Rumour and Ambiguity in Diplomatic Relations Between the Jagiellonians and the Teutonic Order, 1445-1466
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5. С. ROWELL (VILNIUS) RUMOUR AND AMBIGUITY IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JAGIELLONIANS AND THE TEUTONIC ORDER, 1445-1466 Si rumori standum est'. As historians we usually attempt to deduce simple causality from words and deeds, dicta et facta, relying on what is reported to be „true". Such are the rules of the game. In ordinary life we also rely on observation and re port. One secret type of report comes from spies. The activities of spies in east central Europe in the Fifteenth century are well known. These are the unnamed men, the Annen, who served the Teutonic Order, as well as ordi nary merchants and travelling noblemen who picked up and passed on in fonnation during their journeys. Recently this matter has been investigated in considerable depth for the period before 1454 by S. Jóźwiak and it will not be our concern here2. In this paper we will take a brief look at another kind of infonnation source that we can pick up on in the often ambiguous relations between the Teutonic Order, Poland and Lithuania, namely rumour or hearsay. Here we do not mean the effect played on events by accidental rumour as when, for example, in 1452 Casimir Jagiellończyk was worried by rumours of Polish displeasure going the rounds in his kingdom3. Our subject is the role of rumour in deliberate diplomatic activity during the 1 Joannis Dlugossii scu Longini canonici cracoviensis Historiae Poloniae libri xii, 5: Liber XII (XIII), cd. I. Zcgota Pauli [Długosz XU] (Krakow, 1878), 228. s.a. 1456. 2 S. Jóżu iak. Wywiad i kontrwywiad w państwie Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach. Studium nad sposobami pozyskiwania i wykorzystywaniem poufnych informacji w późnym średniowieczu (Malbork. 2004), csp. pp. 222-26,229-44. Spies were used to check the veracity of rumour - continua avisamenta exploratoivm in Alamanniam missoivm. et amicortim scripta ас relationcs Icccnint de rumore Jidciii, Długosz, 183, s.a. 1454. 1 Długosz XII, p. 107. 249 reign of Casimir Jagiellończyk, which is of particular interest for the power it gave all three parties to manipulate the actions of their fellows through fear, such as the deliberate spreading of untrue information in 1468 by the acting grand master, Heinrich von Plauen, who claimed that the citizens of Gdańsk were planning to abandon Casimir in favour of Duke John of Bur gundy, thereby causing anxiety both to the Polish king and his new Prus sian subjects4. In a sense it is the practical implementation of a counsel which Callimach is attributed with offering to his royal pupils towards the end of the fifteenth century5. We will deal with three main events: the nego tiations that led to the election and coronation of Grand Duke Casimir I and IV as king of Poland between 1445 and 1447, the ephemeral figure of the dead Władysław III Warneńczyk and various rumours of alliance between the Teutonic Order and Lithuania during the Thirteen Years' War. After Władysław III was slain fighting the Turk at Varna in 1444, his natural successor was his brother, the young grand duke of Lithuania, Casimir. However, in order to balance the requirements of an increasingly influential noble class within the Grand Duchy and to defend what he and even certain Poles regarded as his natural right to inherit the throne of his father and brother, Casimir deliberately delayed accepting offers from the Polish nobility to elect him their king. Relations between the Grand Duchy and the Crown were further complicated by pressure from the Teutonic Order, which many Lithuanian scholars view anachronistically as a natural ally of Vilnius in opposition to Kraków. They lay stress on a particularly special relationship between Vilnius and Marienburg (and later, Königsberg) which ignores similar advances which the Order was wont to make to the Polish lords for help in influencing the monarch. In February 1446 we see an exchange of letters concerning a planned border meeting with the Teutonic Order. The grand master asks Casimir to help a Gdańsk merchant in dispute with Onacz of Brest. In his February 14 response to the Lithuanian embassy led by Sudevvoj, the grand master re marks that he has held a secret meeting with wenig seyne gebieliger, since he has heard that der lierre grosfursie welle ußsetezen lassen the Treaty of Brest. A report on this embassy and its herte reden was made to the Master of Livonia on February 16. News of this secret meeting, provoked by the 4 Ibidem, p. 499. 