Disarming and demobilising child soldiers:

The underlying challenges

Mark Malan Peace Missions Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretorai

Published in African Security Review Vol 9 No 5/6, 2000

INTRODUCTION

The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers believes that more than 120 000 children under 18 years of age are currently participating in armed conflicts throughout . Some of these children are no more than seven or eight years old. The countries most affected by this problem are Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), , Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Uganda.

In these countries, children are recruited by government armed forces almost as a matter of course. Some children do volunteer to join the armed forces, but tens of thousands are forced to join, sometimes at gunpoint. In situations of armed conflict, wherever governments have recruited and used children as soldiers, so have armed opposition groups. Just as certain African governments have chosen to violate national laws, so opposition groups have flouted public declarations and pledges not to recruit and use children in combat.1

As far as West Africa is concerned, Liberia and Sierra Leone have been by far the most problematic areas. While the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) do not officially recruit any person below the age of 18, the country has a legacy of seven years of in which all factions recruited thousands of children. According to the final figures, out of a total number of 21 315 combatants who were demobilised, 4 306 were child soldiers. Many youths remain traumatised and some are still addicted to drugs. There are also allegations that children continue to be recruited into the AFL, and that they are treated in the same way as they were in wartime.

Even though there is no fully-fledged armed conflict, Liberia is still very much in the grip of insecurity and the daily threat of violence is pervasive. Liberia has been accused by the United Kingdom, the United States and, more recently, in a UN report of supporting the rebels in Sierra Leone, though this has been denounced by the Liberian authorities.2

Sierra Leone has one of the world’s worst records for recruiting children as soldiers. Eighteen years has been set as the minimum age of recruitment for the new army of Sierra Leone. Between 1992 and 1999, however, it is estimated that between 4 500 and 10 000 children were involved in different categories of combatants with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).3 As late as November 1998, it was estimated that 3 000 children were living in the bush with the RUF.4 It has also been estimated than one-third of all underage soldiers in Sierra Leone are girls.5

The extent of the problem of child soldiers in West Africa has been well- documented. However, the problem of child soldiers brings together two of the most challenging aspects of contemporary peace missions: micro- disarmament of former combatants and dealing with children who have been combatants. In particular, what are the generic problems of micro- disarmament? What are some of the perennial problems of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration — as these relate to children who have been involved as combatants? A discussion of such issues can highlight some of the more pertinent and practical recommendations for improving the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of children.

DISARMAMENT CHALLENGES IN AFRICAN PEACE MISSIONS

The ready availability of light weapons in post-conflict societies is widely recognised as a primary contributor to violence, violent crime and even a return to war. Arms management and micro-disarmament have therefore been recognised as key dimensions in all contemporary peace missions.

All weapons in circulation are seldom collected at the end of an armed struggle. The conditions of insecurity that prevail in countries in transition (which are either entering the final stages of a collapsed state, or emerging from anarchy and war) are fertile ground for the maintenance and acquisition of light weapons and small arms by the community at large. Physical security and economic needs are the fuel that keeps the trade in small arms moving. This trade no longer requires a new influx of weapons to be destabilising; there is a constant movement of massive existing stocks in ever-widening circles of distribution.

In states emerging from conflict, the ownership of weapons not only has a security and primacy motivation, but also one based on economic imperatives. Impoverished groups of people, insecure about their own potential for economic development and survival, utilise weapons as if they were cheque books: robbing to cover basic needs and/or exchanging guns for money or goods. Many regions in Africa are now awash with illicit weapons — in some cases, even after extensive international peacekeeping efforts that are considered both successful and unsuccessful.

The success story of new generation peacekeeping in Africa is undoubtedly that of Mozambique. Estimates of weapons imported to this country during the civil war range from 0.5 million to 6 million. During the peacekeeping operation (ONUMOZ, 1993-1995), nearly 190 000 weapons were collected. However, most of these weapons were not destroyed and soon found their way back onto the streets of Maputo or into neighbouring states.6 This obviously has very serious implications for regional security, and great efforts are being made by Mozambique, in collaboration with regional partners, to clean up the mess.

