In ’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

By George Grant

Foreword by Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford

In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

About the Author George Grant is a non-resident Associate Fellow at The Henry Jackson Society. He has written widely on issues relating to foreign policy and defence, with major publications includingSucceeding in Afghanistan (September 2010); The Tipping Point: British National Strategy and the UK’s Future World Role (July 2011); and Shocks and Disruptions: The Relationship Between Food Security and (April 2012). George has also worked extensively on the conflict in Libya and the country’s subsequent post-Gaddafi transition. He moved to Tripoli full-time in May 2012 to become deputy editor of the country’s first post-Gaddafi English-language newspaper, theLibya Herald, as well as Libya correspondent for . He provides regular analysis for national and international newspapers – including The Times, , , and the Wall Street Journal Europe – as well as on TV and radio news outlets, including the BBC; Al Jazeera; Channel 4 News; and Sky News. A frequent speaker on foreign-policy and defence issues, George has provided briefings to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office; the Ministry of Defence; the Stabilisation Unit; and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. George holds Masters degrees in History from the University of , and in Investigative Journalism from City University, .

Acknowledgements I owe a debt of thanks to a large number of people for their help in producing this report. First, I should like to thank Dr Alan Mendoza and The Henry Jackson Society (HJS) for commissioning me to write the report. My thanks also to all those at HJS, in particular Mark Fergusson; Elizabeth Lee; Davis Lewin; and Hannah Nomm, who assisted in the report’s production and launch at various stages. This analysis would have been very much poorer without the expert insights of all those interviewed for the report, as well as those who offered comments on the draft, and my thanks also goes out to them. Finally, I should like to extend particular thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford, who has not only written the Foreword, but has also been an invaluable support. Stuart is universally respected for his efforts to provide clarity and depth to this issue, having authored the first serious assessment of how an independent Scotland might structure its Armed Forces. A former SNP parliamentary candidate who remains ready to provide a non-partisan assessment, Stuart is additionally valuable as a voice of balance in this most divisive of debates. It only remains for me to say that any errors or omissions contained within this publication are mine alone.

3 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

About The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society is a cross-partisan, British think-tank. Our founders and supporters are united by a common interest in fostering a strong British, European, and American commitment towards freedom; liberty; constitutional democracy; human rights; governmental and institutional reform; and a robust foreign, security, and defence policy and transatlantic alliance. The Henry Jackson Society is a registered charity (no. 1113948). For more information about Henry Jackson Society activities; our research programme; and public events, please see: www.henryjacksonsociety.org

4 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Contents

About the Author 3 Acknowledgements 3 About The Henry Jackson Society 4 Foreword 8 Acronyms 10 Executive Summary 12 Introduction 17 Chapter I – Defending What, Exactly? 21 The Foreign Policy of an Independent Scotland 21 Potential Risks to Scottish National Security 22 Chapter II – Joining NATO 27 Would Scotland Remain within NATO, or Have to Reapply? 30 Joining a Nuclear-Armed Alliance whilst Making Scotland Nuclear-Free 31 - Allowing Nuclear-Armed Vessels to Dock in Scottish Ports 33 - WANTING TO MAKE THE RUK NUCLEAR FREE? 34 The Case against NATO Membership for a Nuclear-Free Scotland 34 - Divisions on NATO Membership within the SNP 37 The Geostrategic Importance of Scotland in NATO 37 The Potential Impact of NATO Membership on Foreign and Defence Policy 38 Chapter III – Establishing a Scottish Defence Force 43 The SNP’s Proposed Defence Budget 43 Securing Scotland’s “Share” of UK Military Assets 45 The Scottish Regiments 46 Would the SNP’s Proposals Result in an Imbalanced Defence Force? 47 The SNP’s Aspirations for Defence Equipment 48 - Submarines 49 - Frigates 49 - Remaining Scottish Navy 50 - Fast Jets 51 - 53 - Remaining Scottish Air Force 54 - Scottish Army 54 Special Forces 55

5 Contents

Choosing between the British Armed Forces and the Scottish Defence Force 56 ‘Smart Defence’ and the Specialisation of Scotland’s Armed Forces 58 Defence Cooperation with the rUK 59 Chapter IV – Removing Trident 63 How Quickly Could Trident be Moved in an Emergency? 66 The Job Implications of Trident Removal 68 Moving Trident – The Realistic Scenario 70 Chapter V – Intelligence and Cyber Security 73 Intelligence Sharing with the rUK and Other Countries 74 - The Third-Party Rule 77 - Multilateral Intelligence-Sharing Relationships 78 Establishing Scottish Security and Intelligence Services 78 - The Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) 79 - The Security Service (MI5) 79 - Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 81 Cyber Security beyond GCHQ 82 Developing an Integrated National Cyber Security Strategy 83 Scaling the Cyber Security Problem: The Challenge for Scotland 85 Chapter VI – The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry 89 The Importance of the MoD for Scotland’s Defence Industry 90 - The Article 346 exemption 93 The Future of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship 93 The Future of the Queen Elizabeth-Class Aircraft Carriers 94 The Mood amongst the Defence Industry in Scotland 95 Conditions for the Success of the Scottish Defence Industry 95 Open Procurement 98 Joint Procurement 99 Conclusion 101 End Notes 105 Appendix 119 Bibliography 121

6 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy Foreword

Foreword Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Crawford

As the referendum on Scottish report; but, I thought it appropriate to independence – to be held on 18 comment on some of the main topics September 2014 – looms ever closer, how which he has covered. Whilst everyone an independent Scotland might define its will have their own ideas on what the defence policy and raise; organise; and most important aspects might be, for me deploy its own Armed Forces has become there are only three: NATO membership, one of the major topics du jour of the which is inextricably tied to the question debate. And yet, surprisingly little has of the future prospects of Trident-armed been published on it to date. submarines based at Faslane on the Clyde; cyber security and intelligence George Grant’s assessment of the gathering; and Scottish jobs dependent defence strategy of the Scottish National on the defence industry. Party (SNP), who are the prime movers in the ‘Yes Scotland’ campaign for The SNP conference in October 2012 , is accordingly saw the party reverse its long-held policy both appropriate and timely. As he so on NATO, which had been – up until rightly points out, “precious little has then – to withdraw from the alliance been said by either the SNP or the upon independence, as it is a “nuclear- British Government” about the potential led alliance”. This made neither military defence implications of the referendum; nor political sense, and the party the British Government refuses to leadership had long acknowledged it. speculate, and the SNP refuse to give any Post conference, the SNP position is – detail. and I paraphrase here – to remain within NATO, but to work towards the removal He sets out in this study not to suggest of nuclear weapons from Scottish soil at a defence blueprint for an independent the earliest opportunity. Scotland, but rather to look in some detail at current SNP defence policy, such as it This position is ambivalent at best and is. His investigation is based on the SNP’s downright contradictory at worst. Nuclear Foreign, Security and Defence Policy deterrence is the bedrock of NATO’s Update, dated October 2012, which is military posture. On leaving the UK, most hardly a detailed exposition of the party’s commentators agree that Scotland is plans, and which has been criticised in unlikely to have the status of ‘continuing some quarters as “veneer thin.” state’, and so would have to apply for NATO membership. It would need the In doing so, he has produced the most agreement of all current members, detailed and comprehensive examination in order to be admitted to this most of SNP policy so far, casting his net far successful military alliance, and the strong and wide to take the views of most of the message coming out of Washington, DC commentators who will be prominent in is that, if Scotland persists in its demand the debate. The breadth and depth of his for removal of nuclear weapons from its research demands his report be treated territory, then its accession to NATO will with the gravitas it deserves. either be blocked or delayed for many It would be churlish of me to attempt years. This the SNP need to resolve. to précis what he has discovered in this In terms of cyber security and

8 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy intelligence gathering, it is clear that people and contribute around £1.8 billion an independent Scotland could not per annum to the country’s economy. realistically hope to replicate the current Much of this – think of the Clyde UK triad of the Security Service (MI5); shipyards and the Faslane/Coulport naval the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6); base – relies on orders from the MoD and and Government Communications hosting on the Trident submarine fleet. Headquarters (GCHQ). Even attempting to produce a scaled-down version of the With the best will in the world, if – latter would appear to be well beyond the following Scottish independence – the likely resources of a fledgling independent MoD were to place future equipment nation of some 5 million souls. orders elsewhere in the UK, under the EU Article 346 exemption, then the So, an independent Scotland would be Scottish defence industries would be in reliant, in the short-to-medium term trouble. Similarly, if the Trident fleet was at least, on the rest of the UK (rUK) for forced to leave the Clyde, then there most of its intelligence. Whether the would undoubtedly be job losses (the rest of the UK would be willing or able SNP’s proposal to base both the Scottish to share its intelligence with Scotland is Navy and Joint Headquarters there another thing altogether, tied in as it is notwithstanding). This is something the with the US; Canada; Australia; and New SNP need to acknowledge and deal with, Zealand via the ‘Five Eyes’ arrangement no matter how bitter a political pill it may for sharing signals intelligence (SIGINT). be to swallow. However, without the rUK, Scotland will be exceedingly vulnerable to the cyber I could go on, but I would only be attacks and terrorism which are the repeating what George Grant has already most likely future risks for the newly visited in this admirable report. His study independent state. This is an important asks these – and many other – basic and matter for the SNP to address. important questions of SNP defence policy, all of which must be addressed And lastly, jobs. As I have said oftentimes and answered before the referendum before: you don’t predicate a defence vote. We can only hope that the party’s policy on the number of civilian jobs defence White Paper, to be published in it might support, no more than you the autumn of 2013, will provide at least would build a hospital just to provide some of the answers. employment for doctors and nurses. Of course they are an important To quote George one last time: “that consideration, but they are of second- Scottish voters should be presented with order importance to the primary purpose a clear and truthful picture of what it is of guaranteeing the safety and security of they are voting for is surely something on the nation. which we can all agree.” Amen to that. Currently, it is claimed that Scotland’s Stuart Crawford defence industries employ some 12,600 Gullane, East Lothian 20th June 2013

9 Acronyms

Acronyms

Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) Denial-of-Service (DoS) (EU) Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Ministry of Defence (MoD) Mixed Fighter Force Operations (MFFOs) Multi Role Brigade (MRB) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) Partnership for Peace (PfP) Q( RA) Research and development (R&D) (RAF) Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD) rUK (rest of the UK, minus Scotland) Scottish Defence Force (SDF) (SNP) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) Special Air Service (SAS) Special Boat Service (SBS) Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) United Nations (UN) of America (US)

10 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

11 Executive Summary

Executive Summary

This report provides the first At the heart of the problem with the comprehensive assessment of the SNP’s defence strategy is the fact that Scottish National Party (SNP)’s proposed it appears to be more concerned with defence strategy for an independent helping win the 2014 independence Scotland. Covering six main areas, it referendum, than with actually finds significant shortcomings in the defending Scotland. Political – as SNP’s policy as presently construed. opposed to strategic – considerations The chapters for this report examine: look to have driven policy formulation foreign policy and risks to national in many areas, including the future of security; joining NATO; the funding and the Scottish regiments; where to base constitution of the proposed Scottish the Scottish Navy; and the commitment Defence Force (SDF); Trident removal; to joining NATO whilst simultaneously intelligence and cyber security; and the removing Trident from Scotland. future of the Scottish defence industry.

Defending What, Exactly?

The SNP’s defence strategy does not it is not clear how they would go about articulate a foreign policy based on the achieving Scotland’s international priorities of an independent Scotland; objectives; nor is it clear what emphasis nor is there an assessment of the risks to they would place on involvement in national security and Scottish interests international humanitarian operations. – a necessary requirement to enable defence planners to envisage the role of The SNP have provided no real Scotland’s defence forces. assessment of the risks to Scottish national security. This report finds that SNP policy envisages a Scotland with a an independent Scotland would likely predominantly regional focus centred on be confronted with many of the same the northern European neighbourhood threats as face the UK now, such as cyber in which it is situated, in comparison crime; instability overseas; disruption to to the more global posture of the oil and gas supplies; and international UK. Scotland would also emphasise terrorism. It should not be assumed that its influence through multilateral disassociation fromK U foreign policy organisations, including the UN; the EU; would automatically lower the threat and, if possible, NATO. However, the towards Scotland from hostile actors. SNP make no attempt at prioritisation:

12 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Joining NATO

The SNP’s position that Scotland should from Scotland, without agreement “maintain NATO membership subject from other NATO allies; its opposition to an agreement that Scotland will not to nuclear-armed vessels docking in host nuclear weapons” would make Scottish ports, a position held byno negotiations for entry to the alliance, other NATO country; and the possibility which would not be automatic, very of its demands resulting in the unilateral difficult. There is a fundamental disarmament of another NATO member: inconsistency between the SNP’s non- the UK (or, after independence, the ‘rUK’ nuclear policy and NATO’s Strategic – rest of the UK, minus Scotland). Concept, which states that as “long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain Nuclear weapons aside, there are a nuclear alliance”. clear geostrategic reasons why an independent Scotland might wish to join Unlike the anti-nuclear stance of some NATO, and why the alliance might wish existing NATO members (such as Norway, to have Scotland as a member. Careful whose stance is held largely in principle), thought should be given, however, as to the SNP’s policy would have very whether the potential commitments of real practical implications. Especially membership would be compatible with problematic are: the SNP’s commitment Scotland’s other foreign and defence to the unilateral divestiture of Trident policy objectives.

Establishing a Scottish fenceDe Force

The SNP have proposed a defence Scottish soldiers will be able to choose budget of £2.5 billion per annum. This whether to join the SDF or remain figure appears to have been chosen with the British Armed Forces. The arbitrarily since it does not match the overwhelming consensus of service commitments envisaged by the SNP personnel consulted for this report for their defence force. Moreover, the was that the majority of soldiers would Scottish Finance Secretary has privately prefer to remain with the British Armed warned his party’s defence planners Forces, which, they believed, would that “a much lower budget must be offer greater opportunities. assumed”. The SNP have provided very limited SNP commitments will create significant detail on what equipment their defence personnel difficulties. The SNP propose force would require, and many of the a defence force of 15,000, including all platforms which they have singled “current Scottish raised and restoredK U out would be either impractical or regiments”. The commitment is likely unworkable. The commitment to more political than strategic, and would procure “conventional submarines” leave Scotland with a heavily Army- and “new frigates” would be extremely centric defence force when, strategically, expensive, while most experts believe a greater focus on maritime and air that a Scottish Navy would have greater defence would be preferable. use for smaller vessels. Despite a commitment to inherit Scotland’s share Furthermore, the SNP have said that

13 Executive Summary of fast jets from the UK, none of the what capabilities the SDF would seek Royal Air Force (RAF)’s three jet types to deliver in line with the NATO concept would be suitable. The Eurofighter of ‘Smart Defence’. This approach is Typhoon would likely be too expensive sensible, but the SNP have gone further and complex, and the ageing Tornado by advocating “shared conventional GR4 lacks an air-to-air capability. The basing” and “sharing conventional last option, the Hawk trainer (endorsed military capabilities”. Whilst it would by the SNP’s defence spokesman), be sensible to allow the rUK to make is comparatively slow, with no radar use of facilities north of the border, and only limited offensive capability. sharing bases is another matter entirely, Therefore, it would be unable to fulfil and sharing military capabilities still the air-defence function envisaged by more so. Such an arrangement would the party. As a result, if the SNP wanted almost certainly be unworkable since a fast jet for its Air Force, it would need it would give one nation a de facto to be procured elsewhere. veto over the foreign policy of another nation if disagreements arose as to how The SNP have said Scotland would seek shared assets should be used at a given to coordinate its defence policy with the moment. rUK and other allies, and to prioritise

Removing Trident

Removing the UK’s Trident nuclear to obtain a favourable settlement on a deterrent from Scotland is a pivotal number of other issues, Trident removal plank of the SNP’s bid for independence. will likely be central to independence The pertinent issues are timing and negotiations. cost, as well as the impact on regional unemployment. Trident removal has serious implications for regional job losses: 6,700 are The SNP have not articulated a time presently employed at Her Majesty’s frame on Trident removal, committing Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, a figure set only to “the speediest safe transition to increase to 8,200 by 2022. While of the nuclear fleet from Faslane”. In the SNP propose stationing the Scottish theory, Admiral Lord Alan West believes Navy in place of the Trident fleet, that that Trident could be re-established and would be unlikely to generate more than operational south of the border within a 1,000 jobs. Placing the Scottish Navy in matter of months; in practice, however, the southwest of the country also raises given its high financial and political strategic questions, given that Scotland’s cost, a realistic time frame would be main maritime assets, and many of the years – and perhaps even decades. potential threats, are located to the Furthermore, as Scotland would be north and east. dependent on goodwill from the rUK

14 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Intelligence and Cyber Security

The SNP have provided little information of a Scottish equivalent of theK U ’s on establishing Scottish security and Government Communications intelligence services. The Deputy First Headquarters (GCHQ), although all are Minister has said that she “envisage[s] agreed Scotland’s would not be on the Scotland having independent domestic same scale. Moreover, GCHQ is central intelligence machinery”, with an to the British Government’s efforts to overseas-intelligence service being counter the threat of cyber warfare – “one option available to Scotland”. an increasing, global threat, to which While experts agree that the country the current international peacekeeping could develop a small domestic service framework is not configured to respond modelled on MI5, only a handful of appropriately. The experience of Estonia, countries possess international services in 2007, demonstrates that smaller – the equivalent of MI6. As such, Scotland countries cannot rely on the protection would rely on domestic intelligence; of large alliances, such as NATO, when on defence attachés abroad; and on targeted by cyber attacks. liaison with other nations’ security and intelligence services. Cyber security extends more broadly than cyber warfare, however: The extent to which an independent approximately 80 per cent of the Scotland could expect other countries, in Internet lies in the private sector, with particular the rUK, to share intelligence is threats ranging from cyber crime, one of the most serious misassumptions to non-malicious damage caused by made by the SNP. No country shares careless data storage. While Scotland intelligence without full confidence in could utilise existing private companies the security of the service receiving that to develop effective policies and systems information; nor would the rUK have an to help counter such threats, the most automatic interest in intelligence sharing serious challenge would be one of scale. purely on the basis of shared geography Recruiting cyber-security specialists and other commonalities. remains a challenge in both the public and private sector, especially for smaller Opinions vary regarding the feasibility countries.

The Future of the Scottish fenceDe Industry

The Scottish defence industry employs potential investors of their commitment in excess of 12,600 people, and has in this area. annual sales in excess of £1.8 billion. The SNP have said that this industry The SNP have repeatedly emphasised would continue to have “a healthy order the importance of Ministry of Defence book” post-independence. However, an (MoD) contracts for the Scottish independent Scottish defence industry defence industry. Post-independence, would likely depend on producing however, MoD contracts for more specialist components for use in defence complex weapons systems would likely systems, and the party has yet to be dramatically reduced. Orders for develop a coherent strategy to reassure the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, for example, would almost certainly be

15 Executive Summary cancelled, and – in time – most of the to mitigate the potential for these shipyards would likely close. arrangements to increase costs and delay delivery when not properly pre- The SNP have expressed an interest in planned, as exemplified by the ‘Future joint procurement with other countries European Fighter Aircraft’ programme. to acquire assets not inherited from Joint-procurement programmes the UK. This is a sensible approach both also only tend to be entered into by financially, in terms of cost-sharing, and countries which share not only common also for securing work for domestic commercial interests, but also common industries. The SNP, however, will need strategic and political goals.

16 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Introduction

The central purpose of this report is to precious little has been said by either help advance the public debate about the SNP or the British Government about the defence implications of Scottish the potential defence implications of independence. In so doing, it does not that decision. Given that defence is the seek to provide a defence blueprint for first duty of government, and should an independent Scotland, but rather to therefore be an absolutely central feature analyse what the Scottish National Party in the independence debate, this is (SNP) have said on the matter, and to problematic. see if their proposals stand up to serious scrutiny. Extraordinarily, perhaps, current UK Government policy is explicitly not to have Besides the SNP, there are – needless a policy on what the potential defence to say – several political parties and implications of Scottish independence other groups advocating Scottish might be. Whilst the Government has independence. Nevertheless, it is the provided specific assessments of existing SNP who are overwhelmingly the most defence arrangements north of the significant drivers of the movement. border, and how – in its view – they benefit Moreover, as things presently stand, none both Scotland and the UK as a whole, it of the other main pro-independence has decided against speculating on what groups have put forward any significant could happen to those arrangements in proposals on defence whatsoever.i As the event of a ‘Yes’ vote next September. it is the SNP who presently govern at Holyrood, it will be their vision for an In an October 2012 submission to the independent Scotland which will inform House of Commons Defence Select most voters on 18 September 2014; thus, Committee, the Ministry of Defence it is their policies which merit the most (MoD) made it plain that the “UK scrutiny. As a result, all references in Government’s position is clear: Scotland this report to ‘an independent Scotland’ benefits from being part of K theU and imply one following the SNP’s current the UK benefits from having Scotland independence ambitions. within the UK. The UK Government is confident that the people of Scotland will With little more than a year to go before choose to remain part of the UK, and is a vote on the future of one of the most not planning for any other outcome. It significant political unions of all time, is for those advocating independence to it was a major concern to find that explain the nature and implications of an independent Scotland”.1 i. In their most recent Westminster manifesto, the Scottish Whilst this position is understandable on Greens restricted themselves to pledges to do away with the Trident nuclear deterrent; cut military spending; one level, not least because Westminster and scrap the “redundant Typhoon fighter aircraft” and has no interest in helping do the SNP’s “strategically pointless new aircraft carriers”. job for them, it undoubtedly impedes The defence proposals of the Scottish Socialists, efforts to provide voters in Scotland with meanwhile, extended to just two points: “the removal of all nuclear weapons from Scotland”, and for “Scotland’s a clear and accurate picture of what the overall military budget to [be] brought into line per capita consequences of their decision might with that of the Republic of Ireland”.

17 Introduction be. In lieu of this, and aware of the The report is broken down into six importance of thinking through these chapters analysing the SNP’s positions on: issues before the vote (and not just 1. The foreign policy of an independent negotiating the outcome afterwards), Scotland, and the risks to national several Parliamentary select committees security have taken it upon themselves to provide their own assessments. Amongst them 2. Joining NATO have been the Defence Committee; 3. Establishing a Scottish Defence Force the Scottish Affairs Committee; the (SDF) Foreign Affairs Committee; and the Lords 4. Removing the Trident nuclear Economic Affairs Committee. This report deterrent from Scotland has benefited from the insights provided 5. Intelligence and cyber security in an by many of the expert witnesses for those independent Scotland inquiries, in addition to the more than two dozen experts interviewed separately 6. The future of the Scottish defence as part of my own research. industry For its part, the centrepiece of the SNP’s Each chapter begins by providing as much published thinking on how to defend an detail as possible on what the SNP have independent Scotland is contained within proposed for these areas, before moving its Foreign, Security and Defence Policy on to the views of experts from the Update, a 768-word document released political; military; academic; and defence- shortly after the party conference in industrial fields. The opinions come from October 2012.2 ii The policy positions both sides of the debate, and – combined contained within that paper (combined with my own assessment – examine the with other published statements viability of the SNP’s positions, and what and submissions by the SNP and its the alternative outcomes may be. leadership, and my own interviews) in As research for this report progressed, turn form the basis of what this report what quickly became apparent is that, seeks to scrutinise. if one is being objective on this subject, it is almost impossible not to arrive at the conclusion that – as things currently ii. It is worthy of note that the full and updated version of this resolution – meant to be the cornerstone of the SNP’s stand – defence policy is one of the SNP’s foreign and defence policies – is not available anywhere on weak points. the SNP’s website or, it appears, online. The full document was obtained by this report directly from the office of Angus This is not because they have attempted Robertson MP and is included as the Appendix to this report. The nearest available version online was reproduced by The to put forward a fully thought-through Scotsman shortly before the October conference. The two defence strategy that nevertheless resolutions are identical, save for a 27-word addition to the final paragraph, regarding NATO membership, which is appears to have some deficiencies, but missing from The Scotsman’s copy. The section in question rather because their strategy appears follows here, with the additional text italicised: to be predicated more on how not to “An SNP Government will maintain NATO membership alienate voters, than on how to actually subject to an agreement that Scotland will not host nuclear weapons and NATO takes all possible steps to bring about defend Scotland. nuclear disarmament as required by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty of which all its members are signatories, Three of the most glaring examples of this and further that NATO continues to respect the right of members to only take part in UN-sanctioned operations” (my are found in the SNP’s commitments to emphasis). retain all the current Scottish regiments,

18 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy to base their entire Navy and their Armed might actually be, before they enter the Forces’ headquarters on the Clyde; and to polling booths on 18 September 2014. join NATO whilst simultaneously divesting Scotland of nuclear weapons. Finally, it is impossible to conclude without remarking upon an extraordinary The Scottish fighting regiments are and wholly unintended feature of this undoubtedly amongst the most iconic in report: the vastly disproportionate the British Armed Forces, and any hint number of Scots interviewed as part of my by the SNP that they might be reduced research. These individuals were chosen or even dismantled in an independent by virtue of their relevance to the issue, Scotland would be politically toxic. much of the time as a result of holding – Nevertheless, on the proposed budget or having held – a significant office in the and personnel count for an SDF, as put world of defence and security at the UK forward by the party, this commitment and international level, and nothing to do would almost certainly leave Scotland with their nationality. with an Army-heavy and equipment- light Armed Forces when – strategically They include former NATO Secretary speaking – a greater focus on maritime General Lord George Robertson; former and air defence would be required. MI6 operative Baroness Meta Ramsay; defence-industry chief Ian Godden; Likewise, the commitment to base the leading defence experts Professor Sir Armed Forces’ headquarters and the Hew Strachan and Professor Malcolm Scottish Navy on the Clyde seems to be Chalmers; former Defence Secretary Liam as much about assuaging concerns over Fox MP; and former Foreign Secretary, potentially massive job losses incurred and current chair of Parliament’s by removing Trident (which is currently Intelligence and Security Committee, based there) as it is about meeting the Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP. Others, such as challenges of the security environment ; MSP; Jackie in which an independent Scotland would Baillie MSP; Edinburgh University’s Dr find itself. The Clyde is based in the Colin Fleming; and Lieutenant Colonel southwest of Scotland, whilst both the Stuart Crawford (who has kindly penned potential threats and the major offshore the Foreword to this report), were – of assets are located in the north and east. course – chosen by virtue of their direct relevance to these issues within Scotland. As for the NATO commitment, the SNP’s defence spokesman, Angus Robertson Looking down this list of names, I could MP, is on record telling party delegates not help but recall the observation of (those who are sceptical that a deeply the Saudi prince who, when asked what held anti-nuclear position is compatible he thought of Scottish independence with joining a first-strike nuclear alliance) replied, “Maybe the Scots want to rule that 75 per cent of Scots want in, and that Scotland but why that is preferable to the SNP have got a referendum to win. ruling England as well, I don’t know.”3 None of this is to suggest that an Irrespective of whether or not readers independent Scotland could not defend agree with the conclusions arrived at in itself; but, it is to say that many of the this report, I nevertheless hope that, as SNP’s policies on defence need serious an extensive and varied compilation of work, and that voters deserve to have expert insights, it will serve as a useful a clear and credible picture of what the contribution to this vitally important potential ramifications of their choice debate.

19 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

20 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Chapter I Defending What, Exactly?

The Foreign Policy of an strong emphasis on working through Independent Scotland formal and informal alliances (principally Before any useful attempt can be with the UN; the EU; and NATO, if made at establishing what the defence possible) to enhance its influence priorities and requirements of an abroad, and to protect itself from independent Scotland should be, there stronger powers in turn. An independent must first be a clear sense of what its Scotland would not be pacifist, but the foreign-policy objectives and interests SNP are explicit that, under their rule, it would be, and – in turn – what sort of would “only take part in UN-sanctioned risks to national security and Scottish operations”. An independent Scotland interests would likely be faced. would therefore be likely to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations from time Although brief, the SNP have given to time, or partake in UN-authorised some indication of their foreign-policy NATO missions, if it joined the alliance; aims in their recent Foreign, Security but, it is almost inconceivable that and Defence Policy Update. It appears an independent Scotland would ever that they envisage an independent seek to exert itself militarily beyond its Scotland operating with a regional focus borders on its own. (as opposed to the global ambitions of the UK), necessarily centred around The dual possibilities of the militarisation Scotland’s location in the northern of the Arctic and the opening up of European neighbourhood: new trade routes (both as a result of the thawing of the ice caps) are two “Scotland is [a] maritime nation with specific examples of areas in which an more than 11,000 miles of coastline, independent Scotland would wish to including nearly 800 islands, critical focus. Counter-terrorism, in particular under-sea and offshore infrastructure the protection of its offshore oilfields, and an area of responsibility extending constitutes a third obvious area of far into the and Atlantic concern. Ocean. The SNP recognises our national responsibilities as a northern European Unfortunately, however, the Foreign, nation to work with our neighbours Security and Defence Policy Update is to fulfil current defence and security very light on specifics and, as importantly, responsibilities and improve collective prioritisation. For instance, whilst it is regional arrangements. Environmental clear that a Scottish foreign policy (at changes to the High North and Arctic least with regard to its defence and Region raise major regional challenges security arrangements) would broadly and responsibilities which Scotland be regional in focus and informed by shares.”4 Scotland’s geographical location in the north Atlantic, the SNP have provided As with many other Small Powers, an scant indication of exactly what sort independent Scotland would place a of role they might wish the country to

21 Defending What, Exactly? play in the area. Would Scotland adopt fully formed idea of an independent a full-spectrum approach to defence Scotland’s foreign-policy ambitions. in the region? Or would it adopt a more specialist stance, focusing on the That being said, it is possible to hazard a provision of certain capabilities, and few logical assumptions based on what allowing its regional neighbours to fill in is currently known (not least regarding the gaps? the broader geopolitical context in which Scotland would sit), and to Likewise, whilst it is possible to deduce consider whether the risks likely to face that an independent Scotland might an independent Scotland would differ in wish to contribute, as part of a coalition, any meaningful way from those which it to UN-mandated operations further already confronts as part of the UK. afield, it is much less clear how much of a priority an independent Scotland In its 2010 National Security Strategy, the might afford to humanitarian operations, UK Government identified the main risks and what level of resources they would to which it felt Britain was vulnerable – accordingly need to set aside for them. looking forwards – and prioritised them into three tiers, taking account of both Would Scotland attempt to seriously likelihood and potential impact. They pursue a ‘values-led’ foreign policy, were as follows: providing assets to humanitarian missions on a regular basis? Or would Tier One it only contribute to the most serious • International terrorism affecting the crises? Would an SDF focus only on UK or its interests. Threats include a peacekeeping missions? Or would it chemical; biological; radiological; or contemplate participation in more nuclear (CBRN) attack by terrorists, militarily robust ‘peace-enforcement’ and/or a significant increase in operations as well? Alternatively, would the levels of terrorism relating to it steer clear of both, and focus only on Northern Ireland. disaster relief? • Hostile ttacksa upon UK cyber space Without answers to questions such as by other states, and large-scale these, it is exceedingly difficult to paint cyber crime. a clear picture of what an independent SDF would – or should – look like, and • A major accident or natural hazard the SNP certainly have a responsibility which requires a national response. to the Scottish public to provide more Examples of major hazards are detail ahead of next year’s referendum. severe coastal flooding affecting The remit of this report, however, three or more regions of the UK, or is to scrutinise whatever SNP policy an influenza pandemic. there is already available, and to draw • An international military crisis conclusions accordingly. between states, drawing in the UK; Potential Risks to Scottish its allies; and other states and non- National Security state actors. As to the kind of risks Scotland would Tier Two likely face, the SNP have given no • An attack on the UK, or its Overseas detailed assessment at all, and a clear Territories, by another state or proxy picture cannot be drawn without a using CBRN weapons.

