An Empirical Exploration of an Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

ASMLA: An Empirical Exploration of an Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

Arvin Khoshnood

Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 193 THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 193

ASMLA: An Empirical Exploration of an Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

Arvin Khoshnood ASMLA: An Empirical Exploration of an Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization Arvin Khoshnood

ISSN 0793-1042 June 2021

Cover image: Ahvaz at night, image by Darfash Kaviani via Wikipedia The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies is an independent, non-partisan think tank conducting policy-relevant research on Middle Eastern and global strategic affairs, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel and regional peace and stability. It is named in memory of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, whose efforts in pursuing peace laid the cornerstone for conflict resolution in the Middle East. BESA Perspectives are short pieces on timely and fundamental Israeli, Middle Eastern, and global issues. Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA associates. Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy summarize the papers delivered at conferences and seminars held by the Center for the academic, military, official, and general publics. In sponsoring these discussions, the BESA Center aims to stimulate public debate on, and consideration of, contending approaches to problems of peace and war in the Middle East. The Policy Memorandum series consists of policy-oriented papers. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author’s views or conclusions. A list of recent BESA Center publications can be found at the end of this booklet. International Advisory Board Founder of the Center and Chairman of the Advisory Board: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht Vice Chairman: Mr. Saul Koschitzky Members: Ms. Marion Hecht, Mr. Robert Hecht, Prof. Riva Heft-Hecht, Mr. Joel Koschitzky, Amb. Yitzhak Levanon, Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Mr. Robert K. Lifton, Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, Mr. Seymour D. Reich, Mr. Greg Rosshandler, Amb. Zalman Shoval, Amb. Norman Spector, Ms. Drorit Wertheim International Academic Advisory Board Prof. Ian Beckett University of Kent, Prof. Eliot A. Cohen Johns Hopkins University, Prof. Irwin Cotler McGill University, Prof. Steven R. David Johns Hopkins University, Prof. Lawrence Freedman King’s College, Prof. Patrick James University of Southern California, Dr. Martin Kramer Shalem College, Prof. Robert J. Lieber Georgetown University, Prof. Michael Mandelbaum Johns Hopkins University Research Staff BESA Center Director: Prof. Efraim Karsh Research Associates: Mr. Emil Avdaliani, Dr. Efrat Aviv, Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Bartal, Mr. Edwin Black, Dr. Yael Bloch-Elkon, Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Bouchnik-Chen, Brig. Gen. (res.) Moni Chorev, Dr. Edy Cohen, Dr. James Dorsey, Dr. Gil Feiler, Prof. Jonathan Fox, Prof. Hillel Frisch, Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Dr. Gabriel Glickman, Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, Dr. Eado Hecht, Dr. Tsilla Hershco, Dr. Doron Itzchakov, Dr. Alex Joffe, Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Mr. Yaakov Lappin, Prof. Udi Lebel, Dr. Alon Levkowitz, Prof. Ze’ev Maghen, Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Ambassador Arye Mekel, Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek, Mr. Amir Rapaport, Dr. Asaf Romirowsky, Col. (res.) Dr. Uzi Rubin, Prof. Jonathan Rynhold, Prof. Shmuel Sandler, Dr. Yechiel Shabiy, Dr. Eitan Shamir, Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, Prof. Shlomo Shpiro, Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum, Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos, Dr. Jiri Valenta, Dr. Albert Wolf Program Coordinator: Alona Briner Publications Editor (English): Judith Levy ASMLA: An Empirical Exploration of an Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ...... 5

1. Introduction ...... 6

2. Methods and Materials ...... 7

3. What Is Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism? ...... 7

4. What Is ASMLA? ...... 8

5. The Struggle over Khuzestan ...... 11

6. The Foundation and History of ASMLA ...... 13

7. Latest Developments ...... 14

8. ASMLA’s Use of Terrorism ...... 17

9. Ahwazna TV and the Promotion of Terrorism ...... 22

10. “Saudi Arabia’s Long Arm” ...... 24

11. Political Activities ...... 25

12. Front Organizations ...... 26

13. Conclusions ...... 28

NOTES ...... 30 ASMLA: An Empirical Exploration of an Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

Arvin Khoshnood

Executive Summary The Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) is an ethno-nationalist Sunni Muslim organization that strives to establish an independent Arab state, Ahvaz, within the borders of Iran. The group is active through various front organizations in Europe. Its armed wing, the Mohiuddin Nasser Brigade, has conducted several armed attacks inside Iran. Several of those attacks, especially those committed by the organization in its early days, killed civilians. In 2018, as part of the umbrella organization Ahvaz National Resistance, ASMLA claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack against a military parade in the city of Ahvaz that occurred on September 22. This attack resulted in 25 deaths and more than 60 injured, including many civilians. ASMLA’s two branches are headquartered in Denmark and the Netherlands. In 2020, Danish and Dutch authorities arrested three ASMLA leaders on suspicion of participation in terrorism and espionage on behalf of Saudi Arabia against Iran. The trial of the three began on April 29, 2021, and is still ongoing. This report, which is based on primary source materials issued by ASMLA, critically investigates the organization’s objectives, origins, and operations and draws the conclusion that ASMLA is an ethno- nationalist terrorist organization.

Arvin Khoshnood has extensively researched the Islamic regime’s domestic, foreign, and security policies and published research articles in Swedish as well as international journals. He holds degrees in political science, human geography, and intelligence analysis from Lund University in Sweden and is fluent in Persian. ASMLA: An Empirical Exploration of an Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

Arvin Khoshnood

1. Introduction The Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) is a separatist organization that aims to establish an independent Arab state in Iran’s oil-rich Khuzestan province and adjacent provinces. Due to internal conflicts, the organization split in two in 2015. They both use the same name, with one headquartered in Denmark and the other in the Netherlands. The focus of this study is ASMLA Denmark (hereinafter ASMLA), which drew wide attention from the world’s media in September 2018 after a terrorist attack in the city of Ahvaz in Iran. The purpose of the study is to critically investigate the organization’s objectives, origins, and operations in order to determine whether or not it is an ethno- nationalist terrorist organization. To the author’s knowledge, no in-depth research about this organization has yet been done, despite the security and foreign policy implications of the organization’s operations inside the European Union (in addition to Denmark and the Netherlands, ASMLA also operates in Sweden). The Danish and Dutch authorities conducted an investigation of the organization on suspicion of terrorist and espionage activities on behalf of Saudi Arabia against Iran, and ultimately brought charges against three ASMLA leaders. Their trial began on April 29 and is still proceeding. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 7

