Issue 5 December 2019

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

ISSN 2406-1824 Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Fostering democracy and upholding human rights, taking action to prevent the destruction of the global ecosystem, advancing equality between women and men, securing peace through conflict prevention in crisis zones, and defending the freedom of individuals against excessive state and economic power – these are the objectives that drive the ideas and actions of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We maintain close ties to the German Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) and as a think tank for green visions and projects, we are part of an international network encompassing well over 100 partner projects in approximately 60 countries. The Heinrich Böll Foundation works independently and nurtures a spirit of intellectual openness. We maintain a worldwide network with currently 30 international offices. Our work in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo concentrates on the democratisation process, political education, and environmental protection and sustainable development. We support and open public fora about topical and marginalised socio-political issues and we enable networking among local and international actors whose work aligns with Green values.

Cover design Bogdan Maksimović Introduction Southeastern Europe 3

Kosovo: A Hostage Crisis

By Natalija Miletić

Twenty years on from the Kosovo War, the ing conducted by the very politicians who collective memory of both parties in the were on opposing sides during the war in conflict remains burdened by myths and 1998-99. The fact that the negotiations are in incontestable truths about what actually a state of stalemate, and have been for a took place. Nationalist and ethnocentric long time, should come as no surprise. narratives about the war in the former Yu- The hostage crisis known as Kosovo, in goslav autonomous province continue to which the populations of both Kosovo and dominate public discourse of both Kosovo Serbia are held as ideological hostages by and Serbia. their own political elites, has already been The process of reconciliation and building going on for twenty years. The lack of prog- longstanding peace is being undermined, ress in the official negotiations between primarily, by political elites in both coun- Belgrade and Pristina is an obstacle to tries, whose populist policies amplify the peacebuilding and the normal coexistence prejudices between Kosovar Albanians and of the two Kosovar communities. However, Serbs. The political establishment in both bad policies made by local and interna- countries –composed of, inter alia, war- tional stakeholders, mainly affect the lives mongers, former combatants, convicted of ordinary citizens, rather than the politi- and non-convicted war criminals– face cians and policy makers that are involved. pressure from the international community This issue of Perspectives on the 20th anni- to finally, and without hesitation, resolve versary of the Kosovo War and the NATO the question of the former province of the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugo- ex-Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and normal- slavia, is dedicated to ordinary citizens. ize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. These are the people who, to this day, live The current problems concerning relations with the consequences of war, even if they between the two countries are partly the re- took no part in it; the youth raised to hate; sult of the normalization negotiations, anti-war activists who are considered ene- which have been going on for more than a mies of the state; minorities that are used decade under the patronage of the interna- as pawns in political maneuvering; victims tional community. Kosovo’s status negotia- of war crimes and victims of the NATO mil- tions, which have taken place in the after- itary campaign. In this issue of Perspec- math of a conflict that claimed the lives of tives we aim to highlight the fact that Koso- thousands of civilians, destroyed tens of vo is not just a toponym, but a country thousands of homes and displaced more burdened by its recent violent history, than a million people, led to thousands of where common people are struggling to women being raped, and which only ceased rebuild the broken societies that the con- following the intervention of NATO, are be- flict has left behind.

Natalija Miletić, journalist 4 Southeastern Europe Introduction

Introduction

By Marijana Toma

In the early 1980s, after the death of Social- choice of official language, control of the ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) police, as well as veto powers over any fur- President Josip Broz Tito, demonstrations ther changes to the Constitution of Serbia. took place in Kosovo as Kosovo Albanians A wave of demonstrations were organized sought for Kosovo to be recognized as a Re- across Kosovo, involving students and public within SFRY. At the same time, in- teachers, intellectuals, and miners, which creasing numbers of prominent individu- led the Presidency of SFRY to impose ‘spe- als and institutions in Serbia began to cial measures’, with federal authorities request that Kosovo’s autonomy be re- assuming responsibility for security within duced, claiming that the Kosovo Albanian’s the province. In that period, thousands of protests were “organised counter-revolu- Kosovo Albanians employed in the public tionary activities”. Additionally, the emi- sector– doctors, teachers, university pro- gration of Serbs and Montenegrins from fessors, workers, judges, police and civil Kosovo intensified in this period, accom- servants– were dismissed from their posi- panied by increasingly vocal demands tions and replaced by non-Albanians. At from the Serbian public to halt this trend. the same time, police violence against During the mid-1980s, the division be- Kosovo Albanians increased. tween Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was evident and deep: Albanians continued to A decade of non-violent request that Kosovo be granted the status resistance and the formation of a Republic, as well as for greater liberal- ization, and expressed concerns about of the Kosovo Liberation Kosovo’s underdevelopment within SFRY, Army while Serbs were concerned about discrim- In September 1991, after the war in Slovenia ination against them by the Kosovo Alba- already ended, and war in Croatia was on its nian-led provincial government. After the way, Kosovo Albanian political leaders gath- Central Committee of the League of Com- ered together within the Democratic League munists of Serbia elected Slobodan Mi- of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, a promi- lošević as the new Chairman of the Presid- nent writer and intellectual, and embraced ium of the Central Committee, he managed a policy of non-violent civil resistance, es- to marginalize his political opponents in tablishing a system of unofficial, parallel the Party and established full control over institutions in the health care and education the Serbian branch of the League of Com- sectors. Kosovo Albanians held an unoffi- munists, allowing him to crucially influ- cial referendum in which they voted over- ence political events in Yugoslavia. whelmingly for independence from Serbia At the beginning of 1989, amendments to and Yugoslavia. Between 1992 and 1995, the the Constitution of Serbia were adopted by situation in Kosovo remained tense, but did the National Assembly. These constitu- not erupt in violence, despite the tional changes revoked Kosovo’s autono- strong-handed rule of the Serbian regime. my: most of the Provinces’ autonomous After almost a decade of non-violent resis- powers were annulled, including control tance by Kosovo Albanians, the Kosovo Marijana Toma, historian over economic and educational policy, Liberation Army (KLA), an armed resis- Introduction Southeastern Europe 5

tance organization, was formed by late After additional attempts by international 1997 and began attacking Serbian police mediators to persuade Slobodan Milošević and civilians in Kosovo. In late 1996 and to accept the agreement, US Ambassador 1997, the KLA claimed responsibility for Richard Holbrooke announced the failure armed attacks on members of the military of negotiations on March 23rd 1999, after in Kosovo, as well as against civilians. The which NATO Secretary General Solana di- beginning of armed conflict between the rected Wesley Clark to commence air Yugoslav Army and Serbian police with the strikes, which began on the March 24th and KLA is commonly connected to the attack continued until June 10th 1999. by Serbian police special forces on the fam- ily compound of Adem Jashari in the vil- Operation Allied Force - lage of Donje Prekaze in March 1998, in which Jashari, one of the founders of the NATO military intervention KLA, along with an estimated 50 others against the Federal Republic members of his family and associates, in- of Yugoslavia cluding several women and children, were Between March 24th and June 9th 1999, large killed. During the spring of 1998, the KLA areas of Serbia, including Kosovo, Bel- gradually increased the intensity of attacks grade and Novi Sad, were targeted by in Kosovo, including against police patrols. NATO bombing. While Montenegro was The Army of Yugoslavia and Serbian police not targeted often, Podgorica was bombed responded by shelling Albanian villages. In at the end of April 1999. According to the July 1998, the KLA began an offensive in Army of Yugoslavia, the Belgrade region the Municipality of Orahovac, in an at- was most intensively targeted by NATO’s tempt to take control of the area, which firepower. Although NATO and allied gov- resulted in the killing of many civilians, ernments and military officials stressed both Albanian and Serb, by both the Serbi- their intent to limit civilian casualties and an security forces and KLA. Following the other harm to the civilian population, from KLA’s operations in the Orahovac region, the outset of operation Allied Force, civil- the Serbian army and police coordinated ian casualties occurred. action against KLA forces, and by early Human Rights Watch, which conducted an September 1998 the KLA had lost much of investigation in NATO’s intervention, report- the territory it had previously held. ed ninety separate incidents involving civil- ian deaths during the bombing campaign. Diplomatic efforts During the NATO air campaign, the inter- to stop the war national community continued with diplo- Following a massacre in mid-January in the matic efforts to persuade the Yugoslav village Račak, in central Kosovo, the Con- leadership, primarily Milošević, to accept tact Group called for a peace conference to an international military presence in Koso- be held in France at the beginning of Febru- vo. Based on the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari ary 1999. Despite efforts by the Contact plan, a Military Technical Agreement be- Group, the negotiations failed due to sub- tween the International Security Force stantial differences between the Federal (KFOR) and the Governments of the Fed- Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbian authorities eral Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia was th and the international community on the is- signed on June 9 , 1999 in Kumanovo, then sue of implementation and an international Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. military presence in Kosovo. According to The agreement encompassed the with- the ICTY, the diversity of the Kosovo Alba- drawal of Serbian-Yugoslav forces from nian delegation caused indecision and nu- Kosovo, deployment of KFOR in Kosovo merous changes in their position; the ap- following the adoption of a UN Security proach of the Troika (Austrian Ambassador Council resolution, and allowing KFOR to th Wolfgang Petritsch, acting as the European operate without interference. On June 10 Union’s Special Envoy for Kosovo, Russian 1999 the Security Council adopted Resolu- envoy Ambassador Boris Mayorski, and tion 1244, authorizing the creation of an U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill) did not international civil presence, the purpose of encourage confidence in the process; and which was to provide an interim adminis- the involvement of the U.S. Secretary of tration for Kosovo, demilitarization of the State, Madeleine Albright, introduced con- KLA, and safe return of refugees and inter- fusion and uncertainty into the position of nally displaced persons. Following the the international negotiators. withdrawal of the Serbian police and Yugo- 6 Southeastern Europe Introduction

slav Army, according to the records of the Korenica, and other villages in the Reka Government of Serbia, more than 187,000 Valley, Serbian forces killed at least 287 Serbs and other non-Albanians left Kosovo Kosovo Albanian men and forcibly ex- and moved to Serbia. Those who stayed in pelled a number of Kosovo Albanian civil- Kosovo were targeted by Albanians in re- ians and forced them to leave for Albania. prisals. In this post-conflict violence, be- A significant number of bodies of these tween June 12th 1999 and December 31st men were later discovered in a mass grave 2000, 932 non-Albanians were killed, ab- in Batajnica, during the exhumations con- ducted or went missing, mostly Serbs. ducted in 2001-2002. In Izbica, on March Post-conflict relations between Serbs and 28th 1999, over 100 mostly older men were Albanians have developed slowly. Violence separated from women and children, gath- did not end in 1999, erupting again in ered in a field, divided into two groups and March 2004 when ethnic tensions led to un- shot. In Podujevo, on March 28th 1999, the rest and riots in what is now known in Ser- Serbian Scorpions police unit committed bia as the “March Pogrom”, in which 15 a massacre, killing 19 Albanian women Albanians and 12 Serbs were killed, 170 and children from the Duriqi and Boguje- Serbs were seriously injured, around 800 vci families. Serb houses were destroyed or seriously damaged, as well as 90 Ashkalia and two Victims of victimhood Albanian houses, and 36 Serbian Orthodox Since the end of the armed conflict, Serbia Churches and other religious places were and Kosovo have been in dispute over al- completely or partially destroyed. In recent most every issue related to the conflict, years, the security situation in Kosovo has from the causes of the conflict, its chronol- improved and although the return of Serbs ogy, and nature, to the atrocities that were is slow, relations between Serbs and Alba- committed, and the number of people who nians in Kosovo are slowly normalizing. lost their lives during and after the conflict. Since mid-2000s, the Humanitarian Law War crimes in Kosovo Center in Serbia (HLC) and Humanitarian During the entire period of the NATO Law Center Kosovo (HLC Kosovo), two hu- bombing, the Army of Yugoslavia and po- man rights organizations and documenta- lice forces of the Republic of Serbia contin- tion centers, have conducted extensive ued to specifically target Kosovo Albanian research on human losses in connection civilians, committing killings, including with the Kosovo conflict. According to the executions, and forcing civilians to leave Kosovo Memory Book Database, a total of Kosovo for Albania and Macedonia. Atroc- 13,535 persons were killed or disappeared ities began almost immediately after the during and in the context of the armed beginning of NATO bombing. One of the conflict in Kosovo, 10,812 of which were first major crimes was committed by mem- Kosovo Albanians, 2,197 were Serbs, and bers of Serbian police in Suva Reka, on 526 were Roma, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, March 26th 1999, when 45 members of Ber- and other non-Albanians. HLC and HLC isha family were killed. Among them were Kosovo have analyzed more than 31,600 many women and children, whose bodies documents from numerous sources, in- were discovered and exhumed from a cluding a large number of statements giv- mass grave at the police compound in en by victims or witnesses of war crimes. Batajnica, a Belgrade suburb. One area According to the HLC and HLC Kosovo targeted by the Army and Police was the database, during the conflict in Kosovo in municipality of Đakovica, where Serbian 1998, 2,046 persons were killed or went police began killing Kosovo Albanians and missing, of which 1,705 Albanians, 280 burning houses in March and April 1999 in Serbs, and 61 were other non-Albanians; order to create an atmosphere of fear 1,018 were Kosovo Albanian civilians, 129 among those civilians who refused to leave were Serb civilians, and 44 other non-Al- their homes and flee to Albania. During banian civilians; 682 were Kosovo Alba- the Reka Valley operation, launched in nian members of the KLA, one Kosovo part as a response to the killing of five po- Albanian who was a member of the Army licemen on April 22nd 1999, the Army and of Yugoslavia/Serbian police, 151 Serb Police acted in conjunction, expelling members of Army/Police, and 16 persons Kosovo Albanian civilians from their vil- of other ethnicities who were members of lages and sending many of them to Alba- the Army of Yugoslavia/Serbian police. It nia. On April 27th 1999, in villages Meja and was impossible to determine the status of Introduction Southeastern Europe 7 four Albanians and one non-Albanian as ones on Surdulica, where 29 people were combatant or civilian. killed, Niš, where 19 civilians were killed, Between March 20th and June 14th 1999, Ser- and on the Radio-Television of Serbia stu- bian forces killed or destroyed the bodies of dio in Belgrade, where 17 civilians were 6,901 Albanian civilians. In the same peri- killed. od, the KLA was responsible for the killing or disappearance of 328 Serbian civilians Reconciliation and 136 Roma persons and other non-Alba- While some progress has been made in the nian civilians. Combat between the Army of area of dealing with the past and transi- Yugoslavia/Serbian police and KLA result- tional justice, the process of reconciliation ed in the killing or disappearance of 1,204 still lies in the distant future in the region members of the KLA and 559 members of of the post-Yugoslav states, and in Ser- the Army of Yugoslavia and Serbian Police. bia-Kosovo particularly. It is therefore nec- During the NATO bombing, HLC and HLC essary that Serbia and Kosovo, as well as Kosovo documented 758 persons who lost other countries in the region, accept the their lives as a result of NATO attacks, of already established facts about war crimes which 205 Serbian civilians, 220 Kosovo-Al- committed in the Yugoslav wars during the banian civilians, 28 Roma civilians and ci- 1990s, demonstrate additional willingness vilians of other ethnicities, 30 members of to address these issues through the estab- the KLA, and 275 members of the Army of lishment of regional truth experiments, Yugoslavia and Serbian police. NATO repair the damage inflicted upon victims, bombs killed 260 people in the territory of and establish accountability for past atroc- Serbia, 10 in Montenegro, and 488 in Koso- ities, through war crimes prosecutions and vo. The two most deadly NATO attacks were halting the promotion of war criminals. in Korisa, where 77 Albanian civilians were These steps present the only solid ground killed, and Bistražin, where 64 Albanian ci- for the long awaited reconciliation be- vilians were killed, whereas on the territory tween Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, as well of Serbia, the most deadly attacks were the with other neighbors in the region. 8 Southeastern Europe Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils

Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils

By Simon Ilse and Milan Bogdanović

In early 1999, German Tornado jets took part in airstrikes against targets in Serbia, thus opening a new chapter in the history of Germany. The decision to participate in the NATO intervention in the Kosovo war, taken by the newly formed red-green government in Germany, headed by Gerhard Schroeder, caused major internal strains, primarily in the ranks of the Greens. The focal point of criticism was the “Green” Minister of Foreign Af- fairs, Joschka Fischer, whose support for military intervention clashed with the Green Movement’s anti-war policies. Winfried Nachtwei, former member of the German Bun- destag and the Alliance 90/Greens, interviewed for this edition of Perspectives, speaks about the controversial dilemma of protecting human rights through the use of military force and the policy of non-violence, as well as about the lessons learned from the war and the process of peacebuilding in Kosovo.

