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BOOK REVIEWS

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, by Kamal-Deen Ali� Leiden, Neth�: Brill, 2015� 372 pages�

In Maritime Security Cooperation in the Ali begins, rather helpfully, by exploring Gulf of Guinea, the legal adviser to the the meaning of several terms. First and Ghana Navy, Commander Dr. Kamal- foremost, he seeks to provide a work- Deen Ali, argues that the world should ing definition of the “Gulf of Guinea,” pay attention to the maritime domain of as the phrase has been used for years West and Central Africa. The same argu- without any real consistency to describe ment can be made about his book, as the maritime region of West and Central Ali not only provides the most in-depth Africa. Ultimately, the author expands analysis of maritime security prospects the range of states included in this and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea to important region. At a minimum, Ali in- date but offers conceptual frameworks cludes the twenty-five member states of for maritime security that are applicable the Maritime Organization of West and around the world. Furthermore, the Central Africa, all of which are members lessons that can be extracted from the of either the Economic Community of Gulf of Guinea experience—both the West African States (ECOWAS) or the problems of insecurity and the efforts Economic Community of Central Afri- to address them—can serve as help- can States (ECCAS). But he notes ful guidance for approaching similar that Rwanda, which recently rejoined challenges elsewhere. Notwithstand- ECCAS, should not be included, as its ing the relative absence of credible strategic interests do not align with the literature on maritime security in West maritime domain of West and Central and Central Africa, this book exhibits Africa. On the other hand, he argues that the rigor of first-rate legal scholarship Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2000 combined with the intimate knowledge and is a member of the Arab Maghreb gleaned from an insider’s perspective, Union, should be included, as it is an making it undoubtedly a seminal work important partner for maritime security on both the Gulf of Guinea specifically cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. This and maritime security in general. argument constitutes the first of many

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novel contributions the book makes to approach aligns maritime security more the context-specific dynamics of mari- closely with development than defense. time security in West and Central Africa. Conceptually, Ali charts new territory Beyond defining the Gulf of Guinea, on several fronts. First, his analysis Ali makes a convincing case for the of the theoretical underpinnings of region’s global strategic significance. The security lead him to the conclusion that, economic contribution of the region to although the literature is largely silent in the global energy, mineral, and agricul- doing so, the theoretical approaches to ture markets makes the “security” in general can be applied to concerns of states in West and Central the maritime realm as well. He writes, “It Africa concerns for the entire world. is argued that since the environ- Even after the decline in the price of oil, ment serves the political, economic, and Ali’s case remains unimpeachable, as his strategic objectives of States, the dynam- arguments for the region’s geostrategic ics that surround the pursuit of all inter- relevance go far beyond oft-repeated state interests will similarly be reflected statements about Nigerian oil in par- in the maritime realm.” This notion of ticular. With details about the region’s the activities, interests, and challenges of contribution to the global supply of the maritime domain being interrelated cotton, cacao, and fish, one need never with the broader national interests sug- mention oil to recognize the economic gests that a state’s maritime territory is a significance of the Gulf of Guinea. microcosm of the state itself. Thus mari- These arguments lend further weight to time security cannot be severed from the examples and analyses of the main national interests—security, develop- portions of the book, but the concep- ment, governance, etc.—and is, indeed, tual features of the book are perhaps a fundamental component of them. its most significant academic feature. Ali’s second departure from the lit- In reviewing the literature on maritime erature involves taking an evolution- security, Ali exposes some significant ary approach to maritime security. By gaps, in both coverage of issues and ex- examining how maritime security has isting conceptual frameworks. He begins developed from being a matter merely his analysis by asking a few important of transportation security into a field questions: What is security? What is posing integrated, multisectoral chal- maritime security? And for whom is lenges today, he shows how the concept maritime security? In dissecting some of maritime security has changed and of the existing works on maritime broadened over time. Furthermore, he security, he comes to advocate a “hu- contends that states’ maritime concerns man security” approach, but compiles are context specific rather than uni- elements from a number of different versal. Partly for this reason, he also sources. He thus settles on maritime asserts that there is no real consensus security as being a composite of societal on the elements of maritime security, security, environmental security, food allowing for a wide conception of what security, and economic security. One is included. He seems to suggest that could argue, therefore, that this the best approach in the literature is in the 2008 UN secretary-general’s

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and the Law of the Sea report, which work is therefore warranted, applying lists (section V[B]) the main maritime Ali’s conceptual framework to other security threats as “ and armed contexts besides the Gulf of Guinea. robbery against ships”; “terrorist acts As significant as this book’s theoreti- involving shipping, offshore installations cal contribution may be to the aca- and other maritime interests”; “[i]llicit demic literature on maritime security in trafficking in arms and of mass general, the book’s contribution to the destruction”; “illicit traffic in narcotic discourse on maritime security in the drugs and psychotropic substances”; Gulf of Guinea is impossible to express “[s]muggling and trafficking of per- adequately. As a Ghanaian naval officer sons by sea”; “[i]llegal, unreported and and legal adviser, Ali is able to delve unregulated fishing”; and “intentional into the subject matter in a way that and unlawful damage to the marine few could. The majority of the book is environment.” He later assesses this dedicated to the region-specific analysis, set of threats, along with others, in the and this is truly the heart of the work. specific context of the Gulf of Guinea. Given the resource constraints of West The third main departure is Ali’s novel and Central Africa as well as the trans- framework for conceiving of maritime national nature of many of the threats, security. His framework, elaborated it is not surprising that cooperation throughout the book, has three ele- is seen as the overarching answer to ments: (1) identifying the maritime addressing maritime insecurity in the security threat path; (2) applying the region. But the architecture of maritime threat path to geopolitical and geostra- security cooperation is still very much tegic features; and (3) implementing a under construction. Ali meticulously three-layer, three-indicator approach. dissects the challenges, internal and The maritime security threat path is a external, that plague the progress of bit more than merely a list of generic or effectively using cooperation as a means even specific maritime security threats. of countering threats. His personal It examines both the activity and the ef- familiarity with the processes afoot fects of any given threat. This approach takes the chapters on both regional ap- allows for the contextualization of the proaches and international partnerships threats versus geopolitical or strategic beyond the capacity of normal academic priorities. The third element of the scholarship. Indeed, one could not look framework then concerns the approach up most of the information contained to those threats, involving three layers— in these portions, further adding to national capacity, regional cooperation, the tremendous value of this volume. and global support—paired with three Similarly, the legal analysis in this book progress indicators—improved would be difficult for any scholar outside maritime governance, adequate legal the region to replicate. Ali’s access to frameworks, and an inclusive mari- national laws and regional legal frame- time security concept. While the book works as well as his detailed understand- elaborates this conceptual approach in ing of international maritime law affords the Gulf of Guinea context, it is ap- him the opportunity to provide insight plicable globally. Further academic into both the legal developments and