2. Methods and Materials A qualitative text analysis has been undertaken in this empirical exploration of ASMLA. The foundation of the research is built upon texts produced by ASMLA and published on its official website. These texts, the primary one of which is the group’s political platform, have been critically analyzed by studying their chains of argument. The paper examines what ASMLA says and what it omits, how it argues for the claims it makes, and on what premises its arguments are based. The primary sources also include information gathered from, inter alia, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, the Swedish Security Service, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Danish Radio and Television Board. Secondary sources in this study come from the academic literature and news reports. The secondary sources provide a definition of terrorism as well as a context for ASMLA’s activities and political views. 3. What Is Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism? Before discussing ASMLA in detail, we must define the concept of ethno-nationalist terrorism. Scholars agree that there is no blanket definition of terrorism, and every country has its own national laws that criminalize acts of terror. There are, however, general principles most scholars would accept concerning the definition of terrorism:1 Terrorists, be they individuals or organizations, pursue political objectives and use violence or the threat of violence to advance those objectives. They wish to cause a psychological impact beyond their proximate targets and create fear among the public. Terrorists do not make any distinction between combatants and civilians in their attacks. They also encourage others to carry out attacks against those people or institutions the terrorists have identified as targets. Ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations use violence, the threat of violence, and the stirring up of fear either to increase the autonomy of their ethnic group or establish an independent state within one 8 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization or several countries. Propaganda is an important tool in their effort to make a psychological impact. They use it to spread fear, but also to disseminate disinformation about the enemy with the aim of legitimizing their activities, encouraging others to carry out attacks, and presenting themselves as liberators and freedom fighters. Ethno- nationalist terrorists allocate substantial resources to identity and culture politics as a way of advancing their cause, improving their image, and engaging their social base in their fight. 4. What Is ASMLA? ASMLA is an ethno-nationalist organization that seeks to establish an Arab state within the borders of Iran. According to their political platform, they call their country Ahvaz and their people Ahvazi Arabs.2 Ahvaz is constituted primarily by the oil-rich Khuzestan province in southwest Iran, but also includes the entire Bushehr province as well as parts of the provinces of Ilam, Luristan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Koggiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, Fars, and Hormozgan. A total of around 14 million people inhabit these eight provinces. The total number of Iranian Arabs in all of Iran, according to a recent US Congressional Research Service Report, is 3.2 million—that is, 4% of the Iranian population of 80 million.3 ASMLA’s platform states that Ahvaz will be a democratic republican state respecting human rights, a place in which power can be transferred peacefully among different parties through free elections. However, ASMLA’s use of both the threat of violence and actual violence against civilians (see part 8 for more information), and the way Habib Yabor Kabi (a.k.a. Habib Nabgan), the leader of ASMLA, runs the organization, are contrary to the democratic principles ASMLA claims to cherish. In 2015, disagreements and power conflicts soared within ASMLA and the organization separated in two different groups. One is run from Denmark by Yabor Kabi (the focus of this study). The other was run by Ahmad Nissi from the Netherlands until he was shot in front of his home by Islamic regime terrorists on November 8, 2017. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 9

According to ASMLA Netherlands, one of the main reasons for the split was the leadership style of Yabor Kabi. ASMLA Netherlands describes him as an authoritarian and accuses him of using Machiavellian methods to dominate not only the organization but the entire Ahvazi movement.4 Similar allegations about Yabor Kabi can be found in witness interviews conducted by the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) in an espionage case against the Islamic regime in 2019.5 However, these interviews also indicate that some witnesses believe rival organizations contributed to the conflict within ASMLA. Media reports explain the separation as a consequence of a conflict pertaining to the role of the Saudis in the organization, and how Saudi financial support should be used.6 Regardless, this ethno-nationalist organization considers Ahvaz part of the “Arab Homeland” and thus expects other Arab countries to support its cause.7 To ensure support from Riyadh, ASMLA explicitly established its cause within the context of the proxy war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. ASMLA encourages the formation of an “Arab NATO” and hopes Arab states will take military action against Iran and the Islamic regime’s proxies in the Middle East. The group writes: While it can be interesting to predict future events, it is imperative that the next step and primary objective of the [Persian] Gulf States after hitting the Tehran regime’s proxies in Yemen and regaining Arab prestige must be to act to save Syria and Iraq from the clutches of Iranian interventionism. This can be most effectively achieved through the formation of an “Arab NATO” to work with the legitimate opposition and Sunni majorities, all of which have had their fill of the mullahs’ murderous occupation.8 In ASMLA’s view, the Iranians have occupied their land since 1925. Their enmity is therefore not specifically toward the Islamic regime, but against Iran as a nation state. ASMLA claims that its case is similar to, if not worse than, that of the Palestinians, and says the Islamic regime’s ”policies towards Ahwazi Arabs are every bit as racist, brutal 10 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization and inhuman as those of Israel towards Palestinians.”9 This quote also highlights ASMLA’s hatred of Israel.10 In order to create a sense of historical legitimacy for their objectives, ASMLA writes in its platform that the roots of Ahvazi Arabs go back to the ancient civilization of Elam. Establishing links with the Elamite civilization is one of the most important goals of ASMLA propaganda. It gives the people who identify as Ahvazi Arabs a historical and cultural identity, and provides justification for ASMLA’s attempts to describe Iran as an occupying and alien force. It also helps ASMLA engage its social base, which consists mainly of Iranian Arabs who feel discriminated against and oppressed by the totalitarian Islamic regime ruling Iran. The claim that Ahvazi Arabs have their roots in the Elamite civilization is incorrect and contrary to historical evidence. The same is true of the group’s claim that their land was occupied by Iran in 1925. These claims are examples of the kind of disinformation disseminated by ethno-nationalist organizations to legitimize their objectives. The people of Elam, the Elamites (a.k.a. the Khuzis, and hence the name of the Khuzistan province), were not Arabs.11 In fact, some scholars believe that Cyrus the Great, founder of Iran and the Achaemenid Empire and conqueror of the Elamites more than 2,500 years ago, might have had some Elamite roots himself.12 Khuzestan has been an integral part of Iran ever since that time, more than 2,500 years ago. Most of the Iranian Arabs settled in Khuzestan after the Muslim invasion of Iran in 638. Many ASMLA members, including leader Yabor Kabi, belong to the Banu Kab tribe, which emigrated to Khuzestan from the Arabian Peninsula in the seventeenth century.13 ASMLA is a Sunni Muslim organization. The group writes in its platform that Islam is an important part of Ahvazi Arab society. Hawra Ahmad Nissi, daughter of the murdered Ahmad Nissi (one of the founders of ASMLA and later the leader of ASMA Netherlands), believes the role of Islam in the organization increased when ASMLA began to cooperate with “some Arab states.” She adds that these states MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 11

(Saudi Arabia is likely the principal sponsoring state) “persuaded ASMLA to take on a religious Muslim identity.”14 The Sunni identity fits neatly into the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is being framed as a conflict between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. This affiliation helps ASMLA attract support from other Sunni Arab states. In its platform, ASMLA writes that the current religion of Iran is not true Shiism—that it is in fact an Iranian project that commenced during the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736) against the Arabs. In other words, in ASMLA’s view, the Shiites of Iran are not true Muslims, as their religion is the product of a Safavid project against Arabs. By using this type of discourse, ASMLA contributes to anti-Shiite sentiment. In the process, it makes it possible for ASMLA to cooperate with the Sunni extremist anti-Iranian terrorist organization Jaish Adl (Army of Justice).15 Jaish Adl has been designated a terrorist organization by the US government. 5. The Struggle over Khuzestan ASMLA is not the first ethno-nationalist organization to attempt to establish Ahvaz. The conflict goes back to the 1920s, when the British government tried to increase its influence in Iran, especially in the country’s south. At that time, Khuzestan was located on a vital communications route between Britain and its Indian colony, and it had (indeed, still has) access to immense natural resources. The British, who had longstanding relations with the strongman of Khuzestan, Sheikh Khazal ibn Jabir, saw an opportunity to dominate the region by supporting Khazal in a break from Iran. With British support, Khazal, who led the Banu Kab tribe, turned Khuzestan into a de facto British protectorate. According to Stanford professor Abbas Milani, Khazal was “an unabashed agent of the British government.”16 He protected British interests in Khuzestan and fought on the British side during the First World War despite Iran’s neutrality. For his services, the British government awarded him with the decoration of Knight Commander of the Indian Empire in 1910.17 12 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