22 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

• Risk of major overseas instability; Looking down this list, it is immediately insurgency; or civil war, creating an apparent that an independent Scotland environment which terrorists can would very likely be confronted with exploit in order to threaten the UK. many of the same risks, and to at least as great an extent, which it faces as part • A significant increase in the level of of the UK. organised crime affecting the UK. This certainly includes the risk from • Severe disruption to information cyber crime and natural hazards, in Tier received; transmitted; or collected One; the knock-on effects of instability by satellites, possibly as the result of overseas and organised crime, in Tier a deliberate attack by another state. Two; and an increase in the level of Tier Three illicit cross-border activity, disruption to oil and gas supplies, and disruption • A large-scale, conventional military to international supplies of resources attack on theK U by another state essential to the country, as well as a (not involving the use of CBRN major release of radioactive material, in weapons), resulting in fatalities and Tier Three. damage to infrastructure within the UK. Several of the other risks on this list could also be included (but perhaps • A significant increase in the level of requiring some qualification), primarily terrorists, organised criminals, illegal relating to the widely held assumption immigrants, and illicit goods trying that a more ‘passive’ Scottish foreign to cross the UK border to enter the policy would reduce the risk posed by country. hostile actors wishing to do the nation • Disruption o t oil or gas supplies harm. Amongst the most severe and to the UK, or oil and gas-price obvious dangers to fall into this category instability, as a result of war; is the threat of terrorism. accident; major political upheaval; This was essentially the conclusion that or deliberate manipulation of supply the Jimmy Reid Foundation reached in by producers. a report published in October 2012 (No • A major release of radioactive Need To Be Afraid: An assessment of material from a civil nuclear site possible threats to Scotland’s security within the UK, affecting one or more and how they should be addressed). regions. The top three factors identified by the report as “likely to increase the threat • A conventional attack by a state on to Scottish security” are: “[a]ssociation another NATO or EU member, to with UK foreign policy”, “[p]resence of which the UK would have to respond. nuclear weapons on Scottish soil”, and • An attack on a UK Overseas Territory “[m]embership of military alliances with policies of aggression or retaliation, such as the result of a sovereignty dispute 6 or a wider regional conflict. as NATO.” • Short-to-medium term disruption to In its assessment of the threat of international supplies of resources terrorism in an independent Scotland, (e.g. food, minerals) essential to the the report concludes that it is “[h]ard to UK.5 assess but certainly real, though probably lower than [for the] UK as a whole”.

23 Defending What, Exactly?

The implications of independence on year assessed at the time of writing.10 this threat, it continues, would be “[s] This puts them as the two highest-ranked omewhere between ‘no difference’ and European nations; yet neither country is ‘likely decreased threat resulting from known internationally for its provocative detachment from UK foreign policy’”.7 overseas foreign policies. Norway was sent spiralling up the index as a result of The former head of MI5, Baroness Eliza the atrocity perpetrated by the far-right Manningham-Buller, also drew the link extremist Anders Behring Breivik, whilst between foreign policy and the threat of Greece was hit primarily by domestic terrorism when she said that the 2003 groups angered at the government’s invasion of Iraq “showed very clearly stringent austerity measures.11 It is also that foreign and domestic policy are notable that, looking globally, from 2002 intertwined – actions overseas have an to 2011, North America was the region impact at home. And our involvement in least likely to suffer from terrorism.12 Iraq spurred some young British Muslims to turn to terror.”8 Similar conclusions can be drawn from Europol’s most recent “Terrorism Most recently, the horrendous murder Situation and Trend Report”, TE-SAT of Drummer Lee Rigby on the streets of 2012, which stated that, in 2011, “[n] London on 22 May 2013 was, claimed ot one religiously-inspired [sic] terrorist Michael Adebolajo (one of the two men attack […] was reported by Member allegedly responsible for Rigby’s death, States, nor were any single-issue terrorist and a convert to ), directly related attacks registered. […] Of all specified to the UK’s military presence overseas: affiliations, the majority of attacks were “The only reason we have killed this committed by separatist groups.”13 man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers. And this British Whilst complaints about foreign policy soldier is one. It is an eye for eye and a are often cited by individuals convicted of tooth for a tooth. By Allah, we swear by religiously motivated – and, specifically, the almighty Allah, we will never stop Islamist – terrorism, such grievances fighting until you leave us alone.”9 often extend more broadly than the foreign policy of one particular nation. However, whilst foreign-policy grievances In most cases, they tend to be subsidiary help motivate some terrorists, it would to the primary ideological objective of be highly unwise to calibrate the overall advancing an agenda incompatible with terrorist threat to a state on that basis the democratic values of every state in alone, or – indeed – to conclude that Europe, irrespective of their foreign- foreign-policy grievances constitute the policy posture. Moreover, it should go sole, or even the primary, motivator for without saying that to argue for any many who go on to commit terrorist nation’s foreign policy to be altered, offences. in order to assuage the grievances Data from the Global Terrorism Index (real or imagined) of individuals who produced by the Institute for Economics intentionally deploy violence against and Peace appears to bear this out. civilians for political purposes, is a very Designed to systematically rank the dangerous – and morally ambiguous – nations of the world according to road indeed. terrorist activity, it placed Norway and st th “Some people seem to think the Scots Greece 21 and 26 (respectively, out of are not in [the Islamists’] sights, but a total of 116) in 2011 – the most recent

24 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy the whole of Western Europe is in their the UK), would necessarily exclude an sights,” Baroness Meta Ramsay, formerly independent Scotland. a senior operative with MI6, said in an interview for this report. “If you Indeed, any sensible assessment of want to create a world caliphate, you the potential risks to an independent certainly include Scotland in that, and, in Scotland, and how they should inform its many ways, Scotland is a soft target.”14 defence posture, would recognise that According to Ramsay, airport the world in 10; 20; or 50 years’ time was chosen as the site for the attempted may – and most likely will – look very bombing in 2007 because the attackers different to the world of today. deemed it to be an easier target than A good national security strategy must comparable sites south of the border.15 also take account of the need for a The attackers’ motives appear to have country to respond effectively not just been a mixture of hatred for the UK’s to predetermined, definable threats, foreign policy, primarily its involvement but also to strategic shocks that can in Iraq, as well as a more general disdain materialise without warning, at any for the West and what it represented. The place and at any time. It is worthy of note day before the Glasgow attack, the two that none of the main military conflicts conspirators – Bilal Abdulla and Kafeel in which the UK has been involved Ahmed – had been in London and had since 1945 were predicted beforehand; planted bombs (which failed to detonate) the lesson from that is clear: sovereign near a bus stop and near the Tiger Tiger nations serious about their defence nightclub. After Abdulla’s prosecution, need to retain armed forces with a good the judge stated that the choice of a degree of flexibility and resilience, and nightclub was symbolic, as it represented must resist the slide towards a bare- all that the attackers despised about bones defence specialised for scenarios that may not – and probably will not – be “Western culture: drink, association iii between the sexes, and music.”16 the ones that are actually faced. Similarly, it would not be inconceivable Finally, it is important to note that to envisage how Scotland may well be several of the risks highlighted above no freer from several of the other risks would not necessarily fall within the affecting theK U which, at first glance, remit of defence forces at all, but rather could be construed as being directly the police; emergency services; and linked to foreign-policy posture. other specialist outfits. Many of these agencies are already devolved, and are For instance, whilst the rUK (rest of not the focus of this report; but, it is the UK, minus Scotland) would almost worth appreciating how broad the risks certainly retain military capabilities are to national security, and how often that were greatly superior to those of they fall outside what might commonly an independent Scotland, and a more be thought of as conventional security ‘activist’ foreign-policy posture when it domains. came to overseas military deployments, that does not mean that an international military crisis between states (one of iii. See Jenkin, B. & Grant, G., The Tipping Point: British National Strategy and the UK’s Future World Role, The the four Tier One risks which threaten Henry Jackson Society, London, July 2011

25 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

26 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Chapter II Joining NATO

Amongst the most important issues The vote was certainly controversial; that will help shape the sort of foreign however, it came on the back of policy and defence posture that an discussions (with officials from other independent Scotland would have is NATO members) that highlighted why whether or not it would be in NATO. Of a Scottish exit from the alliance would all the big questions surrounding the be problematic, and after a realisation independence debate, this is also one of amongst the SNP leadership that an the most contentious. independent Scotland outside NATO could be left dangerously exposed. On 19 October 2012, following one of the most heated discussions in the The SNP’s Foreign, Security and Defence party’s 78-year history, the SNP narrowly Policy Update, released shortly after the voted to reverse their decades-long conference, has this to say about the opposition to NATO membership for an party’s new stance on NATO: independent Scotland. “Security cooperation in our region The resolution (proposed by the SNP’s functions primarily through NATO, which defence spokesman, Angus Robertson, is regarded as the keystone defence together with Angus MacNeil MP) said: organisation by Denmark, Norway, “On independence Scotland will inherit Iceland and the United Kingdom. its treaty obligations with NATO. An The SNP wishes Scotland to fulfil its SNP Government will maintain NATO responsibilities to neighbours and allies. membership subject to an agreement On independence Scotland will inherit that Scotland will not host nuclear its treaty obligations with NATO. weapons and NATO continues to respect the right of members to only take part in “An SNP Government will maintain UN-sanctioned operations.”17 NATO membership subject to an agreement that Scotland will not host A total of 426 delegates voted in favour nuclear weapons and NATO takes all of the change, with 332 opposed, after possible steps to bring about nuclear an amendment to reject the motion disarmament as required by the altogether was defeated by just 29 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of votes.18 Four days later, MSPs John which all its members are signatories, Finnie and Jean Urquhart announced and further that NATO continues to their decision to stand down from the respect the right of members to only take party, in protest against the vote. Finnie part in UN-sanctioned operations. In the later explained that the pair could not absence of such an agreement, Scotland “continue to belong to a party that will work with NATO as a member of the quite rightly does not wish to hold Partnership for Peace [PfP] programme nuclear weapons on its soil, but [then like Sweden, Finland, Austria and also] wants to join a first-strike nuclear Ireland. Scotland will be a full member alliance.”19 of the Common Security and Defence

27 Joining NATO

Policy (CSDP) of the European Union and In his interview for this report in March the Organisation for Cooperation and 2013, Robertson elaborated further on Security in Europe (OSCE).”20 the argument which he had previously put forward at the October conference: Addressing delegates at the October “For quite some time the SNP [have] conference to debate the motion, Angus had a formal position for wishing to Robertson explained the proposed be a member of NATO’s ‘Partnership change by calling upon Scotland’s for Peace’ programme.”24 However, strategic obligation to be a responsible he said, meetings with neighbouring player, internationally, at a time states, including Norway and Denmark, when its “region in northern Europe had brought home to him that PfP is facing considerable challenges and membership alone might not be opportunities”. enough, and that the strategic benefits “For the last ten years,” he said, “the offered to small European states by SNP has had a policy of supporting NATO membership were not to be taken ‘Partnership for Peace’, which is: lightly: “it became apparent to me that associate membership of NATO. I am there was a significant gap between what proposing that, given the information we the ‘Partnership for Peace’ provides, and now have from our neighbours, we must what NATO membership offers – both to fulfil our treaty obligations – including individual countries [and] collectively – mutual defence guarantees and in security terms”. conventional cooperation. Sovereignty Launched in January 1994, the PfP is for Scotland means that we can have described as “a programme of practical the optimal conventional defence bilateral cooperation between individual policy, and we should make sure that we Euro-Atlantic partner countries and continue to have the best relations with 25 21 NATO.” The PfP is presently comprised our neighbours.” of 22 members – ranging from former Supporting his colleague, Angus MacNeil states of the (including reiterated the point, arguing that “the Russia and Uzbekistan), to various EU independent-together group of 28 member states (such as Ireland, Austria, nations who’re in NATO [are] natural and Sweden) which, for various historical allies, and people sympathetic to reasons, have opted out of becoming Scotland […] Scotland in NATO is good fully fledged NATO members. defence, good for our neighbouring Given the breadth of its membership, nations who are looking for historical 22 the PfP has adopted an avowedly continuity in defence.” loose mandate, whereby members Presenting an argument that elicited can choose “their own priorities for strong objection from many delegates, cooperation”. This extends across most MEP re-emphasised the fields of NATO activity, including defence message put forward by Robertson reform; civil-military relations; military- and MacNeil: “Robert Burns said it to-military cooperation and planning; best: ‘to see ourselves as others see civil-emergency planning; and disaster us’ is a pretty harsh rigour, and – in my response.26 considered, regretful, professional view According to Robertson, there are – our present policy makes us look odd, several specific areas in which full NATO hopelessly naive and idealistic at best, membership would provide Scotland not ready for the big league.”23

28 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy with benefits that PfP membership angle – that Robertson used at the could not, citing maritime patrol and October conference, when closing his air defence as examples. “If a plane flies case for revising the party’s NATO policy. towards Scotland from the north, it is Following a battering raft of strongly first spotted by a NATO communication worded, and enthusiastically received, centre in Jutland, under the command speeches of opposition from a number of a Norwegian, and that information of senior SNP members, he said: is then passed on to the UK. If Scotland were no longer in NATO, that key air- “I’m very honoured to have been the policing; advance-warning; collaborative campaign director of the SNP in the two approach is not possible – similarly in national -election maritime patrol, and, indeed, air policing victories that we have won; but do not in northern Europe.”27 kid yourself, our best ever result has been 44 per cent of the vote, not ‘50 Shortly before the October conference, per cent plus one’ – and that is what Robertson said that a question had been we require in the referendum in 2014 to put to him, whilst accompanying Alex secure our independence. Salmond MSP on a fact-finding trip to neighbouring countries, about whether “This debate, this vote, is about much, the understood much more than carrying a conference how important NATO air cover was to hall; this is about carrying the country, North Sea security: and we need the country to vote ‘Yes’. Do not disregard the evidence. When asked, “I asked what the impact would be of 75 per cent of respondents said they Scotland not being in NATO. The answer would wish an independent Scotland came that the simplest way to describe to remain [boos from the audience]... it is pulling the plug on the radar. you can boo, you can boo, but do not Everything that is around Scotland turns disregard the evidence.”30 into a black hole where we have no idea what’s going on, and that worries our Criticism of the SNP’s new stance on neighbours intensely.”28 NATO, both from inside the party and outside, has centred on the perceived Whilst strategic considerations such incompatibility of the commitment to as these will undoubtedly have played remove nuclear weapons from Scottish a part in informing the revised stance soil whilst simultaneously seeking to join of the SNP leadership, there does also a first-strike nuclear alliance. seem to have been a more political concern at play: namely, the acute need It is important to re-emphasise, for the SNP to minimise the number of however, that, should the SNP’s stance reasons Scots might find to vote ‘No’ to on nuclear weapons prove an obstacle independence in 2014. to NATO membership for whatever reason, then the party has stipulated As the party leadership has reminded it will forfeit membership in favour of its membership on more than one its commitment to making Scotland occasion, fully 75 per cent of Scots are nuclear-weapons free. As the Foreign, reckoned to support an independent Security and Defence Policy Update Scotland being part of NATO, a position makes clear: also held by 70 per cent of SNP voters.29 Perhaps tellingly, it was this argument “An SNP Government will maintain – as opposed to the military-strategic NATO membership subject to an

29 Joining NATO agreement that Scotland will not host has been strongly challenged by two of nuclear weapons and NATO takes all the world’s leading authorities on state possible steps to bring about nuclear formation in international law. disarmament as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of James Crawford SC, Whewell Professor which all its members are signatories.”31 of International Law at the , and Alan Boyle, Professor Would Scotland of Public International Law at the University of Edinburgh, argue that it is Remain within NATO, not legally possible for two new states or Have to Reapply? to inherit the international personality of the former state, and that it would be What is also apparent from the previous the rUK which would continue as before, quote is the fact that the SNP’s position retaining the rights and obligations of is that an independent Scotland would the UK as it currently stands.34 not in fact need to reapply for NATO membership at all; it would continue The two men provide four main reasons with the status quo ante until such for this. First, there is the majority of time as Scotland, not NATO, decided international precedent (including the otherwise. The SNP have long taken a creation of an Irish state from within similar stance regarding whether or not the UK, and the break-up of the Soviet an independent Scotland would have to Union). Second, there will be the fact reapply for membership of the European of the rUK’s retention of most of the Union. population (92 per cent) and territory (68 per cent) of the current UK. Third, there “With independence, we would just is the likelihood that other states would continue within NATO as a member state, recognise the rUK as the same legal and it would then be after independence entity as before Scottish independence, that the would decide if not least because of the its pivotal role in that would be the continuing position,” the post-war world order. Finally, there Bill Kidd, co-convenor of the Scottish is the fact that, on the rare occasions Parliament’s Cross-Party Group on when one state is dissolved and two new Nuclear Disarmament, said in an states are created peacefully from it, this interview for this report. 32 tends to happen by mutual agreement. “[The North Atlantic Treaty] is an On the last of these points, it is hard international treaty. The treaty has been to envisage any scenario in which the signed on behalf of all of the people majority of people in the UK would and the constituent parts of the United ever give the Westminster Parliament Kingdom. It has not been signed on a mandate to dissolve the entire state behalf of England or Westminster; it has by voting it out of existence. These been signed by all of the people. And, four factors combined, it is therefore because in 1707 there was a unification most likely that it would be the rUK of parliaments (and not an incorporation which would assume the position of of parliaments by Westminster), then ‘continuing state’. it is joint and certainly liable with all treaties.”33 In the opinion of Crawford and Boyle, “the status of Scotland before the However, the claim that Scotland would union of 1707 would be of little or no enjoy the status of ‘continuing state’ relevance. In particular, the Treaty of

30 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Union, considered with or without the the applicant state and the Member Acts of Union, does not currently sound States on the conditions of admission as a treaty in international law.” and the adjustments to the Treaties which such admission entails. This The two men concede that the “rules of agreement is subject to ratification by state succession to treaties generally do all Member States and the applicant not apply to membership of international state.”36 organisations”, arguing instead that “membership depends on the particular NATO officials have delivered a similar rules and practices of the organisation.” verdict, stating in April 2013 that: “It In the case of the UN, they conclude, appears widely agreed that, as a matter Scotland would be expected to join as a of law, a Scotland which has declared its new state, whilst the rUK would continue independence and thereby established as before – including with its permanent its separate statehood would be viewed seat on the UN Security Council. 35 as a new state. As regards the case with the EU, the “In the NATO context, the definitive situation is less clear, since there determination on this question would is no precedent for one part of an be made by the member states, acting existing member state breaking away in the North Atlantic Council. A new and wishing to continue with EU state would not be a party to the North membership. However, in a letter sent Atlantic Treaty, and thus not a member on 10 December 2012 to the House of of NATO. If it were to choose to apply for Lords Economic Affairs Committee, EU NATO membership, its application would Commission President Jose Manuel be subject to the normal procedure, as Barroso appeared to deliver a definitive outlined in Article 10 of the Treaty.”36A verdict on the matter: How eligible an independent Scotland “The EU is founded on the Treaties which would be for NATO membership is an apply only to the Member States who entirely separate question, addressed in have agreed and ratified them. If part of the following section of this chapter. the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that state because Joining a Nuclear- it were to become a new independent Armed Alliance whilst state, the Treaties would no longer apply to that territory. In other words, a new Making Scotland independent state would, by the fact Nuclear-Free of its independence, become a third On several occasions, both Angus country with respect to the EU and the Robertson and have Treaties would no longer apply on its argued that the SNP’s stance on nuclear territory. weapons should not pose a problem for “Under Article 49 of the Treaty on NATO membership, pointing out that, European Union, any European state with just three of the organisation’s which respects the principles set out 28 members retaining possession of in Article 2 of the Treaty on European nuclear weapons (they are: the UK, the Union may apply to become a member US, and France), to be a non-nuclear of the EU. If the application is accepted member of NATO is not – in fact – the by the Council acting unanimously, an exception, but the norm. agreement is then negotiated between

31 Joining NATO

“Within NATO there are other countries words, it was the considered choice of that have the same position that we the nuclear-armed state to remove the do,” Robertson said. “For instance, the weapons, as opposed to a reaction to Norwegian Government’s sovereign demands made by the state in which wealth fund does not invest in companies those armaments were based. that produce nuclear weapons. It’s one of the rules of the investment fund.”37 As for Canada, it stands unique as the only one of the three countries involved Responding to the point that whilst the in the Manhattan Project – to develop governments of several NATO countries the nuclear bomb – which decided might oppose nuclear weapons in against developing its own nuclear theory, none are presently committed arsenal (the other two countries in to a policy of unilateral removal of these the project were Britain and the US). weapons from their territory in practice, However, the decision was subsequently Robertson noted that two NATO member taken to equip the Canadian military states had become nuclear-free in recent with American nuclear weapons, starting decades: Greece and Canada. In many in 1963 and ending with Canada’s important respects, however, neither final divestiture of the bomb in 1984. the experience of Greece nor Canada During that period, Canada deployed can be said to serve as an applicable four nuclear-weapons systems both precedent for Scotland. domestically and in West Germany, and, at one point, was also providing fully 20 In the case of Greece, the country never per cent of NATO’s available nuclear- possessed nuclear weapons of its own, capable aircraft.40 but retained a base – Araxos Air Base – on which American nuclear weapons were The decision to phase out these nuclear stored as part of NATO’s nuclear-sharing weapons was a unilateral one taken arrangement. The US enacted a decision by the Canadian Government, and it to remove these weapons from Greece caused no little disquiet amongst the in 2001, ending more than 40 years of NATO allies at the time. Yet, what is US nuclear weapons deployment to the significant is the fact that Canada took country.38 this action in an attempt to reverse the prior resolution to equip its military When asked at the time to provide an with nuclear-capable weapons systems. explanation for this decision, Pentagon Unlike the SNP, the Government was not spokesman Rear Admiral Craig Quigley to trying force the removal of a nuclear declined to comment: “We have a long- capability resting under the exclusive standing policy of neither confirming control of another country. nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on any installation, and Today, five non-nuclear NATO members that is still our policy. It’s served us well host US-military-controlled nuclear over the years.”39 What can be surmised, weapons on their territory: , however, is that the decision came as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, part of a broader drawdown of forward- and Turkey. Although three of these deployed US nuclear weapons in Europe, countries – Belgium, Germany, and the something which has been taking place Netherlands – have publicly stated their since the end of the ; it was desire to divest themselves of these not forced on the US by demands from weapons, all have committed to a policy the government in Athens. In other of consensus within NATO on the issue.

32 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

That is to say that any decision to remove Asked if he was effectively advocating nuclear weapons from these territories a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ posture with would be subject to agreement by all 28 respect to weapons of mass destruction NATO member states.41 in Scottish territorial waters, Salmond dodged the question, choosing instead An SNP-governed independent Scotland to reiterate his broader opposition to would therefore stand alone in its nuclear weapons: commitment to unilaterally force the removal of another country’s nuclear- “No, we’ll have exactly the same policy weapons capability from its territory. against nuclear weapons as Canada or Norway has: explicitly made by There are, moreover, two further their parliaments. We’ll make it a components of the Scottish situation constitutional provision to prevent that additionally complicate matters, Scotland having the possession of neither of which applies to any of the nuclear weapons, because we are deeply above cases involving other NATO opposed to these nuclear weapons […] countries. I’m saying we’ll be in exactly the same Allowing Nuclear-Armed Vessels position as other non-nuclear members to Dock in Scottish Ports of NATO, and that no country, as you The first of these concerns pertains to must know, ever confirms the existence the SNP’s stipulation that not only will of nuclear weapons on visiting warships; they refuse to allow nuclear weapons that’s just not done. So, we’ll have to be based on their territory, but they the same policy as other non-nuclear will also seek to prohibit nuclear-armed members of NATO.” NATO vessels from docking in Scottish Five months later, at their spring ports. Irrespective of their overall stance conference in March 2013, the SNP on nuclear weapons, no NATO member appeared to move towards a more has sought to proscribe freedom of explicitly hostile position with regard movement for the alliance’s cornerstone to Scotland playing host to the nuclear strategic asset in this way. weapons of other countries. A proposed In truth, the SNP leadership has not motion requesting that the constitution been entirely consistent on this matter of an independent Scotland “should in recent months. Shortly after the seek to ban the possession of nuclear resolution reversing the party’s stance weapons and other weapons of mass on NATO membership was passed destruction” was amended to remove in October 2012, Alex Salmond was the words “seek to”, and insert the additional prohibition on “basing and pressed repeatedly on this particular 43 topic, and appeared to come down in hosting” nuclear arms. favour of allowing such vessels to dock On 6 April 2013, Angus Robertson in Scottish ports. provided perhaps the clearest statement “The issue about visiting warships, etc, yet on the issue: no country ever confirms the existence “Well, the issue for the SNP is about the of nuclear weapons on its warships – hosting and basing of nuclear weapons that is well known. This is an issue all […] we do not want to have nuclear non-nuclear countries have to face up weapons based in Scotland […] Of to within NATO and out of NATO and we course, there is a right of passage for all will do exactly the same thing.”42 vessels under the United Nations Law

33 Joining NATO of the Sea, and so that’s not something “Far better it was curtains for Trident, one can take exception to; there is a I would say,” Salmond told the BBC in right of passage for all countries. What October 2012, when asked what the we are talking about is […] Scotland, as consequence might be for the UK of a sovereign state: will we have nuclear moving its nuclear deterrent off Scottish weapons based in our country? [Will territory.45 we] host them, or allow them to come to ports in Scotland? We don’t want Bill Kidd has gone further, stating his that to happen. And, of course, that’s desire to see Scottish independence one of the great advantages of being a trigger a chain-reaction which would sovereign state […] you can make these not only see the rUK rid itself of nuclear decisions.”44 weapons, but France as well: WANTING TO MAKE THE RUK “If Scotland ceases to have nuclear NUCLEAR FREE? weapons on its territory, then I believe that the United Kingdom will find The second peculiarity with the SNP’s itself unable to continue to be in that position on nuclear weapons (which also position also […] When [the nuclear does not apply to the experience of any missiles] are removed from Scotland, other NATO member) is that, at its most the Westminster-ruled part of the extreme, it could potentially force the United Kingdom that remains will have unilateral disarmament of another NATO no option but to dismantle their nuclear member state. weapons and cease to actually be a Whereas every other NATO member nuclear-weapons state. which has – or has had – nuclear weapons “Following on from that […] I have based in their territory was playing host been recently over speaking in France to just one of many US nuclear bases, at the National Assembly about this. I an independent Scotland would be know […] – because I said it there, and hosting the sole nuclear base belonging it caused a little bit of a ripple of intake to the rUK. Consequently, even if a of breath – that France would be put state such as Belgium; Germany; or the in an iniquitous position as the only Netherlands unilaterally demanded the remaining nuclear-weapons state in removal of American nuclear weapons Western Europe. Therefore, the rolling from their soil, it would never result in programme, hopefully (from my point the de facto nuclear disarmament of the of view), would be that France would entire United States. not be able to continue as a nuclear- Although it is highly unlikely that an weapons state with any credibility after 46 independent Scotland would force the Britain ceased to be one also.” removal of nuclear missiles from its territory in such a manner as to deprive The Case against the rUK of its nuclear-weapons capability, NATO Membership the possibility must – at the very least – for a Nuclear-Free be considered, not least because it is the stated desire of several SNP members Scotland (including Alex Salmond) that Scottish The SNP’s insistence that its policies on independence should indeed trigger a nuclear weapons would not come at the scenario that results in the rUK divesting expense of NATO membership has been itself of nuclear armaments. widely challenged. The arguments are multifaceted; but, amongst the most

34 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy pertinent is the seeming incompatibility of NATO’s nuclear-policy committee) between the SNP’s posture on nuclear warned that, on the SNP’s current arms, and the NATO Strategic Concept. trajectory, Scotland “could not stay in NATO” after independence. Going on Although NATO lacks any official the current evidence, Miller said, “the accession criteria, all members are SNP believes that nuclear weapons Strategic expected to sign-up to its are illegal and should be banned […] Concept , which, on the matter of nuclear If that is the case then that is totally weapons, is explicit: “As long as nuclear incompatible with the NATO position weapons exist, NATO will remain a 47 that nuclear weapons are a critical part nuclear alliance.” of the alliance’s defensive component.”48 Specifically, the SNP’s objection to any Miller was referring to the SNP’s official nuclear-armed vessel docking in Scottish policy of writing a legal ban on nuclear ports, and their broader aspiration weapons into a Scottish constitution, if to see the UK and – perhaps – even the nation opted for independence.49 France decommission their own nuclear This view is shared by Lord George deterrents (coming as a result of the Robertson (a former NATO Secretary removal of British nuclear weapons from General and former Labour Party the Clyde) do indeed appear inconsistent Defence Secretary), who has said that Strategic Concept with the as it stands at Scottish membership of NATO would present. be “inconceivable” if Scotland did not NATO describes nuclear forces – accept the alliance’s 2010 Strategic “particularly those of the United States” Concept. – as the “supreme guarantee of the “There is no doubt at all in my mind. Allies”, adding that “the independent New members have a whole series of strategic nuclear forces of the United obligations that they’ve got to fulfil, but Kingdom and France, which have a the basic one is the Strategic Concept deterrent role of their own, contribute – it is NATO’s working document,” Lord to the overall deterrence and security of Robertson said in an interview for this the Allies.” Aspiring to help rid one, if not report. “If you don’t accept that and all two, of those members of their nuclear that it says, then you simply cannot be forces does not appear consistent with a member. In a way [the SNP] got over NATO’s statement. the hurdle at the conference, and the The Strategic Concept is also fairly perception is that, ‘Right, they have explicit with regard to the importance accepted NATO membership, but they of a mutually cooperative approach have not accepted what comes with it’.” amongst allies, on the issue of nuclear One crucial issue that may well defence. Members pledge to “ensure influence how Scotland’s application the broadest possible participation of for membership will be viewed by the Allies in collective defence planning on other members is the speed at which it nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of seeks to divest itself of the UK’s nuclear nuclear forces, and in command, control deterrent. and consultation arrangements”. Providing evidence to a recent Foreign On 14 April 2013, Franklin Miller (a Affairs Select Committee inquiry, senior director of the US’ National Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Director Security Council, and a former chairman of Research at the Royal United Services