In regard to the NATO intervention in legitimized under international law. In this 1999 – did the Greens do the wrong thing respect, it was clear to us that we support- for the right reasons? ed one evil to prevent another intolerable That thought came to me a few weeks after evil. the beginning of the NATO intervention, because the intention to avert an immi- Could you describe this dilemma? nent humanitarian threat within a short The Green Party, including the peace move- period of time was not achieved. The in- ment, have argued for years about how ad- tention was right, I still believe that, but the equately Western European states could result is questionable. The thought came have reacted to the wars in the Balkans. It up: “Was one being naive about the effec- was agreed that humanitarian aid should be tiveness of this kind of military action?” supported, aid should be given to refugees, refugees should be admitted and sanctions Was the decision to participate in opera- should be imposed on the main aggressors. tion Allied Force, from a German point Whether military action should be taken of view, and in conditions that were not was the subject of huge debate, and it was easy, the right one? postponed by the Greens, in the autumn of From the very start it was mainly about the 1996, when a delegation from our parlia- dilemma of preventing another Bosnia in mentary group and our party visited Bosnia the European political sphere of interest and Herzegovina. There, in Sarajevo, we and, in that sense, it was very much the really understood what had happened to right and necessary thing to do. A major the defenseless population in besieged Sa- problem was that the United Nations Se- rajevo, and how Europe had done nothing curity Council was unable to legitimize effective against it. This was precisely where military action, i.e. the use of force, be- we, most of whom were pacifists, came to Winfried Nachtwei, former cause of the veto announced by Russia and realize there are situations in which the use Bundestag MP (Alliance ‘90/Greens) Simon Ilse, hbs Belgrade office probably also China. The threat of military of military force can be necessary, legiti- director strikes, air strikes, was justified, given the mate and justifiable, in order to prevent Milan Bogdanović, hbs Belgrade real situation in Kosovo, but it was not mass violence. program coordinator Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils Southeastern Europe 9

In 1998 the violence had escalated consid- their support. Had the majority of them erably. In September 1998 the UN Security withdrawn their support of their own For- Council stated how the development in eign Minister, Joschka Fischer, it would Kosovo posed a threat to security and have led to the Green Party leaving the co- peace in the region. The issue was ad- alition and the German Government, and dressed to both parties in the conflict, in- Fischer would not have been Foreign Min- cluding the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army, ister any more. Fischer had already made Albanian Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës - good progress agitating for a political solu- Ed.], but the armed Serbian forces were tion to the conflict, with the five points of marked as the main driver and as the side the so-called Fischer Plan. It tried to in- responsible for the violence. That was the clude Russia and the Western states were main reason for the final approval. behind it. Fischer was the main proponent of a dip- And the dilemma in the German public lomatic solution to the Kosovo war, and discourse – what was it like from your thus the party conference of Bielefeld was perspective? essential for the further development –for The support of Germany for the NATO in- the political development, in Europe– re- tervention meant that democratic Germa- garding the war in Kosovo. ny participated in a war for the first time. In the case of the Greens, it was aggravated Was the Fischer Plan, with its famous 5 by the fact that in our party programme – points, the crucial step towards the reso- even in 1998– we rejected United Nations lution of the conflict? combat missions. We only voted for the It would be an overestimation to say it was weakest form of blue helmets. When we the crucial point. There are different fac- agreed to the NATO intervention, we sim- tors that came together, but it did set the ply broke with the essential pillars of our diplomatic stone rolling. If, however, the peace policy. That brought a storm of in- US and Moscow had dismissed it, the ini- dignation from substantial parts of our tiative would have gone up in smoke. own membership and voters, because There was a will to find a resolution. That those who were involved in the govern- was especially obvious on June 2nd when ment were considered traitors to our pre- two envoys of the Troika –Chernomyrdin vious principles. However, the problem and the Finnish President Ahtisaari– were was that those who condemned the inter- in Belgrade. There was another urge from vention could not provide any suggestions Russian President Yeltsin: “You have to as to what else was possible and necessary reach an agreement!” Milošević sensed to do in Kosovo. then that he didn’t have Russian support In summary, we had a dilemma between anymore, which is why he gave in. the protection of human rights, on the one To summarize, there were several people hand, against mass violence, and on the seeking solutions and the stubborn Mi- other hand the obligation to non-violence lošević had to give in. - non-violence as a fundamental value for the Greens. How do you see the role of Joschka Fis- cher, the then main politician of the Shortly before the intervention the fa- Greens, today? How much is his public mous Green Party conference of image influenced by 1999? Bielefeld took place. Joschka Fischer’s Joschka Fischer did indeed play a very es- speech and the paint bag attack1 left a sential role in this. As a political realist he strong historical impression. What was was aware even before October 1998, be- the most important thing about that par- fore the red-green coalition was formed, ty conference? what the participation of the Greens in the I was at the party conference in May 1999. Government of Germany would mean. The The NATO intervention had already been rest of us, me included, were not com- going on for a few weeks and it hadn’t pletely aware of that in advance. shown the effect we had hoped for. The If you are part of the Government, it isn’t conference was essential, because there enough to just criticize what has been was a discussion about whether the Greens done and say what should be done better. would continue to support the course of You have to practice politics in the given the Federal Government and support its circumstances – with strong principles and Foreign Minister or would they withdraw with the ability to form an alliance. He was 10 Southeastern Europe Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils

very dedicated to the principle that Ger- KFOR did not show determination in many many must not act alone, but always to- areas. There were organized demonstra- gether with partners. He had a strong tions, with around 50,000 people attending opinion about that and pursued it with the in Kosovo, which is very small. Some of the best powers of persuasion, leadership and protesters were armed and behaved like a rhetoric. In this stormy political sea he mob. KFOR soldiers mostly did not inter- was, I believe this strongly, the best and vene and during the days of the March ri- strongest navigator. I am very sceptical ots many Kosovo Serbs were forced from whether there was anyone else in the their homes. Ten Serbian Orthodox sacred Green Party that could provide such strong buildings were destroyed in the Prizren leadership, who would be able to do what area alone at that time. he did. That was an extremely disturbing setback. If the Bielefeld party conference had devel- However, we had the impression that les- oped in another direction, it would have led sons were learned relatively quickly at an to the break-up of the government. It would, operational level. It got a little tricky again most probably, not have changed the fact in North Mitrovica, in the areas predomi- that Germany was participating in it [NATO nantly inhabited by Serbs, in connection intervention - Ed.] – it would have just par- with the unilateral independence, then ticipated under another government. again in 2011, in relation to the customs For the Greens this would possibly, or even issues, when a KFOR soldier was shot. probably, have led to a split and thus to a These crises flared up over and over again. considerable decline. The Greens are to- What was not achieved was to reduce the day the second strongest and sometimes considerable influence of organized crime even the strongest party in Germany - this within the top political circles. It was also success might not have happened in that not possible to effectively reduce unem- case. ployment and the lack of prospects, espe- cially for younger people. As a member of the Bundestag’s Defense However, it must be said that KFOR cannot Committee, you have been to Kosovo do this. These things have to be supported several times since 1999. What was your by UNMIK. I do not dare to say from a de- experience of the 2004 riots, the 2008 fense policy perspective why this was so declaration of independence and other unsuccessful. inter-ethnic tensions? To what extent do you think the decision As members of the Defense Committee, to intervene in Kosovo influenced later we were mainly involved in KFOR. I had discussions about military interventions contact with UNMIK police and we also worldwide? met representatives from Kosovo, includ- Kosovo taught us decisive and fundamental ing civil society actors, on a regular basis. lessons related to stabilization operations in As far as KFOR is concerned, I always had post-conflict environments, with consider- the impression that on the whole they act- able potential for violence. The experience ed appropriately and predominantly was used in Afghanistan by Bundeswehr wisely. soldiers and our NATO partners. In the first few years, stabilization and pre- Each crisis operation is different, because venting major outbursts of violence was all countries in crisis are different, and the the priority. All of a sudden the March riots significantly different framework condi- happened, I was there and I saw how it ex- tions in Afghanistan were not considered ploded, so to say. I noticed a few things: sufficiently. It was a totally different war, First of all, the so-called community of with a different balance of powers, where states had, in the meantime, lost interest a wave of wars over decades meant the in Kosovo, partly due to other crises, espe- Mujahedin, the Taliban, were very experi- cially in Afghanistan after September 11th. enced in the affairs of war. In other words, There was a certain Kosovo-fatigue in the the experience from Kosovo was trans- Parliament as well as the urge to reduce ferred too simply to the next mission. the number of KFOR soldiers more quickly. That sounded a little like the grand topic The so-called frozen conflict, which had of “Lessons Learned”. Did the Green Par- previously been neglected at the interna- ty or Germany learn from Kosovo? Are tional level, exploded again in March 2004. there certain strategies or new ways of Winfried Nachtwei: NATO bombing – the lesser of two evils Southeastern Europe 11

approaching conflicts as a consequence At the time, that was hugely underestimat- of the experience in Kosovo? ed by the German Government. We now The experiences of the OSCE and KFOR need to draw a line and evaluate what went mission in Kosovo from autumn 1998 until wrong, what should be done better in the March 1999 were the starting point. There future in order to promote an empirical was a huge observer mission with a con- narrative that is as realistic and factual as flict dampening function, but there were possible. At the time, Foreign Minister Fis- not enough sufficiently educated and -ca cher also said: “We must look to the pable people. It is something that has been future”. corrected. It was not understood by the ruling parties The creation of the Civil Peace Service, that they must not only stay politically ac- with advisors working against social hos- tive in relation to such conflicts, but that tility and the Center for International there is also a continuing struggle for legit- Peace Operations in Berlin, which is inter- imation and acceptance. nationally highly recognized – they were one lesson. After the intervention in 1999 you men- Another lesson was the Stability Pact – tioned there was fatigue regarding Koso- transnational, comprehensive support for vo in Germany. What is the situation the Western Balkans, which was supposed now, 20 years later? Is Kosovo still of in- to bring together different ethnicities and terest in Germany in 2019? regions through practical work. Many les- The “Kosovo fatigue“ –lower interest among sons were learned from the crisis in the the public about Kosovo– is still present. It Presevo Valley in 2000 and in Macedonia is a fatigue towards countries in conflict in 2001. There was a danger of a new inter- with which European countries, or now the nal war, which was prevented for the first European Union, and the Federal Republic time through coordinated crisis manage- of Germany, had special dealings in the ment by the international community. past; for some years now, since 2014 at Still, in my opinion, the German Govern- least, it applies very clearly to Afghanistan. ment did not do any systematic and public There are only reports in the media when evaluation of the Kosovo war, of its own something huge happens. The problem is participation in it and of the whole mission that there is an enormous crisis competi- – and this also applies to many other coun- tion today. The most actual crises, in tries. There hasn’t been an overall “lessons which our own soldiers are involved, get learned” process at the political and strate- the most attention. gic level and for the current political gen- International efforts of stabilization and of eration the experiences from Kosovo are peace building are much more complicat- not relevant. ed and have a more long-term character than it was imagined at the end of the How do you explain the fact that the West 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. has suffered a severe defeat regarding the There is now the possibility, twenty years justification and interpretation of this war after the war in Kosovo, twenty years since and that to this day it continues to be a the beginning of KFOR and UNMIK, to great hurdle with regard to normalizing draw attention again. Many women and relations between Kosovo and Serbia? men, who were familiar with the initial I have also observed this loss of interpretive phase of intervention are now saying that sovereignty or legitimacy of one’s own ac- KFOR and its troops, who had the task to tions, which was already apparent in the im- ensure peace and to prevent new violence, mediate years following this intervention. were successful. These are narratives that are still wide- spread among the population today, that Translated by Sanja Katarić the population was lied to, that there were other interests at play. The point of view 1 The conference was marked by heated anti-war protests, has been adopted that the war in Kosovo both in and outside the venue. At one point, Mr. Fischer and the violence started with NATO bomb- was hit by a bag of red paint, causing damage to his ear drum - Ed. ings and there was no history behind it. 12 Southeastern Europe The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia

The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia: Its functions, problems, and critiques

By Ivan Čolović

The myth of the Battle of Kosovo Field on June 28th 1389, in which the armies of the Otto- man Sultan Murat I and Serbian Prince Lazar clashed, has, since the early 19th century to this day, served the purpose of legitimizing various political and military projects: From the breakup of communist Yugoslavia and the policies of Slobodan Milošević, through the “Kosovo is Serbia” motto, as part of the Serbian “European agenda”, to the dialogue –both internal and with Brussels– led by Aleksandar Vučić. The “Kosovo Covenant” in modern Serbian history is used to accommodate various political ideas and actions.

The colloquial use of the word myth is wide- auspices of “sacred Kosovo” or the “Kosovo spread today, to denote a story without ba- covenant” - as the mythical narrative about sis in reality, one which is not true. Con- the Battle of Kosovo is most widely referred trary to this, I understand myth in an to today. This function –that of political anthropological sense, as a story with the myth– was already present in the memory status of paramount truth in a particular of this battle in the cult writings about society, a truth which is not debated, one Prince Lazar written a few years after the which an individual is not obliged to be- battle. However, the mature Kosovo myth, lieve in, but must not disturb, must not with all of the episodes we know today, was publicly question. This is why myths are only formed in the first half of the 19th cen- sometimes referred to as “divine stories”. tury, and has served to legitimize various The political function of myth is based on political and military projects ever since. this divinity and unquestionable nature, During that time, the solemn, sacred story because it can serve those in power, or of the Battle of Kosovo has not only served those seeking power, as a tool to legitimize to legitimize the policies of Serbian politi- their policies. They do this by placing them- cians and the Serbian authorities. It wasn’t selves and their political and military proj- always solely a Serbian myth. It also served ects and actions under the protection of the to legitimize political and military projects sanctity of myth, constructing a tailor-made undertaken in the name of other peoples, version of mythical narration, so that they so that there are Croatian, Bosniak, Monte- themselves may become mythical heroes, negrin, Albanian, and Yugoslav versions of or at least their devotees and followers, thus the Kosovo myth, in addition to the Serbian “inscribing” themselves into the myth. one. However, after the Kingdom of Yugo- The same is true of the Kosovo myth, the slavia was dissolved in 1941 –a country myth of the Battle of Kosovo Field on June where Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day, the day of 28th 1389, in which the armies of the Otto- the Battle of Kosovo, June 28th) was a na- man Sultan Murat I and Serbian Prince La- tional holiday, a holiday shared by all Yu- zar clashed. It is important to note that not goslav peoples, when the famous Battle of all of the diverse evocations of this battle in Kosovo Field was emphasized as being a folklore, historiography, literature, and shared political and cultural heritage– the church literature are myth. Mythical are Kosovo myth has been exploited most of- only those offered up as paramount, “sa- ten, if not exclusively, as a Serbian national

Ivan Čolović, political anthropologist cred”, in order to place some political idea myth. It was revived in that capacity by the and writer or action, as well as its actors, under the Quisling government led by Milan Nedić The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia Southeastern Europe 13

during the German occupation of Serbia versions of the Kosovo myth have also de- (1941-1944). Nazi sympathizers close to veloped, emphasizing the participation of Nedić proposed that the authentic Serbian Albanian warriors in the Battle of Kosovo myth of Kosovo should be revived, as it was Field. It goes without saying that they did alienated from the “Serbian soul” in the battle on the side of the Christians, which is Kingdom of Yugoslavia, highlighting its to prove that Albanians are also an old Eu- similarity to the German racial myth that ropean and Christian people, who have had been revived in Nazi Germany. After always stood at the vanguard of Europe. In the Second World War, communist Yugo- corroboration, a national poem is offered slavia did not restore the Kosovo myth as about the Albanian hero Miloš Kobilić2 and part of a common Yugoslav heritage, be- his feat – the killing of Sultan Murat I, writ- cause that role was reserved for the solemn ten in the first decades of the 20th century3. narrative about the People’s Liberation Writer Ismail Kadare greatly contributed to War, the Partisans, and their leader Tito. the popularization of the Albanian version Instead, the Kosovo myth was assigned the of the Kosovo myth. Since 2011, two plays role of keeping the memory of the import- about the Battle of Kosovo have been part ant contribution of the Serbian people’s of the repertoires of two Pairisian theaters, heroic ancestors in the fight for freedom, a one of which was written based on the po- freedom which would be fully realized, ems of the “Kosovo Cycle” from the collec- with similar contributions from other Yu- tion by Vuk Karadžić, and the other is a goslav peoples, only with the victory of theater adaptation of Kadare’s book, Three Communism. This was also the role of the Elegies for Kosovo4. Monument to the Heroes of Kosovo, erect- ed in 1953 by Serbian communists in “Kosovo is Serbia” – Gazimestan. In the time of crisis, wars, and the dissolu- A New Kosovo Covenant tion of communist Yugoslavia (1985-1995), After the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Her- the Kosovo myth served to legitimize the zegovina, and Kosovo in the 1990s, the Ser- main policy goals of the Serbian regime, bian politicians who took over governing headed by Slobodan Milošević. The main the country found themselves tasked with portion of the 600th anniversary celebration adapting the Kosovo myth - which was still of the Battle of Kosovo (July 28th 1989) –a an important political resource for them – grand rally organized in front of the Gaz- to fit the new situation. It was to be separat- imestan Monument– was used by Milošević ed and saved from being compromised as to portray himself as the new Serbian lead- a result of what some would say was its er, a worthy successor to those who led the abuse by Milošević and other Serbian lead- Serbs into battle against the Turks 600 years ers during the wars, and adapted to the new before, and to promise that he would lead goals of Serbian policy, among which was the Serbian people into new battles. During the “European agenda” of moving toward the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herze- the EU. This is why, when the Battle of govina, Serbian soldiers were also called to Kosovo was evoked in public events, it was follow the example of famous Kosovo he- emphasized that the bravery of the Kosovo roes. This sort of motivation for battle was heroes could still serve as inspiration to 21st used most by Bosnian Serb leaders, por- century Serbs, but that it can also manifest traying Bosniaks as descendants of the itself as political and diplomatic struggle to Turks, and the war against them as a con- keep Kosovo as part of Serbia, instead of tinuation of the Battle of Kosovo and an waging a new war – as Milošević did, to the opportunity for the Serbs to take revenge detriment of the Serbian people. on the Turks for their defeat in Kosovo in After 2008, when Kosovo Albanians de- 1389. This is exactly how General Mladić clared Kosovo’s independence, the Vido- hailed the capture of Srebrenica and the vdan celebrations at Gazimestan became a slaughter of its Bosniak residents, which frustration, because Serbian politicians and was ruled to have been genocide by the In- religious leaders could only go there with ternational Court of Justice in 2007: Re- KFOR’s permission, as well as the police venge against the Turks1. force of independent Kosovo. This is why In more recent times, in the context of re- the most important Vidovdan celebrations viving Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, the were moved to Kruševac in Serbia and war of 1998-1999, and the creation of an Višegrad in Republika Srpska. On the other independent state of Kosovo, Albanian hand, Kosovo’s declaration of 14 Southeastern Europe The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia

independence served to revive warmonger- after announcing the internal dialogue, “is ing versions of the Kosovo myth, even lead- to worry about earthly life, and let someone ing to attempts to rehabilitate Milošević and else worry about the afterlife.”6 his Kosovo policy, elevating him to be a new The version of the Kosovo myth in Serbia Kosovo martyr. The culmination and failure dominant today originated in the first half of this new mobilization for battle with the of the 19th century, when concern for the Kosovo Albanians in the name of the “Koso- afterlife was abandoned and the story of vo covenant” was the grand rally in Belgrade Prince Lazar choosing the Kingdom of organized on February 21st 2008 by the Ser- Heaven over the Kingdom of Earth –which bian government, headed by Vojislav Koštu- was included in Serbian church writings as nica, to protest Kosovo’s declaration of inde- early as the 14th century, as well as in folk pendence. Following a series of incendiary songs recorded by Vuk Karadžić– was re- speeches, and chants of “Kosovo is Serbia”, vised. At the time when Serbs and other some protestors caused mayhem in the city, South Slavs were fighting for liberation including an attack on the U.S. embassy. A from Turkish, and then Austro-Hungarian few months after this rally, on May 11th 2008, rule, evoking the famous Battle of Kosovo Koštunica’s party, the Democratic Party of served to raise the morale of these warriors Serbia (DSS), lost the parliamentary for the Kingdom of Earth, and so Lazar was elections. asked to give up on the Kingdom of Heaven or step back and allow Miloš Obilić, who Holy Serbia and Profane had slayed Murat, to take the lead role. Kosovo Having renounced the Kosovo myth as a Aleksandar Vučić, leader of the Serbian concern with the afterlife, Vučić has actu- Progressive Party (SNS), which has occu- ally reasserted his belief in the Kosovo myth pied the most important positions of power as heroic death for earthly life, the main th since 2012, is considered to be the politi- version of this myth from the 19 century cian whose word on all matters of Serbian until today. policy is final, notwithstanding the consti- It is important to note that the people using tutional powers he actually possessed as the Kosovo myth to strengthen their politi- Deputy Prime Minister (2012-2014), Prime cal positions today never mention it under Minister (2014-2017), or now as President. that name, rather using the terms “Kosovo This is why his influence on Serbia’s Kosovo covenant” or “Vidovdan covenant”, sug- policy has been decisive, as well as the use gesting that they are talking about some- of the Kosovo myth to further that policy, thing supposedly more true and valuable which is ambivalent, to say the least – si- than what the colloquial use of the term multaneously renouncing and fully affirm- “myth”, defined as a story without basis, ing the myth. would imply. That is why there is actually Vučić himself publicly professes doubts no difference between calls by Vučić for about what he calls the “mythical ap- Kosovo to be discussed without using the proach” to the Kosovo problem. At his in- “mythical approach” and the frequent auguration as President of Serbia, Vučić statements and warnings to Serbs by his announced a new approach to this prob- closest advisors that the “Kosovo covenant” lem, finding a solution through dialogue, must be kept. The head of the Govern- without prejudice, and without myths: ment’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija, “That is why I want to open up an internal Marko Đurić, is also aware that he is not dialogue on the matter of Kosovo and Me- contradicting Vučić by saying that “Vido- tohija, with all our differences, without vdan is the Serbian covenant, the covenant prejudice, upholding our country’s Consti- of all Serbs, wherever they may live and tution. We have to be open, to renounce the work”7. The decision by the authors of the mythical approach, but without simply giv- Strategy for the Cultural Development of ing away that which we have every right to. Serbia from 2017 to 2027 to give the “Koso- Our internal dialogue is perhaps even more vo covenant” a prominent role in the docu- important than the one we should be hav- ment is also based on the premise that the ing with the Albanians.”5 However, this re- mythical approach to Kosovo is not the nunciation of the Kosovo myth by Vučić same as the covenant. The covenant is applies only to one essentially benign as- mentioned as the “heroic dimension of Ser- pect of it – the versions referring to a so- bian culture”, with a very important func- called “celestial Serbia”. “Our job”, ex- tion – to ensure the “self-preservation of plained Vučić in a statement a few days society in the face of existential challenges The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia Southeastern Europe 15 and challenges to identity”. Other aspects founded in 2012, chose the name “Zavetni- of Serbian culture are also set out – the “En- ci” 8 for itself, explaining that it was done “in lightenment-European” and “democratic” accordance with the Kosovo Covenant, the dimensions– but there is no doubt that spiritual and historical path of the Serbian these are only secondary, because they do people through the centuries, followed by not provide what is most important, the ex- our greatest rulers and minds1.” istence and identity of the nation, a task Furthermore, any critique of the Kosovo entrusted to the “heroic” dimension of Ser- myth –if undertaken to protect values such bian culture, that is to say the “Kosovo cov- as enlightenment, democracy or human enant”, or the Kosovo myth under another rights– will be ineffective if it limits itself to name. questioning the contents of the messages conveyed under the auspices of this myth, because these messages are not necessarily Critical Analysis of the unacceptable from the point of view of the Kosovo Myth critic. It is important to identify and differ- There are a few things to keep in mind re- entiate them, but it is even more important garding the critical analysis of the Kosovo to point out that all of them, no matter the myth in modern Serbia. Firstly, it is import- differences in content, have one common ant to note that this analysis cannot be re- characteristic which separates them from duced to differentiating between the few the values of enlightenment and democra- historically accurate pieces of information cy. Namely, all messages relying on the about the Battle of Kosovo and the histori- myth, messages which inscribe themselves cally unsubstantiated stories about that into it, including those “conveyed” by the event, which serve as the basis for the Kosovo myth today, are to be accepted Kosovo myth, including its modern ver- without thought or discussion. The myth sions. As noted by historian Sima Ćirković, empowers them to impose themselves on all the materials about Kosovo, the entirety certain political collectives, while making of the “Kosovo tradition”, as he would say, them unacceptable to collectives fostering deserves the attention of historians and humanist and democratic values. other researchers. Therefore, to interpret the Kosovo myth critically, it is not enough Translated by Nemanja Georgijević to determine whether there is historical 1 truth to it, but we must also determine the An overview of the creation and evolution of the Kosovo myth, and the main literature on the topic is available in purpose served by stories about the Battle Miodrag Popović’s study Vidovdan i časni krst (St. Vitus of Kosovo, who told them and with what day and the Holy Cross), Ogled o književnoj arheologiji purpose, what their political and ideologi- (4th Edition, Bibiloteka XX vek), as well as in my book cal messages were, and how they changed Smrt na Kosovu Polju. Istorija kosovskog mita (Death on Kosovo Field, a History of the Kosovo Myth) (2nd Edition, over time. The same can be said for re- Biblioteka XX vek). searching and interpreting the role of the 2 Miloš Obilić is said to have been the Serbian knight who Kosovo myth in Serbian society and politics assassinated the Ottoman Sultan Murad I in the Battle of today. Kosovo during the Ottoman invasion of Serbia -- Ed. note 3 An analysis of the written versions of this poem and the It is also important to determine where we explanation of its role in modern Kosovo’s identity politics encounter this myth today, and how to can be found in Anna di Lellio’s book The Battle of Kosovo identify it, as it appears in various types of 1389. An Albanian Epic, I.B. Tauris&Co.Ltd., London, 2009. 4 text – from newspaper articles to scientific La Bataille de Kosovo 1389, translated from the Serbian and directed by: Nathalie Hamel, Theatre du Nord Ouest, studies, and from political speeches to reli- Paris. – “La viellle guerre. La Bataille du Kosovo”, directed gious sermons. Rarely is it a well-developed by Simon Pitaqaj, based on “Trois chants funebres de narrative, as in Zdravko Šotra’s film The Kosovo” I. Kadare, Théatre de l’Oprimé, Paris. 5 Battle of Kosovo (Boj na Kosovu, 1989). Serbian President’s address to Parliament, TANJUG, May 31st 2017 Statements are most often put under the 6 Vučić: It’s time to talk about the Constitution and Kosovo”, protection of the Kosovo myth by using TANJUG, June 2nd 2017 quotes from certain passages of canonical 7 http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/ texts about the Battle of Kosovo (from Vuk 2781371/djuric-nikada-necemo-odustati-od-kosova-i- metohije.html Karadžić’s “Kosovo Cycle” or Njegoš’s 8 Translator’s note: this can roughly be translated as Mountain Wreath), or even more simply, “Defenders of the Covenant” by claiming that the statement or action is 9 Zavetnici in line with the “Kosovo covenant”. For ex- website https://web archive.org/ web/ 20180207002002/ http://zavetnici.rs/?page_id=7542 ample, one political organization in Serbia, 16 Southeastern Europe A Lesson in History

A Lesson in History

By Jelena Krstić

The prewar political history of the former Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo was shaped by its educational system. Both Albanians and Serbs have omitted the other com- munity’s language and history from their curricula. Today, twenty years after the armed conflict, Albanian and Serbian students are using textbooks with different versions of history. Some of the controversial phrases from Kosovar textbooks describing actions by Serbs include: “violence and chauvinist terror”, “terror and genocide”, and “horrific bar- baric scenes of bloody squadrons”. Serbian textbooks use phrases such as “attacks by Albanian gangs” and “Albanian terror over the Serbs”. Such language in school textbooks amplifies prejudice, inter-ethnic intolerance, and nationalist ideas. “I am deeply sorry for all the victims in Kosovo, and for their families’ suffering. Yes, I knew crimes were committed...Yes, I was involved in moving bodies to Batajnica… I didn’t oppose the conceal- ment of crimes. I took no action to find and process the perpetrators, as I should have done.”1 Vlastimir Đorđević Sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity

Early one morning, the S. family had to claiming that the new constitution gives the leave their village in Kosovo. The mother province too much power. At the beginning had dressed the children well, so that they of the 1980s, Albanians ask for Kosovo to be wouldn’t be cold, and prepared some food recognized as a constituent Republic of the for the journey. A group of armed men Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stopped them in a nearby settlement and (SFRY), while Serbs intensify their calls for the separated them, detaining the father and province’s autonomy to be reduced. In March two sons and ordering the rest to keep go- 1989, amendments to the Constitution of Ser- ing. They did keep going and spent some bia strip the province of its autonomy. The time far away from their home, school, situation in Kosovo deteriorates. friends, and relatives. Only after the war In June 1990, the Serbian Assembly de- had ended did they return to their home. It clares that special circumstances have was a few years later that they found out arisen in Kosovo aimed at upending the that all three of the men had been killed constitutional order. A few days later, and their bodies hidden in a mass grave. Kosovo Albanian MPs declare Kosovo to The mother and two sons from the S. fam- be an independent Republic. The Serbian ily are currently living in their home village Assembly then dissolves the Kosovo As- again, in difficult conditions, lacking -em sembly. This officially dissolved Assembly ployment or regular income. compiles a Draft Constitution, which is What happened to the S. family? then accepted by a majority of Albanians in a local referendum. In September 1990, The Crisis between 1980 and the new Constitution of Serbia diminishes 1998 Kosovo’s autonomy even further. The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Feder- A period of discrimination and repression ative Republic of Yugoslavia grants the Au- against the Albanian population in Kosovo

Jelena Krstić, Helsinki Committee for tonomous Province of Kosovo greater auton- ensues. Albanian language radio and tele- Human Rights in Serbia omy. A section of the Serbian public object, vision are limited, and newspapers are A Lesson in History Southeastern Europe 17

Joint Chiefs of Staff Headquarters in Belgrade, in ruins since the 1999 NATO military campaign, pictured in 2019. Photo by Nemanja Subotić CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 closed down. Albanian employees in pub- resolution of the crisis: the FRY/Serbian lic enterprises are laid off en masse, includ- authorities insist that any solution for ing school teachers. Students are unable to Kosovo must respect territorial integrity, attend classes taught in the Albanian lan- sovereignty, and FRY/Serbia’s internation- guage. A number of professors at the Uni- ally recognized borders. The Kosovo Alba- versity of Pristina are dismissed. An infor- nian representatives want a referendum mal school system then develops in held, which would ultimately lead to Koso- Kosovo, and classes are held in private vo’s independence. homes. Kosovo Albanians boycott the elec- During 1998 and early 1999, diplomatic tions for the National Assembly of Serbia in efforts are made to solve the armed con- 1992, instead holding their own. Thus, a flict by peaceful means. The Contact “parallel system” is created, with a shadow Group, consisting of representatives from government that provides services to Koso- the United Kingdom, France, Germany, vo Albanians. A declaration on the rights of Italy, the United States, and Russia, take national minorities adopted by the Serbian part in the negotiations. The Contact Assembly in 1992 lays the blame for the hu- Group rejects the idea of an independent man rights situation on the Albanians. Kosovo, and insists that the province is giv- As the crisis develops, steps are taken to en greater autonomy. The best chance to resolve it. In September 1996, an agree- solve the crisis comes in the form of the ment on the normalization of the educa- agreements of October 1998, which entail tion system and the return of Albanian deploying a civilian mission, a reduction in teachers and students to schools is signed. military and police personnel in Kosovo, In March 1998, an agreement to reopen and their disarmament. However, these schools and universities is signed, allowing agreements are not binding for the KLA, as both Serbian and Albanian students to use it is not a signatory, so the number of inci- the premises. These agreements are not dents continues to rise. The situation dete- enforced. riorates, and FRY/Serbia once again em- ploys disproportionate force. Armed Conflict 1998-1999 In February 1999, the Rambouillet negoti- The crisis in Kosovo escalates into an ations commence. The two sides stick to armed conflict between the Federal Re- their positions on a possible solution: public of Yugoslavia (FRY), as it was called maintaining territorial integrity vs. inde- at the time, and Serbia on one side, and the pendence. The failure of diplomatic efforts Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) on the oth- to solve the Kosovo conflict is the conse- er. The conflict lasts from 1998 until the quence of a combination of reasons – not end of the NATO intervention in June 1999. least the intractability of both sides, and The two sides hold differing views on the the way the negotiations were led. 18 Southeastern Europe A Lesson in History

NATO Intervention of war during the internal conflict in Koso- vo. The Tribunal has ruled beyond reason- The threat of NATO intervention is present able doubt that persons in the highest ech- throughout 1998. After negotiations col- elons of politics, the military and police lapse, on March 24th 1999, air strikes com- took part in a joint criminal enterprise with mence, lasting until June 10th 1999. The the goal of changing the ethnic balance in stated aim of the intervention is to prevent Kosovo and ensuring Serbian control. This a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. state criminal plan was carried out by NATO aircraft strike targets across FRY, means of murder, deportation, forced re- causing damage and destruction to a large settlement, and banishment4. number of targets. In addition to military The ICTY has also ruled that certain mem- facilities, civilian facilities are also hit. bers of the KLA were responsible for violat- Diplomatic efforts to end the crisis contin- ing the laws and customs of war, by sub- ue, with the key interlocutors being repre- jecting imprisoned civilians in camps at sentatives from Finland and Russia. In Lapušnik and Babušnica to cruel treat- early June 1999, FRY/Serbian officials -ac ment, leading to the deaths of two people, cept a peace proposal. The Military Tech- and by killing nine people. It was also de- nical Agreement between the Internation- termined that KLA members interrogated al Security Force (KFOR) and FRY/Serbia and molested two Serbs in April 1998, that th is signed on June 9 1999. The Agreement a KLA soldier raped a woman in the KLA calls for the deployment of international headquarters in Rznić in the summer of security forces in Kosovo and a gradual 1998, and that KLA members murdered withdrawal of FRY/Serbian troops. seven people whose remains were found On June 10th 1999, the United Nations Se- in the vicinity of the Radonjić Lake5. In pro- curity Council adopts Resolution 1244, cessing KLA crimes, the ICTY faced impre- which provides for the withdrawal of cise evidence, an inability to verify evi- armed forces, the demilitarization of the dence, and marked difficulties in obtaining KLA, and the creation of a safe environ- statements from a large number of wit- ment for the return of refugees and dis- nesses. Many witnesses refused to testify placed persons. The Resolution authorizes before the Tribunal out of fear. The Tribu- the formation of an international civilian nal stated that there was an impression mission with the purpose of establishing a that the trial had taken place in an atmo- temporary administration for Kosovo. sphere in which witnesses did not feel safe. Along with FRY/Serbia’s military and po- lice personnel, two hundred thousand Towards an Objective Serbs and other non-Albanians leave Curriculum 2 Kosovo . The overview of the events in Kosovo de- scribed above is one of the possible ways in Epilogue which the armed conflict from 1998 to 1999 During the armed conflict in Kosovo in could be taught. It is simultaneously short 1998 and 1999, 13,535 people were killed: and comprehensive. The situation faced by 10,812 Albanians, 2,197 Serbs, and 526 Kosovo and Serbia today is the result of members of other ethnic communities. multiple, complex, interdependent, and Civilians were the biggest casualties, with asynchronous influences and causes, 10,111 killed or disappeared; in the period which is why such an overview is only a between March 20th and June 14th 1999 framework that cannot be understood out- alone, 7,431 civilians were killed. side of a wider social, political, and histori- As a result of NATO air strikes, 754 people cal context. As such, it is by its nature scant lost their lives: 454 civilians, (219 Albanians, and incomplete, and unable to fully explain 207 Serbs and Montenegrins, 14 Roma, and everything. However, it is also perhaps the 14 members of other ethnic communities) only possible overview in a post-conflict sit- and 300 members of the armed forces (274 uation where there is a frozen conflict char- members of the FRY/Serbian armed forces, acterized by opposing narratives about the and 26 KLA members)3. past, and a huge interethnic divide between The International Criminal Tribunal for communities, such as the one between Ser- the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has ruled bian and Albanian communities. Such an that units of the Yugoslav Army and police approach has the potential to open up committed war crimes, crimes against hu- space for dialogue and mutual understand- manity, and violated the laws and customs ing, as it approaches an extremely complex A Lesson in History Southeastern Europe 19

