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Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2012 Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most Tim Wu Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons Recommended Citation Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most, ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, VOL. 78, P. 313, 2012 (2012). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1767 This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TAKING INNOVATION SERIOUSLY: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IF INNOVATION MATTERED MOST TIM WU* For decades now, experts and scholars have agreed that if maximizing con- sumer welfare is the point of antitrust law, then the protection and promotion of innovation should be an important and perhaps the paramount goal of anti- trust enforcement. It has, after all, been more than sixty years since Joseph Schumpeter argued that innovation and economic growth are essentially the same thing.1 There is very little continuing debate among economists as to whether static or dynamic efficiency is more important over the long run. “Innovation effi- ciency or technological progress,” wrote Joe Brodley back in 1987, summariz- ing economic research, “is the single most important factor in the growth of real output in . the industrialized world.”2 According to Herbert Hovenkamp, “there seems to be broad consensus that the gains to be had from innovation are larger than the gains from simple production and trading under constant technology.”3 Yet all too often this is exactly where the discussion ends. Nearly everyone agrees with these points. But if a law is capable of giving lip service to an idea, it has often done just that. Far from becoming central to the law’s mis- sion, the use of the law to promote innovation has actually retreated. Instead, * Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor, Columbia Law School, and former Senior Advisor to the Federal Trade Commission and chair of its Platform Policy Working Group. I thank the members of that group and Rob Davis, Ed Felten, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp, Susan DeSanti, Howard Shelanski, Kathryn Judge, Linda Holleran, Joe Farrell, and Shane Avidan. The views expressed in this essay are my own, and do not represent those of any current or former employer. 1 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 63–120 (1942). 2 Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1026 (1987). 3 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 751 (2011). 313 78 Antitrust Law Journal No. 2 (2012). Copyright 2012 American Bar Association. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 314 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78 “in contemporary antitrust discourse” writes Jonathan Baker, “price fixing, market division and other forms of collusion are placed at the core of compe- tition policy.”4 The Supreme Court’s last two decades of jurisprudence, have, for example, generally made it more difficult to use the antitrust law to pro- mote innovation, not easier. Now is a particularly important time to consider the relationship between antitrust and innovation. Within the last two years, both the Justice Depart- ment and Federal Trade Commission have accumulated an entire docket of antitrust investigations related to the Internet and other high-tech industries. The list of publicly disclosed investigations is lengthy, and includes major players like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Twitter.5 The nation’s antitrust en- forcement authorities are taking a look at the state of competition on the In- ternet, an inquiry that puts into clear focus the need for antitrust to take seriously its relationship with innovation policy. That is the occasion for the question at the center of this essay. The ques- tion is: How would the enforcement of antitrust look if the promotion of inno- vation were its paramount concern? (This is, I hasten to point out, a slightly distinct question from how the law of antitrust would look). In this essay, following a discussion of the relevant writings, I discuss three large areas where the enforcement of the law would be distinctly different. I. BACKGROUND It is not as if antitrust scholars or enforcers simply ignore innovation. But current analysis of the topic suffers from several endemic weaknesses. Too much of the work in this area begins and ends with the relationship between the antitrust laws and the patent laws.6 This is a natural way to ap- proach the problem if one sees innovation as the exclusive domain of patent, and protecting competition as the sole goal of the antitrust laws. Were the world actually like that, the only problem would be simply making sure the one law doesn’t get in the way of the other. 4 Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. (forth- coming 2013). 5 See Edward Wyatt & Miguel Helft, F.T.C. Is Said Near a Move on Google, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011; Thomas Catan & Nathan Koppel, Regulators Eye Apple Anew, WALL ST. J., Feb 18, 2011. 6 A sample of the writings on the relationship includes WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, ch. 14 (2003); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 313 (1966); Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2008); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1818–20 (1984). 2012] TAKING INNOVATION SERIOUSLY 315 It is by now obvious that this is much too narrow a way to frame the prob- lem. As Mark Lemley writes, “The premise that intellectual property law pro- motes dynamic efficiency while antitrust law concentrates on static welfare is wrong, or at least oversimplified.”7 There is good reason to think that industry structure is at least as important for innovation as the intellectual property laws. At a minimum, it is clear that high barriers to entry in a given industry, whether maintained by a monopoly or an oligopoly, can discourage product innovation by new firms.8 This leads to the conclusion that it is essential to consider antitrust as an innovation regime independent of any discussion of the patent system. To be sure, there is good scholarship that has gone beyond the simple pat- ent-antitrust divide. Herbert Hovenkamp’s recent work (some with Christina Bohannan) also powerfully makes the case that restraint of innovation should be a central concern of the antitrust laws.9 Among others, Jon Baker’s work has focused on market structure as well, pointing out that promoting rivalrous competition is itself a means of serving innovation.10 Joe Farrell’s work is in this camp, and he also pointed out when he was at the Justice Department, that a focus on pricing can sometimes serve as synecdoche, or a proxy, for innova- tion concerns.11 But there are further problems. Even within the antitrust scholarship that goes beyond the patent-antitrust relationship, we face a serious failure to ex- plain what kind of innovation antitrust should try to encourage. Rather, the concept is left vague. To be sure, innovation is by its nature a diffuse concept, but the vagueness indicates the persistent, silent grip of older thinking. Here the older theory is the centralized innovation models prevalent in the mid-20th century. When speaking of promoting innovation, scholars or enforcers some- 7 Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637, 637 (2011 Milton Handler Lecture). 8 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2000) (describing problems arising from patent accumulation); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007). This is why some economists have suggested replacing patents’ exclusionary side with a monetary grant, leaving the incentive to invent while removing its exclusionary ef- fect. Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001). 9 See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION (2012); Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 (2007); Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition for Innovation, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (2012 Milton Handler Lecture). 10 Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 588–601 (2007). 11 Joseph Farrell, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech Before the National Economists’ Club: Thoughts on Antitrust and Innovation, (Jan. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/7402.htm. 316 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78 times seem have in mind the supporting the large industrial laboratories that were once the face of industrial innovation, like the Bell Laboratories, sup- ported by monopoly profits.
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