35 Joining NATO

Institute in London, warned that “there policy change last October. “If the SNP would be little international sympathy, were to force the issue of the removal at least amongst the UK’s traditional of nuclear weapons from the Clyde, allies, were Scotland to insist that the that is effectively forcing the unilateral UK’s nuclear-armed submarines leave disarmament of the [r]UK; […] the [r] its territory on a timescale that did not UK wouldn’t allow that to happen, and allow the rUK to construct alternative neither would the Americans.” What the bases in England or Wales. Such a policy SNP have attempted, with their revised could encourage a robust response from NATO stance – according to Crawford – is the rUK, perhaps even a questioning to “kick the contradictions into the long of whether it could support Scotland’s grass”.50 NATO and EU aspirations.” Liam Fox (the former Conservative It is worth re-emphasising that NATO Defence Secretary) concurred in warning operates on the basis of consensus, that an independent Scotland – if meaning that, to successfully join, an adopting the stance advocated by the independent Scotland would need SNP – should certainly not take NATO to have the support of all 28 existing membership for granted, describing members. the party’s desire to rid itself of nuclear weapons whilst concurrently sheltering Of potentially significant concern to the under the alliance’s nuclear umbrella, as SNP will be the stance of Lieutenant “the most appalling hypocrisy”. Colonel Stuart Crawford on this issue. A former SNP parliamentary candidate “Why should the UK give everything and the author of a paper (widely to the Government of Scotland that cited by that same party) on how an they want, whilst the Government of independent Scotland might defend Scotland is denying all the rest of the itself, Crawford has described the SNP’s UK, and indeed our NATO allies, one of NATO ambitions as “irreconcilable in the the key capabilities that it requires: the short-to-medium term”. nuclear deterrent? Clearly, there would be enormous pressure – not just from In Crawford’s view, the SNP’s stance on the UK Government, but from France NATO membership is informed primarily and the United States – to retain our by political – as opposed to strategic – current capability as part of NATO’s considerations, and is seriously impeded nuclear umbrella. It would be very hard by the fact that a more credible posture to see why (if the Scottish Government would be almost impossible to sell to was denying that capability to Britain the party’s grassroots membership. and to NATO) France, Britain, or the US “Traditionally, the SNP’s objection to would allow Scotland to join NATO at NATO was that it was a ‘nuclear-led’ all.”51 alliance – and not just ‘nuclear-led’, but ‘first-strike’. But, politically, their Meanwhile, Sir Malcolm Rifkind (the credibility was shot to bits by trying to former Conservative Foreign Secretary negotiate out of NATO when everyone and Defence Secretary) has described else was trying to get in; it just made no the SNP’s commitment to joining NATO sense whatsoever.” as “purely presentational”; but he went on to warn that the reality would not be It was this concern, Crawford says, so straightforward: which informed the SNP leadership’s

36 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

“If they want to join, they will be asked, economic powerhouse. They have had ‘Do you accept the underlying basis to step back from their stated desire of what NATO means?’. It’s a nuclear- to remove nuclear weapons from their weapons-based alliance, and, if the shores because of pressure from NATO. answer is, ‘Yes, we do’, then how can The same thing has happened with [the you simultaneously be compelling Netherlands] and Belgium. If it’s nigh the expulsion of nuclear weapons on impossible for Germany to remove from your territory? Scotland would nuclear weapons of mass destruction not be accepted on that basis, and from within NATO, why should we expect nor should it be […] To say only three it to be simple for Scotland to remove members are nuclear-armed is invalid them, let alone make our case for global because the security of all member disarmament an easier one? states is ultimately based on nuclear weapons. How can we insist on getting “Even if it were possible for Scotland to rid of nuclear weapons in Scotland, and remove nuclear weapons, and remain a then say we want to remain part of an member of NATO, where is the morality alliance where our essential safety and in seeking to rid our own country of the security would be underpinned by the abhorrence of nuclear weapons, [whilst] United States’ nuclear guarantee? It’s sheltering under the umbrella of an absolutely absurd.”52 organisation that retains a nuclear first- strike policy? Do we consider nuclear Divisions on NATO Membership weapons immoral just because they’re within the SNP located within Scotland, or do we Perhaps ironically, the potential pitfalls consider them immoral wherever they 53 of the SNP’s NATO bid are one of the may be located?” few things that pro-unionists and This sentiment, that a Scotland in NATO advocates have in common with NATO may find it more difficult to hold several of those within the SNP itself. unswervingly to its commitment to Addressing delegates at last October’s rapidly divest itself of nuclear weapons debate on NATO, MSP and prevent nuclear-armed forces from warned the party leadership that ever visiting its shores, is shared by divesting Scotland of Trident might not many others within the party. be as straightforward as was commonly believed, if the country joined NATO: “Let’s consider NATO membership when the last Trident boat sails down “If we take as our starting point the Clyde, and not before,” urged Bill ‘remaining in NATO’, as the resolution Ramsay, of the SNP’s Trade Unions asks us to do, we can expect it to be Group, to cheers and applause from more difficult to remove Trident from delegates at the October conference. the Clyde. We can expect NATO to prevaricate on whether it’s acceptable The Geostrategic for Scotland to remove nuclear weapons from within our borders, and that will Importance of delay the removal of those nuclear Scotland in NATO weapons. All of these details aside, the SNP “Let’s look at Germany, the largest have argued that it would retain nation in Europe, this continent’s NATO membership for a very practical

37 Joining NATO reason which has nothing at all to do something to the rUK that doesn’t exist with nuclear weapons: namely, the already, and that would be filling a gap geostrategic importance of Scotland to in the north Atlantic and the high north the alliance. […This] would be useful for the rUK because today the rUK looks south, in As previously mentioned, Angus particular to the (which is Robertson has spoken at length about understandable); but it leaves a gap. Scotland’s geostrategic value to NATO In the days when the was (in particular, in terms of maritime stronger, that was fine. Before austerity, surveillance and reconnaissance in the they were persuaded they could fill high north). On 9 April 2013, during these gaps easily; but that’s no longer a speech to the Brookings Institution the case.”55 in the United States, Alex Salmond sought to take this argument further Paul Courtnage (an air-defence specialist still, by turning the issue on its head and former Royal Air Force (RAF) Wing and effectively suggesting that Scotland Commander) concurred that military would be doing NATO a favour by cooperation with Scotland would be becoming a member, as opposed to the important for enabling the rUK to other way around: effectively patrol and protect its high north, warning that, by taking Scotland “[A]nybody could argue that a out of the picture, “the furthest-north ‘Partnership for Peace’ arrangement, airfield from which our jets could as Sweden; Finland; [and] Ireland be based is RAF Leeming in North [have], would be perfectly adequate for Yorkshire.” Scotland’s defence requirements […] The reason that the SNP last year, after The Potential Impact a strong and vigorous debate, decided to adopt a policy of favouring NATO of NATO Membership membership is because we have had on Foreign and indications – signals – from our friends Defence Policy and partners [that] that is what they would prefer, because the framework One final issue, with regard to the NATO of having Scotland (from a strategic question, that Scottish voters may wish position) is quite important in terms of to consider before they head to the their defence configurations. So, we’ve polls next September is what impact taken a decision to signal that we want membership may have on conventional to be […] a responsible member of the foreign and defence policy, quite apart international community, and there’s from nuclear weapons. every possible reason (in terms of In the past two decades, the UK has NATO’s treaties and founding charters) engaged in several overseas military that that would be accepted; but that’s 54 interventions, more often than not in the reason why we’ve done this.” conjunction with the NATO alliance. Dr Colin Fleming, Leverhulme Early Whilst the SNP should not be considered Career Fellow at Edinburgh University, a pacifist party, it is probably fair to has also emphasised the strategic say that they have traditionally taken importance, for the rUK, of a Scotland a more critical stance towards such in NATO. interventions than governments at Westminster have. “[Scotland in NATO could] provide

38 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

SNP opposition to the war in Iraq is EU who don’t lift a finger: I think that is well documented, but Alex Salmond a disgrace.” also strongly criticised the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo (which did not Shedding light on this rationale, Ole enjoy a UN Security Council mandate, on Kværnø, Director at the Royal Danish account of Russian opposition), calling it Defence College’s Institute for Strategy, “an act of dubious legality, but above all has explained that small NATO countries one of unpardonable folly”.56 – such as Denmark – operate on the basis of an unvarnished appreciation of In its Foreign, Security and Defence their geostrategic positions, something Policy Update, the SNP have made which might not sit comfortably with clear their intention for an independent several of the more fiercely anti-NATO Scotland “to only take part in UN- and anti-American advocates of Scottish sanctioned operations”, adding that a independence: NATO commitment to respect this right is one of the conditions for Scottish “Our vision is by no means to defend membership of the alliance.57 “We’ve ourselves. We, as a state, are no longer talked about a triple lock involving able to defend ourselves in military the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish terms […] our investment is not in our Government, and the United Nations’ direct and own defence but rather in standards in relation to military keeping our preferred partners happy so operations,” Angus Robertson said.58 that they will come to our rescue at the end of the day.”59 There are, however, those who suggest that, if Scotland was a part of “The best way of defending Denmark the alliance, it may find itself under would be [by doing it] somewhere far greater pressure to contribute to NATO away from the borders of Denmark, [as] military operations too, than it would part of an alliance. That’s why we’ve do if it chose not to join: the unwritten decided to play an active part in what membership fee of the world’s most the NATO alliance is doing,” added John undisputedly powerful military club. Dyrby Paulsen, of the Danish Social Democrat Party. Proponents of this position point, in particular, to the experiences of True to its word, the country has been countries such as Denmark and Norway, highly active in NATO operations in both of which are frequently cited by Afghanistan and Libya, and has also the SNP as desirable Nordic models to contributed support to the French-led follow. intervention in Mali. “I think we feel that we have to do our Although less active than their Danish bit,” said Søren Espersen (foreign-affairs neighbours, Norway has also not shirked spokesman for the Danish People’s its responsibilities as a NATO member. In Party) in a recent interview on Denmark’s recent years, it has contributed militarily approach to NATO membership. “I can’t to both the missions in Afghanistan and really see why it should always be British in Libya, guided by a similar mindset. and American soldiers that should die, “NATO is our ultimate security whereas other nations would sit on guarantee,” said Iver Neumann, a their hands – like, indeed, many of the former senior advisor to the Norwegian European countries do. Members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Being [a

39 Joining NATO member] is simply part of the package Robertson has rejected the notion that of being [situated in] the West […] This is an independent Scotland would find the state of play, and NATO membership itself compelled to partake in NATO simply […] is not something you toy operations to which it strongly objected: with; it’s something you do.” “That’s a red herring. NATO has become He added that, although some other much more à la carte now. You need European states – such as Austria, a collective decision to do things like Finland, and Ireland – were not part Afghanistan; but there is no obligation of NATO for historical reasons, an on countries – other than Article 5 – to independent Scotland would be hard- participate.”iv pressed to opt out of the alliance and be taken seriously by the other states. Moreover, in the view of several military “That’s what this is all about. Why did officers interviewed for this report, an the SNP [choose] to go out on a limb after independent Scotland may in fact be 30 years of anti-NATO policy? Because able to go the other way, and ‘piggyback’ they realised that [if they continued off the rUK and NATO defence umbrella with that position…] they wouldn’t be for its own security, whilst providing taken seriously by anybody – not just the little in return; however, this might come Nordics, but across the board.”60 at the expense of membership. Moreover, as a small country inside “Of course, Scotland is important NATO, Scotland – like Norway – may geostrategically, and what I think [the well find itself under pressure to follow SNP will] want to do is what Ireland’s the lead of the bigger members: “Teddy done because – as far as the UK is Roosevelt used to say, ‘Speak softly and concerned – [in order] to defend our carry a big stick’,” Neumann said. “[…] islands, we have to make sure we defend we don’t carry a big stick, and that’s the the sea and airspace (particularly up to reason why we should speak softly all of the north of Scotland),” said one senior the time. I mean, you don’t mess with military officer who wished to remain the bigger boys; […] it’s a sandpit rule: anonymous. “What [the SNP] are hoping if you’re not the sabre-toothed tiger on is: ‘We won’t pay any money for this; the savannah, you basically lie low. […] [the rUK] will do it. We’ll be part of NATO, and it won’t cost us anything’.” “On matters nuclear, Norway has consistently been like a duckling behind Wing Commander Courtnage concurred ‘Mother US’: [though] we have been in that Scotland’s physical location may favour of different kinds of reductions well give it the option to rely on its of arms, we’ve been very reticent when neighbours to defend it, should it so […] the talk has been about getting rid wish: “Because of where Scotland sits, of nuclear arms. [However,] we’ve been it’s very difficult for an invading force keeping our eyes on what we could do, given […] the specific squeeze that we 61 iv. Article 5 states that an armed attack against one NATO [are] in.” member will be considered an act of violence against every NATO member, and that – consequently – all NATO allies will In spite of these experiences, however, take the actions which they deem necessary in order to assist former NATO Secretary General Lord the member attacked.

40 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy to get to it without going through NATO seeking to become part of NATO would countries (or very close to them, if they most likely need to demonstrate a come round the north cape of Norway). readiness to actively contribute to the So there is a temptation [that the SNP] alliance (especially given the difficulties might think they can hide under the that would be thrown up by its posture NATO umbrella without contributing on nuclear weapons). This is by no means anything to it – just by default, by virtue a reason why Scotland should not seek of Scotland’s location.” to join NATO if it becomes independent; but, it is certainly a dimension voters However, whilst possible in theory, might wish to consider. in practice, an independent Scotland

41

In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Chapter III Establishing a Scottish Defence Force

The most obvious question, when humanitarian relief operations would considering the potential defence also be desirable. Resources (such as implications of Scottish independence, advanced fast jets, battle tanks, aircraft is the sort of defence forces the country carriers, and the requisite supporting would have. The SNP have sketched out assets) which enable Scotland to play a some ideas in their Foreign, Security more global role would almost certainly and Defence Policy Update; but, as with not be on the table. the foreign policy that must necessarily Foreign, Security and Defence guide such considerations, detail is still In its Policy Update unfortunately lacking. , the SNP envisage an SDF comprising “15,000 regular and 5,000 Nevertheless, amongst experts reserve personnel […] organised into (both consulted for this report, and one regular and one reserve Multi Role elsewhere), there is broad consensus Brigade (MRB).”62 The SNP have also that an independent Scotland would pledged to ensure that Scotland’s ground likely want to prioritise fairly locally forces will include “current Scottish orientated maritime and air defence. raised and restored UK regiments, This would enable the nation to support units as well as Special Forces effectively patrol its waters and airspace and , who will retain whilst also contributing to operations responsibility for offshore protection.” in the area. Such a posture would be consistent with the more regionally In terms of equipment, the SNP orientated focus that an independent envisage that the “Scottish defence and Scotland would seek to adopt, as well as peacekeeping forces will initially be with the geostrategic space within which equipped with Scotland’s share of current it would sit. assets including ocean going [sic] vessels, fast jets for domestic air patrol [sic] The threat of terrorism and potential duties, transport aircraft and helicopters risks to critical economic assets, as well as army vehicles, artillery and air including oil rigs, would demand small defence [sic] systems. A Scottish defence – but competent – Special Forces, as industrial [sic] strategy and procurement well as capable security and intelligence [sic] plan will fill K U capability gaps in infrastructure. (This latter issue is dealt Scotland, addressing the lack of new with at length in Chapter V). frigates, conventional submarines and maritime patrol aircraft.” Whilst Scotland would clearly wish to maintain a standing army, it would The SNP’s Proposed likely want it to be fairly small and easily deployable as part of overseas operations Defence Budget involving larger coalitions. Maintaining To pay for all this, the SNP have the capabilities, especially heavy-lift proposed an annual defence budget of aircraft, necessary to contribute to £2.5 billion for an independent Scotland.

43 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force

This figure represents roughly 1.7 per Northern Ireland. This is quite aside cent of Scottish GDP, significantly less from the fact that actually calculating than the approximate 2.5 per cent of how much is spent on defence in a given GDP currently spent by the UK, but region is notoriously difficult (hence why just above the overall NATO average of the MoD ceased attempting to do so at 1.6 per cent.63 Given that, militarily, an the end of the 2007-2008 financial year; independent Scotland would likely be although, Angus Robertson has claimed less globally ambitious than theK U , this is “nothing more or less than a cover- this (as a stand-alone figure) seems up”, since the MoD continues to produce reasonable. estimates for internal consumption).65 A more useful way of looking at this, If the SNP are correct in claiming that however, is to ask whether that figure their proposed budget will provide them is appropriate for what the SNP have with an extra £500 million to invest in proposed for their defence force (in Scottish defence, then the area in which terms of both personnel and equipment), it could have the greatest relevance is in addition to asking whether those with respect to the local defence jobs personnel and equipment aspirations that such spending would generate. The are themselves realistic. Both of these SNP have focused extensively on this questions are addressed in detail in this issue in recent years, and it is dealt with chapter. in greater depth in Chapter VI. For its part, the SNP have sought As of March 2013, however, the SNP’s to present this £2.5 billion as entire case surrounding the pledge simultaneously a saving and an increase to spend £2.5 billion on defence has in Scottish defence spending. This been cast into serious doubt. The amount represents, the party says, “an reason is an internal memo, authored annual increase of some [£]500m on by MSP (the Scottish recent UK levels of defence spending Government’s Cabinet Secretary for in Scotland, but nearly £1bn less than Finance, Employment and Sustainable Scottish taxpayers currently contribute Growth), which was leaked on 6 March. to UK defence spending.”64 The document significantly downgrades The SNP’s assertion that their proposed Scotland’s post-independence economic £2.5 billion defence budget represents prospects from those which the SNP a £500 million increase on current have given in public, with the result defence spending in Scotland appears being that “a much lower budget must to be predicated on the view that any be assumed.”66 given region of the UK can calibrate how much it benefits from overall defence Quite how this potential downgrade spending based on how much is spent will impact on the SNP’s defence there, relative to other regions. proposals – and whether it will happen at all – remains to seen, with greater Such a perspective is problematic clarity to be hoped for in the party’s insofar as there will be numerous assets defence White Paper, which is due to be integral to the defence of Scotland as published in November 2013. a part of the UK that are not physically located there, just as there will be assets based in Scotland which are integral to the defence of England; Wales; and

44 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Securing Scotland’s that whilst it is the party’s policy that Scotland is entitled to its share of current “Share” of UK Military assets, that does not mean that it will Assets seek to acquire all of them in practice should it become independent: Central to the SNP’s case for how much UK defence equipment might be “On equipment, we’re a twelfth of the inherited by the SDF upon independence population, so 8.4 per cent; it’s pretty is the argument that Scotland is entitled much what everybody acknowledges,” to its “share” of existing military assets. he said in an interview for this report. “Assets and liabilities will be negotiated This commitment has been much at that level. […] There are equipment lampooned of late, most recently by the types [however] that we have current Secretary of State for Defence, contributed towards which Scotland will Philip Hammond MP. In a speech not be operating. Scotland will not be delivered in Edinburgh, on 14 March operating nuclear submarines, although 2013, Hammond pointed out that such we have paid for them; Scotland will not a division would leave Scotland with a be operating aircraft carriers, although bewildering – and clearly unworkable we have contributed towards them.” – Armed Forces consisting of, amongst other things, 10 Typhoon jets; two What Robertson envisages would be Hercules C-130J heavy-lift aircraft; 1.6 negotiations in which Scotland might destroyers or frigates (from a total take a proportionately higher share of of 19); just over half an Astute-class certain assets, in exchange for taking submarine (from a fleet of seven); one zero shares of those which it felt sixth of an aircraft carrier; and under one that it did not need. Alternatively, he Red Arrow.67 suggested, the SNP may agree to some form of financial settlement that would In 2011, the then-Secretary of State see Scotland fairly compensated for its for Defence, Liam Fox, likened the SNP contribution – whilst it had been part of to a child “at a Pick ‘n’ Mix counter in the UK – towards assets which it would a sweet shop. Angus Robertson dips not inherit come independence. his hand in to the Army and grabs the Scottish infantry and cavalry regiments; Objectively assessed, however, whilst then the RAF to pluck a couple of fighter Hammond’s and Fox’s proportional jets and their crews; then the Navy for breakdowns of the Armed Forces could some ocean going war ships and some be dismissed as ‘political point scoring’, coastal vessels too. But like a child with there are other examples of number his pocket money he is thinking purely crunching that are much more difficult to of what looks most attractive for the ignore. Perhaps foremost amongst these money, and ignoring the savouries he is what it would mean in practice for the needs to balance his diet! He’s chosen Scottish Armed Forces should the SNP an Army without any supporting arms; stick to their long-held, and electorally an Air Force without any transport important, commitment to incorporate aircraft or tankers; and a Navy without a all current Scottish raised, andK U - fleet auxiliary.”68 restored, regiments into a Scottish Army. Unsurprisingly, Robertson has rejected this characterisation of the SNP’s ambitions as simplistic, pointing out

45 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force

The Scottish Asked whether or not he took issue with Hammond’s assessment, Robertson Regiments replied, “I take issue with most things According to the Defence Secretary, the Philip Hammond says, especially about current liability of the Scottish fighting what he says in relation to Scotland.” infantry regiments – the Scots Guards, Pressed on the specific point that to the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, and the honour the pledge of retaining all the five battalions of the Royal Regiment of Scottish regiments would dramatically Scotland – is some 4,100 posts. Add to unbalance the SDF, Robertson simply that a further 550 posts from the King’s reiterated the position given in the Own Scottish Borderers when they were Foreign, Security and Defence Policy amalgamated with the Royal Scots (to Update: “We believe that 15,000 form the Royal Scots Borderers), and the uniformed service personnel will fulfil total is some 4,650: almost one third of the requirements for land, sea, and the SNP’s entire proposed defence force. air forces necessary to ensure the key defence and security tasks that Scotland As Hammond and many others have will require.” pointed out, however, the current ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio of the British Army Professor Sir Hew Strachan (Chichele (that is, the ratio of fighting units to Professor of the History of War at Oxford units required to support them) is University, and one of the country’s approximately 1:2. leading authorities on defence issues) has pointed out that, with regard to the The Defence Secretary has calculated SNP’s commitment to incorporating the that “if these fighting units are going Scottish regiments, one of the biggest to be supported by artillery, supplied problems is that the party “haven’t been by logisticians, kept on the move by very precise about what they mean.” engineers, and able to talk to each other thanks to signallers, then that’s 14,000 “They’ve talked about the restoration of the entire defence force of 15,000 of the Scottish regiments,” he said. used up just on ground forces. “But are they talking about the 1881 order of battle, what they see as the “That’s before you’ve even begun to historic regiments? That’s not just think about military headquarters, or the Black Watch and the last round of protecting Scotland’s skies with an air amalgamations. In 1881, the numbered force, or her 11,000+ miles of coastline, regiments of the line were, in most roughly half the coastline of the UK, with cases, amalgamated to create two a navy. battalion regiments. So, for example, nd rd “On a generous interpretation, even if the Black Watch is the 42 and the 73 you ignore the logic of scale economies put together in 1881; the Argyll and st and assume that the naval and air Sutherland Highlanders is the 91 and rd elements of the Scottish defence forces the 93 put together; and so on and so would form roughly the same proportion forth. as the Royal Navy and RAF do of the UK “When Scotland thinks of its historic armed forces under our 2020 plans, regiments it’s those regiments from 1881 this would add another 6,500 service that they think of. Now they’ve gone personnel, requiring a total regular essentially in three rounds of defence 69 defence force of over 20,000.” cuts, of which the 2005 lot (in which

46 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy the Royal Regiment of Scotland was the final outcome, Robertson has added created) are only the most recent. Ever that “post-independence, one of the since 1956 [leading to the 1957 defence that we will be undertaking White Paper, The Sandys Review] there is a Strategic Defence and Security have been debates about the Scottish Review [SDSR], which will help guide regiments; it’s been going on for that the transition of defence forces to the long. So my question, to throw it back to optimal outcome.”72 the SNP, is how many of these regiments are you going to reactivate? The Black Such a review will indeed be necessary; Watch is just the tip of the iceberg.”70 but the SNP also have a responsibility to present the Scottish public with a Even just taking the Scottish regiments clear and credible picture of how an which exist now, significant issues independent Scotland might realistically arise – stemming, essentially, from the defend itself before the independence fact that the ‘Scots regiments’ (like the referendum. Sadly, the party’s current ‘English’, ‘Irish’, and ‘Welsh’ regiments) Foreign, Security and Defence Policy have become part of a distinctive and Update falls short in that regard. Quite deeply interwoven whole that cannot be apart from the practicalities of restoring so easily disassembled. the Scottish regiments, there are also serious questions as to whether an The Scots Guards, for instance, are part of independent Scotland would really the British Army’s Guards division, and, want – or need – such an Army-centric of the several serving officers spoken to defence force. for this report, not one thought it likely or feasible that this regiment would be Would the SNP’s broken off to become part of the SDF. Proposals Result in an More broadly – as the SNP themselves Imbalanced Defence have noted – more than half of Scotland’s locally drafted regiments Force? are not even based in Scotland, and a On 23 May 2012, the editor of Defence significant proportion of recruits are Analysis – Francis Tusa – appeared now drawn from outside Scotland as before the Scottish Affairs Committee, well. Quite what would happen to non- in order to provide them with his Scots members of these regiments, not assessment of the SNP’s public foreign- to mention the many Scots who may policy statements. His verdict on the opt to remain with the British Armed talk of “defence of airspace, economic Forces, is unclear. The situation gets zones and so forth”, appearing in the more problematic still if those wishing party’s manifestos, was that it “leads to remain in the British Armed Forces you pretty inevitably towards [needing] were to outnumber those wishing to join a maritime and air-based armed forces, the SDF in a given regiment. In any case, with much smaller land forces.”73 these issues are all quite aside from the Professor Strachan, in his evidence fact that it is anything but a foregone to the committee, came to the same conclusion that the rUK would simply conclusion, positing that “the more you agree to hand over all these regiments, think that the primary threat faced by come independence.71 an independent Scotland would be from Conceding that the SNP’s current the north – from the Arctic – the more proposals might not completely reflect you might put emphasis on naval or air

47 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force forces rather than ground forces.”74 its more regional focus, might reasonably be expected to spend a proportionately Ron Smith, a defence expert and lower amount on equipment than the professor of Applied Economics at UK – in line with most of its European Birkbeck College, has also warned that an neighbours. Army-centric defence strategy involving the maintenance and restoration of This, however, is not what appears to be all the Scottish regiments would not envisaged by the SNP, with the Foreign, be sensible. Under this model, Smith Security and Defence Policy Update warned, a disproportionate amount of outlining some fairly hefty ambitions the defence budget would inevitably be on the equipment side. Amongst other spent on salaries and overheads: “these things, it envisages Scotland possessing numbers are army-centric. You are not fast jets capable of performing air patrol providing [the regiments] with a lot of duties; new frigates; and conventional equipment, but you have a lot of bodies submarines. and are paying their salaries. The issue is that it would not match Scotland’s The SNP’s Aspirations security needs.”75 for Defence Irrespective of whether or not an Equipment independent Scotland decides to Submarines restore the Scottish regiments, a cursory breakdown of the SNP’s proposed Currently, the entire UK submarine figures suggests that their defence force fleet is nuclear-powered, meaning would be overly personnel heavy. At that an independent Scotland would 15,000 personnel, the proposed SDF need to purchase any conventional, would number more than 10 per cent of diesel-powered submarines it may wish the UK’s current Armed Forces, whilst its to acquire. In the view of Professor proposed budget of £2.5 billion would Chalmers, Scotland would need three be about 7 per cent in comparison to the to four submarines to constitute a UK’s. viable fleet, ensuring that at least one vessel could be at sea at any one Should the commitment to the Scottish time.76 Although significantly less regiments take the total size of the SDF expensive than their nuclear-powered up to 20,000 soldiers, the mismatch counterparts, conventional submarines between personnel and budget becomes are, nevertheless, by no means cheap closer to 14 per cent and 7 per cent of (with prices ranging anywhere between the UK’s current totals, respectively; it £300 million and £650 million apiece to would be greater still if John Swinney’s buy off-the-shelf).77 warning of reduced funds for defence were to materialise. Building conventional submarines in Scottish shipyards, a highly specialist Critics of this assessment will doubtless skill that has not been attempted for observe that the UK, when compared to decades, would likely cost several times many other European powers, spends that amount. Considering that Scotland’s a proportionately greater amount of annual defence budget would be just its defence budget on equipment, £2.5 billion (and quite possibly less consistent with its ambitions to maintain than that), the cost of developing and a global expeditionary reach. An maintaining a conventional-submarine independent Scotland, by contrast, with force would appear to be prohibitive.