5 M. Gliszczeński, Rozmaitości naukowe i literackie, VII (Warsaw, 1860), 18: Iširas: nieprzyjacielem przez swe wierne, strzeż niebezpieczeństwa, mówiąc, iż nieprzyjaciel jest gotów, jakby się nie spostrzegli w tym fortelu. Lithuanian side, may lie behind the rumours which spread through Poland that the Order was planning to renounce the treaty and attack Poland. Whether this was intended by the Lithuanians to form the basis of a new alliance in the wake of Casimir's rejection of the Polish throne, or was (more likely) simply an attempt to alarm the Polish Council - and perhaps the Mazovians - and discredit the Order, such talk of renunciation came to dominate Polono-Teutonic relations until after Casimir's coronation6. The situation was especially dangerous for the Order, which, in accordance with clause 43 of the Treaty of Brest, would ipso facto release its subjects from their oaths of loyalty if it were to wage aggressive war on Poland (or Lithuania). This would not have been an attractive prospect for the grand master, who was accusing rebel burghers within the Prussian League of breaking their oath to the Order. This card had been played with success by the Prussian Estates against Grand Master Russdorf in 1433 with reference to clause 24 of the Treaty of Melno (1422)7. In addition it was asserted, falsely in fact, that the order had requested dispensation from its oath in the treaty from the Council of Basel From letters of August 29 and September 2 1446 it appears that rumours were still spreading in Poland that the Order was preparing for war. The grand master denied this strenuously and repeatedly. It seems now that the Poles, who may have been intimidated by such rumours at first now used them against the Order by deliberately delaying in their confirmation of news that the grand master had not sought a dispensation from the Treaty of Brest from the Council of Basel - Archbishop Wincenty was issued with a papal confirmation to this effect in September 1446, but he informed the master of his knowledge only in March of the following year4. On Septem ber 1 1446 at Stimm the grand master issued a safe-conduct for his servant Arnolt von Morttangen to visit the Council of the Polish Crown including: * Berlin. GStAPK, ОВЛ 9298, 9361, OF 16, 1108-11; Feb. 16 letter: Livl.UB, X, 299; see also A. Krupska, Udzielne księstwo mścislawskie pod rządami Litwy, Prace naukowe Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 18 (1971), 35-55. 7 Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert, ed. E. Weise, 1 (Marburg. 1970), No. 181 § 44, p. 210; Melno-Dokumenty strony polsko-litewskiej Pokoju Melncńskiego z 1422 roku, cd. P. Nowak, P. Pokora (Poznań, 2004), p. 9; 1433: M. Burleigh, Prussian society and the German Order. An aristocratic corporation in crisis c.NIO-1466 (Cambridge, 1984), 142-3. 4 ОВЛ 9298 (XXV, No.87), March 3 1447 with papal letter from Aug. 29 1446; the Council's letters of the same date to Oleśnicki and the grand master arc published in M. Dogicl, Codex diplomatics Rcgni Poloniae ct Magni DucaUis Lituaniae, IV (Vilnius,1764), nos! 101, 102, pp. 139-41. dem erczbisschoff zeit Gneßen, Grosfursten zeit Littaitwen, bisschoffe zeu Leslciw, den herezogen Vlotken und Bolislao und houptmann zeur Wille4. From September 21 we know that the Order had planned to send envoy to Brest/Parczew to the grand duke and the Polish lords, although the grand master himself was too busy to come. A gift (in the form of a silver chain) was sent to Wincenty's man, Vecens Furman, presumably as a sign of a desire on the Order's part to maintain good relations10. In September 1446 under the shadow of a threat of Tatar invasion from the Lithuanian side, the Polish magnates foregathered for a parliament at Parczew. The dowager queen, Sofia, was also there. The counsellors of Poland required Casimir to attend, as indicated by Piotr Kurowsky. Rumours were passed on to the Lithuanian side by a Polish nobleman, Andrzej Rohatyński to the effect that the Poles were planning violence against the grand duke's party. Casimir agreed to come to Brest and no further. By March 5 the archbishop of Gniezno was ready to inform the master that he had received Casimir's letter of agreement to coronation. At the same time Wincenty sent the master the letter he had received from Basel sometime earlier concerning investigations of (inaccurate) rumours about the Order's attempt to squirm out of its obligations under the treaty of Brest. In sum, several Polish prelates had written inquiring whether the Order had asked for permission to renege its oath to uphold the Treaty of Brest. The Council has scanned its records and found no trace of such a plea or its acceptance. A general enquiry among delegates also draws a blank. This would have been non solum sennarium belli sed incendium fore sicut solvere vinculum, quo federa pacts tenebantw. It is the council's duty to defend peace - citravimus ut tu, qui in inclito regni Polonie principatum tenes, ipsius gentes et populos de hits rebus reddas attentosn. After the coronation had taken place at the end of June 1447, the Order's representatives at the ceremony were still complaining that some Poles had accused the Knights of asking the Lithuanian fierren to unite against Po land, but this is not true.