DOCSLIB.ORG

Th Sanctity of Human Life

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Th Sanctity of Human Life The Sanctity of Human Life Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. By Ronald Dworkin. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. Pp. 273. $23.00. Eric Rakowski' I. AN OVERVIEW Life's Dominion defends a novel claim: that disputes over the morality of abortion, assisted suicide, and euthanasia are fundamentally religious disagreements. They are religious, Ronald Dworkin contends, because most people believe that the morality of these actions depends on whether they adequately respect life's "sacred" or inherent value, and "[c]onvictions that endorse the objective importance of human life speak to the same issues-about the place of an individual human life in an impersonal and infinite universe-as orthodox religious beliefs do for those who hold them."' Two conclusions follow, in Dworkin's view. First, because we tolerate religious beliefs we consider wrong, the recognition that someone's decision to abort a pregnancy or to hasten her death typically rests on spiritual values should lead us to permit abortion and euthanasia even if we deplore them. Second, the First Amendment guarantees individual choice in both cases. Either these existential decisions turn on commitments that are religious for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, or government action to restrain abortion or euthanasia entails public endorsement of a religious proposition in violation of the Establishment Clause. Dworkin also defends a related thesis about the limitations that morality places on the use of state power. The state, he maintains, may not gravely burden people to protect values other than individual rights, particularly values, like the importance of prolonging human life in any form, that are controversial and inherently religious. Abortion and assistance to people who * Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University, and Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. t Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). For generous comments, I am indebted to Meir Dan-Cohen, Gillian Hadfield, Lisa Heinzerling, Sanford Kadish, Robert Post, Samuel Scheffler, Cass Sunstein, and Jeremy Waldron. 1. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 163 (1993) [hereinafter LIFE'S DOMINION]. 2049 2050 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 2049 reasonably wish to speed their deaths should therefore be permitted subject to safeguards against error or coercion, because neither abortion nor the voluntary shortening of a life violates a personal right even if one or both affront some people's understanding of life's intrinsic or sacred value. These striking assertions form the book's core, but originality is not its sole virtue. Life's Dominion displays in abundance the deft argumentation, elegant prose, and moral passion that characterize much of Ronald Dworkin's writing. Although its themes are not unheralded-the book reworks a number of articles that Dworkin has devoted to abortion and euthanasia over the last eight years-their contours have been sharpened through restatement. The result is a remarkably coherent argument concerning the moral and constitutional boundaries of the state's authority to regulate killing near the edges of life: during the preconscious existence of the womb and the final oblivion of the fatally ill and the irreversibly demented. The book's central thesis is that beneath the scalding rhetoric of partisans on both flanks of the debates over abortion and euthanasia lies a hitherto unnoticed consensus on what those debates are about. Advocates for abortion rights or living wills, like those who would curtail abortions or ban assisted suicide, are almost all seeking to answer the same question: what policies would best respect the sanctity or inherent value of human life? Few people genuinely believe, Dworkin contends, that destroying a newly fertilized ovum or aborting an embryo early in pregnancy is morally equivalent to murdering a child of ten. But few regard these as morally indifferent acts, even when they deny that a young fetus has morally protected interests of its own. What divides abortion's opponents and defenders is conflicting notions of how individuals and communities can most faithfully express their shared respect for the sanctity of human life, whatever its form. Those who decry abortion emphasize the divine or natural contribution to a new life. They believe "that it is intrinsically a bad thing, a kind of cosmic shame, when human life at any stage is deliberately extinguished."2 Abortion's defenders, in Dworkin's characterization, do not dispute this claim. They too acknowledge that abortion "wastes" the natural "investment" in fetal life.3 But unlike abortion's foes, its defenders assert that not permitting abortion would often result in a morally more important "frustration" of the likewise intrinsically valuable life of the woman seeking an abortion. Both sides' views are therefore "rooted in a fundamental unity of humane conviction," which is "more fundamental" than their quarrel over how the value of life ought to be understood.4 2. Id. at 13, 91-92. 3. See id. at 34, 60, 84, 90. 4. Id.at 71. 1994] The Sanctity of Human Life 2051 Once people's underlying agreement on the main value in peril is brought to light, Dworkin avers, "we will see that a responsible legal settlement of the controversy, one that will not insult or demean any group, one that everyone can accept with full self-respect, is indeed available." 