In Angola, the situation is obviously much worse. Here, the ‘peacekeeping’ environment since UN engagement in 1991 has been described as:

"an amorphous condition of neither war nor peace ... an exhausting series of war, peace agreement, demobilisation, lack of war, threats of war, lack of peace ... a permanent bleeding and rape of people and resources."7

Throughout the peacekeeping engagement, however, the UN never publicly assigned blame for the many violations of the peace accords and Security Council resolutions. This appeared to have been the official policy since the first incomplete demobilisation of 1991/92, with the UN accepting excuses for not handing over territory, not presenting fighters, not relinquishing weapons, and repeatedly missing deadlines.8

On the other hand, UNAVEM III only had a mandate to verify, monitor, supervise and assist with relevant aspects of the peace process. These included:

• the withdrawal, quartering and demobilisation of UNITA forces; • the collection and storage of UNITA armaments; and • the movement of government forces (FAA) to barracks.

It is because of the failure by the parties involved to comply with these critical elements of the UNAVEM mandate that the FAA and UNITA remained ready to transform the ‘not crime-not war’ environment into one of open armed conflict, and to make a mockery of the international community’s seven-year investment in the Angolan peace process.

It is now virtually impossible to estimate the number of available weapons in Angola. It was reported that, in 1992, 700 000 weapons were distributed to civilians by the government following the resumption of fierce fighting. During the demobilisation component of the most recent UN peacekeeping operation (UNAVEM III), only 34 425 weapons were collected, of which many were old and unserviceable. Combined with the small number of police and soldiers who were demobilised, this indicated that most weapons and soldiers were kept outside of the peace process. Without a doubt, the continued availability of small arms in Angola contributed directly to the resumption of the civil war in the country, as it did to the war in 1992.9

Many have argued that UNAVEM III should have had a more robust disarmament mandate, but the reluctance of the Security Council to provide both the mandate and means for coercive disarmament was strongly influenced by the experience in .

In Somalia, general disarmament was seen as a key element of the peace process, but the task was hopelessly underestimated, and there was no clear concept for such large-scale operations. A planning committee drawn from UNITAF and UNOSOM II proposed that the disarmament process should be "continuous and irreversible" with a "standardised and simple process" used to disarm all factions.10

Attempts by UNOSOM II (which took over from UNITAF in May 1993) to implement disarmament were far from ‘standardised’ and ‘simple’, and they led to increasing tensions which culminated, on 5 June 1993, in a series of armed attacks by Somali militia against UN troops throughout south Mogadishu. As a result, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were reported missing and 54 were wounded.

UNOSOM II subsequently initiated action on 12 June 1993, conducting a series of air and ground operations in south Mogadishu. The objective of the action, according to the UN Secretary-General, was to restore peace in Mogadishu so that the political reconciliation, rehabilitation and disarmament process could continue to move forward throughout Somalia.

In support of UNOSOM’s coercive disarmament programme, the US deployed Rangers and Quick Reaction Forces (under US command and control) in Mogadishu. On 3 October 1993, the Rangers launched an operation aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aidid who were suspected of complicity in attacks on UN personnel and facilities. During the operation, 18 US soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. Several hundred Somali’s were killed during the fighting. The bodies of the American soldiers were subsequently subjected to public acts of outrage, and the humiliating scenes were broadcast around the world.

Within days, President Clinton sent reinforcements and set a pullout date for his troops. According to Bowden: "No single event has done as much to influence peacekeeping in the post-Cold War world as the Somalia intervention. In the five years since the humanitarian mission dissolved into combat, Somalia has had a profoundly cautionary influence on American foreign policy."11 By 28 March 1995, the complete withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops had been effected, with few of the mandate objectives of UNOSOM II achieved.12 Ever since, there has been little stomach in Western circles for the notion of coercive peace support operations in Africa. Moreover, the UN seminar on lessons learned from the operations in Somalia concluded, inter alia, that a UN force is unsuited for non-voluntary disarmament and demobilisation.13

For West Africa, the disarmament component of the UNAMSIL mission in Sierra Leone has gotten off to a shaky start. The UN peacekeepers have deployed into a tense and volatile security situation where cease-fire violations have included ambushes against civilians and UN personnel, the maintenance of illegal roadblocks, RUF troop movements, and the denial of freedom of movement for the peacekeepers.14

Although the total number of disarmed combatants stood at 17 191 on 1 March 2000, there is concern over the low quality of surrendered weapons and the ratio of collected arms to the number of former combatants. Many fighters have reported for demobilisation only with ammunition or hand grenades.15

Indeed, it is not entirely clear who is doing the disarming — UNAMSIL or the belligerents. In January, peacekeepers from Kenya and Guinea were reported to have surrendered at least 110 assault rifles, several rocket-propelled grenade launchers, four armoured personnel carriers, communications equipment and other military gear in at least three ambushes by former soldiers and elements of the RUF army.