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challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, international cooperation. (4) Prevailing the book may be viewed as a compen- regional cooperative processes lack coor- dium of the existing legal regimes in the dination and have suffered several set- Gulf of Guinea. This legal landscape is backs. (5) International support for mar- important to understand as efforts pro- itime security cooperation in the Gulf ceed to combat maritime insecurity and of Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated, enhance maritime governance through and in some cases driven by national in- cooperation. The section on emerging terests that affect its overall effectiveness. jurisdictional issues and legal com- These conclusions, as well as the analysis plexities is particularly significant, as it that led to them, serve as an invaluable provides a helpful warning of problems aid in the ongoing effort to secure the that are likely to arise as the coopera- maritime domain of West and Central tive architecture continues to develop. Africa. This book is a must-read for Naturally, one of the challenges of writ- maritime security scholars and anyone ing an analysis of real-world issues is —from policy makers to industry that they do not remain constant. If one leaders to students—working on mari- were to attempt to identify a criticism time matters in the Gulf of Guinea. of the book, it is that it is already out of IAN M. RALBY date on a few specific issues, although one hardly can blame that on the author. For example, the section on private security companies or private maritime security companies, if written today, Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the likely would include a number of new Making of On War, by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger. issues as well as new accountability Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 312 pages. $29.95. mechanisms. But the analysis and les- One is tempted to ask why naval officers sons that can be gleaned remain sound should be interested in reading a biog- and important, even if additional facts raphy of the wife of the famous Prussian exist that could enhance the discussion. philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz. The book expressly arrives at five main In answer we might go to the words of conclusions: (1) Current processes for Marie von Clausewitz herself, from her maritime security cooperation in the letter of dedication to Carl’s unfinished Gulf of Guinea do not address adequate- masterpiece On War: “Readers will be ly the multiple security threats in the rightly surprised that a woman should region. (2) Poor governance contributes dare to write a preface for such a work significantly to maritime security threats as this. My friends will need no explana- in the Gulf of Guinea, but the current tion. . . . Those who knew of our happy cooperative framework does not address marriage and knew that we shared every- the land-sea nexus of maritime security thing, not only joy and pain but also concerns. (3) The relevant legal frame- every occupation, every concern of daily work for maritime security in the Gulf of life, will realize that a task of this kind Guinea is poorly developed, and this un- could not occupy my beloved husband dermines the effectiveness of maritime without at the same time becoming security enforcement and regional and

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thoroughly familiar to me” (preface to times until now. As advertised, though, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and the book is centered on the life of his trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret companion and lifelong love, Countess [Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, Marie von Brühl. With her formidable 1986], p. 65 [emphasis in original]). language skills, Bellinger does exception- In other words, to understand better al work in bringing the history, and even On War’s hidden treasures, it helps the prehistory, of the Brühl family to life. to understand the formidable woman Many surprises await the reader regard- behind On War. We historians have ing Marie’s background and influence. this quaint notion that understanding For example, she was no “ordinary” the context for things helps one bet- Prussian countess, but rather a daugh- ter understand the things themselves. ter of an imperial count of the Holy For naval professionals, especially at Roman Empire. As an imperial aris- the Naval War College, which owes tocrat, she frequented only the very so much to the Prusso-German intel- highest social circles in Europe. Her lectual tradition, to understand better friends and acquaintances were queens, the genesis of the greatest philosophy of princesses, and various types of grand war is no small thing. (Readers inter- duchesses—all themselves politically ested in evidence for this idea should influential women, in an age when few consult Ronald H. Spector, Professors women wielded such influence. of War: The Naval War College and the Marie’s elevated background raises Development of the Naval Profession the book’s first major question, which [Honolulu, HI: Univ. Press of the Pacific, Bellinger poses in this way (p. 47): “How 2005; originally published by the Naval and why did a countess raised in the War College Press, 1977], pp. 14–17). highest social circles ever allow herself Additionally, Bellinger’s biography is to consider marrying a man with con- the result of a fruitful collaboration spicuously less social standing?” Carl’s with Donald Stoker, who has published family had only a dubious claim to the a companion biography of Marie’s “von”—which denoted nobility—in front more-famous husband. Together they of his name, he being a son of (at best) a mined a treasure trove of recently very minor provincial official. Bellinger uncovered correspondence between answers the question in this way (p. 8), Carl and Marie held in Germany by the and it tells one much about both Carl (now) famous couple’s descendants. and Marie: “Indeed, from the very Marie von Clausewitz is more than just beginning of their romance, the couple a biography of a woman married to an determinedly defied the parochial at- officer and military theorist; it covers the titudes of the time and strived to build a spectrum of relevant social, intellectual, relationship if not equal in status, then military, political, and feminist history. at least equal in nature. . . . [I]t was Carl’s It is truly a synthesis of all these forms, promise to treat her as an independent much like Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and and free individual that made this for- the State (1976), which has held the field midable countess decide upon marriage on the details of Clausewitz’s life and with a man of lesser social standing.”