5 The bulk of Life's Dominion is an elaborate attempt to show that this commonly acceptable position is, perhaps surprisingly, virtually indistinguishable from the policy urged by many of abortion's defenders: freely available abortion through at least the first six months, apparently with no consent requirements or waiting periods, combined with public funding for women too poor to pay for their own abortions. This conclusion, Dworkin maintains, is morally required by the values that even those who condemn abortion hold dear, above all by our commitment to tolerating religious disagreement and to protecting individual liberty except where its exercise interferes with the rights of others. Furthermore, in the United States it is legally required by the Religion Clauses, and perhaps by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as well. Dworkin's legislative prescriptions and constitutional analysis are less clear with respect to euthanasia. He argues, as before, that regard for the intrinsic value of human life explains much of the opposition to killing permanently comatose patients, permitting dying patients to obtain lethal drugs from physicians, and allowing people to make legally effective requests to withhold life-sustaining medical care. After dissecting the warring claims and values, however, Dworkin refrains from offering detailed recommendations. His sympathies plainly lie with legislation empowering competent, dying patients to solicit help in hastening their death. He also appears to favor giving effect to advance medical directives or the choices of proxy decisionmakers not to treat permanently unconscious or badly demented patients. He declines, however, to endorse specific rules for determining precisely when these decisions should be respected and what care patients should receive if they did not voice any preference before they lost consciousness or mental acuity. I shall not attempt to assess the cogency of all of Life's Dominion's complex philosophical and legal claims. Some are too large to compass in a review; others have already attracted able commentary. Thus, I shall say nothing about Dworkin's much-discussed theory of constitutional interpretation, 6 on which he relies here in determining the legitimacy of 5. Id.at 10-1I. 6. See RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). In Life's Dominion, Dworkin contrasts two radically opposed approaches to interpreting the Constitution. First, one may think of the Constitution as a constitution of principle, which "lays down general, comprehensive moral standards that government must respect but ... leaves it to statesmen and judges to decide what these standards mean in concrete circumstances." LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 1, at 119. Conceiving of the Constitution in the second manner, as a constitution of detail, means reading its provisions "as expressing only the very specific, concrete expectations of the particular statesmen who wrote and voted for them." Id. For criticism of this disjunction and Dworkin's failure to consider intermediate views, see Jeffrey Rosen, A Womb with a iew, NEv REPUBLIC, June 14, 1993, at 35 (book review). See also "Life's Dominion": an Exchange, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1993, at 43 (containing Dworkin's reply and Rosen's rebuttal). 2052 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 2049 abortion regulation. Nor shall I examine carefully Dworkin's assertions that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses compel states to permit abortion during the first two trimesters and that the Establishment Clause precludes states from refusing to pay for poor women's abortions if states simultaneously provide the poor with general health care.7 Finally, I shall not take up his assertion that lawmakers betray their office if they enact rules that cannot be traced to some principle that an individual might endorse as a principle of substantive justice.8 7. Dworkin is one of the first scholars to urge that the Free Exercise Clause bars states from punishing all or most abortions during the first six months of pregnancy, although at least one federal judge appears to have inclined to that view. See, e.g., Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 490, 564 n.264, 583-85 (1992) (suggesting that the Free Exercise Clause provides a right to abortion "if the weight to be given potential life versus actual life is a quintessentially religious question"); McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 741-42 (E.D.N.Y.) (implying support for a free exercise argument), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services Fifth Edition United States Conference of Catholic Bishops CONTENTS
    Issued by USCCB, November 17, 2009 Copyright © 2009, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. All rights reserved. To order a copy of this statement, please visit www.usccbpublishing.org and click on “New Titles.” Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services Fifth Edition United States Conference of Catholic Bishops CONTENTS Preamble General Introduction Part One: The Social Responsibility of Catholic Health Care Services Part Two: The Pastoral and Spiritual Responsibility of Catholic Health Care Part Three: The Professional-Patient Relationship Part Four: Issues in Care for the Beginning of Life Part Five: Issues in Care for the Seriously Ill and D y i n g Part Six: Forming New Partnerships with Health Care Organizations and Providers Conclusion 2 PREAMBLE Health care in the United States is marked by extraordinary change. Not only is there continuing change in clinical practice due to technological advances, but the health care system in the United States is being challenged by both institutional and social factors as well. At the same time, there are a number of developments within the Catholic Church affecting the ecclesial mission of health care. Among these are significant changes in religious orders and congregations, the increased involvement of lay men and women, a heightened awareness of the Church’s social role in the world, and developments in moral theology since the Second Vatican Council. A contemporary understanding of the Catholic health care ministry must take into account the new challenges presented by transitions both in the Church and in American society. Throughout the centuries, with the aid of other sciences, a body of moral principles has emerged that expresses the Church’s teaching on medical and moral matters and has proven to be pertinent and applicable to the ever-changing circumstances of health care and its delivery.
