained remarkably consistent over the centuries. First, Indian and Pacific oceans is certain to become some of the British Isles and the seas that surround them are its the most valuable strategic real estate in the 21st century. foremost strategic interest. Second, are the Low Countries as they represent the best jumping off point for an attack on the British Isles. If they were to fall to a rival great power, the likelihood of a conventional military attack would significantly increase. Third is that no single great power gains control over continental Europe – to this end, Britain has fought with the Germans and the Russians against the French, with the French and the Russians against the Germans, and fought a Cold War with the French and the Germans against the Russians. Being a maritime state, Australia’s strategic interests follow a similar pattern: 1. the Australian mainland and its littoral seas; Map 1: The Indo-Pacific Region showing the emerging spheres of 2. the Indo-Pacific Arc; naval influence of India and China [adopted from Lockyer 2017: 210]

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This new reality requires Australia to reconceptualise enhanced air and sea surveillance through the Indo- the region. Historically, Australian defence planners have Pacific gateway. Security co-operation between the IP4 thought about the Indo-Pacific Arc along its vertical-axis. will need to be gradual. In the past, the regional powers It has been believed to be the most likely route an have frequently viewed each other as sources of threat, attacking force would take to get to Australia (à la 1942, not co-operation. In the 21st century, however, there is a which is embedded in the idea of Australia’s ‘northern ap- clear convergence of interests between the IP4 on both proaches’). In the 21st century, however, the Indo-Pacific security and strategic matters, and trust and co-operation Arc’s value will be along its horizontal-axis. This requires continue to improve. Over time, the Indo-Pacific gateway a deep rethink of some of Australia’s fundamental should be developed into a gauntlet where all air and sea assumptions. vessels are tracked as they make their journey through the region and the regional powers possess the Australia’s Primary Strategic Objective capabilities to determine whether the traverser should be I argue that the Indo-Pacific Arc should be translated intercepted or granted free passage. into Australia’s primary strategic objective. Although great power rivalry and competition is inevitable as China Deterring Conventional Military Means and India rise to take their respective places within the A less likely approach would be for a great power to new international order, Australia must attempt to extend its sphere of influence through conventional decrease the risk that this argy-bargy does not happen in military means. This might be opportunistic (e.g. the its front-yard. Both China and India will continue to push other great powers are preoccupied), a surprise attack or back against the influence of other great powers and a pre-emptive attack. Either way, Australia’s defence attempt to carve out security zones for themselves – this strategy should be aimed at increasing the costs to any is what emerging great powers do. But the Indo-Pacific great power that made a grab for enhanced regional Arc must be a buffer zone between the spheres of influence through conventional means. To deter this influence not a zone of competition. contingency, Australia should employ a Corbettian How can Australia’s defence strategy deter the great maritime defence strategy.5 powers from competing in the Indo-Pacific Arc? This There has been a debate in Washington, DC, on how depends on how the great power intends on expanding to fight a future war against China. By far the most their influence through the region. They broadly have two popular and developed strategy is ‘Air-Sea Battle’. This options: measures short of war (MSOW); or, conventional strategy is influenced by the thinking of Alfred Mahan6. It operations. involves engaging the Chinese fleet, comprehensively defeating it, and pushing through to attack the Chinese Deterring Measures Short of War anti-access/area denial assets. Thus, the United States MSOW is the most likely means that a great power navy and air force would reclaim control through the first would apply. China has used it successfully in the South and second island chains7. China Sea and, more broadly, Iran and Russia have both A second option, however, is a ‘distant blockage’. This recently expanded their spheres of influence through option is in the tradition of Julian Corbett and argues that MSOW strategies. China has used fishing boats, the United States does not need to fight the Chinese coastguard vessels, oilrigs and energy exploration, front-on. Eighty per cent of Chinese energy traverses diplomacy and political intrusion to expand its sphere of through the Malacca Strait (only about a kilometre wide influence. at its narrowest point). The United States Navy could States can do things within their spheres of influence strangle China from afar. Beijing calls this its ‘Malacca that would provoke resistance from other great powers if Dilemma’. they did the same actions outside their spheres of influence. For instance, establishing a naval base within a great power’s sphere of influence would not provoke retaliation, but the same action elsewhere in the world might. So, what China has done successfully in the South 5Sir Julian Corbett was a late 19th-early 20th century British naval historian and geostrategist. What mattered to Corbett was not Mahan's concept of China Sea is to gradually raise the bar – fishing boats are physical destruction of the enemy (a decisive battle), but the act of replaced by coastguard vessels which, in turn, are passage on the sea. Corbett defined two fundamental methods of replaced by warships. Each escalation is never enough obtaining control of the maritime lines of communication: the physical to provoke a conventional military response by the United destruction or capture of enemy warships and merchantmen; and/or a naval blockade. Today, this concept is defined as sea control (Corbett States and the other great powers and, progressively, the 1988). area is incorporated into its sphere of influence. 6Alfred Thayer Mahan was a 19th century United States naval officer, historian and geostrategist. His key themes included: the value of central To deter MSOW, Australia should look to partner with position, enabling rapid re-deployment of forces from one ocean to 4 the other Indo-Pacific nations (the IP4 ) to increase the another; the criticality of choke points, such as straits; the need to control difficulty of MSOW approaches through the region (see maritime lines of communication; the blockade; and the decisive battle Lockyer 2015). Above all else, there needs to be (Mahan 1890, 1892). 7The First Island Chain refers to the first chain of major archipelagos out from the East Asian mainland and encompasses the Okhotsk, Japan, Yellow, East China and South China Seas. The Second Island Chain runs from Japan through Guam to western New Guinea and encompasses the 4Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Philippines Sea.

