5. С. ROWELL (VILNIUS)

RUMOUR AND AMBIGUITY IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JAGIELLONIANS AND THE , 1445-1466

Si rumori standum est'. As historians we usually attempt to deduce simple causality from words and deeds, dicta et facta, relying on what is reported to be „true". Such are the rules of the game. In ordinary life we also rely on observation and re­ port. One secret type of report comes from spies. The activities of spies in east central Europe in the Fifteenth century are well known. These are the unnamed men, the Annen, who served the Teutonic Order, as well as ordi­ nary merchants and travelling noblemen who picked up and passed on in­ fonnation during their journeys. Recently this matter has been investigated in considerable depth for the period before 1454 by S. Jóźwiak and it will not be our concern here2. In this paper we will take a brief look at another kind of infonnation source that we can pick up on in the often ambiguous relations between the Teutonic Order, Poland and , namely rumour or hearsay. Here we do not mean the effect played on events by accidental rumour as when, for example, in 1452 Casimir Jagiellończyk was worried by rumours of Polish displeasure going the rounds in his kingdom3. Our subject is the role of rumour in deliberate diplomatic activity during the

1 Joannis Dlugossii scu Longini canonici cracoviensis Historiae Poloniae libri xii, 5: Liber XII (XIII), cd. I. Zcgota Pauli [Długosz XU] (Krakow, 1878), 228. s.a. 1456. 2 S. Jóżu iak. Wywiad i kontrwywiad w państwie Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach. Studium nad sposobami pozyskiwania i wykorzystywaniem poufnych informacji w późnym średniowieczu (Malbork. 2004), csp. pp. 222-26,229-44. Spies were used to check the veracity of rumour - continua avisamenta exploratoivm in Alamanniam missoivm. et amicortim scripta ас relationcs Icccnint de rumore Jidciii, Długosz, 183, s.a. 1454. 1 Długosz XII, p. 107.

249 reign of Casimir Jagiellończyk, which is of particular interest for the power it gave all three parties to manipulate the actions of their fellows through fear, such as the deliberate spreading of untrue information in 1468 by the acting grand master, Heinrich von , who claimed that the citizens of Gdańsk were planning to abandon Casimir in favour of Duke John of Bur­ gundy, thereby causing anxiety both to the Polish king and his new Prus­ sian subjects4. In a sense it is the practical implementation of a counsel which Callimach is attributed with offering to his royal pupils towards the end of the fifteenth century5. We will deal with three main events: the nego­ tiations that led to the election and coronation of Grand Duke Casimir I and IV as king of Poland between 1445 and 1447, the ephemeral figure of the dead Władysław III Warneńczyk and various rumours of alliance between the Teutonic Order and Lithuania during the Thirteen Years' War. After Władysław III was slain fighting the Turk at Varna in 1444, his natural successor was his brother, the young grand duke of Lithuania, Casimir. However, in order to balance the requirements of an increasingly influential noble class within the Grand Duchy and to defend what he and even certain Poles regarded as his natural right to inherit the throne of his father and brother, Casimir deliberately delayed accepting offers from the Polish nobility to elect him their king. Relations between the Grand Duchy and the Crown were further complicated by pressure from the Teutonic Order, which many Lithuanian scholars view anachronistically as a natural ally of Vilnius in opposition to Kraków. They lay stress on a particularly special relationship between Vilnius and Marienburg (and later, Königsberg) which ignores similar advances which the Order was wont to make to the Polish lords for help in influencing the monarch. In February 1446 we see an exchange of letters concerning a planned border meeting with the Teutonic Order. The grand master asks Casimir to help a Gdańsk merchant in dispute with Onacz of Brest. In his February 14 response to the Lithuanian embassy led by Sudevvoj, the grand master re­ marks that he has held a secret meeting with wenig seyne gebieliger, since he has heard that der lierre grosfursie welle ußsetezen lassen the Treaty of Brest. A report on this embassy and its herte reden was made to the Master of on February 16. News of this secret meeting, provoked by the