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In other words, Carl and Marie man- might miss. Her text is full of interest- aged to rise above the social norms of ing insights and observations on the their times. Until now we have had only extraordinary couple, but also includes Carl’s perspective, as it were—the one details that even sailors will recognize, we read in On War. By telling the story such as the fact that Marie and Carl of the collaboration between the two, numbered all their letters when he was Bellinger’s book makes clear that the real in the field so they could tell if some political animal in the family was Marie, were missing. (The reviewer used this not Carl. Her influence can be judged by very technique with his spouse during the fact that after Carl resigned his com- his many cruises in the U.S. Navy.) mission in the Prussian army and left Readers looking for new insights on for Russia to join its army—without the the Prussian perspective from inside Prussian king’s written permission—the the Prussian court during the Napole- king still acknowledged Marie, and even onic will be well rewarded, as will nodded to her at court functions. As for those interested in how little or how Carl, the king never forgave him com- much Marie played a role in the genesis pletely; he did allow him to rejoin the and writing of On War, the subject that Prussian army later, but never gave him occupies roughly the last quarter of the a position of real influence. Again, this book. Addressing Marie’s pivotal role in misfortune is our good fortune, since getting Carl’s work published, Bellinger it probably allowed Carl the extra time, leaves little doubt that without Marie beyond that required for his minimal there might have been no On War for duties at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, us to read today, nor any of Carl’s other to write and rewrite his masterpiece. works. Ms. Bellinger’s work reminds One also learns that Marie was very ac- us that a human life is rarely a solo ac- tive in supporting her husband’s career, complishment, lived apart and distinct and developed friendships and corre- from other human beings. Rather, a sponded independently of Carl with the relationship such as that of Marie and great figures of the day, especially Gen- Carl von Clausewitz is an enterprise eral August Neithardt von Gneisenau. lived in collaboration with others of our Marie’s mother, interestingly, was from kind—or in Marie’s case, not her kind— the British middle class (a story in itself), especially those we love and who love us. and she taught Marie to speak English Highly recommended for all audiences. exceptionally well for a German aristo- JOHN T. KUEHN crat. This probably further cemented her relationship with Gneisenau, who also spoke English fluently. The two were so close that Marie, an accomplished painter, later executed one of the more A Higher Standard: Leadership Strategies from famous existing portraits of Gneisenau. America’s First Female Four-Star General, by Ann Bellinger herself is married to a military Dunwoody. Boston: Da Capo, 2015. 288 pages. service member. Because of that experi- $25.99 (Kindle $14.99). ence, as she writes about this military In this book, General Ann Dunwoody, marriage she has an exceptional eye for USA (Ret.), traces her illustrious career the sorts of details that some academics from initial entry into the Women’s

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Army Corps in 1975 as a second lieuten- both herself and whatever organization ant through her promotion to four-star she led. After speaking to executives at general to her retirement in 2012 as Coca-Cola, Dunwoody related, “After the commander of the Army Materiel managing nearly sixty-nine thousand Command (AMC). Dunwoody came employees, one thing is clear to me: from an army family: her father was there is a higher standard that pro- a veteran of both Korea and Vietnam vides the foundation upon which every and retired as a brigadier general; her effective leadership journey is built.” brother was a West Point graduate; and a We all could learn from her mantra. sister was one of the Army’s first female This is truly a book about leadership, helicopter pilots. Throughout her re- with each chapter showcasing impor- markable career, Ann Dunwoody blazed tant lessons and strategies applicable to a trail with a lengthy list of “firsts”: leaders in any organization. Dunwoody • First female field-grade officer in the highlights that “[t]his is not a manual 82nd Airborne Division about how to become a general, nor will • First female to command a battalion I reveal a secret recipe for becoming a in the 82nd Airborne Division great leader.” Her sincerity and passion • First female to command the Com- for the Army team are evident. Chapter bined Arms Support Command 2, “Wendell Would Be Proud—‘Never • First female in the U.S. military to Walk by a Mistake’”—chronicles her achieve the rank of four-star general relationship, as a new second lieuten- Dunwoody’s promotion to four-star ant platoon leader, with her platoon general made front-page news across the sergeant, Sergeant First Class Wendell country and brought instant recognition Bowen. Dunwoody writes (p. 38): “Ser- outside military circles. Yet Dunwoody geant Bowen shared wisdom on many remained well-grounded, with strong levels that guided me through every step support from her family. She relates sto- of my military career.” In this chapter, ries about her mother and father and the she discusses the important leadership influence each played in her career. She lessons that young officers and new also tells about her husband, Craig, and leaders in any company must learn. how important he was to her success. Dunwoody is a good storyteller, and the These stories really enable the reader to lessons she shares are easy for the reader relate to her on a personal level. Dun- to relate to. The leadership lessons are woody writes (p. 72): “Throughout my summarized in the postscript: “Leader- life I’ve met plenty of superheroes, but ship Strategies from an Army Life.” the strongest and most effective among Another chapter, “Leader of Leaders— them were the ones who were simply ‘Build Your Bench,’” enables Dunwoody human and knew they weren’t perfect.” to chronicle her work to promote and The title of the book, A Higher Standard, build the succession plan at AMC is important to Dunwoody. “Those prior to her retirement. She relates words became the foundation of my (p. 223): “One of the most important leadership philosophy and a central part jobs a senior leader has is to develop of how I tried to live my life.” Dunwoody leaders or to ‘build the bench.’” This explains that she consistently worked is a critical lesson that many leaders hard to maintain a higher standard for never learn—to the detriment of the

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organizations they lead. Countless lead- force. In one of the first major works ers are often too involved in promot- in English on the practice of , ing themselves, and see developing Kittrie has written an important book subordinates as a sign of weakness. for lawyers, policy makers, and military The final chapter, “Afterthoughts— strategists. Successful strategic perfor- ‘My Way to Continue the Conversa- mance requires an appreciation of the tion . . . ,’” was initially confusing. It role of politics in war, and because law did not flow with the rest of the book; is an intensely political matter it is an it seemed disjointed; it seemed to be integral part of the strategic operating made up of random thoughts about a environment. Kittrie’s highly readable variety of topics. I eventually realized Lawfare enhances our understanding of that it was Dunwoody’s way of discuss- the growing strategic potential of law. ing and underscoring contemporary This book is at once a history of lawfare, issues she believes are important. a collection of representative case stud- During my almost thirty-year career in ies, and a resource for other researchers. the U.S. Army, I was privileged to serve The foreword by former CIA director R. in the 10th Mountain Division with Ann James Woolsey Jr. is itself an interesting Dunwoody. Her technical and tactical read, setting up Kittrie’s analysis with a skills, along with her keen insight and description of the international legal are- caring attitude, made her a positive role na as a sheriff-less “Wild West” exploited model. It is fitting that she ends every by various governments and nonstate talk with the phrase “In the end, we’re all actors. The author also describes his just soldiers, but that’s the highest thing own foray into lawfare as a professor you could claim to be.” Dunwoody’s leg- at Arizona State University, where his acy in the Army and the larger U.S. mili- analysis of Iran’s dependence on external tary will impact generations of young gasoline suppliers eventually led to the Americans for years to come. This book Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Account- showcases her exceptional talents as an ability and Divestment Act of 2010. Kit- army officer and leader. It is a must- trie’s practical bent is evident through- read for leaders at all levels, in both out Lawfare, and he offers numerous the military and other organizations. suggestions for incorporating lawfare into U.S. national security strategy. THOMAS J. GIBBONS Among the strengths of Lawfare are the concepts provided in the first chapter that prepare the reader for the case studies that follow. Kittrie begins with a historical overview, tracing lawfare Lawfare: Law as a of War, by Orde F. back to the seventeenth century, when Kittrie. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 504 pages. $29.95 (Kindle $14.41). used legal arguments to bolster Dutch maritime power. Kit- In Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, trie’s section on the literature of lawfare legal scholar Orde F. Kittrie analyzes the provides a unique summary of the increasing effectiveness of the use of law leading works in the field. Kittrie breaks to achieve objectives that not long ago down the practice of lawfare into two might have been achievable only using