48 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Admiral Lord Alan West, formerly First Frigates Sea Lord of the Royal Navy, has said that The SNP have also stipulated their a Scottish submarine force would be ambition that an independent Scottish “inconceivable unless they have huge Navy should possess frigates, with the defence spending” far in excess of what 2012 Foreign, Security and Defence 78 is currently being proposed by the SNP. Policy Update lamenting “the lack of new As Professor Strachan has observed, frigates” in the Royal Navy as a capability “there is a function for submarines, gap that Scotland would wish to fill. particularly if you are thinking Presently, the Royal Navy retains 13 Type about maritime defence”; but this 23 frigates in its surface fleet, together must inevitably be set against the with six Type 45 destroyers (after the last consideration of affordability and the Type 42 destroyer was decommissioned 79 question of prioritisation. “If [the SNP] in June 2013).84 The Navy is planning clearly prioritised maritime defence – to replace the Type 23s with 13 Type and submarines in particular – and were 26 Global Combat Ships, due to start ready to go very small on ground forces, entering service from 2021.85 then it might be possible [to obtain a fleet]; but, if they want to maintain all In his 2012 report, A’ the Blue Bonnets, the Scottish regiments as well, then it Stuart Crawford supports the notion would not be”.80 of an independent Scottish Navy possessing a limited number of frigates: For comparison, Norway currently “Possibly a couple of frigates of the anti- retains a fleet of six Ula-class submarine or anti-aircraft type would submarines, but on an annual defence fit the bill in terms of likely tasks in budget of £4.6 billion – almost double maritime diplomacy, control and escort 81 that which the SNP have proposed. of shipping, and providing a Scottish Denmark, which has a more similar naval contribution to regional and defence budget of £2.6 billion, no longer international alliances and coalitions 82 retains any submarines in its navy. In as appropriate. The Type 23-class his analysis of the possible composition frigates HMS Argyll and HMS Montrose of an independent Scottish Navy, Stuart are clearly already suitably named for Crawford concluded that, with nuclear- the [Scottish Navy] and might fit this powered submarines out of Scotland’s requirement adequately.”86 reach and with no conventional variants in the Royal Navy at present, submarines This assumption has been challenged “therefore, are unlikely to form part of by Professor Chalmers, however. On the inventory of the [Scottish Navy], in 23 January 2013, he told the Scottish the short-to-medium term at least. In Affairs Committee that, looked at the longer term, Scotland might wish strategically, Scotland would not want to consider [the] off-the-shelf purchase to have any frigates at all; although, if of conventionally powered and armed broken down proportionately, it “would submarines of the type built by Germany get one” as part of its inheritance from or Sweden.”83 To do so, however, the the 13 currently in service with the issues relating to cost and the overall Royal Navy.87 Explaining his rationale, balance of the SDF would, once more, Chalmers observed that the “Royal need to be considered. Navy has made a choice over the years to focus on quality rather than quantity and to have capabilities that are globally

49 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force deployable. One of the problems we 23s would need to be replaced in the have with things like counter-piracy is not-too-distant future, and that the Type that, because we have so few numbers, 26 would not be considered suitable (as we are using 200-million-pound ships to and when it enters service). confront a few pirates with Kalashnikovs. Scotland might well end up inheriting Asked to clarify exactly what the SNP one frigate, but that would not be the had in mind by this assertion, an advisor centrepiece of its navy in terms of what to Angus Robertson replied that “there it had to confront; it would have to have are a number of stages to go through a significant number of other smaller before reaching final conclusions on vessels, I would suggest.”88 military equipment” – including the 2013 Scottish Government White Paper As for the Type 45 air-defence on independence, post-independence destroyers, their size and sophistication negotiations from 2014 to 2016, and would almost certainly put them out of a Scottish SDSR in 2016.91 Pressed on Scotland’s reach; the same is true of the the point that, by lamenting “the lack Type 26 frigates (as and when they enter of new frigates”, the SNP must surely service), should Scotland contemplate have in mind what they don’t like about acquiring one for whatever reason. the Royal Navy’s existing and future- planned ships, no further response was Echoing Chalmers’ warning that forthcoming. Scotland would probably want to opt for a fleet comprised of smaller vessels, Remaining Scottish Navy Lord West has given the view that even As just mentioned, smaller vessels “the Type 23s are too complex”, but that than submarines and frigates would inheriting its share of these would be likely form the bulk of an independent the main option confronting Scotland, Scottish Navy, and there are several of given the lack of alternatives in the these currently in the possession of the 89 Royal Navy. In the view of Ron Smith, a British Royal Navy. Scottish Navy would wish to focus more on corvettes and patrol boats, “which is The SNP have yet to give a clear what most other countries have, [and] indication of what type and number of would be a lot cheaper”. Such vessels these craft they might wish to acquire, would, he suggests, be suitable for the referring only to the need for “ocean types of functions a Scottish Navy might going vessels”. When combined with wish to carry out, namely: “fishery the lack of detail on the foreign-policy protection, protection of North Sea oil side, this presents not inconsiderable and occasional issues to do with piracy difficulties when attempting to scrutinise and terrorism.”90 the SNP’s naval ambitions beyond the major ‘status’ assets such as frigates The SNP’s position on exactly what and submarines which they mention sort of frigates they want for an specifically in their Foreign, Security and independent Scotland is puzzling. The Defence Policy Update. Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update is not specific, but laments “the That being said, it is possible to surmise lack of new frigates” as a procurement some of the likely requirements of gap that Scotland would need to fill. a Scottish Navy – based on some of Presumably this means that the SNP what the SNP have said, and on logical have acknowledged that the ageing Type deduction considering Scotland’s

50 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy size; geographical location; and likely of – and exposure to – the Royal Navy). ambitions. Of most interest to an An independent Scotland would independent Scottish Navy would certainly be entitled to a share of these. likely be a share of the Royal Navy’s Mine Countermeasures (MCM) ships Not mentioned so far are the four assault and offshore patrol vessels. Presently, ships in service with the Royal Navy: the the Royal Navy possesses eight Hunt- two helicopter carriers, HMS Illustrious class minehunters and seven in the and HMS Ocean, and the amphibious 92 assault ships HMS Albion and HMS Sandown class. The UK’s MCMs are 95 recognised as amongst the best in the Bulwark. All four have been designed world, and perform an important role for an outward-looking navy with in seeking out – and keeping sea lanes global reach, and it seems unlikely they clear of – unexploded ordnance. As a would be within the reach independent result, a share of these would represent Scotland. This being said, it comes back a valuable addition to an independent to the question of what sort of role a Scottish Navy. Scottish Navy would want to play. The amphibious assault ships are versatile Scotland would probably have a more vessels that can be deployed across a difficult time negotiating a share of the range of functions, from enabling and UK’s River-class offshore patrol vessels, supporting onshore military incursions, however, since the Royal Navy possesses to providing a de facto offshore hospital just four of them at present.93 The ships and command centre for disaster relief perform an invaluable function enforcing operations. UK and EU fisheries laws, and can be used from anything from fire-fighting Beyond that, the Royal Navy also to disaster-relief operations. Such possesses the Surveying Flotilla, a vessels would also play an important disparate group of six ice-patrol and role in patrolling Scotland’s offshore survey ships which traverse the waters installations, and, in truth, would appear of the world, gathering data to be to be a much more functional asset than translated into charts which will provide safe passage for mariners across the any large frigates which the country may 96 seek to acquire. However, given that so globe. An independent Scotland may few are available, it is quite probable or may not wish to attempt such a role; that Scotland would need to procure but, given that these vessels perform additional equivalents from elsewhere. a non-defence-specific function, it is anyway outwith the remit of this report The Royal Navy also possesses a number to venture an answer in that regard. of smaller patrol boats – including 16 of the Archer-class P2000 Fast Inshore Fast Jets Patrol Craft, and two Fast Patrol Boats In terms of feasible inheritance options, of the Scimitar class.94 The latter are one of the biggest challenges for an responsible for patrolling the shores independent Scotland will surely be the around Gibraltar, and for supporting lack of suitable fast jets for its Air Force. ships in the Strait of Gibraltar. The Currently, the RAF retains three types Archer-class boats contribute to a of jet: the ; the range of ‘fleet tasking’ (although their Tornado GR4; and two variants of the primary role is to support the country’s Hawk training aircraft, the Hawk T1 and 14 University Royal Naval Units, which the Hawk T2. provide undergraduates with experience

51 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force

At present, the RAF maintains six community, as well as recognition squadrons apiece of the Typhoons from within the SNP, that the Typhoon and the Tornados, and more than 200 would almost certainly be too advanced Hawks, meaning that – numerically and too expensive for an independent speaking, at least – an independent Scotland to maintain. Scotland could be apportioned its ‘fair share’. There are very serious questions, This then leaves the Hawk trainer as however, about how appropriate any of the only other jet available, in the these aircraft would be for the country’s RAF’s hangars, for inheritance by an defence needs. independent Scotland. In his report, Lieutenant Colonel Crawford concluded An extremely capable all-weather that both the Typhoon and Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, the Tornado were likely beyond Scotland’s reach, GR4 also boasts advanced air-to- and that “even smaller nations’ aircraft ground attack systems which were of choice, the American F-16, might be deployed most recently in 2011, beyond the [Scottish Air Force’s] realistic during Operation Ellamy (part of the aspirations and, in any case, would NATO mission to enforce UN Security have to be purchased from elsewhere.” Council Resolution 1973 over Libya). A Thus, he surmises that, for air defence significant limiting factor, in terms of its and strike attack, “Scotland’s relatively suitability for an independent Scottish modest needs […] might be filled […] by Air Force, however, is its lack of air-to-air the BAE Hawk aircraft currently in the defence systems, with Angus Robertson RAF inventory.”100 explicitly endorsing the proposition that a Scottish Air Force (for reasons With Crawford’s admirable report of cost and feasibility) “operate[s] one representing the first and most jet variant or one aircraft variant”, not comprehensive effort to detail what the both – necessitating a multi-role fighter SDF might actually look like, many of his if at all possible.97 Moreover, the RAF’s conclusions have been incorporated by Tornado fleet is fast approaching the end the SNP. In interview, Angus Robertson of its life, and is due to be phased out endorsed Crawford’s choice of aircraft, altogether to make way for additional describing the Hawk as a machine which Typhoons and the new F-35 Joint Strike “can be operated to do the role the fast Fighter in the next few years.98 jets currently perform in the QRA [Quick Reaction Alert] platform”.101 If Scotland is expecting to inherit some air-defence aircraft from theK U , then However, this conclusion has been the only suitable option (in terms of strongly challenged by the air-defence capabilities) would be the Eurofighter expert consulted for this report (who Typhoon. Amongst the world’s most argued not only that the Hawk would be advanced multi-role fighters, the incapable of carrying out this role, but Typhoon is capable of being deployed in that an independent Scotland may wish the full spectrum of air operations: from to consider not attempting its own air air policing, to peace support, through defence at all). “Simply put, I don’t see to high-intensity conflict. Unlike the what use Scotland would have for the Tornado GR4, the Typhoon is capable Hawk; you’re giving them a trainer,” said of air-to-air and air-to-ground roles.99 Wing Commander Paul Courtnage. Unfortunately, there appears to be “The Hawk couldn’t do QRA because it broad agreement amongst the strategic doesn’t have radar, so it would never

52 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy find its target. BAE do export Hawks would therefore serve a very limited fitted with radar (essentially it’s acut- practical purpose, and would probably down F-16 radar); but you couldn’t just be chosen simply so that Scotland could add that sort of equipment to the nose claim to have a fleet of fighter jets come of our Hawks. It wouldn’t fit, for a start, independence. “What the SNP seem and you haven’t got the ability to power to be envisaging [for their Air Force] is it – the hydraulics to drive the antenna, just not what [the Hawks are] designed and so forth.” for, or certainly not the T1s, the T1As and the T2s that we have. And the big Asked if the Hawk might not be able giveaway is the letter they all begin with: to perform even a basic air-defence T, for Trainer.”103 Indeed, it is worthy of role, guided by ground-based radar, note that the RAF itself does not list the Courtnage said, “They could, but it’s Hawk as one of its Offensive or Defence a lightweight fighter armed with very jets, but as a Training Aircraft, along short-range weapons. It’s far more likely with several small propeller planes and to be taken out by incoming fighters a glider.104 with much longer-range weapons and greater capability. They just won’t match If Scotland did wish to possess fast a potential airborne threat on their own. jets in its Air Force, therefore, it is the conclusion of this report that it would “The Hawks are capable of carrying a very need to acquire them from elsewhere; limited air-to-air fit: two sidewinders and no suitable jet currently exists in the a gun. They have no radar; so all they RAF’s inventory. could really do would be point defence, let’s say, as a lightweight visual fighter.” Maritime Patrol Aircraft During the Cold War, Hawks were used Another central function for a Scottish to augment the UK’s frontline fighters on Air Force, as envisaged by the SNP, Mixed Fighter Force Operations (MFFOs) would be maritime patrol. On this over the North Sea. “The Hawks would issue, the party have made much of sit on the wing of a big, radar-equipped the UK Government’s decision to scrap aircraft, and would follow them to an the Nimrod MRA4 programme as part engagement, with the idea being that the of their 2010 SDSR. Angus Robertson big fighters would try and get […a] visual recently said in interview that a “good on the enemy, and let [the Hawks] go and example of where Scotland would have mix with them,” Courtnage continued. to procure equipment which it will not “Obviously it wasn’t something we ever inherit is [in] maritime patrol aircraft, of used in anger, and it was difficult to do, which the UK currently has zero – unlike and it tended to tie the hands of the big the Norwegians, unlike the Danes, unlike 105 fighters anyway because they couldn’t the Irish”. To fill the roles intended for just accelerate away as fast as they liked the MRA4, the UK is currently relying to meet the enemy because they’d just on existing assets such as the Type 23 leave the Hawks behind.”102 On the SNP’s frigate and the Merlin helicopter. own rationale, however, this would not Whilst an independent Scotland be possible for an independent Scottish would clearly require assets capable of Air Force, since the Hawk would be the performing a maritime-patrol function, sole fighter jet in its armoury, if chosen. Courtnage is critical of SNP suggestions Courtnage concluded that, for the needs that they could have realistically of an independent Scotland, the Hawk expected to inherit Nimrods from the UK

53 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force had the programme not been scrapped. exactly what type of aircraft and “The Nimrods are way beyond what they helicopters an independent Scottish Air would need. They will need aircraft that Force may require – not to mention all can do maritime patrols – coastguard- the other resources required to support type operations – but they don’t need their effective operation – is almost big maritime patrol aircraft to do that. impossible without knowing what Scotland would wish to achieve with “The Scottish Fisheries Protection them. Agency currently operates two Reims Vigilant F-406 aircraft that they use to For instance, until it becomes clear how monitor fishing vessels, and to protect serious an independent Scotland might no-take areas. Assuming that they be about overseas military deployments might want to do slightly more than or disaster-relief operations, it is hard to that – and actually be able to patrol calibrate how many – and what kind of – their waters, defend their coastline, and transport aircraft it may wish to acquire. carry out anti-smuggling operations; The same applies to helicopters, bearing search and rescue; oil-spill and pollution in mind the point made by Angus monitoring; and the like – they might Robertson: that a Scottish Air Force, for consider something like the Airbus reasons of cost and practicality, would Military HC-144 Ocean Sentry. wish to avoid having more than one type of any given asset where at all possible. “[The Sentry] is not long range […]; but it can stay airborne for around eight hours, The British Army Air Corps currently and has the sorts of sensors that they maintains a sizable fleet of more than would require. It has multiple voice- and 60 Apache attack helicopters (highly data-communications capabilities, […] expensive and advanced pieces of Commercial Satellite Communications equipment designed to hunt and destroy (SATCOM), a vessel Automatic tanks, and capable of classifying and Identification System, direction-finding prioritising up to 256 potential targets equipment, […] surface-search radar, in a matter of seconds).107 It is hard an electro-optical/infra-red system, and to envisage what use an independent electronic surveillance equipment. Scotland would have for such equipment (unless it planned to adopt an extremely “Another option is the ATR assertive posture internationally, which 42 Maritime Patrol Surveyor, used by the does seem unlikely). Italians. Many nations are looking at the Boeing P-8 Poseidon; but that’s a much Likewise, it is hard to conceive what use bigger, more expensive beast. There are Scotland would have for a share of the quite a lot out there; but the Scottish RAF’s nine TriStar air-to-air refuelling needs and budget should be reasonably aircraft; but, again, without a clear modest.”106 foreign policy, it is impossible to be certain. Remaining Scottish Air Force As regards the numerous other assets Scottish Army required to operate a functioning air Many of the same questions need to be force, the SNP have thus far not given asked with regard to the composition specifics beyond a general ambition of Scottish ground forces, because the to acquire “transport aircraft and SNP’s Foreign, Security and Defence helicopters”. Here, again, deducing Policy Update offers nothing more

54 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy specific than the assurance that they will use for main battle tanks, unless it’s in contain “army vehicles” and “artillery”.108 support of overseas aspirations as part of NATO, because they are so expensive. In his assessment of the Scottish Armed What I can see them needing are Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Crawford armoured cars, such as [the six-wheel- concludes that it is unlikely that a drive] Mastiffs, as well as other hybrid Scottish Army would need to equip itself anti-mine-type vehicles.” at the heavy end of the war-fighting spectrum: “There is no real case for Deverell also envisages Scotland main battle tanks or heavy artillery adopting some of the British Army’s for an army with a regional focus and lighter, tracked assets, in particular [which is] predicated on home defence, the Scimitar armoured fighting vehicle aid to the civilian authorities, and (which is armed with a 30mm cannon, limited contribution to coalition military for self-defence, and is deployed in a operations overseas.”109 Yet again, it has reconnaissance role). In terms of giving to be said that such an assessment can further specifics, particularly the sort provide no guarantees in the absence of of numbers that might be required, a fully crafted foreign policy and national Deverell agreed that such an assessment strategy. was impossible without first knowing what the SNP’s foreign policy would be, It is the position of this report that, and for what activities they would want whilst it does indeed seem unlikely a to use the Army. that Scottish Army would have much use for the British Army’s Challenger II Special Forces main battle tank, there could be a place for some of the more advanced artillery Relatively little has been said in public assets – especially air-defence systems. regarding the role of Special Forces in Ground-based air defence might assume an independent SDF. The SNP have said still greater importance if Scotland nothing more than that Scotland should does initially find itself without an air- have some, who, together with the defence-capable jet fighter (although Royal Marines, “will retain responsibility both of the British Army’s Rapier and for offshore protection.”111 Starstreak platforms are short-range, Perhaps the most authoritative voice and could only be used to guard specific 110 to have spoken out on the issue to date assets). If Scotland were to get into was the late Colonel Clive Fairweather, the business of serious ground-based a former second-in-command of 22 air defence, it may wish to consider SAS, who helped bring an end to the procuring the Patriot missile system; siege on the Iranian embassy in London although, again, this would need to be in 1980. Fairweather concluded that measured against a proper national Scotland would indeed wish to have its security risk assessment, as well as cost. own Special Forces, and that they would Regarding other potential assets of focus primarily on counter-terrorism – in use to a Scottish Army, Brigadier John particular, protection of the North Sea Deverell CBE, formerly of the Royal oil rigs. Scotland would also need to Scots Dragoon Guards, is of the view consider threats to critical infrastructure that Scotland may well wish to develop on the mainland (for instance petro- a wheeled, medium-to-light armoured chemical sites like Grangemouth and force. “I cannot see them having any Mossmorran, as well as the Torness and

55 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force

Hunterston nuclear-power stations). the country would have to “rely on UK Special Forces” to provide it with the He also told a defence conference, necessary security.114 in 2012, that, given how dependent Scotland would be on oil and gas Choosing between the revenues, its Special Forces would want to be situated close to a port or airfield British Armed Forces to enable them speedy access to the rigs and the Scottish when necessary. “We need about 75 Defence Force individuals for a Scottish Special Forces squadron, with the ability to get aboard Amongst the most contentious towering rigs by boat, or possibly from questions surrounding the future of underwater or by air,” he said. “The unit the Armed Forces, should Scotland opt would need snipers, linguists, medics for independence, is: In which nation’s and bomb-disposal experts, all of whom military would Scots soldiers serve? can nimbly scale ladders and kill the 112 The question is not so much whether enemy at short range if necessary.” or not they will be given a choice, as Fairweather warned that Scotland could it is which Armed Force they would not rely on inheriting Special Forces actually choose. Regarding the former units from the British Army, however, issue, Angus Robertson has been explicit suggesting that only a “handful” of SAS in saying that personnel serving in (Special Air Service) and SBS (Special regiments assigned to Scotland would Boat Service) personnel might “come not be obliged to continue with those home” to join.113 regiments if they did not wish to do so: This assessment is broadly shared by “Service personnel take an oath to the another former SAS officer spoken to Crown, and that oath will be fulfilled for this report, who wished to remain within the Scottish defence forces or anonymous. “The SNP would have to Armed Forces of the rest of the United create their own Special Forces unit, Kingdom. Serving personnel will be given mainly to defend the oil rigs. I would the option to be part of the Scottish suggest an SBS capability to prevent defence forces, or remain within the the oilrigs being hijacked.” The officer Armed Forces of the rest of the United 115 cautioned, however, that recruitment Kingdom.” might be a problem, given the likelihood The overwhelming consensus amongst that Scottish Special Forces would be service personnel consulted for this focused just on Scotland, and may report is that a majority – perhaps even therefore spend their time “thumb a large majority – of Scottish service twiddling”. “The Scottish Special personnel would prefer to remain within Forces couldn’t be expeditionary or the British Armed Forces, rather than peacekeeping; they would just be based join the SDF. All who agreed to speak in Scotland”, he predicted. did so on condition of strict anonymity, Colonel Fairweather said that it would being conscious of the acute political likely take three years to get Scotland’s sensitivity of this issue (in particular, from Special Forces operational, at a cost of a constitutional perspective as members £5-10 million “and at least £2.5 million of the Armed Forces). The MoD’s policy annually to keep the force on the of not offering any opinion on the ground.” During the transitional period, ramifications of Scottish independence

56 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy also made impossible a survey designed “Because the Scottish Government for this report, to be circulated amongst would only focus on home defence Scottish service personnel, asking and peacekeeping, the view inside the precisely this question. regiment is that you would have large numbers of predominantly Scottish Privately, many serving in regiments young men going to join the British north of the border are seriously Army, because there they can serve on contemplating this issue, in light of the operations; and they know that, in an forthcoming independence referendum. SDF, operational defence would become One officer spoken to for this report put extremely limited,” said one officer. the question to his platoon of 32 men shortly upon returning from Afghanistan “And what of the young officer born, in early 2013. Of the 32, fully 30 said raised, and educated in Scotland? He that they would wish to remain with the can either join the Paras [British Army British Army. Of the two who did not, Parachute Regiment] or the local Scots one said he wasn’t bothered either way, regiment. If he chooses the latter, he whilst the second offered his opinion cannot go to Sandhurst; so he would that, for the same level of pay and be going to a new training school in conditions, why wouldn’t he want to Scotland, with the best hope of going join the SDF when “all we’d be doing is and sitting on the border in Cyprus or checking passports on the M6”? Similar Lebanon with a blue beret and no rounds feedback was offered from all other in his rifle. Or he can join the Paras, one servicemen consulted. of the most recognisable regiments in the world. What’s he going to do? It’s a It was even revealed that some soldiers no brainer; the SDF would be too dead- had been asking their officers whether end and too parochial.” or not it was treasonable for them to support joining the armed forces of The worrying consequence of this, in the another country, given that they had view of this officer and others consulted, sworn an oath to serve the Crown as is that an independent Scotland would part of the British Armed Forces. be left with a “second-rate” defence force, with the best and brightest opting Coupled to this, there was a strong to join the British Armed Forces instead. feeling that few within the current “This is the view of officers and men, Armed Forces really knew what the SDF the consensus view,” said the officer. would be for, and that also made them “The SDF will be staffed by second-class sceptical. Of the ten soldiers asked by Scots soldiers […] If you have all those another officer if they favoured joining infantry battalions, like the SNP want to the SDF, nine said that they could not have, you’re going to have to keep them understand what would be achieved by interested and deployed, and you won’t independence, whilst the tenth said he get many if they can join a deployable wasn’t bothered either way. British Army.” Of those who have formed an opinion This concern about the challenges that in this regard, the general view appears an independent Scottish Armed Forces to be that the SDF would be less exciting might have in persuading potential and offer fewer opportunities than recruits to join it (and not its British its larger and – they assumed – more counterpart) has also been voiced globally active British counterpart. outside the Armed Forces. “I can

57 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force envisage a two-tier military service, all of us collectively believe that few where ambitious young Scots join of them would want to. No-one knows the British Army, and then, once he’s what the Scottish defence force is for.”119 married and got children and wants to calm down a bit later in life, he transfers ‘Smart Defence’ and to the Scottish Army,” said Professor the Specialisation Strachan. of Scotland’s Armed “Assuming the British Armed Forces Forces continued to recruit Scots, and the Scots currently serving chose to stay (and I Underpinning the entire debate over the think the majority would), only with a appropriate size, shape and ambitions very good pay and pension deal – which of the SDF is the question of just how would add further to costs – could you specialised that force should be. As with entice Scots to a Scottish Armed Forces. all but the greatest martial powers, an I think you’re bound to get lower calibre independent Scotland would very much personnel in an SDF […] When you join rely on the collective military strength of the RAF, for instance, presumably you its allies for its ultimate defence, hence want to fly fast jets in exciting places, not the SNP’s ambition for Scotland to be Hawks in the north of Scotland.”116 part of NATO. Defence Secretary Philip Hammond also In light of this, there has been some waded into this debate recently, claiming discussion as to how Scotland might that an SDF would be able to offer only configure its Armed Forces to most a “fraction” of the career opportunities usefully contribute to those alliances. of the British Armed Forces. He went on Professor Strachan has suggested to add that the SNP’s promise to base that Scotland would wish to consider troops entirely in Scotland was akin to adopting a ‘niche’ defence posture, telling potential recruits: “Join the Navy whereby it abandoned any notion of and see the Clyde”.117 attempting to develop a full spectrum of defence capabilities and instead Happily for the SNP, however, not focused on delivering high-quality everyone is so pessimistic, including capabilities in a few specific areas. Such Colonel Crawford (who has argued that an approach, Strachan argued, could men and women serving in an SDF achieve “enormous amounts of savings may in fact have more opportunities and greater efficiencies”, and would, for deployment, not fewer). “It’s wrong moreover, conform to precisely the sort to think that a Scottish Defence Force of “smart defence” thinking being called would be boring. It may have only 50 for by NATO Secretary General Anders per cent of the commitments [of the Fogh Rasmussen.120 British Armed Forces]; but, if it’s 10 per cent of the size, then that’s five times ‘Smart Defence’ is a NATO initiative more opportunities.”118 In spite of this, that essentially seeks to formalise and Crawford has also warned that Scottish further deepen collaboration between soldiers would likely prefer to remain as members on defence. The alliance part of the British Armed Forces: “All of reasons that in “these times of austerity, us in the military community are saying each euro, dollar or pound sterling that no-one has asked the Scottish counts. Smart defence is a new way of soldiers if they would want to transfer; thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities the Alliance needs

58 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy for the coming decade and beyond. It Scottish NATO membership all-but is a renewed culture of cooperation imperative for this to work. that encourages Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining Whilst this ‘specialised’ route is one military capabilities to undertake the option for Scotland, there are those Alliance’s essential core tasks agreed in who argue that NATO has just as great the new NATO strategic concept. That a need for members who are ready and means pooling and sharing capabilities, able to deliver the more ‘conventional’ setting priorities and coordinating capabilities, which are by no means efforts better.”121 incompatible with the Smart Defence concept. “If you look at Afghanistan By acting together, NATO has and ISAF [the International Security rationalised, members can have access Assistance Force], what have all the to resources which they could not afford Nordics done?”, asked Tusa. “They have individually. ‘Smart Defence’ also seeks deployed infantry battle groups and, to redress the long-standing problem boy, has NATO been saying, ‘Please give of some members making unilateral us these.’ They have not necessarily said, decisions to give up certain capabilities, ‘Please send us this niche or that niche.’ which leaves other members under an Because they have been so short of increased obligation to maintain their bodies, they have been crying out loud own investment those now-abandoned for boots on the ground and so forth, areas of defence (in turn, leading to so these entirely non-niche capabilities specialisation “by default”). To address from Denmark, Norway and whatever this, the initiative seeks to encourage have been welcomed with open arms.”124 specialisation “‘by design’ so that members concentrate on their national Moreover, Tusa argued, the logic of strengths and agree to coordinate having niche forces only applies if planned defence budget cuts with Scotland proved itself ready and able to the Allies, while maintaining national actually use them when called on: sovereignty for their final decision.”122 “[People will] rely on you only if you The SNP have specifically endorsed will turn up on the day when they say, this concept in their Foreign, Security ‘My God, I need whatever it is you are and Defence Policy Update, asserting providing.’ Based on the very scant that in an independent Scotland: “Joint things from SNP documents, you do procurement will be pursued with the not get the impression [that they will rest of the UK and other allies as well have] an armed force that [is] looking to as shared conventional basing, training deploy anywhere, in which case you will and logistics arrangements, fulfilling not be able to have niche armed forces, because no one will want to rely on your shared priorities in ‘Smart Defence’. This 125 includes sharing conventional military niches if you will never use them”. capabilities, setting priorities and better coordinating efforts providing economic Defence Cooperation synergies, job stability and taxpayer with the rUK 123 value for money.” Just as an independent Scotland Clearly, however, this sort of would wish to work closely with NATO arrangement depends strongly on on defence, so too would it need to political goodwill and exceptionally cooperate especially closely with the close military-strategic planning, making rUK in particular.

59 Establishing a Scottish Defence Force

This certainly seems to be what the SNP these gaps easily; but that’s no longer have in mind, with their Foreign, Security the case.”128 and Defence Policy Update advocating “shared conventional basing” with the Such a vision seems to entail the rUK rUK, as well as “shared conventional leaving Scotland to ‘cover its back’ in training and logistics arrangements”, as the north, freeing London to focus its previously mentioned.126 resources elsewhere; however, several difficulties with this immediately In the assessment of Dr Fleming, arise. The first is the greatly reduced Scotland’s geographical location makes capabilities that Scottish defence collaborative defence agreements forces will almost certainly have at “a practical solution to an awful lot their disposal, when compared to the of headaches – both from a Scottish UK assets currently based north of the perspective, [and] also from Kan rU border. On air defence, for instance, perspective”.127 RAF is currently the main base for the Tornado GR4s, with three “The assets in Scotland would be squadrons of Typhoons scheduled to difficult to replicate,” he argued, citing relocate there beginning summer 2014 in particular the radar systems on the (in order to take on the QRA (Interceptor) western coast, as well as subsea systems North role).129 vital to UK intelligence gathering. The problems thrown up by having no RAF The SNP have said that they plan to use airfields north of the border could also Lossiemouth as the home for Scotland’s be significant for the rUK, with the most Air Force; but, given that they would northerly suitable airfield in England quite possibly be attempting to fulfil the being, as previously mentioned, RAF same QRA function with Hawk trainers, Leeming in North Yorkshire. Responding it seems unlikely that the rUK would to potential incursions from the high feel its back was being suitably covered. north, therefore, would become Similar comparisons could be drawn on considerably more difficult – even if the maritime side, given the enormous existing stations further north in England likely discrepancies between the Royal were adapted, or new ones built. Navy and a future Scottish Navy. Quite what any such agreement might Clearly, there would be areas where look like in practice, however, is subject Scotland could fill capability gaps, or – to differing interpretations. In Fleming’s at the very least – work closely together view, Scotland would be “filling a gap in with rUK Armed Forces in order to do so; the north Atlantic and the high north” in but, the most substantive component of exchange for defence support in other any defence agreement between the two areas. countries would likely involve continued rUK access to military facilities currently “That would be a natural strategic based in Scotland. position for Scotland to take – the high north – and it would be useful for the As the former Minister of State for the rUK because […] the rUK looks south, Armed Forces, Nick Harvey, has made in particular to the Middle East (which clear, “the defence footprint in Scotland is understandable); but it leaves a gap. at the moment is comprehensively In the days when the Royal Navy was integrated with the whole of the stronger, that was fine. Before austerity, United Kingdom’s defence capability. they were persuaded they could fill What is based in Scotland is not there

60 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy by accident. It is based there because Indeed, even when it comes to more it makes sense in military terms for conventional defence-cooperation the defence of the UK as a whole.”130 agreements, Scotland would have Consequently, Harvey continued, “it is to be aware that the closer it sought certainly the case that there are facilities to integrate itself militarily with the in Scotland that, in an ideal world, we rUK – and other allies, for that matter would wish to continue using.” – the greater the limitations there would be on its own freedom of action Foreign, Security and Defence In their (with regard to its defence and foreign Policy Update , however, the SNP appear policies). To take advantage of NATO’s to envisage even closer collaboration ‘Smart Defence’ depends first of all on than this, advocating not only “shared Scotland being accepted as a member, conventional basing,” but also “sharing 131 and, secondly (assuming that that hurdle conventional military capabilities”. will be crossed), on Scotland taking a Quite how this might work in practice is conscious decision to align its military very far from clear. As Nick Harvey has priorities; objectives; and capabilities again observed, this sort of joint defence with those other member states. The “is not a concept or a doctrine that we potential for limiting freedom of action, recognise. We cannot see anywhere in that this necessarily entails, is certainly the world an example of joint defences 132 a challenge for all nations; but it is a among sovereign UN member states.” proportionately greater one for smaller The immediate, and seemingly countries with more limited capabilities insurmountable, problem with sharing and a greater dependence on alliances military capabilities is what to do when to begin with. foreign-policy objectives diverge. If one The SNP may well conclude that, for party wishes to deploy an asset, and the reasons of cost and practicality, it would other objects – or, if the two parties have be better to allow the rUK to provide it differing objectives for how that asset with defence capabilities in certain areas should be used at a given moment – then (in return for continued access to bases the situation becomes impossible. Such and other assets north of the border). an arrangement would be tantamount However, they will have to be realistic de facto to giving Scotland a veto over and honest about what the potential rUK foreign policy, and vice versa. consequences of this will be, particularly Even the sharing of bases seems a in terms of the extent to which they difficult proposition, with similar – could pursue an authentically different although not as extreme – obstacles defence policy to that of the rUK. This, arising in terms of a divergence of views after all, is the ultimate expression of with regard to deploying assets from a what it means to be a sovereign nation. shared base.