The British plan for Khuzestan failed when the Iranian government arrested Khazal in 1925. Britain, fearing even worse relations with Iran amid the rising influence of Soviet communism, left Khazal to his fate but maintained contact with his family. (The British considered bringing Khazal’s family back to power in southern parts of Iran during the Second World War when British and Russian forces invaded Iran, and again during the 1950s when Iran nationalized its oil.)18 ASMLA official Rahim Hamid has described the British desertion of Khazal as a brutal betrayal. Hamid’s statement shows that ASMLA agrees with the historical facts about British support for Khazal’s separating of Khuzestan from Iran. He writes:19 Amir Khazal Al-Kaabi [= Sheikh Khazal ibn Jabir], the last ruler of Ahwaz during Iran’s 1925 invasion, was brutally betrayed by the British Empire, which had pledged its support to protect the Ahwazi Arab nation from imminent Persian invasion and occupation. The British vowed to provide military assistance for Ahwazi forces. In an act of depressingly familiar treachery, the British decided that their political interests wold be better served by siding with Iran’s rulers, disregarding the treaties with Amir Khazal and backing Iran’s military occupation of Ahwaz. From time to time, the separatists of Khuzestan have received support from Iran’s Arab antagonists, such as Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, for instance, provided the separatist Mohiuddin Nasser and his group with military support during the 1960s.20 The Iraqi Baathist Party (especially during the rule of Saddam Hussein) supported separatist organizations financially and militarily, and allowed them to organize operations from within Iraqi borders. With the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and the ensuing political crisis in the country, the Ahvazi separatists saw a new chance to achieve Ahvaz, but the new Islamic regime crushed the attempt. On September 22, 1980, Iraq commenced what would turn out to be an eight-year war against Iran, and Khuzestan became its primary target. But to the disappointment of Saddam Hussein, the Iranian Arabs stood by Iran against the Iraqi aggression. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 13

According to Associate Professor Rasmus Christian Elling of Copenhagen University, who has researched ethnicity and nationalism in post-revolutionary Iran, many Iranian Arabs supported Iran during the war, and today, many Iranian Arabs consider themselves Iranian nationalists. Elling states:21 Many Arabs I’ve spoken to say that, although they wish [for] considerably more autonomy and rights, they are not in favor of the idea of splitting with Iran. In fact, many of them are ardent Iranian nationalists, even if they are critical of the current political system in Iran. Thus you often hear Arab dignitaries in Khuzestan reminding the Iranian public of the huge price they paid for defending Iran against Iraq in the 1980-88 war between those countries. Despite what Saddam Hussein may have hoped for, there was no significant pro- Iraqi sentiment among Iran’s Arabs. 6. The Foundation and History of ASMLA After the Iran-Iraq war, Ahvazi separatists continued to strive for the independence of Ahvaz. In a way, they benefited from the Islamic regime’s brutal totalitarian rule. From the time of the establishment of the Islamic regime, the social, political, environmental, and economic situation of the Iranian people, not least the people of Khuzestan, had deteriorated significantly, and this facilitated the separatists’ activities. Rising dissatisfaction against the regime among Iranians helped the separatists recruit members and gain sympathizers. To improve the life of the Iranian Arabs, some Khuzestan locals founded the Islamic Reconciliation Party (IRP) in 1999, a party that cooperated with the so-called reformists within the establishment. The goal of the founders of IRP was to run in municipality elections and influence the politics of the province, especially in the city of Ahvaz. They had success in the municipal elections of Ahvaz in 1999, and in 2000 even succeeded in winning a seat in parliament. One of the main officials of IRP was Habib Yabor Kabi, who ran in the parliamentary elections without success. Ahmad Nissi (who later led ASMLA Netherlands) was also active in IRP. In 1999, Yabor Kabi and 14 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

Nissi, under the cover of doing legal work for IRP, covertly established ASMLA and its armed wing, the Mohiuddin Nasser Brigades. The group did not declare its existence publicly until 2005. In April of that year, a document marked “top secret” began to circulate that gave rise to protests in Khuzestan. The document was signed by Muhammad Ali Abtahi, then chief of staff of President Khatami, and was dated July 24, 1998. It was a directive that authorized Iranian governmental institutions to change the demographics of Khuzestan and reduce the number of Iranian Arabs in that province within 10 years. While the Islamic regime claimed the document was fabricated and that a chief of staff cannot issue directives, ASMLA actively encouraged people to protest. According to ASMLA, the Mohiuddin Nasser Brigades carried out several attacks connected to the protests and “delivered painful blows to many of the Persian state’s institutions.”22 Many people, including civilians, were killed or injured in these attacks (see part 8 for more information). In response, the Islamic regime banned IRP and designated ASMLA a terrorist organization. In spring 2006, the founders of ASMLA escaped from the UAE. In April of that year, Habib Yabor Kabi and Ahmad Nissi visited the US Consulate General in Dubai and asked for US help for the families they had left behind in Iran. They also asked for a meeting with representatives of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to provide them with information and gain their support for ASMLA.23 Ultimately, Yabor Kabi become a refugee in Denmark and Nissi in the Netherlands. 7. Latest Developments ASMLA reorganized in the European Union and committed several armed attacks in Khuzestan. But it was not until September 22, 2018 that the organization caught the attention of the world’s media. On that day, at 9:00 a.m. local time, four gunmen disguised in fake military outfits attacked a military parade in the city of Ahvaz that the regime had arranged in commemoration of the start of the Iran-Iraq war. In addition to the military personnel participating in the parade, the terrorists also targeted regular people and journalists who had gathered MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 15 to watch. The attack resulted in 25 deaths and more than 60 people injured, including many women and children. Soon after the attack, Jacob Muhamed (a.k.a. Yaqoub Hur Tostari and Yaghoub Nissi), spokesperson for ASMLA, claimed that the Ahvaz National Resistance, of which ASMLA is a significant part, was behind the terrorist attack. Muhamed, who claimed the attack was a legitimate operation, told Danish TV2:24 The Ahvaz National Resistance (ANR) takes responsibility for the attack. We are a coalition of different larger and smaller groups, where I am a spokesperson for ASMLA. It is ANR that is behind the attack. The reason we are taking responsibility [for the attack] is that Islamic State originally took responsibility [for it], but that is incorrect. The Islamic regime in Iran decided to respond to this attack by liquidating ASMLA’s leader, Habib Yabor Kabi. The assassination plan against him failed, however, when the Swedish Security Service (Säpo), in cooperation with its counterparts in Denmark and Norway, arrested one of the principal regime agents involved in the plan. On October 21, 2018, Säpo arrested Muhammad Davoudzadeh Loloei, a Norwegian-Iranian citizen, at Gothenburg’s Landvetter Airport on his returned from Iran, likely with instructions on how to proceed with the assassination. The Swedish authorities extradited him to Denmark, where, on June 26, 2020, he was convicted, sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, and expelled from Denmark for life.25 On February 27, 2019, Säpo arrested Raghdan Hraishawi, a Swedish- Iraqi citizen, on charges of spying on ASMLA on behalf of the Islamic regime. Hraishawi, who had spied on the organization at least since April 2015 in the disguise of a journalist, was convicted on December 20, 2019 by the Swedish court and sentenced to two and half years’ imprisonment.26 The events connected to ASMLA do not stop there. On October 30, 2018, a bit more than a month after the attack in Ahvaz, Finn Borch Andersen, head of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), 16 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization announced at a press conference that ASMLA was being investigated for approving the Ahvaz terrorist attacks.27 A week later, on the morning of November 7, PET raided several addresses in the Danish city of Ringsted and arrested Habib Yabor Kabi, Jacob Muhamed (Ahmad Nissi’s cousin and Yabor Kabi’s son-in-law), and Tamim Farouk Beck (Kabi’s brother, a.k.a. Nasser Yabor). All three were soon released, but PET continued to investigate ASMLA. On February 3, 2020, the Danish ASMLA trio was again arrested by PET, this time on charges that they were implicated in espionage on behalf of Saudi Arabia against persons and activities in Denmark and abroad during 2012-18.28 On June 10, 2020, the allegations expanded to include funding and promoting of terrorism in Iran as well as espionage concerning military affairs in cooperation with Saudi intelligence. PET said:29 The three leading members of ASMLA, who have been in remand custody since February 2020, will now be charged with having violated Section 114b and 114e of the Danish Criminal Code concerning financing and promotion of terrorism. The alleged offenses were committed between 2012 and 2018. At the same time, the charges will be expanded to include violation of Section 108(2) of the Danish Criminal Code concerning espionage in relation to military affairs. The offenses carry a maximum penalty of 12 years’ imprisonment. On April 15, 2021, the Danish Public Prosecutor announced that charges had been brought against the ASMLA trio and that court proceedings would start on April 29. On February 3, 2020, another ASMLA member was arrested in the Netherlands. The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) arrested Eisa Savari (a.k.a. Mehdi Fakher), one of the organization’s main TV personalities, on terrorist allegations. AIVD had found messages between Savari and his arrested colleagues in Denmark regarding terrorist attacks inside Iran against the Islamic regime’s armed forces, but also against banks.30 Savari was released from custody on January 15, 2021, but is still under investigation by the Dutch authorities. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 17