4 Ibidem, p. 499. 5 M. Gliszczeński, Rozmaitości naukowe i literackie, VII (Warsaw, 1860), 18: Iširas: nieprzyjacielem przez swe wierne, strzeż niebezpieczeństwa, mówiąc, iż nieprzyjaciel jest gotów, jakby się nie spostrzegli w tym fortelu. Lithuanian side, may lie behind the rumours which spread through Poland that the Order was planning to renounce the treaty and attack Poland. Whether this was intended by the Lithuanians to form the basis of a new alliance in the wake of Casimir's rejection of the Polish throne, or was (more likely) simply an attempt to alarm the Polish Council - and perhaps the Mazovians - and discredit the Order, such talk of renunciation came to dominate Polono-Teutonic relations until after Casimir's coronation6. The situation was especially dangerous for the Order, which, in accordance with clause 43 of the Treaty of Brest, would ipso facto release its subjects from their oaths of loyalty if it were to wage aggressive war on Poland (or Lithuania). This would not have been an attractive prospect for the grand master, who was accusing rebel burghers within the Prussian League of breaking their oath to the Order. This card had been played with success by the Prussian Estates against Grand Master Russdorf in 1433 with reference to clause 24 of the Treaty of Melno (1422)7. In addition it was asserted, falsely in fact, that the order had requested dispensation from its oath in the treaty from the Council of Basel From letters of August 29 and September 2 1446 it appears that rumours were still spreading in Poland that the Order was preparing for war. The grand master denied this strenuously and repeatedly. It seems now that the Poles, who may have been intimidated by such rumours at first now used them against the Order by deliberately delaying in their confirmation of news that the grand master had not sought a dispensation from the Treaty of Brest from the Council of Basel - Archbishop Wincenty was issued with a papal confirmation to this effect in September 1446, but he informed the master of his knowledge only in March of the following year4. On Septem­ ber 1 1446 at Stimm the grand master issued a safe-conduct for his servant Arnolt von Morttangen to visit the Council of the Polish Crown including:

* Berlin. GStAPK, ОВЛ 9298, 9361, OF 16, 1108-11; Feb. 16 letter: Livl.UB, X, 299; see also A. Krupska, Udzielne księstwo mścislawskie pod rządami Litwy, Prace naukowe Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 18 (1971), 35-55. 7 Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert, ed. E. Weise, 1 (Marburg. 1970), No. 181 § 44, p. 210; Melno-Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej Pokoju Melncńskiego z 1422 roku, cd. P. Nowak, P. Pokora (Poznań, 2004), p. 9; 1433: M. Burleigh, Prussian society and the German Order. An aristocratic corporation in crisis c.NIO-1466 (Cambridge, 1984), 142-3. 4 ОВЛ 9298 (XXV, No.87), March 3 1447 with papal letter from Aug. 29 1446; the Council's letters of the same date to Oleśnicki and the grand master arc published in M. Dogicl, Codex diplomatics Rcgni Poloniae ct Magni DucaUis Lituaniae, IV (Vilnius,1764), nos! 101, 102, pp. 139-41. dem erczbisschoff zeit Gneßen, Grosfursten zeit Littaitwen, bisschoffe zeu Leslciw, den herezogen Vlotken und Bolislao und houptmann zeur Wille4. From September 21 we know that the Order had planned to send envoy to Brest/Parczew to the grand duke and the Polish lords, although the grand master himself was too busy to come. A gift (in the form of a silver chain) was sent to Wincenty's man, Vecens Furman, presumably as a sign of a desire on the Order's part to maintain good relations10. In September 1446 under the shadow of a threat of Tatar invasion from the Lithuanian side, the Polish magnates foregathered for a parliament at Parczew. The dowager queen, Sofia, was also there. The counsellors of Poland required Casimir to attend, as indicated by Piotr Kurowsky. Rumours were passed on to the Lithuanian side by a Polish nobleman, Andrzej Rohatyński to the effect that the Poles were planning violence against the grand duke's party. Casimir agreed to come to Brest and no further. By March 5 the archbishop of Gniezno was ready to inform the master that he had received Casimir's letter of agreement to coronation. At the same time Wincenty sent the master the letter he had received from Basel sometime earlier concerning investigations of (inaccurate) rumours about the Order's attempt to squirm out of its obligations under the treaty of Brest. In sum, several Polish prelates had written inquiring whether the Order had asked for permission to renege its oath to uphold the Treaty of Brest. The Council has scanned its records and found no trace of such a plea or its acceptance. A general enquiry among delegates also draws a blank. This would have been non solum sennarium belli sed incendium fore sicut solvere vinculum, quo federa pacts tenebantw. It is the council's duty to defend peace - citravimus ut tu, qui in inclito regni Polonie principatum tenes, ipsius gentes et populos de hits rebus reddas attentosn. After the coronation had taken place at the end of June 1447, the Order's representatives at the ceremony were still complaining that some Poles had accused the Knights of asking the Lithuanian fierren to unite against Po­ land, but this is not true. Casimir says that he has no knowledge of such a rapprochement. The Knights also remind Casimir that the Council has sent confirmation that the Order had not sought to break the treaty of Brest and ask the king to make this clear publicly12. This tactic is in keeping with

