Master’s Thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University

‘Traitors, Snitches, Collaborators’ Analysing In-Group Criticism Towards Peace Organisations in Intractable Conflict

Marthe Hiev Hamidi Abd Abad

Spring 2019 Supervised by Kristine Höglund Wordcount: 22.994

Abstract. Identity serves two functions: it orders our environment, and it gives us a sense of certainty. The role played by identity in the intractability of conflict has recently sparked a new line of research. Drawing on insights from social psychological research, I argue that intractable conflict circumstances bolster social identities and create rigid group norms, which affect the vulnerability of peace movement organizations that operate in this context. I hypothesize that peace organizations that disregard prominent group beliefs regarding the conflict, are more likely to be severely criticized at the collective level. For the empirical analysis, I turn to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a typical case of on-going intractable conflict. I compare the results of a qualitative content analysis of expressions of in-group criticism towards local Israeli peace organisations in local media reporting, within the framework of group beliefs (2005-2018). The results indicate an overall trend of in-group criticism towards peace organisations in Israel, based on which suggestions for advances to the theory are made.

Table of Contents List of Abbreviations ...... 4 1. Introduction ...... 5 2. Previous Literature: Peace Organisations in Conflict ...... 8 2.1 Peace movements and peace organisations ...... 9 2.2 In-Group Criticism Explained ...... 10 Uncertainty Reduction ...... 11 2.3 The Socio-Psychological Infrastructure in Intractable Conflict ...... 12 Hypotheses ...... 17 3. Research Design ...... 18 Case selection ...... 18 Operationalization & Method ...... 19 Timeframe ...... 21 Sources ...... 21 4. Analysis: Prominent Group Beliefs & (Severe) In-Group Criticism ...... 23 Background to the Israeli Palestinian-conflict ...... 23 The First and Second Intifada ...... 24 4.1 Breaking the Silence ...... 26 IV: Assessment of Group Beliefs ...... 27 DV: Expressions of Criticism against Breaking the Silence ...... 29 Foreign Agents ...... 30 Silencing Breaking the Silence? ...... 34 Breaking the Silence Must Be Silenced ...... 36 4.2 B’tselem – The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories ...... 38 IV: Assessment of Group Beliefs ...... 39 DV: Expressions of Criticism Against B’tselem ...... 42 B’tselem’s disengagement from the IDF ...... 46 ‘Traitor’: El-Ad Addressing the UN Security Council ...... 47 Who is B’tselem Serving? ...... 49 4.3 Zochrot ...... 52 IV: Assessment of Group Beliefs ...... 53 DV: Expressions of Criticism against Zochrot ...... 54 The Nakba Film Festival ...... 56

2 4.4 Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights ...... 58 IV: Assessment of Group Beliefs ...... 59 DV: Expressions of criticism against Yesh Din ...... 60 5. Comparative case analysis ...... 63 Literature ...... 68

Acknowledgements

3

Acknowledgements

This thesis would have not come to fruition with out the help of a number of people. First, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Kristine Höglund, my advisor, for guiding me through the exploratory stage of this project to its final touches. Thank you for your readiness to share your insights and expertise, as well as your frequent encouragement to stay concentrated and motivated.

To Clea, Yaloe and Matthias, I would like to thank you for reading and providing useful comments on the earlier drafts of this thesis.

To David, thank you for your long-distance love.

My utmost gratitude belongs to Josephien and Asghar, my mother and father, for their invaluable support and welcome distractions whenever in doubt.

List of Abbreviations BtS Breaking the Silence

IDF Israel Defense Forces

MK Member of Knesset (Israeli Parliament)

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OPT Occupied Palestinian Territories

PM Prime Minister

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

4 1. Introduction In the summer of 2016, the Israeli Parliament passed the ‘Foreign Government NGO Funding Transparency Bill’, which legally enforces non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Israel to publish their sources of funding, if more than half of it derives from foreign political entities. According to officials, “[the law tries] to deal with the phenomenon of NGOs who represent in Israel, in a non-transparent manner, the outside interests of foreign states, while pretending to be a domestic organisation concerned with the interests of the Israeli public.”1 Consequent to the passing of this Bill, the Israeli government published a list of 20 somewhat NGO’s that were affected, and now legally obliged to publish their sources of funding. Several local and international NGO’s and activists reacted critically to the official discourse surrounding the passing of this legislation, as they felt that listed organisations were being portrayed as foreign agents to the Israeli public, thereby turning it into a ‘blacklist’. Notably, it is not only the right-wing Israeli government that maligns peace organisations in Israel; criticism towards this specific type of organisation also exists within broader civil society23. Take for example the Israeli whistleblowing veteran organisation ‘Breaking the Silence’, which profiles itself as a Jewish organisation consisting of Israeli veterans that “wages peace” by ‘exposing the public to the daily reality of the occupation’ through the publishing of testimonies by former soldiers about their activities while they were on military duty’ (website Breaking the Silence). After being asked how the Israeli public regards ‘Breaking the Silence’ (BtS), a 25-year-old male, who generally does not vote and who took part in Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014 replied “Not good. In Israel, ‘Breaking the Silence’ is regarded very badly. They are accused of publishing false testimonies (Anonymous source, personal communication, March 16, 2019).” When told that the Israeli Defence Force’s (IDF) censor first has to approve all testimonies before BtS can publish them, this respondent merely shrugged his shoulders.

1 https://www.menschenrechte.org/en/2018/07/12/the-struggle-of-human-rights-ngos-and-the-funding- transparency-law-in-israel/ 2 In July 2018, a bill was passed in the Israeli Parliament to prevent the organisation from entering school premises2 In July 2018, or meeti a billng wasstudents passed to in give the lectures Israeli Parliament about their to experiences prevent the in organisation the Israeli Defence from entering Forces. school premises or meeting students to give lectures about their experiences in the Israeli Defence Forces. (https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Breaking-the-Silence-bill-passed-into-law-562699 , last retrieved 10- 05-2019.) 3 ‘Breaking the Silence Must Be Silenced, Jerusalem Post website https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Breaking-the-Silence-must-be-silenced-515721, last retrieved 20-05- 2019.)

5 His answer indicates multiple things: (1) that this particular person, having served in the Israeli army himself, has a great trust in the way the IDF operates – even when the IDF’s very morality is on dispute – and believes that his environment views the IDF similarly4, (2) that BtS is broadly seen as the ‘bad guy’, because they publish false testimonies to defame the IDF (and the soldiers who have fought and fallen for the country) and (3) that this particular organisation has been much-discussed amongst Israelis. Indeed, BtS has been severely criticized through a governmental incitement campaign that started since the organisation was founded in 2004, as well as in the media – which portray the veteran organisation as being ‘anti-Israel’. Most notable, however, is the amount of death wishes and treason-accusations directed towards BtS on social media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram5. In comparison to BtS, other local peace organisations seemingly receive lesser scorn from the Israeli public. For example, public criticism directed towards the Israel’s oldest peace organisation ‘Peace Now’, which also aims to raise awareness about the conflict and human rights violations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), is much more moderate than is the case for ‘Breaking the Silence’. In an effort to understand this variation in criticism, this thesis zooms in on one particular puzzle: ‘in- group’ criticism (criticism coming from within the social group one identifies with, in this case Israel) towards local peace organisations that are working in a context of intractable conflict. Logically speaking, criticism towards peace organisations may seem odd, as these organisations generally work to attain peace for all of those involved, by resolving the conflict in a peaceful manner – without the use of violent means, that is. One would especially expect that the demanding, stressful and exhausting nature of intractable conflicts, and their costliness in material and human terms, would motivate society members to be supportive of peace movements, rather than ostracize them. The question that arises, then, is: ‘In a context of intractable conflict, why are some peace organisations severely criticized by in-group society, while others are not?’ To answer this question, I bring together insights from the literature on social identity theory, the development of a socio-psychological infrastructure in intractable conflict, group beliefs, and peace movement organisations.

4 Israeli Democracy Index 2017, website https://en.idi.org.il/articles/20283. 5 Breaking the Silence, website https://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/media/48369.

6 Based on theory, I argue that a context of conflict influences the process whereby individuals self-categorize themselves into social groups (Roccas and Brewer 2002; Hogg 2000). In a context of intractable conflict, the self-categorization process bolsters a monolithic group identity consisting of rigid group beliefs and norms. These group beliefs and norms, the so-called ethos of conflict, develop based on within-group consensus and become an integral part of the group’s socio-psychological repertoire, which serves to strengthen and maintain the social identity of the in-group in the face of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal 2007). Drawing from Hogg’s (2000) uncertainty-reduction model, I hypothesize that when a peace organisation is perceived to disregard prominent group beliefs and norms under circumstances of intractable conflict, it is likely that other group members will severely criticize/reject this organisation. To examine this hypothesis and formulated sub-hypotheses, this study draws from several rich sources of qualitative data: data from national news outlets, academic scholarship and policy documents. To explore variation in criticism towards peace organisations in the Israeli context, I rely on an interpretative analysis of group beliefs in the mission statements of selected peace organisations, as well as a content analysis of national newspaper articles that report on expressions of severe criticism or express criticism towards these organisations. The aim of this study is to analyse whether peace organisations that disregard prominent group beliefs, are criticized more (severely) by in- group society, than peace organisations that do not. Two sub-hypotheses are formulated to explain possible variation in in-group criticism. Following this introduction, Chapter Two commences by briefly reviewing existent scholarship on peace movement organisations and positions the present study in relation to previous research. This is followed by a theoretical discussion on the relevance of Hogg’s (2000) uncertainty-reduction model in explaining in-group criticism and Bar-Tal’s (2007) theory on the development of socio-psychological infrastructure in intractable conflict, thereby presenting the argument for how group beliefs and social identity processes can syndicate to spark severe public criticism towards peace organisations. Chapter Three details the research design including the chosen variables and their operationalization in the qualitative data, as well as the case selection for four Jewish-Israeli peace organisations and methodological choices. Chapter Four presents and discusses the results of the qualitative analysis for each case. Chapter Five entails a comparative analysis, reflects on the methodology, and extends the findings and limitations beyond the intractable context of Israel. The final section of this thesis

7 presents conclusions and suggests implications and avenues for further research.

2. Previous Literature: Peace Organisations in Conflict Peace activism and peace organisations have recently been gaining more attention from scholars and researchers (Schwebel 2008; Nasie, Bar-Tal, en Shnaidman 2014; Fleischmann 2016; Shultziner en Shoshan 2018). At the individual level, studies have previously sought to explain what moves individuals to adopt an activist identity and join a particular social movement for peace (Nasie, Bar-Tal, en Shnaidman 2014). Often, studies of peace activism have been related to the study of social movements, thereby focusing explaining the effectiveness of such movements in a specific context (Benford en Snow 2000; Hermann 2009; White en Demirel-Pegg 2017; Bosi en De Fazio 2017). The earliest examples of social movement studies date back to the American anti-war movement against U.S. involvement in Vietnam of the 1960s6, as well as the nuclear disarmament movement, both of which have arguably played an effective role in the struggle for peace in the world (Schwebel 2008). Moreover, studies of peace organisations have mainly been conducted by the use social movement- and organisational theories to analyse the structures, ideology and tactics of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in peace and conflict resolution. Several researchers have sought to analyse social movement organisations and the effectiveness of their tactics, by using political opportunity frameworks or resource mobilization models (Meyer 2004; White en Demirel-Pegg 2017; Hermann 2009). These approaches draw from the basic notion that social movement organisations respond to resources and to political opportunities and constraints that are available to them in a specific context. Due to a lack in explanatory power of these ‘rational’ approaches to explain collective actions, researchers have also opted for organisational identity theory, in an effort to explain the ‘endogenous’ factors influencing organisational tactics, like the construction and maintenance of a collective organisational identity (Gawerc 2016). As mentioned previously, this analysis does not analyse the effectiveness of tactics used by peace movement organisations, but rather seeks to further understanding of the vulnerability of peace organisations that operate in a context of intractable conflict. Previous research indicates that negative public attitudes towards peace

6 Almost 100,000 anti-war protestors took part in mass demonstrations on 21 October 1967 “The Four Stages of The Antiwar Movement”, website New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/opinion/vietnam-antiwar-movement.html, last visited 15-05- 2019.

8 movements persist in Israel (Gawerc 2016; Fleischmann 2016), as well as in Cyprus (Anastasiou 2002) and in Northern Ireland (Bosi en De Fazio 2017). Although a vast amount of literature on peace movements organisations mentions existence of severe in- group criticism, it has been a relatively understudied topic – which may be due to the lack of analytical power of conventional rational perspectives to explain this particular phenomenon (Kriesberg, Northrup, en Thorson 1989; Halperin 2008). The present study argues that the vulnerability of peace organisations in a context of intractable conflict can be best understood in the broader process of social identity construction for group members. This research seeks to advance understanding of the social identity processes at play in intractable conflict contexts, by studying the empirically unexplored role of group beliefs in generating in-group criticism towards peace movement organisations in Israel. In doing so, this thesis aims to contribute to an existent research gap in the debate on the ‘effectiveness’ of peace organisations, by shedding a light on their vulnerability in intractable contexts. Moreover, this study seeks to develop existent theory by exploring variation in severe public criticism that is directed towards peace organisations that work in intractable contexts of identity-based intractable conflict.

The following sections delineate the theoretical framework of analysis of this thesis, based on Hogg’s uncertainty-reduction theorem (2000) and Bar-Tal’s work on the development of a socio-psychological infrastructure. These theories allow for a phenomenological interpretation of in-group criticism towards peace organisations as a manifestation of social identity processes in a context of intractable conflict.

2.1 Peace movements and peace organisations Peace organisations fall under the definition of a ‘social movement’, which reflects “a conscious, collective, organized attempt to bring about or resist large-scale change in the social order by non-institutional means” (Nasie, Bar-Tal, en Shnaidman 2014: 314). According to Nasie et al., social movements arise from a context where institutionalized means are not perceived to bring about ‘real change’. Although the concepts of a social movement and peace organisation are seemingly nested in one another, Nasie et al. pose that the main difference between a movement and an organisation is the perceived need for a higher level of organized non-institutional pressure, which can express itself in specifically articulated goals, tactics and strategies (Ibid: 314). Like social movements, organisations carry out non-institutional pressure through their dedicated membership.

9 In their research, Nasie et al. conceptualize ‘peace organisations’ in the specific context of intractable conflict, which is generally understood as a type of conflict that is prolonged, characterised by great animosity and vicious cycles of violence, seemingly irreconcilable and self-perpetuating (Kriesberg, 1993, 1995 in Bar-Tal, 1998: 23). Thus, Nasie et al. propose “the struggle for peace in a context of intractable conflict provides a situation that enables the rise of a social movement, with various peace organisations struggling alongside each other to change societal goals and policies that support the continuation of the conflict”. In trying to achieve a change in formal policies, peace organisations are likely to provide frequent resistance to formal authorities (Ibid: 314). It is with regard to the changing of societal goals, that Nasie et al. classify peace organisations as those “organisations attempting to change opinions held by the public on peace-related issues, supporting peaceful conflict resolution, and opposing the use of violence” (Ibid: 314). According to the authors, the changing of public opinion and the beliefs that underlie it is not an easy task for peace organisations, especially not in intractable conflict environments where involved societies develop rigid shared beliefs regarding the conflict, the in-group and the rival. These beliefs are thought to support the continuation of the conflict (see Bar-Tal 2007; Bekerman 2009). As indicated by Nasie et al. 2014, peace organisations that operate in a context of intractable conflict face a significant challenge in attempting to change societal goals and policies regarding the conflict, supposedly more so than peace organisations in other contexts (where conflict is either absent, or tractable). Bar-Tal’s theorem on the development of socio-psychological conditions for societies that are involved in intractable conflict partly addresses this challenge. However, it may be obvious that peace organisations generally walk a thin line with regard to general public opinion, which influences their vulnerability in a specific context – and ultimately also their effectiveness.

2.2 In-Group Criticism Explained The following section explains Hogg’s uncertainty-reduction model in relation to the role played by group norms in the generation of in-group criticism, using a social psychological paradigm (Social Identity Theory). This paradigm also forms the basis for discussing Bar-Tal’s theorem of the development of a socio-psychological infrastructure in intractable conflict. Originally, Social Identity Theory (SIT) was developed as a grand theory to understand intergroup behaviour (Tajfel and Turner 1979). SIT’s central tenet

10 is that people assign (self-categorize) themselves into specific social groups through a process of self-categorization. This process serves two important functions: it cognitively segments and orders the social environment into in-groups and out-groups, thereby allowing individuals to locate or define themselves in their social environment (Trepte and Loy, 2017: 6). According to SIT, individuals describe themselves in terms of the defining characteristics of social groups they psychologically feel like they belong to. This is what constitutes an individual’s social identity – a so-called ‘in-group’.

Uncertainty Reduction Hogg’s (2000) uncertainty-reduction model is a motivational extension to SIT, and will solely be discussed to provide useful insight into the functioning of social identity. Hogg’s basic proposition is that people are intrinsically motivated to ‘pursue’ an identity because the process of self-categorization is a particularly powerful way to reduce subjective uncertainty, since it offers a well defined, consensual and clearly prescriptive in-group ‘prototype’ (an ideal type social identity) that enables the individual to capture meaningful similarities within and differences between groups (Ibid: 233). Subjective uncertainty, in Hogg’s interpretation, is the product of the social comparative context that challenges people’s certainty about their cognitions, perceptions, feelings and behaviours, and ultimately, their certainty about and confidence in their sense of self. Hogg posits that these important perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, feelings and behaviours are anchored in social consensuses that turn them into in-group norms that become central to cognitive prototype of the in-group (Hogg 2000, in Hogg 2006). According to Hogg, the discovery of within group ‘dissensus’ with regard to these norms can be a particularly potent source of uncertainty, which can be solved in various ways (Ibid: 233). At the individual level, group dissensus can be solved by dis-identifying oneself from the group and identify with a different group (Ibid: 233). There is also an option to redefine the in-group prototype by marginalizing contenders and making them appear highly dissident from the prototypical group identity. This would include making the self-image appear highly representative of the desired social identity (Haslam e.a. 2014: 149). At the group level, this process of redefining the in-group identity can be done through a strategy of rejecting deviates by excluding dissenters. This latter notion is relevant to the present study of in-group criticism towards peace organisations. According to Hogg, in-group norms are relatively adaptive perceptions of the social world and our place within it: they work to reduce uncertainty

11 and regulate social perception and social interaction (Hogg and Reid 2006: 13). The ‘relative adaptability’ of in-group norms implies how ‘radicalism’ can be understood at the group level: if severe ‘within group dissensus’ is discovered, and the group chooses to ostracize those who are considered dissenters, the adaptability of group norms has supposedly been stretched to its maximum limit. It follows from Hogg (2000) and Nasie et al (2014) that a peace organisation in intractable conflict is per definition bound to foster prototypical disagreement about the group’s social identity, and therefore a source of uncertainty about relatively important perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, feelings and behaviours for fellow in-group members. Based on SIT and Hogg’s uncertainty-reduction model, it may therefore be expected that non-institutional pressure applied by peace organisations and their membership motivate uncertainty reduction in fellow group members – which can spark social identity processes at the level of the collective, like the ostracizing of ‘dissenters’ through expressions of severe in-group criticism.