While the investigations into ASMLA in Denmark and the Netherlands were still ongoing, one of the organization’s leaders, Swedish-Iranian citizen Habib Chaab (a.k.a. Habib Alaswad), traveled to Istanbul on October 9, 2020, and subsequently disappeared. About three weeks later, the Islamic regime acknowledged that he was in their custody. On November 14, 2020, the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence (VAJA) aired a documentary showing Chaab confessing to several security crimes against Iran, from armed robbery to terrorism and collaboration with Saudi Arabia.31 These confessions, one of which concerned the Ahvaz attacks of 2018, were likely coerced. Chaab remains in Iranian custody and is at risk of being hanged. On December 14, the Turkish National Intelligence organization (MIT) revealed that Chaab had been lured to Istanbul by a woman with whom he was romantically involved. As it turned out, the woman was an agent of the Islamic regime who had infiltrated ASMLA. Upon his arrival in Turkey, Chaab was abducted and transported to Iran.3 8. ASMLA’s Use of Terrorism While the latest development concerning ASMLA came as a reaction to the terrorist attack in Ahvaz in 2018, that was not the first terrorist attack in which ASMLA was involved that brought about civilian casualties. ASMLA’s armed wing, the Mohiuddin Nasser Brigades, used explosives and machine guns in many attacks in Iran. The first known attack by ASMLA was carried out in Ahvaz in 2005 as a continuation of the protests there. At 10:30-11:00 am on June 12, bombs exploded in Ahvaz at the office of the governor, the management and planning organization, and other public institutions. They were timed to explode during office hours, a time when civilians visited those public institutions. The bombs killed seven to eight people and injured more than 70, among them many civilians.33 The ASMLA attacks that occurred before the group’s leaders escaped Iran came to a climax on January 24, 2006. On that day, ASMLA attacked the Saman bank in Ahvaz, arguing that the bank financed Iranian settlement projects in Ahvaz.22 A bomb exploded close to the 18 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization bank around 10:00 am local time, again during office hours. Initial media coverage reported at least eight dead and 46 injured. It is believed that 30-50 clients and 15 members of staff were inside the bank when the bomb went off.34 In 2018, ASMLA leader Habib Yabor Kabi reiterated that ASMLA does not consider Iranian banks civilian institutions because the regime exploits them against Iranian Arabs.35 This position is intended to justify and encourage attacks on banks, which, notwithstanding the regime’s alleged use of them, have civilian staffs and client bases. As mentioned, the Dutch authorities found conversations between the ASMLA member arrested in the Netherlands and those in Denmark regarding future attacks against banks. The organization was less active between the escape of its leaders from Iran in 2006 through the beginning of the 2010s. But after reorganizing in the EU, ASMLA resumed its armed struggle, claiming responsibility for several attacks on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s oil infrastructure.36 The 2018 Ahvaz attacks differed from those attacks, which mainly targeted the Islamic regime’s security personnel. The 2018 attacks targeted civilians in a similar way to the ASMLA attacks of 2005 and 2006. The switch to the more violent and brutal attack style in 2018 might be explained by the changing political climate in Iran and across the Middle East. In the wake of the 2009 countrywide uprising in Iran against the Islamic regime, more and more Iranians gave up hope that the regime can be reformed and joined the movement that endeavors to overthrow it entirely. This movement, which shows signs of Iranian patriotism (clearly visible during the countrywide demonstrations of winter 2017-18 and November 2019), not only shook the Islamic regime but alarmed ethno-nationalist organizations like ASMLA, as a popular movement of that kind works to their disadvantage.37 In the 2017-18 and 2019 protests, for instance, patriotic anti-regime slogans could be heard in many cities in Khuzestan, an indication that organizations like ASMLA are losing ground. One of the slogans that could be heard was “Rest in Peace Reza Shah,” the same Shah (and founder of the Pahlavi dynasty) who in 1925 ordered the arrest of Sheikh Khazal. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 19

To this should be added the intensifying proxy war between the Islamic regime and Saudi Arabia, where several anti-regime organizations compete for Saudi support. In view of this background, it can safely be concluded that the 2018 Ahvaz attack was a way for ASMLA and the Ahvaz National Resistance to attract the attention of dissatisfied people in Khuzestan, but also to draw support from Saudi Arabia and other states that are rivals of the Islamic regime. In addition to its own terrorist targeting of civilians and civilian institutions, ASMLA also incites others to commit terrorist acts. On August 17, 2017, ASMLA praised a terrorist attack against park rangers (non-combatants) in Khuzestan. ASMLA described the park rangers as “security officials known for committing acts of terror and blackmail against the Ahwazi people,” but provided no evidence to support that accusation.38 The park rangers are described by ASMLA as “occupation security” and “settlers,” while the attackers are described as members of a “resistance movement.” ASMLA’s article contains a photo of a young man wearing a keffiyeh (the traditional Arabic headdress) and holding a Kalashnikov. He is framed within a map of Ahvaz and with its flag in the background, a clear glorification of terrorism. The image also shows a severely injured park ranger in a hospital bed connected to medical devices. Encouraging, approving, and glorifying violence committed by others against civilians is also explicit in an ASMLA article published in 2015. In this article, ASMLA incites terrorist attacks against Iranians, whom it labels as “settlers,” no matter if they are civilians or combatants. It says (emphasis added):39 […] all Ahwazi citizens, without exception, are obliged to engage in resisting all forms of Persian settlement undertaken by Persian authorities without differentiation between any particular form of settlement, or Persian Military personnel, agriculturalists or pastoralists, or government employees settled in Arab Ahwaz. 20 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