'OF 16,206-7. 10 OF 16, 1133-5. 11 OBA 9298, No.2. 12 OBA 9361, fo. 5"*: Item am selbigen montage sageten sye ym: Durchlauchlerfiirste und grosmechtigcr koening. супе boreuchtunge ober unseren Onlcii ist ansgegangen \in Rcyche instructions issued to the envoys after Trinity Sunday, although the alleged rumours of the Knights' approaching the Lithuanians to form an anti-Pol­ ish alliance are not mentioned in the instructions. The proposal concerning a renewal of the Russdorf treaty came from the Lithuanian side, as we have seen, and there is no trace in surviving records that the Order took an initia­ tive with the Lithuanian nobility. Of course the unanswerable question also arises as to which noblemen could be envisaged here: not Casimir and Goštautas's faction and probably not even the Žemaitijan supporters of Michał Zygmuntowicz. The Order's man who sought to visit Swidri- giello and Lengwenowicz at the end of 1446 did so with Casimir's czu Polen undyn ewer koeninglichen gnoden Cronen, me das unser hoineyster und wir alle suhlen den ewigen /rede wellen brechen und sulcher erde, dye wir denne gesworen haben ober den ewigen frede, gesucht suhlen haben ym concilio uns c:u entpinden. Wer unserem liomeyster, unserem ordeit und unserem landen eyn sulchs c:u geleget hot [der] ist nicht unsers ordens und unser lande fruit tlt gewesen, wenne unser liomeyster. seyn orden und seyne lande sulchen ewigen frede stete und pfeste abegot wil halden wellen und so habe w[ir] hyr efynj bulle vom concilio doiynne ewer koeniclichegnode wol hoeren wirt, ab man unserem liomeyster, svynem orden und seynem landen recht adder unrecht gelhon hot, und bitten ewer koenicliche gnode czu lesen losen. Die bulle wort gelesen etc. Entwort des herren konynges: Her hette do von nye gehört und wusle ouch wol. das es nicht were, und seezte ouch keynen glauben doroff, das wir eyn sulchs gesucht hellen und wurde her eyn sulchs erfaren, her weide es selber dem herren liomeyster schreyben etc. \ \ Item am selbigen montage würben sye ouch an den herrn koenig: Diirchhiuclisler furste und givsmechiiger koening, unserem liomeyster ist wol vorkomen, wye das etliche herren awß der cronen ron Polen offenbar solden gerehet haben, wye das unser liomeyster, unser orden und unser landen solden gesucht haben an den littawischen herren sich mit ehen czu vorbynden ober dye crone ron Polen. Wir czweyfelen nicht eweren gnoden ist do von wol wissentlichen denne ewe koenigliche gnode ist gwßßirstc und yn den landen gewest und noch givßfurste sert und ewer königliche gnode Weys wol, ab wirs gesucht haben adder nicht, und ab man unserem liomeyster und seynem oiden, der methe recht adder Unrechte lltiit. Zunder dye eyn sulchs sagen dye seyn unsers liomeyster seyncs onlens und seiner lande fninth nicht und weide got, das wir den mochten sehen dersulchc wort retthe. Wir weiden das alzo rorantwerten, das ewer koenigliche gnode sehen woeide, das man unserem liomeyster, unserem orden und unseren landen ungutlich dorwie Ihethe etc. Entwert des herren koenyges: Wir wyssen wol, das es nicht gesehen ist. das ors gesucht habet und haben ouch do von sye gehört und uns ist nicht wissentlichen do von denne wir haben tage mittenander gchalden, do cer ouch bey sert gewesen, wir haben es nye hört gedencken und ouch ron nyekeynem liitawschen herren erjfaren. do es an gesucht weren, und sprach czu den polenschen herren. Eer polensehen henvn das hört eer wol, das eer sulch wort loset awßgehen, yo wen es dorezu koemmet. so wellet eers nicht bekam seyn und wellet euch gute frtt[njt vorterben czu vorderste mit den liitawschen herren, dye ewer gute fnmde seyn und ouch mit den herren von Prewßen mit den eer czu guter eyntracht sert gekomen. Es wer besser das eer eyn sulchs lyst und menget nicht gute frufnd], Domjfder erczbisschojf spräche: llerre koenig, sulcher wort were nw nicht noet czu dusscr czeyt. Der koenig entwerte und sprach: Es ist alle wege noch dye worheyt czu reden. knowledge and was interested primarily in potential responses to policy concerning Novgorod. In the crucial months leading up to Casimir's acceptance of the Polish Crown on very much its own terms, forcing the Polish nobility to admit ipso facto, although not ipsis verbis, that no other suitable candidate was available to them, the Teutonic Order was paralysed by exploitation of mmours concerning an attack on Poland and underhand reneging of the Treaty of Brest which would have given strength to internal dissent (the Prussian League). The Polish side appears to have grasped blackmail as a policy with which to beat back the Order. After the coronation Casimir is asked to defend the Order publicly against charges of plotting against Po­ land (and Lithuania). During the Polish interregnum following thexleath of Władysław III at Varna in 1444 Casimir himself had made use of rumours spread innocently by merchants to the effect that the king had not perished in order to fend off calls from Polish nobles to take up his paternal inheritance in Krakow. However, during the 1450s rumours began to emerge claiming that Władysław was indeed still alive. A pretender appeared in Bohemia and Poland, while in 1452 the grand master of the Teutonic Order was sent a letter by someone who claimed to have seen he king doing penance in Portugal13. By 1457 this rumour was being proclaimed in verse: Polonia, gaude tuo rege Wladislao vivente felicitei; or: Sic vivat Wladislaus / Sic dometur vobis salus /felixque victoria. Amen 1457u. In this case the active spreading of the Teutonic Order's claimed sightings seems to be directed against the legitimacy of Casimir as he seemed to be losing ground in the war against the Order (1454-66) and also the legitimacy of Casimir's claims to be a defender of Christendom in the model of his blessed brother during international arguments against the Order. It was an attempt by the order to undermine the Jagiellonian claim to be a devout family whose members were willing to die for the faith - as Casimir's sainted son, Casimir, was taught. As it was, the false - Władysław, Jan of Wilczyna, reported in Silesian circles in 1452 had previously impersonated a Ruthenian duke (Ostroróg) and Lew of Mazovia before fleeing to the Rhineland to become Władysław Warneńczyk. Jan Rychlik, the 1459 pretender, was interviewed by the Dowa­ ger Queen, Sofia, just in case he were her lost son. She had the man thrown into jail. These charlatans were not created by the Order, but they appear to