61

In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Chapter IV Removing Trident

The most fiercely held position of the feasibly be removed, irrespective of SNP, when it comes to defence and whether or not the rUK had a permanent independence, is the need to remove the base for them elsewhere). UK’s nuclear deterrent from Scotland. The issue of whether this ambition is When pressed to give some indication of compatible with NATO membership has a preferred timeline, Angus Robertson been examined in Chapter II; this chapter reiterated that the SNP position was will focus more specifically on some just to see the “speediest safe” removal of the practical issues surrounding the of Trident. Asked whether it would be removal of Trident from Scottish territory. acceptable if it did indeed take 20 years to find and construct a safe and secure The SNP’s 2012 Foreign, Security and site south of the border, he answered, Defence Policy Update reiterates the “when was the last time you thought 20 party’s commitment to this policy: “A years was speedy?”, but refused to be long-standing national consensus has more specific than that.134 existed that Scotland should not host nuclear weapons and a sovereign SNP Should Scotland opt for independence government will negotiate the speediest in 2014, it is likely that two primary safe transition of the nuclear fleet considerations will qualify the SNP’s from Faslane which will be replaced by fervour to remove nuclear weapons conventional naval forces.”133 from Scottish territory. The first will be the speed with which an alternative site There is no disagreement as to the fact can be found south of the border. An SNP that Trident could be removed from government would be unlikely to force Scotland; the debate is over the timeline the missiles’ removal so fast as to prevent and what the potential consequences of an alternative location being found, that decision might be, for both the rUK since the result of doing so could be the and an independent Scotland. unilateral disarmament of the rUK. Doubtless aware of these issues, the The second consideration will be simple SNP have been cautious not to put a realpolitik and the strategic importance timeline on Trident removal, and are of Alex Salmond fulfilling his pledge unlikely to do so. In recent years, various that an independent Scotland would analyses have been conducted on this cease to be a “surly lodger” within the subject, with conclusions ranging from UK, and would instead set out to be a a timeline of 20 years or more (working “good neighbour”.135 Whatever the fiery on the assumption that this is how long it rhetoric at party conferences, the SNP might take the rUK to find and construct leadership understands that the removal an alternative site south of the border), of Trident will form but one of a panoply to a matter of weeks (working on the of issues to be negotiated, and that the assumption that this is the maximum importance of close cooperation with the speed at which the weapons could rUK in a host of other defence-related

63 Removing Trident areas will temper their ability to force credible – in terms of being possible, this particular issue too hard. In practical irrespective of whether it is desirable – terms, this means that, whilst the SNP by Parliament’s Scottish Affairs Select could – in theory – bullishly demand Committee. Trident’s removal at a speed that would add considerable cost and disruption to CND Scotland’s report concerned itself the rUK’s efforts to find a suitable new exclusively with the question of how location for the fleet (not to mentioning quickly, in theory, the nuclear deterrent poisoning relations, with potentially could be disabled and removed from the deleterious consequences for Scotland in country (with no allowance made for other areas), they are much more likely finding alternative locations elsewhere). to allow the rUK time– within reason – to This is unsurprising, given that – as move at a more comfortable pace. its name suggests – the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is concerned What this means, of course, is that not just with the removal of Trident Scottish voters who believe that a vote from Scotland, but with the unilateral for independence will be a vote for the nuclear disarmament of the UK as a immediate removal of Trident should whole. Indeed, a prior report published prepare to be disappointed. Without in January 2012, entitled Trident: question, the rUK would not wish to have Nowhere to Go, concluded that, should its nuclear deterrent based indefinitely the weapons be removed from Scotland, in what would be a foreign country no single site would exist in the rUK that – so clearly there would be ambition could feasibly house them – in practice, from both sides to bring Trident south necessitating their complete disposal. of the border – but, equally, this would need to be balanced against serious The Trident nuclear deterrent is considerations of cost and practicality, comprised of three components: the which would weigh heavily on the speed four Vanguard-class submarines, the with which relocation could be achieved. warheads, and the missiles. All four of the UK’s nuclear-armed submarines are In August 2012, the Scottish Campaign for located at Faslane Naval Base, situated Nuclear Disarmament (CND) published on the eastern shore of Gare Loch in a report entitled Disarming Trident: A southwest Scotland. Any warheads not practical guide to de-activating and onboard the submarines are stored dismantling the Scottish-based Trident at the Royal Naval Armaments Depot system. (RNAD) Coulport, situated some eight miles west of Faslane, beside Loch Long. The report examined how quickly the The missiles, on the other hand, are fleet could be decommissioned and carried in the submarines at all times, removed from Scotland, and concluded with none being stored at either Faslane that: the keys and triggers for the or Coulport (although there is a facility to weapons could be removed within seven do so, if needed).137 days, the missiles disabled within eight, and the warheads disabled within a year. The difficulty insofar as relocation is Within two years, the report asserted, concerned is not where to house the all the warheads could be entirely nuclear submarines, but where to house removed from Scotland, and dismantled the warheads and – most problematic – completely within four.136 This timeline mate them with the missiles. has subsequently been endorsed as As far as the submarines are concerned,

64 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy the primary considerations are that the the past include the Portland Naval Base site be satisfactorily defendable; large near Weymouth, which closed in 1995, enough; and able to provide ready and Barrow in Cumbria. Barrow has access to deep water, ideally enabling never been a serious contender, owing the submarines to enter and leave port to the shallowness of the water (which from any direction. Aside from Faslane, would restrict submarine access without there are several other ports in the UK significant dredging); the small size of that could serve. Amongst these are the dock; and a significant population Milford Haven, a natural deepwater nearby.142 Portland was placed on the port in south Wales, and Devonport shortlist for Polaris, the predecessor to in southern England, presently home Trident, but was ruled out due to the lack to Britain’s five Trafalgar-class nuclear- of a suitable site for a nuclear-armaments powered submarines.138 Both sites also depot in the vicinity. Since then, Portland have the additional advantage of shorter has seen a number of new residential, supply lines to the Atomic Weapons commercial, and marina developments; Establishment at Aldermaston (where has become home to the UK national the warheads are manufactured and sailing centre; and was even a venue for assembled), whilst Devonport already the sailing at the 2012 Olympic Games.143 regularly hosts the Vanguard submarines, unarmed, for maintenance.139 It should also be noted that various studies have mooted the possibility Following extensive examination of expert of temporary relocation of Trident to witnesses, the Scottish Affairs Committee France or the United States; but given concluded that – as presently configured that this could not be a long-term – neither Milford Haven nor Devonport solution – if indeed it could be done at could be used to house the warheads, all – the question would inevitably return or mate them to the missiles; similar to where in the rUK to base it thereafter conclusions were reached regarding (hence this proposal is not afforded other potential sites. Milford Haven, consideration in this report). presently the third-largest port in the UK, Trident: Nowhere to Go also has a huge Liquid Natural Gas facility In , the CND nearby, and is responsible for 29 per cent examined all of the above options, of the UK’s trade in seaborne oil and and concluded that there was not a gas.140 For obvious reasons, this places a single viable alternative to Faslane and potentially decisive question mark over Coulport anywhere else in the rUK. The the wisdom of storing nuclear warheads implication was made that independence nearby. Devonport, meanwhile, has a for Scotland would therefore mean de facto large population too close to the port to the nuclear disarmament for satisfy the safety margins required by the the entire UK, with the report’s author Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, and (John Ainslie) commenting that the nearby Falmouth (which was considered MoD “are beginning to realise that as a possible Coulport in the 1960s) was if an independent Scotland holds its ruled out because it would impact on an ground on Trident, then Britain would have to abandon its nuclear weapons area with a strong tourist economy, and 144 would involve the loss of two villages and programme.” moving a significant population.141 Other sites to have been considered in

65 Removing Trident

How Quickly Could Two principal objections have been levelled at the use of either facility Trident be Moved in in the past: first, that neither has the an Emergency? same amount of storage space for the warheads as Coulport does; and second, The CND’s assessment that, come that they are situated in the middle of independence, the rUK may be forced the Berkshire countryside (some 40 miles to “abandon its nuclear weapons from the coast, and over a 170-mile drive programme” has, however, met with from the most likely submarine base strong opposition. One of the most at Devonport).147 Yet, as Francis Tusa notable challenges has come from Lord noted on 23 May 2012, in his evidence West, who has insisted that – with the to the Scottish Affairs Committee, requisite political will – a major national- simply because it is not ideal does strategic asset such as Trident could not mean it could not be done (as an certainly be relocated (within months if interim measure, at least): “You have to absolutely necessary). remember that all the nuclear warheads Examining the worst-case scenario, go through those facilities for upgrade in which an independent Scotland and maintenance; they are driven along demanded the fleet’s immediate the roads. It happens daily.”148 removal, West concluded that, with Whilst AWE Burghfield would need to be emergency legislation, it could be done. modernised, both sites are considered “We could get rid of the warheads from of sufficient size (as the UK has overseen Coulport quickly, and we could get rid of considerable reductions to the number the boats – the submarines move; that’s of warheads in its possession since the not a problem. You could just do it […] end of the Cold War). Whilst Coulport Getting the warheads out would take a was designed to accommodate some 600 bit longer; you’d have to have convoys warheads, any alternative facility today to bring it all down south, but that’s would need to accommodate closer to not a problem: you’ve got the space at one third of that number. In a statement Aldermaston and Burghfield to store to Parliament on 26 May 2010, Foreign those.”145 Secretary William Hague announced Both Aldermaston and Burghfield are that, in future, the UK’s overall stockpile nuclear-licensed facilities in Berkshire, “will not exceed 225 nuclear warheads”, and part of the MoD’s Atomic Weapons whilst the maximum number of Establishment (AWE). The AWE is operationally available warheads will headquartered at Aldermaston, a remain at 160.149 sizeable location covering some 750 “The huge storage area we’ve got acres. Formerly a wartime airfield, for nuclear warheads [at Coulport] is the site is now a sophisticated centre huge because, once upon a time, we providing advanced-research, design, had each submarine full of 16 missiles and manufacturing facilities. AWE with ten warheads on each; that’s 160 Burghfield, a former munitions warheads in each submarine,” said factory, occupies a 225-acre site, and Lord West.150 “Now that’s been reduced is responsible for the maintenance of dramatically because of various attempts the warheads whilst in service (as well at multilateral disarmament; so, the as their complex final assembly and actual number of warheads you have to eventual decommissioning).146 store is dramatically less. We can store

66 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy them at Aldermaston and Burghfield if to retain a continuous at-sea deterrent necessary.”151 throughout the transition. This is about the length of time that the Vanguards Most radically, Lord West has also (which would have been previously stated that, in an emergency scenario, equipped at Faslane and Coulport) tend the Coulport weapon-handling facility stay out on patrol.154 could literally be floated down the coast in its entirety. “It’s the biggest floating As Lord West himself freely structure in Europe. It would have to be acknowledged, however, such drastic done really carefully, because it hasn’t measures would generate a massive been moved for years; but, yes, in theory uproar, and incur an enormous cost it could be done.” The main problem, as (which he estimated at around £4 previously highlighted, would be where billion).155 Needless to say, an ultimatum to put it. “If Scotland got separation, from the SNP necessitating such a and immediately said, ‘Take your response would also comprehensively warheads away’, then there would have poison the independence negotiations to be emergency primary legislation to between Scotland and the rUK; it is, for disregard planning laws and say that, [as that reason, exceedingly unlikely that the it’s] a national security emergency, you SNP would take such severe action. are going to [move them].”152 Indeed, if its life as an independent Asked how long such an operation country is not to begin with disaster, a might take in total, Lord West estimated Scottish Government would depend on a matter of months, dismissing the positive relations with the rUK in order to notion that it would take several years obtain satisfactory results in negotiations at least. “I think it could be done much on a whole host of issues critical to its quicker. People are talking about what future. This applies to other defence- happens in peacetime. If you have to related matters (such as the division do something, you can do it. How long and sharing of assets, cyber security, would it take us to sail a task force to the intelligence, and membership of NATO), Falklands? If you asked someone today as well as issues that go to the heart of they would tell you months; you’ve got the Scottish economy (including the to get all the stuff ready. How long did it mooted ‘Sterling-zone’ currency union, take when we actually were at war? Four North Sea-oil revenues, pensions, and days. That’s the difference: [whether the division of the UK national debt). or not] you have to do something. If As is the case with accession to NATO, [the SNP] turned round and said, ‘Take accession to the European Union is your warheads away, otherwise we’re also contingent on the approval of all going to confiscate them’, what do you member states. say? ‘Oh, that’s going to take us a very long time’? Then they say, ‘Well, we’ll Moreover, whatever the rhetoric about confiscate them’, and you say, ‘OK, well standing up to Westminster, the SNP you confiscate our warheads’. No; you’d will be all too aware that Scotland would move them.”153 possess the weaker hand in any post- independence negotiations, by virtue of West also pointed out that, in the worst- it being the smaller state; the demandeur; case scenario, the rUK would have a little and – with near certainty – the party over six months – some 200 days – to without continuing-state status. execute this move if it wanted to able Hence, it seems fair to assume that this

67 Removing Trident is why the SNP have been so reluctant “Currently, the MoD will say there are to place a definitive timeline on Trident around 6,500 people directly employed removal. Given the blunt considerations at Faslane and Coulport, with another of realpolitik, it simply would not make 2,000 coming,” said Jackie Baillie, strategic sense for Scotland to insist on Labour MSP for Dumbarton.159 “But, in Trident’s removal before an alternative 2003, EKOS [an economic and social- location can be found elsewhere. development consultancy] did a study to look at the economic impact of Faslane. In In fact, there is good reason to believe addition to the 6,500 directly employed, that this reality has been quietly accepted they concluded that another 4,500 were by the SNP leadership for some time. As dependent on the site; so that’s 11,000 early as 1997, their election-manifesto in total. And whatever people’s view is on statement that “the SNP have a long- nuclear weapons, there is a responsibility standing objection to nuclear weapons” to think about the jobs there.”160 was followed by a pledge to “negotiate a phased but complete withdrawal of Those presently employed at the site are Trident from the Clyde” (my emphasis), indeed worried for their futures, should a significant departure from previous Scotland choose independence next year manifestos which had demanded its and divest itself of Trident. Speaking in immediate removal.156 front of the Scottish Affairs Committee, plumber and Unite union shop steward The Job Implications Richie Calder, from Faslane, spoke of Trident Removal of “a fear in the [local] community” that independence “is going to take it One further consideration that is very apart”.161 Jim Conroy (chairman of the likely to stay the SNP’s hand on Trident, industrial shop-stewards’ committee at least in terms of the speed with which on the base, and a mechanical fitter in they may seek to get it out of Scotland, is Faslane’s Northern Utilities building) the significant number of jobs it provides. added his prediction that independence Figures vary slightly, but there are “would be devastation for the west currently some 6,700 civilian and military of Scotland as a whole. Our members personnel employed at Her Majesty’s don’t just reside in the local area – Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde – which Helensburgh, Garelochhead, Renton and comprises Faslane and Coulport – and Dumbarton. They travel from Glasgow the Government projects this number to and even further afield than Glasgow. increase to around 8,200 by 2022.157 The It would be devastation. You have other rise in the number of jobs over the next support companies outwith the base as 162 decade accompanies the Government’s well.” decision to base all of the Royal Navy’s Such sentiments very much reflect the submarines on the Clyde, with all five messages relayed to Baillie from people of the Trafalgar-class vessels to be living in the area: “When I speak to my 158 moved there from Devonport by 2017. constituents, it’s instructive. The retailers According to the MSP who represents understand the importance of having the constituency in which the base is Faslane, because [it is] able to sustain a situated, however, these figures do not retail offer [for the] town. When most take into account the several thousand other towns are on their knees with jobs not directly related to HMNB Clyde, empty shop units, Helensburgh is able to but which exist by virtue of its presence. sustain a retail offer that is quite diverse

68 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy and, despite the recession, doing quite course, there are the several thousand well. additional jobs generated across the wider economy, as a result of the base’s “You go into a school and you ask them, presence. ‘How many of you know somebody who works in Faslane?’, and at least Unfortunately, without having a clear half the hands go up. So it is the most idea of what an independent Scottish significant local employer; it matters to Navy would consist of, it is impossible our economy. If the jobs weren’t there, to accurately predict how many jobs it would we have the same range of schools would provide. What the SNP have said, that are there, the same infrastructure however, is that their naval force would support? […Consider] the almost 2,000 be comparable to that of Denmark or people coming up [to work at HMNB Norway. Clyde]: the impact that will have in making sure we have enough space in As discussed in the chapter on our schools, enough suitable housing to conventional forces, the comparison either rent or buy; […] recognise that, with Norway seems unrealistic. With an during a recession, to have an influx of annual defence budget of £4.6 billion, some 2,000 people – plus their families – over £2 billion more than the SNP is really significant for any local area. It’s propose to spend, the Norwegian Navy a real boost for the local economy.”163 consists of 37 vessels (including five frigates and six submarines).165 It also has The upshot of this (insists Baillie) is that, one major base, employing some 4,000 whilst Trident may be unpopular across people in total.166 Scotland as a whole, in the area in which it is situated, it is quite the opposite: Closer to the mark – at least in terms of “By and large, people view the base as budget – is Denmark, which spends £2.6 a very positive thing […] I’ve done focus billion per annum on defence (almost the groups in the past. I’ve spoken to groups same as the SNP’s proposed £2.5 billion). of women in the past, who instinctively Denmark has two main bases: one with 600 personnel and the other with 500 don’t like the idea of nuclear weapons; 167 but they understand it provides personnel, a total of 1,100. employment in their community. They Clearly, this figure falls far short of the jobs understand it’s not just low-paid jobs; provided by HMNB Clyde, and employees these are high-quality, well-paid jobs, there have additionally complained of a which are hard to come by.”164 lack of clarity from the SNP on specifics. The SNP have an answer to such According to Calder, “[p]eople are really uncertainty: that Faslane would be used quite sceptical about what has come up to house the entire Scottish Navy, and so far, which is very little.” Of concern would serve as the headquarters for is not merely how many jobs might the Armed Forces in an independent be replaced if Trident goes, but what Scotland. Clearly, however, this then kind of jobs (and whether they will be presents the question as to whether transferable for current employees, such a set-up could match the 6,700 many of whom have very specialist jobs currently provided by HMNB Clyde, skills). These and other questions were and the 1,500 (or 2,000, according to put to Angus Robertson, by Calder and Baillie) extra ones set to move there other base representatives, at a meeting in the coming years. On top of this, of on 15 February 2013; but they are not expecting to receive any answers until

69 Removing Trident after the SNP have published their 168 Moving Trident – The defence White Paper in November. Realistic Scenario In strategic terms, there is also a serious question mark over the SNP’s plans Consequently, the most realistic scenario with regard to the suitability of Faslane for Trident removal will be that it takes as either Scotland’s sole naval base, or place over an extended period of time, as headquarters for the Armed Forces. sufficient to enable theK rU to find and Legitimate questions exist as to the make ready an alternative location, and strategic viability of placing the entire likewise for proper preparations to be Scottish Navy in the southwest of the made for HMNB Clyde’s future – and that country, given that both its primary at- of its employees – on the Scottish side. sea assets (the oil and gas rigs), as well Judged against these criteria, the as potential threats, are located almost overwhelming consensus is that moving entirely in the north and east. Trident will take many years, although In the past, the SNP have spoken about quite how many remains a matter of using Rosyth, on the east coast, as a base. intense speculation. At the lower end of This would add a further dimension to the the scale is Lord West, who estimated that post-Trident jobs equation; but it is not “if you want to set up and build a new site clear whether strategic considerations – and do it really quickly as a major, fast would precipitate a resurrection of project – it would probably take about this policy if Scotland did become five to seven years, because you would independent. As for having the Armed have to go through all the clearances Forces’ headquarters at Faslane, this [and] planning; work out where you were also raises questions since, ordinarily, going to put the thing; work out exactly it is seen as advantageous to have such what it is you want to bring down; and all the other stuff. That would be speedy in a a facility rather closer to the centre of 170 political power – in this case, Edinburgh. peacetime context.” In the UK, for comparison, the MoD is Others, such as Professor William Walker situated just a few hundred yards down of St Andrews University (who co- the road from Parliament, and more or authored an early assessment of Trident’s less directly opposite Downing Street. future in an independent Scotland, For all of these reasons, combined together with Professor Chalmers, back with the length of time it would take in 2002), warn that any move could to properly establish an independent take 20 years or more. Whilst RNAD Scottish Navy, the SNP may very well Coulport was constructed in just four choose against moving Trident out of years, following the selection of Faslane Scotland at such a speed as gives those in the 1960s as the home for the Polaris presently working there insufficient time ballistic-missile submarines, neither of to find alternative employment. In the the “facilities had to go through any kind words of Lord West: “If 6,500 employees of planning system.” This time, though, are given their P60s all at once, and told, any relocation will likely not be as swift ‘Off you go’, that isn’t going to make the because the “public feels it has a right SNP dead popular is it?”169 to express an opinion on these matters […] The Government would have to go through various quite difficult political processes to try to get consent for [a move].”171 In Walker’s estimation, “the

70 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy process of finding a site might take five to to replacing them, and to participate in 10 years”; then, with “all the engineering the US life-extension programme for the and construction works […] it could be Trident D5 missile, “which will enable us a long time.” His conclusion: “20 years to retain that missile in-service until the might be a minimum.”172 early 2040s.”175 Dr Phillips O’Brien, Director of the Scottish Professor Chalmers has also argued Centre for War Studies at Glasgow strongly that Trident is a bargaining University, has suggested that 10-15 years chip which the SNP, in an independent might be a possible target, but only under Scotland, would be foolish to squander. specific conditions which are unlikely to materialise: “If you had unlimited political “I think the starting point for London will will and funds behind it, you could do it be: ‘Look, it’s bloody difficult for us to quicker than 20 years without a doubt, move this. We want this to stay here’. I but an enormous amount of resources think, actually, the rUK would want to would have to be put into it with no one go further than that; I think they would objecting and cross-party support […] want some legal undertaking by the Scots personally I can’t see that happening.”173 Government […] I mean, they’d have to have legal arrangements anyway for In light of this, there are some within the how it operated, but I think they’d want community of experts examining this some guarantee that it would stay for issue – amongst them Lieutenant Colonel some significant number of years – 10; Crawford – who have concluded that an 15; or however many years to, at the very independent Scotland would be wiser to least, give them the chance to build an shelve any notion of speedy withdrawal alternative. of Trident, and instead see the deterrent for what it is: the ultimate bargaining chip. “But, from a Scottish point of view, I think it’s a great bargaining chip if they “Angus Robertson has been careful not are prepared to play it. I don’t think the to put a time frame on the removal of SNP, now or after a referendum, would Trident. It’s the biggest bargaining chip be prepared to give away that chip very they have,” Crawford said, arguing that easily. So they’d say, ‘OK, if you really the only reason that the SNP have not want this, you’ll have to give us X; Y; and been more up-front about this ahead of Z in return’, like support for NATO and EU the referendum is because it would cause membership.”176 uproar with the party grassroots. “They haven’t sold that line to the grassroots Unfortunately, given the enormous of the party, and the grassroots wouldn’t political sensitivity surrounding this have it; there would be a huge fuss. But issue, combined with the fact that the that’s the reality, that’s what they’re SNP will not want to reveal their hand trading on […] I’ve said until I’m blue in – for perfectly understandable reasons the face that Trident will stay on the Clyde – before negotiations begin, this is until it’s obsolete.”174 one area where we should not expect full disclosure before the referendum. When, however, will Trident become Hopefully, however, this chapter will have obsolete? Under current plans, first helped shine some light on the possible outlined in a 2006 MoD White Paper, realities of moving Trident from Scotland, “the Vanguard-class submarines are and why it would likely be a much more likely to start leaving service from the drawn-out process than is sometimes early 2020s”; but, the UK has committed assumed.

71

In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Chapter V Intelligence and Cyber Security

Of all the issues pertaining to the defence On the issue of how much these services of an independent Scotland, intelligence would cost to run, Sturgeon took the and cyber security are perhaps the most amount presently spent by the UK on sensitive and least well understood. The intelligence and cyber security, a little SNP have provided precious little detail over £2 billion, and calculated a “pro on their plans in this area to date, with rata [sic] share of that” for Scotland.180 the relevant section of their Foreign, When it was pointed out that the UK Security and Defence Policy Update has devoted billions of pounds over stating only that they will possess such several decades to developing its capabilities – and no detail at all about sophisticated intelligence and cyber- how this will happen: security infrastructure, and asked if the SNP had factored set-up costs into “While conventional military threats the equation, Sturgeon did not provide to Scotland are low, it is important an answer, but referred the committee to maintain appropriate security and back to the White Paper currently under defence arrangements and capabilities. preparation.181 This includes a cyber security and intelligence infrastructure to deal with When similar questions were put to new threats and protect key national Angus Robertson for this report, he economic and social infrastructure.”177 answered that “for very obvious reasons, I’m not going to go and have a long The Deputy First Minister of the conversation about how you deal with Scottish Government, intelligence […] the Home Secretary, MSP, provided a little more detail in she would say exactly the same thing to her evidence to the Foreign Affairs you.”182 Select Committee, whilst promising a fuller assessment in the SNP’s much- Asked to at least give a broad indication anticipated defence White Paper (due in as to the SNP’s thinking on the matter, November 2013). Robertson focused on cyber security as “one of the greatest challenges we Speaking on 28 January 2013, she said, face”, and “an area of great potential “In terms of security and intelligence, for Scotland [as it is] perfectly suited to I would envisage Scotland having developing appropriate technology to independent domestic intelligence deal with this 21st-century challenge”. machinery in Scotland sitting alongside our police service.”178 “There are already projects underway in Scotland relating to cyber security, Asked if an independent Scotland might which are very easily scalable [after] attempt to set up an external-intelligence an independence vote. There are also service, the UK equivalent being MI6, people within the current intelligence Sturgeon answered, “That is one option and policing community who will be very that is available to Scotland”.179

73 Intelligence and Cyber Security well placed,” he said.183 vast set-up costs of establishing new security and intelligence infrastructure, Asked if he believed, therefore, that a quite distinct from the costs of running share of current intelligence and security it; the feasibility of attempting to operatives would be transferred from establish Scottish equivalents to MI6 and the UK services such as the Government GCHQ; and, perhaps most contentiously, Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) the conditions under which intelligence and MI5 to work in independent Scottish would be shared between the rUK and services, Robertson posited that “across Scotland. the defence and security world, there are a great many people who would be Intelligence Sharing glad to be based in Scotland; work in Scotland; and provide the appropriate with the rUK and defence and security skill set for a Other Countries sovereign Scotland.”184 In a February 2013 submission to It also appears to be clear SNP policy Parliament, the UK Government that the country, particularly in the initial examined the implications of Scottish post-independence phase, would share independence, and looked closely at intelligence and security assets with their impact on the three security and the rUK. As Nicola Sturgeon explained, intelligence agencies. It concluded the envisaged domestic-intelligence that the “Security Service (MI5), the service would be “working very closely Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and […] with the [r]UK and making sure we the Government Communications are sharing intelligence and sharing Headquarters (GCHQ) operate lawfully our response to some of these threats. within the UK, and abroad on its behalf, […] There would be continued shared under UK Acts of Parliament passed in arrangements with the rest of the UK 1989 and 1994. Should Scotland become regardless of our independent capability independent the automatic position because that makes sense based on our in law would be that [these services] geography.”185 would continue to operate on the same basis, except that they would have no Asked if she believed that a Scottish authority or obligation to act on behalf Government would be able “to of an independent Scottish state.”187 read the rest of the UK’s secret intelligence”, Sturgeon replied, “There The report continued: “It would be open are arrangements with other countries to representatives of an independent and the UK […] now in terms of sharing Scottish state to seek to make use of intelligence. […] I think there would arrangements now operative within the be a very close relationship between UK should they so wish, although any Scotland and the rest of the UK.”186 proposals would need to be considered carefully and may not be straightforward Clearly, the SNP do not yet possess a or necessarily in the interests of the fully formed position on these issues, continuing KU .”188 and – perhaps unsurprisingly – large swathes of the SNP’s assumptions have The Home Secretary has also warned been called into question (including that assumptions by the SNP that shared by several experts interviewed by this geography and other interests would report). Areas of particular note are the inevitably result in shared intelligence

74 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy are premature. with the Algerians; the Algerians have – for many, many years – a history of During a visit to Glasgow, on 8 February having to deal with Islamist terrorism, an 2013, Theresa May made it clear that absolute treasure trove of information before the rUK agreed to share any about people and organisations who intelligence with an independent are a direct threat to British interests. Scotland, the new country would need So, sneering this off [as] ‘if you’re going to establish the same basis of trust as to talk to somebody like the Algerians the UK currently has with other nations. then why not talk to us?’ just shows a “The point is that if Scotland is separate complete ignorance of the reality.”191 it becomes a separate state. So it is not the same as sharing intelligence across The harsh reality, Ramsay insists, is that the UK,” she said. the rUK would not share intelligence with any country unless it had a clear “The SNP make a lot of assumptions in a interest in doing so: lot of areas and are trying to tell people nothing would change but there is a “It’s a cold, hard, nasty world that we’re whole range of issues that would need in when we’re talking about sharing or to be looked at and decided upon […] I giving intelligence, and it’s always only think in terms of looking ahead to the given when it’s in the interests of the referendum, people would question very giver – not the recipient – and that’s seriously the SNP if they don’t come up an important principle [the SNP] don’t with firm proposals on issues like this.”189 seem to grasp. It’s maybe not nice; but you don’t tell somebody something’s in The SNP have hit back at these remarks, their interests to know unless it’s in your with a party spokesman accusing May interests that they know it.”192 of “rank hypocrisy”. He went on to add that she is “in no position to lecture This is a rule that extends across Scotland”, and that her comments “make intelligence communities – including no sense – if the UK government is the UK and US, between whom exists happy to share intelligence with Algeria, perhaps the most sophisticated and in- as recently announced, depth intelligence-sharing relationship why wouldn’t it make sense to share on earth: “The reason the Americans intelligence with an independent work with us, and have good liaison Scotland?”190 with us, is not because they like the blue of our eyes, or because they’re very The Home Secretary’s warnings have, Anglophile; it’s because they reckon however, been defended by Baroness they get something back for it that they Ramsay, who strongly dismissed the value, and if you haven’t got anything to comparison with Algeria: offer, you don’t get. […] “You could almost hear the amusement “What the SNP are working on is an in the voice of this idiot from the Scottish assumption that the resources the Government, implying that if you’re British agencies have, they will have going to share with Algeria, then why absolute access to; and that’s not what’s not the Scots? But, of course, what this going to happen, because that’s not person – whoever he is – didn’t know, what does happen in these situations. or doesn’t seem to understand, is: of They’ll only get what’s in the interests of course we’re going to share information the [r]UK agencies to tell them.”193