The article provides instruction on how to “resist settlement and settlers”: 1. Boycotting settlers socially and severing all contact with them. 2. Economically boycotting settlers and their businesses. 3. Military confrontations with settlers. It goes on to reiterate the need to attack all Iranians on the grounds that they are all conspirators against Arab Ahwazis: At this decisive stage it has become imperative for all members of the National Ahwazi Resistance to join ranks in order to deliver the most powerful blow possible to Persian occupation, which includes Persian settlers, who have, ever since their arrival, acted and conspired against the Arab Ahwazi people. In explicitly inciting terrorist attacks against civilians, actions the group terms “military confrontations with settlers,” the article contributes to a state of fear among the people of Iran—especially Khuzestan locals who do not have an Arab background. The ASMLA article claims that “the settlers” are being armed by the Islamic regime against Ahvazi Arabs, which is entirely false. Regular citizens have not been, and are not being, armed by the Islamic Republic, especially considering that dissatisfaction among the people toward the regime is extensive. Armed civilians would represent an immense threat to the regime. Other acts of terrorism in which ASMLA is involved stem from its cooperation with Jaish Adl, which operates mainly in the Iranian province of Baluchistan. Jasih Adl attacks have brought about many civilian casualties, prompting its designation by the US government as a Sunni terrorist organization. The cooperation between ASMLA and Jaish Adl consists of more than political support. According to ASMLA, the two organizations coordinate their attacks against Iran, which means that ASMLA is (at least to some extent) an accomplice to crimes committed by Jaish Adl.40 Furthermore, according to a Danish news report, one of the arrested Danish ASMLA trio is accused of having financed operations of Jaish Adl.41 According to the report, he attempted in 2017 to raise MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 21

€5 million for anti-Iranian terrorist organizations both inside and outside Iran, suggesting that ASMLA probably cooperates with other like-minded organizations. It is clear that ASMLA, which operates from EU territory, is violating EU law by conducting, encouraging, supporting, and endorsing terrorism against Iran, including private citizens.42 ASMLA defends its acts of terrorism by stating in its political platform that it is waging an “armed struggle” against Iran. According to international law, armed struggle opposes colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes. There are several problems with this contention. Three main points make it explicit that ASMLA’s “armed struggle” is in reality nothing but terrorism: • By attacking civilians, encouraging attacks on civilians, and supporting terrorist organizations that target civilians, ASMLA violates the principle of distinction under humanitarian law.43 This principle demands that belligerents distinguish between civilians and combatants. Like most other terrorist organizations, ASMLA’s attacks are often (though not always) indiscriminate. This means ASMLA does not value the life of the Iranian Arabs it purports to represent, as many Iranian Arabs may have been present at the military parade in 2018, visited the Saman Bank in 2006, or visited the public institutions targeted in 2005. • The territory ASMLA claims is neither dominated by colonialists nor occupied by alien forces, meaning its political case is invalid according to international law. Iran’s borders are internationally recognized, and Khuzestan has been an integral part of Iran for thousands of years. In 1925, the Iranian government did not invade or occupy Khuzestan, but stopped Khazal’s (initially British- backed) attempt to detach the province from Iran. In addition, many Iranian Arabs, as noted by Elling, consider themselves Iranian nationalists, reject separatism, and reject the idea that Khuzestan is occupied by a foreign power. 22 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

• The Islamic regime is brutal, inhumane, and totalitarian, but it is not racist. The ideology of the regime is based on pan-Islamism (the idea of an Ummah), and within this ideology there is no room for racism or ethnic discrimination. In addition, the Islam that the Islamic regime in Iran claims to defend emerged in Saudi Arabia, the prophet and the Shiite Imams are all Arabs, and some regime officials claim to be seyed—that is, descendants of Islam’s Arab prophet. As far as the regime is concerned, anyone who opposes it and its ideology, no matter who the person is or what his background may be, constitutes a security threat and will be dealt with accordingly. The regime has indiscriminately murdered thousands of Iranians from different provinces to stay in power. 9. Ahwazna TV and the Promotion of Terrorism ASMLA runs a TV channel called Ahwazna from a studio in the Netherlands. The group uses the channel to disseminate fake news and disinformation about Iran, strengthen the Ahvazi Arab identity inside and outside Iran, and engage its social base. The channel’s programs demonstrate the importance of identity politics for ethno-nationalist organizations. According to ASMLA’s platform, the media must be used to support and promote the establishment of Ahvazi cultural institutions, raise awareness about the Ahvazi cause, produce songs and anthems about Ahvaz and the struggle for independence, reflect the history of Ahvaz, and encourage Ahvazi Arabs to adhere to Ahvazi Arab traditions. Jacob Muhamed, spokesperson for ASMLA and one of the trio arrested in Denmark, is Ahwazna’s executive director. The channel’s programs are broadcast via satellite and on the Internet. To administer the channel, ASMLA established a foundation on July 1, 2017 in Denmark called Ahwazna Fonden.44 Habib Yabor Kabi became head of the foundation and Jacob Muhamed, Tamim Farouk Beck, Habib Chaab, and Jonas Saeid Mohiseny (a.k.a. Saeid Hamidan) made up the rest of the board. Mohiseny, an Iranian-Swedish citizen, is the current president of ASMLA while Yabor Kabi and his colleagues are in custody. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 23

In addition to the activities mentioned above, Ahwazna TV is used by ASMLA to promote terrorism and depict terrorist attacks as legitimate acts of armed struggle against Iran. This was made clear from a verdict sent down by the Danish Radio and Television Board (DRTB) in 2020. On November 20, 2018, after media reports that ASMLA had been involved in the 2018 Ahvaz attacks, the DRTB decided to investigate Ahwazna. The Board announced its verdict on February 20, 2020.45 It was signed by Judge Elisabet Michelsen, president of the Court in Lyngby, who was appointed by the Danish Judges’ Association to serve at the DRTB and work on cases similar to the ASMLA case. DRTB said it had found approval and promotion of terrorism against Iran in, among other programs, an Ahwazna talk show called Kalama Kal Saif (The Word as the Sword). The program was broadcast less than one week after the 2018 Ahvaz attack. The show’s host, Eisa Savari, was arrested by the Dutch AIVD in February 2020. His guest on the show was ASMLA leader Habib Yabor Kabi. Both designated the attack as legitimate, glorified it, and praised the attackers. These acts, according to DRTB, go against Danish terrorism laws. DRTB stipulated in its verdict that Iran is recognized as a sovereign state by the international community and that ASMLA’s violent struggle against it thus constitutes terrorism. DRTB is thus the first governmental organization in the EU to have convicted ASMLA for terrorism. After the verdict, DRTB immediately withdrew Ahwazna’s broadcasting permits, which had been issued on November 6, 2017, and informed the Danish police of its findings. On November 13, 2020, Ahwazna Fonden underwent a forced dissolution and was marked bankrupt on the website of the Danish Business Authority. Despite all this, Ahwazna TV is still broadcasting. It is likely that Stichting Ahwazna, a new foundation registered in the Netherlands on November 24, 2018, now administrates the channel.46 24 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