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categories: instrumental lawfare—the action against companies providing use of legal methods to achieve results the ships with essential services such as typically sought from kinetic weapons; maritime insurance. In letters to these and compliance leverage disparity—the companies, Israeli lawyers referenced seeking of advantages over an opponent the U.S. Supreme Court case of Holder more disposed to comply with the law. v. Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S. Kittrie attributes the rise of lawfare to 1 [2010], 130 S.Ct. 2705) to argue that three factors: the increased number and providing services to the flotilla was il- reach of international laws and tribunals, legal because it supported . The the rise of nongovernmental organi- letters proved persuasive. By rendering zations focused on the law of armed the ships unable to secure the necessary conflict, and the advance of globaliza- services to gain permission to leave their tion and economic interdependence. Greek ports, Israel succeeded in stopping Kittrie follows up his macro-level the 2011 flotilla without firing a shot. conceptual analysis with detailed case Kittrie devotes a chapter to China’s inno- studies at the micro level that exemplify vative approach to lawfare. He explains the prevalent trends in lawfare. His how China systematically wages lawfare examples move from the battlefields of across the strategic operating environ- the Middle East through the courtrooms ment, including maritime, aviation, of New York to the doctrinal manuals of and space lawfare, as well as lawfare the Chinese military. The range of ex- in cyberspace. For example, Kittrie amples, all linked by the common theme analyzes how China is using maritime of lawfare’s increasing effectiveness, law to justify denying access to the South underscores how widespread and mul- China Sea for international navigation. tifaceted the phenomenon has become. China has developed a concept of law- Kittrie devotes four of his eight chapters fare it calls falu zhan, or “legal warfare,” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which as part of its . Kittrie’s he describes (p. 197) as “the closest thing case studies show how China incorpo- the world has to a lawfare laboratory.” rates lawfare into its strategy through a For example, Israel’s experience with comprehensive approach coordinated maritime law in 2011 demonstrates how across the Chinese government. “” lawfare can achieve a military Unlike China, the United States has no objective without using force. In May similar comprehensive lawfare strat- 2010, Israeli forces intercepted a flotilla egy. Kittrie describes how parts of the of ships from Turkey attempting to vio- U.S. government nevertheless have late a blockade of the Hamas-controlled employed legal techniques success- Gaza Strip, killing nine people. A UN fully to achieve strategic results, such as fact-finding mission subsequently the U.S. Treasury’s use of international criticized Israel for its handling of the financial laws against Iran. Some of the incident. Faced with a similar flotilla most effective U.S. lawfare has been the preparing to leave Greece in June 2011, work of private-sector attorneys rather Israeli lawyers used legal measures to than U.S. government actions. Kittrie stop the ships from leaving port. Those provides several examples of litiga- measures included threatening legal tion that used the Antiterrorism Act

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of 1990. A significant case was Boim Lawfare reminds us that lethal force v. Holy Land Foundation, in which at- is only one of many factors affecting torneys working on behalf of the family outcomes in war. Kittrie points the way of a U.S. victim of terrorism secured a toward how legal factors can be used to judgment against Islamic fund-raising achieve practical effects. Military officers organizations, drying up a significant and policy makers who read this book source of material support to Hamas. will be rewarded with a better under- Kittrie concludes with a compelling standing of the legal dynamics that are argument for a more creative and in- exerting an increasingly powerful influ- novative integration of lawfare into ence on the legitimate use of violence. U.S. strategy. As he observes (p. 96), KEVIN ROUSSEAU the 2015 National Security Strategy identifies security challenges that are decentralized, transcend state borders, involve nonstate actors, and “cannot be neutralized using only deterrence Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Prepara- or the United States’ traditional ki- tions for II, by John M. Lillard. Lin- netic toolbox.” Lawfare underscores coln: Potomac Books, Univ. of Nebraska Press, why strategists must have a practical 2016. 224 pages. $39.95 (Kindle $26.37). understanding of the entire spectrum of With the Navy’s recent efforts to rein- factors affecting the strategic operating vigorate war gaming, there has been environment—informational, cultural, renewed interest in the interwar gaming political, economic, social, and legal. conducted at the Naval War College in Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic Newport, Rhode Island. In the Naval to expect strategists and policy makers War College Review, Proceedings, and to be legal experts as well, so his conclu- other maritime journals, war-gaming sions include an analysis of the sources experts and enthusiasts alike have tried of “lawfare power” and recommenda- to characterize the nature and value of tions for leveraging the skills of the U.S. the Navy’s war games played between legal community. To show how private- 1919 and 1941. John Lillard’s Playing sector expertise can inform potential War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Prepa- military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes rations for World War II is the latest how Special Operations Command contribution to this resurgence. Seek- Pacific reached out to the University of ing to provide a comprehensive study Pennsylvania’s law school for research on of the interwar games conducted at the foreign criminal laws that could be used College, Lillard intends to inform our to detain and prosecute foreign fighters understanding of the “navy’s transition” supporting the Islamic State. In Kittrie’s during this period. Playing War asserts assessment (p. 32), if the United States (p. 8) that the Newport games were properly leverages its extensive legal “transformational” and played a “central expertise to support a national lawfare role . . . in preparing the navy for war.” strategy, the “U.S. advantage in sophis- For the most part, the author contributes ticated legal weapons has the potential to the history of that era, but does so to be even greater than its advantage with a work that would have benefited in sophisticated lethal weapons.”