In each incident, the troops offered no resistance. A contingent of more than 100 well-armed Guinean soldiers surrendered the largest arms stockpile to date to a far smaller group of rebels on 14 January 2000. UN officials said that the Kenyans were severely outnumbered in two ambushes, while the Guinean troops had not yet come under UN command. The Guineans were en route to Freetown to begin their UN assignment when they were stopped at a rebel roadblock. Apparently under orders from their government to avoid combat, they put up no resistance.16 On 18 January, RUF rebels at Makeni also disarmed and detained 14 ECOMOG soldiers who were providing an escort for humanitarian staff of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who were on their way to collect child combatants in Kabala.17

TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT REGIME?

In response to the above and other incidents, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1289 on 7 February 2000, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that: "authorises UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfil … [its] tasks … and affirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and … to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence …"18 Resolution 1289 thus provides the legal framework for coercive action by UNAMSIL in pursuit of its disarmament mandate. But can this be translated into assertive action on the ground? Two general conclusions in this regard were reached in an extensive series of case studies on disarmament undertaken within the peace process by the UN Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR): firstly, when peace enforcement is an option (as in UN- sanctioned regional or coalition operations), significant leverage can be applied to achieve the disarmament mandate; and secondly, when peace enforcement is not an option, the UN nevertheless retains important and potentially effective sources of leverage for implementing disarmament — as long as forces are properly supported and employed.19

As part of peace enforcement, properly employed military leverage can contribute by: • taking crew-served and individual weapons out of circulation that pose a direct threat to the peace support and humanitarian elements;

• helping to limit the use of weapons that are retained by the parties (since it is wishful thinking to believe that all the weapons can be collected);

• providing an alternative source of security for people caught up in a conflict (a moral imperative when encouraging people to give up their weapons); and

• using force judiciously to coerce compliance by recalcitrant factions (the most contentious of the recommendations).20

On the other hand, even in the absence of the ability to play a coercive role, UN peacekeepers have other sources of leverage, such as:

• a reputation for objectivity in monitoring agreements and reporting accurately on violations of such agreements (which deters would-be cheats and reassures compliant parties);

• the ability to elicit co-operation from a population that is weary of war and rule by the gun;

• the ability to solicit the support of outsiders for disarmament through putting pressure on their allies among the parties, limiting arms- smuggling across their territories, and refusing sanctuary to belligerents;

• playing the ‘CNN card’, or threatening to expose ill-will, non-compliance and inhumane behaviour to the ‘court of international public opinion’; and

• offering assets at their disposal (pecuniary or otherwise) to individual belligerents in exchange for their guns.21

Daniel has warned, however, that such sources of leverage come to naught, unless peacekeepers are adequately supported and the mission properly executed. This implies that the following four basic rules must be applied:

• Peacekeepers must have the resources and determination to do the job and must ensure that the parties understand this.

• UN forces should absolutely minimise the amount of time it takes to deploy an effective monitoring and reporting capability.

• Peacekeepers must act decisively immediately upon arrival and respond firmly to challenges.

• Peacekeepers must act and respond uniformly to challenges.22 Although UNAMSIL has missed the boat on all four these points, the Secretary-General is obviously aware of their importance. In his latest report to the Security Council on UNAMSIL, Annan states that: "One of the main priorities for the United Nations in Sierra Leone remains the speedy establishment of a credible peacekeeping presence throughout the country to create the necessary climate of confidence and security conditions for the implementation of various aspects of the peace process."23 The Secretary-General also predicted that the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process should be accelerated through a flexible and ’results-oriented approach’, provided that UNAMSIL can be deployed throughout the country and provide security for former combatants of all factions in an equal and impartial manner.24 This accords with the UNIDIR case study on disarmament in Liberia, in which Adibe concludes that: "It is necessary to emphasise again that disarmament involves a need for individual security which disarmers have been reluctant to assume."25 However, the notion of UN peacekeepers providing security through coercive disarmament and mandate enforcement defies the lessons of historical experience. For example, the UN seminar on lessons learned from the operations in Somalia concluded, inter alia, that a UN force is unsuited for non-voluntary disarmament and demobilisation.26

The UNAMSIL operation is therefore very much a test case for the new UN affirmation to do things with conviction, and the lessons learned from this West African ‘experiment’ will need to be well-heeded by those who support the UN deployment in the DRC. In this highly volatile security environment, the Security Council has tasked the proposed 5 500-strong MONUC force to protect UN and Joint Military Council personnel, as well as civilians. Operative paragraph 8 of Resolution 1291 states that the Council: "Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."27 There is an emerging trend for the Security Council to invoke Chapter VII powers for the protection of civilians and the disarmament of combatants. This provides evidence of some recognition that force may be necessary to ensure compliance when consent crumbles at the tactical level. All disarmament commitments in peace processes have tended, at least at the outset, to be based on consensus — regardless of whether the external forces deploy under a Chapter VI or VII mandate. However, the idea of voluntary disarmament is soon challenged by issues such as the security concerns of disarming combatants and the deficient troops-to-task structure of peace support forces.