10. “Saudi Arabia’s Long Arm” To register Ahwazna Fonden, ASMLA, in accordance with Danish law, invested around €40,000 in the foundation. This capital came from a source in the UAE, a fact that has given rise to speculation as to whether the payment was in fact made by Saudi intelligence in return for ASMLA’s cooperation.47 Although many details about the Saudi-ASMLA relationship, which involves both terrorism and espionage, are unknown, the Danish authorities have accumulated a colossal amount of compromising evidence. It was based on this evidence that Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Jeppe Kofod summoned the Saudi envoy in Copenhagen on June 10, 2020 to state the Danish government’s emphatic protest against the Saudi intelligence services’ support for ASMLA terrorism. According to a press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, the protest was “in response to information that three people from the ASMLA group are being charged with terrorism- related activities and have received funding from a Saudi intelligence service.”48 The press release quoted Jeppe Kofod as stating: The authorities announced very serious new charges today. The new charges make an already completely unacceptable case even more serious, and this requires a clear response. Today, the Danish side made it crystal clear to the Saudi ambassador that we will under no circumstances accept such activities, and our ambassador in Riyadh has repeated the same message directly to the Saudi authorities. I also intend to raise the matter with the Saudi Foreign Minister myself. According to a report from the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) based on information from PET and the Danish Prosecutor’s Office, ASMLA received or tried to receive about €2.6 million from a Saudi intelligence organization during 2012-18.49 The prosecutor states that these funds were to be transferred to individuals or groups for the purpose of carrying out terrorist operations against Iran. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 25

Hawra Ahmad Nissi, daughter of Ahmad Nissi, also provides some insight into the Saudi-ASMLA relationship. She claims that ASMLA is closely linked to Riyadh and has become one of its instruments against Iran in the ongoing proxy war between the two countries. On November 3, 2018, shortly after it became public that the Islamic regime had attempted to assassinate Yabor Kabi, Hawra claimed that “if it turns out that it is really the state of Iran that is behind this assassination attempt in Denmark, it is in fact Saudi Arabia’s long arm that they are trying to cut.”50 11. Political Activities While ASMLA’s political program stipulates that armed struggle is the organization’s main strategy to fight Iran and the Islamic regime, ASMLA is also active in the political arena. One of its political aims is to create an identity for the people the group calls Ahvazi Arabs, and Ahwazna TV is an important part of this effort. The group’s political activities are also designed to raise awareness about the cause and obtain international recognition. This is very important, as it can help ASMLA gain support abroad and legitimize its operations against Iran. Through its political work, ASMLA endeavors to depict its use of terrorism as lawful according to international law by presenting Iran as “occupiers” and the Islamic regime as “racists.” ASMLA’s political efforts consist, among other things, of arranging demonstrations and conferences against Iran around the world, especially in Arab countries. ASMLA believes its Arabic background may help it gain Arab support, especially during the ongoing proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In December 2016, for instance, ASMLA arranged a conference in Tunis at which Habib Chaab, then vice-president of the organization, encouraged Arab states to take military action against Iran.51 He raised the idea of establishing a provisional Ahvazi government in exile to coordinate the struggle, and hoped for Arab states’ support. The issue of a government in exile was also discussed at a conference in Copenhagen in November 2018, and can be deemed one of ASMLA’s 26 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization main political goals.52 A government in exile could be an important step toward attracting support from Iran’s antagonists, especially among the Arab states. Another conference took place in Cairo in September 2017 at which Habib Chaab reemphasized the importance of armed struggle against Iran and the support of Arab states to ASMLA in this regard. He reminded the assembly that Egypt’s Nasser had given machine guns to Arab separatists in the 1960s as a way of encouraging similar actions today.53 Events of various types and lengths have also been arranged in Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and the US. 12. Front Organizations ASMLA has formed a web of numerous front organizations that appear to be completely independent from ASMLA, but in reality are run by the group and promote its objectives and operations. These front organizations are a vital part of ASMLA’s structure, as they help it create propaganda and spread fake news and disinformation. One of ASMLA’s front organizations is the Ahwazi Organization for the Defense of Human Rights (AODHR). This organization describes itself as a “non-profit, non-governmental organization dedicated to the promotion and reinforcement of the principles and norms of human rights,” leaving out any information about its relationship to ASMLA.54 AODHR was registered in Denmark by Habib Yabor Kabi on September 6, 2017, but on August 30, 2018, the name of the organization was changed in the register of the Danish Business Authority to the European-Ahwazi Organization for the Defense of Human Rights.55 An organization with the same name as AODHR was also registered by Jonas Saeid Mohiseny in Sweden on September 7, 201756. Mohiseny (a.k.a. Hamidan), the current ASMLA leader while Yabor Kabi is in custody, has for at least a few periods been executive director of AODHR.57 MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 27