    [Show full text]
  • Glover, Jonathan. Humanity: a Moral History of the Twentieth Century
    Glover, Jonathan. Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press: 2000. Jonathan Glover (1941-____ A.D.) directs the Centre of Medical Law and Ethics at King’s College, London. Preface. What lessons in ethics ought one to derive from the violence of the twentieth century? Chapter 1: Never Such Innocence Again. At the end of the twentieth century, one cannot be certain of the existence of a moral law or of moral progress. Intellectual repudiation of moral law and last century’s history argue against them. News tends to anesthetize viewers to events. Everything gets forgotten in the endless news cycle. Glover has not experienced the events of which he writes. He is attempting to get perspective on them. In philosophical ethics, there has been a move from theoretical ethics to applied ethics, putting human concerns squarely in philosophy’s crosshairs. Ethics generally should be more empirical. Enlightenment confidence that rationality would banish war and cruelty proved shallow. Glover looks at human spiritual darkness, in the hope of restraining it in the service of a better future. PART ONE: ETHICS WITHOUT THE MORAL LAW Chapter 2: Nietzsche’s Challenge. Friedrich Nietzsche foresaw the collapse of religious morality in the twentieth century. Nietzsche valued self-creation, and castigated all authorities that might claim to govern or restrain that project. God is dead. Religion is poison and must be swept away. Governments rely on confusions of the masses. A self-created man is noble in the sense that his superior completeness frees him to do whatever he may need in order to self-create.
    [Show full text]
  • Inhuman Wrongs Crimes Against Humanity in Theory, Law, and Politics
    Inhuman Wrongs Crimes against Humanity in Theory, Law, and Politics Goya, Third of May 1808 Government 94gl* Professor Cheryl Welch Fall 2016 [email protected] Thursday 2:00-4:00 617.495.5855 CGIS Knafel Building– K108 CGIS K151A Office Hours: by appointment Course Description This course examines the notion of a crime against humanity from the perspectives of moral theory, history, and contemporary international law and politics. After considering some philosophical perspectives on abuses whose wrongness has been termed “morally over- determined,” we turn to nineteenth-century cases of so-called scandals against humanity: slavery and expulsion or extermination of conquered peoples. We then trace the emergence of the concept of crimes against humanity in the twentieth century as a category of international crime at the intersection of human rights and humanitarian law and examine debates over the legalization offenses that “shock the conscience.” Finally, we turn to philosophical and political debates surrounding the prevention and prosecution of some contemporary crimes against humanity. *This course counts as a Government seminar or elective. It also counts toward the secondary concentration in Ethnicity, Migration, and Rights. Welch 94gl - fall 2016 - page 1 of 6 Course Requirements 1. Class participation (30% of grade) • Blog posts: Students are expected to have done the readings and to come to the seminar prepared to discuss them. Before each class (except for the class in which you are presenting), you will be expected to post a short response to the reading. Posts are due on Canvas by 8 am on Thursday morning. First post is due on Thurs., Sept.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ethics of Changing People Through Genetic Engineering, 13 Notre Dame J.L
    Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy Volume 13 Article 5 Issue 1 Sym[posium on Emerging Issues in Technology 1-1-2012 What Sort of People Do We Want - The thicE s of Changing People through Genetic Engineering Michael J. Reiss Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp Recommended Citation Michael J. Reiss, What Sort of People Do We Want - The Ethics of Changing People through Genetic Engineering, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 63 (1999). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol13/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE DO WE WANT? THE ETHICS OF CHANGING PEOPLE THROUGH GENETIC ENGINEERING MICHAEL J. REISS* Within the last decade, genetic engineering has changed from being a relatively esoteric research technique of molecular biologists to an application of considerable power, yet one which raises widespread public concern. In this article, I first briefly summarize the principles of genetic engineering, as applied to any organism. I then concentrate on humans, reviewing both progress to date and possible future developments. Throughout, my particular focus is on the ethical acceptability or otherwise of the technology. I restrict myself to cases where humans are themselves being genetically engineered. This means, for instance, that I do not cover such topics as xenotransplantation (when animals are genetically engineered to make them suitable for transplantation into humans) and the issues resulting from the production of such products as genetically engineered human growth hor- mone, al-antitrypsin, or vaccines (when micro-organisms, ani- mals, or plants are genetically engineered to produce human proteins).