75 Intelligence and Cyber Security

This point was also made separately by sourcing, and the sourcing is something Sir Malcolm Rifkind (who, since 2010, which you protect at all costs. First, has chaired Parliament’s Intelligence and because of the security of that particular Security Committee, and who served as source, whether it’s technical or human; Foreign Secretary between 1995 and [and second,] because, if you’re a service 1997): that gets known as not protecting its sources to the utmost, you soon stop “It takes two to tango: you don’t share getting sources. intelligence with any government, however much you might wish to, unless “Why would anybody risk giving you that government is cooperating with anything if they know you can’t be you. It’s a two-way process; there is trusted to keep their secret? For no country in the world that we share many sources it is a matter of life and intelligence with unless we have the death; it’s not overly dramatic to say corresponding benefit from them. It is that. When you think about it: if it’s entirely probable that an independent secret intelligence, it’s something you Scotland would want to have that should not be having – in which case, relationship with the rUK; but that then you’re getting it through a person ora brings up the question of how would technical operation which shouldn’t be they make their contribution? They happening, and somebody’s at risk in would have to make a Scottish equivalent there if it gets out. So I just don’t think of the [Secret Intelligence Service]. enough thought is given to this. [The They would have to create a Scottish SNP] seem to think that intelligence is equivalent of the Security Service, [and] traded like any other commodity; but of GCHQ. These things take money; but that is not how it happens.”195 they also take a hell of a lot of time.”194 It is quite possible to accept the point One other important factor that could that no country shares intelligence jeopardise the intelligence-sharing unless it is in its interests to do so, whilst relationship between an independent also appreciating that the physical; Scotland and the rUK, at least initially, economic; and other ties between would be issues pertaining to the Scotland and the rUK would render close reliability of any new Scottish agencies: relations in both their interests. Indeed, this point has been repeatedly made by “A new service setting up in Scotland Nicola Sturgeon and many others. would take many years to persuade people to trust it,” said Baroness Ramsay. According to Baroness Ramsay, however, “It’s got nothing to do with nationality; this fact would by no means result it’s to do with the organisation – how it in the rUK going ‘above and beyond’ works, and how it’s seen to be working the standard modus operandi in its – and any Scottish service would have intelligence-sharing relationship with to prove (not just to the British, but to Scotland. The notion, for instance, that services all round the world) that they London and Edinburgh might come could be trusted – not because they to some arrangement – as part of would deliberately be untrustworthy, independence negotiations – whereby but accidentally [untrustworthy]. the rUK provided an intelligence ‘umbrella’ to Scotland (sharing all “You have to be sure. Secret intelligence relevant intelligence until the Scottish is terribly sensitive because of the

76 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy services were up and running) was CIA, was alleged by Mohamed’s lawyers described by Ramsay as “just not in the to have substantiated his claim to have real world”. been tortured at – and en route to – Guantánamo Bay. “This picture is exactly what Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP would like to Having lost its case first in the High believe – that important areas of Court, and then in the Court of activity can just continue as they are at Appeal, the British Government present, without any change produced resolved to settle with Mohamed, by by independence. It just will not happen awarding him a rumoured £1 million in like that; the [r]UK intelligence and compensation.197 Indeed, such has been security services will pursue their own the Government’s determination to interests by all the considerable means prevent a repeat of this incident that it at their disposal, and the only time any has inserted a clause in the Justice and intelligence might be given to a Scottish Security Act 2013, given Royal Assent structure would be when essential [r] on 25 April, stipulating “that the court is UK interests were involved and it was required to give permission for material essential that Scotland needed to not to be disclosed if it considers that know.”196 the disclosure of the material would be damaging to the interests of national The Third-Party Rule security.”198 The extent to which the rUK would be willing to share intelligence with an The circumstances under which the independent Scotland would also be US – or other countries – may wish for influenced by the international relations secret intelligence provided to the [r] of both countries. For instance, were UK not to be passed onto Scotland are the US to share a piece of intelligence varied, but would obviously include their with their British counterparts, which assessment of the ability of Scottish the rUK subsequently deemed to be of services to keep that information secret. relevance to Scotland, it could under Countries would also consider the no circumstances pass that information implications of sharing intelligence onto Scotland without America’s express with Scotland based on its international consent. This rule, known as the Third- posture and foreign-policy objectives. Party Rule, is of fundamental importance This would also apply to the rUK’s in the intelligence community, and the bilateral intelligence-sharing consequences of breaking it are – at relationship with a new nation north of best – a drying-up of that source of the border. In short, countries would information, if not a wider breakdown in have precious little reason to share relations between the two parties. intelligence with a Scotland whose It was the British Government’s international orientation was at odds determination not to break this principle with their own, if the result would be to that led it to fight so hard against facilitate that posture and underpin it. successive rulings from the courts As Sir Richard Mottram, a former chair that secret intelligence relating to the of the Joint Intelligence Committee, has alleged torture of the UK resident and said: under such circumstances, all rUK terror suspect, Binyam Mohamed, be Governments would have “a very narrow released. This intelligence, which had definition of what they would want to been provided to British officials by the do. Where they had a direct interest in

77 Intelligence and Cyber Security things such as counter-terrorism, yes, Whether or not an independent Scotland they would do something, because that might ever be invited to join ‘Five Eyes’, was in their interests. Otherwise, they thus presumably making it ‘Six Eyes’, would probably be quite awkward.”199 would depend on whether or not it was considered strategically compatible, Multilateral Intelligence-Sharing and – equally – whether or not it could Relationships actually and meaningfully contribute Similar considerations would also apply SIGINT to the alliance. At least part of to whether or not an independent the answer to this latter question would Scotland would be party to multilateral depend on how serious and effective intelligence-sharing relationships, in an independent Scotland’s overseas- particular the ‘Five Eyes’ community intelligence-gathering network would and NATO’s internal intelligence-sharing be, and in what areas it would choose to network. prioritise its efforts. For Scotland to be part of the NATO network would obviously be contingent Establishing Scottish on it joining the alliance (although Security and sources consulted for this report are in Intelligence Services private agreement that only fairly low- level intelligence tends to be shared in The UK’s intelligence network consists this network in any case). An altogether of three agencies which, between tighter and more significant operation is them, command a budget in excess of ‘Five Eyes’, one of the most important £2 billion a year. Working together to intelligence-sharing frameworks on protect the country, they are: the Secret earth. Intelligence Service (MI6), which has responsibility for taking action to deal First established in 1946 as an agreement with threats from abroad; the Security for cooperation in signals intelligence Service (MI5), responsible for threats (SIGINT) between the UK and US, ‘Five developing domestically; and the SIGINT Eyes’ (formally the UKUSA Agreement) Service (GCHQ), tasked with monitoring, was later extended to include the three intercepting, and decrypting information Commonwealth countries of Canada; from those who pose a threat to the UK Australia; and New Zealand.200 from overseas (including in cyber space). ‘Five Eyes’ is one of the most In addition, there are the Defence important international intelligence- Intelligence Staff (DIS) and the Joint sharing frameworks in the world, with Intelligence Committee (JIC). The membership determined by a common former makes up part of the MoD, language; mutually compatible strategic and its primary functions are to assess objectives; and, importantly, the intelligence material and to provide ability of each member to contribute information on possible threats to the intelligence to the benefit of the UK. The latter is part of the Cabinet others. Each member of ‘Five Eyes’ is Office, and its responsibilities are officially assigned lead responsibility for to advise government ministers on intelligence collection and analysis in priorities for intelligence gathering, as different parts of the globe, consistent well as analysing information provided with their geographical location and by the other four agencies. capabilities.

78 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Across a range of areas, the intelligence intelligence work: “All the Nordic states and security services also work closely gather intelligence either through with the police; although, given that defence attachés or through liaison with policing is already a devolved matter other services like our own”.202 She also (with Scotland possessing a distinctive emphasised that the Nordic states each and effective police service), this is not possess an excellent Security Service an area covered in this report. which, in addition to its normal security activity, is able to gather some foreign Both for reasons of cost and because intelligence on its own soil. of the probability that it would not be so globally ambitious as the KU is now, In evidence given to the Foreign Affairs it seems almost inconceivable that an Committee, Sir Richard Mottram independent Scotland would seek to concurred that any external-intelligence replicate the entirety of the vast cross- agency which Scotland might seek to governmental network that makes up create would “not bear any relationship Britain’s existing security and intelligence to the scale of the network that is capability. currently operated by [MI6] and the range of information that it derives.” The Secret Intelligence Service Assuming, as Sturgeon has posited, that (MI6) Scottish intelligence agencies would Although Nicola Sturgeon has said that be funded to the tune of 8-10 per cent establishing a Scottish equivalent of MI6 of the current UK total – some £160- would be “an option”, experts (both 200 million – Mottram suggested that consulted for this report, and elsewhere) Scotland could deliver an external- seem to be in broad agreement that intelligence service comparable to that this would be unlikely. Whilst Scottish of sister agencies such as New Zealand’s, intelligence and security services would “which have a fairly narrow range of clearly need to gather information functions”.203 regarding potential threats to Scotland from abroad, that is not analogous to The Security Service (MI5) the work of MI6 (which maintains one of Scotland would, however, need to the world’s biggest networks of overseas establish its equivalent of MI5, albeit agents who perform a broad range of on a smaller scale. Baroness Ramsay secret-intelligence gathering and covert has suggested that “in time, Scotland operations abroad in pursuit of British could have a reasonably efficient, Government objectives). capable national security service on a par with some of the smaller European Baroness Ramsay has said that countries.”204 The difficulty would be the Scotland “would be mad to establish an likely prolonged length of time it would intelligence service [like MI6]”, pointing take to set-up a Scottish Security Service, out that “very few countries in the and, indeed, any other intelligence- world actually have an MI6 […] global- gathering agency Scotland may wish to intelligence services are very few and far establish. between.”201 Instead, Baroness Ramsay posited, Scotland would probably adopt One of the major challenges, Baroness similar methods to those deployed Ramsay said, would be recruitment. by other small countries (such as “That’s got nothing to do with the the Nordic states) for their overseas- talents of Scots at all; there are a lot

79 Intelligence and Cyber Security of Scots in the intelligence and security the real nitty-gritty of agents and cases. services who’ve done extremely well. You couldn’t do that because [you] It’s not a question of national talents; it’s cannot talk about anything you’ve done a question of resources and expertise inside.”207 built up over time.”205 For much the same reasons, the UK A major part of this is the extreme Government would also be extremely importance of personal relationships unlikely to relinquish the physical and liaisons in intelligence gathering, assets that comprise its security and which can often take years to identify; intelligence services, most of which are cultivate; and maintain. Added to that – in any case – situated south of the is the already mentioned issue that border. it would take considerable time for Scottish intelligence agencies to win In the early years at least, and quite the trust of sister agencies. Good inter- possibly subsequently, an independent agency relationships are of particular Scotland would require considerable importance to smaller countries such as support from the UK if it were not to Scotland “because none of the individual be left dangerously exposed. Such countries that aren’t global have the assistance would not be without resources to get all the information they precedent, as Sir David Omand has need,” the Baroness explained. “That’s highlighted: “It is part of our history that where trust in your capability and your we helped both Australia and Canada ability to protect secrets [comes in]; the develop significant capability over a minute you think a security service is a period of very many years, lending them bit loose with information, you just don’t staff and in some cases providing even give them anything.”206 the director of their communications security and communications The difficulty in this regard is that, unlike intelligence organisations until they with the Armed Forces, it is almost were able to stand on their own feet, inconceivable that an independent which they do now.”208 Scotland would take its “share” of the security and intelligence services, in In the case of the Scotland-rUK either personnel or assets. The nature relationship, the importance of of an intelligence agent’s work is such such assistance would likely be that he or she could not simply be even more pressing given the deep transferred sideways into the equivalent interconnectedness of the two service of another country, taking all of countries. This might also consequently their contacts and classified information limit Scotland’s freedom of action, with them. “That does not mean with Omand telling the Foreign Affairs some Scots might not leave and come Committee, “There would, of course, to Scotland and help to try and set initially be a large number of gaps [in something up,” Meta Ramsay said. “But Scotland’s intelligence capabilities]. Part the only expertise an MI5 officer would of the negotiation that I would imagine be able to actually bring in to a Scottish would take place would be London service would be the expertise of how to saying very firmly to Edinburgh, ‘Here’s recruit people, how to run agents, that part of the deal: for our security as well as your own, you are going to have to sort of thing; but it’s all very theoretical. 209 What he or she wouldn’t be bringing are make certain arrangements.’”

80 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Moreover, as Omand; Ramsay; and much more than that would be needed. others have made clear, the rUK would It would be expensive and [the] overall only offer an independent Scotland value you would get from two centres such assistance as was required to meet [NATO’s and Scotland’s] rather than one its own security interests, not those of would be less […] I have some doubts as Scotland; and, whilst the two would to whether it would be feasible to do it certainly be interconnected, they would to the requisite standard. A much more not be one and the same. sensible way would be to try to construct a relationship of sharing with the rest of Government Communications the United Kingdom.”211 Headquarters (GCHQ) Opinions vary as to the extent to which Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones (a former an independent Scotland could establish chair of the JIC, who served as Minister of its own version of GCHQ. In order to State for Security and Counter-Terrorism counter the developing cyber threat, Sir between 2010 and 2011) has also Richard Mottram has said that Scotland highlighted some of the key challenges would indeed “need a mini-GCHQ to confronting the establishment of a both protect their information and Scottish GCHQ: “The issue will be cost. consider other things that go with this. I do not think Scotland could develop – […] These things can be done because because the investment is long and deep, we can think of other countries that do and extremely resource demanding this that are of a similar scale to Scotland – I do not think they could develop an in terms of population and economy.”210 organisation that is on a par with GCHQ. There’s only one other country that’s in Sir David Omand, who formerly headed the game the way we are, and that is GCHQ, concurred with Mottram’s the US […] We are devoting £650 million analysis regarding the possibility of additional over five years, on the base establishing a “mini-GCHQ”, but voiced of already having substantial structure – greater concern as to whether it would and intellectual and political investment have the requisite capabilities to protect – in the subject. GCHQ is there; you Scotland adequately: build on what you’ve got, and, if you’re starting from scratch, this is potentially a “The United Kingdom Government in its 212 cyber strategy has said that we will be very big call on resources.” a leading player. The highest standards Professor Keith Martin, Director of the of cyber security will be necessary for Information Security Group at Royal economic reasons. I cannot imagine a Holloway University, concurs that Government in Edinburgh would want Scotland would struggle to replicate the to take a different view […and] that set-up at Cheltenham. “GCHQ is a pivotal means you then have to have access organisation in the cyber defence of the to technical capability linked to some realm […and] if Scotland was cut off from serious intelligence capability. GCHQ, then clearly there’s something “The smaller nations in NATO can missing. If I were a Scottish minister access some of this through the NATO planning a breakaway, I’d certainly be arrangements which the Americans thinking carefully about that. I do not think it would be easy for Scotland to are underpinning. There is some NATO 213 research capability. To get to the sort have its own GCHQ.” of level that I would think appropriate, The importance of GCHQ is its ability to

81 Intelligence and Cyber Security identify, monitor, and counter threats in 2007. The attacks swamped websites to national security and which emanate of numerous Estonian organisations, from cyber space. It stands to reason including the parliament; banks; that the starting point when putting government ministries; newspapers; up effective cyber defences is knowing and broadcasters, with the perpetrator where the threat is aimed. “It’s not widely suspected to have been Russia. good enough to just have a general Had this been a conventional attack, understanding that there is a threat,” Estonia (a NATO member since 2004) said Baroness Neville-Jones. “You need could have expected a robust response to know where it’s going and where from the alliance – under Article 5 of it’s coming from. That depends on an NATO’s founding treaty, whereby “an extremely well-developed intelligence attack against one or more [members] base, at the heart of which is GCHQ […] in Europe or North America shall be GCHQ tracks the threat; it can show you considered an attack against them all” – the threat coming.”214 not to mention severe sanction from the United Nations.216 Such a capability is especially vital in countering malicious threats to a As it was, the international response nation’s electronic infrastructure, what is to this flagrant and malicious violation commonly referred to as cyber warfare. of Estonian sovereignty was collective The threat posed by cyber warfare is real international impotence (made all the and growing (with risks exacerbated as more acute by the fact that, although malicious actors enhance their capacity Russia was widely suspected to have to launch cyber attacks, and nations been responsible, this was never become ever more reliant on electronic definitively proved to have been the systems in order to function properly). case).217 In January 2008, more than eight months after the attacks were launched, There is no exact agreed definition of Estonia succeeded in convicting one cyber warfare; but it can essentially be man for participating in the affair, and summarised as politically motivated fined him the grand total of £830.218 hacking in order to conduct sabotage and espionage, especially against In this new and evolving security arena, government targets and other critical therefore, nations are arguably more national infrastructure. Although vulnerable – and less able to rely on cyber attacks can be launched by international protection – than in any private citizens, this is also a new other kind of warfare, making effective mode of warfare being developed by national cyber security capabilities (such governments (with already talking as are presently afforded to theK U by of “winning informationised wars by the GCHQ) even more important. mid-21st century”).215 Cyber Security beyond In some respects, cyber warfare poses a greater threat to national security GCHQ than conventional conflict does, not Vital though government agencies such least because the world’s current as GCHQ are in this arena, however, international peacekeeping framework they nevertheless form only part of the is manifestly not configured to respond solution in dealing with threats from appropriately. No better example of this cyber space. exists than the cyber attacks on Estonia,

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As the Government has acknowledged simple as ensuring the appropriate anti- in its 2013 review of the landscape of virus software is installed on a computer, the UK’s cyber security strategy, fully or that data is properly stored and 80 per cent of cyber attacks could be backed up. prevented through simple computer and network ‘hygiene’.219 “Cyber security is as much about protecting us from ourselves, as it Indeed, it is important to distinguish is about protecting us from others,” between cyber warfare of the sort Professor Martin said. “Accidental previously described and cyber crime loss of data, and careless practice that more broadly (which encompasses results in information leaking – this is commercially motivated offences online, not necessarily because of a malicious as well as non-malicious acts that can enemy; it’s because of bad practice result in damage to electronic systems that leads to massive data loss. People and/or the loss of information). lock their houses up; they lock papers in a drawer; they look after their photo In countering all of these threats, private album, and keep it somewhere safe; companies – and individual Internet but they stick all this stuff digitally on a users – have both a role to play and computer, and don’t back it up. If that an interest in playing it. The reality is computer then gets a bit of malware, that nobody controls the Internet, and they lose their entire photo album; they nobody owns it (with 80 per cent of it 220 lose all their correspondence; they lose lying in the private sector). access to their bank.”222 In most cases, the first line of defence against cyber threats, whether malicious Developing an or accidental, must be provided by the Integrated National target of those threats themselves. Dr Cyber Security Thomas Rid (one of the world’s leading experts on cyber-security strategy, and Strategy a Reader at the Department of War The challenge in developing an effective Studies at Kings College London) made cyber-security strategy is how to this clear in his interview for this report: integrate all these areas: promoting best “If you are HSBC and you are a target of practice at the individual and company attacks – which every bank is – who is level, and also timely and appropriate at the frontline there? The answer is the information sharing and system company itself. If your company network integration further up the scale. is penetrated from another country, it is not as if any UK agency is standing at the The reality, according to Professor Rid, border watching the traffic; or, at least it is that “nobody has full visibility about is not as if they can do something about the entire picture; so, neither Q GCH it. It is a question of how you organise nor the Cabinet Office nor anybody your company security, and – in some else in the City has full visibility of the cases – how you cooperate with law threat landscape, of the vulnerability 223 enforcement in order to take action, if landscape.” 221 you have to take action.” Bringing these disparate components Brought right down to the individual together to provide that bigger picture level, good cyber security could be as is a challenge that all nations are now

83 Intelligence and Cyber Security having to confront, with varying levels of analysed, Britain is placed in first success. The UK Government’s review of position, ahead of the US; Australia; and the cyber-security landscape was itself Germany (who are ranked second; third; a product of collaboration between and fourth, respectively).228 central government, think tanks, industry representatives, academics, In terms of developing its own cyber- and citizens’ groups.224 The Government security strategy; bringing together the has also begun an initiative to create an government, the private sector, and information exchange in a confidential academia; and taking advantage of some environment, in order to enable major of the commercial opportunities which companies to share experiences and the sector provides, there are those who lessons learned about cyber attacks to argue that an independent Scotland which they have been subjected but, for could do well. commercial and reputational reasons, “I think Scotland, if it got its act together, do not want to acknowledge publicly.225 could tackle a fair amount of cyber As previously mentioned, the security,” said Professor Martin. “I think Government is also devoting an the UK is struggling to get its head round additional £650 million to its cyber- cyber security – it’s certainly making security strategy, with payment good progress; but it’s not got it all spread out between 2011 and 2015. sorted – so it’s not like there’s a perfect Additionally, it is bringing together system now. Scotland has as good a chance as anybody, in that sense of fifteen government organisations, in an 229 attempt to coordinate these efforts.226 getting it right.” With some 1,000 cyber attacks launched Planners would need to recognise that against British targets every hour, at an an independent Scotland would remain annual cost to the economy of between acutely vulnerable to cyber attacks on its £18 billion and £27 billion, the UK clearly critical national infrastructure, as well as remains vulnerable; but, there is reason to commercially motivated cyber crime to believe that it is faring well compared (not least on account of its still significant to other advanced nations.227 financial-services industry). Denial-of- Service (DoS) attacks and covert data According to the Cyber Power Index acquisition can be particularly damaging prepared by the Economist Intelligence to financial-services industries (due to Unit, the UK now surpasses every the destruction of trust and the potential other G20 country for its ability to slowing – or even stopping – of trade, withstand cyber attacks and to deploy quite aside from the immediate loss of digital infrastructure needed to boost money and data involved). the economy. The index is constructed from 39 indicators and sub-indicators However, whilst Scotland’s vulnerability which measure specific attributes in that area would be significant, the of the cyber environment, with data same could be said of the market drawn from across four drivers of cyber for cyber solutions and services. As power: legal and regulatory framework, Professor Martin pointed out whilst economic and social context, technology highlighting the business potential of the infrastructure, and industry application. Scottish cyber industry: When all this information has been “The UK Government is trying to secure

84 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Britain, [and] also to promote cyber as “Every country, including the United a business the UK can sell, with people States – a huge country in comparison coming to the UK for cyber-security to all European countries – is struggling services. There are lots of companies to recruit the necessary talent and skills in that industry [which are already in to develop the products, programmes, Scotland], as well as the universities. and projects that make you safe in cyber There’s nothing to stop Scotland getting space. It’s a problem in the public and on top of that and developing its own the private sector,” Professor Rid said. cyber-security industry. Singapore is going to pour money into research to “With the exception of Israel – and develop cyber programmes and security Scotland will not be Israel – all small companies there – so this is not a closed countries are by definition marginal door; it’s an open market”.230 players in this field, and, to a degree, dependent on the larger players […] In Scotland today, there are already Basically, you need an economy of scale some 2,000 people employed in the when it comes to cyber security.”233 security and resilience industry, with sales of over £200 million. Scotland As a specific example of the challenge, Rid has over 100 capable companies with cited the problem he has encountered products; services; and applications in in finding K U -based control-system fields ranging from cyber security, to experts to better gauge the threats to, surveillance, and business continuity, to and vulnerabilities in, Industrial Control biometrics.231 Systems (ICS). “It turns out there are actually very few people in the UK to In his evidence to the Foreign Affairs talk about this; one of them is actually in Committee, Sir David Omand also made Scotland. If a country of 63 or 64 million this point, highlighting companies has issues with the economy of scale (such as SELEX Galileo, one of the because it is actually not big enough world’s leading companies in the cyber compared to, say, the United States security) based north of the border, as [what chance does a smaller nation like well as the “excellent computer science Scotland have?] That is the biggest issue; departments” in Scottish universities.232 I cannot emphasise that enough.”234 Scaling the Cyber In an effort to address the serious shortage of qualified cyber-security Security Problem: experts, GCHQ has thrown its weight The Challenge for behind the ‘Academic Centre of Scotland Excellence in Cyber Security Research’, a programme which has brought together Perhaps the most serious challenge eight leading British Universities in an for Scotland in establishing itself as attempt to encourage them to devote a serious player in the cyber-security greater focus and resources to this field. domain would be one of scale. Whilst, as Amongst the various benefits offered mentioned, there would be nothing to to the universities by GCHQ are: closer hold an independent Scotland back from collaboration with QGCH and others in designing a coherent cyber-security the cyber-security industry; partnership strategy, drawing together the requisite endorsement in publications and capabilities to enact it in practice would prospectuses; and extra funding be more problematic. opportunities, including up to £50,000

85 Intelligence and Cyber Security in capital investment.235 effective cyber defences. In this respect, he said that London presently enjoyed a Indeed, even the United States has distinct advantage: struggled to find the necessary talent in this field. In 2010, it was estimated that “London is extremely well positioned just 1,000 people existed in the entire US to combine the private sector and the with the requisite skills needed for the public sector because of their physical most demanding cyber-defence tasks, proximity to one another. Think what with a force of some 20,000 to 30,000 other cities can offer the same thing. being what was needed.236 Germany does not have a city where you have business and government “You need to be big in this game,” Rid in one spot: business and banking is continued. “If you look at the private in Frankfurt; but the government is in sector, some companies in the US have Berlin. In America, business and banking more revenue than entire countries. In is in New York, not in Washington, the conventional security arena, when DC; and Brussels a similar picture. it comes to military capabilities, states This physical proximity is extremely are very unequal. They are even more important because it is all about trusting unequal when it comes to cyber security, people, about creating trust between because the supporting eco-system that individuals. Cyber security is not you need in order to be both defensively something that is just technical […] We and offensively big players is so hard to have to see the entire cyber-security set- come by. […] up in the UK as more like a cluster, like “It is certainly possible that small an eco-system that consists of private companies in this arena could be very entities as well as public entities”.238 successful; but, if you are a Scottish For an independent Scotland, therefore, company and you are interested in the challenges of establishing a cyber- cyber security, right now you are part of security network comparable to that a system that is one of the best: it can possessed by the UK are clear. compete with what is happening in the United States. It is impressive what is Irrespective of whether one accepts the happening in London. […So] I think it is analysis provided here, however, what is unrealistic to [try and] replicate this in absolutely certain is that developing and a small country because no other small implementing a coherent, integrated country in Europe is into it in a major cyber-security strategy is an extremely way. The economy-of-scale argument complex undertaking – made all the is the central argument, and you can more so by the continuously fluid and break that down into networks between evolving nature of cyber space. companies and government; the running of intelligence agencies or law- It is undoubtedly striking, therefore, that, enforcement agencies; or attracting skill, whilst the SNP have singled out cyber you name it.”237 security as a field in which they feel an independent Scotland could thrive, they As a final point, Rid also emphasised have presented no meaningful proposals the importance of physical proximity whatsoever for how they might go about between political and economic centres this in practice. Whilst it is unrealistic of power, a more subtle but additionally to expect the SNP to present a full important component of developing cyber-security strategy before the 2014

86 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy referendum, it is difficult to accept their more than aspiration as yet exists to assurances as to Scotland’s potential substantiate the claim. to succeed in this arena when nothing

87

In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Chapter VI The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry

The Scottish defence industry currently defence industry, including for its iconic employs over 12,600 people, and has and politically significant shipyards. Said annual sales in excess of £1.8 billion. It the SNP defence spokesman, in May is primarily focused on the naval sector, 2012, “With independence, Scotland with leading players including Rosyth- would have a healthy order book. It based Babcock Marine – which is part is not the London government that of an alliance of companies building makes the yards successful – it is the the UK’s two new Queen Elizabeth- second-to-none Scottish skills base and class aircraft carriers. Furthermore, BAE technical expertise that brings orders to Systems Maritime undertakes the design the yards, and that will continue under and manufacture of, and through-life independence.”241 support for, a number of warships – including the Type 45 destroyers – all With regard to their ambitions for the from its facility on the River Clyde.239 defence industry in Scotland, the SNP’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Yet, Scotland is also home to a range Update says simply that a “Scottish of other defence contractors working defence industrial strategy and across a broad spectrum of sectors. procurement plan will fill K U capability SELEX Galileo is a leader in the supply of gaps in Scotland, addressing the lack of electronic systems for military air; land; new frigates, conventional submarines and sea platforms, and is also heavily and maritime patrol aircraft.”242 involved in many other programmes (including the Eurofighter, and the F-35 The SNP have also stated their support Joint Strike Fighter). Thales Optronics for an independent Scotland pursing a designs and manufactures a variety joint-procurement strategy: of systems – including laser targeting “Joint procurement will be pursued with devices for the British and other armed the rest of the UK and other allies as well forces, and the sonar and electronic- as shared conventional basing, training warfare support for the Royal Navy’s and logistics arrangements, fulfilling Vanguard- and Astute-class submarines. shared priorities in ‘Smart Defence’.”243 A third example would be Vector Aerospace Component Services, which Little else has been offered by the SNP specialises in providing one-stop-shop on this issue to date. The vast majority capability for an extensive range of of existing references to Scotland’s mechanical and hydraulic components defence industry have been focusing on for rotary and fast-jet aircraft.240 job losses and what the party alleges to be the MoD’s defence underspend in Should Scotland vote for independence Scotland, with no substantive assertions in 2014, Angus Robertson has presented on what the industry’s future might look an optimistic outlook for the Scottish like under independence – other than a

89 The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry statement that jobs would be protected, be fine in Scotland […] I don’t think they and the spending imbalance rectified. are fully engaging in the debate on this subject, and I don’t mind being public on On 22 November 2012, the party issued that criticism”.245 a statement describing the Westminster government as the “[r]eal threat to A fuller breakdown of Godden’s Scotland’s defence sector”, arguing that assessment of the defence industry’s the loss of 360 civilian defence jobs over prospects in an independent Scotland is two consecutive quarters that year was provided later in this chapter; however, “making a mockery of scaremongering his criticism of the SNP is included here [over the potential loss of] defence jobs because of Robertson’s direct reference in an independent Scotland”. to his evidence, which the defence spokesman had used in formulating his In the statement, Angus Robertson own case. warned that “Westminster is making disproportionate and damaging cuts The Importance of the to Scotland’s defence jobs, and the only way that will change is with a Yes MoD for Scotland’s vote in 2014. Unlike a Westminster Defence Industry Government determined to continue In 2010, the SNP published an SDSR to eroding Scotland’s defence footprint, coincide with the UK Government’s own an independent Scotland would protect National Security Strategy and SDSR defence jobs.” that followed from it. The majority of In evidence provided to the Scottish the document is devoted to a detailed Affairs Committee, Ian Godden (the breakdown of how many defence former chairman of the defence-industry jobs have been cut in Scotland – more trade organisation, ADS) suggested that than 10,000 since 1997, on the SNP’s the defence industry could succeed assessment – and the level and impact – under the right conditions – in an of the MoD’s ‘defence underspend’ in independent Scotland. Drawing on these Scotland (calculated as more than £5.6 words, Robertson said this assessment billion between 2002 and 2008, when “reflects the positive vision that the compared with spending levels in other SNP has for the defence industry”, regions of the UK).246 elaborating further: “the exceptional The SNP’s report warns that skill base, industrial capacity and strong independence may be highly necessary supply chain [which] the defence for the future security of Scotland, industry has in Scotland means that the depending on whether or not the sector would continue to thrive in an Westminster government “is committed independent Scotland.”244 to a future for conventional defence In an interview for this report, across the UK” (my emphasis). It goes on however, Godden reacted unhappily to to express fears that “[u]nless the SDSR Robertson’s evaluation of his evidence and Ministers consider this as a priority to the committee, claiming that he felt now, the conventional KU Armed Forces “used and abused” by the SNP. “I gave will become concentrated in ‘Super evidence for three hours to the Scottish Garrisons’ and bases, commanded and Affairs Committee, and they picked trained almost exclusively in the south two bits and made it look like I was of England.”247 supporting the idea that defence would

