In Favor of Teleosemantics: a Millikanian Treatment of the Intentional Content of Mental Representation
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City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2011 In Favor of Teleosemantics: A Millikanian Treatment of the Intentional Content of Mental Representation Pierre Faye Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1718 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] IN FAVOR OF TELEOSEMANTICS: A Millikanian Treatment of the Intentional Content of Mental Representation by PIERRE FAYE A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2011 ii © 2011 PIERRE FAYE All Rights Reserved iii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date Chair of Examining Committee John Greenwood Date Executive Officer Iakovos Vasiliou Michael Devitt (Advisor) Ruth Garrett Millikan John Greenwood Richard L. Mendelsohn Steven Ross Supervision Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iv Abstract IN FAVOR OF TELEOSEMANTICS: A Millikanian Treatment of the Intentional Content of Mental Representation by Pierre Faye Advisor: Professor Michael Devitt Theoretical attempts to naturalize mental contents, that is, to explain how wholly physical organisms manage to represent the external world to themselves, are mostly conducted in accordance with causal-informational and/or functionalist approaches based on nomic physical correlations. In 1984, Ruth Millikan and David Papineau simultaneously, though independently, injected new life into the naturalist program by introducing a divergent approach known today as “teleosemantics.” In first approximation, teleosemantics purports to naturalize mental content by substituting for the former concept of nomic correlations found in causal and/or functionalist models, the biological concept of etiological functions resulting from natural selection. Since its introduction, teleosemantics has been an object of constant misunderstanding and resolute opposition. The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate that, when properly conceived, teleosemantics is indeed a coherent project capable of responding to the central objections raised against it. Offering a defense of teleosemantics is of critical value to the general program of naturalization of mental content because the spirit of the teleosemantic approach resonates best with the deepest v philosophical tenets of the naturalist enterprise. I want to argue that only a teleological perspective, that is an analysis of etiological functions grounded in the actual history of selected beneficial mechanisms for generating mental representations, is able to explain the real nature of intentional content. Millikan’s models of teleosemantics will function as my main frame of reference: her model represents the best contemporary program of intentional realism developed in strictly naturalist terms. This dissertation develops into four chapters. Chapters one and two present a criticism of causal-functionalist models and an analysis of their inability to overcome the challenge of misrepresentation, giving reasons to look for an alternative perspective. Chapter three introduces teleosemantics as a potential candidate for such an alternative model, focusing on Ruth Millikan’s perspective, with the ambition to alleviate the many misunderstandings and confusions generally attached to this view. Chapter four addresses the apparently powerful objections against the historical dimension of teleological functions and the controversial role this historical dimension is supposed to play in fixing the intentional content of mental representations in teleosemantics. vi In memory of my father. To Anne-Marie, Caroline and Mylène. Acknowledgments I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Prof. Michael Devitt, not only for his constant support both on intellectual matters and practical issues, but also for his confidence in my ability to complete this ambitious project. I would like to thank Prof. Ruth Millikan, whose impressive philosophical work plays a central part in this dissertation. With incredible commitment and generosity, Prof. Millikan helped me understand her teleological model thanks to her careful comments and enlightening explanations. I have been extremely fortunate to benefit from Prof. Michael Devitt and Prof. Ruth Millikan’s guidance during all these years. One of the first courses I took at the Graduate Center was Prof. Alberto L. Cordero’s Philosophy of Science class. Since then, Prof. Cordero has become a mentor and a friend. He introduced me to the subtleties of quantum mechanics and relativity. I am thankful for the many wonderful evenings of passionate philosophical discussions and exquisite meals. Finally, I want to thank my friend Jeffrey Stephenson. Jeffrey has always been there for me when I needed to improve the quality of my writing, thanks to his great mastery of English language. I am also grateful for his helpful philosophical comments and valuable insights. vii IN FAVOR OF TELEOSEMANTICS TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 Treating Intentionality Aside From Consciousness: Some Justifications .................................... 7 CHAPTER 1: THE DOMINANT MODELS AND THE CHALLENGE OF MISREPRESENTATION .............................................................................................................. 12 1.1 The Appeal of the Dominant Models ................................................................................... 14 1.2 Misrepresentation and Asymmetrical Dependency ............................................................. 19 1.3 Nomic Correlations versus Robustness ................................................................................ 29 1.4 Misperception versus Misidentification ............................................................................... 44 CHAPTER 2: FUNCTIONALISM AND ITS LIMITS ................................................................. 56 2.1 Representations and Malfunctions in Functional Role Theories ......................................... 57 2.2 Functionalist Kinds and the Problem of Membership.......................................................... 68 2.3 Functionalism without Functions ......................................................................................... 74 2.4 “Functioning As” Functions versus Proper Functions ......................................................... 83 CHAPTER 3: THE TELEOSEMANTIC PERSPECTIVE ........................................................... 91 3.1 The True Nature of Teleosemantics ..................................................................................... 94 3.2 The Price of Teleology ....................................................................................................... 102 3.3 Millikanian Functions ........................................................................................................ 110 3.4 Derived Functions and the Novelty Issue .......................................................................... 122 3.5 From Natural Signs to Intentional Representations. .......................................................... 130 CHAPTER 4: OBJECTIONS TO TELEOSEMANTICS AND REPLIES ................................. 138 4.1 The Logical Structure of the Objections against History ................................................... 140 4.2 Conceptual Analysis versus Theoretical Definitions ......................................................... 150 4.3 Millikanian Meaning .......................................................................................................... 163 4.4 Misleading Intuitions Dispelled ......................................................................................... 186 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 206 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 211 1 INTRODUCTION This dissertation is a research in philosophy of mind conducted within the framework of naturalism. It aims at providing a naturalist account for the intentional content of mental representations. Naturalist philosophers want to explain mental activity as the result of entirely natural processes, in particular, although not necessary exclusively, causal processes in the brain. They reject Spiritualism, Vitalism and other forms of substance- dualism. These are also thinkers whose rejection of the distinction between metaphysics and natural philosophy leads to embrace the best knowledge of the time, the one produced by the sciences, as a guiding line for their research. Theoretical attempts to naturalize mental contents, that is, to explain how wholly physical organisms manage to represent the external world to themselves, are mostly conducted in accordance with causal-informational and/or functionalist approaches based on nomic physical correlations. In 1984, Ruth Millikan and David