2.3 The Socio-Psychological Infrastructure in Intractable Conflict Identity is a contested territory within the field of conflict studies, leaving scholars divided between the psychological benefits of identity and the apparently reiterative role played by identity in the intractability of conflict (Cook-Huffman 2008; Bekerman, Zembylas, and McGlynn 2009; Barber 2009; Bekerman 2009; Hammack 2010). Psychological research has found that a lack of a clear and social identity in human beings is aversive: it has been associated with stress, anxiety and depression at the individual level (Burke & Reitzes 1991 in Hogg, 2000). Similarly, experimental research has found that individuals tend to simplify their social identity complexity in the face of real threat, leading scholars to conclude that conflict situations tend to bolster a specific social identity (Brewer en Roccas 2002: 104). Israeli scholar Daniel Bar-Tal provides an important socio-psychological insight into what he labels the Sociopsychological Foundations of Intergroup Conflict (2007), in an effort to explain how intractable conflict conditions shape group identities. His main argumentation is that groups involved in intractable conflict develop a ‘socio- psychological infrastructure’ to adapt to the conditions of intractable conflicts. This adaptation includes three fundamental challenges, according to Bar-Tal: the fulfilment of needs of group members, (2) dealing with stress, and (3) withstanding the rival (Ibid: 1430). According to Bar-Tal, the ‘socio-psychological’ infrastructure fulfils is made up of

12 a collective memory, an ethos of conflict, as well as a collective emotional orientation. The ethos of conflict and memory of conflict consist of rigid group beliefs, which serves the adaptation of society members to the conditions of the conflict in their individual and collective lives (Ibid: 1434). The basic premise of Bar-Tal’s article is that the socio-psychological infrastructure consists of three basic elements that interrelate: a collective memory, an ethos of conflict, and the collective emotional orientation (Ibid: 1435). He theorizes that these components, which make up the socio-psychological infrastructure (hereafter simply referred to as ‘infrastructure’), develop to address three basic psychological challenges involved in adapting to the circumstances of intractable conflict:

(1) To satisfy needs that remain deprived during intractable conflicts, like psychological needs of safety, positive identity, and so on (see also Tajfel, 1982); (2) To cope with the stress, fears and other negative psychological phenomena that accompany intractable conflict situations and; (3) To adapt means to develop psychological conditions that will be helpful in successfully resisting the rival group in an attempt to win the conflict, or at least not to lose it.

It appears from Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological framework that groups in intergroup conflict have a strongly developed sense of group identity – which is perhaps due to the circumstances of conflict. In Bar-Tal’s conception, two out of three components of the infrastructure (the collective memory and the ethos of conflict) are based on group beliefs, and complemented by what the scholar labels a ‘collective emotional orientation’ of the group. Bar-Tal posits that the group provides cultural frameworks in the shape of context, situations and information against which the emotions of its members arise, thereby turning emotional experiences such as fear or hatred, into a group phenomenon. Furthermore, Bar-Tal the collective memory consists of group beliefs (i.e. cognitions that are shared by society members on topics and issues that are of special concern to group life and contribute to its uniqueness)7, which evolve to present the history of the conflict to society members (Ibid: 1436). This collective memory develops as a narrative over time, and tells about the past in a way that is functional to a society’s

7 According to Bar-Tal, societal beliefs provide the basis for understanding of reality, good communication, interdependence, and coordination of social activities, all of which are necessary for the functioning of the social system.

13 present. The second component of the socio-psychological infrastructure is the ethos of conflict. This is what develops under prolonged intractable conflict, and essentially a narrative about the present: a structure of shared central group beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future (Ibid: 1438). According to Bar-Tal, an ethos of conflict provides a clear picture of the conflict, its needs, purposes and motivations – as well as images of the in-group’s society and the rival’s society. The challenges of intractable conflict lead to the development of group beliefs that comprise the ethos of conflict, which centre around the following themes: (1) the justness of the in-group’s own goals, (2) security, (3) a positive collective self-image, (4) one’s own victimization, (5) delegitimizing the opponent, (6) patriotism, (7) unity and (8) peace. The outlines of these group beliefs are provided as follows:

Justness (1) Justness beliefs outline the group’s goals and establish their justice, as well as provide the rationale for the eruption of the conflict. These beliefs provide a set of reasons drawing from a historical, national, theological or cultural source that assures importance of these goals.

Security (2) The issue of security becomes the main preoccupation of in-group members (Bar-Tal 2007), because intractable conflicts involve continuous and frequent violent clashes. Security thus comes to play a central and determining group value. Security values are expressed in the group’s beliefs concerning personal safety, which constitutes the prevention of loss of life, injury and property damage, as well as national survival, national survival and the conditions that secure this, guarantee achievement of national goals, deter and maintain the enemy. According to Bar-Tal (1998), these security beliefs may pertain to the geopolitical, economic diplomatic, educational or societal domains, like geopolitical boundaries that ensure security, military industries for maintenance of security, or security-related legislature (Ibid: 27).

Delegitimization of the opponent (3)

14 Bar-Tal mentions that a society in intractable conflict develops group beliefs that delegitimize the opponent. This constitutes a process of categorization of out-groups into extremely negative social categories with the purpose of excluding them from recognized out-groups, which act within the framework of accepted values and norms. De-legitimization entails the characterizing of negative traits, the use of political labels like ‘terrorists’ when addressing any members of the out-group, and group comparisons, which all pertain to dehumanization of the opponent.

Positive self-image (4)

According to Bar-Tal (1998), the process whereby the enemy is delegitimized goes hand in hand with group beliefs that create a positive self-image. He states that the intense effort required – e.g. social and military mobilization, and the own group’s perpetration of aggressive and immoral acts, sometimes even atrocities – requires the forceful maintenance of a positive self-image within the in-group. This is done by means of intense self-justification, self-glorification and self-praise. To create a maximum contrast between the own group and the out-group, the ‘Other’, is the goal. Often, attributes such as humaneness, morality, fairness, trustworthiness, courage, heroism and endurance are used for this purpose.

In-group victimization (5) Moreover, a group in intractable conflict believes that the opponent is victimizing it, which is a belief that is formed through a long period of suffering from losses and violence. According to Bar-Tal, beliefs about victimization are supported by other beliefs, like the beliefs about the justness of one’s own goals, as well as the wickedness of the opponent’s goals, the delegitimizing characteristics of the opponent and one’s own positive self-image. In other words, the dichotomous focus on the malicious and evil ‘Other’ and the morally just ‘Self’ leads a society to assume that it is a victim. According to Bar-Tal, beliefs about the own group’s victimization imply that the adversary, who does not only fight for unjust goals, but also uses immoral means to achieve these goals, imposed the conflict on one’s own group. The perception of one’s own victimization is functional to the in-group during intractable conflict (Ibid: 29), because it allots the responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict as well as subsequent acts of violence to the opponent. More so, perceptions of victimization provide the moral power to seek justice and oppose the adversary.

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Patriotism (6) Another group belief mentioned by Bar-Tal is patriotism, which is especially functional to a society in intractable conflict, because patriotic beliefs are thought to increase cohesiveness of the group (Doob, 1964). Moreover, in the name of patriotism, group members can be asked to forego their personal conveniences, wishes or even needs in the service of the larger collective (Somerville, 1981). Patriotism is defined by Bar-Tal (1993: 48) as the “attachment of group members to their group and the country in which they reside”, which is associated with positive evaluation and emotion, is expressed in beliefs connoting contents of love, loyalty and pride. Unless patriotic beliefs are internalized by its members, ‘a society will have difficulty in coping with intractable conflict’ (Stagner, 1967). This may be due to the fact that in times of intractable conflict, patriotism even demands the ultimate sacrifice - the loss of life. In general, therefore, patriotic beliefs have come to serve as an explanation and justify sacrifice (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997).

Unity (7) Beliefs of patriotism closely relate to group beliefs about unity, which centre on the essential requirement to set aside internal fights, controversies, and disagreements in the group in order to unite the group's forces in face of the external threat. These beliefs engender a feeling that all society members support the goals of the conflict and follow the leaders. Moreover, these beliefs function as a means to increase solidarity and cohesiveness in society, in order to mobilize. A lack of unity is detrimental for the struggle with the enemy, because it creates polarization and internal tensions.

Peace (8) Lastly, Bar-Tal developed his idea that beliefs about peace are also functional for societies engaged in intractable conflict: they present the society members, both to themselves and to the world, as peace seeking and -loving. Although this peace is mainly conceived of in Utopian terms, the function of these group beliefs is to provide hope and optimism – a crucial belief to endure the circumstances of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998: 29).

16 These group beliefs that make up the ethos of conflict, in complementation with those beliefs that belong to the group’s collective memory, make up a solid and unifying narrative that the in-group members share. Eventually, these group beliefs come to shape the nature of the group identity, as they imbue it with meaning (Barthel 1996; Oren 2019; Gillis 2018). Based on this discussion of Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological infrastructure, it may be clear that the proliferation of intractable conflict indeed seems to be rooted in the proliferation of competing narratives. In conclusion, this theoretical chapter argued that group members develop a socio-psychological infrastructure that maintains and strengthens the in-group’s social identity, in order to adapt to the conditions of the intractable conflict and withstand the rival. Social identity theory presented the argument that peace organisations, which cause group ‘dissensus’ with regard to prominent collective norms, are likely to be ostracized by fellow group members. After presenting the hypotheses that will guide this analysis, the next chapter details the research design.

Hypotheses This study seeks to answer the research question: ‘In a context of intractable conflict, why are some peace organisations severely criticized by in-group society, while others are not?’ In doing so, this study hypothesizes that the disregarding of prominent group beliefs by peace organisations leads to severe expressions of criticism towards them. Based on the discussed theory, the following main hypothesis is formulated:

H1: The more peace organisations disregard prominent group beliefs relating to the conflict, the more likely it is for these organisations to be severely criticized by in-group society in a context of intractable conflict.

In an effort to understand possible variation in in-group criticism for this case study of Israeli organizations, two more sub-hypotheses were formulated that will possibly allow for advancing the theory on group norms in intractable conflict.

H2: The more a peace organisation disregards group beliefs about security, the more likely it is that this organisation will be severely criticized by in-group society in a context of intractable conflict.

H3: The more a peace organisations disregards group beliefs about in-group victimization, the more likely it is for this organisation to be severely criticized by in-group society in a context of intractable conflict.

17

The sub-hypotheses were formulated based on academic literature that explicitly stressed the centrality of security beliefs in Israeli society (Bar-Tal 1998; Fleischmann 2016; Shavit 2017), as well as the existence of a discourse of historical victimization that applies to the Israeli case (Bar-Tal 1998; Wohl en Branscombe 2008; Yurman 2008). Following these sub-hypotheses, it may be expected that peace organisations that disregards group norms about security and in-group victimization will be criticised more vehemently than others by fellow group members.

3. Research Design Recent history in the Arab-Israeli conflict (2005 - 2018) suggests that the development of a social-psychological infrastructure and (social) identity processes have particularly shaped negative in-group reactions towards peace movement organisations in Israel (Fleischmann 2016, Hermann 2004). This section provides an overview of the methodological choices that were made for this comparative case study of in-group criticism towards peace organisations in intractable conflict. The choice for a qualitative design over a large N-study was due to the exploratory nature of this research of group beliefs and in-group criticism towards peace organisations, thereby looking to advance theory rather than to engage in theory testing. The novelty of this comparative case study of social identity processes lies in its focus on the empirically unexplored role of group beliefs in generating in-group criticism towards peace organisations. I argue that this phenomenon relates to the vulnerability (and necessary strategizing) of peace organisations operating in the broader context of on-going intractable conflict. In line with previous literature on the intractability of conflict and the proliferation of competing narratives (Hammack 2010; Bekerman 2009), this study sought to shed a light on the process whereby group beliefs form into a conflict-supporting narrative/ideology that rejects those educational organisations that are willing to work for peace.

Case selection The decision to select Israel as a case to study in-group criticism towards peace organisations that operate in intractable conflict was made on account of several considerations. As a researcher I had a limited amount of cases to choose from due to personal language restrictions and a lack of data. It should be noted that cases from other intractable conflict contexts, such as Cyprus or Northern Ireland, were initially

18 considered. Aside from a lack of data, many peace organisations in Cyprus and Northern Ireland had ceased to exist, making it hard to evaluate the theory at hand. What would have significantly strengthened the research design of this study would be to include peace organisations from the Israeli and the Palestinian context. The decision to solely focus on Israel was due to the fact that there was no possibility to find Palestinian news outlets that published national news in the English language. In the Israeli case, there was data. Although Israel is a country of nine million people, and 80% of its population speaks Hebrew, English news publications have been growing (Jewish Virtual Library8). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a well-acknowledged and generally considered “typical” case of intractable conflict (Kriesberg, 1993, 1995 in Bar-Tal, 1998: 23). Notwithstanding the inability to include Palestinian peace organisations in this study of in-group criticism towards peace organisations, the choice for Israel is still relevant for making inference to the larger population peace organisations that work in contexts of intractable conflict. As case studies generally include the problem of case selection bias, I used Mill’s most-similar case design method to select peace organisations with similar background conditions (Gerring 2006; Gerring en Cojocaru 2016). All Israeli peace organisations in the case sample were engaged in either advocacy or educational methods to raise awareness and disseminate knowledge about the conflict and human rights violations to the Israeli public and beyond. By educational activities methods, I refer to the holding of lectures in public spaces, conducting of research projects, or the use more interactive methods like the organizing of ‘informational tours’ of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The organisations I selected for this study are ‘Breaking the Silence’, ‘B’tselem’, ‘Yesh Din’ and ‘Zochrot’. Although all cases have similar background conditions, their outcome (the frequency or type of group criticism that is directed at them) may differ due to specific causal factors.

Operationalization & Method The causal mechanism put forth in the theoretical section posits that in-group disagreement about prominent group beliefs leads to uncertainty within the group, which might cause group rejection or ostracizing of peace organisations. To assess this mechanism, I analysed mission statements published by the selected organisations, and

8 The Israeli Press, website Jewish Virtual Library https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-israeli-press, last visited 14-05-2019.

19 purposefully collected media articles on these organisations from local newspapers by searching their digital databases for the period 2005-2018. Through an interpretative analysis of the mission statements of selected peace organisations based on Bar-Tal’s delineation of the eight prominent group beliefs, I analysed how these organisations related to prominent group beliefs in the Israeli context. This process entailed the operationalization of my independent variable ‘disregarding of prominent group beliefs’. The operationalization of the dependent variable of in-group criticism, ‘expressions of rejection/disapproval’, towards peace movement organisations was more challenging, since finding such expressions are largely subjected to the researcher’s interpretation. Assessment of the dependent variable ‘expressions of criticism’ was done inductively as well as systematically, through the use of the ‘Nvivo’ software. The importing and cleaning of my data with Nvivo initially allowed me to get familiarized with the media articles. For my own interpretation, I set out to find expressions of criticism in the news reporting on the selected peace organisations by classifying ‘expressions of criticism’ into types and sources. I determined the frequency of criticism by including both verbal and physical expressions of disapproval (types of criticism), and distinguished between criticism coming from established group members (like politicians or security officials) and criticism coming from private individuals (source of criticism). There appeared to be returning themes in the reporting on expressions of criticism towards all four organisations, which I coded into the nodes: ‘Foreign Agents’, ‘Libel and Slander’, ‘Lies’, ‘Treason’ and ‘Moral Army’. The ‘Foreign Agents’ node consisted solely of references to the concept of a ‘foreign agent’. The node ‘Libel and Slander’ included references to ‘libel, ‘slander(ing)’ and ‘besmirching’. The node ‘Treason’ was coded wider, to include key words like ‘treason’, ‘enemy’, ‘snitching’ as well as ‘mole’ and ‘spy’, and stemming words, like ‘treachery’ and ‘traitor’. The node ‘Lies’ has been coded to include the keywords ‘lies’, ‘lying’ and ‘false’. The node ‘Moral Army’ consisted of references to ‘moral army’, ‘morality’ and ‘moral’. I conducted another search-query with Nvivo to assess whether I would find other contextually relevant expressions of criticism in the collected data, using keywords like ‘criticism’, ‘terror’, ‘controversy’, ‘incitement’, ‘rally’, ‘protest’, ‘radical’, ‘death threats’, ‘criminal’. For example, some peace organisations were accused of ‘supporting terrorism’. Using Nvivo’s ‘query’-function, I was able to systematically trace the frequency of keywords and themes throughout the data. After checking the results of these queries

20 against the context of the articles, I coded these keywords into the existing nodes (themes), which allowed for assessment of patterns in the data. By attributing values to the media articles (year of publication and source – either Ha’aretz or Jerusalem Post), I was able trace how themes developed in time and across sources by visualizing my queries in cross-tabulations. The use of Nvivo arguably enhanced the objectiveness of my data analysis, as it enabled me to keep an oversight on how the study was conducted and how it changed over time.