Under such circumstances of eroding consent to disarmament, a strategy of ‘compellence’ provides an alternative to passivity by peace support forces. Compellence is defined as "a show of force within the confinements of peace support missions that operate under the strategic consent of the parties." The enforcement of weapons control and disarmament is thus seen as conceivable from the bottom up, whereas consent must be preserved from the top down.28

The UNIDIR report highlights the need for peace support forces with a disarmament mandate to be provided with the doctrinal, political and military discretion to pursue a strategy of compellence. The latter should be guided by the following three recommendations:

• Peace support forces need to combine trustbuilding with the threat to take action against non-compliant conduct. However, the credibility of threats against non-compliance can only be achieved by a ‘heavy’ military presence, combined with the political resolve and operational capability to respond swiftly to violations.

• As the security dilemma of disarming soldiers is the foremost obstacle to voluntary disarmament, peace support forces have to be prepared to provide a minimum level of security to the parties and local population in the area of application of disarmament. (Somalia and Srebrenica have shown that, if this is not possible, it may be better not to pursue disarmament at all).

• At both the strategic and tactical levels, disarmament should be carried out within a clear normative framework that enables all concerned to distinguish between compliance and cheating, thereby reducing the occurrence of ‘grey area’ situations. It may be necessary for sector commanders to negotiate subsidiary disarmament agreements and possibly communicate expected penalties in the case of non- compliance.29

These recommendations obviously place a very heavy decisional burden on sector commanders — and indeed, all commanders at operational level. However, the challenges of getting disarmament right are as much political as they are operational. As Cox has noted: "Until the UN finds a way between the hollow invocations of Chapter VII to which the Security Council is now prone, and acceptance that any recalcitrant party can sabotage a mission by withdrawing its consent, the frustration of complex UN peacekeeping operations, especially in regard to disarmament, is likely to continue."30 Unfortunately, until the political and operational level issues are resolved, and micro-disarmament is seen to be working effectively during peace processes, there will be little enthusiasm in decisionmaking and doctrinal circles to address the unique issues concerned with the disarmament and demobilisation of child combatants. Hopefully, in-depth debate will help to change this, and holistic solutions to challenges in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration initiatives will be sought through the development of child and gender-oriented thinking that translates into principle, policy and practice.

DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION OF CHILDREN

The doctrinal lacuna regarding child soldiers is very apparent. UN and regional peacekeeping forces have had to confront many situations involving child soldiers and child victims, but have at times demonstrated an inability to react appropriately and in accordance with international standards. Volatile and dangerous circumstances, vague mandates and rules of engagement, and a lack of training have produced some lamentable encounters between peacekeepers and youth.

In Liberia, for example, ECOMOG troops were engaged for a number of years in combat operations against factions comprising child soldiers — some as young as six or seven. In the process, they confronted and killed child soldiers in combat, and detained and committed abuses against child combatants and suspected faction members.31 This example is not intended to condemn ECOMOG forces, but rather to reinforce the point made previously — that it is difficult to focus with much empathy on the issue of children in armed conflict in a situation that involves ongoing combat against youthful warriors.

It is also difficult to link disarmament to longer term demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration needs where the primary need is for conflict termination or stabilisation operations. As Cohn has observed: "In a foreshortened peace process that aims primarily to stop the guns, as in Liberia, the most conscientious children’s rights activists will be at a loss to intervene."32 Here the peace process was intended principally to end hostilities and enable the semblance of democratic transition. The peacemakers did not make substantive post-war commitments, and they did not provide for an oversight mechanism to monitor progress with peacebuilding.

At the operational and tactical levels, there are indeed legal obligations placed on peacekeepers when encountering child soldiers. The fourth Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols I and II include rules governing the recruitment and participation of youth in hostilities, their treatment when detained during conflict, and the status of youth who actually take up arms. Thus, there is a certain culpability of the commanders who use children in combat, and an obligation to bring these people to book. On the other hand, the latter would likely require the military defeat of the forces concerned — with the children in their ranks.

