The Governance of the International Monetary Fund
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THE GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ARIEL BUIRA At the end of World War II the Bretton Woods conference gave birth to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—better known as the World Bank. These two international financial institutions have come to exert a major—some would say dominant—influence on economic policy in developing countries over the last half century. During the nineties these two institutions have placed significant importance on governance issues among their member countries. The IMF, in particular, has given increased attention to such issues, following the approval of the Guidance Note on governance by the Executive Board1 five years ago (IMF 1997). The promotion of transparency and accountability are now at the core of the IMF’s efforts to ensure the good use of public resources as well as the domes- tic ownership of IMF programs (IMF 2001b). In this respect, transparency and accountability are important global public goods in an increasingly interdepen- dent and democratic world. These two factors facilitate trust and confidence, bol- stering cooperation within the context of the international financial system. In recent years the IMF has developed and applied its instruments for pro- moting these objectives to an extent well beyond what was envisaged at the time the Guidance Note was approved. Indeed, the IMF helps countries identify any weaknesses that may exist in their institutional and regulatory frameworks that could give rise to poor governance; it then provides support in the design and implementation of remedial reforms. Given the strength of vested interests that benefit from the lack of transparency and accountability in these situations, over- coming these weaknesses often requires that the countries undertake significant structural reforms. By the very nature of its work then, the IMF exerts consider- able influence over the majority of its 183 member countries, on such economic Preparation of this chapter was financed in part by a grant from the OPEC Fund for International Development. It is a condensed version of a paper presented at the September 2000 meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of 24 on International Monetary Affairs and is based on and develops several themes in a paper prepared for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 225 226 POLITICS and politically sensitive matters as wage policies, taxation and public expenditure levels, public sector prices and tariffs, subsidies and pensions, privatisation poli- cies, the exchange regime and the exchange rate, interest rates and monetary pol- icy, trade policy, financial sector regulations and others. With resources of over $280 billion and an expanded mandate, the IMF is probably today the most pow- erful of all international institutions. In view of its influence, it is of interest to consider to what extent the IMF’s own governance meets the standards of transparency and accountability required to ensure the ownership of programs by member countries and the prudent and effective use of international public resources. This chapter takes up that ques- tion, and begins with an analysis of the IMF’s power structure and of the issues raised by its current patterns of decisionmaking. Given the similarities between the IMF’s and the World Bank’s composition of shareholding and the resulting decisionmaking structures, this analysis of the IMF can also be applied to the World Bank. CURRENT PATTERNS OF DECISIONMAKING The decisionmaking patterns of the IMF member countries involve three key areas: the distribution of voting powers, the rules for decisionmaking, and the management structure within the IMF. Each of these dimensions is examined below in terms of its potential and actual effects on IMF policies and operations. Voting powers Two aspects are remarkable in the distribution of voting power in the IMF. One is the skewed distribution of voting rights between industrial and developing countries, due in part to the diminished role of basic votes relative to quota-based votes. The other is that some of the variables used to determine quotas—a cru- cial element of voting powers—have not changed in more than 50 years. Both facts suggest that voting powers have not kept pace with changes in the global economy, undermining the IMF’s capacity to pursue its cooperative mandate. Basic votes and quota-based votes. IMF members do not have equal voting power. Instead, they have weighted voting, a departure from the traditional practice of international organizations. To clarify, the vote of an IMF member has two com- ponents. Each member has 250 basic votes simply by virtue of its membership, as a symbolic recognition of the principle of the legal equality of states. Each mem- ber also has one additional vote for every 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) of its quota. Because the number of basic votes has not changed with successive quota increases, the ratio of basic votes to total votes has declined from 12.4 per- cent of the voting power of the countries participating in the Bretton Woods con- THE GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 227 ference (IMF 1993, schedule A) to 2.1 percent today, despite the entry of 135 new member countries. In fact, as a proportion of the total, the basic votes of the orig- inal members have declined from more than 12 percent to less than 0.4 percent as a result of a 37-fold increase in total quotas. This has changed the power structure of the IMF since the importance of the basic vote of a country is inversely related to the size of its economy, as basic votes represent a substantially higher propor- tion of the voting power of small countries. To illustrate: A country with a quota of 10 million SDRs would be entitled to 350 votes—100 votes due to its quota size and 250 basic votes for being a mem- ber. If the size of quotas is multiplied by ten, the country will have 1000 votes on account of its quota and 250 basic votes, for a total of 1250 votes. Thus the share of basic votes declines from over 70 percent to 20 percent of the total. Recall that in 1945 there were 14 countries—almost a third of the membership—whose quota was $10 million or less, and 28 countries—more than half the total—whose quotas were $50 million or less. With the passage of time, inflation and economic growth have combined to increase the size of the quotas. But since the number of basic votes has remained constant, their relative proportion to the total has declined, emasculating the role of basic votes and the relative influence of devel- oping countries. Determination of quotas. Because members’ quotas are the main factor determin- ing voting rights, the process for setting such quotas should also be examined. It has been said that the quotas of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China were politically determined at the Bretton Woods conference. Raymond Mikesell, who was asked by the U.S. Treasury to estimate the first quo- tas, writes: In mid-April 1943, White [i.e. Harry Dexter White, chief international economist at the U.S. Treasury in 1942–44] called me to his office and asked that I prepare a formula for the . quotas that would be based on the mem- bers’ gold and dollar holdings, national incomes, and foreign trade. He gave no instructions on the weights to be used, but I was to give the United States a quota of approximately $2.9 billion; the United Kingdom (including its colonies), about half the U.S. quota; the Soviet Union, an amount just under that of the United Kingdom; and China, somewhat less. He also wanted the total of the quotas to be about $10 billion. White’s major con- cern was that our military allies (President Roosevelt’s Big Four) should have the largest quotas, with a ranking on which the president and the sec- retary of state had agreed....I confess to having exercised a certain amount of freedom in making these estimates in order to achieve the predetermined quotas. (1994, pp. 22–23) 228 POLITICS Subsequently,at the meeting of the Committee on Quotas,Mikesell was asked to explain the basis for his quota estimates, and he further writes: I had anticipated this request and gave a rambling twenty-minute seminar on the factors taken into account in calculating the quotas, but I did not reveal the formula. I tried to make the process appear as scientific as possi- ble, but the delegates were intelligent enough to know that the process was more political than scientific. (1994, pp. 35–36) Given these historical facts, it is remarkable that—with only some adjust- ments in the weighting and definition of the main variables—the IMF contin- ues to use the original formula for determining members’ quotas. It is certainly understandable that the lack of equity and rationality in the quota criteria con- tinues to cause controversy and mistrust among members today, just as it did 50 years ago. The original formula is now combined with four other formulas, which give different weights to the same variables, and an element of discretion is used in selecting the formula to be applied in each case. (At times, the average of the various calculations is used to set a country’s quota.) It is therefore not surprising that current quotas are far from representative of the actual sizes of economies—of their ability to contribute to the IMF or of their importance in the world economy. This can be easily illustrated by the fact that such large countries as Brazil, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea, with real GNPs and populations much larger than those of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, had quotas in 1999 that were only a fraction of those countries’ and fewer votes (table 1).