The new war in Nagorno Karabakh and how it may end

Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

Introduction

On September 27, 2020 launched a large scale attack along the whole line of contact with Nagorno Karabakh Republic. This is the second attempt by Azerbaijan to solve the conflict by military means in the last four years. The previous escalation was in April 2016, when four days of hostilities did not bring any significant changes on the ground. This time, however, Azerbaijan’s attack is under way for 12 days and this flare –up is the largest since the end of the war in 1994. Meanwhile, the difference is not only the duration and scale of hostilities. The key new factor is the unprecedented involvement of in the conflict. Of course, Turkey was always supporting Azerbaijan within the concept of “One nation, two states”. But for the first time we witness large scale deployment of Turkish weapons, including Bayraktar drones, Turkish instructors and advisors. Another new feature of Turkish involvement is the mercenaries from Syria and Libya fighting alongside with Azerbaijan, documented by French and Russian authorities, including President Macron and the Director of Russian foreign intelligence service.

Background

Since the end of the war in 1994 negotiations have been underway under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries – , the US and . Minsk Group itself was formed in 1992 to assist finding a solution to the conflict. Several proposals were elaborated and delivered to the conflict sides. The latest of them were so called “Madrid basic principles”. They have been developed since 2004 and were disclosed by the Presidents of Russia, France and the US in July 20091. As a result of intensive negotiations in 2009 – 2011 an agreement was prepared by the mediators and presented to the leaders of and Azerbaijan in Russian city of Kazan in the June 2011. Agreement envisaged the “phased approach solution”, with withdrawal of the Armenian forces form the some territories of Nagorno Karabakh Republic at the first phase, interim status for Nagorno Karabakh with international security guarantees including deployment of peacekeeping forces, and the future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will.

1 Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries, https://www.osce.org/mg/51152.

However, Azerbaijan declined to sign the agreement in Kazan, as President Ilham was always arguing that even hypothetical possibility of Nagorno Karabakh’s existence outside of Azerbaijan was unacceptable for and was stating that Nagorno Karabakh would not be granted independence either today or tomorrow, or in 10 or 50 years 2. It should be noted, that oil boom has been underway in Azerbaijan since 2007 as a result of the launch of Baku – Tbilisi - Jeyhan pipeline. Thus Azerbaijan was confident that could either force Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh Republic to capitulate during negotiations or invade Nagorno Karabakh Republic by force. Azerbaijan started its military blackmail in August 2014 and it culminated in April 2016 four day war, which showed that Azerbaijan was not able to get a military victory over Nagorno Karabakh Republic.

Meanwhile, since the 2008 global financial crisis the transformation of the Post – Cold war era has been underway. The “Unipolar moment” marked by the undisputed US hegemony was fading away, while no clear signs of the emerging new world order were visible. The transition period, called by many experts as global disorder, ushered in significant changes both on global and regional level. The first feature was the return of great power competition, which amidst the absence of global hegemonic power triggered rivalry for regional hegemony3.

The most illustrative example is the Middle East region, where Turkey, Iran and are vying for regional dominance. This period was also marked by steep deterioration of Russia - West relations, marked by mutual sanctions and multiple crises. The transformation of global security architecture has impacted also Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The and phased approach solution are based on the notion of international guarantees, which should prevent Azerbaijan from attacking Nagorno Karabakh using the territories given to Baku during the first phase of the deal before the referendum. However, the dawn of the global disorder has significantly reduced the reliability of any international security guarantees provided to Nagorno Karabakh Republic. The situation in Syria, where large parts of state were captured by different state and non-state actors, war in Donbass and chaos in Libya were straightforward examples of the failures of international community to live up to its promises. The April 2016 war launched by Azerbaijan in defiance of 1994 – 1995 agreements on ceasefire and Minsk group Co-Chairs multiple statements arguing that there is no military solution to the conflict, was another proof that unraveling of the Post cold war order impacted also Nagorno Karabakh. Thus, if before April 2016 parts of Armenian society were ready to discuss the possibility to accept and to implement phased approach solution based on the basic principles, after the war it was obvious that it equaled to capitulation for Nagorno Karabakh Republic and would bring nothing but eventual catastrophe.