Timeframe Recent history in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2005 - 2018) suggests that the development of a social-psychological infrastructure and (social) identity processes have particularly shaped negative in-group reactions towards peace movement organisations in Israel (Fleischmann 2016, Hermann 2004). Generally, scholars contend that faith in the peace process eroded amongst the majority of Israelis following the events of the Second Intifada (Hermann 2009; Fleischmann 2016; Nasie, Bar-Tal, en Shnaidman 2014). According to Fleischman, the shift in Israeli public opinion was especially due to the wave of suicide bombings conducted by some Palestinians (Ibid: 363). According to Hermann (2009), the breakdown of the peace talks and the period of increased violence between 2000 and 2005 indicated that without a radical change of the Israeli national ethos, peace was impossible (Hermann 2009 in Nasie et al. 2014: 315). Correspondingly, Dier (2010) observes that many of the Israeli peace groups and organizations that have been established since the beginning of the Second Intifada were characterized by ‘new radical non-institutionalized activities in the public space’ (e.g., Dier, 2010 in Nasi et al.: 315). Based on the idea that the Israeli peace movement radicalized in relation to public opinion the years following the Second Intifada, the present timeframe of this study has been set between 2005 and 2018.

Sources The Israeli media outlets used in this study are the Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz (‘The Nation’). The decision to use data from Ha’aretz and The Jerusalem Post was based on the intention to avoid bias by using media sources that offered a political counterbalance in their reporting on criticism towards Israeli peace organisations. Although there are other newspapers like Yedi’ot Acharonot and Israel HaYom that have a larger reader constituency, the decision to include only Ha’aretz and The Jerusalem Post was made due to the digital accessibility of their respective archives. Both Ha’aretz and The

21 Jerusalem Post are privately owned by large private businesses, and both of these national newspapers publish their editions both in Hebrew and in English. The Jerusalem Post was founded in 1932, and it was the first Israeli media outlet that started publishing its newspapers in English (website New York Times9). It is Israel’s fourth largest independent newspaper with a relatively small circulation (between 15,000 – 40,000), but with an influential reading constituency including the diplomatic community in Israel and foreign journalists based in Israel, as well as many Jewish subscribers overseas (website Jewish Virtual Library10). According to the American media website Allsides11, the Jerusalem Post leans towards the Israeli political centre-right. On its website, the Jerusalem Post states that its readers will “appreciate the Israeli politics section for it’s “un-bias” and zero spin approach to reporting on Israel’s democratic process to avoid confusion” (website Jerusalem Post12). According to the Jewish Virtual Library, an encyclopaedia of Jewish and Israeli history, a Canadian media company bought the Jerusalem Post in 1989, which led to a radical shift in its reporting towards the political right. In the wake of the change in leadership, which led to a more nationalist outlook stance on security matters, a number of the senior (and so-called ‘dovish’13) journalists left (website Jewish Library14). Haaretz was founded in 1918 and is Israel’s oldest independent newspaper. According to its website, Haaretz is a liberally progressive and secular source of news, and has a circulation of 72,000 (100,000 on the weekends)15. In 1997, Haaretz also started publishing its news editions in English. According to the BBC, Ha’aretz’ reader constituency is strictly secular (website BBC16). Moreover, the Ha’aretz editorial leadership brandishes itself as an elitist newspaper with a left-wing ideological stance

9 “Israeli Boom in Media Outlets is a Sign of Trust in the News”, website New Tork Times: https://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/israels-boom-in-media-outlets-is-a-sign-of-distrust-in-the- news, last visited 5-4-2019. 10 https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-israeli-press#Post 11 The American media bias website allsides.com aims to uncover hidden bias by the use of several methods, e.g. blind bias surveys, third party data and community feedback, to reflect the subjective judgment of American people with regard to political bias in news reporting. It ranks the Jerusalem Post as centrist. 12 About, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy, last visited 4-4-2019. 13 The hawk-dove characterisation is a commonly used expression in international relations to describe political positions on the use of military pressure to resolve a conflict. Whereas doves oppose the use of military force; a hawk favours entry into war. 14 ‘The Israeli Press’, website Jewish Virtual Library: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-israeli-press 15 ‘About Ha’aretz’, website Ha’aretz: https://www.haaretz.com/1.5349621, last visited 5-04-2019. 16 ‘The Press in Israel’, website BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4969714.stm, last visited 7- 04-2019.

22 (website News York Post17). The newspaper takes a confrontational stance with regard to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. One columnist from the Jerusalem Post wrote that Amos Schocken, Ha’aretz’ owner and patrician publisher, ‘lives in an utopian fantasy world where thousands of Arab students studying in Israeli universities and thousands of Israeli students studying in Arab universities’. This exemplifies the accusation that Ha’aretz is a newspaper for Israel’s intellectual elite. Moreover, the New York Post noted in 2011 that Schocken is routinely criticized in Israel, where he is labelled “a traitorous radical, an arrogant “post- Zionist”, an aristocrat of old Israel who overlooks Israeli security concerns and only shows disdain for the Orthodox, for the settlers, for all the non-Ha’aretz readers who live in provincial cities”.

4. Analysis: Prominent Group Beliefs & (Severe) In-Group Criticism In the following sections, four separate analyses of in-group criticism will be conducted for each selected case of Israeli peace organizations. For every organisation, the course and the character will be determined based on an inductive interpretation of the organizations’ mission statements in relation to eight group beliefs (Bar-Tal 1998; 2007). Following this, a qualitative content analysis of the newspaper articles that reported on criticism towards selected Israeli peace/human rights organisations outlines public expressions of criticism in relation to specific events. A frequency-count of key words that indicate expression of disapproval of the selected organisations in the public discourse allow for a visual illustration of how this phenomenon has manifested itself within the chosen time frame of analysis (2005-2018). These results are displayed in the tables that are to be found in the appendix of this study. After each case has been examined individually, the next section of this thesis allows for a comparative case analysis of all four cases, followed by a discussion of the results in relation to the theory. The next section will contextualize this study by providing a brief background into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Background to the Israeli Palestinian-conflict The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is generally known as a clash between two different peoples over the same territory. After the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the Partition Plan for Palestine, seeking to divide it into a Jewish State

17 ‘The Dissenters’ (2011), website The New Yorker https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/02/28/the-dissenters, last visited 16-05-2019.

23 and an Arab State, a civil war (1947-1948) broke out between the Jews and the Arabs. This war is now known as the War of Independence in Hebrew and as the Nakba in Arabic (meaning ‘the Catastrophe’). Ultimately, this war led to the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948, as well as the flight or forceful displacement (Israeli and Palestinian accounts differ) of 700,000 Palestinians from what they considered to be their lands (website Jewish Virtual Library18). Ever since the State of Israel was created in 1948, there have been continuous tensions in the region between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In 1967, Israel reacted to Egyptian aggression by striking pre-emptively on June 5, thereby taking out Egypt’s air force (website Jewish Virtual Library19). This marked the beginning of the Six Day War, which would ultimately lead Israeli to occupy all of the territory they had won in battle: Gaza, the Sinai desert, and the West Bank. In 1973 Egypt and Syria coordinate a surprise-attack against Israel in the southern Sinai Desert and the northern Golan heights on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (website Jewish Virtual Library)20. In November 1977, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat informed the Israelis that Egypt was ready for a ‘just peace’21. Following Sadat’s visit, a group of 348 reserve officers and soldiers from combat units wrote an open letter in March 1978 to the Israeli government to make sure this opportunity for peace was not lost (website Peace Now22). This moment signified the birth of Israel’s first peace movement, Shalom Achsav (‘Peace Now’).

The First and Second Intifada In 1982, Israel would return the Sinai to Egypt as a part of a peace treaty that was signed in 1979, meaning that the occupation would continue only in the West Bank and Gaza. In December 1987, spontaneous demonstrations and riots broke out that quickly spread through the West Bank, triggering nonviolent actions like mass boycotts, Palestinians striking from their jobs in Israel, as well as assaults (using rocks, Molotov cocktails and occasionally firearms) on Israelis, marking the First Palestinian Uprising (Said, in

18 ‘Israeli War of Independence’, website Jewish Virtual Library https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israeli-war-of-independence, last visited 16-05-2019. 19 ‘Six Day War’, website Jewish Virtual Library: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-six-day-war, last visited 4-05-2019. 20 ‘Yom Kippur War’, website Jewish Virtual Library https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-yom- kippur-war, last visited 15-05-2019. 21 Sadat’s speech at the Israeli Knesset on 16-03-1977, YouTube https://youtu.be/CsQ0bikGkXg, last visited 13-05-2019. 22 ‘Who we are’, website Peace Now https://peacenow.org.il/en/about-us/who-are-we, last visited 14-05- 2019.

24 Lockman en Beinin 1989: 5). Scholars argue that the First Intifada of the 1980s posed the first real challenge to Israel’s authority, and pushed the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to the centre of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Beitler 2004: xi). That the Palestinians were successful in garnering empathy for their revolt amongst Israelis became clear in 1988, when Peace Now was able to mobilize 50,000-80,000 against the government’s violent response to the Palestinians. The First Intifada ended in negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians in Madrid in 1991, after which a six-year period of peacemaking was initiated that changed the world’s opinion about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Harms en Ferry 2017: 152). As Israel’s biggest peace movement, Peace Now fully supported the Oslo peace process of 1993, as well as a peace treaty that was signed with Jordan in 1994 (website Peace Now23). Following the Oslo peace agreement of 1993, however, Palestinian discontent regarding life under the occupation developed itself in a context of heightened Palestinian animosity and dissatisfaction with the snail pace of the peace process and the breakdown of the Camp David talks of July 2000 (Ibid: 144)24. The Second Intifada significantly changed the relationship of Israelis to Palestinians. The Palestinian version holds that on 28 September 2000, Israeli politician Ariel Sharon started the intifada by making an intentional visit to Temple Mount during his presidential campaign, as a place that is otherwise prohibited religious territory for Jews25. After the first killings of Palestinian demonstrators by Israeli forces, leaders of military groups around the world were calling for jihad26(Ibid: 150). In what becomes a heightened period of violence in which Israeli and Palestinian casualties ratio 1:3, the Second Intifada ends in 2005. On the Israeli side, the Second Palestinian Intifada marks a change in perception of the Palestinians, mainly due to the targeting of Israeli civilians by suicide bombers from October 2000 onwards – causing Israeli public support for the peace process to plummet even more (Beitler, 2005: 149; Peters en Newman 2013: 67; Fleischmann 2016: 363).

23 ‘About us’, website Peace Now https://peacenow.org.il/en/about-us/who-are-we, last visited 5-05- 2019. 24 The Camp David talks took place in July 2000, between then-Israeli PM Ehud Barak (who would later be replaced with Ariel Sharon) and the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. The talks were initiated by the United States. 25 Sharon entered the holy site surrounded by hundreds of armed bodyguards, after warnings that he would exacerbate tensions with Palestinians (Beitler: 143). 26 The Arabic word Jihad refers to a holy war against the enemies of Islam.

25 4.1 Breaking the Silence Founded in 2004 in Jerusalem, ‘Breaking the Silence’ (BtS) is an NGO consisting of veteran combatants who have served in the Israeli military – the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). The organization consists of a board of four people and twelve staff members, and it has a research department, educational department as well as an advocacy and ‘Jewish Diaspora’ department that mainly focuses on a Jewish American audience. In their mission statement (website BtS27), BtS says that it attempts to stimulate public debate about the “price paid for a reality in which young soldiers face a civilian population on a daily basis and are engaged in the control of that population’s everyday life”. Further, the organisation says that its work aims to bring an end to the occupation, by exposing the public to everyday life in the occupied territories. This is done through publication and dissemination of the testimonies of soldiers who serve in the territories, who “witness and participate in military actions that change them immensely”. According to BtS’ mission statement, cases of abuse towards Palestinians, raiding and destruction of property are described as ‘extreme’ and ‘unique’ cases, even though they have been ‘the norm’ for years. BtS argues that the reality that is portrayed through the testimonies of former combatants is different and much grimmer. Even more so, BtS states that the testimonies “display the deterioration of moral standards, which finds expression in the character of the military order and rules of engagement that the state considers justified in the name of Israel’s security”.

“[…] While this reality is well-known to Israeli soldiers and commanders, Israeli society in general continues to turn a blind eye and deny what is being done in its name. Discharged soldiers returning to civilian life discover the gap between the reality they encountered in the territories, and the silence about this reality they find at home. In order to resume civilian life, soldiers have to ignore what they have seen and done. We strive to make heard the voices of these soldiers, pushing Israeli society to face the reality it has created (website BtS).”

BtS collects testimonies from Israeli soldiers who have served in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem since the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000. The organization holds lectures, house meetings, and other public events through the voices of former combatants. Moreover, BtS states on its website that they conduct tours in Hebron, a city consisting of 230,000 Palestinians with a settlement of 850 Jewish settlers living in the

27 Website Breaking the Silence (https://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/about/organization)

26 very centre of the city (website Jewish Virtual Library28), as well as the Hebron Hills. According to the organization, these tours have the aim of giving the Israeli public “access to a reality that exists only minutes away from their homes, but is rarely portrayed in the Israeli media” (About organization, website BtS). With regard to the collection of testimonies, BtS claims that it has collected over 1,000 testimonies to date, and that all of them are “meticulously researched by crosschecking facts with additional eyewitnesses and/or the archives of other human rights organizations that are active in the field.” It seems like the organization is defending its research method, perhaps in response to public scrutiny. According to (Katriel 2018: 1), mission statements may change over time in response to public commentary, in an effort to (re-)gain public legitimization. Keeping this in mind, BtS further notes that it has “acquired a special standing in the eyes of the Israeli public and in the media because of its unique role in giving voice to the experience of soldiers”. The use of wording here (‘special’), may already indicate the organisation’s (un)popularity amongst different groups of Jewish Israelis. According to BtS, most soldiers prefer to stay anonymous, due to “various pressures from military officials and society at large”.

IV: Assessment of Group Beliefs BtS’s mission statement touches upon several important group beliefs, namely; positive collective self-image (1), justness (2), security (3), victimization of those Israeli soldiers who carry the ‘burden of maintaining the occupation’ (4), patriotism (5), and unity (6). Their mission statement does not directly address group beliefs that (de)legitimize the opponent, nor does the organisation appeal to group beliefs of peace. BtS’s reference to the ‘deterioration of moral standards [of the IDF forces]’ plainly refers to group beliefs about morality (a collective positive self-image), which can be related to the earlier-mentioned popular Israeli saying that the IDF is ‘the most moral army in the world’29. Considering that the majority of Israelis have served in the army, it is very likely that BtS’ accusation of deterioration in moral standards will be perceived as opposing group beliefs of a positive collective self-image, e.g. the morality of the IDF.

28 ‘Hebron’, website Jewish Virtual Library: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/vie-hebron, last visited 4- 4-2019. 29 In his 2009-address to the UN Human Rights Council in an Emergency Session, British Colonel Richard Kemp, who served as the former commander of British Forces in Afghanistan, served with NATO and commanded troops in Northern-Ireland, Bosnia and Macedonia, mentioned based on his experience and knowledge, that the IDF “did more to safeguard the rights of civilians in a combat zone than any other in the history of warfare” during Operation ‘Cast Led’ of December 2008 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JM0fTss0UX4).

27 BtS’s mission statement continues by relating this declining morality in addressing group beliefs of justness and security: “moral deterioration finds expression in the character of military orders and rules of engagement, which are considered justified by the state in the name of Israel’s security”. By arguing that the state considers moral deterioration justified in the name of Israel’s security, BtS is indicating that the organisation itself opposes this view. It is unclear to what extent the State’s justness beliefs corroborate with the justness beliefs of the group, which is a point that will be discussed later on. Nonetheless, this statement signposts not only that the organisation opposes the State’s justification of the IDF’s ‘immoral behaviour’ in the name of security, but also that BtS does not share prominent group beliefs concerning personal safety, national goals of survival, or generally accepted conditions that secure this. BtS clearly focuses on the experience of the ‘common Israeli soldier’, and addresses in-group victimization by stating “soldiers who serve in the territories witness and take part in military actions that change them immensely”. Also, BtS seemingly refers to the (mental) sacrifice that individual group members have to make during their army service, as they “have to ignore what they have seen and done in order to continue civilian life”. In her research on traumatization in Israel, Friedman-Peleg (2016) notes that the cause of traumatization for war-veterans is two-fold: soldiers experience life- endangering threats; but they can also be victimized by their own use of violence. Thus, soldiers can be both victims of threat, as well as self-traumatized perpetrators (Young 2002, in Ibid: 424). In their mission statement, BtS also touches upon group beliefs of patriotism. Not only does BtS place the blame for the ‘declining morality’ of the soldiers who serve their country with the State, the organisation also designates the State as the cause for soldiers’ self-victimization. This may trigger doubt in a veteran’s patriotism and make him/her more critical of his/her service, especially when he/she is making the transition from military to civilian life. In aiming to give individual soldiers a platform to share their personal stories about their military service, BtS is further asking them to put their individual needs above the collective – thereby asking them to do the opposite of being patriotic in the context of intractable conflict. This is also where group beliefs of unity come into play. According to Bar-Tal (2007), unity beliefs should engender a feeling that all group members support the goals of the conflict and follow the leaders. BtS is obviously denouncing the military orders

28 and rules that are formulated by the State. The organisation further notes that it targets soldiers who feel like they had to ‘hold their silence’ upon their return to civilian society, and that it uses these soldiers’ testimonies to remind others in the group of the cost and the ‘reality’ that was created with the occupation. In putting individual accounts of victimization above the collective need for resilience in the face of threat, it therefore seems plausible that BtS does not meet the group beliefs and requirements for unity.

DV: Expressions of Criticism against Breaking the Silence Between January 2005 and December 2018, Ha’aretz and the Jerusalem Post combined wrote a total of 221 articles that mentioned BtS in the titles of their articles, and/or mentioned BtS in the introductory paragraph. Of the 79 articles that mentioned BtS in The Jerusalem Post, 48 articles noted negative criticism towards BtS. For Ha’aretz, there were 142 articles mentioning BtS, of which 84 articles reported on negative criticism towards BtS. As expected based on the ideological stance of both newspapers, news reporting on group criticism was skewed in favour of BtS in Ha’aretz, indicating that overall, Ha’aretz’ takes a much more supportive position in its reporting on human rights and democratic freedoms. The centre-rightist Jerusalem Post is not only less supportive of BTS in terms of the content in its reports on the organization, the number of articles they publish is also less (48).