problem from the viewpoint of pure facts, ambitions”9 in public view at the 1981 free from appraisal and explanations. It is demonstrations. Serbia’s quixotic efforts to precisely the fact that it is incomplete that preserve the common state were insuffi- allows for questions to be asked, indepen- cient to stand up to internal and external dent research to be conducted, and conver- enemies. In spite of this, however, Serbia sations to be started, which is the essence of defied ultimatums and obstinately awaited historíe as knowledge gained through lis- international military intervention. tening and inquiring. Both curricula neglect to mention efforts At the same time, this overview of the on both sides to resolve the crisis peaceful- events in Kosovo is more comprehensive ly, as well as the agreements concluded as than the history being taught in both coun- part of those efforts. Compromises accept- tries’ schools, which deviates from the facts ed during those talks, which sometimes and approaches the topic superficially and necessitated that political positions were with political motives. In this regard, there changed, are a special taboo. are more similarities than differences be- The most obvious similarity, however, lies tween them. in the way victims of the war are portrayed, where both curricula choose to only list The Instrumentalization of their own victims, while exaggerating their Youth suffering, and failing to cite sources. Text- books from Kosovo do not recognize KLA The key similarity between the two educa- victims, nor the criminal proceedings be- tion programmes is the way they instru- fore the ICTY; Serbian textbooks do not mentalize young people: The teaching of contain a single sentence about mass history is used to propagate and ingrain a crimes, deportations, or hiding the bodies desirable narrative about past events and of Kosovo Albanians in secret mass graves, their effects on the present. For young peo- and, unexpectedly, fail to mention crimes ple in Kosovo, history is supposed to show against Serbs and other non-Albanians the genesis, evolution, and success of the committed by the KLA. struggle for independence, and all events The most surprising decision by the Serbian are perceived exclusively form that point authorities is to have textbooks completely of view, even when they had little or noth- omit the armed conflict from 1998 to 1999, ing to do with it6. as well as the period of crisis, discrimina- Thus, the 1974 Constitution is not men- tion, and repression against Albanians that tioned in light of the autonomy it offered, preceded and led to the armed conflict. but as the result of protests in the late Young people in Serbia learn that Albanians 1960s, which called for, among other in Kosovo strove toward separatism, and in things, Kosovo to be granted the status of the end, with the help of the international a Republic. Likewise, the demonstrations community and by means of bombing that of the early 1980s are placed in the context caused enormous human losses and de- of the struggle for independence rather struction, finally got their way. than the struggle for social justice and po- On the other hand, textbooks from Kosovo litical equality. contain an apotheosis of the military strug- The political aspirations of the time are gle for independence, ignoring the position also misrepresented, omitting the fact that that was dominant before the war - that of the future of Kosovo was previously seen non-violent opposition to repression. The by Kosovar politicians within a Yugoslav military conflict is accordingly very promi- framework, and that the idea of living to- nent, and used as an opportunity to legiti- gether in a wider state was only given up in mize the KLA as a party to the conflict that late 1991, when it became clear that this led to the final outcome, and not as a party framework no longer formally existed. whose demilitarization was a component of On the other hand, Serbian textbooks7 aim post-war agreements. to show how the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the loss of Kosovo were historically determined by events beyond Serbia’s History as a National control, and in which it had no allies to rely Programme on. The 1974 Constitution allowed Kosovo There are several long-term consequences more independence than was justified and of this approach to teaching history, which “undermined Yugoslavia”8. This was al- are difficult to rectify. The most obvious is ready evident a few years later, when Alba- the inability of the communities involved nians put their “nationalist and separatist to reach out to one another due to these 20 Southeastern Europe A Lesson in History

conflicting teachings about the past. A both countries. This is especially true be- self-victimizing narrative that refuses to cause Serbia and Kosovo are fortunate recognize the suffering of others will fail to enough to have an abundance of resources see the importance of dialogue with them, to rely on when preparing history curricula: and will base its arguments on the culpa- Over 3,000 pages of ICTY verdicts, which bility and crimes of the other side. Further- have been determined to be accurate be- more, perceiving events as having been yond reasonable doubt, provide a reliable imposed from outside serves to maintain and credible source of information; evi- the conviction that the current solution is dence presented to the court provides a unnatural and temporary, and that, if the direct insight into documents relevant for political conditions should change, it too expanding lessons and deepening knowl- can be overturned. This makes it impossi- edge, especially as these documents would ble for a political solution to a conflict to otherwise be unavailable to researchers. become a societal solution, thereby freez- Victim testimonies help put a human face ing the potential for conflict. on certain historical facts and events that Insisting on militarism fails to uphold dia- took place a long time ago, greatly increas- logue and negotiations as methods of con- ing a society’s capacity for solidarity, un- flict resolution, which makes it more likely derstanding, and acceptance. that future participants in public and po- In this way, we could start expecting even litical life in both countries will reach for more from our education – to teach us to re- violent solutions, instead of dialogue and spect diversity and equality, making us more compromise. accessible to one another, and making dia- A less obvious consequence is that treating logue with other communities common- young people as a formless mass to be mold- place, and not just a formal demand as part of ed as desired and necessary, in addition to international processes that the countries are being ethically wrong, could be counterpro- involved in, or toward which they strive. ductive. Young people do not live in isola- tion (anymore); they have contact with Translated by Nemanja Georgijević members of other communities, and the freedom and desire to seek out information, 1 ICTY, 2013. Case Vlastimir Đorđević, IT-05-087A: Dordevic which is ever more available, on their own. (Appeal), Public Transcript of Hearing, May 2013 2 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref- By teaching history as a national pro- ugees, 2000. The Global Report 1999 gramme rather than learning about past 3 Data on the number of casualties: Humanitarian Law Center events based on reliable evidence could 4 ICTY, Case Šainović et al. (IT-05-87-T), first instance deepen mistrust in the education system ruling from 2009, and the Appeals Council verdict from 2014, available at: http://www.icty.org/en/case/miluti- among young people, given that they are novic/4; Case Đorđević (IT-05-87/1), first instance ruling witnessing one reality while being taught from 2011, and Appeals Council verdict from 2014, avail- another at school. And while some young able at: http://www.icty.org/en/case/djordjevic/4 5 people will inevitably accept the imposed ICTY, Case Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84), first instance ruling from 2008, and Appeals Council ruling from 2012, narrative and continue down the path of available at: http://www.icty.org/case/haradinaj/4; Case simplification and stereotyping, many oth- Limaj et al. (IT-03-66), first instance ruling from 2005, ers may take an opportunistic approach and Appeals Council Verdict from 2007, available at: and treat education as just one of the nec- http://www.icty.org/case/limaj/4. 6 All claims about the contents of history teaching in Kosovo essary steps in growing up, and not as one rely on the paper: “Kosova 1912-2000 in the History that is supposed to equip them with knowl- Textbooks of Kosova and Serbia”, 2012 Gashi edge and skills, develop their critical think- 7 Two history textbooks for primary school were used, se- ing, and empower them to become active lected according to the number of students using them. 8 Đorđe Đurić, Momčilo Pavlović, 2010. Istorija - udžbenik in the protection of human rights, democ- za osmi razred osnovne škole (“History - A textbook for racy, and the rule of law10. the Eighth Grade of Primary School”), JP Zavod za A different history lesson on the armed udžbenike 9 conflict in Kosovo from 1998 to 1999 is one Predrag M. Vajagić, Nenad Stošić, 2010. “Istorija”, udžbenik za osmi razred osnovne škole, (“History” - a based on alternative ways of teaching textbook for the eighth grade of primary school), Klett young people about the recent past that 10 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Mem- continues to shape their present. A fact- ber States on the Council of Europe Charter on Education based approach to teaching is the founda- for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education, CM/Rec(2010)7, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers tion of history as an academic discipline, so on 11 May 2010 at the 120th Session, available at https:// this could be an opportunity for history search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?Objec- teaching to regain its original direction in tID=09000016805cf01f War Criminals Be Quiet, Victims Speak Up! Southeastern Europe 21

War Criminals Be Quiet, Victims Speak Up!

By Marigona Shabiu and Ivan Đurić

The Regional Network of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights (YIHR) gathers together a young generation of peace activists, who are too young to remember, yet determined never to forget, the atrocities, crimes and victims of the wars in the Balkans. They are the 2019 laureates of the Vaclav Havel Human Rights Prize for their work on peacebuilding and reconciliation in the region. YIHR activists face continuous threats of physical vio- lence and have been prosecuted for their activism. In this curated interview for “Perspec- tives”, Marigona from Pristina and Ivan from Belgrade, two colleagues from YIHR, talk about their motivation to join the organisation and the challenges they face in their strug- gle against national mono-ethnic narratives twenty years after the war in still the deeply divided societies of both Kosovo and Serbia.

Although they were only kids during the genuine belief in the importance of being wars in Yugoslavia, Marigona and Ivan vocal about important issues that concern have not hesitated to stand up to war crim- our societies at the local as well as regional inals and say: “War criminals be quiet, in level. YIHR is one of the very few NGOs order for victims to speak up”. One of their that connects these two perspectives and signature activities is to show up with a provides young people with the opportu- banner with this message whenever con- nity to debunk and challenge national, victed war criminals from Serbia or Kosovo mono-ethnic narratives. make public appearances. The perpetra- I started my activism at YIHR in 2008, tors of the war on both sides are still pres- when I was only 14 years old. I had attend- ent in the countries’ political and social ed a Human Rights School, where we had arenas. the opportunity to discuss very important These and similar activities put them at top topics, such as human rights, LGBTIQ* of the list of “foreign mercenaries” and rights, gender equality, transitional jus- “domestic traitors” [terms often used to tice, and so on. That was the first time I label those who dare to speak about war learned about transitional justice and I was crimes committed by their own govern- amazed by the work of activists, not only in ments - Ed.], marking them as targets for Kosovo, but also in the region, who were threats and physical attacks. Despite this, brave enough to challenge their social and Marigona and Ivan say they don’t have the political systems to deal with the past, even luxury of giving up these courageous acts. putting their lives at risk sometimes, due to They spoke about their motivation to be the very sensitive nature of this topic. part of the YIHR regional network and the The roots of YIHR’s work were established fight that they are not willing to give up, precisely through the courage and enthu- despite rising nationalistic narratives in all siasm of young people willing to fight for the countries in the region. human rights. For more than 15 years, we have been strongly and proudly encourag- When did you join the Initiative and what ing and supporting our group of activists was your motivation to do so? by enabling them to communicate and co- Marigona Shabiu, Youth Initiative for MARIGONA: My motivation to become an operate with their peers in the Western Human Rights, Kosovo Ivan Đurić, Youth Initiative for activist came from my interest and Balkans and beyond, while also engaging Human Rights, Serbia 22 Southeastern Europe War Criminals Be Quiet, Victims Speak Up!

the broader public in matters that concern What is it like to talk about war crimes us all. and victims in societies that are very far IVAN: My path to YIHR was a bit unusual, from reconciliation and where peace- as I joined the Initiative after being a politi- building attempts face numerous cal party activist for some years – it usually challenges? goes the other way around. What brought MARIGONA: It is still a taboo, especially if me to YIHR was the liberty to vocally and you do so in an inclusive and unbiased openly talk about uncomfortable topics re- manner. In Kosovo, the Albanian commu- gardless of the current political situation in nity is reluctant to accept that there were Serbia. There is an enormous value and Serbian civilian victims, as well. For the benefit to having counterparts in other majority of people, all Serbs are bad. The countries in the region with whom we share same goes for Serbs’ feelings about Kosovar values and, together, fight this battle. Obvi- Albanians. ously, working regionally brings great value The past conflict has produced different to our messages and activities, but on a per- forms of prejudice and intolerance. A com- sonal level it brings another kind of satisfac- mon aftereffect of the conflict is the lack of tion, self-confidence and determination, opportunities for people from both sides, which makes YIHR exceptional. in particular for youth. Young people face At the beginning of my years of activism, in numerous obstacles, often created as a 2006-2007, the issue of war crimes and war consequence of administrative barriers criminals was one of the main political and mental barriers caused by a lack of questions, but the context was completely trust and information, and existing preju- different than today. Serbia was extradit- dices. Young people from both communi- ing or on the way to extraditing individu- ties lack opportunities to interact and als wanted for war crimes; the question of communicate with each other. As a result, arresting Mladić and Karadžić was immi- xenophobia and the growing sense of al- nent and it seemed like a turning point for ienation among young people is very Serbian society. concerning. It seemed as if we were breaking connec- Politicians in both countries are further tions with the Milošević regime and the perpetuating this situation with messages past and entering an era of decisive and serving the sole purpose of scoring politi- fast European integration and democrati- cal points, without actually trying to have sation. But that was obviously a false pic- an impact on the broader reconciliation ture. I still believe, more and more every between the two societies. It caused much day, that our stance, as a society, towards concern when former Prime Minister of war criminals and the wartime period, and Kosovo Ramush Haradinaj appointed Mr. Serbian actions in that period, is determin- Sylejman Selimi as his political adviser, ing our present, and above all our future. given the fact that the latter has been con- Like many others, I completely misjudged victed for war crimes by the courts in Koso- the situation fifteen years ago. Nationalism vo. The fact that Haradinaj, as Prime Min- in our society goes far deeper than party ister, was previously tried by the politics, and support for Milošević’s poli- International Criminal Tribunal for the cies and actions, and for the ideology of former-Yugoslavia (ICTY) is not reassuring Serbian nationalism, transcends all for the victims of war crimes who still live in spheres of society. It is not just the political Kosovo. Instead of unifying figures that elites that are currently in power, it is also cross ethnic lines, we have leaders with the political elites in the opposition. Na- controversial pasts, who create distrust tionalism is in our academia, education among people from other communities system, and cultural scene –both high both in Kosovo and Serbia. class culture and kitsch culture and sports– Another crucially important factor is the and not only football hooligans, but also education system in Kosovo, which is per- the national football federation, and so on. petuating various nationalist narratives, The voices of peace activists are not as particularly through history books. This has strong as they were and we are currently been found by an analysis of textbooks con- on the losing side. ducted by YIHR Kosovo in 2017. On the oth- However, being unpopular doesn’t make er hand, Serbian youth living in Northern us wrong: I feel it is completely the Kosovo learn from history books influenced opposite. by the Serbian government, which barely mention the Kosovo war and portray the War Criminals Be Quiet, Victims Speak Up! Southeastern Europe 23

Serbian people as the main victims of it. Such hatred and xenophobic language has created isolation, prejudice, distrust and insecurity in both communities. Collective memory in both Kosovo and Serbia is dominated by national mo- no-ethnic narratives, which are filled with myths and glorify heroes. Victims are usu- ally left in the margins, while the tendency to portray one group as the main victim and the other only as the perpetrator is the central element of official, state narratives in both Kosovo and Serbia. Every other ex- perience, especially those of ordinary peo- ple and peaceful resistance by various groups, is not acknowledged. Researching and documenting the past in an unbiased manner helps in building up collective memory and acknowledge the life stories of every individual. Prizren, summer 2019. Photo by hbs Belgrade. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 For more than 15 years, YIHR has worked to challenge such narratives and empower is very important to increase critical think- citizens to raise their voices so as to ac- ing among young people in order to tackle knowledge the suffering of all victims and the existing ethno-nationalist narratives respect their dignity. We strive to create an about the recent past in Kosovo, as well as environment where all victims from all in the region, which are nurtured within communities are recognized, while aim- the ethnic and national groups, and there- ing to gain justice for them and their by hinder effective dealing with the past families. and deepen the divisions between the In Kosovo, to mark the International Day communities. of Enforced Disappearances –August 30th– Kosovo and Serbia need to intensify their YIHR activists organize street actions ded- efforts to reconcile the past conflict by -ap icated to the more than 1,600 missing peo- proaching past mistakes and the causes of ple from all ethnic groups in Kosovo. violence in an open and transparent man- Furthermore, we have launched a virtual ner. Both countries need to continue the museum, where we provide an open space dialogue process, towards reaching a le- for ordinary people to share their personal gally binding agreement that will ultimate- stories about their experiences as refugees ly bring peace and further contribute to during the war in Kosovo. the reconciliation process. Given the lack of cooperation and commu- IVAN: They say that time heals everything, nication between the two societies, due to but in this case it is completely the oppo- the violence in the recent past and existing site. Now, 20 years later, the question of political pressure and ethno-nationalist who is responsible for the actions that led agendas, we are focusing our efforts on es- to war, and the war crimes that were com- tablishing a network of youth from both mitted, interests no one. Memories of the communities who are capable of and em- victims and survivors of the war are fading powered to bring forward reconciliation away. processes, so as to create a prosperous and The general public –even the people affect- peaceful region. We believe that young ed by the war– don’t want to talk about it people from Kosovo and Serbia should be anymore. They don’t want to hear about it. capable of understanding and promoting Everyone feels that we have been talking cross-border communication and cooper- about it for 20 years. But no one takes into ation as a foundation for sustainable peace account the lack of conclusions. Yes, it’s between the two countries. true, we have been talking about this for 20 Through increased dialogue we can create years, but not in the proper way. better ways of dealing with the past, chal- And in Serbia we’re not sure why the war lenging nationalist propaganda and in- started. Our version of events does not cor- creasing social resilience, so that past con- relate with anyone else’s. How the war flicts are never repeated. We believe that it ended is also questionable. What were the 24 Southeastern Europe War Criminals Be Quiet, Victims Speak Up!