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A Corbettian strategy has not been popular in The Author: Dr Adam Lockyer is a senior lecturer in Washington, DC, in part because it is likely to provoke security studies at Macquarie University. His research the precise behaviour it is trying to deter. When Beijing interests span civil wars and insurgencies, post-conflict sees that Washington is planning to strangle it through reconstruction, United States foreign policy and Aust- the Indo-Pacific Arc, it is likely to urgently move to ralian defence strategy. He has published widely on ensure that it can keep its merchant fleet safe through these issues. He was the 2015 Fulbright Scholar in the straits. This means incorporating the region into its United States-Australian alliance studies at Georgetown expanding sphere of influence. In short, if Washington University; and has held positions in defence studies at adopted a Corbettian strategy it may provoke the exact the University of New South Wales, the United States reaction it is trying to deter. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, and at the Australia, however, is not the United States. Beijing Center for Strategic and International Studies in would not fear that Australia would unilaterally and pre- Washington, DC. He was the Lowy Institute's 2008 emptively attempt to disrupt Chinese maritime trade or Thaw ley Scholar in international security. He also attack and dismantle its ‘string of pearls’8 through the served for four years in the Australian Army. [Photo of Dr Indian Ocean. Despite Australia being unlikely to strike Lockyer: Macquarie University] first, there should be little doubt in Beijing, or New Delhi, or Tokyo, or elsewhere, that if they were to make an References aggressive play for influence through the Indo-Pacific Babbage, Ross (2008). Learning to walk amongst giants: Arc, Canberra would make sure that their respective the new defence white paper. Security Challenges 4 ‘Malacca Dilemmas’ became a reality. (1), 13 – 20. A Corbettian maritime strategy plays to Australia’s Brown, James, and Medcalf, Rory (2013). Fixing strengths. The Army has been looking to improve its Australia’s incredible defence policy. Lowy Analysis ability to perform amphibious operations (as mentioned Paper, 8 October 2013 (Lowy Institute for Inter- earlier, they call this a maritime strategy, but it is in fact national Policy: Sydney). a maritime doctrine). A Corbettian maritime strategy Corbett, Julian S. (1988). Some principles of maritime would give direction to these endeavours. strategy. Classics of Seapower series. (United States Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, MD). Conclusion Defence, Department of (1987). The defence of Australia The main strategic thinkers in Australia have all been (Australian Government Publishing Service: engaged in robust debates for decades without Canberra). seemingly being able to land a punch on each other. So, Defence, Department of (2016). 2016 defence white the debate goes around-and-around in circles without paper (Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra). advancing. The reason, I argue, is that they are often Dibb, Paul (1986). Review of Australia’s defence capa - using the same nomenclature to mean different things bilities (Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra). (e.g. defence strategy) or using terms as synonymous. This imprecise language has often led to sloppy Dibb, Paul (2006). Is strategic geography relevant to thinking. To advance the debate, in a constructive way, Australia’s current defence policy? Australian Journal some broad agreement on what is being debated is of International Affairs 60 (2), 247 – 264. required. I made an initial suggestion on how to define Dupont, Alan (2003). Transformation or stagnation: the key terms in the debate. Second, we need to have rethinking Australia’s defence. Australian Journal of some agreement on what a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ defence International Affairs 57 (1), 55 – 76. strategy would be for Australia. I used the logic of Evans, Michael (2005). The tyranny of dissonance: strategy to develop an evaluation tool. Finally, I Australia’s strategic culture and way of war, 1901- attempted to build a new defence strategy for Australia 2005. Study Paper No. 306 (Land Warfare Studies from first principles. Centre: Canberra). None of the above is meant to be definitive. My hope Lockyer, Adam. (2015). An Australian defence policy for is that by suggesting some definitions and a framework a multipolar Asia. Defence Studies 15 (3), 273 – 289. and demonstrating how these could be mobilised to Lockyer, Adam (2017). Australia’s defence strategy: create a new defence strategy, the debate in Australia evaluating alternatives for a contested Asia can advance. I hope that defence scholars can begin to (Melbourne University Press: Melbourne). land punches on each other in order to advance the Lockyer, Adam, and Cohen, Michael D. (2017). Denial debate – even if my work is the boxing bag. strategy in Australian strategic thought. Australian Journal of International Affairs 71 (4), 423 – 439. Mahan, A. T. (1890). The influence of sea power upon history, 1660 – 1783 (Sampson Low: London). Mahan, A. T. (1892). The influence of sea power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793 – 1812 (Sampson Low: London). 8 The ‘String of Pearls’ refers to the network of Chinese military and White, Hugh (2012). A middling power: why Australia’s commercial facilities along its sea lines of communication from China to Port Sudan. defence is all at sea. The Monthly, September 2012.

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