The first account of criticism towards BtS appears in 2009, when the director of the international pro-Israel NGO ‘StandWithUs’, writes an opinion in reaction to what he perceived as an increase in the popularity of BtS abroad. In the article, titled “Breaking the Rules”, he states that reporting about IDF misconduct based on anonymous testimonies “breaks the rules of any kind of serious reporting”, and that there “is no silence to break” in an open and democratic society (The Jerusalem Post30). Katz and Keinon publish another critical article in July 2009, and raise the issue of BtS’ foreign sources of funding, amidst public controversy about a damning report on IDF misconduct during Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009). The article quotes a senior IDF

Figure 1. Zionists Against Breaking the Silence Poster (2012) 30 https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Breaking-the-rules

29 official who dismissed the BtS’ report because it was based on “rumours and hearsay”, and further noted that the organisation’s only motive was to slander the IDF, rather than initiating an investigation (“Europeans Funding ‘Breaking the Silence’”, the Jerusalem Post31). In December 2011, Leibler refers to BtS as an Israel ‘demonizer’ (The Jerusalem Post32). Then in November 2012, Fogelman reports that an opposition movement to BtS was launched: Zionists Breaking the Silence, aimed at providing a counter narrative to BtS’s accounts of IDF misconduct (see figure) (Ha’aretz33). The campaign poster, which depicts how an IDF soldier helps a Palestinian elderly man (see figure 1), is a clear attempt at bolstering the IDF’s image as a moral army, and thereby bolstering a positive collective self-image for Israelis. About three years later, in September 2015, blog-writer Asher writes in the Jerusalem Post, “BtS is a political organization funded by European governments, and run by self-hating Jews who are trying to destroy their only state. Do not let them fool you (“The End of The Beginning. Exposing the Lies of Israel’s Haters, Jerusalem Post”34)”. Finlay (2005) explains that the concept of a ‘self-hating’ Jew, which was originally introduced by Theodore Lessing in 1930 to describe anti-Semitism amongst Jews, is a concept that is increasingly being by used by right-wing Zionists to brand those who disagree with governmental policies as disloyal or ‘pathological’. By referring to BtS as an organisation that is ‘funded by European governments’ and ‘run by self-hating Jews’, the author might be speculating about another catastrophe entailing the destruction of the State of Israel by anti-Semitic forces.

Foreign Agents In mid-December 2015, Harel writes about the start of a wave of verbal attacks towards BtS, because a commercial local television channel – which mainly targets a Jewish audience35 - accused BtS of ‘lying’ in its reports. According to Harel, these accusations were promptly followed by a toxic incitement video that was made by the right-wing group Im Tirzu (meaning ‘if you will it’ in Hebrew), which aired online on 15 December 2015. The video shows the faces of four leftist activists – one of who was a member of

31 https://www.jpost.com/International/Europeans-funding-Breaking-the-Silence 32 “Candidly Speaking, Israel Losing War of Ideas” (https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Candidly-Speaking-Israel-losing-war-of-ideas) 33 “Is the New Group That Shows the IDF as Do-gooders All it Seems?” https://www.haaretz.com/soldiers-as-do-gooders-fact-or-fable-1.5197211 34 https://www.jpost.com/Blogs/The-End-of-the-Beginning/Exposing-the-lies-of-Israels-haters-415572 35 http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Tag.aspx/37460

30 BtS36 - and labels them ‘foreign agents’, using the name ‘shtulim’ – Hebrew for moles or traitors (Ha’aretz37). On December 16, Sucharov analyses the video and notes that it was shot from the perspective of the viewer, thereby appealing to Israeli’s most direct fear these days: being stabbed by a Palestinian in the streets. Moreover, Sucharov writes that after the attacker raises his arm to stab the viewer, the image freezes and the narrator says in Hebrew “before the next terrorist stabs you, I already know that this activist, a planted agent from Holland, will protect him from Shin Bet38 interrogation; that activist, a plant from Germany, will call the soldier who tried to protect you a ‘war criminal’; yet another activist, planted by Norway, will protect him in court, and another, an EU agent, will call Israel a ‘war criminal’.” According to Sucharov, the narrator ends the video, which concurrently shows the faces of the Israeli activists, by saying “while we fight terror, they fight us” (Ha’aretz39). In another article titled “Why Breaking the Silence Became the Most Hated Group in Israel” Pfeffer questions the controversy surrounding BtS in December 2015. He states that Israeli soldiers have told an alternative story recounting less glorious aspects of Israel’s wars since 1949 – and that this used to cause similar critical response from the public. The controversy, Pfeffer states, is due to the ‘longevity and scale’ of BtS as a full-fledged organisation that has been a constant thorn in the establishment’s side since 2004. He argues that there is a campaign of de-legitimization waging against BtS because they are a threat to the comfortable consensus (Ha’aretz40). Moreover, Pfeffer states that it is difficult to “completely ostracize” BtS, because the group has never endorsed the conscientious objection of the military service. He concludes by stating that the ‘demonization’ of the group is not that surprising, in the current ‘period of social intolerance’ in Israel. On 23 December 2015, Schechter writes that several politicians started to air their criticism on BtS shortly after the release of the video. According to Cohen, Defense

36 The other three activists were members of The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, HaMoked: the Centre for the Defence of the Individual and B’tselem https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium- im-tirtzu-s-video-equates-human-rights-with-treason-1.5377802 37 “Don’t Shoot Down Breaking the Silence, It’s Just the Messenger” https://www.haaretz.com/israel- news/.premium-dont-shoot-down-breaking-the-silence-its-just-the-messenger-1.5379068 38 The Shin Bet is Israel’s national security intelligence agency. 39 “Im Tirzu’s Pernicious Video Equates Human Rights With Treason” (https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-im-tirtzu-s-video-equates-human-rights-with-treason- 1.5377802) 40 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-why-breaking-the-silence-became-the-most-hated- group-in-israel-1.5378452

31 Minister Moshe Ya’alon banned BtS from visiting army basis or joining IDF functions (Ha’aretz41). After Ya’alon’s statement, Education Minister Bennet (a member of the religious Jewish Home party and opponent of a Palestinian State) was fast to announce that he would not allow BtS into the Israeli School system (“Education Minister Bennet Bars Breaking the Silence from Schools”42, Ha’aretz). Lastly, Harkov writes on December 20 that Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist secular party Yesh Atid – ‘there is a future’, accused BtS of “crossing the line between criticism and treason”, and mentioned that they were “undermining the Israeli state by besmirching the IDF and its officers abroad” (Jerusalem Post43). According to Schechter, BtS was frequently accused of ‘snitching’, ‘treason’ and ‘airing Israel’s dirty laundry abroad’ by politicians, op-ed writers, pundits, as well as by ordinary citizens in the days that followed (Ha’aretz44). In an opinion article titled “Column One: Israel’s Homegrown Enemies”, Glick writes that left-wing groups such as BtS are disseminating their ‘blood libel’ against Israeli to foreign audiences, and that their ultimate goal is to destruct Israel because they believe it is illegitimate and should be replaced by a non-Jewish state of one sort or another. According to the Oxford dictionary, the notion of ‘blood libel’ refer to allegations that originated in the Middle Ages, when Jewish people were falsely accused of using the blood of Christians in their religious rituals. The blood libel was later used for incitement against Jews in various countries throughout the 18th and 19th century (website Jewish Virtual Library)45. Drawing from this, Glick seems to be accusing BtS of inciting anti- Semitism abroad. She further calls BtS ‘apologists of Palestinian terrorism’, and notes that they should be designated as ‘enemies of the state’ (The Jerusalem Post46). In January 2016, the Association of Civil Military Studies in Israel conducts an online survey (N=500) of respondents between 18-65 years old, proving that 54% of the Israeli population think that at its essence, BtS is a political organization. Schatz, a spokeswoman for BtS, writes in February 2016 that she is ‘glad to know’ that more than half of the Israeli population believes that BtS is a political organization, and that its

41 “Defense Minister Ya’alon: ‘Malicious’ Group Breaking the Silence Tarnishes IDF” https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-ya-alon-breaking-the-silence-tarnishes-idf-1.5376929 42 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-education-minister-bennett-bars-breaking-the-silence- from-schools-1.5377558 43 “Lapid with Reservists: Breaking the Silence Crossed From Criticism to Subversion” (https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Lapid-with-reservists-Breaking-the- Silence-crossed-from-criticism-to-subversion-437862) 44 “How to Break Breaking the Silence, The Israeli Right Wing’s Omertà44 Dreams” https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-how-to-break-breaking-the-silence-omert-1.5381204 45 https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/blood-libel 46 https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Column-One-Israels-homegrown-enemies-438381

32 activities do not have to do with the IDF, but rather relate to the military rule that soldiers are required to enforce. (The Jerusalem Post47). However, in an article titled “Defense Minister Ya’alon: Breaking the Silence Is Gathering Military Secrets –That’s Treason” dated in March 2016, Shpigel reports that Defense Minister Ya’alon has ordered a criminal probe to investigate whether BtS had received ‘classified military information’ and if it made use of such data in its ‘activities abroad’ (Ha’aretz48). Considering that Ya’alon, as the Defense Minister, is aware that BtS’s reports all have to go through a military censor, it is likely that this referral to BtS as a threat to national security is meant to stigmatize the group as a ‘public enemy’. A couple of months later in June 2016, Edelman writes an article noting how left-wing BtS members have been physically assaulted, and have received death threats over the phone (“Left-Wing Activists Facing Violence, Death-Threats”, Ha’aretz). The article mentions that one member of BtS was punched by a student, after he was instructed to do so by ‘extreme right-wing rapper’ Yoav Eliasi. In November 2016, Ben Zikri reports that BtS was declined a prize from a university in the city of Be’er Sheva on the grounds that Bts was not in ‘national consensus’. He also notes that a group of twenty activists protested against the prize, whilst accusing BtS of incitement and chanting, “we love the IDF” (Ha’aretz49). These incidents indicate that BtS is publically considered as an unpatriotic group that exists on the fringes of public consensus. In the same month, Gravé-Lazi reports on a campaign titled ‘Breaking the Silence Hunters’, which features a video introducing three soldiers, who claim that they had been harassed by members of the BtS organization to give testimony. The group behind the campaign, called ‘Reservists on Duty’, was formed earlier that year in opposition to BtS. Amit Deri, the founder of Reservists on Duty, stated that he suspected BtS from ‘receiving its testimonies through deceiving recently discharged soldiers’ (Jerusalem Post50). In an attempt to discredit BtS’ method and work objective, Deri further claimed “soldiers come from battle and they are in a difficult [emotional]

47 “Breaking the Silence, Toward a Moral Army and a Moral Country”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Breaking-the-Silence-toward-a-moral-army-and-a-moral-country- 444488, last visited 24-4-2019. 48 “Ya’alon: Breaking the Silence Gathering Intel. That’s Treason”, website Ha’aretz: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-ya-alon-breaking-the-silence-gathering-intel-that-s- treason-1.5420614, last visited 6-5-2019. 49 “Protestors Chant in Anger as Breaking the Silence Wins Alternative University Prize”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/protesters-chant-in-anger-as-breaking-the-silence-wins-alternative- university-prize-1.5458354, last visited 24-4-2019. 50 “IDF Reservists Question ‘Harassment’ Tactics of Breaking the Silence”, website Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/IDF-reservists-question-harassment-tactics-of-Breaking-the-Silence- 457983, last visited 24-4-2019.

33 state and believe this group wants to listen to them, when in fact they have ulterior motives”. It does not become clear from the article what these ‘ulterior motives’ may entail. However, BtS’s reply to this accusation can be read in their mission statement, “every soldier who gives testimony to Breaking the Silence is well-aware of the aims of the organization and the interview”. That right wing groups have comfortably taken the lead in the delegitimization- campaign that wages against BtS becomes clear in January 2017, when a group of more than 75 disabled IDF veterans sign an Im Tirzu petition to ban BtS from speaking in schools. A Staff Sergeant Major was quoted saying “The purity of arms is a cornerstone of IDF and combat soldiers. Over the years, thousands of soldiers have died and lost their lives in order to protect this value in battle. […] I myself lost my left eye because of our desire not to harm innocents. I recommend that the people of Breaking the Silence learn a little about the facts as they really exist in the field and do not spread false propaganda against the army (The Jerusalem Post51).” By publically involving disabled veterans, it may be clear that Im Tirzu is attempting to steer public opinion and delegitimize BtS’ morality as an organisation, by framing them of being dismissive of the personal sacrifices made by war veterans who serves their country.

Silencing Breaking the Silence? In June 2017, another controversy develops in reaction to a video that was publicized by the group ‘Reservists on Duty’, which shows BtS’ spokesman Dean Issacharoff testifying about assaulting a Palestinian man who was arrested for throwing stones in February 2014. In reaction to Issacharoff’s public testimony of assaulting a Palestinian during his service, Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked (member of Netanyahu’s Likud party) requests a criminal probe, stating on Army Radio “if it really happened, he must be questioned and punished. If it didn’t happen, the state must say so clearly (The Jerusalem Post52).” On June 23 2017, Hovel writes that after being summoned for questioning by the Israeli Police, Issacharoff showed them the unedited tape of his testimony. In reaction to the questioning, BtS criticized what it called “improper motivation” behind the investigation, which they claimed was aimed at silencing BtS in a legal campaign that had been going

51 “Disabled IDF Vets Back Banning Breaking the Silence from Schools”, website Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Disabled-IDF-vets-back-banning-Breaking-the-Silence-from- schools-478119, last visited 25-4-2019. 52 “Shaked Calls for War Crimes Probe of Breaking the Silence Official”, website Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Shaked-calls-for-war-crimes-probe-of-Breaking-Silence-official- 496099, last visited 24-04-2019.

34 on for months. BtS called on Shaked “not to make do with the investigation of just one activist from BtS, but also to investigate the hundreds of combat soldiers, men and women, who broke silence openly, in order to tell what we did in the territories and about the daily violence used against Palestinians (Ha’aretz53). Following this, a highly unlikely situation develops in a case of alleged IDF misconduct, wherein the word of a Palestinian plaintiff is seemingly valued more by the Israeli authorities than that of an Israeli soldier. Hovel writes on November 16 2017 that the case against Issacharoff took a turn when police investigators tracked down the Palestinian man in question, Hassan Joulani. After being questioned about the incident in Hebron, Joulani said that soldiers did not use violence against him beyond the necessary force to handcuff him – Joulani admitted to resisting the wrist restraints (Ha’aretz54). Because of Joulani’s statement, the prosecutors conclude that the incident never happened, and close the case on November 16 of 2017. The attorney that represents BtS reacted sceptically, “the Justice Minister does not want to open the Pandora’s Box of the occupation that will expose the violence and the injustice.” Hovel writes on November 16 that Issacharoff stood behind his words and was outraged at being presented a liar, leading him to request an opportunity to examine the evidence in open court. According to Hovel, there were two other people in Issacharoff’s company who had testified; Ronen Silberstein, a soldier who had served with Issacharoff for one and a half month during the end of his service, and said that he remembered and witnessed the incident – thereby supporting Issacharoff’s version of the event. The commander of the company that Issacharoff and Silberstein were in when the incident happened however said he agreed with Joulani’s version. Consequent to the closing of the case on November 16, Netanyahu twittered, “Breaking the Silence lies and slanders our soldiers around the world. Today this fact received further proof, if anyone had a doubt. The truth wins out.” Justice minister Shaked furthermore praised Issacharoff’s fellow soldiers for speaking out, adding that it was good that the truth came out about BtS ‘as an organization that lies and slanders Israel’.

53 “Police Question Breaking the Silence Spokesman After Complaint by Justice Minister”, website Ha’aretz: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-breaking-the-silence-spokesman-questioned- after-justice-minister-complains-1.5487429, last visited 24-4-2019. 54 Prosecutors Close Case Against Breaking the Silence Spokesman, Who Claimed He Assaulted a Palestinian, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-prosecutors-close-case- against-breaking-the-silence-spokesman-1.5466200, last visited 24-4-2019.

35 On Nov 21 2017, Kubovich and Hovel write that Issacharoff claims to believe that the police interviewed the wrong Palestinian based on his testimony (Ha’aretz55). To corroborate Issacharoff’s version of the story, BtS publishes a video showing the aftermath of the Palestinian man’s arrest, which was filmed by B’tselem at the time56. They write that the video shows that the Palestinian has bruises on his face, and that Silberstein, the deputy commander who had backed Issacharoff’s story, is present in the video, whereas the company commander who claimed Joulani’s version was true, is not. In reaction to the new video, the deputy state prosecutor said “Joulani was identified based on Issacharoff’s own statements”, and “the claim that there was another incident which ostensibly fits the many details he gave in his interview is a belated claim which doesn’t fit the evidence in this case (Ha’aretz57).”

Breaking the Silence Must Be Silenced During these first days of media frenzy, the Jerusalem Post remains remarkably silent about Issacharoff’s case. The only articles that mentions this particular legal affair involving BtS’ spokesman Issacharoff, is an opinion article titled “Breaking the Silence Must Be Silenced” written by Akerman, a former brigadier general who served as a division head in the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) on November 30 2017. Akerman states that the lies BtS has been telling over the years have been exposed a number of times, and that the ‘embarrassing’ incident that recently occurred with BtS’s spokesman has proven this once more. Akerman then continues to question BtS’s purpose of protecting human rights, by asking, “whose rights exactly?” (The Jerusalem Post58). This question can be interpreted in two ways, but essentially boils down to the same thing. Whether Akerman means to accuse BtS of preferring the human rights of Palestinians to the rights of Israelis, or whether he is calling BtS out on their lack of appreciation for the human rights of Israelis, for whom the organisation should have more appreciation – it is clear that Akerman blames BtS for choosing the ‘wrong’ side or not choosing at all. By questioning their work method (which is “actually built on a pack of lies”), and by criticizing BtS for conducting most of their activities abroad, Akerman

55 “How Israel is Trying to Break Breaking the Silence” https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium- breaking-the-silence-releases-video-on-controversial-incident-1.5467283 56 Ha’aretz video Issacharoff in the aftermath of arresting Joulani (Youtube: https://youtu.be/4QVAK6kqInU) 57 “Breaking the Silence Releases Video ‘Corroborating’ Claims That Their Spokesman Beat Palestinian” https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-breaking-the-silence-releases-video-on-controversial- incident-1.5467283 58 https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Breaking-the-Silence-must-be-silenced-515721

36 concludes by equalling BtS’s ‘self-hatred and incitement’ to the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement59. Moreover, he posits that current laws are too weak to offer protection from anti-Israel anarchists, and proposes that there is only one course of action: to enact legislation to limit the activities of these organizations, and possibly close them down. Akerman concludes by stating that Israel must do everything to protect itself, the sooner the better. After the stormy events of November 2017, Gravé-Lazi writes in February 2018 that a parliamentary bill was pending aimed at barring organizations like BtS from the Israeli education system to perform ‘anti-IDF’ activities (The Jerusalem Post60). In the article, Gravé-Lazi quotes Lapid “We cannot allow organizations that encourage draft- dodging and call the IDF officers and soldiers criminals inside the Israeli education system.” From reading this statement, it becomes clear why BtS has been labelled a possible ‘threat’ by the Israeli authorities: encouraging Israeli youngsters to dodge drafting to the military would entail a diminished military capacity. In the eyes of the authorities, BtS is not only likely to cause a quantitative decline in Israel’s ability to fight and defend itself, but also triggering the psychological collapse of young Israelis’ conflict ethos – with all consequences involved. In June 2018, Lis reports that the ‘Breaking-the-Silence’-law had been passed through the Israeli Knesset. One MP said “[…] anyone who undermines the existence of the State of Israel and slanders IDF soldiers to the point where they are persecuted by international courts cannot claim innocence. The senseless attempt to attribute to IDF soldiers a lust for murdering children will not be heard in our schools,” BtS issued a statement in response to the passing of the law, stating that it did not apply to them, because they did “not act to support of promote indictment of soldiers in foreign courts” (Ha’aretz61). It appears from this latter statement that there is an important point of political contention about BtS’ activities, namely whether the anti-occupation organisation is ultimately looking to give Israel’s legal sovereignty out of hands.