'•' rex Polonie vivit in insula regni Portugallie - April 10, 1452. " Plock Codex, quoted in Monumentą Poloniae Historien, 5, p. 991.

254 have been used by it (and Casimir's other political critics at home and abroad - in 1459 he was also given short shrift at the sejm in Piotrków by Jan j Rytwianski15, who seemed to cast a shadow over Casimir's legitimacy as 'l king-grand duke). The delicate political balance within the Jagiellonian realms and espe­ cially in relations with the Order gave fertile ground for rumour to become a useful albeit double-edge diplomatic sword. The Lithuanian nobles were often suspected by their Polish cousins of being in cahoots with the Order. The suspicions of 1446, which we have already noted, were not unique. In 1456 in council at Lqczyca the Lithuanians were ready to threaten to re­ place Casimir in Lithuania with another grand duke (although in the end they did not dare do so), reminding the monarch that listening to the Poles had cost his brother Władysław his life. Długosz claims that they dared to speak to their lord in this way because they had made a secret treaty with the Grand Master. There is no surviving evidence for such an agreement. Bronius Dundulis, the Lithuanian historian claimed this was suspicious fan­ tasy on the Chronicler's part. However, we have evidence from the grand master's archive that shortly after this sejm the Lithuanian lords found they were unable to make further contact with the master16. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy during the Thirteen Years' War permitted one part of the Jagiellonian realms to maintain good relations and trade with the Order. The Lithuanians could claim that prisoners from the Grand Duchy taken at Chojnice were merely wedding guests and ask for them to be returned out of friendship, as the Lithuanians had returned captured knights after the Battle of Pabaisos in 1435 (they forget that negotiations over the release of some prisoners were still going on in the mid-1440s)17. The Teutonic order also wanted the Lithuanians to take part in the peace negotiations with Po­ land in 1466, even though they had not taken part in the war. This was perhaps also an attempt at making the Second Treaty of Toruń as compli­ cated as the Treaty of Brest. According to Długosz, in 1459 the grand master spread a rumour to the effect that it had been prophesied for a long time that the Order would