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from additional editing and more at- of War Plan ORANGE and the fleet prob- tention to detail in its historiography. lems. Requested by College President This book succeeds with its analysis of Admiral Harris Laning and written by how the Newport war games evolved to Captain Wilbur R. Van Auken, head reflect the emergence of new technolo- of the newly created Research Depart- gies and operational thinking for the ment, the report summarized lessons Navy. Lillard organizes his analysis into learned from all the Blue-Orange games three phases: early (1919–27); middle played between 1927 and 1933. The (1928–34); and late (1935–41). He author notes that Van Auken’s analysis focuses on one or two College classes of the Trans Pacific problem presaged within each of the phases, concentrating the logistic challenges of the war and on those of significant figures such as the advent of the four hundred de- Chester Nimitz, Thomas Hart, Harold stroyer escorts that emerged during the Stark, Kelly Turner, Bull Halsey, and war. As War Plan ORANGE matured in Robert Ghormley. The author is at the 1930s, so too did the war gaming, his best when he analyzes the actual marked by the construction of Pringle games played and describes the relevant Hall and its famously square-tiled gam- insights recorded by the student-players ing floor. Lillard succinctly chronicles or the gaming faculty, or both. For ex- Newport’s war-gaming transforma- ample, his section on Tactical Game 94 tion throughout the book’s narrative. of 1923 describes how that game demon- Readers familiar with the scholarship strated the importance of reconnaissance that examines the U.S. Navy between and detection of the enemy’s forces first. the two world wars will be distracted In his chapter on the middle phase, Lil- by Lillard’s efforts to set his thesis apart lard explains how the games explored from the other literature. Playing War the innovations of air and undersea looks and feels most similar to Michael warfare, pointing out that the players Vlahos’s The Blue Sword: The Naval learned more about aviation than they War College and the American Mis- did submarines. Lillard concedes that sion, 1919–1941 (Newport, RI: Naval the College games were not innovative War College Press, 1980). Both of these in themselves; instead he reinforces the works are short in length, and have idea that “they were a common playing appendices and tables that lay out the field, a shared experience” for the men war games played by each class. Lillard’s who would fight the next war at sea. book focuses more directly on the games Playing War is a useful complement to and the chronology of the College than Edward Miller’s War Plan Orange: The Vlahos’s monograph does. However, in U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 attempting to separate his research from (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, The Blue Sword, Lillard states (p. 10) that 1991) and Albert Nofi’s To Train the Vlahos “did not use wargame records Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Prob- from the Naval War College archives,” lems, 1923–1940 (Newport, RI: Naval which is not true. Making matters more War College Press, 2010). Lillard’s ex- confusing, Lillard continues to refer amination of the 1933 Van Auken report to Vlahos’s text throughout the book. is particularly effective at showing the Later, Lillard asserts (p. 12) that John College’s contributions to the evolution Hattendorf, coauthor of Sailors and

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Scholars: The Centennial History of the operational environment. The HTT’s U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: mission was to conduct research (in the Naval War College Press, 1984), is “a social sciences and anthropology) and former professor of naval history” whose to advise military commanders about history of the College lacks “critical the unique cultural aspects of the local/ analysis.” At the time of publication, regional population. In eleven chapters, Hattendorf was and remains the Ernest McFate and Laurence have compiled J. King Professor of Maritime History an invaluable collection of experiences at the Naval War College, and is still from the scientists involved. They afford recognized as the preeminent scholar on us the opportunity to accompany these the history of the U.S. Navy at Newport. scientists on their journeys, as they share In addition to these two notable errors, their perspectives with the military. We Playing War still reads like a disserta- learn the value of embedding social tion in need of another round of editing. scientists with military units and how Chapter introductions and descriptions important their knowledge and expertise of the students are repeated several times are for military leaders to achieve an un- and add little to the analysis presented. derstanding of today’s complex, cultur- With the main body of the book ending ally diverse operational environments. at 137 pages, this work leaves the reader In this way, social scientists can help with the impression that there is still military leaders make more-informed, more to explore about the relationship and therefore better, decisions. between the interwar war games and General David Petraeus (Ret.) states how the U.S. Navy fought during the in the foreword that the “key ter- Second World War. While this imperfect rain in is the human volume has some merit, the definitive terrain.” He highlights the role social history of the Naval War College’s inter- scientists played in shaping the cultural war war games remains to be written. framework of the space and how they contributed to military leaders’ JON SCOTT LOGEL knowledge to ensure mission success. General Petraeus posits the notion that the military indeed may require even greater sociocultural knowledge to conduct future military operations. Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan, ed. Montgomery Today’s military leaders are well trained McFate and Janice H. Laurence. New York: Ox- in tactics, techniques, and procedures; ford Univ. Press, 2015. 320 pages. $39.95 (Kindle however, the twenty-first-century $22.99). battle space presents inherent dif- The twenty-first-century security ficulties for military leaders. One of environment has been characterized by their principal deficiencies is a lack of numerous cross-cultural battle spaces, cross-cultural competence (C3). C3 is such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. the ability to communicate effectively The U.S. Army initiated the human and appropriately with people of other terrain team (HTT) because it needed cultures. As the number of multina- to address the impact of the human tional coalition military operations cultural dimension in the combat

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continues to increase, military leaders For example, James Dorough-Lewis’s will need to achieve C3 to be effective. chapter, “Investing in Uncertainty,” Military leaders must be prepared to provides a clear illustration of some of adapt to a wide range of cultural, social, the challenges the social scientists faced and political challenges in the operation- in the HTTs. We learn about the need to al environment. Education in cultural delineate between social scientists and competency, cultural intelligence, and members of the Intelligence Commu- social intelligence plays a pivotal role in nity. This distinction is critical for social a military leader’s ability to lead, build scientists as they attempt to establish relationships based on trust, and develop relationships based on trust and cred- unity of effort and command within ibility. Their research task is to assess complex, culturally diverse environ- and understand the cultural nuances ments. A leader’s ability to engage and and the cultural environment that may communicate effectively requires that he impact the overall ; or she understand the unique social and in contrast, the intelligence analyst behavioral qualities of the local popula- probes the environment for meaningful tion. This capability is a requirement information that will be used to un- for successful negotiation and conflict derstand the operational environment. management. Lack of it can mean the The social scientist seeks to understand difference between success and failure. each individual’s cultural perspective and relationships among people living This volume is a tribute to the knowl- in the environment. Social scientists and edge and expertise of social scientists anthropologists in the HTTs work with who served as members of HTTs. Their the local people to build relationships stories serve as evidence of their unique based on trust and to find ways to help experiences, insights, and contributions local people continue with their daily toward achieving cultural understand- lives. In one such example (p. 196), the ing in combat zones in places such as Army had built a hospital to meet all the Iraq and Afghanistan. It is worth not- security requirements. However, Sunni ing that HTTs offered more than just women needing medical care preferred cultural expertise. Rather, they made to travel to a hospital an hour away— a considerable investment in develop- rather than travel the path on which ing relationships with local people their husbands, sons, and brothers had and provided their military units with lost their lives. Social scientists were critical assessments about operating in able to communicate with these women and among members’ host nations. This and understand their cultural perspec- information was critical for military tive, which they shared with the military decision makers and those involved in team. This incident highlights the need campaigns, so it was to understand the culture, beliefs, and critical for the social scientists as soon values of the local people when operat- as possible to build rapport and cred- ing in a culturally diverse region. Social ibility with the local population, as well scientists provide a cultural lens toward as with the military units to which they the local people, examining and explain- were assigned. Laurence and McFate ing how they perceive what is happening invite us to share their experiences as in their unique cultural point of view. we join each scientist on that journey.