59 The Islamic Movement is a Palestinian political movement that seeks to advocate Islam in Israel. In 1996, the Movement split over its decision to stand candidates for the Knesset. Whereas the formed a party in the Israeli Parliament, the Northern Branch continues to boycott elections and is said to have links with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (website European Council of Foreign Relations, https://www.ecfr.eu/mapping_palestinian_politics/detail/islamic_movement_northern_branch). 60 “Knesset Advances Bill Banning Breaking the Silence from Schools” https://www.jpost.com/Israel- News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Knesset-passes-bill-banning-Breaking-the-Silence-from-schools-543752 61 “Israel Passes Law Targeting Groups That Support Soldiers Indictment” https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-passes-law-targeting-groups-that-support-soldiers- indictment-1.6284735

37 In conclusion, BtS touches upon six out of eight group beliefs in its mission statement. 132 articles out of a total of 221 media articles mention expressions of disapproval towards BtS. It appears from the content analysis, that there are several patterns of criticism towards BtS. A general increase in criticism is apparent from 2015 onwards, and all of the themes that were mentioned beforehand (Foreign Agent’, ‘Libel and Slander’, ‘Lies’, ‘Treason’, and ‘Moral Army’) could be found in the media reports (table 1; figure 2, in appendix). It appears that BtS is mainly criticized with regard to the morality of the IDF, it seems. It can further be interpreted from the data that there is a slight decline in media reporting on the organisation in 2018.

4.2 B’tselem – The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

In their mission statement, B’tselem states that it aims to end the occupation, recognizing that “this is the only way to achieve a future that ensures human rights, democracy, liberty and equality to all people, Palestinians and Israelis alike, living on the bit of land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea (B’tselem website62)”. The mission statement further posits that there are various political routes that can bring about this future, and that “while it is not B’tselem’s role to choose among them: continued occupation is not an option”. The missions statement continues by noting how, twenty-two years after the occupation of the West Bank started in 1967, in 1989, B’tselem was found by former MP Yossi Sarid (1940 – 2015). It further states that ‘B’tselem’ in Hebrew means “in the image of” and is a reference to Genesis 1:27: “And God created humankind in His image. In the image of God did He create them.” According to the organisation, this Biblical reference expresses “the Jewish and universal moral edict to respect and uphold the human right of all people”. Based on this principle, B’tselem continues that it has devoted itself to documenting Israeli violations of Palestinians’ human rights in the West bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza strip for over 25 years. The organization notes that it has the view of helping to minimize such violations by means of publishing statistics, testimonies and eyewitness accounts, video footage and reports. Principally, B’tselem makes explicit mention that its work is based on the assumption that occupation was a temporary state of affairs:

62 ‘About B’tselem’, at https://www.btselem.org/about_btselem, last visited 12-05-2019.

38 “Yet after more than half a century of occupation, during which time Israel implemented policies which cemented significant changes that indicate long-term intentions, the reality of occupation can clearly no longer be considered a temporary one.” (website B’tselem)

While continuing to document and publicize human rights violations, B’tselem states that it now unambiguously demands an end to the occupation. In order to promote that goal, B’tselem posits that it works to expose the injustice, violence and deprivation inherent to the regime of occupation, in order to deconstruct the apparatuses that enable it, and to challenge the legitimacy of the occupation in Israel and internationally. It is further mentioned that B’tselem has won several human rights prizes, including various awards for its video project. In the conclusion of its mission statement, B’tselem notes that it is funded solely by donations coming from North America and Europe, as well as generous contributions coming from private individuals in Israel and abroad.

IV: Assessment of Group Beliefs

Based on this reading of B’tselem’s mission statement, it becomes clear that the organization touches on several beliefs that are important to the Jewish Israeli group. There are references to beliefs of peace (1), security (2), a positive collective self-image (3), and justness (4), de-legitimization of the opponent (5), as well as beliefs of victimization (6).

In the first paragraph, B’tselem makes a strong connection between the ending of occupation and peace, thereby sketching a future image wherein Palestinians and Israelis alike have equal human rights, and live peacefully together ‘on the bit of land they have’. Considering the work B’tselem does in the harsh reality that is the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is clear that the organization intentionally – and almost daringly, but not in a very cynical manner – seeks to appeal to idealistic beliefs of peace, perhaps to foster support for its mission. It is important to note that this linking of ‘occupation’ and peace may be intentional: quitting the military occupation of the West Bank may lead to peace some day. In this aspirational message, however, B’Tselem implicitly touches on group beliefs of security as understood in the context of general public opinion in Israel.

In appealing to the group norm of ‘Jewish morality’ by using a Biblical allusion (‘Tikkun Olam’ is another example of a moral norm that is strongly embedded in

39 Orthodox Jewry63), it is apparent that B’tselem seeks to explain the organisation’s motivation and sense of duty in reporting on human rights violations as a Jewish-Israeli organisation. Quick after appealing to Jewish group norms of a collective positive self- image, B’tselem’s mission statement puts the spotlight on what they perceive as the problem at stake: the legitimization of the occupation in Israel and abroad.

In June 2017, the Israeli Democracy Institute published the results of a survey amongst a representative sample of the national population (N=600, whereof 100 Palestinian-Israelis) on whether Israeli adults thought that the ‘control’ over the territories in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) was an occupation – 62% answered ‘no’ 64. To an extent, this finding seems to corroborate with B’tselem’s notion that ‘occupation’ is legitimized in Israel. In March 2019, another survey (N=unknown) that was conducted by the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute in collaboration with the nonpartisan Citizens Accord Forum and the Shaharit Institute illustrates that 71% of the Israeli Jewish respondents answered that Israeli ‘control’ over the Palestinians was immoral (The Jerusalem Post65).

The outcomes of these surveys are seemingly contradictory, but might have to do with the use of wording. When asked how the word ‘occupation’ is used in Israeli public discourse, a 25-year old Israeli male (page 5) mentioned that while the word ‘occupation’ is also used in Israel, it is only used in specific times and places because it generally triggers a negative, and often angry response (“we are not doing this for no reason”). The respondent explained that therefore, the termination ‘control’ is more commonly used: “We need to control what is happening in the West Bank and Gaza in order to protect ourselves (Anonymous source, private communication May 2019)”. Regardless of the use and interpretation of wording in these surveys, it may be clear that B’tselem, in referring to Jewish morality and relating this to a state of occupation wherein Israelis are the bad- intentioned ‘occupiers’, is intentionally taking a somewhat provocative approach with regard to the group’s positive self-image.

63 Tikkun Olam explained by the Orthodox Jewish Chabad movement, website https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/3700275/jewish/What-Is-Tikkun-Olam.htm, last visited 3-05-2019. 64 “62% of Jewish Public: Holding onto Territories in Judea, Samaria Not an Occupation”, Israeli Democracy Institute, website https://en.idi.org.il/press-releases/15728, last visited 5-05-2019. 65 Survey ‘Religious Faith, Peace and Coexistence’ in “71% of Israeli Jews Find Control Over Palestinians Immoral”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/71-percent-of-Israeli- Jews-find-Israeli-control-over-the-Palestinians-as-immoral-583431, last visited 5-09-2019).

40 What is further striking about B’tselem’s mission statement is that it makes reference to a different time in history, when the occupation was (supposedly) only considered to be a temporary solution. Using this historical reference, B’tselem touches upon group beliefs of justification by indicating that the goal of providing a safe and secure homeland for the Jewish people by maintaining an occupation over the Palestinian population was only temporarily justified in the State’s formative years. Indirectly, B’tselem seems to be saying that the State of Israel in its present state has established and developed itself to an extent that it is no longer justified in maintaining a never-ending occupation. This stands in stark contrast to the right-wing discourse, which habitually claims that continuation of ‘the occupation’ is justified because the Palestinians have not proven themselves to be ‘reliable partners for peace’, making it a necessary means to safeguard Israel’s right to exist and secure its citizens from ‘outside threats and terrorists’.

Importantly, B’tselem contradicts group beliefs of de-legitimization of the enemy in its mission statement. By focusing on documenting the occupation from the viewpoint of the Palestinians who live under occupation, B’tselem is clearly legitimizing the opponent by ‘humanizing’ the Palestinians. This is most pertinent with regard to the video project B’tselem developed in 2007, which trains Palestinian volunteers in the field to become citizen journalists and film human rights violations. On 24 March 2016, one of B’tselem’s volunteers filmed the killing of a Palestinian attacker who had stabbed another soldier. The video shows that the attacker was subdued and lying on the ground, before a 19-year old IDF soldier named Elor Azaria shot him in the head, killing him. B’tselem broadcasted the video about four and a half hours later. B’tselem’s video was used as evidence when Azaria’s trial started in April 2016; he was ultimately convicted to manslaughter in January 201766. According to Kaplan Sommer in July 2017, the trial continues to divide the country over field combat ethics (Ha’aretz67).

Moreover, B’tselem’s stated interest in only documenting Palestinian human rights violations, obviously contradicts group beliefs of in-group victimization. Not surprisingly, this particular focus on Palestinian victimization has led to negative reactions within the in-group. In 2009, Lefkovits wrote that B’tselem was accused by NGO Monitor of being neglectful about human rights violations of Israelis in the

66 According to some, Azaria got a lenient sentencing (he was convicted of manslaughter instead of murder). Instead of serving 14 months in prison, Azaria was released early after serving nine months in prison (Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-Parole-Board-orders-early- release-of-Hebron-shooter-Elor-Azaria-545468, last visited 5-05-2019). 67 “Why the Hebron Shooter Trial is Dividing Israel”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel- news/why-the-hebron-shooter-trial-is-dividing-israel-1.5481805, last visited 17-05-2019).

41 conflict68 (“NGOs Condemned for Ignoring Shalit”69, Jerusalem Post). In choosing to focus on victimization of the ‘enemy’ out-group, it is clear that B’tselem disregards group beliefs of Jewish-Israeli victimization in the conflict, in what seems to be a deliberate strategy aimed at delegitimizing the occupation in Israel.

DV: Expressions of Criticism Against B’tselem Between January 2005 and December 2018, Ha’aretz and the Jerusalem Post wrote a total of 208 articles that mentioned B’tselem in its title or in the first paragraph. Of the 88 articles that mentioned B’tselem in The Jerusalem Post, 24 articles also reported on negative criticism towards the organisation. Ha’aretz published 120 articles that mentioned B’tselem, of which 43 articles mentioned negative criticism towards BtS’ work as an organization. The following sections will provide more in-depth perspective on expressions of criticism towards B’tselem, which was often aired in reaction to specific events. In 2006, Prof. Gerald Steinberg (head of the organization NGO Monitor) wrote that B’tselem had been accused of ‘besmirching’ the state and the security forces for years. Steinberg notices that Israeli officials had “largely ignored these NGO’s, allowing their radical political agendas and selective reporting based on “Palestinian eye- witnesses” to go unchallenged”, but that the cost of silence was starting to sink in – thereby leading to a change in approach70 (The Jerusalem Post 71). In another article, Steinberg was quoted again, stating, “The unwillingness [of B’tselem] to campaign on [Shalit’s] behalf is immoral.” This accusation was rejected by a B’tselem spokeswoman, who stated that this criticism was unfounded and replied “It is very sad that the suffering of the Shalit family is cynically manipulated in order to trash human rights NGOs, and we have no intention of cooperating with this (The Jerusalem Post72).” Several years later, in 2012, B’tselem releases a video that was originally filmed by Palestinian TV, showing an incident involving Lt.-Col. Shalom Eisner, who had hit several activists (foreigners and Arabic speakers, some of whom Palestinian) with his M-

68 The IDF soldier Gilad Shalit was kidnapped near the Gaza border in June 2006 and ultimately exchanged for 1,000 Palestinian prisoners who were serving in Israeli prisons in 2011. 69 “NGO’s Condemned for Ignoring Schalit”, website Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Israel/NGOs-condemned-for-ignoring-Schalit, last visited 24-4-2019. 70 Steinberg’s article mentions that cost of silence towards these NGO’s has included the spreading of boycott and divestment movements, damage to Israel’s image, as well as threats of arresting senior IDF officers in the United Kingdom and the United States. 71 “Challenging the NGO Mythodology”, Jerusalem Post website https://www.jpost.com/Israel/Challenging-the-NGO-mythology, last visited 25-04-2019). 72 “NGOs Condemned for Ignoring Shalit”, Jerusalem Post website https://www.jpost.com/Israel/NGOs-condemned-for-ignoring-Schalit, last visited 26-04-2019).

42 16 rifle butt during a pro-Palestinian bike ride in the Jordan Valley. According to Lazaroff, the video caused discussion in the media and in the public, splitting opinions in favour and against Eisner (“Palestinian Tapes Show Eisner Hitting 3 Activists”73, The Jerusalem Post). IDF Chief of staff Benny Gantz dismissed the senior officer after the attack, on the grounds that the attack was a ‘moral failure’ that did not reflect IDF principles (Ha’aretz74). Both accounts indicate that again, morality seems to be the issue regarding left-wing activism in relation to the army, and Israel’s image abroad. In May of 2014, B’tselem welcomes Hagai El-Ad (1969), a physician by training, as its new executive director (website B’tselem75). After El-Ad’s appointment, B’tselem quickly garners negative attention in the Israeli media. On 14 August 2014, Harkov writes that the head of the National-Civilian Service Authority wrote a letter to B’tselem, stating that it is not allowed have National-Civilian Service volunteers to work in their offices, because the organisation delegitimizes Israel by lying and inciting against the State and the IDF – “the most moral country in the world”. Furthermore, the article mentions that the positions and the data B’tselem disseminates “encourage our enemies and lead to extreme anti-Semitic expressions against the State of Israel, as well as violent acts of anti-Semitism against Jews around the world” (The Jerusalem Post76). By accusing B’tselem of inciting violence against State and the Jewish people (in equal regard), it seems like this type of statement is intended to trigger Jewish Israelis’ collective memory of Jewish victimization in an attempt to unify and mobilize Israelis against B’tselem. In the same article, Harkov mentions that B’tselem refuses to call Hamas a terrorist organisation, even though Israel and other countries like the US classify it as such. On August 24 2014, B’tselem publishes a statement in reaction to what apparently turned into a public discussion about the organization’s stance with regard to terrorism. B’tselem wrote that some people were “recently disconcerted” to hear that B’tselem referred to Hamas as an ‘armed Palestinian group’, rather than a ‘terrorist organization’. B’tselem continues by stating that it “unequivocally rejects” actions whereby Hamas deliberately targets citizens on the grounds that they are unquestionably unlawful and morally unacceptable, and further explains that B’tselem chooses not to use the loaded and controversial term ‘terrorism’ but strives to employ objective wording. It further

73 https://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Palestinian-tapes-show-Eisner-hitting-3-activists 74 “WATCH: New Video Shows Shamed IDF Officer Struck Several Left-wing Activists”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/1.5215795, last visited 26-04-2019. 75 https://www.BtSelem.org/press_releases/20140528_new_director 76 “B’tselem Banned From National-Civilian Service” https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And- Diplomacy/BtSelem-banned-from-National-Civilian-Service-371117

43 notes, “Any interpretation of such neutral language with regard to harming civilians could not be further from the truth” (website B’tselem77). This media debate on ‘truth’ versus ‘lies’ about B’tselem and the Israeli- Palestinian conflict sets the tone for incidents that follow. In September 2014, Zieve writes that the organization often finds itself at the centre of Israeli criticism, especially during times of heightened conflict, and publishes an interview with B’tselem’s spokeswoman titled “Q&A with B’tselem: Does The Human Rights NGO Recognize Hamas as Terrorist?” Then in November 2014, dozens of protesters took part in a protest rally outside of B’tselem’s Jerusalem office, where the organisation was holding an exhibition. The Jerusalem Post writes that three right-wing Jewish protestors were arrested for throwing stones at the exhibition (The Jerusalem Post78). In the same month, the Jerusalem Post reports that a demonstration was planned against B’tselem by a group called “mothers of soldiers against B’Tselem”, which was promoted by Defense Minister Lieberman on his Facebook Page (The Jerusalem Post79). Some months later in December 2014, Jeremy Bob writes that Jerusalem’s Magistrate Court barred a man from protesting or approaching B’tselem’s director Hagai El-Ad or the organization’s offices at a distance of closer than 50 meters for six months (The Jerusalem Post80). In August 2015, Gontarz publishes an interview with Miki Zohar, a MP for Netanyahu’s Likud party, who slated B’tselem for being a ‘rotten apple’ in Israeli society (Ha’aretz81). In September 2015, Yaron writes that Im Tirzu claimed ‘victory’ after they stated they had deprived B’tselem from 100,000 euros in prize money from the Dutch government, the Human Rights Tulip, by mobilizing their forces online to vote for any other human rights organization but B’tselem. “We won because they won’t receive money. We won because we acted for the sake of Israel and the IDF. We have love and we have faith and in the end we’ll win”, is what Im Tirzu posted on Facebook after the

77 https://www.BtSelem.org/on_human_rights_and_terror 78 “Three Right-Wing Protestors Arrested at B’tselem Exhibition in Jerusalem”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Three-right-wing-protesters-arrested-at-BtSelem-exhibition-in- Jerusalem-381400, last visited 24-04-2019. 79 “Lieberman Supports Demonstration Against B’Tselem”, website Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Liberman-supports-demonstration-against-BTselem-381266, last visited 13-5-2019.