90 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Most recently, the SNP have strongly blocks under construction in Glasgow, condemned revisions to the MoD’s and the planned integration of the 2011 Defence Basing Review, specifically vessels in a purpose-built facility in with regard to the relocation of forces Rosyth (in addition to significant supply- currently based in Germany. The 2011 chain activity), Scotland would suffer Review “had originally envisaged the a disproportionate impact from any re-location of 6,500-7,000 [Army] cancellation.”251 personnel currently based in Germany, to bases in Scotland”, as part of the UK’s Specifically, the document warns, “due total planned drawdown from Germany to workload and capacity planning by 2020. It predicted that “as a result which has been focused on the carrier the overall defence footprint in Scotland projects, neither BAE Systems (Clyde) will increase by over 2,000 posts”.248 In […nor] Babcock Marine (Rosyth) [have] April 2013, however, it was formally sufficient order book to sustain the announced that this figure, as part of a current workforce of [around] 5,400 broader recalibration, was to be reduced direct employees if one or more of the to merely “an additional 600 personnel carriers are cancelled […] Cancellation of returning from Germany.”249 the contracts would immediately impact on the Aircraft Carrier Alliance, BAE Responding to rumours of the change, Systems Surface Ships, Babcock Marine, which were circulating ahead of the Thales, Rolls-Royce, Converteam, April announcement, Angus Robertson MacTaggart Scott, SSSL (Rosyth), Ticon, described the move as “a monumental and a range of other Scottish companies betrayal of Scotland’s defence in the carrier supply chain. The likely personnel, their families, and the impact would be at least 1,000 jobs people of Scotland”, adding that “this directly, and 4,500 indirectly, in the devastating blow comes on the back of supply chain.”252 significant cuts in defence spending and jobs in Scotland”.250 The SNP SDSR submission also mentions the impact of cancelling any plans to In addition to focusing heavily on defence construct the Type 26 Global Combat jobs, the SNP have also delivered a Ship north of the border (although frank assessment of the importance details were far less exhaustive since no of continued MoD investment for the construction work has yet begun, and nor future of the Scottish defence industry – have the final locations for construction in particular, shipbuilding. yet been finalised). From what the SNP understood at the time, however, “any At the time that the SNP’s 2010 SDSR cancellation would lead to job losses for submission was written, considerable 100 engineers based [on] the west coast uncertainty existed regarding the future of Scotland”, and would also “affect BAE of one of the two Queen Elizabeth-class Systems and other companies in the aircraft carriers, significant sections supply chain.”253 of which are under construction in Scotland. “To cancel one or more of the With its focus on securing continued Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers UK-Government investment in Scotland, would present a huge challenge to not on the prospects for the defence the sustainability of the Scottish and industry in the event of independence, UK shipbuilding industry,” the report the SNP SDSR makes very clear the cautions. “With the two largest lower importance of MoD programmes for

91 The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry the Scottish defence industry: “Based security is an essential consideration). on the new approach to industry- In 2011-2012, 40 per cent of new MoD customer cooperation and industry contracts by value, and 63 per cent partnership (developed initially through by number, were placed on a non- the Type 25 destroyer programme, and competitive basis (that is, were not fully manifested in the aircraft-carrier tendered on the open market).256 programme), the shipbuilding industry in Scotland is now achieving independently This trend is particularly pronounced benchmarked world-class levels of when broken down by supplier, with efficiency in warship construction. an overwhelming majority of contracts which are placed with the big companies “In short, the certainty of MoD responsible for producing complex programmes and associated long-term security products being awarded non- employment on the development and competitively. In 2011-2012, just 45 building of highly capable military ships per cent of the contracts awarded by has been the catalyst for developing the MoD to Babcock International were a sophisticated class-leading industry, won competitively, as were 29 percent capable of competing internationally,” of those won by Thales; 11 per cent by the SNP report continues. “Skills BAE Systems; 7 per cent by Rolls Royce; and capacity, once lost, would be and just 3 per cent by Finmeccanica almost impossible to reinstate later. (SELEX Galileo being a Finmeccanica This not only has implications for the subsidiary).257 defence industry, but will diminish the increasingly positive attitude Equally significant is the proportion towards prospective employment in of MoD contracts awarded to British- engineering […] now being seen in the based companies, even when Scottish economy.”254 This assertion is tendered competitively. This is a direct supported by statistics, with 50-80 per consequence of the fact that the UK cent – probably closer to 80 per cent – defence industry is presently the second of all defence work in Scotland directly biggest on Earth, and certainly amongst dependent on MoD contracts.255 the most advanced: around 85-90 per cent of defence contracts stay within the All of this is exceedingly pertinent in the UK when offered competitively.258 context of the industry’s future under independence, given the high likelihood Perhaps the most exclusively national that the UK Government would greatly and non-competitive section of the reduce the number of defence orders it defence industry is warship building. It placed in an independent Scotland. In is the only major sector in which 100 the case of complex warship building, per cent of the platforms tend to be it may even cease placing orders there national – as opposed to fighter jets, for altogether. instance, which are often international, collaborative efforts – and contracts for As several expert witnesses pointed these ships are invariably awarded non- out during interviews for this report, competitively toK U -based companies. defence procurement remains very far It is regularly pointed out that the UK from being an open market, with the has not ordered and built a warship British Government retaining a strong in a foreign country since the Second interest in favouring domestically based World War, and Peter Luff MP, the companies (in particular where national former minister responsible for defence

92 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy equipment, has gone so far as to state contracts to build warships for the Royal that – in fact – no complex Royal Navy Navy unless the rUK decided not to warship has been built outside the UK apply the Article 346 exemption (which for almost 200 years.259 is a highly unlikely prospect). The Article 346 Exemption The Future of the Type Under EU competition rules, Member 26 Global Combat Ship States are obliged to place contracts on the open market, except in cases On the immediate horizon, in regard to considered essential to national security. Scotland and MoD build contracts, is the The exclusion, laid down in Article issue of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship 346(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning (13 of which are due to replace the Royal of the European Union, stipulates that Navy’s ageing Type 23-class frigates from “any Member State may take such 2021 onwards).263 Within the UK, the measures as it considers necessary for Clyde shipyards are billed to become the protection of the essential interests “the main British centre of excellence of its security which are connected for naval surface ships”, meaning that with the production of or trade in in all likelihood they would, ordinarily, arms, munitions and war material; such become the sole supplier of complex measures shall not adversely affect ships for the Royal Navy, including the the conditions of competition in the Type 26.264 internal market regarding products However, there are now widespread which are not intended for specifically concerns that the UK Government is military purposes.”260 There is no delaying any final decision on where the application process to apply an Article Type 26 frigates will be built until after 346 exemption; it is up to Member the independence referendum, because States to decide for themselves whether a ‘Yes’ vote will result in them no longer the criteria have been met, and the being built in Scotland. On this point, the MoD’s Director Commercial for Defence Government has now been explicit. As Equipment and Support has said that Peter Luff told the Scottish Affairs Select he cannot recall an instance where an Committee, on 13 June 2012, “When we exemption had been challenged.261 come to build the new Type 26 frigate – Peter Luff has explained that, when the Global Combat Ship – we will have considering whether to use the Article to apply for an exemption under Article 346 exemption, “the test that we apply 346 to enable us to build it within the as a country is a test of operational United Kingdom without contracting it. advantage and freedom of action. We That means that, if Scotland is separate, believe in our ability to maintain an we cannot build it in Scotland.”265 operational advantage and a competitive Amidst growing press speculation edge over our enemy. […] Where we wish that this would be the case, Angus to maintain our operational freedom of Robertson, speaking a month before Luff action we would apply the Article 346 made his comments, sought to dismiss exemption”.262 such concerns as “the scaremongering Warship building comes under the of Tory ministers”. He pointed out that exemption, meaning that defence “shipbuilders across Europe regularly companies based in an independent get orders from other countries”, and Scotland could no longer secure MoD that the Type 26 Global Combat Ship

93 The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry

“has attracted interest from countries 266 The Future of the including Australia and Canada.” Queen Elizabeth-Class In fact, the Canadian Government had Aircraft Carriers ruled out the prospect of collaboration with the UK on the project over one year As regards the construction of the earlier, having come under sustained two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft pressure from their own shipyards carriers, suggestions that construction (which were concerned that they would could be moved out of Scotland upon lose out on bidding and building).267 independence are misplaced. Work on both carriers is well underway, The prospect of the UK and Australia and it would be neither practical nor working together on the Type 26 sensible to move the operations at this is, however, a much more distinct advanced stage. Regarding the Article possibility. On 18 January 2013, the 346 exemption, Luff has made clear that British and Australian governments “the exemption applies to the prevailing signed a new defence treaty “to provide conditions at the time it is applied. It a framework for the many strands of co- 268 would not be invalidated by a Scottish operation between the two countries.” separate state. The carriers would not Amongst the various potential areas be affected, as I understand it.”270 of collaboration, the Royal Navy has announced that “the two countries’ Where the future for work on the military will be seeing whether we can carriers would be far less certain, work jointly on Australia’s future frigates however, is during the post-construction and the Royal Navy’s Type 26 ‘Global maintenance and refitting stage (which Combat Ship’”. Specifically, Defence will be considerable, given that the Secretary Philip Hammond and his carriers are due to see some five decades Australian counterpart, Stephen Smith, of service apiece). It was Luff’s opinion agreed “to explore the possibility of co- that people “often focus [too much] on operation over mutual design work for the construction of a particular platform the Royal Navy’s new Type 26 Global or asset. Through-life maintenance and Combat Ship – a design that could support are often of a greater value to meet the needs of the Royal Australian the economy. We would not be able Navy.”269 to maintain complex warships in a country where we could not guarantee As the statement makes explicit, our freedom of action. It is as though however, nothing has yet been formally Scotland would disqualify itself from the confirmed regarding such collaboration maintenance of ships.”271 (which would, nevertheless, be confined to mutual design work to ensure that Philip Dunne MP, Luff’s successor as the Type 26 met the requirements of the Minister for Defence Equipment, has Australian Navy, should they decide to estimated that the cost of providing adopt the ship themselves). What seems support to the carriers over their apparent is that, come the construction lifetime is likely to be as significant as phase, the UK would not be building Type their construction cost. The trade unions 26 frigates for use by the Royal Navy in of Babcock Marine in Rosyth have said Australia, nor would the Australians be that they envisaged each of the two building their frigates in the UK. warships needing maintenance every 10 years or so – meaning one aircraft carrier

94 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy being worked on every five years, over a possibly be assumed that the Scottish period of 50 years. The unions have also Government would be in the business been frank in their view that it would of placing defence orders on anything be much less likely that this work would like the scale of its UK counterpart, and, take place if Rosyth were outside the like all commercial enterprises, defence UK.272 companies tend to go where the money is. The Mood amongst As Dr John Louth (Director of the the Defence Industry ‘Defence, Industries and Society’ in Scotland programme at RUSI) told the Scottish Affairs Committee recently, “It seems to Representatives of defence companies me that there is a very strong correlation based in Scotland are extremely between the size of the nation’s defence reluctant to speak publicly about their budget and the size, scale, capability fears or otherwise, regarding Scottish and capacity of its defence industrial independence; none agreed to do so for base.”274 Francis Tusa has agreed with this report. Privately, however, concerns this assessment, providing the direct have been raised about the potential loss example of Thales (which currently has a of access to the world’s second-largest significant presence in Scotland): “They defence market, and there have been move their facilities to where the money some discussions about the possibility is. In the case of air defence, they closed of relocation south of the border in the down all of their French facilities and event of a ‘Yes’ vote in 2014. moved them to the UK because that One well-placed source told this report was where the budget was for their that, following discussions he had had particular niche. with the board of one of the big defence “It is a lot easier to flex factory demand companies, “they said quite clearly within the defence industry than you that, if Scotland became independent, would think. The idea that that could they would move their operation out take decades before a move is wrong. from near Edinburgh”. The company If you ended up with an independent in question employs several thousand Scottish defence force with limited people in Scotland who, the source capabilities, and low-tech capabilities at said, would consequently lose their that, those facilities will be within Britain jobs. Separately, Peter Luff has also within months – end of. It goes where told the Scottish Affairs Committee that the money is, pure and simple.”275 “individual companies in Scotland are saying to me privately, ‘In the event of Conditions for separation we would consider moving south of the border because we want to the Success of the keep our access.’”273 Scottish Defence Given the certainty of being excluded Industry from the large number of non- Whilst an independent Scotland’s competitive contracts still placed by the defence sector would undoubtedly be MoD, it is not hard to understand why much smaller than the rUK’s, this does defence companies in Scotland will have not mean that its collapse would be reservations. Even on the open market, inevitable, at least in some areas. with the best will in the world, it cannot

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Ian Godden has argued that a Scottish second, getting off its hobbyhorse about defence industry could succeed, but only whether defence industrial is a good under specific conditions and with the thing or not.”277 active support of a future independent Scottish Government: Godden argued that Scotland would need to invest around £40 million per “First – and this is an apolitical statement annum in defence R&D, warning that – Scotland needs a defence-industrial “the industries will die if it doesn’t do strategy; it hasn’t got one, and it needs that.” £40 million equates to 10 per cent one. If it’s a new nation, I would argue of the roughly £400 million UK science it needs an even sharper one, because and technology budget for defence otherwise it will lose industries it has got (although the MoD’s total R&D spend used to having as a result of being part is much higher, around £1.5 billion per of the UK”.276 year).278 Godden stressed that Scotland could Vice-Admiral Sir Andrew Mathews, the not allow its defence-industrial strategy Royal Navy’s Chief of Matériel (Fleet) to dictate its defence strategy (that for Defence Equipment and Support, is, prioritising defence jobs over the has offered a similar view: “I suspect nation’s actual strategic needs); but, nor that there is quite a strong correlation should the country’s defence strategy between high-end manufacture, in fail to take account of its industrial base. terms of defence equipment, and the amount that nation spends on defence Highlighting what he described as the R and D.”279 “immaturity” of current thinking on this issue, he cited one recent defence The next critical factor for the success conference he had attended in which of an independent Scottish defence experts had presented what equipment industry would be certainty about the they felt an independent Scotland future. The Scottish Government must, would require. “Guess what? Ninety Godden said, “give large international per cent of the equipment was bought companies a signal about their from America. So I said, ‘OK, fine; what commitment for 15 to 20 to 30 years; happens to Scotland’s investment in the otherwise they will not invest.”280 Eurofighter Typhoon? What happens to all the missiles that the Europeans use? Even with all these requirements in Are you going to buy European missiles? place, however, Godden warned that Because some of the equipment is made Scotland’s defence industry would in Paisley and Glasgow. What are you need to fundamentally recalibrate what going to do with SELEX Galileo that’s tied sort of equipment it sort to produce into all these European programmes?’ – effectively abandoning ambitions to So somebody had tied a defence policy manufacture complete platforms, and to defence equipment without thinking focus instead on being a niche supplier of the industrial implications of anything. of specific products for use in defence systems. Shipbuilding of the kind that “Next, if Scotland wants the existing defence companies in Scotland engage defence-industrial base to continue, it in now, Godden said, would have no will have to, as a nation, do two things it future under independence: is not doing at the moment: committing much higher research and development “This idea that Scotland could become [R&D] spending to the industry, and, a platform producer for aircraft carriers,

96 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy or a large-plane manufacturer: that’s unlikely to seek to procure outside a UK nonsense; it’s just a cover story. This eyes-only environment”.285 debate about shipbuilding and so-on is, in my view, a distraction because the Much of the radar work in Scotland is real industrial question is: ‘Can Scotland currently carried out by SELEX Galileo. continue to build its niche technologies In the event of Scottish independence, and, as an independent country, become the rUK would exempt the contract even better at promoting its engineering from open competition, and seek to skills?’.”281 retain it within its own borders. SELEX Galileo is also what is known as a ‘List X’ For instance, Scotland has for many site, which means that it has access to years produced some of the finest confidential information which the MoD submarine periscopes in the world, would not want outside of the UK. Both and every Royal Navy submarine since of these considerations would certainly 1917 has been fitted with a periscope make the SELEX site vulnerable in an from Thales or its previous incarnation independent Scotland. as Barr and Stroud.282 Scotland does not only fit out Royal Navy submarines Other ‘niche technology’-sector firms with their periscopes, however, but which would be adversely impacted exports to other countries as well.283 include Vector Aerospace, in Perth, Scottish defence companies are also and Thales, in Glasgow. As the Scottish involved in the production of a range Affairs Committee have noted, “Vector of other equipment (including missile Aerospace carries out maintenance systems and sensor systems, along with and repair on aircraft parts. It is over mechanical and hydraulic components 80 per cent reliant on contracts to for rotary and fast-jet aircraft).284 maintain components for the [MoD’s] aircraft fleet of over 40 Chinooks and Clearly, however, the Scottish defence 130 Tornadoes. It is unclear whether industry is heavily geared towards the Perth site would be awarded any equipping the British Armed Forces at such contracts when Vector has an present, with the majority of defence alternative site in Hampshire.” Thales, work directly dependent on MoD meanwhile, is also a ‘List X’ site and is contracts. Whilst some contracts would heavily dependent on MoD contracts doubtless continue to be placed in for its defence-electronics and Optronics Scotland, there is also the risk that work. As the Scottish Affairs Committee the MoD would shift its orders for warns, “If the MoD withdrew its custom, specific items of defence equipment to and was not willing to place orders in a companies located within the rUK. separate Scotland, then it would put a big question mark over the viability of As with the warships, such a shift south the Glasgow site.”286 of the border would be especially probable in the case of sensitive high- In his interview for this report Hew end equipment which the British Strachan concurred that the shift of KU Government would chose to procure defence contracts out of Scotland would non-competitively, in the interests of prove a major challenge to the defence national security. One specific example industry there under any circumstances: posited by Philip Dunne would be with “[The defence companies] are pretty sensitive radar equipment, which the terrified, saying these expertise[s] will British Government “would be most leech out of Scotland, and so forth.”

97 The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry

Asked for his assessment of the ‘niche as “the new approach” of the UK technology’ route, Strachan said, “I Government to defence procurement, don’t think it’s a viable option. Most of several criteria have to be met before those employed in defence in Scotland the MoD should consider issuing a non- are employed on the ‘whole submarine’ competitive contract. Examples of when side, not the ‘periscope’ side, and – in an open-procurement approach should any case – why would the rUK continue be adopted include: when a requirement to place further orders north of the can be met off-the-shelf from the border?”287 domestic and global market, when it can be met by modifying an off-the- Open Procurement shelf-product, and when it can be met In answer to Professor Strachan’s through a new development programme question, the main reason for continuing via the market. In the first category are to award contracts to an independent anything from simple commodities such Scotland would be (according to as socks and body armour, to mature the UK Government’s own defence- technologies such as the C-17 transport industrial strategy) one of quality and aircraft. Potential modified off-the-shelf cost. In its February 2012 White Paper, products include protected vehicles National Security Through Technology: such as those used in Afghanistan, whilst Technology, Equipment, and Support new development programmes pursued for UK Defence and Security, the through the market include the new F-35 Lightning fighter and the A400M Government placed a strong emphasis 290 on the desirability of open procurement: Atlas transport aircraft. “Wherever possible, we will seek to Examples of products that could not fulfil the UK’s defence and security – and would not – be procured on the requirements through open competition open market include national-level in the domestic and global market,” the communications, low-level observables, report reads. It goes on to lay out the aspects of complex weapons, and Government’s commitment to “buy off- nuclear technologies.291 the-shelf where appropriate”, and even states that it is “concerned about the To look at what proportion of MoD proportion of non-competitive contracts procurement fits the former and latter that have been let by the [MoD]”.288 categories is to understand, however, how very far defence is from being an Inevitably, however, the UK Government open market – even with the best will is significantly constrained, in in the world. To repeat, fully 63 per this regard, by national security cent of MoD contracts by number, and considerations, as the White Paper itself 40 per cent by value, were placed non- openly acknowledges: “Procurement competitively in 2011-2012. in the defence and security areas is, however, fundamentally different from Scotland’s defence industry would other forms of procurement, so we therefore need to find other customers will […] take action to protect the KU ’s to replace the lost UK business if operational advantages and freedom of possible, whilst also actively seeking to action, but only where this is essential encourage new defence orders from for our national security.”289 the rUK Government. Scotland’s own defence needs would undoubtedly be In what the White Paper has described insufficient to maintain the industry at

98 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy anything like its current size. In order to develop an extremely close defence- to succeed, Scotland would need to industrial relationship with the rUK. consciously and proactively seek to link its defence industry to the needs of “If Scotland wants to become bigger countries, and to develop bilateral independent of England, industrially relationships with them; it could not then it has to link with some other large simply continue as presently constituted country. My own feeling is it would be and hope new orders would materialise Germany; it would be the new industrial to replace lost ones. Of course, to relationship that Scotland should be speak of the defence industry as a seeking – which, of course, politically, homogenous unit in this sense is deeply is very difficult to say – [but] for a small nation like Scotland, it has to link to one misleading: it is a collection of individual 292 companies with individual agendas; of the big industrial powers.” but, given that the final customer in this industry is almost invariably a national Joint Procurement government, government policy clearly Creating the conditions in which larger has an important role to play. powers would wish to purchase defence equipment from an independent “If Scotland votes to delink with England Scotland would often mean entering politically, is it going to rely on the agreements whereby Scotland agreed to industrial policy with England to remain? purchase equipment from them in turn. It’s going to have to be stronger because Such appear to be the rules of the game you’ve just created a barrier to industrial in the defence industry, and, whilst policy called a nation,” Godden said. seeking to square this circle in terms “Scotland will need a much stronger of committing to the principles of open industrial policy, and it needs to be much procurement, this is also an area which clearer about what its industrial policy brings into greater clarity the need to is, and about which countries it’s trying properly coordinate a nation’s defence to do business with in defence. It’s hard strategy with its defence-industrial enough for the UK to negotiate with strategy. America on the Chinooks, the Joint Strike Fighter, and some of those contracts.” In addition to these kinds of bilateral A “small country like Scotland”, he quid pro quo defence relationships, surmised, would find it even tougher. Scotland may well also want to consider the option of joint-procurement This is why, Godden insists, Scotland programmes in order to secure will need to be extremely focused on contracts to build a share of a given what exactly it is it’s trying to offer, and asset with another country or countries. to whom. “Why would the US feel it was In principle at least, joint-procurement better investing in Scotland than the KrU ? programmes enable countries to fulfil Does the US have a special feeling about a twin objective of securing work for Scotland?” As previously mentioned, their domestic industries whilst also Godden is of the view that Scotland gaining a needed military asset. Such should focus on providing high-quality programmes have become increasingly products in the niche engineering and popular in recent years (with defence technology sectors that presently reside budgets being squeezed, and weapons in Scotland. He also insisted that, for all systems becoming increasingly complex) the potential difficulties, Scotland would as a means of acquiring equipment that be exceedingly unwise to avoid trying

99 The Future of the Scottish Defence Industry some countries could not develop on countless alterations; the French had their own. pulled out; the Germans had tried, and failed, to do the same; and the UK alone Foreign, Security and Defence Policy In its had expended more than £20 billion on Update , the SNP explicitly iterated their the programme. (In 2011, the National ambition for an independent Scotland to Audit Office estimated theK U ’s total adopt a joint-procurement strategy with programme cost would eventually hit both the rUK and other allies. £37 billion).294 The classic example of joint procurement An important feature of this scheme in the UK in recent years has been the from the perspective of an independent Eurofighter Typhoon, and it also serves as Scotland, aside from highlighting an example of the many potential pitfalls the potential pitfalls, is the strategic of collaboration between nations which proximity of the nations involved. Joint- have competing (and often, evolving) procurement programmes tend to be interests. The origins of the Eurofighter entered into by countries not only with programme can be traced back as far common commercial interests, but as the 1970s; but the formal ‘Future also common strategic and political European Fighter Aircraft’ programme interests. Quite how many nations an that was to become the Eurofighter was independent Scotland could identify launched by the UK, France, Italy, Spain, 293 with similar strategic requirements and and West Germany in 1983. It was not budgetary capabilities, and which were until 2003 that the Eurofighter entered also in the business of developing their service, however, fully 54 months late. own defence-industrial programmes, is During this time, it had undergone open to question.

100 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Conclusion

On 18 September 2014, the future of the The SNP have presented their vision of United Kingdom will be decided when how an independent Scotland would the people of Scotland vote on whether defend itself, and have promised further or not they want independence. detail in their defence White Paper due Not until after that vote has taken to be published in November 2013. place, assuming the outcome favours Whilst it is to be hoped that this White separation, would the real work on how Paper will fill in some of the gaps present to establish Scotland as an independent in their current policies, it is unlikely to country begin. What comes out of that dramatically alter any assessment of the process, be it with regard to defence; SNP’s substantive positions (unless, of the economy; or any other area, would course, they are planning some dramatic be likely to differ in many important policy U-turns, which Angus Robertson respects to what was promised by the has assured me they are not). negotiating parties going in. It would, after all, only be at this point that the For instance, the SNP have already been rhetoric would cease, and both sides clear that they want to rid Scotland would be forced to seriously confront of nuclear weapons; that they want what was and was not feasible. Scotland to be in NATO; that they will have a defence force of 15,000 In this respect, it is legitimate to ask personnel; that they will preserve all how useful it is to focus, before that the Scottish regiments; that they want time has come, on the practicalities of frigates, fast jets, and submarines; how an independent Scotland might that they will base the Scottish Navy at defend itself. Added to this is the fact Faslane; and so forth. These are very that opinion polls have consistently clear and not easily misinterpreted showed a clear majority opposed to commitments, all of which have been independence, meaning that such examined at length in this report. discussions are most likely academic in any case. Where more detail from the SNP would make a real difference would be on the The answer to both of these questions is ‘whys’ and the ‘hows’ of what they have the same: voters need to be presented proposed – which, in turn, would better with the clearest possible picture of inform the sort of ‘whats’ listed above. what they are voting for. Just as political Most important as a starting point parties have a responsibility to present would be a serious foreign policy that the public with their manifestos before started by asking what sort of country an election, so the need for a clear would Scotland seek to be in the world. appraisal of the facts is all the more A proper assessment of the sort of risks important ahead of the independence with which any Scottish defence force referendum (given that voters will be might have to deal as a result of that choosing not merely a government for would then necessarily follow. the next five years, but whether or not to break apart the United Kingdom). The SNP’s failure to properly answer these questions lies at the heart of the

101 Conclusion problem with their defence strategy as indeed academic; but it means that they it presently stands. The SNP have said leave a wide open goal for any serious that they want a defence force of 15,000 appraisal of their defence proposals. men; but why? To do what exactly? And what is the strategic purpose of The difficulty that SNP planners will retaining all the Scottish regiments? doubtless be wrestling with is the Likewise, the SNP ambition to acquire seeming incompatibility, in many areas, big-status assets such as frigates and between what makes strategic sense in submarines is not underpinned by any military terms (or at least what is viable) clear assessment of what purpose they and what they perceive voters to actually would serve in a Scottish Navy. That is want. As previously mentioned, glaring not to say that such assets might not examples of this include the politically serve a good purpose, just that the SNP important commitment to retain all the have not made clear what that purpose Scottish regiments and to put the entire would be. Scottish Navy on the Clyde. Overarching all of these considerations The fact that an independent Scottish is, of course, the question of how all Defence Force would most likely want these aspirations would fit together to focus on maritime and air defence to form a coherent – and affordable – matters little when the electoral whole. On a budget of £2.5 billion per consequences of saying that all the annum (and considerably less if John Scottish infantry regiments might not Swinney is to be taken at his word), make it through independence – at least could Scotland really afford to maintain not without considerable reductions all of the different assets which the SNP in size – could be fatal. The same goes would wish for it to acquire? And would for the naval commitment: one of the they really deliver the sort of defence biggest difficulties, in electoral terms, force Scotland would need? with pledging to divest Scotland of Trident is the significant job losses that It is the considered conclusion of this that would entail. What better way to report that not only have the SNP failed assuage those concerns than a pledge to to answer most of these questions replace those British nuclear submarines adequately to date, but that many – if with all of Scotland’s fighting ships, not the majority – of their proposals irrespective of the fact that Faslane for defence do not withstand serious would make a questionable location for scrutiny. this navy at best? There does, unfortunately, appear to On many other issues, it is the be a good reason for this, which was conclusion of this report that the SNP mentioned in the introduction to this are guilty of simple wishful thinking. The report: namely, that the SNP’s current clearest example of this is what they defence strategy appears not to be seem to believe would be the nature geared towards genuinely trying to of any intelligence-sharing relationship defend Scotland at all, but to help it win between an independent Scotland and the independence referendum. On one the rUK. As was discussed at length in level, this is perhaps understandable, Chapter V, it is almost inconceivable since the SNP leadership know as well that the rUK would share intelligence as anybody that without victory in with Scotland to anything like the extent that referendum all of these issues are suggested by Nicola Sturgeon in her

102 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select would have in establishing its version Committee in January 2013. Likewise, of GCHQ – have not been addressed. although it is the view of this report that Similarly, although there are conditions an independent Scotland would be able under which sections of the Scottish to negotiate entry to NATO, the SNP’s defence industry could succeed, Angus position on nuclear weapons would Robertson’s assertion that the shipyards pose far greater difficulties than Angus would have “a healthy order book”, Robertson and others within the party following independence, seems fanciful. are letting on. Scotland would almost The days in which Scotland was in the certainly not automatically continue as business of constructing complete a NATO member upon independence, as military platforms would almost Bill Kidd has claimed it would. certainly be over, and the defence industry would instead need to invest As regards the all-important issue of heavily in enhancing Scotland’s position Trident removal, this too would be as a niche supplier of products for use in fraught with difficulties of a kind that defence systems. the SNP have yet to lay before Scottish voters. Although the government of a Having said all of this, it is not in any sovereign Scotland would have every way the position of this report that right to demand the removal of nuclear Scotland could not develop a coherent weapons from Scottish territory, and and effective defence strategy suited although this could be theoretically to its national interests and security achieved in a matter of months, it is requirements. But then, the purpose of simply inconceivable that the SNP this report has never been to formulate would deliver such an ultimatum to this blueprint, but rather to scrutinise the rUK (given the potential to wreck the SNP (whose responsibility it is to its negotiating position across a whole produce such a strategy ahead of next host of other critical issues by doing year’s referendum). so). Much more likely would be a time frame for removal that extended That the party have not done so is into years, if not decades, given the unfortunate first and foremost from the serious financial; logistical; and political perspective of the voters of Scotland challenges of locating and constructing themselves, who need to be given the a suitable alternative base south of the facts before they head to the ballot border. Somehow, however, one gets the boxes on 18 September 2014. Given impression that many pro-independence how politically charged and divisive the voters committed to seeing Scotland independence debate can be, however, quickly rid itself of Trident have not been this failure is also unfortunate from the fully apprised of this reality. perspective of this report and how it is likely to be received in that context. In truth, there is not a single aspect of the SNP’s defence policy looked at for As mentioned in the introduction, it was this report that did not raise some fairly my express ambition at the outset of this serious questions. Although there are undertaking to deliver as objective an undoubtedly areas within the field of assessment as possible of SNP defence cyber security in which an independent strategy, highlighting the positives as Scotland could do well, major challenges well as the negatives, backed by clear arising from the importance of scale – and honest assessment from experts combined with the difficulties Scotland across the field. That there is so little

103 Conclusion about the SNP’s current proposals that the SNP will at least reflect on some of withstands serious scrutiny means that its conclusions, and refine their case this report is necessarily very critical, accordingly. Irrespective of whether one and it is thus quite likely to be written off is pro-union or pro-independence, that as ‘pro-union’ in some quarters. Scottish voters should be presented with a clear and truthful picture of what it is However, rather than taking this paper they are voting for is surely something as a negative challenge to their case on which we can all agree. for independence, it is my hope that