    [Show full text]
  • Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design PDF Book
    CHOOSING CHILDREN: GENES, DISABILITY, AND DESIGN PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Prof Jonathan Glover | 128 pages | 24 Jun 2013 | Oxford University Press | 9780199238491 | English | Oxford, United Kingdom Choosing Children: Genes, Disability, and Design PDF Book First, some qualities that parents choose for their children may not benefit society. Despite such matters, however, Glover assumes that conditions like deafness and blindness are obstructions to flourishing, and that any desire a disabled person has to embrace his or her disability is due to such factors as societal compensations and a lack of knowledge about what a life void of disability would be like. Enlarge cover. Denver Seminary has a wealth of resources that are available to current students, alumni, and the local community. Most [of these variations] don't do anything," Silver said. A bit more nuanced than Harris, but not necessarily more insightful. Rating details. Josh Parker rated it really liked it Sep 13, Sama meininki jatkuu, tosin pienimuotoisemmin. Kristien rated it it was amazing May 08, If there are bad choices about what kind of children to have, the badness of many such choices cannot consist in failing to give the child what it is owed. Also, teachers could design small projects around the disorders described in the book, providing students with essential information to help them argue either side of the debate. Lee Silver, a professor of molecular biology and public policy at Princeton University, urged the audience members to look at someone sitting next to them. Their value has been conferred upon them by a higher source, and they are fulfilled only when serving and loving that higher being.
    [Show full text]
  • 17 the DOCTRINE of SANCTITY of HUMAN LIFE in JUDAISM and CHRISTIANITY: LESSON for the NIGERIAN NATION Sunday Elijah Iyanda Unive
    Ilorin Journal of Religious Studies, (IJOURELS) Vol.10 No.1, 2020, pp.17-30 THE DOCTRINE OF SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE IN JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY: LESSON FOR THE NIGERIAN NATION Sunday Elijah Iyanda University of Ilorin, Department of Religions [email protected], +2348034871397 Abstract From the Biblical creation narratives, sanctity of human life is the major reason for human existence. The process of life is sustained through the means of procreation and preservation of the essence of human life. In point of fact, preservation and respect for sanctity of human life have become topical issues in human history. Among the Jews, there was oppression of the aliens, fatherless, shedding of innocent blood and injustice. This could be interpreted as disrespect for human life, irreverence, senseless killings, human sacrifices and other social maladies ravaging the society. This research work examined a critical study of the doctrine of sanctity of human life in Judaism and Christianity in relation to Nigerian situation. The research method adopted for the paper was historical and theological, because it addressed an age-long problem that is related to God, comparatively in Judaic and Christian perspectives. The study argues that human life is sacred from womb to tomb. And in that light, human life is expected to be treated with respect and reverence if society is to be safe for all. Keywords: Sanctity of Human Life, Christianity, Judaism, and Nigeria Introduction The Bible, according to Judaism and Christianity is the inspired and inerrant written word of God, and the content is true in its entirety. Hence, it is the ultimate standard by which all other truth-claims are to be judged.1 The Biblical doctrine of sanctity of life is found in the creation narrative, with the implication that life belongs to God.