It is important to note that, once children participate actively in armed hostilities, whether forcibly recruited or of their own volition, they lose civilian status and become legitimate military targets. However, as agents of the international community in the service of peace and human rights, UN and regional peacekeepers should be held to an even higher standard than those embodied in the present laws of war. Moreover, if captured, combatant children under 15 continue to benefit from the special protection provided by the Geneva conventions and protocols, as well as by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.33

To comply with these imperatives would thus require very thorough and specialised training for UN and regional peacekeepers, including not just theory, but intense and extensive simulated exercises. For example, how should peacekeepers respond when ordered by armed children to surrender their weapons? This type of training will not happen in practice, however, until extant peace support doctrine and the manuals used by troop-contributing forces are developed and updated to reflect and guide all aspects of a ‘results-oriented’ disarmament and demobilisation approach.

Considerable research and writing are available on the unique demobilisation and rehabilitation needs of former child combatants. However, there is a dearth of expertise and documented experience in dealing with the combined and unique challenges of disarming and demobilising child soldiers, as a specialised dimension and task within peace missions. The problem is that doctrinal development is based not only on concepts, but also on real experiences in the application of these concepts, as they are recorded through the various ‘lessons learned’ mechanisms.

There are very few recorded and applicable lessons learned in the disarmament and demobilisation of children in peace processes. As Cohn has observed: "[P]eacemakers and child welfare advocates interested in promoting the rehabilitation and reintegration of child participants in war will find a paucity of documented past experience to learn from. The El Salvador, Guatemala and Liberia peace processes [for example] provided for no child oriented demobilisation, reintegration or reinsertion programmes."34 Moreover, the time, energy and resources allocated within any peace process for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes will partly depend on the political-military context that brings the parties to the negotiating table. Fighting factions will have to balance the desire to secure compensation for their combatants with the need to avoid public resentment over the perceived rewarding of perpetrators of armed violence. The practice of peace processes culminating in national elections with tight post- demobilisation schedules exacerbates such tensions.

For example, the use of child soldiers in Mozambique was a particularly stigmatised practice. In order to avoid acknowledging its own child soldiers at a time when the 1994 elections were getting under way, Frelimo allegedly refrained from denouncing Renamo’s forced recruitment of children and from insisting on rehabilitation programmes for demobilising youth. Thus, political expedience may result in a denial of children’s rights violations by all factions.35

The reintegration programme for demobilised soldiers in Mozambique was a 36-month programme benefiting 92 881 former soldiers — 70 902 or 77% from the government forces, and 21 979 or 23% from Renamo. Only 1.5% (1 380) of these soldiers were women. Although less than a few hundred of the soldiers were younger than 18 at the time of demobilisation, 27.67% (25 700) were younger than 18 at the time of recruitment.36

In the southern provinces of Mozambique, community leaders expressed their concern over the lack of support for adolescents and young adults who were involved in military activities as children during the war. According to these leaders, the former child soldiers were not entitled to any reintegration benefits because they were not formally demobilised. Some were disabled or had been wounded, while others suffered psychological instability reflected in their difficulties in adapting to school and community life.37

In Angola, neither the government nor UNITA wanted to admit the existence of child soldiers. The former is not surprising, as the Angolan government had ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990 (which forbids the recruitment of children under 15 as soldiers). During the demobilisation phase stipulated by the Lusaka Protocol, which began in earnest at the end of 1995, both sides underreported the number of children employed as soldiers. In August 1995, both sides reported to Graça Machel that they had 1 500 former child soldiers to be demobilised. Initial head counts soon disproved these figures, with a March 1996 UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs count revealing more than 1 500 soldiers under the age of 18 in just four of the 15 demobilisation centres. Moreover, such counts are not so easy. According to Personnaz: "When asked their name and age, all young soldiers — as if obeying an order — say that their name is Antonio and they are 30 years old, even if they look 15 years younger."38 There are a number of reasons, beyond international stigmatisation, for the huge disparity between the reported or suspected number of child combatants involved in a given conflict, and the number who actually become part of the formal demobilisation process. For example, the very nature of contemporary armed conflicts, involving forces with flat, non-hierarchical structures of authority, creates all kinds of barriers to the participation of children in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes. Rebel groups often lack the institutional structures and means of control to bring their forces — especially children — into camps. Indeed, the power of such rebel groups lies in the autonomy that all individuals have — especially tactical level commanders.