104 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Endnotes

1. HC 483: Defence implications of 7. Ibid. possible Scottish independence – Written evidence from the Ministry of 8. BBC Reith Lectures 2011: Securing Defence, House of Commons Defence Freedom, BBC, 6 September 2011, Select Committee, 16 October 2012, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/radio4/ http://www.publications.parliament. transcripts/2011_reith3.pdf (last uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/ accessed 4 June 2013) writev/483/m00.htm (last accessed 4 9. Transcript of Woolwich killer June 2013) speech: ‘it’s an eye for an eye’, The 2. Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, Times, 23 May 2013, http://www. Security and Defence Policy Update, thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/crime/ Scottish National Party, October 2012, article3772760.ece (last accessed 4 Appendix June 2013) 3. The foreign policy implications of and 10. 2012 Global Terrorism Index: Capturing for a separate Scotland – Written the Impact of Terrorism for the Last evidence from Sir James Craig, former Decade, Vision of Humanity, Institute Ambassador, House of Commons for Economics & Peace, 4 December Foreign Affairs Committee, 24 January 2012, http://www.visionofhumanity. 2013, http://www.publications. org/pdf/gti/2012_Global_Terrorism_ parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ Index_Report.pdf (last accessed 14 cmselect/cmfaff/writev/643/m15.htm June 2013) (last accessed 10 June 2013) 11. Ibid. 4. Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, 12. Ibid. Security and Defence Policy Update, Scottish National Party, October 2012, 13. TE-SAT 2012: EU Terrorism Situation Appendix and Trend Report, Europol, 25 April 2012, https://www.europol.europa. 5. A Strong Britain in an Age of eu/sites/default/files/publications/ Uncertainty: The National Security europoltsat.pdf (last accessed 10 June Strategy, HM Government, 2013) October 2010, https://www.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/ 14. Ramsay, Meta, Interview, 29 March attachment_data/file/61936/national- 2013 security-strategy.pdf (last accessed 4 15. Ibid. June 2013) 16. Ahmed, H., Murray, D., Simcox, R., 6. Johnson, R., Patterson, B., Rogers, P., and H. Stuart, Islamist Terrorism: The and W. Walker, No Need To Be Afraid: British Connections, 2nd Edition, The An assessment of possible threats Henry Jackson Society, July 2011, p. to Scotland’s security and how they 184 should be addressed, The Jimmy Reid Foundation, October 2012, http:// 17. Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, reidfoundation.org/wp-content/ Security and Defence Policy Update, uploads/2012/10/No-Need-to-be- Scottish National Party, October 2012, Afraid.pdf (last accessed 4 June 2013) Appendix

105 Endnotes

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107 Endnotes

2013 safer-together (last accessed 4 June 2013) 59. Scottish independence: wHo do you defend a small country?, BBC News, 68. Fox, Liam, Stronger together, Better 1 March 2013, http://www.bbc. together, Safer together, Website of Dr co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland- Liam Fox MP, 9 October 2012, http:// politics-21628443 (last accessed 17 www.liamfox.co.uk/news/stronger- June 2013) together-better-together-safer- together (last accessed 10 June 2013) 60. Neumann, Iver, Interview, 20 March 2013 69. Hammond, Phillip, Speech 2013/03/14: Stronger and safer together, HM 61. Neumann, Iver, Beyond NATO, Nordic Government, 14 March 2013, Horizons, 4 March 2013, http://www. https://www.gov.uk/government/ nordichorizons.org/beyond-nato.html speeches/2013-03-14-stronger-and- (last accessed 10 June 2013) safer-together (last accessed 4 June 62. Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, 2013) Security and Defence Policy Update, 70. Strachan, Hew, Interview, 22 April 2013 Scottish National Party, October 2012, Appendix 71. House of Commons Defence Select Committee – Scottish National Party 63. Stavridis Calls on Allies to Up Defense (SNP) Written Evidence for Inquiry Spending, Military.com News, 23 into the outcomes of the Strategic April 2013, http://www.military.com/ Defence and Security Review, Scottish daily-news/2013/04/23/stavridis-calls- National Party, 13 February 2011, on-allies-to-up-defense-spending.html http://www.publications.parliament. (last accessed 4 June 2013) uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/ 64. No camp blunders by highlighting writev/761/m29.htm (last accessed 14 Trident, Scottish National Party, 4 April June 2013) 2013, http://www.snp.org/media- 72. Robertson, Angus, Interview, 19 March centre/news/2013/apr/no-camp- 2013 blunders-highlighting-trident (last accessed 4 June 2013) 73. Scottish airsAff Committee – Minutes of Evidence HC 139-I, House of Commons 65. UK caught “red-handed” on Scotland’s Scottish Affairs Committee, 23 May underspend, Scottish National Party, 2012, http://www.publications. 21 January 2013, http://www.snp. parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ org/media-centre/news/2013/jan/ cmselect/cmscotaf/139/120523.htm uk-caught-red-handed-scotlands- (last accessed 14 June 2013) underspend (last accessed 4 June 2013) 74. Ibid. 66. The truth about taxes, spending and 75. Uncorrected Transcript of Oral oil in a separate Scotland., Better Evidence To be Published as HC 1 39- x Together, 6 March 2013, http://b.3cdn. v i, House of Commons Scottish Affairs net/better/c1d14076ee08022eec_ Committee, 23 January 2013, http:// u9m6vd74f.pdf (last accessed 4 June www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 2013) cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/uc139- xvi/uc13901.htm (last accessed 4 June 67. Hammond, Phillip, Speech 2013/03/14: 2013) Stronger and safer together, HM Government, 14 March 2013, 76. Ibid. https://www.gov.uk/government/ speeches/2013-03-14-stronger-and- 77. U.S. Navy Needs Diesel Submarines,

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109 Endnotes

Class (last accessed 5 June 2013) Website, Ministry of Defence, 2013, http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/ 94. P2000 Class, Royal Navy Website, trainingaircraft.cfm (last accessed 5 Ministry of Defence, 2013, http:// June 2013) www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/ Ships/Patrol-and-Minehunters/P2000- 105. Robertson, Angus, Interview, 19 March Class (last accessed 5 June 2013) 2013 95. HMS Bulwark, Royal Navy Website, 106. Courtnage, Paul, Interview, 21 March Ministry of Defence, 2013, http:// 2013 www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/ Ships/Assault-Ships/HMS-Bulwark (last 107. Apache attack helicopter, British accessed 5 June 2013) Army Website, Ministry of Defence, 2013, http://www.army.mod.uk/ 96. Ice Patrol and Survey Ships, Royal Navy equipment/23287.aspx (last accessed Website, Ministry of Defence, 2013, 5 June 2013) http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The- Fleet/Ships/Patrol-and-Minehunters/ 108. Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, Ice-Patrol-and-Survey-Ships (last Security and Defence Policy Update, accessed 5 June 2013) Scottish National Party, October 2012, Appendix 97. Robertson, Angus, Interview, 19 March 2013 109. Crawford, Stuart and Richard Marsh, A’ The Blue Bonnets: Defending an 98. Securing Britain in an Age of Independent Scotland, Royal United Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence Services Institute, October 2012, and Security Review, HM Government, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/ October 2010, http://www.direct. assets/Scottish_Defence_Forces_ gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_ Oct_2012.pdf (last accessed 5 June digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/ 2013) digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2013) 110. Rapier, British Army ebsite,W Ministry of Defence, 2013, http://www.army. 99. Typhoon FGR4, Royal Air Force mod.uk/equipment/23277.aspx (last Website, Ministry of Defence, 2013, accessed 5 June 2013) http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/ typhooneurofighter.cfm (last accessed 111. Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, 5 June 2013) Security and Defence Policy Update, Scottish National Party, October 2012, 100. Craw ford, Stuart and Richard Marsh, Appendix A’ The Blue Bonnets: Defending an Independent Scotland, Royal United 112. A Question of Independence: Services Institute, October 2012, Defending an Independent Scotland, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/ The Scotsman, 15 May 2012, http:// assets/Scottish_Defence_Forces_ edition.pagesuite-professional. Oct_2012.pdf (last accessed 5 June co.uk/Launch.aspx?EID=65ed11ae- 2013) 01a1-4c72-8d78-df13725eb405 (last accessed 10 June 2013) 101. Robertson, Angus, Interview, 19 March 2013 113. Ibid. 102. Courtnage, Paul, Interview, 21 March 114. Ibid. 2013 115. Robertson, Angus, Interview, 19 March 103. Ibid. 2013 104. Training Aircraft, Royal Air Force 116. Strachan, Hew, Interview, 22 April 2013

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111 Endnotes

137. The Referendum on Separation for Establishment Website, AWE Scotland: Terminating Trident – Days or Management Limited (AWE ML), 2013, Decades?, House of Commons Scottish http://www.awe.co.uk/aboutus/ Affairs Committee, 25 October 2012, our_sites_92e5c.html (last accessed 5 http://www.publications.parliament. June 2013) uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/ cmscotaf/676/676.pdf (last accessed 147. Scottish airsAff Committee – Minutes of 14 June 2013) Evidence HC 139-I, House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, 23 May 138. Trafalgar Class, Royal Navy Website, 2012, http://www.publications. Ministry of Defence, 2013, http:// parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/ cmselect/cmscotaf/139/120523.htm Submarines/Fleet-Submarines/ (last accessed 14 June 2013) Trafalgar-Class (last accessed 5 June 2013) 148. Ibid. 139. Chalmers, Malcolm and William 149. Daily Hansard – Debate, House Walker, The United Kingdom, Nuclear of Commons Hansard Debates, Weapons, and the Scottish Question, 26 May 2010, http://www. The Nonproliferation Review, 2002, publications.parliament.uk/pa/ http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/91walk. cm201011/cmhansrd/cm100526/ pdf (last accessed 5 June 2013) debtext/100526-0005.htm (last accessed 5 June 2013) 140. Port of Milford Haven – Delivering Port Infrastructure and Services, Port of 150. West, Alan, Interview, 20 March 2013 Milford Haven Website, 2013, http:// 151. Ibid. www.mhpa.co.uk/ (last accessed 5 June 2013) 152. Ibid. 141. The Referendum on Separation for 153. Ibid. Scotland: Terminating Trident – Days or 154. Ibid. Decades?, House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, 25 October 2012, 155. Ibid. http://www.publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/ 156. Chalmers, Malcolm and William cmscotaf/676/676.pdf (last accessed Walker, The United Kingdom, Nuclear 14 June 2013) Weapons, and the Scottish Question, The Nonproliferation Review, 2002, 142. Ibid. http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/91walk. pdf (last accessed 5 June 2013) 143. Weymouth and Portland, London 2012 Website, 2013, http://www. london2012.com/venue/weymouth- and-portland (last accessed 5 June 157. The Referendum on Separation for 2013) Scotland: Terminating Trident – Days or Decades?, House of Commons Scottish 144. Ainslie, John, Trident: Nowhere Affairs Committee, 25 October 2012, to Go, The Campaign for Nuclear http://www.publications.parliament. Disarmament, February 2012, uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/ http://www.cnduk.org/images/ cmscotaf/676/676.pdf (last accessed stories/briefings/trident/trident- 14 June 2013) nowhereToGo.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2013) 158. Nuclear sub fleet moved ot Clyde, BBC News, 6 May 2009, http://news.bbc. 145. West, Alan, Interview 20 March 2013 co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_ west/8035556.stm (last accessed 5 146. Our Sites, Atomic Weapons

112 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

June 2013) House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, 12 September 2012, 159. Baillie, Jackie, Interview, 27 March http://www.publications.parliament. 2013 uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/ 160. Ibid. cmscotaf/139/120912.htm (last accessed 14 June 2013) 161. Scottish Affairs Committee – Minutes of Evidence HC 139, 174. Crawford, Stuart, Interview, 25 March House of Commons Scottish Affairs 2013 Committee, 7 March 2013, http:// 175. The Future of the United Kingdom’s www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ Nuclear Deterrent, HM Government, cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/uc139- December 2006, https://www.gov. xix/uc13901.htm (last accessed 5 June uk/government/uploads/system/ 2013) uploads/attachment_data/file/27378/ 162. Ibid. DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2013) 163. Baillie, Jackie, Interview, 27 March 2013 176. Chalmers, Malcolm, Interview, 7 March 2013 164. Ibid. 177. Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, 165. Sea , Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Security and Defence Policy Update, 16 January 2012, http://mil.no/ Scottish National Party, October 2012, organisation/equipmentfacts/sea/ Appendix Pages/default.aspx (last accessed 5 June 2013) 178. Foreign policy considerations orf the UK and Scotland in the event of 166. Scottish Affairs Committee – Scotland becoming an independent Minutes of Evidence HC 139, country, House of Commons Foreign House of Commons Scottish Affairs Affairs Select Committee,K U Committee, 7 March 2013, http:// Parliament, 23 April 2013, http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/uc139- cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/643. xix/uc13901.htm (last accessed 5 June pdf (last accessed 14 June 2013) 2013) 179. Ibid. 167. Ibid. 180. Ibid. 168. Ibid. 181. Ibid. 169. West, Alan, Interview, 20 March 2013 182. Robertson, Angus, Interview, 19 March 170. Ibid. 2013 171. The Referendum on Separation for 183. Ibid. Scotland: Terminating Trident – Days or Decades?, House of Commons Scottish 184. Ibid. Affairs Committee, 25 October 2012, 185. Foreign policy considerations orf http://www.publications.parliament. the UK and Scotland in the event of uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/ Scotland becoming an independent cmscotaf/676/676.pdf (last accessed country, House of Commons Foreign 14 June 2013) Affairs Select Committee,K U 172. Ibid. Parliament, 23 April 2013, http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 173. Scottish Affairs Committee – cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/643. Minutes of Evidence HC 139, pdf (last accessed 14 June 2013)

113 Endnotes

186. Ibid. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/uc643-ii/ 187. Scotland analysis: Devolution and the uc64301.htm (last accessed 10 June implications of Scottish independence, 2013) HM Government, February 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 200. Declassified UKUSA Signals Intelligence uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ Agreement Documents Available, data/file/79417/Scotland_analysis_ National Security Agency, US Devolution_and_the_implications_of_ Government, 24 June 2010, http:// Scottish_Independan...__1_.pdf (last www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_ accessed 5 June 2013) room/2010/ukusa.shtml (last accessed 5 June 2013) 188. Ibid. 201. Ramsay, Meta, Interview, 29 March 189. Barnes, Eddie, May: MI5 wouldn’t 2013 share with independent Scotland, The Scotsman, 9 February 2013, http:// 202. Ibid. www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/ uk/may-mi5-wouldn-t-share-with- 203. Uncorrected Transcript of Oral independent-scotland-1-2782615 (last Evidence to be published as HC 643-ii, accessed 5 June 2013) House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 4 December 2012, http:// 190. Ibid. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/uc643-ii/ 191. Ramsay, Meta, Interview, 29 March uc64301.htm (last accessed 10 June 2013 2013) 192. Ibid. 204. Ramsay, Meta, Interview, 29 March 193. Ibid. 2013 194. Rifkind, Malcolm, Interview, 18 March 205. Ibid. 2013 206. Ibid. 195. Ramsay, Meta, Interview, 29 March 207. Ibid. 2013 208. Uncorrected Transcript of Oral 196. Ramsay, Meta, Correspondence, 9 May Evidence to be published as HC 643-ii, 2013 House of Commons Foreign Affairs 197. Wintour , Patrick, Guantánamo Bay Committee, 4 December 2012, http:// detainees to be paid compensation www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ by UK government, The Guardian, cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/uc643-ii/ 16 November 2010, http://www. uc64301.htm (last accessed 10 June guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/16/ 2013) guantanamo-bay-compensation-claim 209. Ibid. (last accessed 5 June 2013) 210. Ibid. 198. Justice and Security Act 2013, HM Government, 25 April 2013, 211. Ibid. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2013/18/section/8/enacted 212. Neville-Jones, Pauline, Interview, 25 (last accessed 5 June 2013) April 2013 199. Uncorrected Transcript of Oral 213. Martin,K eith, Interview, 24 April 2013 Evidence to be published as HC 643-ii, 214. Neville-Jones, Pauline, Interview, 25 House of Commons Foreign Affairs April 2013 Committee, 4 December 2012, http://

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215. War in the fifth domain, The 12 January 2012, http://www. Economist, 1 July 2010, http://www. boozallen.com/media-center/press- economist.com/node/16478792 (last releases/48399320/49587573 (last accessed 5 June 2013) accessed 5 June 2013) 216. The North Atlantic reatyT , NATO, 4 229. Martin, Keith, Interview, 24 April 2013 April 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 230. Ibid. (last accessed 5 June 2013) 231. Security and resilience industry in 217. Estonia has no evidence of Kremlin Scotland, Scottish Enterprise Website, involvement in cyber attacks, Ria 2013, http://www.scottish-enterprise. Novosti, 6 September 2007, http:// com/your-sector/aerospace-defence- en.rian.ru/world/20070906/76959190. and-marine/adm-strategy/adm-facts/ html (last accessed 5 June 2013) security-facts.aspx (last accessed 5 June 2013) 218. Estonia fines man orf ‘cyber war’, BBC News, 25 January 2008, http://news. 232. Uncorrected Transcript of Oral bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7208511. Evidence to be published as HC 643-ii, stm (last accessed 10 June 2013) House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 4 December 2012, http:// 219. The UK cyber security strategy: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ Landscape review, National Audit cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/uc643-ii/ Office, 12 February 2013, http:// uc64301.htm (last accessed 10 June www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/ 2013) uploads/2013/03/Cyber-security-Exec- Summ.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2013) 220. Ibid. 233. Rid, Thomas, Interview, 26 April 2013 221. Rid, Thomas, Interview, 26 April 2013 234. Ibid. 222. Martin,K eith, Interview, 24 April 2013 235. UK Universities awarded Academic Centre of Excellence status in Cyber 223. Rid, Thomas, Interview, 26 April 2013 Security Research, Government Communications Headquarters, 2 224. The UK cyber security strategy: April 2012, http://www.gchq.gov.uk/ Landscape review, National Audit Press/Pages/Cyber-Security-Research- Office, 12 February 2013, http:// Centres-of-Excellence.aspx (last www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/ accessed 11 June 2013) uploads/2013/03/Cyber-security-Exec- Summ.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2013) 236. Gjelten, Tom, Cyberwarrior Shortage Threatens U.S. Security, NPR, 19 July 225. Rid, Thomas, Interview, 26 April 2013 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/ 226. The UK cyber security strategy: story/story.php?storyId=128574055 Landscape review, National Audit (last accessed 5 June 2013) Office, 12 February 2013, http:// 237. Rid, Thomas, Interview, 26 April 2013 www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2013/03/Cyber-security-Exec- 238. Ibid. Summ.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2013) 239. The defence industry in Scotland, 227. Ibid. Scottish Enterprise Website, 2013, http://www.scottish-enterprise.com/ 228. New Cyber Index Ranks Ability your-sector/aerospace-defence-and- of G20 Nations to Withstand marine/adm-strategy/adm-facts/ Cyber Attacks, Harness Digital defence-facts.aspx (last accessed 5 Environment, Booz Allen Hamilton, June 2013)

115 Endnotes

240. Ibid. 251. House of Commons Defence Select Committee – Scottish National Party 241. Shenton, Joel, Independence ‘would (SNP) Written Evidence for Inquiry decimate Scottish shipbuilding’, into the outcomes of the Strategic Defence Management Journal, Defence and Security Review, Scottish 17 May 2012, http://www. National Party, 13 February 2011, defencemanagement.com/news_story. http://www.publications.parliament. asp?id=19777 (last accessed June 5 uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/ 2013) writev/761/m29.htm (last accessed 14 242. Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, June 2013) Security and Defence Policy Update, 252. Ibid. Scottish National Party, October 2012, Appendix 253. Ibid. 243. Ibid. 254. Ibid. 244. Real threat to Scotland’s defence sector 255. The Referendum on Separation for revealed, Scottish National Party, 22 Scotland: How would Separation November 2012, http://www.snp. affect jobs in the Scottish defence org/media-centre/news/2012/nov/ industry?, House of Commons Scottish real-threat-scotlands-defence-sector- Affairs Committee,K U Parliament, 8 revealed (last accessed 5 June 2013) April 2013, http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 245. Godden, Ian, Interview, 4 April 2013 cmselect/cmscotaf/957/957.pdf (last 246. House of Commons Defence Select accessed 10 June 2013) Committee – Scottish National Party 256. Chapter 1 – Finance: Table 1.17 New (SNP) Written Evidence for Inquiry Contracts Placed: By Type, Defence into the outcomes of the Strategic Analytical Services and Advice, Defence and Security Review, Scottish Ministry of Defence, 12 December National Party, 13 February 2011, 2012, http://www.dasa.mod.uk/ http://www.publications.parliament. modintranet/UKDS/UKDS2012/c1/ uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/ table117.php (last accessed 5 June writev/761/m29.htm (last accessed 14 2013) June 2013) 257. Charts 1.14d Levels of Competitive 247. Ibid. Contracting with Key Suppliers, 248. Taylor , Claire, Defence Basing Defence Analytical Services and Review, House of Commons Library, Advice, Ministry of Defence, 12 14 November 2011, http://www. December 2012, http://www. parliament.uk/briefing-papers/ dasa.mod.uk/modintranet/UKDS/ SN06038 (last accessed 5 June 2013) UKDS2012/c1/chart114d.php (last accessed 5 June 2013) 249. Brook-Holland, Louisa and Claire Mills, Army Basing Review 2013, House of 258. Scottish airsAff Committee – Minutes of Commons Library, 3 April 2013, http:// Evidence HC 139-I, House of Commons www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/ Scottish Affairs Committee, 13 June SN06598 (last accessed June 5 2013) 2012, http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 250. UK Govt set to break defence promises cmselect/cmscotaf/139/120613.htm to Scotland, Scottish National Party, (last accessed 14 June 2013) 3 March 2013, http://www.snp. org/media-centre/news/2013/mar/ 259. Ibid. uk-govt-set-break-defence-promises- 260. Consolidated Version of The Treaty on scotland (last accessed 5 June 2013) the Functioning of the European Union,

116 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Official Journal of the European Union, on building warships, CTV News, 6 30 March 2010, http://eur-lex.europa. March 2011, http://www.ctvnews.ca/ eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ ottawa-won-t-be-working-with-u-k- :C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF (last on-building-warships-1.615318 (last accessed 5 June 2013) accessed 10 June 2013) 261. The Referendum on Separation for 268. Britain and Australia to Work Scotland: How would Separation Together to Create Possible Frigates affect jobs in the Scottish defence of the Future, Royal Navy, Ministry industry?, House of Commons Scottish of Defence, 18 January 2013, http:// Affairs Committee,K U Parliament, 8 www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News- April 2013, http://www.publications. and-Events/Latest-News/2013/ parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ January/18/130118-UK-and-Aus- cmselect/cmscotaf/957/957.pdf (last Type26 (last accessed 5 June 2013) accessed 10 June 2013) 269. Ibid. 262. Scottish airsAff Committee – Minutes of Evidence HC 139-I, House of Commons 270. Scottish airsAff Committee – Minutes of Scottish Affairs Committee, 13 June Evidence HC 139-I, House of Commons 2012, http://www.publications. Scottish Affairs Committee, 13 June parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 2012, http://www.publications. cmselect/cmscotaf/139/120613.htm parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ (last accessed 14 June 2013) cmselect/cmscotaf/139/120613.htm (last accessed 14 June 2013) 263. Type 26, Royal Navy Website, Ministry of Defence, 2013, http://www. 271. Ibid. royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Ships/ 272. Ibid. Future-Ships/Type-26 (last accessed 14 June 2013) 273. Ibid. 264. The Referendum on Separation for 274. The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Separation shuts shipyards, Scotland: How would Separation House of Commons Scottish Affairs affect jobs in the Scottish defence Committee, 20 January 2013, http:// industry?, House of Commons Scottish www.publications.parliament. Affairs Committee,K U Parliament, 8 uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/ April 2013, http://www.publications. cmscotaf/892/892.pdf (last accessed parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 17 June 2013) cmselect/cmscotaf/957/957.pdf (last accessed 10 June 2013) 265. Scottish airsAff Committee – Minutes of Evidence HC 139-I, House of Commons 275. Ibid. Scottish Affairs Committee, 13 June 276. Godden, Ian, Interview, 4 April 2013 2012, http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 277. Ibid. cmselect/cmscotaf/139/120613.htm (last accessed 14 June 2013) 278. Scottish Affairs Committee – Minutes of Evidence HC 139, 266. Shenton, Joel, Independence ‘would House of Commons Scottish Affairs decimate Scottish shipbuilding’, Committee, 19 December 2012, Defence Management Journal, http://www.publications.parliament. 17 May 2012, http://www. uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/ defencemanagement.com/news_story. cmscotaf/139/121219.htm (last asp?id=19777 (last accessed 10 June accessed 14 June 2013) 2013) 279. Ibid. 267. Ottawa won’t be working with U.K.

117 Endnotes

280. Godden, Ian, Interview, 4 April 2013 April 2013, http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ 281. Ibid. cmselect/cmscotaf/957/957.pdf (last 282. The Referendum on Separation for accessed 10 June 2013) Scotland: How would Separation 287. Strachan, Hew, Interview, 22 April 2013 affect jobs in the Scottish defence industry?, House of Commons Scottish 288. National Security Through Technology: Affairs Committee,K U Parliament, 8 Technology, Equipment, and Support April 2013, http://www.publications. for UK Defence and Security, HM parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/ Government, February 2012, https:// cmselect/cmscotaf/957/957.pdf (last www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ accessed 10 June 2013) system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/27390/cm8278.pdf (last accessed 283. Godden, Ian, Interview, 4 April 2013 5 June 2013) 284. The defence industry in Scotland, 289. Ibid. Scottish Enterprise Website, 2013, http://www.scottish-enterprise.com/ 290. Ibid. your-sector/aerospace-defence-and- marine/adm-strategy/adm-facts/ 291. Ibid. defence-facts.aspx 292. Godden, Ian, Interview, 4 April 2013 285. Scottish Affairs Committee – 293. A History of the Programme, Minutes of Evidence HC 139, Eurofighter Typhoon Website, House of Commons Scottish Affairs 2013, http://www.eurofighter.com/ Committee, 19 December 2012, eurofighter-typhoon/programme/ http://www.publications.parliament. history.html (last accessed 5 June uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/ 2013) cmscotaf/139/121219.htm (last accessed 14 June 2013) 294. British costs soaring orf Eurofighter jets: audit, Space War, 2 March 2011, 286. The Referendum on Separation for http://www.spacewar.com/reports/ Scotland: How would Separation British_costs_soaring_for_Eurofighter_ affect jobs in the Scottish defence jets_audit_999.html (last accessed 5 industry?, House of Commons Scottish June 2013) Affairs Committee,K U Parliament, 8

118 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

Appendix

Resolution to SNP Conference: Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Update October 2012 The Foreign, Security and Defence policy defence and security responsibilities of Scotland should be determined by and improve collective regional the Scottish Government and Scottish arrangements. Environmental changes Parliament and always reflect the to the High North and Arctic Region priorities of people living in Scotland. raise major regional challenges and responsibilities which Scotland shares. An independent Scotland will be an outward-looking nation which is open, Scotland will require military capabilities fair and tolerant, contributing to peace, to fulfil these responsibilities. These will justice and equality. By mobilising our be provided by the Scottish defence assets and the goodwill and recognition and peacekeeping services which that Scotland enjoys in the world, we will be answerable to the Scottish will provide sustainable access to natural Government and Scottish Parliament. resources to tackle need and prevent An independent Scottish government insecurity in the world for this and led by the SNP will commit to an annual future generations. defence and security budget of £2.5bn, an annual increase of more than £500m The SNP reiterates its commitment on recent UK levels of defence spending to non-nuclear defence, international in Scotland but nearly £1bn less than law, the United Nations and supporting Scottish taxpayers currently contribute multilateral solutions to regional and to UK defence spending. global challenges. The Scottish armed forces will comprise While conventional military threats 15,000 regular and 5,000 reserve to Scotland are low, it is important personnel, operating under Joint Forces to maintain appropriate security and Headquarters based at Faslane, which defence arrangements and capabilities. will be Scotland’s main conventional This includes a cyber security and naval facility. All current bases will be intelligence infrastructure to deal with retained to accommodate units, which new threats and protect key national will be organised into one regular economic and social infrastructure. and one reserve Multi Role Brigade Scotland is a maritime nation with more (MRB). The air force will operate from than 11,000 miles of coastline, including Lossiemouth and Leuchars. nearly 800 islands, critical under-sea Regular ground forces will include and offshore infrastructure and an area current Scottish raised and restored of responsibility extending far into the UK regiments, support units as well as North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. The SNP Special Forces and Royal Marines, who recognises our national responsibilities will retain responsibility for offshore as a northern European nation to work protection. with our neighbours to fulfil current

119 Appendix

The Scottish armed forces will be nuclear weapons and a sovereign SNP focused on territorial defence, aid to government will negotiate the speediest the civil power and also support for the safe transition of the nuclear fleet international community. The Multi Role from Faslane which will be replaced by Brigade structure and interoperable air conventional naval forces. and sea assets will provide deployable capabilities for United Nations Security cooperation in our region sanctioned missions and support of functions primarily through NATO, humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace- which is regarded as the keystone making ‘Petersburg Tasks’. defence organisation by Denmark, Norway, Iceland and the United The Scottish defence and peacekeeping Kingdom. The SNP wishes Scotland to forces will initially be equipped with fulfil its responsibilities to neighbours Scotland’s share of current assets and allies. On independence Scotland including ocean going vessels, fast jets will inherit its treaty obligations with for domestic air patrol duties, transport NATO. An SNP government will maintain aircraft and helicopters as well as NATO membership subject to an army vehicles, artillery and air defence agreement that Scotland will not host systems. A Scottish defence industrial nuclear weapons and NATO takes all strategy and procurement plan will fill KU possible steps to bring about nuclear capability gaps in Scotland, addressing disarmament as required by the Nuclear the lack of new frigates, conventional Non Proliferation Treaty of which all its submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. members are signatories, and further that NATO continues to respect the right Joint procurement will be pursued with of members to only take part in UN- the rest of the UK and other allies as well sanctioned operations. In the absence as shared conventional basing, training of such an agreement, Scotland will and logistics arrangements, fulfilling work with NATO as a member of the shared priorities in ‘Smart Defence’. This Partnership for Peace programme like includes sharing conventional military Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland. capabilities, setting priorities and better Scotland will be a full member of the coordinating efforts providing economic Common Security and Defence Policy synergies, job stability and taxpayer (CSDP) of the European Union and value for money. the Organisation for Cooperation and A long-standing national consensus has Security in Europe (OSCE). existed that Scotland should not host

120 In Scotland’s Defence? An Assessment of SNP Defence Strategy

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‘If you believe in the cause of freedom, then proclaim it, live it and protect it, for humanity’s future depends on it.’ Henry M. ‘Scoop’ Jackson (May 31, 1912 – September 1, 1983) U.S. Congressman and Senator for Washington State from 1941 – 1983

First published in 2013 by The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society 8th Floor, Parker Tower, 43-49 Parker Street, London, WC2B 5PS Tel: 020 7340 4520 www.henryjacksonsociety.org © The Henry Jackson Society, 2013 All rights reserved The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not necessarily indicative of those of The Henry Jackson Society or its Trustees 978-1-909035-07-2 128 £10.00 where sold