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This book provides the perspectives of history and the reader, and most likely and experiences of social scientists who, to the consternation of the Pentagon, embedded with military teams, shared Naylor’s knowledge of special operations their knowledge and cultural expertise and his extensive contacts reveal the to help military leaders make informed temperaments and competencies of key decisions within culturally diverse individuals and the details of numerous environments. This volume will prove clandestine missions and organizational to be an invaluable resource for military capabilities. Many will condemn Naylor leaders, as it highlights the importance for revealing these secrets, but the and impact of understanding the role fault is not with Naylor; it is with those of cultural diversity in military op- who talked. The book also, perhaps erations. McFate and Laurence have unintentionally, exposes flaws in how performed a service to the military by the United States wages war, as well as providing a valuable resource for all the limitations of special operations. military leaders to guide them in future The book begins by recounting the military operations. In addition, this creation of JSOC after the failed Iranian book applauds those scientists who were hostage rescue operation in 1980. New daring enough to join in the human threats to national security required a terrain effort and share their experiences new that had the with us. The ability to achieve cultural resources and capabilities to respond competence must be viewed as a war- quickly to crises and apply special- fighting imperative and as a prerequi- ized military capabilities to rescue site for all future military leaders. This hostages, kill terrorists, and neutralize volume is informative and inspiring—a weapons of mass destruction. Naylor must-read for all those interested in reminds us that senior military lead- the cultural and human dimensions ers opposed the new command, but of multinational warfare. The detailed the failure in Iran trumped parochial bibliography provides recommenda- thinking. The second and more inter- tions for further reading to enhance esting part of the book addresses the the reader’s knowledge of this topic. expansion of JSOC as one result of the YVONNE R. MASAKOWSKI momentous impact of the 9/11 attacks. From the beginning, JSOC had signifi- cant advantages over both conventional military organizations and nonaffili- ated special operations units. The units Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special placed under JSOC’s direct control were Operations Command, by Sean Naylor. New York: the best-trained and best-resourced St. Martin’s, 2015. 560 pages. $29.99 (paperback units in the military. Each of these $17.99, Kindle $14.99). units had its own sophisticated—and Once again, Sean Naylor has produced grueling—selection process. Remark- an authoritative and well-written book. ably, JSOC headquarters had nothing Relentless Strike chronicles the history that mirrored such careful processes of the Joint Special Operations Com- for selecting its . Also oddly, the mand (JSOC), America’s top-tier special Pentagon had no process for selecting operations military unit. To the benefit a JSOC commander whose experience

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and temperament matched the require- Hawk Down” debacle. Other, less- ments of a national force. To be sure, known operations took place as well. some of JSOC’s early commanders were The results of JSOC’s work before 9/11 excellent—but that was the exception. were mixed, at best. While the qual- This deficiency became clear in the im- ity of operators in JSOC’s subordinate mediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. units was superb, the JSOC command The 1980s and ’90s were a period of and staff—and “Washington”—often steady growth in terms of structure, underperformed. Some of these defi- budget, and formalized relationships ciencies would be addressed after 9/11. throughout the interagency world. JSOC The 9/11 attacks produced a sense of was required to be ready to launch a vulnerability for Americans. They also task force within four hours for a variety created a need to respond quickly with of missions of national importance. force against those directly and indi- Although specific mission require- rectly responsible. No one was more ments ultimately would dictate the task frustrated by the military’s inability to force’s composition, significant mission strike back quickly than Donald Rums- “enablers” from inside the Defense De- feld, the Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld partment and external to it always had looked to General Charles Holland, to be on standby. It required dedication commander of the U.S. Special Opera- of a dozen Air Force transport aircraft tions Command (USSOCOM), for a to deploy the JSOC staff, operators, plan. He was bitterly disappointed: Hol- helicopters, ground-assault vehicles, land was unprepared, and therefore was and other necessary equipment for reluctant to seize the opportunity to take initial operations. This initial package the war to America’s enemies. However, often would encompass five hundred JSOC’s reputation, built in part by its people, and more people and equipment extensive liaison network in Washington frequently would follow. Addition- and its sophisticated exercise program, ally, being ready for every contingency now grabbed Rumsfeld’s attention. JSOC required JSOC to have a comprehen- easily was able to sell its unique capabili- sive liaison network throughout many ties to an anxious buyer. JSOC’s bound- government agencies, especially the less self-confidence would lead to an Intelligence Community. This formulaic expanded role, because the administra- approach to every mission resulted in tion in Washington desperately needed a large task force being deployed for to go after Al Qaeda and its supporters. almost every problem. As a result, JSOC Although JSOC was a subordinate com- unintentionally undermined its ability to mand of USSOCOM, General Holland deploy clandestinely and remain agile. was happy to stay on the sidelines. JSOC During this time frame, JSOC deployed would become “almost an independent to war alongside conventional forces in military force for Rumsfeld,” under Panama and during Operation DESERT the command of Major General Dell STORM. It also deployed in response Dailey. Everything seemed to be in place to the hijacking of the Italian cruise for JSOC to destroy those responsible ship Achille Lauro, which had eighteen for the 9/11 attacks. The leadership in Americans aboard, and to in Washington empowered JSOC to do 1993 in what would become the “Black whatever was necessary. The superbly