" Długosz XII, 294. The nobleman takes pains to point out, however, that Władysław perished felici el gloriosa movie obeunte. On posthumous legends of Władysław in general, see K. Olejnik. Władysław III Warneńczyk (1424-1444) (Szczecin, 1996), 273-310; for the falsc-Wladysławs see: Л. Lewicki, Psendo-Warneńczyk, KH, 9 (1895), 240; S. Jakubczak, Mikołaj Rychlik, któiy sių za króla polskiego Władysława III Warneńczyka podawał, KH, 95 (1988), 199-205. ,ft Długosz XII, p. 228; ОВЛ 14635, 15. 09. 56. "ОВЛ 13725.

255 possess not only its previous Prussian territories (that it had lost to Poland recently) but also „all regions, lands and realms as far as Syria and the Holy Land"18. It is therefore no surprise that during the Council of Mantua the Polish representative, Jakub of Sienno attempted to persuade the assembly gathered there to send the Order to Tenedos to fight the Turk19. It is tempting to see the Memcl rumours of a Lithuanian desire for war with Poland in 1460 as part of imminent negotiations for peace between the Crown and the Order20. The Lithuanians, however, were unwilling to act without consulting the grand duke. Around the same time (February 12 1460) the merchants of Gdansk were complaining that the Lithuanians and Mazovians were supplying the Order with food21. The official peace be­ tween Lithuania and the Order allowed economic activity to continue - Gdansk merchants complain that their fellows returning from the Grand Duchy were subjected to a 1 groat toll in Königsberg in 1459, while in 1460 the grand master arrested merchants on their way to Kaunas22. It may be worthwhile examining Lithuanian neutrality as a deliberate diplomatic and commercial ploy rather than facile anti-Polish policy on the part of the Lithuanians.

In brief conclusion: the relationship between Poland, Lithuania and the Teutonic Order was deliberately ambiguous and under such conditions de­ liberate use of rumour was a weapon used by all three parties in their sepa­ rate attempts to influence and manipulate one another. It is another aspect of diplomatic bluff, be it to make the Poles accept Casimir in 1446-1447 on his own terms or to moot the ludicrous idea of exchanging Podole for in the id-1450s in order to calm the Polish and Lithuanian nobles down. But that is another matter.

Długosz XII, 280. " Ibidem, 299; J. Smolucha, Inicjatywy Piusa II rozwiązania kwestii tureckiej w latach 1458-1464, Zeszyty naukowe uniwersytetu jagiellońskiego, 1267 [Prace Historyczne. 131] (2004), 80-81; M. Dąbrowska, From Polami to Tenedos. The project of using the Teutonic Order in the fight against the Turks after the Fall of Constantinople, [in:] liyzanz und Ostmiiteleuivpa, 950-1453, cd. G. Prinzing, M. Salamon (Wiesbaden, 1999), 165-76; Budapest. Szechenyi National Library, Ms. Lat. 210, fos 118-142 contains material from the Council, including the diary of Gregor von Heimburg. 20 22.01. 1460-OBA 15428. 21 A. Radzimiński, J. Taiidccki, Katalog dokumentów i listów krzyżackich oraz dotyczących wojny trzynastoletniej z Archiwum Państwowego w Toruniu, II: 1454-1510 (Warszawa, 1998). No. 285, p.128. " Ibidem, No. 233, p. 105 (16. 04. 59); 295, p. 132-33 (05. 05. 60).