80 “Court Bars Man From Harassing B’tselem”, Jerusalem Post website https://www.jpost.com/Breaking- News/Court-bars-man-from-harassing-BtSelem-383567, last visited 26-04-2019. 81 “Anyone Who Belongs To B’tselem or Breaking the Silence is Also a Rotten Apple”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-anyone-who-belongs-to-BtSelem-is-also-a-rotten-apple-1.5383918, last visited 27-04-2019.

44 votes were counted (Ha’aretz82). These referrals to ‘winning’ strongly indicate that B’tselem has become paralleled to an enemy at this point in time. The enemy-association is apparent once more when fire breaks out in January 2016 in B’tselem’s Jerusalem office. Both the Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz publish articles commenting on B’tselem’s speculation that arson was in play (Haaretz83; The Jerusalem Post84). Eisenbud and Hartman write that after it was established that the fire was probably due to an electrical short circuit, B’tselem issued a statement in relief, noting, “we’re going back to normal” (The Jerusalem Post85). Over the course of 2016, the data indicates that expressions of criticism involving stigmatizing accusations of ‘treason’ and ‘foreign collaboration’ have become common in the media, as well as amongst supporters of the political right (see table 2, in appendix). While the ‘NGO Transparency Bill’ is pending in the background, Baram writes an article titled “The ‘Traitors’ Who Filmed Our Heroic Soldier Executing a Wounded Palestinian Terrorist” in March 2016, stating that B’tselem has come to be seen as the guilty party in documenting the Hebron-shooting incident involving Elor Azaria (Ha’aretz86). Jeremy Bob writes in March 2016 that B’tselem’s executive director Hagai El-Ad wrote a letter to the military, asking for protection for the volunteer who had filmed a shooting incident in the city of Hebron. The volunteer, who had been called by name upon dissemination of the video by B’tselem, and his family members, had been receiving death threats. The article also mentions that physical violence was used, when Jewish settlers living in Hebron threw stones at his house (The Jerusalem Post87). In

82 “Right Wing Activists Claim Victory Over B’tselem”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-right-wing-activists-claim-victory-over-b-tselem-1.5399960, last visited 27-04-2019. 83 “Arson Suspected in Fire at B’tselem’s Office Building in Jerusalem”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/fire-breaks-out-in-b-tselem-jerusalem-office-1.5388641, last visited 27-04-2019. 84 “Arson Suspected in Fire at Offices of left-wing NGO B’tselem”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Arson-suspected-in-fire-at-offices-of-left-wing-NGO-BTselem- 441047, last visited 27-04-2019. 85 Fire at Offices Left-Wing NGO Caused by Electrical Fault, Not Arson”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Fire-in-Btselem-office-likely-due-to-electrical-fault-not-arson- 441091, last visited 26-04-2019. 86 “The ‘Traitors’ Who Filmed Our Heroic Soldier Executing a Wounded Palestinian Terrorist”, website Ha’aretz, https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-as-if-BtSelem-is-the-guilty-one-1.5424206, last visited 27-04-2019. 87 “B’tselem Seeks Military Protection for Volunteer Who Filmed Hebron Shooting”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/BtSelem-asking-for-military-protection-for-volunteer-who- filmed-Hebron-shooting-449870, last visited 26-04-2019.

45 July2016, Edelman writes that Im Tirzu’s campaign brandishes Hagai El Ad, B’tselem’s executive director, as a ‘mole’ and a ‘foreign agent’ (Ha’aretz88). These events are an illustration of the shift in media discourse towards B’tselem. Critical expressions have come to portray the organisation as dissenters who ‘are doing damage to Israel’, and even labelling the group as ‘the enemy’.

B’tselem’s disengagement from the IDF In June 2016, B’tselem’s executive director Hagai El-Ad publishes a statement in Ha’aretz, announcing that B’tselem will be disengaging itself from the Israeli military. In the first paragraph of the announcement, B’tselem notes that most of its criticism is directed at the Israeli government, and that it does not regard the army as the main responsible organization for what is happening in the West Bank. El-Ad further writes that the decision to impose military rule is the Israeli government’s, and IDF soldiers, “their loyalty and spirit of volunteerism”, are ‘tools’ in the hands of politicians for ruling over the Palestinians and depriving them of their basic rights. El-Ad notes that the decision to not longer appeal to military law enforcement agencies and demand the launching of investigations is a ‘strategic change’ in the group’s mode of operation. He continues to explain that B’tselem initially demanded that the army investigate cases of unlawful killing, use of violence or injustice, in order to try and impose some standards within the context of an occupation that was labelled ‘temporary’ by international law. He continues by stating, “Israel – through the IDF – is sovereign in the occupied territories and bears the responsibility of ensuring that its conduct with regard to the population is seemly”. El-Ad further notes that on the surface, it seemed like B’tselem was a nuisance to the government and the IDF all those years, but that military law enforcement agencies realized that interacting with B’tselem could serve as an effective tool in creating the illusion that they treated complaints seriously, by addressing them in collaboration with a human rights group. He concludes B’tselem will no longer ask military authorities to investigate because they feel the damage caused to human rights by these fruitless appeals override the benefits (Ha’aretz89).

88 “Left-Wing Israeli Activists Facing Violence, Death Threats”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-left-wing-israeli-activists-facing-violence-death-threats- 1.5417056, last visited 29-04-2019. 89 “Why B’tselem is Disengaging From the Military”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-why-btselem-is-disengaging-the-idf-1.5390783, last visited 28-04-2019.

46 After this announcement, Cohen reports in September 2016 that B’tselem released a report stating that the IDF did not properly investigate its soldiers during the war with Hamas during ‘Operation Protective Edge’ in the Gaza war of 2014. The IDF reacted by accusing B’tselem of ‘unprofessionalism’, ‘bias’ and ‘waging a war of delegitimization’ against Israel’s justice system (Ha’aretz90). It becomes clear that, although B’tselem sought to nuance its condemnation of the IDF by putting the blame on the Israeli authorities, it cannot spare the IDF in its effort to de-legitimize the occupation. In September 2016, Jeremy Bob writes that B’tselem’s issued another report that concluded that the only way to do justice to the 1,391 Palestinian civilians that got killed by the IDF during the 2014 Gaza war was intervention by the International Criminal Court. This exemplifies that indeed, B’tselem is serious about its change of strategy, by taking its efforts to the international arena.

‘Traitor’: El-Ad Addressing the UN Security Council On 14 October 2016, Hagai El-Ad addresses the United Nations (UN) Security Council in an informal meeting on behalf of B’tselem, and appeals to the UN to act on the situation of occupation in Israel – which has almost reached its 50-year anniversary by that time. On 16 October 2016, Ha’aretz’ editorial board publishes an item stating that the ‘unbridled and near-unanimous attack on [El-Ad] only shows how low Israel democracy has sunk under this Likud government, and the danger it faces’ (Ha’aretz91). It appears from this, that El-Ad’s UN-appeal triggered a great deal of public discussion in Israel, something Misgav confirms when he writes on 23 October 2016 that most of the Israelis are turning their backs on B’tselem, and a large number of Israelis are accusing them of stabbing the country in the back (Ha’aretz92). In a sense, these notions of rejection and even ‘betrayal’ could have been expected in this specific context, wherein B’tselem’s ‘disengagement’ with the IDF and its ‘engagement’ with an outside institution like the UN – that is known for having an ‘Israel-bias’ in Israel. Also, B’tselem’s move was bound to stir up political criticism. Two days after El-Ad’s UN address, Netanyahu reacted to B’tselem’s partaking in the informal

90 “Israeli Army Failed to Investigate Misconduct in 2014 Gaza War, NGO says”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-ngo-idf-has-failed-to-investigate-gaza-war-misconduct- 1.5439638, last visited 29-04-2019. 91 “It Was B’tselem’s Duty To Go To The UN”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/it- was-BtSelems-duty-to-go-to-the-un-1.5450485, last visited 28-04-2018. 92 “Israel’s Left-Wing Groups Should Close Shop”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-left-wing-groups-close-shop-1.5452274, last visited 28-04- 2019.

47 meeting with the UN Security Council in his weekly Cabinet meeting. Netanyahu accused B’tselem for joining the ‘chorus of slander’ against Israel, and criticized them for being a ‘fleeting and bizarre organisation’ that is the product of Israeli democracy (Ha’aretz93). The article mentions that Netanyahu later airs criticism on his Facebook page, “What these organisations cannot achieve through democratic elections in Israel, they try to achieve by international coercion and recycling the false claim that ‘the occupation and settlements’ were the reason for the conflict.” In reaction to El-Ad’s address at the UN, a heated Likud94 lawmaker responded bluntly that he would seek to revoke El-Ad’s Israeli citizenship, on account of what he called out to be an “explicit breach of trust” (Ha’aretz95). Interestingly, and in comparison to his party member’s threat to revoke El-Ad’s citizenship, Netanyahu’s criticism (a ‘fleeting and bizarre product of Israeli democracy’) towards B’tselem and El- Ad seems more deliberated at this stage. This might be due to the fact that Netanyahu did not want to lose face, since he publically condemned Im Tirzu’s campaign earlier that year, by stating that he objected to the use of the word ‘traitor’ for those who did not agree with him (Ha’aretz96). Although this comment could be interpreted as an unusual display of conciliatory statesmanship from Netanyahu, it might also be that the PM is intentionally using his moral high ground as a political ploy to appease left-wingers who had come to oppose B’tselem over the course of 2016. In February 2017, Landsmann indicates that B’tselem’s disengagement from the army, and its turn to the international stage, had indeed created antagonism amongst the left-wing opponents of the opposition (Ha’aretz97). This does not come as a complete surprise, seeing as B’tselem’s disengagement from the army can indeed be interpreted as an insult to Israeli democracy – arguably the Israeli left’s most cherished possession. The fact that Ha’aretz is especially vocal with regard to El-Ad’s UN address might indeed indicate that B’tselem’s change in strategic course has touched a sensitive spot with the

93 “Netanyahu Slams Human rights NGO B’tselem for joining ‘Chorus of Slander’ Against Israel”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/netanyahu-slams-israeli-rights-group-for-un-appearance- 1.5449949, last visited 28-04-2019. 94 The Likud party is a liberal and conservative party that is secular Zionist. Current PM Binyamin Netanyahu is from the Likud-party. 95 “Coalition Chairman Threatens to Strip Israeli Who Criticized Occupation at UN”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/coalition-chairman-seeks-to-strip-citizenship-of-b-tselem-head- 1.5452046, last visited 29-04-2019. 96 “Netanyahu Condemns Ads Attacking Left-Wing Activists: My Political opponents Are not ‘Traitors’”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-netanyahu-condemns-ads-attacking- left-wing-artists-1.5396978, last visited 28-04-2019. 97 “Israeli Anti-Army Group Refuses to Be the Army’s ‘Useful Idiot’”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-israeli-anti-occupation-group-refuses-to- be-the-army-s-useful-idiot-1.5431572, last visited 29-04-2019.

48 paper’s left-leaning reader constituency. This may be the reason why, in February of 2017, Ha’aretz publishes a Letter to the Editor written by Balanson, who is the Chief of Staff of NGO Monitor. Balanson notes that B’tselem is on the fringes in Israel (something she states El- Ad had confirmed himself by calling B’tselem’s mission ‘dissent’), by openly rejecting collaboration with vital democratic institutions, and that El-Ad now has abandoned the ‘façade’ of human rights that previously characterized B’tselem. Furthermore, Balanson points out that El-Ad and B’tselem, unable to convince the Israeli public to accept their views, have instead turned outwards, but that their international advocacy and false war allegations only fuel the boycotts and sanctions targeting Israel aided by ‘distant and unaccountable’ European officials (Ha’aretz98). Seemingly, these expressions of condemnation carry traces of the incitement-argument that has previously been used against B’tselem, but were previously only used by right-wing supporters who openly related it to ‘anti-Semitic hatred’.

Who is B’tselem Serving? In May 2017, another opinion article written by a private individual named Taub titled, “Who Are B’tselem and Breaking the Silence Serving” (Ha’aretz99). Taub opinions that organizations such as B’tselem are only adding oil to the hatred outside of Israel, which will not help ending the occupation because there is simply ‘no realistic option to do so’100. In Taub’s deterministic view, the contributions of B’tselem and BtS only serve organizations that wish to inflame conflict, like the BDS-Movement. Moreover, he posits the view that by pushing off the end of the occupation, human rights in the West Bank are likely to deteriorate (it is likely that the writer is referring to when Hamas took over in Gaza after Israel disengaged in 2005101). Therefore, he concludes, organizations like B’tselem should continue to improve the ethical norms of IDF soldiers, instead of ‘demonizing Israel’ with human rights reports that ultimately would not serve the cause of peaceful coexistence they claim to aspire to.

98 “Letter to the Editor: B’tselem’s Post-Truths”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/letters/letters-to-the-editor-BtSelem-post-truths-1.5439835, last visited 28-04-2018. 99 https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-who-are-BtSelem-and-breaking-the-silence-serving- 1.5469224 100 This view has come to represent 66% of the Israeli population, who answered in March 2019 that there is no alternative to the state of ‘control’ over the Palestinians at present (https://www.jpost.com/Arab- Israeli-Conflict/71-percent-of-Israeli-Jews-find-Israeli-control-over-the-Palestinians-as-immoral-583431). 101 Israel’s disengagement from Gaza happened in 2005, and earmarked the beginning of the a period of unrest for the civilians living in Gaza, as well as the Israeli civilians living in the south of Israel next to Gaza-border (Levin 2014: 88).

49 This type of argumentation clearly implies that organisations like B’tselem operate with an ‘ulterior motive’ that is different from the motives they let on, and seems based on the presumption that B’tselem (as an Israeli organisation) is well aware that there is ‘no other realistic option than the occupation’. Although this notion of realism is different from the classic Zionist narratives that has been voiced to justify the occupation before, this new type of criticism – henceforth referred to as “post-truth” criticism – shares similar traits to the type of anti-Semitic criticism that implies there is another catastrophe coming for the Jewish people. By indicating that there is a larger ‘plot’ that motivates the activities of organisations such as B’tselem, expressions of post-truth criticism essentially amount to the domain of ‘conspiracy theories’. Whereas Ha’aretz is very vocal about El-Ad’s informal UN-address of October 2016, The Jerusalem Post keeps remarkably quiet in its reporting on criticism towards B’tselem during this period. On May 10 2017 the Jerusalem Post editorial staff makes note of what they call a ‘rare scold’ from a senior IDF officer, who accused B’tselem of ‘distorting the truth’ and ‘staging’ videos by creating incidents (The Jerusalem Post102). This clearly indicates an effort to undermine B’tselem’s credibility by discrediting the organisation’s methodology. Furthermore, in April 2018, Hoffman writes that politicians have criticized B’tselem’s campaign calling on soldiers to refrain from firing their weapons at Gazan protestors approaching the security fence. The Public Security Minister responded to the campaign, titled ‘I am sorry, commander, I will not fire’, by calling it a “knife in the back of residents of the South”, and called B’tselem “liars who support terrorists” (The Jerusalem Post103). In July 2018, El-Ad writes in Ha’aretz that he is barred from speaking at Israeli schools due to his informal address at the UNSC, thanks to the so-called ‘Breaking the Silence’-law, which applies to anyone “who operates overseas to help institutions that help promote diplomatic steps against Israel” (Ha’aretz104). On 13 October 2018, the Jerusalem Post reports that Israel’s envoy to the UN, Danny Danon, reacts to another scheduled speech by B’tselem at the UN, “we will expose not only Palestinian incitement and lies, but also those of Hagai El-Ad and B’tselem. We will continue to defend Israel

102 “IDF Spokesman Posts Personal Response To B’tselem Video”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-spokesman-personally-replies-to-BtSelem-slander- 490341, last visited 05-05-2019. 103 “Sorry Officer, I Can’t Shoot: B’tselem’s Latest Campaign Rises Ire”, website Jerusalem Posthttps://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Sorry-officer-I-cant-shoot-BtSelems-latest-campaign-raises-ire- 547949, last visited 5-05-2019. 104 “I Am Not Allowed To Speak in Israeli Schools. Even More Worrying, These People Can”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-who-is-permitted-to-speak-to-israeli-children-at- school-1.6314007, last visited 5-05-2019.

50 and the truth (Jerusalem Post105).” In an article publishes on October 14 titled “Netanyahu: B’tselem is a Disgrace”, Lazaroff notes that Netanyahu publically scolded B’tselem for being a disgrace, prior to El-Ad’s second UNSC address scheduled later that week (The Jerusalem Post106). On October 18, an article appears titled “Netanyahu: B’tselem Helping Israel’s Enemies”, in which Lazaroff writes that Netanyahu commented, “while our soldiers are preparing to defend Israel’s security, the director-general of B’tselem chooses to make a speech full of lies at the UN in an attempt to help Israel’s enemy (The Jerusalem Post107).” This statement seems to be an obvious appeal to soldiers’ patriotism, and aimed at turning them against B’tselem, the ‘foreign agent’ that lies and works against them. On the same date, Lazaroff publishes another article stating that Israel’s envoy to the UN lashed out at El-Ad, calling him a ‘wretched collaborator’ as well as other accusations in Hebrew. Furthermore, Dannon had said “Mr. El-Ad, you are a citizen of the State of Israel who is serving our enemies. They are using you against us. IDF soldiers guard you, and you came here to defame them. Shame on you (The Jerusalem Post108).” Israel’s envoy to the UN further accused B’tselem of ‘moral blindness’. Concluding this section on B’tselem, it is clear that the organisation touches upon six out of eight group beliefs in its mission statement. A total of 67 out of 208 media articles mention expressions of criticism towards B’tselem between 2005 and 2018 (see figure 3, in appendix). It appears from the content analysis critique towards B’tselem increases in 2014, the year that El-Ad becomes executive director. Table 2 (in appendix) indicates that all of the themes recur in the media reporting on B’tselem from 2014 onwards. Although there is already discussion on morality of the army in 2006 and 2012, mentioning of this theme in the media significantly increases in 2016, the year that El-Ad informally addresses the UNSC. Accusations of treason seem to be frequent in 2014, 2016 and 2018, as well as slandering and besmirching the state and the security forces. ‘lying’ and spreading false information accusations of.