    [Show full text]
  • Jonathan Glover
    JONATHAN GLOVER 19 NOVEMBER 2016 THE INAUGURAL LANSON LECTURES IN BIOETHICS Discussant: Alastair Campbell TWO CONCEPTS OF DIGNITY Professor Glover is as well as the moral Professor of Ethics at resources that bring Free Admission “Dignity” is one of the most Professor Glover' s work King’s College humanity back often used terms in bioethics, forges connections between London, and was from the brink time Director of its Centre and again. His most and yet is the least well moral philosophy, the of Medical Law and recent book, Alien understood. In the Inaugural history of ideas, psychology, Ethics from 1998 to Landscapes: For registration, visit: Lanson Lecture in Bioethics, and bioethics. The range 2007. He has authored Interpreting http://tinyurl.com/lans Professor Jonathan Glover will and depth of Professor seven books, Disordered Minds onlectures contrast two versions of Glover’s thinking are of including Causing (2014), is “a respect for dignity. The first is huge importance today, Death and Saving searching, humane Date: about not humiliating people. when the post 1945 Lives (1977), which is look at the lives of Saturday, 19 November The second (expressed consensus on international now a classic. What the mentally 2016 particularly by the co-operation and a shared Sort of People Should ill”(The New Enlightenment philosopher moral vision are under There Be? (1984) was Scientist). He Time: Immanuel Kant) is about major threat from influences the first philosophical chaired a European 2:30 - 4:30 pm showing respect for as diverse as Trump’s book ever written on Commission Registration starts at someone’s moral standing.
    [Show full text]
  • Matters of Life and Death KO
    Matters of Life and Death Knowledge Organiser 1) Sanctity of Life 4) Religious views on Abortion Sanctity of Life All life is sacred and a gift from God. God gives life Roman Catholic No Abortion. It is a sin. Life begins at conception, and God takes it away. View therefore it is murder. “Thou shall not kill” Christian “All made in the image of God” Roman Catholic Abortion goes against the Sanctity of Life. God teachings on “You knit me together in my mother’s womb” View gives life and takes it away. Sanctity of Life “I knew you before you were born” Church of Abortion is wrong, but if it is the lesser of two Buddhist view Life is not created by God therefore it is not sacred. England View evils it is allowed. on Sanctity of Humans are special though because they been Church of Support the mother’s choice “Love thy Life reborn as a human and they are closer to England View neighbour” and “treat others how you want to be enlightenment. treated” Humanist view Humans are special but not because they were Buddhist View Abortion is wrong, life begins at conception on Sanctity of created by God. We have a duty to be kind and therefore it is murder “Do not harm any living Life compassionate to all humans. being” Buddhist View Causes Dukkha to the foetus and Blind Turtle 2) When does life begin? Story reminds us that all humans are lucky to be Conception When the sperm and egg meet reborn as a human, so do not destroy.
    [Show full text]
  • Entretien Avec Peter Singer Sur Jonathan Glover Et L'éthique Du Faire-Mourir Benoît Basse
    Document generated on 09/24/2021 11:15 a.m. Canadian Journal of Bioethics Revue canadienne de bioéthique Entretien avec Peter Singer sur Jonathan Glover et l'éthique du faire-mourir Benoît Basse Jonathan Glover: Questions de vie ou de mort Article abstract Volume 2, Number 1, 2019 For this special issue dedicated to Jonathan Glover, Peter Singer was asked to reflect on the influence that the book Causing Death and Saving Lives had on URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1058154ar him, as well as the Glover seminar in Oxford that Peter Singer attended in the DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/1058154ar late 1960s. One of Peter Singer's recurring arguments is the criticism of the traditional distinction between acts and omissions. But Glover is no stranger to See table of contents this questioning, even if the two thinkers do not seem to want to draw exactly the same conclusions. What is at stake is this: what are we really responsible for and how demanding should our morality be? Publisher(s) Programmes de bioéthique, École de santé publique de l'Université de Montréal ISSN 2561-4665 (digital) Explore this journal Cite this review Basse, B. (2019). Review of [Entretien avec Peter Singer sur Jonathan Glover et l'éthique du faire-mourir]. Canadian Journal of Bioethics / Revue canadienne de bioéthique, 2(1), 77–83. https://doi.org/10.7202/1058154ar All Rights Reserved ©, 2019 Benoît Basse This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online.