2 Speech of the Azerbaijani President in the Oath Taking Ceremony - Palace, October 24, 2008, https://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/en/7871416.html. 3 Emerging Global Order: Implications for the Regional Geopolitics, https://www.indrastra.com/2018/10/Emerging- Global-Order-Implications-for-Regional-Geopolitics-004-10-2018-0020.html. Meanwhile, despite the obvious transformations of global and regional order and the consequences of the April 2016 war, OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs continued to insist on the implementation of the “Madrid basic principles”. The unwillingness of mediators to bid a farewell to the outdated schemes and to elaborate new, innovative approaches contributed to the impasse in negotiations, which have not been moving forward since the failed Kazan summit. The July 2020 skirmishes along Armenia – Azerbaijan international border, and the launch of several large-scale Azerbaijan – Turkey military drills afterwards were clear indicators that Azerbaijani leadership made a decision to make another attempt of solving the conflict through military means. Both before and after the July 2020 skirmishes expressed its public frustration over the negotiation process, accusing Minsk Group Co-chairs of absence of concrete actions and declaring about Azerbaijani rights to solve the conflict by military means.4

The role of external actors

Since the collapse of the South Caucasus was the crossroad of interest of several external actors – Russia, Turkey, Iran, the US, EU, NATO and recently also China. However, while looking through the external actors’ involvement and their interest in recent years, it becomes clear that the two key players in the region are Russia and Turkey. Iran is on survival mode due to the US “Maximum Pressure campaign”, while EU, despite involvement of Armenia, Azerbaijan and into the Eastern Partnership program and signature of Association Agreement with Georgia in 2014 and Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Armenia in 2017, has neither resources nor willingness to be significantly involved in the regional geopolitics. EU is a normative player and works mainly through promoting its values, rules and norms by supporting reforms in different sectors, but it’s absolutely not enough for having decisive influence in hard power issues.

The US signed a charter on strategic partnership with Georgia in 2009 and supported the establishment of Turkey – Georgia – Azerbaijan strategic partnership. However, the shift of the US attention to the Asia - Pacific, which started during the second term of Obama presidency and took more decisive pattern during President Trump tenure, has prevented the US active involvement in the region.

Russia views South Caucasus as a part of its zone of “special interests” and is interested in strengthening its positions in the region. However, as for now Russia has strong presence only in Armenia. Relations with Georgia have been ruined by 2008 Russia – Georgia war, and despite economic normalization launched by the new Georgian authorities in late 2012, no political breakthrough is possible as far as issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia hasn’t been solved. Thus, having almost no chances to significantly boost its presence in Georgia, Russia has started to

4 The July Escalation Along Armenia-Azerbaijan Border, https://www.institutfuersicherheit.at/isp-working-paper- the-july-escalation-along-armenia-azerbaijan-border/. deepen its cooperation with Azerbaijan. As for Azerbaijan, warming of relations with was perceived as a possibility to get Russian support in Karabakh conflict. Thus, in recent years both states have launched intensive economic cooperation and Azerbaijan has bought up to 5 billion USD modern weapons from Russia. As for Russia, the key goal was to deploy Russian peacekeepers along Nagorno Karabakh – Azerbaijan borders as a part of any Karabakh deal and to establish de facto military base in Azerbaijan. Kremlin believed that this idea, often dubbed as “Lavrov plan” would be a long term guarantee of Russian influence in Azerbaijan regardless of future possible domestic political changes in that republic. However, apparently this idea was rejected both by Armenia and Azerbaijan.5

Meanwhile, Turkey also viewed Azerbaijan as its gate to enter South Caucasus. Given cultural and linguistic affinity and the notion “One people, two states” firt put forward by the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, bilateral relations have been improving since late 1990s. However, the strategic revision of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP and President Erdogan which aimed at the establishment of Turkey as an independent regional power with spreading interests in Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Mediterranean and South Caucasus has brought new momentum into Turkey – Azerbaijan relations. Turkey perceives its support to Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabakh conflict as a key possibility to increase its involvement in the region and challenge Russia’s role as the only kingmaker in Armenia – Azerbaijan relations.

In recent years Azerbaijan sought to pursue a balanced policy between Russia and Turkey. Situation was changed after the July 2020 clashes along Armenia – Azerbaijan border. Azerbaijan launched large scale military drills with Turkey, and there were reciprocal visits of Azerbaijan and Turkish high level defense officials6. Most probably, Azerbaijan gave up it hopes that Russia might pressure Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh Republic to make unilateral concessions and decided “to put all eggs in Turkish basket”.