There is also a generally fallacious assumption that all children find disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes necessary or attractive. The peace dividend may not be, or perceived to be a common good. In pre-conflict societies like Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the survival strategies of the élite had made life impossible for children, warfare created critical and useful avenues for attaining new power. As a result, post-conflict situations are not necessarily of interest or perceived benefit to them. A key challenge, therefore, is to create a sense of hope for children in the post- conflict environment and to restore children as individuals with faith in peace.

RESTORATION AND REINTEGRATION CHALLENGES

Even where children can be accommodated and induced into formal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, it is often forgotten that there are both quantitative and qualitative dimensions to demobilisation and reintegration. The first dimension is the tangible side of the process, and can be measured by counting the number of soldiers reporting to assembly areas, turning in weapons, and eventually being relocated to home communities or other destinations of choice. It is this aspect that has hitherto been the main focus of peace missions, and which receives most mention in the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the status of ongoing peace processes where the UN is involved.

On the other hand, the qualitative dimension is non-tangible — it has to do with reversing indoctrination of militaristic (and often revolutionary) ideologies and values — including that of violence as a means of conflict resolution. Demobilisation needs to be comprehensive enough to uproot both the instruments and organisation of violence, as well as the ideology of violence. The latter means inculcating alternative values and non-violent means of conflict resolution.

The following is a sample of material, physical, judicial and psychological needs that will be felt by many, if not all children being demobilised:

• nutrition; • medical treatment (including for sexually transmitted diseases and substance abuse); • respect and self-esteem; • human dignity and confidentiality; • consultation and participation in determining their fates; • reintegration packages and benefits; • community sensitisation in advance of family reintegration; • amnesty from prosecution and/or protection from retribution for acts committed during hostilities; • protection from repeat recruitment; • mental ‘disarmament’; • education, peace education and vocational training; and • employment creation.

However, the general needs of demobilising child soldiers will normally far exceed the resources available to address them. Indeed, given the general levels of deprivation and traumatisation experienced by child combatants, there is virtually a demand to meet the entirety of Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of pre-potent human needs. The project is so demanding, that huge programme and funding gaps are inevitable.

Under such circumstances, there may be a tendency to give up, to accept child soldiers as part of a ‘lost generation’. However, Brett and McCallin take issue with sensational media reporting that portrays child soldiers as psychopathic killers who are beyond rehabilitation and the boundaries of civil society.39

It is true that traumatised and deprived children are capable of extremely violent deeds, even in a fairly ‘normal’ society like South Africa. Of 19 618 reported attempts to commit murder with a firearm in this country during 1996, 1 322 were by children 12 years of age and younger, while 825 were by children aged between 13 and 17 years. A total number of 10 903 actual murders with a firearm were recorded for this year, with children of 12 years or younger being responsible for 791, and those aged 13 to 17 years committing 449.40

However, Brett and McCallin believe that it is more fruitful to move away from deeds committed to focus on the consequences suffered by child soldiers as children, and to attempt to address the deficiencies in personal development caused by participation in armed conflict. Here, they find it useful to focus on the needs and rights of all children, as articulated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. But there is also a need to look at the capacity to function effectively within a given society as determined by both the positive and negative experiences of children, and to design programmes that meet very specific requirements for rehabilitation and social reintegration.

The perceived solution to social breakdown is to focus on the family as the primary unit of succour and support. The Convention on the Rights of the Child recognises that the family is: "the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of its members … [and] that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding."41 On the other hand, efforts to trace family sometimes fail, or the family has perished in the conflict, or has otherwise been rendered incapable of providing the physical means of sustenance, as well as "happiness, love and understanding." Children may also be fearful of returning to their communities because of the events in which they have participated. In these circumstances, there is a need for other care-giving arrangements that meet the child’s physical, social and emotional needs. This is of particular importance for older child combatants who have spent considerable time with the military and may therefore find it very difficult to reintegrate into their families.42 The dominant view is that children should be reunited with their families and communities as soon as possible. Some argue for immediate reuniting and the channelling of all support through families and communities. Others argue for the provision of a stable and protected interim environment before family reunification — one that allows for the treatment of health problems, the identification of other special needs, and the breaking of ties to a military hierarchy and command structure.43

Brett and McCallin do not see the creation of special institutions as a satisfactory or viable long-term solution to meet the special needs of children who have experienced horrifying and life-threatening events. For example, they recommend placement with a substitute family as a potentially more appropriate option. However, they do note that former child soldiers may need a period of time between demobilisation and the return to their families to allow for rehabilitation and assessment of their situation.44