Kamil Alboshoka has also been executive director of AODHR.58 Alboshoka, a British national, is director of The Gulf-European Centre for Human Rights (GECHR), which he founded in the UK in 2018.59 GECHR claims, without mentioning its connection to ASMLA, that it is a “not-for-profit human rights center, publishing human rights news and articles to raise awareness of the plight of the people in the Middle East.”60 The organization condemned the arrest of the ASMLA members in Denmark and in the Netherlands and deemed the arrest of these “political activists” the product of “false Iranian allegations contradict[ing] human rights principles and European laws.”61 Another ASMLA organization is the Arabic-European Foundation for International Relations (AEFIR). Habib Yabor Kabi registered AEFIR in Denmark on January 24, 2017, but the organization ceased to exist on January 26, 2020.62 Again without mentioning ASMLA, AEFIR described itself as “a scientific, political and media center that, through its activities [and] publications, contributes to the development and deepening of Arab-European relations, specifically the European Ahwaz, in all fields and at all levels.”63 In the effort to attract scholars and create academic legitimacy for ASMLA’s objectives, Habib Yabor Kabi registered the Dur Untash Center for Strategic Studies (a.k.a. Dur Untash Studies Center, or DUSC) on August 30, 2018 in Denmark.64 DUSC claims to be “fully independent in its work and management of its research activity” and makes no mention that is controlled by ASMLA.65 The editor of DUSC is Rahim Hamid.66 Hamid is also a senior editor of the information center Ahwaz Monitor, which he co-founded. The center claims that its “primary objective is to provide an accurate, objective and honest picture of events in Ahwaz,” but it fails to be accurate or honest regarding its link to ASMLA.67 The list of ASMLA front organizations is long. Others include Ahwazna Forening (the Awazna Association), which was registered in Denmark in 2014 by Tamim Farouk Beck. This organization ceased to exist in May 2020. Jacob Muhamed registered Ahwaz Press and Ahwazian Pen Foundation for Culture and Media in Denmark in 2015 and 2016, 28 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization respectively. The first ceased to exist in December 2019 and the second in February 2020. Habib Chaab’s Ahwaziska Kulturföreningen-AKF (the Ahvazi Culture Association), which was registered in Sweden in 2008, is still listed as active, though Chaab is now in the custody of the Islamic regime. 13. Conclusions According to the definition of ethno-nationalist terrorism presented in this paper and the objectives and activities of ASMLA, it can be concluded that ASMLA is an ethno-nationalist terrorist organization. ASMLA uses the EU as a base from which to plan, sponsor, encourage, and coordinate terrorist attacks against Iran as a nation. The primary target of ASMLA is the Islamic regime, but its attacks have also been against civilians. ASMLA’s anti-Iranian and Sunni Islamic characteristics, which resemble those of the terrorist organization Jaish Adl, make the organization a perfect instrument for Saudi Arabia to use against Iran in the Iranian-Saudi proxy war—a war that has reached as far as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. It is apparent that ASMLA, besides being an ethno-nationalist terrorist organization, is also a significant tool for Saudi foreign policy. It is likely that in the post- Islamic regime era, Saudi support for ASMLA will stoke tensions between Riyadh and the new Iranian regime, as ASMLA terrorism is directed not only against the current Islamic regime but against Iran as a nation, including civilians. The same would apply to any other state supporting ASMLA as well. Supporting ASMLA and other ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations can be a dangerous game. It can backfire and force the Iranian people, dissatisfied though they may be with the Islamic regime, to gather behind it against foreign attempts to break off Iranian territories and thereby extinguish Iran. For the Iranian people, there is an important distinction between Iran and the Islamic regime. The first is their home, which they will defend however they can (as Iranians did against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War). The second is a brutal totalitarian regime many of them want to MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 29 get rid of (as shown in the winter protests of 2017-18 and the November 2019 protests). This difference should be given close attention by policy makers in countries that oppose the Islamic regime in order to avoid alienating the Iranian people, both now and in the future. The 2005 ASMLA attacks in Khuzestan, the attack on the Saman Bank in 2006 (which implicated ASMLA Netherlands), and the Ahvaz attack in 2018 are three explicit examples of the group deliberately targeting civilians. Moreover, ASMLA encourages terrorism by others, including against civilians and civilian institutions (e.g., banks and park rangers). The Danish Radio and Television Board has found ASMLA and Ahwazna TV guilty of promoting and glorifying terrorism. ASMLA’s encouragement of and participation in terrorism against civilians is indiscriminate in two ways: • ASMLA does not distinguish between civilians and combatants. • ASMLA does not distinguish between Iranian Arabs and non-Arab Iranians. Coordinating attacks with the terrorist organization Jaish Adl is another terrorist crime ASMLA commits. In addition to engaging in terrorism, ASMLA is politically active to achieve its objectives. The organization takes advantage of its satellite TV channel and the web of front organizations it has built over the past half decade to establish an independent Ahvaz. To reach this objective, ASMLA uses its organizational network to spread disinformation about Iran, the history of its cause, and its operations. Thus, ASMLA’s front organizations should be considered supporting organizations for ASMLA’s terrorist activities. ASMLA attempts to manipulate public opinion in order to legitimize its operations. It touts four primary falsehoods to justify its actions: 1) its claim to Elamite origins; 2) its claim that its land has been occupied by Iran since 1925; 3) its claim that the totalitarian Islamic regime is a racist regime; and 4) its claim that ASMLA’s violent acts are part of an armed struggle and are therefore permissible according to international law. It will be interesting to see if the three ASMLA leaders currently on trial in Denmark will be convicted for terrorism-related activities. NOTES

1. Byman, D., Byman, D., “The logic of ethnic terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 21 (2) (1998), 149-169; Hoffman, B., Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press), 2006; Jones, S. G., and Libicki, M. C., “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida,” RAND Corporation (2008); Sinai, J., “How to Define Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2 (4) (2008) 9-11; Addicott, J. F., Terrorism Law: Materials, Cases, Comments (Tucson: Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company), 2009; Schmid, A. P., "The Definition of Terrorism," in A. P. Schmid (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2011), 39- 157; Richards, A., Conceptualizing Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2015. .Political Programme), November 27, 2015) الربنامج السيايس ,ASMLA .2 3. Katzman, K., Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, Congressional Research Service Report, December 9, 2020. بيــان توضيحــي )1( صــادر مــن قيــادة الحركــة حــول األســباب ,ASMLA Netherlands .4 .October 21, 2015 ,التــي أدت اىل فصــل حبيــب جــرب. 21 5. Säpo, Attachment D, in Case B 2890-19, Stockholm: Stockholm District Court, December 20, 2019. 6. Delhaas, R., & Davidson, D., Terrorismeverdachte Delft eerder doelwit van Iraanse spionage, February 3, 2020. 7. ASMLA, Ahwaz is Part of the Arab Homeland; Seeks Self-Determination, November 25, 2018. 8. ASMLA, Arabs Must Stop the Iranian Advance and Save the Middle East, May 24, 2018. 9. ASMLA, #Ahwazna – Hundreds of Ahwazis Demonstrate in Brussels against Iranian Occupation’s Crimes, February 24, 2017. 10. ASMLA, #Ahwazna – The Threat of Ongoing Persian Settlement Policies in Al-Ahwaz, February 27, 2015; ASMLA, Arabs Must Stop the Iranian Advance and Save the Middle East, May 24, 2015; ASMLA, Iranian Intelligence Fabricates Evidence Again to Justify Executing more Ahwazi Activists, June 16, 2015; ASMLA, Iranian Regime Resettles Tens of Thousands in ‘Persian-only’ Settlements in Al-Ahwaz to Enforce Demographic Change, June 19, 2015; ASMLA, Iranian Occupying Authorities Spread Drugs to MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 31

Destroy Ahwazi Arab Society, July 12, 2015; Hamid, R., #Ahwazna – Iran’s “resistance” regime demolishes another Ahwazi Arab family’s home, attacks woman and sons with bricks, July 9, 2017. 11. Potts, D. T., The Archaeology of Elam: Formation and Transformation of an Ancient Iranian State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2004; “Elam,” Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia (New York: Columbia University Press), 2020. 12. Potts, D. T., “Cyrus the Great and the Kingdom of Anshan,” In V. S. Curtis & S. Stewart (eds.), Birth of the Persian Empire: Volume I (London: I. B. Tauris), 2005. 13. Abu-Hakima, A. M., “Banu Kab,” Encyclopaedia of Islam (2 ed.), 2012; Savory, R. M, “Khuzistan,” Encyclopaedia of Islam (2 ed.), 2012. 14. Skyum, S. B., & Seidelin, M, Min far var iransk modstandsleder og blev myrdet, October 21, 2018. 15. ASMLA, #Ahwazna – Following Arab Operation against Iranian Oil Pipeline, Baluchi Fighters Kill, Injure Dozens of IRGC in Ambush Operation, January 8, 2017. 16. Milani, A., The Shah (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2011, page 17. 17. The editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Khazʿal Khan,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2020. 18. Milani, A., The Shah (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2011. 19. Hamid, R., Understanding the Iranian occupation of Al Ahwaz and the struggles of these oppressed people, September 14, 2015. 20. ASMLA, Cairo Hosts 1st Symposium Exposing Iranian Expansionism in Arab world, September 23, 2017. 21. Quoted in Esfandiari, G., Poverty, Separatism, And Bloody Memories Of War: Why Iran’s Khuzestan Matters, September 28, 2018. 22. ASMLA, #Ahwazna – Project for the Settlement of “Lor and Bakhtiyari” Tribes in Al Ahwaz, December 17, 2014. 23. US Consulate General Office, Situation in Iran’s Khuzestan and Requests for Support, Published by Wikileaks, April 4, 2006. 24. Søe, Carl-Emil, Iransk talsmand i Danmark hyldede terrorangreb på tv, September 23, 2018. 32 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