goals of the policy that had led us to war? If narrative – or even completely disputing it. we did not fulfil these goals, do we plan to For this we are labelled as traitors. Because revisit them? we are not present in mainstream media Serious questions about the causes of the and public discussions, most of our mes- war, the actions of the Serbian police and sages are sent through public actions where army during the war, and the consequenc- we face threats of physical violence. At the es of the war are taboos in our society. Our same time, we poke this nationalist para- elites are intentionally keeping all of these digm of national unity and single minded- topics under the carpet: You will hear no ness in the eye. For this we are labelled as one associate themselves with the Mi- foreign mercenaries. lošević regime, but almost no one com- It feels unnatural that we, as young people pletely distance themselves from it. The born during or after the war, are dealing with only thing to penetrate the wall of silence the issue of the legacy of the conflicts during is the voices of support for people convict- the 1990s - I often hear that remark. But this ed by the ICTY. The government supports was not our choice. Previous generations left them. Their memoirs are being published. this toxic issue unresolved. It still shapes our Government jets bring them home from political reality. Our motto is “too young to prison after serving their sentences. remember, determined never to forget”. I In order to convey our message, the first ob- strongly believe it is socially responsible to stacle to overcome is the wall of silence. We devote your time and your career, and –why are speaking out about things you are not not say it– to risk a lot trying to defeat this na- supposed to talk about. That feels unnatural tionalistic monster, which has been destroy- to people and automatically creates a dis- ing our countries and societies. Many people tance between us and them. For this we are –and not just individuals, but entire genera- labelled as weirdoes. A huge problem is that tions– have avoided tackling this. We do not we are questioning the official nationalistic have that luxury. Born, Raised and Deported Southeastern Europe 25

Born, Raised and Deported: Kosovo Roma children surviving in Serbia

By Anđela Milivojević

During the NATO operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1999, ethnic Albanians violently expelled approximately 96,000 of Kosovo’s 120,000 pre-1999 Romani population. According to international administrators in Kosovo, not a single person has been brought to justice for anti-Gypsy crimes occurring since 1999 as part of the on-going ethnic cleansing campaign. Most of the families fled to Western Europe, primarily to Germany. Although these families came from Kosovo, due to the EU Readmission Agreement with Serbia, over 22,000 people have been deported to Ser- bia since 2007. Some of the children spoke only Albanian, Romani or German.

“Mirsad, I don’t understand why are you as Gypsies, who fled from Kosovo to Western camping in front of the school? The bell Europe during the war in Kosovo in 1998-99. rang five minutes ago!” shouts principal The European Roma Rights Centre esti- Nenad Ćirić through the window of his of- mates that during “NATO action against the fice at the boy he spotted in the schoolyard Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1999 through a video camera. The class has al- and the subsequent return of predominant- ready started, but the elementary school ly ethnic Albanians from abroad, ethnic pupil Mirsad is playing with a ball outside Albanians violently expelled approximately the classroom with some other kids. four-fifths of Kosovo’s pre-1999 Romani Nenad Ćirić is the young and energetic population – estimated to have been principal of the “Branko Pešić” elementary around 120,000 – from their homes”. school in Zemum, on the outskirts of Bel- Fleeing from the Kosovo war, Roma families grade. The school has worked with children tried to seek asylum in countries such as Ger- and young adults aged from 10 to 16 that have not entered primary school or did not finish it on schedule, since the 1970s. Another peculiarity of this school is that over 80% of their pupils are of Roma nationality. “I mostly worry about their safety,” ex- plained Nenad as he closed the window that looks out onto the yard where the chil- dren were playing. Mirsad was abandoned by his mother when he was seven and his father is a convicted drug addict. “His grandparents are his guardians today and they are doing the best they can to take care of the boy,” says the principal. But Mirsad is disobedient. He of- ten misses class and doesn’t arrive on time. On the other hand, he is not violent and he doesn’t get into fights like other children. Mirsad is one of dozens of children from Ash- kaelia, Egyptian and other families regarded Pupils with their teachers at a school event. Photo by Anđela Milivojević, all rights reserved. 26 Southeastern Europe Born, Raised and Deported

He says the biggest problem is motivating the kids to come to school regularly. Many of the children who have returned from counties in Western Europe did not attend school in those countries. And if they did, they didn’t certify their diplomas, nor do they know how to, says Nenad.

Survival before education Another problem might be a more serious one – parents’ understanding of the impor- tance of education. Over 90% of the parents of these children either did not attend or have only finished elementary school, explains Nenad, who says that parents do not perceive school as important. “Motivating these kids is the biggest prob- School area in Zemun, Belgrade. Photo by Anđela Milivojević, all rights reserved. lem, because they have no support from many, France and Austria. However, many home,” he explains. of them have returned to Serbia since then. The causes of the poor educational out- Over 22,000 people have been transported comes and high drop-out rates from school back to Serbia since 2007 in accordance are numerous: poverty, poor knowledge of with the EU Readmission Agreement, ac- the Serbian language, discrimination, lack cording to data from the Commissariat for of motivation and support, failing to keep Refugees and Migration of the Republic of up with the curriculum, inadequate hous- Serbia. Some were deported and some de- ing conditions, and long distances of Roma cided to return on a so-called “voluntary” communities from schools. basis. Roma families with children make “These people are taking care of their chil- up the largest proportion of the returnees, dren, but school is simply not the most having spent from several months to sev- important thing for them, so the question eral years in European countries, most of their children graduating is just not im- commonly in Germany. portant. We have a lot of children who “The majority of our children, their par- start helping their parents at some point - ents were from Kosovo, and all of them babysitting younger siblings, girls cleaning went, at some point, to Western Europe to around the house and boys collecting sec- seek asylum,” explains Nenad, who has ondary [recyclable] materials with their been working for the school for over twen- parents” says Nenad and concludes “Be- ty years. tween the idea of going to school or surviv- ing, they will choose the latter.” A new way to survive is to go Western Eu- rope. Families that go to Germany and seek asylum are given social assistance for several months while their asylum request is processed. The chance to actually re- ceive asylum is small. At the beginning of 2016, German Parlia- mentary State Secretary Hans Joachim Fuchtel, on a visit to Belgrade, said that “Ser- bia is a safe country of origin where people can live freely. It means that those who seek asylum and who will be granted asylum if they come from Serbia will be zero, and they will be returned to their country of origin”. Although Roma families know that asylum applications will almost certainly be re- jected, they still decide to take this step, pushed by poverty to find a better life for at A classroom at the “Branko Pešić” school. Photo by Anđela Milivojević, all rights reserved. least a few months. Born, Raised and Deported Southeastern Europe 27

According to the school principal, Nenad the settlement. From time to time, teach- Ćirić, many of the families aim to spend ers visit the neighborhood in order to talk some time in Western Europe because so- to parents or provide help in the form of cial assistance is important to them. clothes, shoes or give New Year’s gifts. “You have kids who don’t know math but “Parents are very aware that we are the know what paperwork they need for social only ones taking care of these children, assistance. That is survival. Children are trying to get them to finish school and children and we can’t blame them for any- helping them,” says the school principal. thing. Every single thing that happens in Due to all the problems that pupils face on their lives –adults are the ones to blame, a daily basis, the school uses a modified no matter whether it is the state, the edu- teaching model with a reduced curriculum cational system or the non-governmental that is adapted for children with limited pri- sector– there are people everywhere who or knowledge, poor knowledge of the Serbi- have failed them,” explained Nenad. an language and very difficult living condi-

School as a safe haven It was May 13th 2019 when live music, chil- dren singing and a long round of applause were heard from the small attic at the “Branko Pešić” elementary school. At the end of a successfully completed school year, the pupils and teachers of the school prepared an event that they called “Music and Geography Around the World”. Roma children, along with their peers, including many refugees fleeing war who also attend this school, sang and played tunes from different continents - African, Asian and Latin American. The music teacher was playing a guitar and the sports teacher was helping on the drums. Along with the Serbian National Anthem, the children sang famous rock School hallway decorated for the School Day celebration. Photo by Anđela Milivojević, all rights reserved. songs as well as traditional ethno-songs. tions. The model aims to enable children to After the performance the pupils were hap- acquire a minimum of knowledge during a py, laughing and hugging their teachers. short period of time, so that they are then The applause lasted for several minutes. able to attend a regular primary school. Despite all the misfortunes that Roma chil- Teachers are particularly sensitive to dren who originate from Kosovo face, a cer- working with children who come from dif- tain number of them manage to successfully ficult backgrounds, but the school’s prin- complete the studies at this school – all cipal, Nenad, admits it is often emotional- thanks to their dedicated teachers. Over 30 ly exhausting. teachers of various subjects work in the “Sometimes it seems like it would be easier school. However, their job is not just to for me to carry cement all day compared to teach. what I experience and hear from the kids in Not far from the school is the Roma settle- only one day here at the school,” he says. ment of “Zemun polje”, where many Roma children live. The living conditions in this 1 settlement are dire, and the settlement is http://www.errc.org/press-releases/five-years-of-ethnic- cleansing-of-gypsies-from-kosovo often referred to as an unsafe ghetto. 2 http://www.kirs.gov.rs/wb-page.php?kat_id=44 However, teachers from the Branko Pešić 3 http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/politika/ elementary school are always welcome in 2179434/fuhtel-srbija-sigurna-zemlja.html 28 Southeastern Europe Rape as a Weapon in War

Rape as a Weapon in War

By Thomas Roser

Only time doesn’t heal wounds: Women abused during the war continue to be stigma- tized and silenced. In Kosovo, the number of women who were raped during the war, and who are often severely traumatized, is estimated at around twenty thousand. Only a fraction of them seek professional help. And only a few dare to talk openly about their experiences to their families.

PRISTINA. The war is still not over for the raped me”, she says in a hesitant voice. “I dark-haired woman. At the Kosovo Reha- told them that I had five children, and I bilitation Centre for Torture Victims asked them to let me go. They laughed and (KRCT) in Pristina, 50-year-old Adelina said that they would make me more chil- (name changed) tells us that she had al- dren. And they called for other soldiers to ways been “a very strong person”: “Wheth- take me with them”. er poverty or violence, I had many prob- At that moment she thought only of the lems to solve in my life. But when it came promise she had made to return to her son, to this, I wasn’t up to the task. Even with Adelina says: “I broke loose, ran away. As I my family, I still can’t talk about it”. looked around, I saw one of the soldiers In the wrong place at the wrong time: Ade- pointing his pistol at me. The other one fell lina talks about the fateful day in April into his arm - and prevented the shot”. 1999, which changed her life, with her The war raged in Kosovo from February hands clasped together. The day before, 1998 to June 1999. Twenty years later, the Serbian militia had massacred more than consequences of the war still cause many 20 men in her village. “After the shootings problems for the inhabitants of the Balkan even the animals did not seem to come to state, which has been independent since rest anymore. The dogs barked, the cows 2008. The number of rape victims alone is mooed, the chickens cackled”. The fear estimated at twenty thousand women. Ac- that her missing brother might also be cording to KRCT therapist Selvi Izeti, rape among the dead made it difficult for her to is a “weapon of war” that is still effective grasp a clear thought: “I just couldn’t un- decades later. In Kosovo, the victims were derstand how humans can do this to other between eight and sixty years old. Chil- humans.” dren, elderly and disabled women were Without her husband, who was working also raped: “It was not a question of wheth- abroad at the time, Adelina and her five chil- er the women were attractive or not. It was dren sought refuge in her parents’ house. It about hurting society”. was her concern for her hungry children that Adelina never talked to her family about prompted her to return the next day to her what she had experienced. Only one of her own farm for milk and eggs. “Mama, are you sisters knew about it, Adelina says. She has coming back?” her three-year-old son asked not talked about it to her husband because her, crying as she went. she is afraid of his reaction: “He often When Adelina opened the gate for the drinks a lot, sometimes he is violent. I don’t hungry calf, so that it could get to the cow know how he would react”. Once she asked on the pasture, she noticed the two sol- him what he thought of raped women: “He Thomas Roser, journalist diers by the henhouse too late. “They said that he believed such women were Rape as a Weapon in War Southeastern Europe 29

immoral”. Her children have grown up, not be fulfilled by many of the women af- but she has not been able to tell them fected. As a result, a relatively small num- about the rape either: “I would have diffi- ber of only one hundred women have been culty explaining to them why I had kept recognized so far as entitled to receive the this from them for so long”. pension. For example, a relative must tes- A thorny rose on an open hand adorns a tify to the rape: “But if the women have picture painted by one of the victims never told their families about it, they can during therapy at the KCRT. According to hardly have the rape confirmed by a rela- therapist, Izeti, only around a thousand of tive”. Some women are unable to provide the traumatized women have so far asked the very detailed description of the cir- for help - and mostly without the knowl- cumstances and the course of the crime edge of their families. The stigma attached that is required: “20 years have passed. to rape victims makes it difficult for them And many can hardly remember every de- to open up to their relatives: “Because they tail. That is why sometimes the authorities were never able to talk about what they ex- don’t believe them”. perienced, the war is still fresh for them, Anxiety, depression and post-traumatic but their trauma is chronic. And these cas- stress disorder are common problems es are always the most difficult to treat”. among victims of sexual violence during It is the shame and fear of the reactions of wars. While the initially very high number relatives and the social environment that of former prisoners of war and veterans who still keeps many victims of sexual violence sought help in the KRCT has declined over in patriarchal Kosovo from talking about the years, the number of rape victims will- their suffering. Only last October, for the ing to undergo therapy increases: “The suf- first time, a rape victim dared to speak fering of former prisoners of war is accept- publicly on Kosovar television about the ed. They have no problems to talk about it”. crime they had suffered. Vasfije Krasniqi Rape victims, on the other hand, often nev- Goodman, who now lives in the USA, re- er felt able to talk about it: “Their problems ported in a tearful voice how at the age of usually increase with the years”. 16 she was deported by a Serbian police- Izeti reports that women often deliberate- man to a neighboring village, where she ly do not speak about their rape at the be- was raped by him and another man. She ginning of their therapy: “Often they first had begged her tormentor several times to ask whether there are cameras and record- shoot her, said the mother of two: “But he ers, whether the conversation is being re- told me that I would suffer more if he let corded or whether someone is listening to me live”. them”. Only when they are sure that no one The report by that courageous woman was else can learn about their experiences do “an important step” to “break” the social they feel free enough to speak. Fearing that stigmatization of rape victims, Izeti said. other people might find out about their The number of women seeking advice and rape, the women that visit the KRCT often help in the KCRT did not increase signifi- tell their families that they are going to a cantly, contrary to expectations. But many gynecologist or another doctor, Izeti said, patients finally dared to open up to their speaking of a “double problem” that their families and talk about their experiences: patients face: “They feel compelled to lie to “Vasfije had the support of her family. And their family even if they want treatment”. this was to become a model for other fam- Those women who dared to contact KRCT, ilies - which is what is happening now.” which operates in several cities, needed For a long time, the attention of the State “urgent help”, according to Izeti’s experi- to the needs of traumatized rape victims in ence: “But they can also drastically change Kosovo was insufficient. The care of affect- their situation for the better. Their lives ed women has so far been largely left to change when they begin to talk about what independent organisations such as the they have experienced and their problems. KCRT. Until recently, rape victims were Even women who relapse two or three not entitled to any state aid. Only since years after their therapy are much easier to February 2018 have women who can cred- treat”. ibly prove that they were raped during the She cannot forget the rape and will never war been able to apply for a small pension be able to forget it “until the end of my life”, of 230 euros per month. Adelina says. But since she came into con- However, Izeti explains that the conditions tact with the KRCT in 2016 and could talk for receiving the war victims’ pension can- about her experiences, she feels “70 per- 30 Southeastern Europe Rape as a Weapon in War

cent better”: “If I have the feeling that I coming better, she says when she says can’t cope with it alone, I call - or I come goodbye, “I hope that my problems will by” Adelina says. Talking to other rape vic- eventually be a thing of the past - and that tims is particularly helpful for her: “It’s I will finally be able to put them behind simply a good feeling to talk about our me”. shared experiences with women who have similar experiences”. “Step by step” it is be- Translated by Sanja Katarić The Kosovo Pressure Cooker Southeastern Europe 31

The Kosovo Pressure Cooker: Kosovo Serbs between Belgrade and Pristina By Tatjana Lazarević

Kosovska Mitrovica, along with the neighboring municipalities of Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić, constitutes a compact Kosovo community primarily populated by Serbs. At the same time, this is a part of Kosovo where the Serbian state still leads a parallel life. Kosovar Albanians and the Western partners are using this administrative condominium to highlight accusations of disorganization and a lack of law and order, with an increas- ing number of voices warning about Northern Kosovo being on the verge of new a con- frontation. Albin Kurti, the newly elected Prime Minister of Kosovo, of the Vetëvendosje party, has announced changes both with regard to Kosovo’s official policy towards the Serbian minority in the north of the country, as well as concerning the dialogue on the status of Kosovo. As part of the political power play between Belgrade and Pristina, it has been the “bad guys” from the north who have thus far always been most affected.