Despite the obvious expenses and funding difficulties, the issue of creating an appropriate institutional environment as an interim phase in the rehabilitation and reintegration merits further exploration. It may indeed be necessary to design a sort of ‘military decompression’ phase to address the fact that: "During military service, the children are separated from the supportive and nurturing environment of the family, and are dependent on rigid and authoritarian structures to control their behaviour … Once this is removed, and without a support structure in place, the risk may be that not having learned accepted mechanisms for personal control they may resort to aggressive techniques to get what they want."45 Similarly, the UNDP report on reintegration in Mozambique recommends that: "Reintegration programmes for [demobilised soldiers] must have a minimum duration of 24 months to allow the [demobilised soldiers] time to ‘demilitarise’ his/her behaviour and ambitions, and become an active member of civilian society."46

CONCLUSION: SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

Beyond general recommendations on disarmament in peace missions, as covered elsewhere in this article, a comprehensive report listing very pertinent recommendations on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration for child soldiers has been compiled by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Office of the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict.47 Often such comprehensive sets of recommendations remain nothing more than ‘wish lists’, but this report does contain some basic truths and suggestions for improving processes at a practical level, and these deserve reiteration.

For example, the report points to the fact that most formal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes are narrowly conceived as opportunities to disarm factions (one man, one gun). The requirement for weapons to be surrendered as a criterion for eligibility has often led to the exclusion of children, especially girls, from such programmes. It recommends, therefore, that child soldiers should be eligible to enter the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process irrespective of whether they present themselves at the assembly points with weapons. It is encouraging to note that this principle has indeed been applied in the design of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme for Sierra Leone.

Other recommendations of a fairly practical, though ambitious nature include:

• preparations for child demobilisation in the midst of ongoing conflict by, for example, dispersing children or transferring them from zones under the control of their former commanders to avoid repeat recruitment or reprisals; • special programming for those child soldiers who demobilise as adults after having grown up within the armed group;

• protection of children from further abuse during the time of demobilisation by separating them immediately from adult soldiers;

• early removal (within 48 hours) of children from the formal assembly site to an interim care site or centre under civilian control;

• systematically assessing the presence and special needs of girl soldiers, in a way that reflects their military service roles — as fighters, cooks, messengers, spies, labourers, ‘wives’ or sexual slaves; and

• plans for tracking, documenting and supporting the high percentage of child combatants who routinely do not enter the formal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process.48

With regard to the last point, Cohn has advocated the formulation of guidelines that would require peacekeepers to report all encounters with soldiers under the age of 15, and where possible, to remove them to protective custody pending family reunification or alternate suitable placement.49

Brett and McCallin have recommended that the participation of children in conflict must be recognised in peace agreements and related documents, that their needs are not neglected and are incorporated as a matter of principle in plans for demobilisation, rehabilitation and social reintegration.50 This view was reinforced by Olara A Otunnu who, in his 1 October 1999 report to the UN General Assembly, recommended, inter alia, that: "As a general policy … child protection and welfare should become an explicit priority in the mandate of every United Nations peace operation, that a senior child protection advocate should be attached to such operations … and that appropriate training on the rights and protection of children and women be provided for peacekeepers."51 Such recommendations have been taken extremely seriously, as reflected in the mandates of both the UNAMSIL and MONUC missions.52 But the real challenge is to move to effective disarmament, and to take the very sound recommendations on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration for children and youths and actually find the resources and will to implement them. The final word on this rightfully belongs to Otunnu, who pleads as follows for the launch of an ‘era of application’ for international norms: "Over the past 50 years, the countries of the world have developed an impressive body of international human rights and humanitarian instruments ... Words on paper cannot save children and women in peril. The Special Representative believes that the time has come for the international community to redirect its energies from the juridical task of the elaboration of norms to the political project of ensuring their application and respect on the ground."53

NOTES

1. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Executive summary: The use of child soldiers in Africa: An overview, nd, .

2. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Liberia, nd, .

3. The highest estimate was provided by Olara A Otunnu who, on returning from a six-day visit to Sierra Leone on 4 September 1999, stated that more than 10 000 children had been serving as child soldiers with the rebels and civil militia. Quoted in Africa News, 10 September 1999.

4. A Roberts, Teenage warriors fight to last boy, The Independent, 24 November 1998.

5. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Sierra Leone, nd, .

6. M Chachiua, Arms Management Programme: Operations Rachel 1996- 1999, ISS Monograph 38, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, June 1999, p 6.