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trained operators were anxious to make of the enemy networks that the intel- Bin Laden and his lieutenants pay with ligence process was producing. their lives for their actions. But, for the General McChrystal’s force of person- second time, a leadership deficiency on ality fused all these disparate parts of the part of a senior commander ham- the enormous intelligence apparatus pered JSOC. General Holland, and now together. Retooling Delta Force, the Major General Dailey, both aviators, did Rangers, and SEAL Team 6 was rela- not have what was necessary to unleash tively easy; the troops instinctively knew JSOC’s special operations capabilities. they needed to operate in small teams Both were conservative, conventional and in unorthodox ways to defeat enemy thinkers unable to adapt to a new type of networks. They welcomed McChrys- warfare. The triad necessary for success- tal’s aggressiveness and willingness to ful action had two elements in hand— take risks. The war was an obsession Washington sponsorship and competent for the JSOC commander. It became operators—but still lacked a key ele- McChrystal’s life, and he wanted his ment: a proper JSOC commander. Major men to understand that the war, and General Stanley McChrystal would fix nothing else, should be their life too. His this shortcoming, and with gusto. single-minded determination was infec- McChrystal commanded JSOC for tious to some and repellent to others. almost five years, transforming it into The JSOC commander had perfected a a killing machine in Iraq, Afghanistan, process that became known as F3EAD and beyond. To McChrystal and many (“Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, in Washington, JSOC was the “nation’s Disseminate”), and the JSOC opera- main effort in the war on terror.” He was tions center was called the “Death Star.” in of a global enterprise, but the “Strike to develop” intelligence became enterprise needed better intelligence and the task force catchphrase. McChrystal a better scheme to respond rapidly to had perfected the F3EAD machine, and that intelligence. JSOC would expand its the process had become self-sustaining. liaison network within the Intelligence Naylor claims that in the U.S. military’s Community and to other organizations darkest days in Iraq, JSOC was the only operating in the region. Capturing and American force achieving success. This interrogating enemy operatives now depends on how you measure success, would be preferred to killing them. especially in light of the contemporary JSOC began running agent networks as situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan. well as putting its own operators on the Under McChrystal’s leadership, JSOC’s ground, even in places such as Bengha­ operators efficiently and effectively zi, to develop situational awareness. found, fixed, and captured or killed JSOC also demanded extensive aerial high- and midvalue targets and anyone reconnaissance assets. Likewise, war in else they deemed appropriate. Often the information age pushed JSOC to they fought their war disconnected develop a cyber capability to hack into from other U.S. and coalition forces social media and cell phone commu- that were fighting the same war. JSOC’s nications. Then JSOC’s subordinate size, an issue in the 1980s and 1990s, units needed to retool to respond to the grew from about eight hundred to growing clarity about the disposition more than 2,300 in 2008, not including

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a six-hundred-man JSOC intelligence known to be false. It is the job of the brigade added in late 2008. JSOC de- author to maintain that world, to hold manded and received a disproportionate the reader suspended throughout the share of assets, including taking control entire book, and to prevent him or of other military units not only when her from falling out of the fictional necessary but when convenient—to the world with an ungraceful “whump.” dismay of commanders also charged For the author of a techno-thriller, with fighting the war. But JSOC did holding the reader suspended in this kill Zarqawi and Bin Laden and many, alternate reality requires even more many other very bad people. Leaders in finesse than for other types of fic- Washington declared, “JSOC is awe- tion. The world of a techno-thriller is some.” Our enemies needed killing, and relatively close to the world in which the no military unit did it better than JSOC. reader lives. Both the technology and Naylor tells us that before 9/11 several the environment of the story are set in a key figures described JSOC as “a Fer- future near enough that all the govern- rari in the garage.” General McChrys- mental and organizational structures, tal, with the full support of leaders in global and domestic relationships, and Washington, took the Ferrari out of the technical capabilities showcased in the garage and created a killing machine story must be close enough to what the whose performance was unparalleled. reader knows today to be believable. Unfortunately, a discerning reader This is the challenge P. W. Singer and easily could conclude that the Fer- August Cole set for themselves in Ghost rari actually was still on the same road Fleet. It is a herculean task. The inter- as the rest of the U.S. military—and national backdrop today is far different that road would lead to nowhere. from that of the techno-thriller heyday HY S. ROTHSTEIN of the 1980s and early 1990s. The U.S. cultural setting of Red Storm Rising, published in 1986, was influenced by forty years of the . Dominated by baby boomers and gen Xers, the Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, by P. general population of the United States W. Singer and August Cole. New York: Houghton during that time had limited access to Mifflin, 2015. 416 pages. $28 (paperback $14.95, international news and perspectives, Kindle $9.99). had grown up with the threat of nuclear No author today will argue with Samuel war, and had been indoctrinated with Taylor Coleridge’s perspective that any the ideological vilification of Com- work of fiction requires the reader munism. Today the cultural backdrop to engage in a willing suspension of for the U.S. population is as mixed disbelief. The wording of the concept and varied as the people themselves. is important because it goes beyond International news and perspectives are the idea of a reader just pushing the “I available to anyone, quite literally at the believe” button. The concept requires touch of a finger; the threat of nuclear the reader to be an active participant: war has been replaced with a threat of he or she must willingly enter a world terrorism; and ideological vilification

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revolves around extremist religious characters act exactly as their stereo- groups rather than nation-states. types suggest they should—and the This techno-thriller, then, with its results of their actions are predictable. hegemonic China overtaking the United The strongest element of the book is States, feels slightly unbalanced, as if it the technologies the authors choose to is not settled on a firm foundation. It include. While the overuse of nomen- was only during the last decade that a clature feels clunky for all but those majority of Americans came to consider who collect technical classifications China a player on the international like Boy Scout badges, the authors do stage, and those Americans who view not reach too far into the realm of sci- China as a threat (with the exception of ence fiction to build their arsenal of the U.S. Navy, perhaps) represent both weapons, chemicals, and drugs. There a smaller percentage and an even newer is enough linkage to existing technolo- phenomenon. In fact, the American gies and medical trends to make the perspective of our relationship with future employment of these more- China over the past ten years probably advanced programs feel realistic. Even can be described best as bipolar, or so, they all fit into a too-predictable, maybe schizophrenic; but historically no-surprise-here mold. There are even China has not been considered existen- a few moments when the story feels like tially threatening, and still is not com- a propaganda piece for the Navy’s exist- monly considered so today. Whump. ing Zumwalt-class destroyer or railgun That means the story Pete Singer and programs. Whump, and whump again. August Cole create has to be strong All of which raises the question, who is enough to overcome each cultural the audience P. W. Singer and August inconsistency that unceremoniously Cole are trying to reach? If it is the dumps us out of our suspended disbelief. military, we do not need to read four Unfortunately, the one-dimensional and hundred pages to tell us what we already stereotyped portrayal of the military know. China’s versions of the concepts of family in the story is representative of antiaccess/area-denial and air-sea battle the rest of the characters in the book. have brought plenty of visibility to the Whump. China’s “Directorate” is a future risk China represents, even for calculating, unfeeling behemoth. The those who have not been watching the Russian character is a vodka-swilling Pacific for years. If the book is intended spy. The insurgent is a femme fatale. for a civilian population that no longer Whump, whump, whump. It may be shares the common cultural backdrop an editor’s dream to have characters do that existed during the Cold War, it exactly what we presume they would feels like just another fearmongering do, but as a story line it does not carry piece written by another advocate for a enough of a thrill to make the reader bigger defense budget. If it is a plea for want to stay engaged. Rather than the administration to sit up and take incorporating strong, motivating factors notice of China as a threat, it does not (including irrational ones) that would do a good enough job of explaining why make erratic actions plausible and add all the elements of U.S. national power interest and depth to the story, the supposedly are completely defunct.