In 1999, my daughter Marija was six years satiated, as it would later turn out, by rob- old. We were still living in my parents’ house bing and murdering; and columns of refu- at the time. As you enter Kosovska Mitrovi- gees. Distraught, they waited for the big ca from Zvečan, a great building towers over unknown to roll in from the south. the main street. As a habit, the first thing I And they kept waiting. Kosovska Mitrovica do in the morning is look through the win- is the only town in Kosovo where, at least dow. On that, what was it, June 17th maybe, in one part -north of the Ibar- Serbs re- I did the same and froze my gaze. Right mained. Kosovska Mitrovica, along with across the street stood a tall black soldier the neighbouring municipalities of Zvečan, with a helmet on, holding a strange auto- Zubin Potok, and Leposavić, still make up matic rifle at the ready, wearing an un- a compact Serb-majority area. known uniform. My next thought was of This accustomedness to foreign uniforms Marija, probably because of what I call cog- then spread to the Kosovo police. Before nitive self-defense. Exhausted by a three- getting accustomed to each of them, there month-long bombing campaign, I constant- was a period of violence, bitterness, and a ly feared for her life, focused on protecting refusal to accept them. Now, it’s the Koso- her, and despaired at the knowledge that vo Army’s turn. nothing actually depended on me. Also in June of 1999, I watched as the former The image of that French soldier in Kosovs- head of the County of Kosovska Mitrovica ka Mitrovica marked the official break with turned his official car away from people who my previous life. had assembled on the street, waiting to hear Serbs in Northern Kosovo got used to what they could expect. Without telephone French, Danish, and Belgian uniforms, lines, with disassembled institutions and and the UNMIK police, in spite of negative refugees, they gathered in the streets wait- emotions. Citizens who stayed in the four ing for officials to talk to them. municipalities north of the River Ibar had previously said tearful goodbyes to dusty Parallel Reality military and police uniforms of the former Since the original UN mission, through federal state - some exhausted from waging temporary institutions of self-government Tatjana Lazarević, KoSSev news war, and others, usually paramilitaries, in Kosovo - first under international ad- portal editor 32 Southeastern Europe The Kosovo Pressure Cooker

ministration, and then, after the unilateral sels Agreement in 2013, the Serbian state declaration of independence in 2008, un- itself completely abolished its executive der mere supervision, and up to the end of and judicial authority in Kosovo. supervised independence in 2012, the Ser- The abolition of these institutions began in bian state has led its own parallel life in December 2014, with the dissolution of the Kosovo. Ministry of the Interior, i.e. the civilian po- The consolidation of state institutions in lice service, and the integration of several the North, as well as in Serb-majority com- hundred police officers and civil servants munities south of the Ibar, was already into the Kosovo system, and finished with visible in 2001 - from municipal public ser- the dissolution of the courts in 2017. vices, through civilian police services, the The normalization of relations between the payment system, the courts, and finally the two peoples as the ultimate political agen- return, or relocation, of what is now called da arrived in the North of Kosovo straight The University of Pristina Temporarily Set- from Brussels. Its alter ego was precisely tled in Kosovska Mitrovica. With the excep- the abolition of Serbian state services, fo- tion of the University, which returned with cusing above all on the North. Communi- the agreement of UNMIK, other institu- ties south of the Ibar were not paid much tions operated in secret, in secluded loca- attention. tions, without official insignia. Both the When the new document on Kosovo, The Kosovo and international authorities were Agreement on Comprehensive Normaliza- aware of their existence. The services were tion of Relations, was signed in April 2013, provided with difficulties, and were often a new phase began. In addition to the final just a stepping stone to the places where abolition of Serbian state authority, it was citizens’ needs would ultimately be fulfilled also characterized by a severe lack of trans- - in relocated administrations in Raška, parency about the talks and agreements Niš, Kraljevo or Vranje [cities in southern between Belgrade and Pristina, mediated Serbia close to the border with Kosovo - by the EU. For the media, obtaining accu- Ed.] - needs such as obtaining personal rate information about what the negotia- and travel documents. Post offices, prima- tions were about, how the negotiations were ry schools and high schools, doctors’ offic- proceeding, what was on the table, and how es and hospitals never stopped operating. the agreements would be implemented A political slogan often heard in the North with regard to citizens, seemed like mis- is that the University and the hospital are sion impossible. The only exceptions were the pillars of Serbs’ survival in the North the inane statements of the European (the post offices are omitted). team, which never revealed anything, and Contrary to these guerrilla efforts to pre- the populist and ever more polarizing serve the presence of the Serbian state, sound bites from the Serbian and Kosovar Kosovo Albanians and Western partners leaders - polarized not only in relation to used this administrative condominium to one another, but in relation to reality itself. highlight accusations of disorganization Over the course of 6 years, over 30 technical and the absence of order and law. Al- agreements have been signed, and scores of though the systems intertwined in the high-level political and technical talks held. south as well, accusations and criticism Hundreds of accompanying civic initiatives were directed mostly at the North. were started to support the respective lead- erships in their stated intentions of achiev- Comprehensive ing lasting peace and stability in the region. Abnormalization Contrary to all that, the sixth anniversary Since the day Serbs first put up a fight at the of the Brussels Agreement was met with River Ibar, the negative narrative about the entire process having been forgotten, Serbs merely shifted from previous war and with both societies deeply destabi- zones in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegov- lized. The talks have reached a dead end - ina, through Milošević’s Serbia, to the at least those on the official agenda. The North of Kosovo, and has cemented itself sudden revival of the idea of a land swap, there to this day. wherein the North, or a small piece of it, Two decades since the war, it seems as would remain part of Serbia, ensued, fol- though Serbs had a more difficult time -ad lowing what seemed to the publics on both justing to the dismantling of the former sides to have been a fait accompli secret Yugoslav system of administration than to deal between the two Presidents [Serbian the fact that, after 100 years, with the Brus- and Kosovo presidents Aleksandar Vučić The Kosovo Pressure Cooker Southeastern Europe 33

Joint Chiefs of Staff Headquarters in Belgrade, in ruins since the 1999 NATO military campaign, pictured in 2019. Photo by Nemanja Subotić CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 and Hashim Thaçi - Ed.], with the consent hardline nationalist DSS [Democratic Par- or passive agreement of certain interna- ty of Serbia - Ed.] leaderships were re- tional mediators. moved by abolishing municipal assemblies For citizens, all of this amounts to an ab- in 2013, and a bit earlier in the south. A normalization. Both Serbs and Albanians U-turn had previously taken place in late hold abiding feelings of the transience and 2011 and early 2012 on the policy of sup- ambiguity of their everyday lives, and of porting roadblocks in the North. This pol- permanent tensions bordering on latent icy started in 2011, when Kosovo special conflict, while their respective leaderships police units tried to take control of two ad- have remained constant for over three de- ministrative crossings in the North. The cades. It seems as though the process of last barricade in the North remained in the both nations waking up to the fact that one Bosniak Mahala until 2016. side is led by wartime leaders, and the oth- In the autumn of 2013, the first Kosovo lo- er by warmongers and stranglers of civic cal elections were held throughout the and media freedoms, has only recently North, formally kicking off the Brussels started to enter a more mature phase. Ever Process in the field. With it began what more heralds are warning that we are once citizens learned to recognize as institution- again edging toward a new conflict. Eu- al terror and the abolition of civil liberties, rope, which has crowned these leaders as including freedom of speech. the Balkans’ stabilocracies, has only re- In the first round of these elections, just be- cently started to note other winds blowing fore polling stations were closed, a group wearing ski masks burst into the central from the region, above all thanks to a new- polling place and smashed the ballot boxes. ly alert Germany. During the day, there was a rumour circu- lating that this incident was being prepared Democratorship if the electoral result didn’t favour the can- It stands to reason that, in a battle of ele- didate supported by Belgrade, and general phants, it is the grass that suffers the most Bratislav Dikić [retired Serbian Gendar- - in a battle between Belgrade and Pristina, merie general Bratislav Dikić was sen- Kosovo Serbs are the grass. Those in the tenced to 8 years in prison before the High- south and in Metohija suffered the most, er Court in Podgorica for an attempted above all as targets of ethnically motivated coup d’état on the day of the parliamentary physical assaults, and later as targets of ad- election in Montenegro in October 2016 - ministrative asphyxiation, in spite of solid Ed.], a Gendarmerie general at the time, legislative and constitutional provisions. now a prisoner in Spuž, took a stroll through In preparation for the signing of the Brus- the city with a group of young men. After sels Agreement, the North’s political blood the second round, the newly elected mayor, count was changed almost overnight. The close to the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) 34 Southeastern Europe The Kosovo Pressure Cooker

[party of Serbian President Aleksandar apartment in 2014, breaking a window and Vučić - Ed.], Krstimir Pantić, resigned after striking his wife. just a few days, and in the election cam- paign for the third round, on January 16th The Last of the Mohicans 2014, mayoral candidate Dimitrije Janićije- I am writing this text on the day of the third vić, who was running against the Serbian (snap) Kosovo mayoral elections in the List [political party close to Aleksandar North [held on May 19th 2019 - Ed.]. The Vučić’s SNS - Ed], was murdered. Ten days Serbian List has just declared victory. It later, on January 27th, another candidate, had no challengers in the Kosovo Serb Oliver Ivanović, was arrested. Finally, in the community. It entered the elections after fourth round, in the spring of 2014, there four of its mayors had resigned six months were no incidents; the ballot boxes re- ago, saying that Kosovo municipalities had mained empty throughout the day and only ceased to exist in the North. Their return to filled with votes in the evening. These were the system, which, according to their pay counted in the neighbouring Serbian town checks, they had never really left, was con- of Raška, instead of Kosovo Polje, as the ditional on the removal of the 100% tax on regulations stipulated. Serbian goods imposed by Kosovo author- International representatives, led by the ities, and on the release of Serbs arrested OSCE and the EU called it a great victory for on suspicion of involvement in the murder democracy and free and fair elections in of Oliver Ivanović. None of these condi- chorus, applauding Pristina and Belgrade. tions have been met thus far. The same All other incidents were just one-time mayors who had resigned have now won agency news items. again, except for one, whose brother ran Oliver Ivanović spent three years in prison. instead. Less than a year after he was released, he The oxymoron that has struck this commu- was executed on the same day Janićijević nity, and apparently the entirety of Serbian was murdered, on January 16th 2018. He society as well, has made zombies out of had spent his freedom as a candidate in the them. In this Kosovo pressure cooker, new local elections in Kosovo, demonized which has been boiling under pressure for by the media and political machinery con- 20 years, Kosovo Serbs are slowly boiled trolled by the Serbian List, with his car set frogs. If and when it explodes, they will not on fire once again in the summer of 2017. remove the lid, but they, especially those During his political engagement, since from the North, will most likely continue 1999, the greatest leader of the Kosovo playing the role of the bad guys in the nar- Serbs had a bomb planted under his car in rative. 2005, his party offices set on fire in 2013, and an unknown person entering his Translated by Nemanja Georgijević Depleted Uranium Southeastern Europe 35

Depleted Uranium: Between sensationalism and health hazard

By Elion Gerguri

Twenty years after the bombing, many questions relating to the use of depleted uranium and its consequences for human health and the environment remain unanswered. NATO and some Western governments argue that depleted uranium does not have any harmful effects, while doctors and other experts point out the increased number of malignant tumors, genetic mutations, birth defects and other serious conditions, including leuke- mia, caused by radiation. Kosovo and Serbia have approached the issue of depleted ura- nium based on their own – very different – political agendas.

The availability of information, data and surveys about the use of depleted uranium is very limited and there is a lack of public awareness or public debate about this is- sue in both Kosovo and Serbia. There were isolated debates and rumours about an increase in the mortality rate after the war, with many people linking this situation to the use of depleted uranium, especially people living close to targets that were bombed by NATO. For the last twenty years both govern- ments have politicised and misused the issue of depleted uranium and questions related to it. This has led to increasing de- mands for experts to investigate the issue and discover the truth about the conse- quences of depleted uranium use during the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Background

According to available information, de- Figure 1. Sites identified as being targeted by ordnance containing depleted uranium pleted uranium ammunition was used in at least 112 cases across Kosovo, mostly in munition was used in Kosovo during NA- the southwestern regions of Gjakova, Priz- TO’s three-month-long intervention. ren and around Ferizaj. Additionally, de- Kosovo was bombarded by depleted ura- pleted uranium was also used less inten- nium shells (bullets) during April 1999. sively in attacks by U.S. bombers in the Around thirty thousand depleted uranium areas of Vranje, Preševo, and Bujanovac, rounds (projectiles) were fired and about as well as in a locality in Montenegro1. Al- 10 tons of the depleted uranium debris though some estimates are much larger, was scattered across Kosovo. information available from NATO con- In reviewing the data on environmental Elion Gerguri, Balkan Green firms that 10 tons of depleted uranium am- measurements for depleted uranium col- Foundation, Kosovo 36 Southeastern Europe Depleted Uranium

lected by field missions in the Kosovo area widespread distribution of DU. Compared in November 2000, a year and a half after to background exposures to natural urani- the end of the conflict in June 1999, evi- um, exposure to DU is very limited. Ac- dence of concentrated depleted uranium cording to SCHER, higher exposures to DU contamination was only found in soil sam- dust may occur shortly after the hit when ples at localized points of concentrated entering vehicles hit by DU bullets, and in contamination. There were no signs of de- battle when near a tank hit by DU ammu- pleted uranium in waters. nition. Vehicles hit by DU should be made It is important to note that hits on non-ar- inaccessible and properly disposed of by moured (‘soft’) targets do not generate sig- civilians. Used DU ammunition should nificant contamination because the de- also be stored and disposed of properly. pleted uranium penetrators do not gener- The United Nations environmental investi- ate significant amounts of aerosols on gators’ analysis of 355 samples of soil, water impact.2 and plants in Kosovo showed “no cause for alarm” over the radiation risks from deplet- What is depleted uranium and ed uranium ammunition. But the report from the United Nations Environmental how is it used? Program (UNEP) called for precautionary According to the European Commission’s measures, including cleaning up all 112 Scientific Committee on Health and sites hit by NATO air strikes and monitoring Environmental Risks (SCHER), depleted drinking water. UNEP officials admitted uranium is a dense metal produced as a that the report left open questions about by-product of enrichment of natural potential long-term adverse effects from uranium for nuclear fuel. It is still exposure to radiation and chemicals on hu- radioactive, but at a much lower level than man health and the environment.4 the starting material. It is used in armour- piercing shells and bombs, to give them more penetrating power. Such munitions Sensationalism or health were used in both Gulf Wars and in Serbia hazard and Kosovo. Their use has raised concerns Stories of depleted uranium were popular about health threats from exposure to the immediately after the war. However, to distributed uranium. Many studies have avoid minimizing the great Kosovar victory reported a lack of evidence of hazard, but after the NATO intervention, it became a their results remain controversial. The taboo topic. There are numerous scientific European Parliament in 2008 asked for articles about the dangers of depleted ura- more information about the science of nium – many of which describe it as ex- depleted uranium and on where it can be tremely dangerous. On the other hand, state found.3 authorities claim that the dangers of deplet- The potential health and environmental ed uranium use in Kosovo are minimal. effects of depleted uranium (DU) have In 2015, Arif Krasniqi, Chairman of the Eco- been a concern for many years. In particu- logical Party of Kosovo (a non-parliamenta- lar, its use in munitions has led to claims ry party) invited all of the political factions that it is involved in various problems in in Pristina to approach this issue seriously affected areas, both among combatants and, if necessary, seek help from the inter- and civilians. A number of independent national community to carry out decontam- studies have reviewed the data and no ination of sites that were proven to be con- conclusive evidence of damage has been taminated. “Our interest is to know the found. These findings are still being dis- truth. No one has the right to turn a blind puted by others, however. The Interna- eye to this issue. These are living people - tional Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons ecology knows no peoples and borders. This questions the radiation exposure and dose issue has not been discussed enough, no calculation models used, claiming that DU one is talking about it, and that is not good”5. weapons are a new source of contamina- Nenad Rašić, a former member of the Koso- tion that needs more scientific analysis. vo Assembly, also believes that cooperation SCHER agrees with the conclusion of the in the region is indispensable, but he assess- UN Environment Programme, the Interna- es that the political decision-makers are cur- tional Atomic Energy Agency and others rently not ready to tackle these issues seri- that environmental and human health ously. “At the moment I see neither the po- risks are not expected due to the potential litical potential, nor the will, in this govern- Depleted Uranium Southeastern Europe 37 ment to initiate such cooperation. If there is malignant tumours7. In response to this no pressure, I don’t think anyone will deal allegation, NATO7 referenced a UN Envi- with it. We need expert, technical and finan- ronment Programme report, released in cial help. I am sure that EU institutions 2001, which states that that the health risks could do this well, but we could also ask the from uranium are negligible8. U.S. to investigate this fairly, and in line with Professor Danica Grujičić of the Faculty of the measures to be taken, the risk to the Medicine at the University of Belgrade is population would decrease”6. involved in forming a group of independent Although the Kosovo government does not experts that aims to prove the public health plan to reopen the issue of depleted urani- consequences of the 1999 bombing. “Why um and the potential danger to public is it that no administration in Serbia since health, Ferid Agani, former Kosovar Min- 1999 has formed a group of experts in agri- ister of Environment and Spatial Planning, culture, chemists, doctors, and physicists, does not rule out the possibility that it will which would prove exactly what they did to be put on the agenda if the facts prove the us? Let the experts do their job. It is a shame existence of danger. “But at the moment that the State shows no interest in the health there are no such facts,’’ said Agani, high- consequences for the population when it is lighting that the questions are legitimate known that NATO bombers used depleted but that he is convinced that this case has uranium ammunition and also attacked been sensationalized and that there is no chemical-industrial complexes”. real danger to public health. At the same time Jelena Milić, the Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, has Depleted uranium - A Serbian continually pushed for a fact-based discus- scapegoat sion on depleted uranium in Serbia. Milić identifies the media as the largest propa- While depleted uranium ammunition was gator in the formation of the narrative on used in at least 112 cases all over Kosovo, the harmfulness of depleted uranium. depleted uranium ammunition was used “They have begun ‘accusing’ the ammuni- on a smaller scale in Serbia in the areas of tion for every potential health problem, Vranje, Preševo, and Bujanovac, as well as and are utilising ‘fake news’ in order to in a locality in Montenegro. Available me- form public opinion”9. dia articles in Serbian mostly ignore the fact that depleted uranium ammunition was used almost entirely in Kosovo, and to Depleted NATO a lesser extent in Southern Serbia. The Economist magazine has recalled that Serbian Parliament recently established a the use of depleted uranium ammunition in commission to examine the alleged effects the first Persian Gulf War in Iraq, in 1991, on public health of NATO’s use of depleted when at least 300-350 tons of depleted ura- uranium ammunition. No details are avail- nium were used, has raised concerns able about the work of the committee or among some NATO member states, as hun- what data it is using. However, the com- dreds of cases of malignant diseases have mittee is intended to submit its’ first report since been diagnosed among NATO sol- in 2020. diers, as well as a very high number of cases The President of the Serbian Society for the among the Iraqi people. A particularly large Fight Against Cancer, Professor Slobodan number of patients were recorded in south- Čikarić, published an article in 2015 in which ern Iraq, where, according to The Econo- he claimed that the harmful effect of deplet- mist, depleted uranium ammunition was ed uranium has resulted in a drastic increase “used to a great extent”. The most promi- in the number of cases and deaths from leu- nent critics of the use of depleted uranium kemia and lymphoma. His findings are ammunition at the time of the first Persian based on an analysis of the annual reports of Gulf War were Italy and Germany, as well as the Institute of Public Health of Serbia. How- some other countries whose soldiers be- ever, no serious debate has taken place at an came ill with malignant tumours. There was official level about these findings. a risk that these countries would directly Professor Čikarić claims that depleted ura- demand the end of the use of depleted ura- nium used in NATO airstrikes on Serbia in nium for military purposes – something 1999 is responsible for high mortality rates. NATO wanted to avoid at all costs10. Studies have shown that depleted uranium During the Kosovo conflict in 1999, about is a carcinogen: When ingested, it inter- 30,000 depleted uranium rounds were rupts normal cell growth and can lead to fired at targets on the ground. Fact-finding 38 Southeastern Europe Depleted Uranium