    [Show full text]
  • Can Humanity Leave War Behind
    Asia Society Hong Kong Center November 2016 Program Can Humanity Leave War Behind Us? Evening Presentation by JONATHAN GLOVER, Professor of Ethics, King’s College London Thursday, November 17, 2016 Asia Society Hong Kong Center, 9 Justice Drive, Admiralty Drinks reception 18:30, Presentation 19:00, Close 20:00 $200 Asia Society members/CUHK alumni; $300 Non-members “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save Photo credit: AFP/Getty succeeding generations from the scourge of war…”, UN Charter, 1945. 70 years later, the nightmare in Syria raises the question of whether humanity will everImages escape the scourge of war. Out of so many different causes of war, this talk will discuss only one. Tribal psychology - based on nationality, ethnicity or shared belief - can erupt into war, followed by the cycle of violence and revenge that often follows defeat for either side. Are there lessons from history about successful and unsuccessful ways of containing or avoiding tribal conflict? Are some methods of keeping peace in the world likely to be more effective than others in damping down the cycle of violence? A single world government is in some ways a terrifying prospect. Are there strategies short of world government that give us a chance of leaving war behind us? One of the world’s foremost bioethicists, Jonathan Glover is Professor of Ethics at King’s College London. From 1998-2007 he was Director of the Centre of Medical Law and Ethics at King’s College London. From 1967-1997 he was Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at New College, Oxford.
    [Show full text]
  • The Oxford Vegetarians - a Personal Account
    WellBeing International WBI Studies Repository 1982 The Oxford Vegetarians - A Personal Account Peter Singer Monash University Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/acwp_aafhh Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Other Anthropology Commons, and the Other Nutrition Commons Recommended Citation Singer, P. (1982). The Oxford Vegetarians - A personal account. International Journal for the Study of Animal Problems, 3(1), 6-9. This material is brought to you for free and open access by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI Studies Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. y-- A.NRowan Editorial P. Singer Editorial s1xt1es. This particular event is described below by Peter Singer, one of the phil­ neglect of the interests of animals, gave me a lot to think about, but I was not about osophy students, whose life was changed as a result of his meeting with the "Oxford to change my diet overnight. Over the next two months Renata and I met Richard's Vegetarians." wife Mary and two other Canadian philosophy students, Roslind and Stanley Godlovitch, who had been responsible for Richard and Mary becoming vegetarians. Ros and Stan had become vegetarians a year or two earlier, before reaching Oxford. They had come to see our treatment of non human animals as analogous to the The Oxford Vegetarians- A Personal Account brutal exploitation of other races by whites in earlier centuries. This analogy they now urged on us, challenging us to find a morally relevant distinction between Peter Singer humans and nonhumans which could justify the differences we make in our treat­ ment of those who belong to our own species and those who do not.
    [Show full text]
  • Sanctity of Life Jack Healy
    The Linacre Quarterly Volume 58 | Number 4 Article 10 November 1991 Sanctity of Life Jack Healy Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq Recommended Citation Healy, Jack (1991) "Sanctity of Life," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 58: No. 4, Article 10. Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol58/iss4/10 Sanctity of Life Father Jack Healy, O.Carm. We may ask what value the notion of "sanctity of life" has when, in support of their positions, both proponents and opponents of suicide and voluntary euthanasia appeal to it. For example, Glanville Williams, a long time advocate in England of voluntary euthanasia and abortion, introduced his ideas to the American public in 1957 with a book entitled The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. I Williams sees no incompatability between the sanctity of life principle and the practices he advocates. Yet Albert Schweitzer, having concluded on the basis of his African missionary work that human life was inviolable and sacred, formulated a view ofthe sanctity oflife (Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben! which could in no way admit what Williams proposes. We may ask, furthermore, what value the sanctity of life notion has when moralists differ so fundamentally as to its serviceability in ethical discourse. Marvin Kohl, the Fredonia State philosopher and advocate of "beneficent euthanasia," says of the notion, It is chameleon-like, changing its colours according to the moral theory it rests upon. It is almost as if a family of related but differing principles were hidden
    [Show full text]