25. Roskilde Court, Dom, in Case 9-2075/2020, Roskilde: Roskilde Court, June 26, 2020. 26. Stockholm District Court, Dom, in Case B 2890-19 (December 20), Stockholm: Stockholm District Court, December 20, 2019. 27. Ritzau, Truede iranere efterforskes for terrorbilligelse, October 30, 2018. 28. PET, Ledende ASMLA- medlemmer anholdt for spionage i Danmark på vegne af Saudi-Arabien, February 3, 2020. 29. PET, Nye sigtelser: Ledende ASMLA-medlemmer sigtes for finansiering og støtte af terror, June 10, 2020. 30. Davidson, D., Delhaas, R., & Versluis, J, Hoe een Iraans-Saoedisch conflict naar Nederland kwam, October 17, 2020; Delhaas, R., & Davidson, D., De Iraanse schaduwoorlog van Ringsted tot Rijswijk, May 20, 2020; Public Prosecutor Office, Dagvaarding van verdachte, in Case 10/960177-19. Rotterdam: Public Prosecutor Office, April 17, 2020. .November 14, 2020 ,مستند فرجام جنایت ,VAJA .31 32. TRT World, Turkey says Iranian intelligence behind kidnapping of dissident Chaab. December 17, 2020. 33. Fathi, N., 7 Bombings Shatter Iran’s Pre-Election Calm, Killing 10. 13 June 13, 2015; ASMLA, #Ahwazna – Project for the Settlement of “Lor and نگاهــی بــه ,.Bakhtiyari” Tribes in Al Ahwaz, December 17, 2014; Ghadimi, A .June 7, 2017 ,حــوادث امنیتــی ایــران در ســه دهــه اخیــر 34. Esfandiari, G., Iran: President Cancels Trip As Explosions Rock Southern City, January 24, 2006. 35. ASMLA, Head of ASMLA Hails the Latest Attack on Regime Oil Facilities, March 1, 2018. 36. ASMLA, Iranian Forces on High Alert in Ahwaz as Rebels Target IRGC HQ Building. August 3, 2016; ASMLA, One Iranian Occupation Soldier killed in Ahwazi Resistance Attack on Checkpoint. September 8, 2016; ASMLA, #Ahwazna – Ahwazi Resistance Target Revolutionary Guards Regional HQ in Ahwaz, many Casualties Reported, January 10, 2017; ASMLA, #Ahwazna – Video: Ahwazi Freedom Fighters Destroy Two Major Iranian Oil Pipelines, January 3, 2017; ASMLA, In New Blow to Iran Regime, ASMLA Brigades Hit Major Oil field in Ahwaz, February 27, 2018. 37. Khoshnood, A., “Terrorism och desperation – när en nationalistisk våg av protester sköljer fram i Iran,” Orientaliska Studier, 157 (2019), 16-31. MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES I 33

38. ASMLA, Resistance Movement Targets Security Patrol in Amidyah, Causalities Reported, August 16, 2017. 39. ASMLA, #Ahwazna – The Threat of Ongoing Persian Settlement Policies in Al-Ahwaz, February 27, 2015. 40. ASMLA, #Ahwazna – Following Arab Operation against Iranian Oil Pipeline, Baluchi Fighters Kill, Injure Dozens of IRGC in Ambush Operation, January 8, 2017. 41. Foght, T., & Fastrup, N., Alvorlig mistanke: Ringsted-iranere fik millioner fra Saudi-Arabien til terrorvirksomhed, June 11, 2020. 42. European Union, Fight Against Terrorism – Definitions of Terrorist Crimes and Support to Victims, March 15, 2017. 43. See Article 13(2) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). 44. Danish Business Authority, Ahwazna Fonden, January 9, 2021. 45. DRTB, Afgørelse vedørörende tilsyn med Ahwazna Fonden, February 20, 2020. 46. OpenCorporates, Stichting Ahwazna, December 4, 2019. 47. See Esfandiari, G., Poverty, Separatism, And Bloody Memories Of War: Why Iran’s Khuzestan Matters, September 28, 2018; Toft, E., Nævn undersøger, om eksiliranere har opfordret til had og terror, December 6, 2018; Wivel, K., Staghøj, M., & Hattens, L., Spioner i provinsen, February 6, 2020. 48. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Jeppe Kofod: Terrorrelaterede aktiviteter på dansk jord er en markant skærpelse af en i forvejen alvorlig sag, June 10, 2020. 49. Foght, T., & Fastrup, N., Alvorlig mistanke: Ringsted-iranere fik millioner fra Saudi-Arabien til terrorvirksomhed, June 11, 2020. 50. Jung, E., & Bjørnager, J. A., Myrdet iraners datter: »Vi spørger os selv, hvem bliver den næste?«, November 3, 2018. 51. ASMLA, #Ahwazna – Tunis Conference Shows Arab Solidarity with Ahwaz Growing Steadily, December 5, 2016. 52. ASMLA, Ahwaz is Part of the Arab Homeland; Seeks Self-determination, November 25, 2018. 34 I ASMLA: An Ethno-Nationalist Terrorist Organization

53. ASMLA, Cairo Hosts 1st Symposium Exposing Iranian Expansionism in Arab world, September 23, 2017. 54. AODHR, About Us, 2020. 55. Danish Business Authority, Eurpean-Ahwazi Organization for the Defence of Human Right, December 22, 2020. 56. Allabolag.se, Ahwazi Organization for the Defence of Human Rights, June 1, 2020. 57. Hamid, R, Deadly sewage threatens millions of Ahwaz Arab people, January 23, 2016. 58. AODHR, Ahwaz human rights conference underline need for global solidarity as protests spread in region following another fatal shooting, February 14, 2017. 59. OpenCorporates, The Gulf European Centre Ltd, November 14, 2020. 60. GECHR, About Us, April 25, 2018. 61. GECHR, GECHR condemns arrest of Ahwazi political leaders, activists in Denmark, the Netherlands, February 8, 2020. 62. Danish Business Authority, Arabic-European Foundation for International Relations, December 22, 2020. 63. AEFIR, About Us, August 30, 2017. 64. Danish Business Authority, Dur Untash Center for Strategic Studies, December 25, 2020. 65. DUSC, About Us, 2020. 66. Fair Observer, Rahim Hamid, 2019. 67. Ahwaz Monitor, About Us, June 22, 2016. Recent BESA Center Publications Mideast Security and Policy Studies

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