missions by the United Nations Environ- having information that is accurate, com- ment Programme and the World Health parable, fact-checked, professionally re- Organisation looked into the environmen- searched, and publicly available, will the tal and health impacts11. Although the mis- citizens of both countries be able to accu- sions found no convincing evidence to rately inform themselves about the issue of indicate any health impact on people in depleted uranium and its impact. Kosovo, it was noted that people could 1 come into contact with depleted uranium Aerial photography of targets in both Kosovo and Serbia: https://mega.nz/?fbclid=IwAR08rnsOcfk0PgUxQQCqfG- by picking up objects from the ground or CVKvhVNa-9Ktes2CQ9rkcq3rS8GjclEGsKU1g#F! ingesting contaminated soil12. vMtD3QIB!aOxlGdNuqDDtrmp0_CgYHg 2 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2001). Depleted Uranium in Kosovo: Common ground https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/uranium.pdf Since the war, media reports in Kosovo 3 Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks and Serbia have suggested that there are (SCHER) (2010). Depleted Uranium: https://ec.europa. eu/health/scientific_committees/opinions_layman/deplet- higher rates of leukemia in areas where ed-uranium/en/index.htm depleted uranium was used. A representa- 4 CBS News (2001). Report: Kosovo Not Contaminated: tive from Kosovo’s Institute of Public https://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-kosovo-not-contam- Health told Deutsche Welle that the coun- inated/ 5 Kosovalive.org (2015). Uraniumi i varfëruar: gjurmëve të try’s health authorities have not studied së vërtetës (in Albanian): the issue because there is no reliable data. http://kosovalive.org/uraniumi-i-varferuar-gjur - Kosovo only established a national cancer meve-te-se-vertetes-2/ database in 201213. To date, Kosovo’s Insti- 6 Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS) (2015). Osiromašeni uranijum: u potrazi za istinom (in tute of Public Health has released publica- Serbian): tions, neither of which are related to de- http://www.nuns.rs/info/activities/25502/osiromaseni-ura - pleted uranium. On the other hand, the nijum-u-potrazi-za-istinom.html Institute of Public Health of Serbia is high- 7 International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (2014). Malignant Effects: depleted uranium as a genotoxin and ly active, with numerous reports and anal- carcinogen: http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/ yses, including data on the number of can- docs/216.pdf cer patients and deaths in the periods be- 8 The Borgen Project (2017). 5 Facts About Cancer in Serbia: fore and after the bombing. https://borgenproject.org/5-facts-about-cancer-in-serbia/ 9 European Western Balkans (2018). Milić: Towards a fact- All of the questions about depleted urani- based discussion on depleted uranium: um, the risk of exposure to it and its impact https://www.ceas-serbia.org/en/external/5434-all-this- on health, are legitimate. Kosovo and Ser- would-not-have-happened-had-the-serbs-listened-to-jele- bia should focus their attention on environ- na-milic 10 The Economist (2001). Depleted NATO: https://www. mental protection at the regional level, as economist.com/leaders/2001/01/11/depleted-nato ecological problems know no borders and 11 World Health Organization (WHO) (2001). Report of the regional cooperation is desperately needed. World Health Organization Depleted Uranium The ultimate question regarding depleted Mission to Kosovo: https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/ handle/10665/108666/E71919.pdf?sequence=1&isAl- uranium in Serbia and Kosovo is who will lowed=y give us answers – politicians or experts? 12 World Health Organization (WHO). Environmental Both countries should work together on Threats to Children: https://www.who.int/water_sanita- reducing antagonism, promoting profes- tion_health/hygiene/settings/ChildrenNM4.pdf 13 Deutsche Welle (2012). Uranium risks haunt Kosovo sur- sional exchange and setting aside their vivors: https://www.dw.com/en/uranium-risks-haunt-koso- differences for a common cause. Only by vo-survivors/a-16366645-0 The First Collateral Damage Was Democracy Southeastern Europe 39

The First Collateral Damage Was Democracy

By Elisa Satjukow

On Easter Sunday, April 11th 1999, the Belgrade journalist and editor Slavko Ćuruvija was shot on his doorstep. NATO’s military intervention in the Kosovo war had begun three weeks prior. With slogans like “Ćuruvija is welcoming the bombs”, the Serbian State media had publicly branded him as a “traitor”.1 Although Ćuruvija had previously re- ceived warnings that his life was in danger, he decided not to leave Belgrade.2 Ćuruvija was shot in the back seventeen times in broad daylight, which sent a “very strong message by the regime”3 recalls a friend, who, like many other Serbian intellectuals and critics of the regime, shared the opinion that Ćuruvija’s murder was a contract killing.

“We were suddenly all afraid that Mi- tions and Milošević ruled in and through a lošević will take the chance offered by the state of emergency. Once again, it was the bombing to finish off the whole opposi- democratic activists who became, as Ver- tion”4, my informant describes the situa- an Matić states, “the first collateral dam- tion faced by the so-called ‘Other Serbia’ age of the war”11. after the assassination of Ćuruvija. The While ethnic cleansing in Kosovo intensi- term ‘Other Serbia’ emerged with the Bel- fied at the beginning of the bombing, the grade Circle5 and has been used since the Serbian government pursued what Eric 1990s to denote intellectuals and political Gordy calls the “destruction of alterna- activists who stood up for a democratic tives”12 in order to stabilize its own power. and pluralist Serbia in the Milošević era.6 “How do you talk about human rights and At the time of Ćuruvija’s death, Veran building democracy when the world’s Matić, the founder of the independent ra- leading democracies are bombing you? dio station B92, was repeatedly asked by The simple answer, pro-democracy activ- his friends from the ‘West’ why there was ists say, is that you don’t”13, states journalist no rebellion against the bombing in Ser- Kevin Cullen. Does this really hold true? bia: “Where are the people who poured In the following article, I will analyse the onto the streets every day for three months reaction of the independent media, NGOs in 1996 to demand democracy and human and intellectuals to the NATO bombing rights?”7, recalls Matić. Back in 1996, hun- and discuss their attempts –despite the dreds of thousands of people had demand- combined dangers of “NATO planes in the ed a democratic and European Serbia. sky, Milošević on the ground”14– to keep Only one year later, a period began that the alive the dissident and anti-nationalist journalist and writer Velimir Ćurguz Kazi- voices of the country. Last but not least, I mir describes as a reign of “terror”8. will show that the question of whether Ser- The universities were successively depolit- bia ‘deserves’ to be collectively held ac- icized with the University Act9 in the spring countable for the crimes in Kosovo, in the of 1998 and independent media were hit end, led to an irreversible rupture in the hard by a new Media Law10, which con- ranks of the ‘Other Serbia’. tained strict censorship regulations and was followed by repression of critical re- Facing a Double Threat porting. With the beginning of the war in With the beginning of the NATO air raids, Elisa Satjukow, PhD, lecturer, Kosovo, the country was again under sanc- the Yugoslav government immediately de- University of Leipzig 40 Southeastern Europe The First Collateral Damage Was Democracy

clared a state of war and mobilized for the sion not to continue reporting on the radio “defence of the country”.15 Isolated from for as long as the war lasted. Instead, Project the outside world and governed under mar- FreeB92 was launched by supporters of the tial law, the ‘Other Serbia’ in particular was radio station in the form of a website, “to in a doubly dangerous situation. Not only keep alive a flicker of the Other Serbia”.21 were they confronted by daily NATO air B92 wanted to maintain the spark of the raids and their immediate consequences, ‘Other Serbia’ not only on the web but also they also experienced a renewed radical na- at concerts and events organized at the Bel- tionalization encroaching on their everyday grade club Industrija, where every day be- lives. The powers of the police and judiciary tween 12am and 9pm an alternative public were extended by emergency laws so that came together “to provide a vague mood house searches could be conducted with- that unites us. A feeling of young people op- out a warrant and suspects detained for up posing Milošević and the bombing”.22 Goff to 30 days without judicial convictions or and Trionfi see the takeover of the station the right to a defence.16 Furthermore, the and the temporary arrest of Veran Matić, “Decree on the assembly of citizens during who had been denounced shortly before by the state of war” from the 31st of March 1999 Vojislav Šešelj as a ‘NATO General’, as a sanctioned any public meeting without pri- “test case of the regime”23 and a warning to the remaining independent media. In a statement in April 1999 the Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM) recommended that, due to the tense situa- tion, journalists either remain passive or cooperate with the regime: “…objective reporting, or even reporting which would not be welcomed by the authorities, entails disproportionately high risks”.24 Most of the independent media followed this recom- mendation and during the period of the bombing either complied with censorship guidelines or, like Slavko Ćuruvija, stopped publishing altogether. Thus, with the be- ginning of the bombing, Serbia became what cultural activist Borka Pavičević called an “information black hole”.25 Because of Joint Chiefs of Staff Headquarters in Belgrade, in ruins since the 1999 NATO military campaign, pictured in the censorship many people felt like car- 2019. Photo by Nemanja Subotić CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 toonist Aleksandar Zograf, who wrote in an or permission from the state with a heavy e-mail to his friends: “It’s hard to say what fine or imprisonment.17 is happening because we are so badly in- If the first “collateral damage”18 of the formed”.26 Like Zograf, many others who bombing was democracy, then democra- had a modem at the time, used the internet cy’s best-known symbol was the radio and as the main method of gaining information, TV station B92. Founded in 1989, B92 was communication and intervention. Home- the most important source of alternative pages like CNN, Sky News and Beograd. information during almost the entire peri- com were popular for gathering informa- od of Milošević’s rule. B92 was closed by tion; mailing lists, chatrooms and emails the Government at the outset of the bomb- were used to exchange experiences.27 ing and shortly afterwards taken over and For the ‘Other Serbia’ in particular, the in- rebranded as a patriotic youth station, ternet became the most important mouth- which transformed the “usually lively al- piece. For example, writer and women’s ternative culture and politics station into a rights activist Jasmina Tešanović e-mailed standard government-run organ”.19 her war diary to a friend in Sweden, who On the same day that B92 was closed by the then published it anonymously online. Government, Veran Matić was arrested on Within a week Tešanović’s diary had been his way to the B92 studio and held in custo- translated into seven languages and shared dy for several hours. In a press release from on over 50 websites. After the war, the 13th of April 1999, the “staff of the real Tešanović published the diary as a book28 B92”20 informed their listeners about the and many others followed her example.29 events that had taken place and their deci- Political appeals were also primarily shared The First Collateral Damage Was Democracy Southeastern Europe 41

via the internet, such as the “Statement of only did Milošević use the state of emer- concerned citizens”30 of 16th April 1999, gency to suppress his critics but he also which under the title “Let civility prevail” managed to reassemble a majority of the condemned both the NATO bombings and people behind him. violence against the Kosovar Albanian peo- In these days opposition to the NATO ple by Serbian forces. The 27 signatories, bombing was common ground among among them many well-known regime crit- people in Serbia – but for very different ics, demanded an immediate end to vio- reasons. At the heart of the conflict was the lence and all military activities. In another question of whether Serbia deserved to be appeal, titled “Letter to the Albanian collectively held accountable for the friends”31, Serbian NGOs pleaded for a crimes in Kosovo, or whether this should common peaceful solution – “to renew nor- be seen as a reaction to a decade of Serbian mal life and activities and find a solution to war crimes committed under the rule of the status of Kosovo”.32 Milošević. This was the moment, as one of The student activists and programmers of my interviewees described, when many the Internet magazine FREE SERBIA, people who were against the wars in Yugo- which was founded in reaction to the war, slavia until 1999 “somehow flipped” and also used the Web for alternative report- now said to themselves: “Well, no, I’m ing: “We wanted to break the media block- against this bombing. This is too much. ade, which was imposed from both sides. The Serbian side is not the only one re- Our slogan was ‘anti-NATO, anti-Mi- sponsible”.37 lošević’”33, Janja Bobić describes the mag- The remaining circle of dissidents was se- azine’s approach. Readers were therefore verely intimidated, not least by the murder shocked when a rumour circulated that the of Slavko Ćuruvija. The murder was seen Yugoslav Internet connection was about to as a moment that instigated the reorgani- be shut down at the end of April 1999. zation of cooperation among Yugoslav Twenty Serbian NGOs urgently appealed NGOs. Out of fear of “politically disappear- to U.S. President Bill Clinton that access to ing”38, the Yugoslav NGO Action network the Internet was vital for their survival: was founded by some fifty-five non-state “For NATO it appears important to cut off groups. all dissenting people and groups from Yu- But even for those who were still political- goslavia in order to maintain the image of ly active during the war, the question of Yugoslav society as if it is totally controlled Serbian responsibility for what happened by the Milošević regime and made only of in Kosovo quickly became a crossroads extreme nationalists who deserve punish- that divided the ranks of civil society. ment by bombs”.34 What is apparent here Obrad Savić, a member of the Belgrade is not only the dependence on the World Circle, later distanced himself from the po- Wide Web as the only free means of infor- litical attitude propagated at the time – mation, but also frustration about the which he described as naive– towards Ser- one-sided representation of Yugoslav soci- bian crimes in Kosovo: “I am ashamed that ety in the Western media. “The [Western in our public statement we caused both journalists] could have accomplished this sides to be held responsible for the expul- by not forgetting the ‘Other Serbia.”35, says sion of the Kosovo Albanians and to legiti- Nafsika Papanikolatos, from Human mize our criticism of NATO with the expe- Rights Watch, criticising the marginalisa- riences of the Kosovo Albanians”.39 It only tion of the Serbian opposition in reporting became clear to him following the end of by NATO countries. the war, following discussions with his Al- banian colleagues, that the Serbian side in The Question of Responsibility particular was responsible for the mass The state of war opened up opportunities expulsion and killings during the war. for Milošević to suppress his political op- Nataša Kandić, director of the Humanitari- ponents and strengthen his power. The an Law Center, also sees the reluctance of regime knew well how to make use of the Serbian NGOs to accept the role played by patriotic mood among the people and Serbia in expelling the Albanian population transformed the initial gatherings in public in Kosovo as a fracture in civil society that places into ‘anti-war events’, showing continues to this day: “Perhaps everything ‘TARGET’-signs as a symbol of defiance.36 would have been different if people in Bel- For the ‘Other Serbia’, the patriotic support grade had decided to show their concern of the regime was a double setback: Not about what happened to the Albanians be- 42 Southeastern Europe The First Collateral Damage Was Democracy