The active participation of Turkey in large scale attack launched by Azerbaijan on September 27 is a proof that, most probably, Azerbaijan made a final choice between Russia and Turkey. Turkish officials, including President Erdogan and ministers of defense and foreign affairs immediately made statement supporting Azerbaijan and denouncing calls for ceasefire by OSCE Minsk group co-chair countries Presidents7. President Aliyev sent a letter to President Erdogan

5 OSCE Minsk Group ex-co-chair: ‘Lavrov plan’ on Karabakh peace not backed by conflicting sides, https://news.am/eng/news/498007.html.

6 Turkey, Azerbaijan launch joint military drills, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-azerbaijan-launch-joint- military-drills/1926495.

7 Erdoğan demands Armenian pullout, does not endorse international ceasefire calls, https://ahvalnews.com/nagorno-karabakh/erdogan-demands-armenian-pullout-does-not-endorse-international- ceasefire-calls.

expressing his gratitude for Turkish support and once again reiterated his words during meeting with Turkish minister of foreign affairs in Baku on October 68. Azerbaijani and Turkish digital media are full of videos depicting the combat use of Turkish Bayraktar drones. The documented facts of participation of Syrian mercenaries in Azerbaijani attacks form such groups as “Jabhat al - Nusra”, “Firqat al – Hamza” and “Sultan Murad devision” is a clear indication that Azerbaijan has provided full freedom to Turkey in ’s actions in Nagorno Karabakh9. Meanwhile, Turkey views these mercenaries as a long term tool of its influence in Azerbaijan, as obviously some of them will stay in Azerbaijan after the end of hostilities.

New war has put Russia in delicate position. Each day of hostilities objectively increases Turkey’s influence in Azerbaijan, which definitely worries Russia. One of the key reasons behind Russia’s decision to start her military campaign in Syria in September 2015 was Moscow’s desire to prevent the return of radical Islamist fighters to Russia and other former Soviet Union republics. Meanwhile, Turkey brought them just close to the borders of Russian Northern Caucasus, which itself was an epicenter of Islamist terrorism in 1990s and beginning of 2000s. These developments definitely worry Russia.

Meanwhile, any tough actions against Azerbaijan may pull Baku even closer to Turkey. Thus, Moscow should be interested in quick end of hostilities. However, as Russia’s key goal is the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zone, Moscow is not interested also in simple return to the status quo of evening September 26, 2020. Kremlin has already stated that deployment of Russian peacekeepers is possible only if both Armenia and Azerbaijan agree on that. Moscow has to make uneasy choices between preventing the growth of Turkish influence, not alienating Azerbaijan, not losing its position in Armenia, moving forward her ideas about Russian peacekeepers, and avoiding potential spillover effects.

What lies ahead?

The new war in Nagorno Karabakh has ruined the old options for solution. The basic principles elaborated in 2007 are not viable and any future insistence on them by mediators will bring the process to nowhere. The last four years of Karabakh conflict history have proved that phased approach solution is futile and may only perpetuate the vicious circle of “war – ceasefire – war”. Given the factual internationalization of conflict with direct involvement of Turkey and international mercenaries, any attempt to simply freeze the situation will backfire and has a

8 Visit of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Azerbaijan, 6 October 2020, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin- bakanimizin-azerbaycan-i-ziyareti-6-10-2020.en.mfa.

9 Russia says Islamist fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict pose threat to Moscow, https://www.reuters.com/article/armenia-azerbaijan-russia-int/russia-says-nagorno-karabakh-risks-becoming-launch- pad-for-terrorists-ifax-idUSKBN26R1VE

potential to ignite a real regional war in the future. Meanwhile, it should be noted, that given Armenia’s and Nagorno Karabakh Republic’s limited recourses if nothing tangible will be done by international community to stop Azerbaijan and Turkey now, Armenian side will have no option but to enforce significant and long-term damage on Azerbaijan’s gas and oil industry, thus cutting the flow of money.

The only way to overcome the deadlock, to prevent the future losses of life and to ensure the sustainable development of the South Caucasus is the package deal on Karabakh conflict, which should include the recognition of Nagorno Karabakh Republic independence or its unification with Armenia and parallel settlement of border issues between NKR and Azerbaijan.