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Scriptie Versie 23 Juni 2013 SOFTWAREOCTROOI VS. AUTEURSRECHT MOETEN WE AMERIKA VOLGEN? Een rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek naar de octrooieerbaarheid van software. Naam: Joeri Lans ASR: 494066 Product: Masterthesis Rechtsgeleerdheid met het accent op het privaatrecht Scriptiebegeleider: Prof Mr. W.A. Hoying Tweede lezer: Mr. J.M.H.P. van Neer “Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.” – Thomas Jefferson 1 1 The founders constitution, Volume 3, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, Document 12 - 2 - INHOUDSOPGAVE Inleiding __________________________________________________________ 6 I. Welke software valt er onder de huidige wetgeving onder het begrip software “als zodanig” als genoemd in art. 2 lid 3 ROW en art. 52 lid 3 EOV? _______________ 8 1.1 Basiseisen octrooirecht. ________________________________________________ 8 1.2 Betekenis van de begrippen uitvinding en software “als zodanig”.________________ 8 1.2.2 Technische software? Contribution approach. _____________________________ 9 1.2.3 Any hardware approach______________________________________________ 10 1.3 Wat valt er nu precies onder een technische uitvinding? ______________________ 10 II. De wenselijkheid van zuivere bescherming (waarom is bescherming door het auteursrecht en de beperkte bescherming door het octrooirecht onvoldoende) ___ 15 2.1 Geschiedenis van het auteursrecht ______________________________________ 15 2.1.2. Geschiedenis van het Octrooirecht_____________________________________ 15 2.2. Werking auteursrecht_________________________________________________ 16 2.3. Verschil tussen het auteursrecht met het octrooirecht. _______________________ 16 2.4. Argumenten waarom software niet binnen het auteursrecht valt________________ 17 2.4.1 Software en het auteursrecht?_________________________________________ 17 2.4.2. Auteursrecht werkt innovatieremmend __________________________________ 18 2.4.3. Onduidelijkheid binnen het octrooirecht _________________________________ 19 III. Wat zijn de nadelen van zuivere bescherming? A. Volgens de Open Source beweging? B. Volgens de Nederlandse Adviescommissie ____________________________ 20 3.1 Begrippen Open Source software________________________________________ 20 3.2.1 Nieuw & Uitvinderswerkzaamheid moeilijk vast te stellen. ___________________ 21 3.2.2. Bedrijven kunnen gebruik maken van octrooien op standaarden, waardoor open source software moeilijk wordt om te programmeren. ___________________________ 21 3.2.3. De volledige openstelling van het octrooirecht m.b.t. computerprogramma’s belemmert de innovatie. __________________________________________________ 22 3.3.1. Nadelen volgens de Nederlandse Adviescommissie _______________________ 23 - 3 - 3.3.2. Octrooi op manieren van zakendoen ___________________________________ 23 IV. Hoe is de regeling in Amerika en hoe is daar met de in hoofdstuk III beschreven nadelen omgegaan _________________________________________________ 24 4.1. Geschiedenis softwareoctrooi in Amerika _________________________________ 24 4.2. Eisen softwareoctrooi Amerika _________________________________________ 25 4.3. Zijn de nadelen die in hoofdstuk 3 gevonden zijn opgelost in Amerika? __________ 27 4.3.1. De eisen nieuw en uitvinderswerkzaamheid. _____________________________ 27 4.3.2. Belemmert het softwareoctrooi de innovatie?_____________________________ 29 4.3.3. Octrooien op standaarden – Patent thicket? _____________________________ 32 4.3.4. Dominante marktpositie? ____________________________________________ 32 4.4. FRAND voorwaarden ________________________________________________ 33 4.5. Source code bij beschrijving van de uitvinding? ____________________________ 36 IV. Een bevredigende regeling voor Europa? Hoe zou zo’n regeling eruit moeten zien _____________________________________________________________ 39 5.1. Geschiedenis van het technologie criterium _______________________________ 39 5.2. Het voorstel van mr. Ir. R. B. Bakels _____________________________________ 40 5.3. Een volledige openstelling verwezenlijken? _______________________________ 42 VI. Conclusie en aanbevelingen _______________________________________ 44 VI. Literatuurlijst ___________________________________________________ 46 - 4 - VERKLARENDE WOORDENLIJST EN AFKORTINGEN AIA - American Invents Act CAFC - Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit EOB - Europees Octrooi Bureau EOV - Europees octrooiverdrag ETSI - Europees Telecommunicatie en Standaardisatie Instituut ROW - Rijksoctrooiwet 1995 R&D - Research and development SEP - Essential Patent USC - United States Codes USPTO - United States Patent and Trademark Office Vandale - Van Dale Groot woordenboek van de Nederlandse taal WTO - World Trade Organization - 5 - INLEIDING Stelt u zich eens voor. U heeft een softwarebedrijf. U wilt nieuwe software produceren en besteedt veel tijd en geld in onderzoek naar wat er precies op de markt nodig is aan software. Op een gegeven moment krijgt u een ingeving en u ontwikkelt nieuwe software. Deze software zorgt ervoor dat de bestandsgrootte van een computerbestand kleiner wordt om op te slaan. Vervolgens kan met dezelfde software het bestand worden uitgepakt waardoor het bestand weer beschikbaar wordt. Het is hierdoor een handig programma om bestanden op te slaan en te versturen via internet. Een week na publicatie staan er op internet vijf andere programma’s die ook bestanden tijdelijk kleiner kunnen maken. Deze programma’s gebruiken niet dezelfde broncode, maar hebben wel precies dezelfde functie, namelijk dat de bestandsgrootte tijdelijk kan worden verkleind. Uw droom valt in duigen. Doordat deze concurrenten een nieuwe broncode hebben geschreven is dat geen inbreuk op het intellectuele eigendomsrecht van uw product. Dit is een voorbeeld waar je als bedrijf mee te maken kunt krijgen en waar je niets tegen kunt doen. Een ander voorbeeld. U heeft een webshop waar u artikelen verkoopt. Uw grootste concurrent gebruikt een methode van zakendoen die erg goed werkt. U wilt ook op deze manier zakendoen, maar u wordt tegen gehouden omdat het octrooi dat uw concurrent heeft op deze manier van zakendoen. Dit voorbeeld representeert de andere kant van het softwareoctrooi. Een bekend voorbeeld van een methode van zakendoen waarvoor in Amerika een octrooi is afgegeven is het “one- click”-octrooi van Amazon. 2 Zoals blijkt uit deze inleiding is het onderwerp voor deze scriptie het octrooirecht op software. In het huidige stelsel wordt voornamelijk het auteursrecht gebruikt om het intellectuele eigendomsrecht op software te beschermen. Deze scriptie gaat in op de vraag of het auteursrecht wel de beste manier is om de software te beschermen. De centrale vraag die ik beantwoord in de thesis luidt: Is ruimere bescherming van software door middel van octrooien wenselijk en zo ja, hoe kunnen de gesignaleerde nadelen van deze bescherming worden ondervangen? 2 United States Patent 28-09-1999, nr. 5960411. - 6 - Om in Europa een octrooi op software te krijgen moet de software vanzelfsprekend aan de eisen van een regulier octrooi voldoen. Het moet dus een uitvinding zijn, de uitvinding moet nieuw zijn, deze nieuwheid moet berusten op inventiviteit van de uitvinder en het moet industriële toepasbaarheid hebben. 3 In art. 2 van de Rijksoctrooiwet 1995 (hierna ROW) en art. 52 van het Europees octrooiverdrag (hierna EOV) staat dat computerprogramma’s als zodanig worden uitgesloten van octrooieerbaarheid. Dit betekent echter niet dat er in Europa of Nederland geen octrooi te verkrijgen is op software. Hiervoor zijn twee extra vereisten. De uitvinding moet meer omvatten dan software als zodanig en daarnaast moet de software een technisch effect hebben. In hoofdstuk 1 wordt dieper hierop ingegaan en wordt bekeken hoe het softwareoctrooi op dit moment geregeld is in Europa. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt ingegaan op de wenselijkheid van het softwareoctrooi. Wat zijn nu eigenlijk de voordelen van het softwareoctrooi en wat zijn de nadelen als er gebruik gemaakt wordt van het auteursrecht? In hoofdstuk 3 worden de nadelen van het softwareoctrooi bekeken. De nadelen worden bekeken op basis van de argumenten die de Open-Source beweging geeft. Daarnaast wordt er in dit hoofdstuk ingegaan op de nadelen die de Nederlandse Adviescommissie 4 heeft gegeven bij het advies voor het afwijzen van de Europese richtlijn 5. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt bekeken hoe het softwareoctrooi in Amerika is vormgegeven en hoe de nadelen die beschreven staan in hoofdstuk 3 worden ondervangen. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt bekeken of het softwareoctrooi gebruikt kan worden in Europa en hoe dit juridisch eruit zal moeten zien. 3 H. Struik, 2010, p 327. 4 Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 21501-30 nr. 105. 5 (Voorstel voor een) Richtlijn voor octrooieerbaarheid van in computers geïmplementeerde uitvindingen, COM 2002,92. - 7 - I. WELKE SOFTWARE VALT ER ONDER DE HUIDIGE WETGEVING ONDER HET BEGRIP SOFTWARE “ALS ZODANIG” ALS GENOEMD IN ART. 2 LID 3 ROW EN ART. 52 LID 3 EOV? Software wordt in Europa in beginsel beschermd op grond van art. 10 van het TRIPS- verdrag en de Berner Conventie dat in elk land weer is geïmplementeerd in de auteurswetten. Als iemand software schrijft dan rust op de broncode van de software het auteursrecht. Het octrooirecht op software wordt via art. 52 lid 3 EOV uitgesloten voor software “als zodanig”. In eerste instantie lijkt daarmee de kous af, maar het betekent echter helemaal niet
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