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Perhaps all of this is what makes the the case of the First World War at sea, a book unique, though. While the plot fol- thankless one too, when compared with lows the typical path of a techno-thriller, the far better known and better reported where an aggressive move by a “bad guy” situation on land. This notwithstanding, forces a “good guy” to join in a fight of it is hard to imagine a more timely and epic proportions, the discomfort the well-balanced book. David Stevens, as reader feels at the end is real, despite the Royal Australian Navy’s historian, all the fully anticipated and stereotyped was perhaps in a perfect position to take characters, plots, and technologies. on this project, but this should in no But that is not so much thrilling as it is way diminish what he has achieved. His troubling. The disturbing question that extensive and far-reaching research has lurks in the background and perme- produced a work that, while entertain- ates the plot like an insidious, deadly ing and readable, has sufficient gravitas gas is, how effective is the United States to ensure it will become the defini- when it comes to using the diplomatic tive work on the subject. This title will and informational elements of national appeal to all audiences; historians will power in the international arena? This revel in the wealth of archival material might have been the true heart of the and private diaries, but this book is far story. Surrounded by layers of protective more appealing than a mere record of muscle in military might and economic historical fact. Anyone who has been to strength, have the diplomatic and in- sea and experienced life on board ship, formational elements of U.S. national in particular a warship, will appreciate power aged and atrophied beyond the the insights from someone so obviously size of the body they inhabit? Without well versed in this area. Drawing heav- the diplomatic and informational ele- ily on his own seagoing background, ments, can the government still oper- Stevens presents an engaging narrative ate on just the military and economic that gets to the very heart of the unique elements? The idea is unexplored, but human experience that is life at sea. Ghost Fleet, with a plot that takes Lady In many ways, then, this book represents Liberty’s sword and purse away right the best of both possible approaches from the start, leaves readers suspended to a history of this type: the broad and in a disbelief completely different from analytical, which sweeps over the major the one they thought they were entering. maritime events of the time, giving the work its much-needed context; CONNIE FRIZZELL and the intensely personal, employ- ing many passages from diaries, letters, and reports that together illustrate the rich variety of naval life from the deck plates to the wardroom. To this end, In All Respects Ready: Australia’s Navy in World each chapter ends with a short biog- War One, by David Stevens. Melbourne, Austral.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014. 320 pages. $59.95. raphy of an important or interesting figure from the preceding pages, which Writing a definitive history of any major both enriches and helps to consolidate conflict from a single nation’s perspec- this comprehensive coverage. The book tive can be an exacting task—and, in also triumphs in another aspect: by not

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overlooking the very real administra- ago, came up with the “fleet unit” idea, tive challenges the young navy faced in as a way for the British dominions to trying to establish itself simultaneously contribute to the naval defense of the with the moment of its supreme test: a global economic system—something world war at sea. Thus, interspersed with that should still resonate today, in this coverage of all the important actions at new era of naval cooperation. Australia sea is a discussion of the myriad sup- alone among them persevered with it, porting activities necessary to develop and as a result was propelled within a a navy with global reach: the establish- few short years into the companionship ment of bases and supply lines; the use of those nations with true global reach at of native labor; the issues of pay and sea. This is an important book because, benefits; the challenges of recruiting and above all else, it is a lasting testament training; right down to health concerns to the character of the Australian sailor. and the treatment of offenders and The hurdles were enormous, but the deserters—it is all there. Even the bore- Australians, it seems, always rose to the dom of the long and often fruitless pa- challenges, overcoming them with ease trols in search of contraband and intel- under the most trying of circumstances ligence, so much a feature of the war at —and with an alacrity and charm sea and yet rarely reported on, is repro- that has endeared them to all. duced faithfully in an engaging manner. ANGUS ROSS In the end, one is left to marvel at the foresight of those who, all those years

OUR REVIEWERS

Connie Frizzell, an officer and a captain in the U.S. Navy, is a joint mili- tary professor at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and the codirector of the College’s Center for Cyber Conflict Studies. She was also a 2012–13 Harvard Kennedy School of Government national security fellow.

Thomas J. Gibbons, a retired colonel in the U.S. Army, is currently associate professor of profes- sional military and graduate education effectiveness at the Naval War College, working for the associate provost. Prior to assuming this position he was the senior Army adviser at the College and worked in the Joint Military Operations Department. Dr. Gibbons served on active duty in the U.S. Army for twenty-nine years.

John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Chair for Historical Research at the U.S. Army Com- mand and General Staff College (CGSC). He retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004 at the rank of commander after twenty-three years of service as a naval flight officer, flying both land- and carrier-based aircraft. He has taught a variety of subjects, including , at CGSC since 2000. He has authored Agents of Innovation (2008) and A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the Samurai to the 21st Century (2014), and coauthored Eyewitness Pacific (2008) with D. M. Giangreco, as well as numerous articles and editorials. He was awarded a Moncado Prize

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from the Society for Military History in 2011. His latest book, published by Praeger for the two hundredth anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, is Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns (2015).

Jon Scott Logel is an associate professor at the Naval War College. He conducts applied research in the War Gaming Department and teaches Ulysses S. Grant and the Profession of Arms. He is the author of the forthcoming Designing Gotham: West Point Engineers and the Rise of Modern New York, 1817–1898.

Yvonne R. Masakowski is an associate professor of strategic leadership and leader development at the Naval War College. She received a PhD and a master’s degree from the City University of New York and a master’s degree from the University of Connecticut. She is a contributing editor to the Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making.

Dr. Ian Ralby is an adjunct professor of maritime law and security at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has extensive experience in international and maritime law, and is considered an expert on both the regulation and oversight of private security companies, and on maritime security. He holds a BA and an MA from the Uni- versity of Maryland, Baltimore County, a JD from William and Mary Law School, and an MPhil and PhD from the University of Cambridge.

Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer, and a graduate of, and professor of joint military operations at, the Naval War College. He received a second MA from Providence College and is currently pursuing PhD studies, looking at naval transformation prior to the First World War. His recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the wake of the Dreadnought revolution.

Hy S. Rothstein is a senior lecturer, Department of Defense Analysis, and a member of the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has a PhD in interna- tional relations from the Fletcher School, Tufts University. His research has focused on unconven- tional warfare, counterinsurgency, , and military deception. He is the author of Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of (2006).

Kevin Rousseau is a student at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the Defense Intelligence College, the George Mason University School of Law, and the Naval War College Command and Staff distance education program.

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