7. M Sayagues, No war, no peace, no Angola peace, no Angola solution, Mail & Guardian, 3-9 July 1998.

8. Ibid.

9. Chachiua, op cit, p 6.

10. S/25354, p 14.

11. M Bowden, quoted in G Constantine, Death of 18 US troops haunts American view on peacekeeping, Washington Times, 22 January 1998.

12. J Chopra, Å Eknes & T Nordbø, Fighting for hope in Somalia, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations 6, 1996, p 2.

13. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung et al, in co-operation with the UN DPKO, Comprehensive report on lessons learned in Somalia, April 1992 — March 1995, Sweden, 1995, pp 75-78.

14. United Nations Security Council, Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/186, 7 March 2000, paragraph 10.

15. Ibid, paragraph 23-24.

16. C Lynch, UN troops disarmed in Sierra Leone, US worried about peacekeeping ability, Washington Post, 6 February 2000. 17. United Nations, S/2000/186, op cit, paragraph 11.

18. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1289, S/RES/1289 (2000), 7 February 2000, paragraph 10.

19. D C F Daniel, Is there a middle option in peace support operations? Implications for crisis containment and disarmament, in E A Zawels et al, Managing arms in peace processes: The issues, United Nations (UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project), New York and Geneva, 1996, p 79.

20. Ibid, pp 79-80.

21. Ibid, p 81.

22. Ibid, pp 81-82.

23. United Nations, S/2000/186, op cit.

24. Ibid, paragraph 45.

25. C Adibe, Managing arms in peace processes: Liberia, United Nations (UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project), New York and Geneva, 1996, p 49.

26. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, op cit, pp 75-78.

27. UN Security Council, Resolution 1291, 25 February 2000, paragraph 8.

28. F Tanner, Consensual versus coercive disarmament, in Zawels et al, op cit, pp 203-204.

29. Ibid.

30. D Cox, Peacekeeping and disarmament: Peace agreements, Security Council mandates, and the disarmament experience, in Zawels et al, op cit, p 133.

31. I Cohn, The protection of children in peacemaking and peacekeeping processes, Harvard Human Rights Journal 12, 1999, p 149.

32. Ibid, p 142.

33. Ibid, p 151.

34. Ibid, p 166.

35. Tanner, op cit, p 146.

36. S Barnes, Reintegration programmes for demobilised soldiers in Mozambique, report prepared for UNDP/RSS, Maputo, March 1997, p v. 37. Creative Associates International Inc, Study of demobilised soldiers facing difficulties in the reintegration process, final report for the International Organisation of Migration, Maputo, September 1996, p 20.

38. D Personnaz, For Angola’s former child soldiers, peace brings uneasy calm, UNICEF Feature 11071.ANG, May 1996.

39. R Brett & M McCallin, Children: The invisible soldiers, Rädda Barnen, Stockholm, 1998, pp 122-123.

40. E Hennop, Audit on governmental and non-governmental youth crime prevention projects in Gauteng, Gauteng Provincial Government in collaboration with the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 1999, p 5.

41. Preamble to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

42. Brett & McCallin, op cit, pp 130-131.

43. UNICEF and the Office of the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, Contribution to the DPKO document on Lessons Learned in DDR of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment, New York, 30 September 1999, p 8

44. Brett & McCallin, op cit, pp 131-132.

45. M McCallin, The reintegration of young ex-combatants into civilian life, expert meeting on the design of guidelines for training and employment of ex-combatants, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1995.

46. Barnes, op cit, p vii.

47. UNICEF and the Office of the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, op cit.

48. Ibid.

49. Cohn, op cit, p 152.

50. Brett & McCallin, op cit, pp 189-191.

51. United Nations General Assembly, Protection of children affected by armed conflict: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General for Children and Armed Conflict, A/54/30, New York, 1 October 1999, paragraph 173.

52. In his 17 January report to Council (S/2000/30), the Secretary-General states that: "Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been victimised through displacement … separation from and loss of families, physical injuries, and exposure to chronic violence and recruitment into fighting forces. Thousands serve as combatants with the various fighting forces …" (paragraph 38). Similarly, in his 7 March 2000 report to Council on the UN mission in Sierra Leone (S/2000/186), the Secretary-General mentions the appointment of a senior child protection advisor to UNAMSIL as the focal point for matters such as the release of child abductees and the demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers (paragraph 34).

53. United Nations, A/54/30, op cit, paragraph 29-30.