105 “B’tselem to Address U.N. Security Council on Thursday”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/BTselem-director-to-speak-about-Israel-at-UN-Security-Council- 569310, last visited 5-05-2019. 106 “Netanyahu: B’tselem is a Disgrace”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel- News/Netanyahu-BtSelem-is-a-disgrace-569400, last visited 6-05-2019. 107 “Netanyahu: B’tselem Helping Israel’s Enemies”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Netanyahu-BtSelem-helping-Israels-enemies-569756, last visited 6-05-2019. 108 “B’tselem Head, I‘m Not a Traitor; Israeli UN Envoy: You’re a Collaborator”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/BTselem-address-UN-Security-Council-on-Gaza-Khan-al- Ahmar-569721, last visited 6-05-2019.

51 4.3 Zochrot On its website, Zochrot (which means ‘remembering’ in Hebrew) describes that, although the Nakba (Arabic for ‘the Catastrophe) is part and parcel of the Israeli discourse, the organisation’s vision is to promote ‘acknowledgement and accountability for the on-going injustices since the Nakba of 1948’. In its mission statement, Zochrot notes that it promotes ‘the re-conceptualization of the Return [in Israeli society] as the essential reparation of the Palestinian Catastrophe of 1948, and a chance for a better life for all the country’s inhabitants’. It may be clear from this that Zochrot supports the Palestinian claim to the Right of Return109. The organisation further posits that there is a gap between awareness in Israeli society about the Nakba on the one hand, and the actual acknowledgement and accountability of the injustices caused by the Nakba on the other110 - which they claim is due to ‘continued adherence of Jewish Israeli society to colonial concepts and practices’. Zochrot is firm in stating that peace will come only after the country has been ‘decolonized’, so that all its inhabitants and refugees can live together. The mission statement then continues by explaining how the organisation envisions the realization of the Return: as a multidimensional process that integrates refugees into an equal and joint Palestinian-Jewish society.

“Return of the Palestinian refugees to their country on the basis of acknowledgement and accountability, coupled with a joint Jewish-Palestinian process of restitution founded on the principles of transitional justice. This Return will be a central and essential part of the creation of a multicultural democratic space and a joint and equitable fabric of life for all inhabitants of this country on all levels (from home and neighborhood to state level) and in all sectors (economics, politics, and urban planning, but also education, arts and sports) (website Zochrot111).”

In the final sections of its mission statement, Zochrot states that it will act to ‘challenge’ the Israeli Jewish public perceptions and generate processes in which Israeli Jews will reflect on and review their identity, history, future and the resulting discourse through

109 The Palestinian Right of Return is a claim that applies to the 7 million Palestinian refugees (including descendants) who have been living in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria ever since the Palestinian Nakba (Sa’di en Abu-Lughod 2007). The Palestinian’s claim to the ‘Right of Return’ has been one of the core problems in negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians ever since the Madrid negotiation in 1991, with Israel consistently rejecting this claim. 110 Whereas Palestinians traditionally understand the Nakba as a years long planned out Jewish campaign to ethnically cleanse the Arabs out of Palestine, the Israelis tend to blame spontaneous Arab fleeing and Arab armies, and/or unfortunate wartime incidents (Website the Jewish Virtual Library110). 111 ‘Our vision’, website Zochrot https://zochrot.org/en/content/17, last visited 5-05-2019.

52 which they conceive of their lives in this country. The organisations concludes by noting that its focus on the Jewish target audience derives from its practical and moral responsibility for Palestinian ‘refugeehood’, as well as from its privileged power position under the present regime.

IV: Assessment of Group Beliefs In this mission statement, Zochrot mainly touches upon 5 group norms: justness (1), de- legitimization (2), victimization (3), as well as positive self-image (4), and peace (5). Zochrot does not outspokenly touch upon security beliefs, unity, or patriotism. In terms of justness beliefs, Zochrot is making a clear appeal to Jewish Israelis to ‘acknowledge and provide accountability for the injustices done’ to the Palestinians. Drawing from the ‘zero-sum’-principle, it becomes clear that Zochrot disregards justness beliefs of the Jewish Israeli in-group, but instead focuses on the justness of Palestinians right to return. This stands in close connection to beliefs of victimization and legitimization. Zochrot clearly chooses to be on the Palestinian side of the conflict by stating that they have been victimized by the Jewish ‘colonial project’. Moreover, Zochrot is clearly legitimizing the opponent, by arguing for the right of Palestinian refugees who are ‘worthy of dignified living circumstances in equal and joint conditions’. With regard to group norms of positive collective self-evaluation, Zochrot links the continued victimization of Palestinian to a gap in Israeli acknowledgement thereof by pointing towards Jewish Israelis’ ‘continued adherence to colonial practices and concepts’. By referring to colonialism, which bears a negative association, Zochrot seems to be implicitly referring to morality. In fact, this is made explicit in the last sentence of their mission statement, where they candidly assert the ‘practical and moral responsibility’ of Jewish Israelis for Palestinian refugeehood. Regarding beliefs of peace, Zochrot notes that it believes peace will only come after the country is decolonized, enabling all of its inhabitants and refugees to live together without the threat of expulsion or denial of Return. The organisation continues to sketch peace as a future where the return of Palestinian refugees will be central to the creation of a ‘multicultural democratic space and a joint and equitable fabric of life on all levels (home and neighbourhood to state level) and in all sectors (economics, politics, urban planning, but also sports, education and arts)’.

53 DV: Expressions of Criticism against Zochrot The amount of media reporting on Zochrot was significantly lower than for BtS or B’tselem: only 34 articles were found in the newspapers’ digital databases that mentioned the NGO. The Jerusalem Post wrote eight articles about Zochrot. Ha’aretz wrote twenty-two articles that mentioned the NGO’s name: twelve thereof specifically mentioned expressions of disapproval towards the NGO. In May 2006, Honig criticises Zochrot in an article about the Mayor of the city of Haifa, who said that he would be willing to realise the right of return in the context of a peace treaty. Honig writes, “Hitherto, only Israeli Jews of the outermost fringes of the ‘loony Left’ dared explicitly advocate what the Arabs sanctify as the “right of return” – i.e. inundating Israel with millions of hostile irredentist Arabs, thereby wiping the Jewish State off the map.” Honig then singles out ‘a bunch called Zochrot’ that promotes the ‘not-so-subliminal’ message that nothing Zionist in Israel is legitimate. The author continues to note that in no time, Zochrot’s overt objective has evolved into the facilitating of the “right of return”, and warns that this Palestinian claim is imperceptibly and rapidly gaining adherents amongst the Israeli public – as well as with established officials (The Jerusalem Post112). In June 2007, Rinat notes that two signs showing the names of the Palestinian villages, ‘Yalu’ and ‘Emmaus’, were vandalized in a popular hiking park on the way to Jerusalem. The signs, which were advocated for by Zochrot and approved by Jerusalem’s municipality, mentioned that the park was built on top of the villages after its residents had been forced to leave in the wake of the 1967 Six-Day- war (Ha’aretz113). Another issue develops when Zochrot starts to disseminate educational kits including history and personal views on the Nakba, to more than a hundred Israeli educators. In June 2009, Kashti writes an article titled “Are Teachers Introducing Nakba To Students Against State’s Wishes?” about Zochrot’s educational kit, noting how a history teacher stated that the topic of the Nakba was “a minefield” that too few teachers were willing to enter (Ha’aretz114). This indicates that Zochrot is clearly touching on a topic that is socially sensitive. That the issue is also politically sensitive is confirmed in June 2011, when Shtull-Trauring writes that Zochrot is distributing teaching material to teachers during a time that the Nakba is recurring in headlines as a subject that is ‘not to

112 “Another Tack: Sins of Omission”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Another-Tack-Sins-of-omission, last visited 6-05-2019. 113 “Out of Sight Maybe, But Not Out Of Mind”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/1.4942627, last visited 5-05-2019. 114 https://www.haaretz.com/1.5060178

54 be touched’. According to the article, the ‘How do you say Nakba in Hebrew?’-Kit became popular with teachers at junior high schools in Israel, who did not want to be named out of fear of sanctions by the Ministry of Education under the ‘Nakba Law’115 (Ha’aretz116). In January 2012, Prof. Gerald Steinberg of NGO Monitor criticizes Zochrot, a radical organisation that supports the Palestinian claim of “Right to Return”, which has ‘no legal basis’ and would ‘end the existence of Israel as the Jewish nation-state’. In reaction to the cutting of German funding to the organisation, Steinberg reacts, “This is a significant victory in the battle to hold funders responsible for their support of NGOs involved in demonization.” Steinberg further states that Zochrot falsely accuses Israel of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘forcible displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian people’ (“NGO Monitor Slams Funding of +972 Blog”, Jerusalem Post).” Steinberg’s criticism towards Zochrot seems to be rooted in a preconception that the organisation sees Israel as ‘an enemy’. This is strongly indicated by Steinberg’s referral to ‘battle’, as well as his statement that Zochrot is ‘demonizing’ and ‘falsely accusing’ Israel. In April of 2012, Hartman writes that the police tried to arrest three members of Zochrot in Tel Aviv on the Israeli Independence day, after they finished holding a commemoration of pre-1948 Arab villages at their offices. According to the police, the organisation was ‘disturbing the peace’ by wanting to hand out ‘incitement material’ – referring to the flyers that showed names of Arab villages that existed before 1948 (The Jerusalem Post117). This particular event illustrates how reference to the Palestinian narrative is easily interpreted as provocation by the Israeli authorities. This is confirmed once more in May 2012, as Hartman writes that students of Tel Aviv University organised a Nakba-event in collaboration with Zochrot, despite opposition by other students and even a warning by the Education Minister who called on the University to ‘rethink’ the event, as it was “mistaken and outrageous”. Nationalist parliament members even called on the public to join them outside of the university to celebrate “the day of our enemy’s defeat” (“Despite Wide Opposition, Students to Mark

115 The Nakba Law was passed in 2011, and authorizes the Finance Minister to reduce state funding or support to an institution if it holds an activity that rejects the existence of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic” state or commemorates “Israel’s Independence Day as a day of mourning” (https://www.adalah.org/en/law/view/496, last visited 14-5-2019). 116 “Unofficial Nakba Study Kit a Hit With Teachers”, website Zochrot https://www.haaretz.com/1.5021895, last visited 6-05-2019. 117 “Police Arrest 3 at ‘Nakba’ Event ‘Stand-Off in TA”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/National-News/Police-arrest-3-at-Nakba-event-stand-off-in-TA, last visited 6-05- 2019.

55 Nakba”118, Jerusalem Post). This illustrates how indeed, any type of reference to the opponent’s historical potentially triggers animosity.

The Nakba Film Festival In reaction to the second edition of the Nakba Film Festival, organized by Zochrot, Culture Minister Livnat (from the Likud party) states on November 25 2014, “It is an unreasonable situation, in my view, when an entity that is supported by the State of Israel enables the holding on its premises of a festival devoted entirely to preaching that the day on which Israel was founded is a day of mourning” and that “the state cannot bear the cost of funding of an entity that encourages debate over what the Palestinians call ‘the right of return.’” (Ha’aretz119). Not only does this statement indicate that there is a particular ‘national’ emotion that should be affiliated with the day the state of Israel was created, it implies that Minister’s notion of ‘cost’ of encouraging debate is not solely financial, but also political. Then, in April 2015, Santis, an affiliate of the NGO Monitor group labels Zochrot a ‘fringe Israeli NGO’, a ‘tiny radical anti-Zionist’ group, that operates through generous funding of foreign Christian aid organisations. The article states that Zochrot received millions of shekels in the last year (about $700,000), most of which came from Christian organisations in Europe, leading Santis to problematize what he perceives as Christian support for the abolishment of Jewish Israel – even likening it to the centuries of anti-Semitic teachings that led to the Holocaust (The Jerusalem Post120). He concludes that Zochrot is the perfect window-dresser for what he perceives a ‘theological onslaught on the right of the Jewish people to sovereign equality’. This type of criticism seems to be influenced by beliefs of historical victimization. A couple of months later, in December of 2015, another media buzz surrounds Zochrot regarding their Nakba international film festival. Birnbaum simply writes that it was a ‘disgraceful’ event. He further writes that Rosenberg, the new head of Zochrot, as well as its fellow members, have turned a ‘blind eye’ to their own weathered history, and

118 https://www.jpost.com/National-News/Despite-wide-opposition-students-to-mark-Nakba-Day 119 “Israeli Cinematheque Should Lose Funding for Holding Nakba Film Fest, Says Minister”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/cinema-should-lose-funding-for-nakba-films-1.5335216, last visited 15-05-2019. 120 “Israelis Who Hate Israel – And The Christians Who Fund Them”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Christian-News/Israelis-who-hate-Israeland-the-Christians-who-fund-them- 400534, last visited 19-05-2019.

56 have ended up vilifying themselves (Jerusalem Post121). Birnbaum further notes that if Zochrot really wanted to bring about peace, that they should organize a film festival about Israel’s Independence in the West Bank. This last comment indicates the general conception in Israel that there is no ‘partner for peace’ on the Palestinian side. That same month, Zochrot is criticized in the context of the Nakba film festival by the Culture Minister Miri Regev, who, according to Ha’aretz’ editorial board, depicted the group as ‘traitors’ who ‘endangered the state’s existence’ (“Culture Minister Wages Undemocratic Assault on Nakba Film Festival”122, Ha’aretz). In what produces a string of articles by Ha’aretz, attacking the Minister’s ‘undemocratic’ assault on Zochrot and the Nakba film festival, the Minister ultimately backtracks and publishes a statement that the investigative committee found that the films “have presented slanderous content but that they do not reach the level of a violation of the [Nakba] Law” (Ha’aretz123). In April 2017, Skop writes that an Israeli college cancelled a screening of two Nakba films by Zochrot, after right-wing activists protested against it. The president of the academic college wrote that they had made their decision based on complaints that they had been receiving that by receiving Zochrot, their program (which included screenings from other groups) would constitute support for the global BDS-Movement (Ha’aretz124). Zochrot’s spokesman responded that this was a strange claim, considering that the organisation only focused its activities inside of Israel. In December 2017, Anderman writes that the same culture Minister sought to fine the cinema that was intending to hold the annual Nakba Film Festival, organized by Zochrot, based on the Nakba law of 2011. The Culture Minister was quoted saying, “While Israel is celebrating 70 years, the Cinematique State is trying to remember and sanctify the Nakba. Not on my watch”. By referring to the Tel Aviv Cinematique as the ‘Cinematique State’, the Minister seems to be accusing the art-house cinema of two things: being pro-Palestinian on account of disseminating a Palestinian historical narrative, as well as of arrogance in equalling itself to the level of the Israeli State. In conclusion, Zochrot’s mission statement touched upon five out of eight group beliefs. From the total of 34 articles, twenty noted ‘expressions of criticism’ towards

121 “Tel Aviv Nakba Festival – La-La-Land In The Holy Land”, website Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Tel-Aviv-Nakba-festival-la-la-land-in-the-Holy-Land-436820, last visited 15-4-2019. 122 https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/culture-minister-s-anticultural-coercion-1.5432706 123 “Israeli Culture Minister Backs Off Nakba Film Festival” (https://www.haaretz.com/israel- news/culture/.premium-regev-backs-off-nakba-film-festival-1.5434400) 124 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israeli-college-cancels-screening-by-peace-group- after-right-wing-activists-protest-1.5458508

57 Zochrot (see figure 4). Table 3 (see appendix) indicates that in-group criticism towards Zochrot spiked in 2012 and 2014, and that it centred on ‘helping the enemy’ (Treason) and inciting against Israel (incitement was coded into the node (‘Lies’): three different articles in the Jerusalem Post in 2012 mentioned accusations of incitement against Israel. As appears from the previous sections, Zochrot has been accused on ‘delegitimising’ the Jewish state, in addition to being labelled anti-Zionist, anti-Israel, and anti-Semitic.

4.4 Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights In its mission statement, Yesh-Din125 writes that the group is registered as a non-profit organisation in Israel, and that a volunteer corps and a professional staff consisting of lawyers and human rights experts serve it. Furthermore, the mission statement mentions explicitly that Yesh Din is subjected to Israeli law. After its establishment in 2005 (after the Second Intifada), Yesh Din notes that it has worked to protect the human rights of Palestinians living under Israeli armed forces’ occupation. It further states that it sees the occupation as the main source for violations of human rights, and that Yesh Din therefore seeks to end it. Yesh Din further mentions that it documents, collects, and disseminates reliable and updated information regarding systematic human rights violations in the OPT, and that it has a two-tiered approach:

“On the individual level, we work on individual cases to assist those whose rights have been violated. On the systemic level, we use the accumulation of individual incidents to identify structural violations of human rights and advocate for change.” (Website Yesh Din126)

The statement continues to read that Yesh Din conducts public and legal advocacy, in an effort to pressure the Israeli authorities to “implement their duty according to international humanitarian law to protect the Palestinians and their rights”. Furthermore, Yesh Din states that it is the duty of the Israeli authorities to raise public awareness about human rights violations in the OPT. The organisation notes on its website that its work focuses on law enforcement on settlers and other Israeli civilians; criminal accountability of IDF personnel that is deployed in the West Bank who are suspected of offenses against Palestinians; and human rights violations related to takeover of Palestinian land and restricting Palestinians’ access to their land.

125 Although they do not state it in their mission statement, Yesh Din means ‘There is law’. 126 “About us”, website Yesh Din https://www.yesh-din.org/en/about-us/, last visited 26-4-2019.