tween March and June 1999 and to demon- 3 Interview with the author on March 20, 2013, in Belgrade. strate their attention and political solidari- 4 Ibid. 5 ty” . 40 Kandić herself set off for Pristina short- The Belgrade Circle (“Beogradski krug”) was an associa- tion of independent intellectuals who critically discussed the ly after the bombing started and visited ethno-nationalist politics of the Milošević regime following Kosovo and refugee camps in Macedonia the outbreak of the Bosnian War in 1992. Their declared throughout the war and afterwards. In let- aim was to “promote ideas, deeds and activities that affirm ters41 and interviews she reported in detail the values of a democratic, civil and plural society”. From the extensive material of their meetings, the anthologies on the human rights violation and crimes “Druga Srbija” (1992) and “Intelektualci i rat” (2002), committed against Kosovo Albanians: “I edited by Ivan Čolović and Aljoša Mimica, emerged. know from conversations with Albanians 6 Ana Russell-Omaljev, Divided We Stand: Discourses on that they expected people to come from Identity in ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia Social Construction of the Self and the Other. Stuttgart 2016, p. 2. Belgrade and show that they care about 7 Veran Matić, Bombing the Baby with the Bathwater, what is going on in Kosovo. Perhaps even a March 30, 1999, available at: http://www.hartford-hwp. hundred Belgrade intellectuals could have com/archives/62/336.html, 08.05.2019. 8 changed the Albanian-Serbian relation- Ćurguz Kazimir, The last decade, p. 9. 9 The University Law of the 26th of May 1998 practically 42 ship”. Kandić describes the heart of the abolished the autonomy of universities and meant the end dilemma in which the ‘Other Serbia’ found of their self-government. It stipulated that rectors and itself at the beginning of the bombing. faculty chairmen should be appointed by the government. At the same time, any criticism of NATO’s It also stipulated that all employees had to sign new con- tracts based on these new regulations and, last but not military intervention seemed to trivialise least, that the government was empowered to close a uni- Serbian war crimes in Kosovo – a “propa- versity if it did not meet their expectations. See: The Uni- ganda trick of both sides”, diagnoses sociol- versity Act of 1998, Human Rights Watch, available at: ogist Božidar Jakšić, condemning both NA- https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/serbia/Serbia99-03. htm, 09.01.2017. TO’s and Milošević’s politics at the same 10 The Information Law passed by the government on the 20th time: “I consider the dilemma ‘either NATO of October 1998 allowed the government to use fines and or Slobodan Milošević’ to be a false one, a prison sentences or even completely withdraw the work mere propaganda trick of the two sides. If I permits of media that spread “fear, panic and defeatism”. See: The Serbian Public Information Law, Committee to oppose NATO aggression against my coun- Protect Journalists, August 29, 2000, available at: https:// try that does not mean I support Milošević’s cpj.org/reports/2000/08/serb-info-law.php#61, policy. If I am an opponent of Slobodan Mi- 24.04.2016. 11 lošević’s policy that does not mean I sup- Matthew Collin, This is Serbia calling: rock ‘n’ roll radio and Belgrade’s underground resistance. London 2004, p. port NATO military actions against my 147. country. (...) I reject both policies”.43 12 Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia, National- The right to a third –and neutral– way, the ism and the Destruction of Alternatives. Pennsylvania “pravo na treće mišljenje”44, as Ljubiša Ra- 1999. 13 Kevin Cullen, Democracy Activism: A War Casualty. Mi- jić called for in relation to the NATO bomb- losevic Foes Say Bombs Stifle Them, Boston Globe, May ing, was then also the focus of a public de- 26, 1999. bate in the critical newspaper Vreme,45 14 Bozidar Jakšić, From a Balkan Perspective, Greek Hel- triggered by Milošević’s trial in The Hague sinki Monitor, July 19, 1999, available at: http://www. bndlg.de/~wplarre/back277.htm, 20.6.2016. in the summer of 2002. For the first time, 15 N.N., Sinoć u 20 časova NATO započeo zlikovačku the question of the responsibility of the agresiju protiv naše zemlje. Savezna vlada proglasila rat- ‘Other Serbia’ for the crimes committed no stanje, Politika, 25.03 1999, p. 1. 16 under the rule of Milošević was publicly Peter Goff; Barbara Trionfi, The Kosovo news and propa- ganda war. Wien 1999, p. 315. debated between many well-known Serbi- 17 The Decree on the Assemblies of citizens during the state an intellectuals and activists. The be- of war, The Official Gazette of The Republic of Serbia, No. haviour during the war in Kosovo was at 17, available at: https://freeserb.home.xs4all.nl/ the core of the controversy, which shows facts/1999/e-07041999a.html, 09.01.2017. 18 “Collateral damage” is a technical military term that re- that the NATO bombing was one of the fers to incidental killing or wounding of non-combatants crucial moments, as political scientist Jas- or damage to non-combatant property during an attack on na Dragović-Soso states, that manifested a legitimate military target. It is widely criticized for its the rift within the ‘Other Serbia’ that con- euphemistic connotation. For the NATO mission against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO’s final report 46 tinues until today. referred to the fact that it was the “most precise and low- est-collateral damage air campaign in history.” For anal- 1 N.N., Deset godina od ubistva Ćuruvije, RTS, April 11, ysis and criticism of the NATO mission see: Amnesty In- 2009, available at: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/sto- ternational, NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ”Col- ry/135/Hronika/54911/Deset+godina+od+ubist- lateral Damage” or unlawful killings? Violations of the va+%C4%86uruvije.html?email=yes, 03.02.2017. Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force, 2 Attacks on the Press in 1999 – Yugoslavia, Committee to June 5, 2000, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/ Protect Journalists, February 2000, available at: http:// documents/EUR70/018/2000/en/, 03.02.2017. cpj.org/2000/03/attacks-on-the-press-1999-yugoslavia. 19 Marina Blagojević, A victory for the media?, Central Eu- php, 08.03.2019. rope Review 1 (1999), No. 13, September 20, 1999, The First Collateral Damage Was Democracy Southeastern Europe 43

available at: http://www.ce-review.org/99/13/blagoje- available at: https://www.wri-irg.org/en/archive/xyu/en/ vic13.html, 13.01.2017. albfrien.htm, 17.01.2017. 20 From the Staff of the real B92, nettime.org, April 13, 32 Ibid. 1999, available at: https://nettime.org/Lists-Archives/ 33 Matthew Collin, This is Serbia calling, p. 168. nettime-l-9904/msg00236.html, 09.01.2017. 34 Goran Gorić, Symbolic Warfare: NATO versus the Serbian 21 Ibid. Media, in: Phil Hammond / Edward S. Herman, Degraded 22 Quoted originally in German, translated by the author. capability: the media and the Kosovo crisis. London 2000, See: Katja Diefenbach; Katja Eydel, Belgrad Interviews: p. 88 - 110, p. 91. Jugoslawien nach NATO-Angriff und 15 Jahren national- 35 Nafsika Papanikolatos, Western Media and the “other istischem Populismus. Berlin 2000, p. 36. Serbia”, Human Rights Review 1 (2000), No. 2, p. 114. 23 Goff; Trionfi, The Kosovo news and propaganda war, p. 36 See Srđan Atanasovski, ‘The Song Has Kept Us’: Sound- 316. scape of Belgrade during the NATO Bombing, Südosteu- 24 Ibid, p. 315. ropa 64(2016)4, p. 25 Collin, This is Serbia calling, p. 150. 37 Interview with the author, March 20, 2013. 26 Aleksandar Zograf, Bulletins from Serbia: [e-mails & car- 38 Diefenbach, Belgrad Interviews, p. 74. toon strips from behind the front line]. Hove 1999, p. 17. 39 Originally in German, translation by the author. Ibid, p. 74. 27 Smiljana Antonijević, Sleepless in Belgrade: A virtual 40 Ibid, p. 118. community during War, First Monday 7 (2002), No. 1, 41 Natasa Kandić, Letters, Humanitarian Law Center, avail- 7.1.2002, available at: , 23.04.2016. Natasa-Kandic-Letters-1999.pdf (09.05.2019). 28 Jasmina Tešanović, The Diary of a Political Idiot. San 42 Diefenbach, p. 118. Francisco 2000. 43 Jakšić, From a Balkan Perspective. 29 Just to name a few: Dušan Veličković, Amor mundi. Amor 44 Ljubiša Rajić, Pravo na treće mišlenje, Vreme, No. 608, mundi: dani ratnog stanja u Beogradu: istinite priče, Bel- August 29, 2000, available at: https://www.vreme.com/ grade 1999; Vladimir Arsenijević, Meksico. Ratni cms/view.php?id=320922, 08.05.2019. dnevnik, Beograd 2000; Ljubiša Rajić: Dnevnik iz Beogra- 45 The debate is accessible online at the Vreme archive under da, Oslo 2000; Stojan Kaličanin: Ratni dnevnik. Dnevnik Vreme, Arhiva 2002, available at: https://www.vreme. zločina i užasa (sedamdeset i ocam dana Nato agresije na com/arhiva.php?year=2002, 08.05.2019. See also Latin- SRJ), Kraljevo 1999; Dragomir Antonić, Bombardovanje ka Perović, Tačka razlaza. Povodom polemike vođene na se nastavlja…, Belgrade 1999, Aleksandar Zograf, Bulle- stranicama lista “Vreme” od 1. Avgusta do 21. Novembra tins from Serbia etc. 2002. Belgrade 2004. 30 Let Civility prevail. A statement of concerned Serbian 46 Jasna Dragović-Soso, The Parting of Ways. Public Reck- citizens, April 16, 1999, available at: http://www.saran- oning with the Recent Past in Post-Milošević-Serbia, in: takos.com/kosovo/ks13civil.html, 03.02.2017. Timothy Waters (Ed.), The Milošević trial. An Autopsy. 31 Letter to Albanian Friends from Nongovernment Organi- Oxford 2012, p. 390-408, p. 405f. zations, War Resister’s International, April 30, 1999, 44 Southeastern Europe Media Wars

Media Wars

By Dejan Kožul

Though 20 years have passed, it seems as though it happened only yesterday -- not just because the events are relatively recent, but also because the rhetoric in both Serbia and Kosovo has not changed throughout this period. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the same political actors are still active and in decision-making positions. Still, even when actors from other, “democratic” parties were in charge during the past 20 years, the nar- rative about victims of “NATO aggression” was the same.

If we go by media coverage on both sides, a mistake.” “We will never agree with that - Serbia’s media emphasized the beginning our people are not a mistake,” said Vučić. of the bombing campaign, i.e. its anniver- The media acted in accordance, especially sary, whereas Kosovo’s media focused on outlets close to the ruling party. This is evi- celebrating the 20th anniversary of the end denced by a selection of titles which read as of the conflict. That is understandable, follows: “NATO Monsters!”, “All Serbs Were since former U.S. President Bill Clinton The Target”, “NATO Aggression Was A Crime”, graced this year’s celebrations with his “I Regret Bombing Serbian Children”, etc. presence, as did the former NATO Su- Since statistics are often arbitrary in this preme Allied Commander Wesley Clark, part of the world, they are prone to adjust- and former Secretary of State Madeleine ment and inflation. Suffice it to say that the Albright. Perhaps an unimportant but still exact number of casualties was unknown illustrative detail is that streets and monu- for quite some time, and only in 2014 did ments in Pristina have been dedicated to the Humanitarian Law Center publish a Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright, as the list of casualties of the NATO bombing of architects of Kosovo’s independence. FR Yugoslavia by name. On the 20th anniversary of the start of the According to this list, a total of 754 people bombing campaign of FR Yugoslavia, a cen- lost their lives in the NATO strikes, 454 of tral commemoration ceremony was held in whom were civilians, and 300 members of Belgrade, with all the most illustrious rep- the armed forces. Among the civilians, 207 resentatives of the Serbian people in attend- were Serbs and Montenegrins, 219 Albani- ance – those from Serbia and from abroad: ans, 14 Roma, and 14 civilians of other na- the President, Prime Minister, Serbian Gov- tionalities. A total of 274 members of the ernment Ministers, as well as Milorad Yugoslav Army or Police were killed, in Dodik, member of the Presidency of Bosnia addition to 26 members of the Kosovo Lib- and Herzegovina, Željka Cvijanović, Presi- eration Army. All in all, three times fewer dent of Republika Srpska, Irinej, Patriarch people than the President claimed. of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Russian Some of the titles refer to the fact that the and Chinese Ambassadors, etc. They were bombs dropped on the FRY were filled all in attendance when the President of Ser- with depleted uranium, but here too, they bia, Aleksandar Vučić said that the deaths merely repeated what had been said. of 2.500 civilians during the “NATO aggres- Slobodan Milošević’s party, the Socialist sion”, and especially the deaths of 79 chil- Party of Serbia, put out a statement on the dren “will always be a crime to us, and to matter, in which they point out that Opera-

Dejan Kožul, journalist them, even when they admit it, it is merely tion Merciful Angel (“Milosrdni anđeo” in Media Wars Southeastern Europe 45

Selected newspaper headlines from Serbian dailies on the 20th anniversary of the NATO military campaign: “Heroic Defense of Serbia”, “Moscow Will Defend Your Right to Kosovo and Metohija”, “I Regret Dropping Bombs on Serbian Children”, “The Entire Serbian People Was The Target”, “NATO Used Weather Warfare To Kill Us”, etc.

Serbian, the name the NATO action is incor- Justice Minister Vesna Mikić, who called rectly referred to in Serbia), left behind 15 the NATO intervention “a genocide”. Ra- tonnes of depleted Uranium, leading to 300 mush Haradinaj, Kosovo’s Prime Minister children per year being diagnosed with can- at the time, commented on this event on cer, and raising the cancer mortality rate by his Facebook page, and was quoted by 36% compared to 1998. Kosovar media: Even Politika, the longest-running daily “There is no room in the Government of newspaper in the Balkans, ran an article Kosovo and its institutions for individuals, titled “NATO Should Treat Our Citizens whatever their ethnic background may be, Diagnosed With Cancer, Civic Initiative who seek to disrupt our common Euro-At- Suggests”, and the Večernje Novosti even lantic values.” went a step further down the path of con- For the Serbian side, this decision was an- spiracy theories with the title “NATO Used other case in point that Ramush Haradinaj Climate Weapons to Murder Us.” needed Serbs who would be loyal to him. This has all served to foster mistrust of The signing of the Kumanovo Agreement, NATO. The Institute for European Affairs which marked an end to the conflict, as conducted a survey on public support for well as the bombing, holds a special signif- NATO integration, to coincide with the 20th icance for the Kosovo side, then as well as anniversary of the bombing, which found 20 years later, when former U.S President that as many as 79% of Serbian citizens op- Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Ma- pose NATO accession, and 64% would re- deleine Albright, and the former Supreme fuse to accept an apology from NATO for Allied Commander Wesley Clark attended the bombing. the commemoration. In Kosovo’s media, While media outlets in Serbia were trying to the whole affair was presented as the 20th find individuals from NATO who would anniversary of Kosovo’s liberation from open up and express their remorse, NATO Serbia, and the aforementioned guests representatives mostly spoke to Kosovar me- were hailed as heroes. dia, in general and terse statements, without Thus, the Koha Ditore quotes Bill Clinton a hint of remorse -- quite the opposite. as saying: “I am in love with Kosovo. It is Kosovo’s public broadcaster carried a quote the time I am most proud of.” from the U.S. Ambassador to Kosovo, Philip This event received lackluster coverage in Kosnett, who said that the U.S. supported the Serbian media, and even when they did strikes against the FRY 20 years ago, so as to comment on it, they merely quoted Marko put an end to the ethnic cleansing carried Đurić, Director of the Government’s Kosovo out by Slobodan Milošević, after all diplo- Office, who characterized the event as -be matic efforts had failed. ing an “ugly and cynical vampire ball.” The best illustration of the polarized views the two sides have of this anniversary is the Translated by Nemanja Georgijević example of the sacking of Kosovo Deputy 1 http://www.hlc-rdc.org/?p=34890 Contents

Kosovo – A Hostage Crisis 3 By Natalija Miletić

Introduction 4 By Marijana Toma

NATO Bombing: The Lesser of Two Evils – interview with Winfried Nachtwei 8 by Simon Ilse and Milan Bogdanović

The Kosovo Myth in Modern Serbia: Its functions, problems, and critiques 12 By Ivan Čolović

A Lesson in History 16 By Jelena Krstić

War Criminals Be Quiet, Victims Speak Up! 21 By Marigona Shabiu and Ivan Đurić

Born, Raised and Deported: Kosovo Roma children surviving in Serbia 25 By Anđela Milivojević

Rape as a Weapon in War 28 By Thomas Roser

The Kosovo Pressure Cooker: Kosovo Serbs between Belgrade and Pristina 31 By Tatjana Lazarević

Depleted Uranium: Between sensationalism and health hazard 35 By Elion Gerguri

The First Collateral Damage Was Democracy 39 By Elisa Satjukow

Media Wars 44 By Dejan Kožul Publication information

Publisher Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo

Publication date December 2019

Editor-in-Chief Natalija Miletić

Editorial Board Milan Bogdanović, Simon Ilse

Translation Nemanja Georgijević, Sanja Katarić

Language editing/ Proofreading James May

Layout/Typesetting Dušan Šević

Printed by Zeppelin Pro, Belgrade

Paper Art Paper, 125 gr/m2, Cover: Art Paper, 250 gr/m2

ISSN 2406-1824

Opinions expressed in the articles are those of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. All articles in this publication are subject to Creative Commons License CC BY-NC-ND 3.0