58 It may be clear that Yesh Din takes a very legal approach in the way they have framed their mission statement. In the final section, the organisation states that it is careful in accepting donations because it wants to maintain its independence. Yesh Din then reiterates what it already stresses in the first sentence of its mission statement: that it is an Israeli organisation that is registered and complies with proper administration for their status as a not-for-profit organisation. Also, the organisation notes that it is obligated under Israeli law to detail donations from foreign governments over 20,000 Israeli Shekels, and provides links for the visitors of their website to see for themselves. Lastly, Yesh Din notes that it receives its funding through governments that are ‘friendly’ to Israel.

IV: Assessment of Group Beliefs It seems like Yesh Din’s mission statement does not touch upon group beliefs of peace, unity, or patriotism. Mainly, the organisation claims to focus on law enforcement with regard to human rights violations by Israeli security personnel and the Israeli authorities. By taking a legal approach, however, Yesh Din does seem to address group beliefs of justness (1), security (2), victimization (of the opponent) (3), legitimization of the opponent (4). Like B’tselem (before they disengaged from the Israeli military in 2016), Yesh Din plays the role of army watchdog.

Yesh Din appeals to beliefs of justness based on the argumentation that human rights are being violated – and that this is why the occupation needs to end. Importantly, Yesh Din’s mission statement does not touch upon collective beliefs of positive self- image in a very explicit manner. Rather, the NGO takes a more neutral approach regarding the ‘occupation’ – they simply state it is the ‘source’ for human rights violations, and that they protect the human right of Palestinians ‘living under’ the Israeli armed forces’ occupation. Yesh Din does take an oppositional stand with regard to Jewish Israeli group beliefs of victimization. The organisation makes no explicit mention of Israeli human rights violations, and although it is broad in using just the termination ‘human right violations’, there is clear mentioning of the power asymmetry in terms of perpetrator vs. victim.

Yesh Din states it focuses on law enforcement on settlers, and ‘other Israeli civilians’, criminal accountability of Israeli security personnel suspected of offenses against Palestinian, as well as human rights violations related to Palestinian land and their

59 access to land. By advocating for Palestinian human rights, and placing the ‘enemy’ in a human rights frame, Yesh Din contributes to the legitimization of Palestinians in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – thereby taking an oppositional stand with regard to Israeli group beliefs that de-legitimize the opponent.

DV: Expressions of criticism against Yesh Din

Between 2005 and 2018, the Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz together wrote a total of 108 articles in which the keywords ‘Yesh Din’ were mentioned at least once. For the Jerusalem Post, the total amount of articles that were critical about the organisation amounted to 29 out of 72 articles. Ha’aretz wrote 36 articles that mentioned the words Yesh Din; only seven articles mentioned negative expressions of disapproval towards the organisation.

In September 2007, Hass writes a supportive article about several peace groups, amongst which Yesh Din, cynically stating that the ‘anarchists’ remind Palestinians that there is still hope (Ha’aretz127). In January 2008, another article is published, stating that the IDF condemned Yesh Din’s report of being ‘faulty and biased’ (Ha’aretz128). In November 2008, the IDF laments Yesh Din for releasing a report without first allowing the army sufficient time to respond to the allegations, stating that the organisation lacked “ethical and professional rule” (Jerusalem Post129). This type of comment undermines Yesh Din’s image as the army’s watchdog. On 9 March 2009, Lazaroff writes that Yesh Din filed a court petition claiming Israel was violating international law by mining gravel in the West Bank (Jerusalem Post130).

The next day, an opinion article appears in the Jerusalem Post, in which the author states, “the Israeli authorities should do a better job at monitoring the environmental impact and economic consequences” at stake, but that the real trouble is the foreign funding Yesh Din receives. The article continues by problematizing Yesh Din’s work to delegitimize Israel’s presence in ‘Judea and Samaria’ (the West Bank),

127 “Disrupting the Separation Policy”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/1.4978555, last visited 24-4-2019. 128 “Human Rights Group: Israel’s Trials of Palestinians are Unfair”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/1.4976078, last visited 19-05-2019. 129 “IDF Dismisses Human Rights Group Report”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel/IDF-dismisses-human-rights-group-report, last visited 19-05-2019. 130 “Mining in West Bank Violates International Law”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel/Mining-in-W-Bank-violates-international-law, last visited 14-05-2019.

60 likening the group to foreign agents that work against the interests of the Jewish claims about the West Bank – like Israel’s security concerns. Further, the author opinions that Yesh Din does not care about the ‘threat of terrorist infiltration’, and, while promoting “human rights”, the organisation is encouraging Palestinian negotiators to hang tough while it lobbies their interests, instead of being critical about its ethics of dependency on foreign powers (Jerusalem Post131).

In March 2009, Miller writes a response to this Jerusalem Post-article in Ha’aretz, by noting, “ad hominem attacks are often employed when the facts are hard to debate” and “that delegitimizing Israeli human rights organizations by accusing them of representing foreign interests is not only factually incorrect, but intellectually dishonest.” The author, who is a field researcher for Yesh Din, notes that there is an attempt to stifle an “honest and cool-headed human rights debate in Israel”, in which Israeli human rights activists are often branded as ‘tattle-tales’, thereby likening Israel to ‘the naughty child in the kindergarten of world opinion’. This bears implication for human rights NGOs of being considered as ‘snitches’ and ‘foreign agents’ within Israel. In August 2009, Izenberg writes that Israeli authorities are considering outlawing Yesh Din (as well as other NGOs) that receive funding from foreign governments, which they see as a ‘problem’. Moreover, the article quotes a spokesman from the foreign ministry “these organizations – who often issue very critical reports without giving the government time to respond – are not interested in true dialogue but rather in grabbing headlines which then help them in their fundraising efforts (Jerusalem Post132).”

In December 2010, Hartman writes that hundreds of documents were stolen from the Yesh Din offices in Tel Aviv. The article mentions that there were no signs of break-in, “leading to speculation that it was an inside job, of a mole planted by a right- wing organisation” (Jerusalem Post133). In January 2011, Lis writes an article titled “Leftist Groups: ‘Witch Hunt’ Against Us Will Destroy Democracy in Israel”. The article states that Yesh Din joined a list of several Israeli left-wing organisations, which decried a Knesset plenum decision to support a panel of inquiry to investigate groups suspected

131 “Israel’s Latest Crime”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Editorials/Israels- latest-crime, last visited 14-5-2019. 132 “Rights Groups: Gov’t Stifles Free Speech”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel/Rights-groups-Govt-stifles-free-speech, last visited 18-4-2019. 133 “Hundreds of Yesh Din Documents Stolen”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Hundreds-of-Yesh-Din-documents-stolen, last visited 16-04- 2019.

61 of “delegitimizing” the Israel Defence Forces through investigating their sources of funding (Ha’aretz134). It becomes clear how sources of funding are becoming increasingly linked to the issue of ‘public legitimacy’ for several organisations in Israel.

In July 2011, Foreign Minister Lieberman commented that left-wing organisations and human rights NGO’s were “aiding terrorism”. Yesh Din pushes back, “If the foreign minister doesn't file a police complaint and pass on the information in his possession within 24 hours, everyone will know that he is a liar and his sole purpose is to incite against the [NGOs]” (Jerusalem Post135). On July 13 2011, Lieberman and another member of the Parliament seek to push their “proposal for a parliamentary inquiry into the funding of terror-supporting organizations (Ha’aretz136)." In August 2011, NGO Monitor publishes a report alleging that Belgium taxpayer funds are being used to finance ‘anti-Israel’ NGOs, “political advocacy NGOs that claim a human rights mandate, such as Yesh Din […]” (Jerusalem Post137). From this point in time onwards, the public discussion on human rights organisations such as Yesh Din takes a doubtful turn. In January 2013, an article titled “Yesh Din’s Agenda” features replies by Jerusalem Post readers, “It seems to me the radical Left’s Yesh Din has only one purpose in living here, and that is to make Jewish life in Israel as hard as possible and make sure Arabs get our land” and “have they traded the truth for the lies they have disseminated for so long against the Jewish population?” (Jerusalem Post138). This referral to lies and truth, and the accusation of only wanting to make Jewish life as hard as possible, indicate not only how deep-rooted Yesh Din’s legal activity with regard to the West Bank is, but also how threatening Israelis perceive the smallest change to the status quo. Throughout 2013, the Jerusalem Post makes mention of more Yesh Din reports, but falls silent on criticism towards the organization. In June 2015, Yesh Din and Breaking the Silence collectively gathered soldiers’ statements and 65 questionnaires about the protocols and instructions that were

134 https://www.haaretz.com/1.5104021 135 “Yesh Din: If FM Does Not Act On NGO Accusations, He’s a Liar, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Yesh-Din-If-FM-doesnt-act-on-NGO-accusations-hes-a-liar, last visited 16-04-2019. 136 “Israel’s Boycott Law Prompts Rightist MKs to Push Bill Probing NGOs”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/1.5027025, last visited 15-04-2019. 137 “NGO Monitor Slams Belgium Funds ‘Anti-Israel’ Group”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/International/NGO-Monitor-slams-Belgium-funds-for-anti-Israel-group, last visited 16-04-2019. 138 “January 8: Yesh Din’s Agenda”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Letters/January-8-Yesh-Dins-agenda, last visited 19-5-2019.

62 distributed to them. In their report, Yesh Din concludes that the IDF does not do enough to protect Palestinians in the West Bank, to which the IDF responded that its report was ‘biased’ and its analysis of the facts ‘tendentious’ (Ha’aretz139). In January 2018, Jeremy Bob publishes an article mentioning that NGO Monitor criticized Yesh Din’s methodology, saying that it was biased and that its definitions were ‘vague’. In conclusion, 36 out of 41 articles that were written on Yesh Din mentioned expressions of criticism. Figure 5 (see appendix) indicates that there was a significant amount of reporting on Yesh Din between 2007-2014 (during this time the Jerusalem Post wrote more articles on the organisation than Ha’aretz). Table 4 (see appendix) shows that there is an outlier in 2009, when Yesh Din is criticized for being funded by foreign political organisations in two articles (coded into the ‘Foreign Agent’ node) in the Jerusalem Post. 2011 is another outliers, as Yesh Din is accused of ‘delegitimizing the IDF’ (‘Moral Army’), ‘helping the enemy and supporting terrorism’ (‘Treason’), and ‘slandering Israel’ (‘Libel and Slander’) whilst being funded by international governments (‘Foreign Mole’).

5. Comparative case analysis In the previous sections, separately conducted analyses on four Israeli peace organisations sought to assess the independent variable of this study, ‘disregarding of group beliefs’, as well as the dependent variable of this study, ‘expressions of in-group criticism’. This section seeks to compare the findings of the previous analyses in a comparative case analysis, and relates them to the hypotheses that were formulated following Chapter 2.

139 “Israeli Rights Group Blasts Army For Failing to Protect Palestinians from Settlers”, website Ha’aretz https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-yesh-din-blasts-army-for-failing-to-protect-palestinians-from-settlers- 1.5373398, last visited 19-5-2019.

63

Figure 2 Overview Group Beliefs Figure 2 provides an overview of the group beliefs that have been interpreted for each case, based on the mission statements that were published on their website. A decision that was made in the research design was to include group beliefs that were addressed through the ‘zero-sum’-principle. Intractable conflicts are considered to be zero-sum conflicts, meaning that there is no ‘win’-‘win’ situation that accommodates both parties. Based on the this principle, I assessed which organisations directly, or indirectly touched upon group beliefs (indicated in figure 2 with an asterisk*). What appears from the data is that all peace organisations in this sample touch upon beliefs of justness. For BtS, ‘justness beliefs’ are addressed by stating that the organisation rejects the government’s stance in ‘justifying the occupation for security ends’. I have not marked BtS’ statement on justness with an asterisk, since it is not possible to assess whether the government’s position on justness reflects group beliefs thereof. It should be noted that I have neither marked an asterisk for BtS’ position with regard to security beliefs, based on corresponding argumentation. What should be highlighted with regard to organisations such as BtS and B’Tselem, is that counter- criticism to BtS on behalf of the government mentions security-reasons, and appeals to justness goals in doing so (“All these lies won’t stop me from leading our determined struggle against terrorism […] to guarantee the security of Israel and its citizens140).

140 “Netanyahu Touts His Fight Against Terror Slams Left’s Babbling”, website Jerusalem Post https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Netanyahu-touts-his-fight-against-terror- slams-Lefts-babbling-441132, last visited 21-5-2019.

64 Moreover, it appears that all of the peace organisations in this sample appeal to ‘in-group victimization’. Three of the organisations do so through the ‘zero-sum’- principle, thereby focusing on the Palestinians as the victims of the conflict. Only BtS is directly appealing to in-group victimization, through its focus on the individual Israeli soldier. This finding is rather interesting, as BtS is the most criticized organisation in the sample of this study. Their focus on in-group victimization does not seem to serve the purpose of ‘providing the moral power to seek justice and oppose the adversary’ (Bar-Tal 2007) – it is therefore likely that this in-group victimization is not functional to the conflict circumstances. This argumentation is supported by the fact that Netanyahu has asked several foreign governments to stop funding left-wing NGOs – “first and foremost Breaking the Silence”. Furthermore, it is interesting that BtS seems to be linking in-group victimization to a rather gloomy prospect (of no peace), seeing as there are no references to ‘peace’. As an organisation that profiles itself as a veteran organisation, BtS is the only organisation that touches upon patriotism and unity beliefs, by relating these group norms to the ‘degrading morality’ of the Israeli army (‘zero-sum’-principle). It should be noted that all organisations addressed group beliefs of a positive collective self-image. Generally, it appeared from the content analysis that morality is a sensitive topic, especially for B’tselem and BtS – which is probably due to their work as ‘army watchdogs’. B’tselem is the second-most criticized organisation in this sample. The organisation touches upon six out of eight group beliefs. Twice does B’tselem directly relate to beliefs of peace as well as a positive collective self-image (Jewish morality); the zero-sum principle applies to four group beliefs. It is hard to make sense of this constellation of factors, and to relate this to the amount of criticism directed towards B’tselem. However, the content analysis shows indicates that the organisation has been frequently related to ‘treason’ and ‘foreign involvement’. This might imply that the organisations’ decision to disengage from the IDF and call for ‘outside legal intervention’ was likely to be interpreted as a radical move, thereby seemingly confirmed right-wing group Im Tirzu’s stigmatization of the NGO for many Israelis. Notably, official discourse took a very critical stance of B’tselem in 2018, by accusing its executive director of ‘serving the enemy’ and being a ‘collaborateur’. Generally, the results of the content analysis showed that there were negative connotations for ‘foreign involvement’ for all cases.

65 Zochrot and Yesh Din respectively touched upon 5 and 4 group beliefs (out of eight), of which nearly all of the group values were addressed through the ‘zero-sum’- principle. This is not surprising, as peace organisations usually take a challenging stance towards issues related to peace in an effort to change the status quo (Nadie et al. 2014). First and foremost, the content analyses for these two organisations show that the frequency of criticism is much less than for BtS and B’tselem. Secondly, it seems that the criticism towards Zochrot and Yesh Din carries the same themes as for BtS and B’tselem, such as foreign involvement and the presentation of ‘false truths’. The main difference between Zochrot and Yesh Din on the one hand, and B’tselem and BtS on the other, is that With regard to the formulated hypotheses, it should be noted that the results of this study indicated support for H1. Generally, all of the peace organisations touched upon important group beliefs. For the organisations that touched upon six, instead of five (Zochrot and Yesh Din) group beliefs, this study found higher values on the dependent variable of in-group criticism (132 for BtS; 67 for B’tselem). The results furthermore indicated support for H2, seeing as Yesh Din (36) received more criticism than Zochrot (20) (which did not appeal to security in its mission statement). Interestingly, the result for BtS indicated that appeals to in-group victimization are likely to cause more criticism towards peace organisations. On these grounds, H3 has to be rejected. This contradicting finding suggests lanes for further research on the specific functions of group beliefs in intractable conflict. Support for the third hypothesis might imply the importance of the role played by the political establishment of states involved in intractable conflict. Further research into the topic of group norms and their interplay with national politics could provide more insight into ‘identity politics’ as a phenomenon. With regard to the methodology of this study, it should be noted that there was quite a large amount of overlap on the IV and the DV: group-criticism towards peace organisations often draws from prominent group values. For future research, this should be taken into account. Other pathways for researching the role of group beliefs could entail a dyad-study that would include the Palestinian case.

Concluding remarks This thesis tried to explain why intractable conflict continues to be just that – intractable – and employed a socio-psychological perspective to expose the social identity processes

66 at play that arguably support the insolvability of conflict. Identity is a powerful tool for creating an order in our social environment and for reducing our individual uncertainty. This thesis has taken this insight and applied it to a puzzling social phenomenon: severe in-group criticism of peace organisations who work in contexts of intractable conflict. At the group level, the findings of this thesis indicate that there is evidence in support of the main hypothesis. Peace organisations that disregard specific group beliefs regarding the conflict are more likely to face expressions of criticism coming from the in-group. However, further research into the relation between prominent group beliefs and politics is required, and would serve to understand why fellow in-group members may ostracize peace organisations working towards a non-violent solution of intractable conflict.

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70 APPENDIX (Tables and Figures)

Table 1. Patterns in media reporting on in-group criticism: Breaking the Silence

Figure 2. In-Group Criticism towards Breaking the Silence (2005-2008)

71 Table 2. Patterns in Media Reporting on In-group Criticism: B’Tselem

Figure 3. In-Group Criticism towards B’tselem (2005-2008)

72 Table 3. Patterns in Media Reporting on In-group Criticism: Zochrot Zochrot (N=20) 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2009 2007 2006 Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost Hrtz Jpost NODES (N=1) (N=0) (N=1) (N=0) (N=0) (N=1) (N=6) (N=2) (N=1) (N=0) (N=0) (N=1) (N=0) (N=3) (N=1) (N=0) (N=1) (N=0) (N=1) (N=0) (N=0) (N=1) Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Agent Libel and 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Slander Lies 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Treason 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 7 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Moral 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Army TOTAL 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (N) * For the years 2010, 2008 and 2005 there was no data. Figure 4. In-Group Criticism Towards Zochrot (2005-2018)

73 Table 4. Patterns in Media Reporting on In-group Criticism: Yesh Din

Figure 5. In-Group Criticism towards Yesh Din

74