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THE STRUCTURE of BEING in ARISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS the New Synthese Historical Library Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy THE STRUCTURE OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS The New Synthese Historical Library Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy VOLUME 52 Managing Editor: SIMO KNuUTTILA, University ofHelsinki Associate Editors: DANIEL ELLIOT GARBER, University ofChicago RICHARD SORABJI, University ofLondon Editorial Consultants: JAN A. AERTSEN, Thorrws-Institut, Universitiit zu Koln, Germany ROGER ARIEW, Virginia Polytechnic Institute E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH, University ofWaterloo MICHAEL AVERS, Wadham College, Oxford GAIL FINE, Cornell University R. 1. HANKINSON, University ofTexas JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University, Finnish Academy PAUL HOFFMAN, University ofCalifornia, Riverside DAVID KONSTAN, Brown University RICHARD H. KRAUT, Northwestern University, Evanston ALAIN DE LIBERA, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Sorbonne JOHN E. MURDOCH, Harvard University DAVID FATE NORTON, McGill University LUCA OBERTELLO, Universita degli Studi di Genova ELEONORE STUMP, St. Louis University ALLEN WOOD, Stanford University The titles published in this series are listed at the end ofthis volume. THESTRUCTURE OF BEING IN ARIS TOTLE , S METAPHYSICS By JlYUANYU State University of New York at Buffalo, U.s.A. SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS :MEDIA, B.V. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN 978-94-010-3991-8 ISBN 978-94-010-0055-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-010-0055-0 Printed an acid-free paper AII Rights Reserved © 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2003 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2003 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. To Yajie CONTENTS Acknowledgements ix Abbreviations xi Introduction xiii Chapter 1 Per se Being and Potential/actual Being 1 i. Per se being 1 ii. PotentiaVactual being 9 iii. The scope of the focal structure of being 18 Chapter 2 From Being to Substance 21 i. The focal connection ofper se beings 22 ii. PotentiaVactual being and substance 36 iii. The science of being 42 Chapter 3 Hylomorphism and Its Two Approaches 49 i. The composition of substance 51 ii. Two hylomorphic approaches 57 iii. The new start ofMetaphysics vii. 17 65 iv. Re-grouping the central books 76 Chapter 4 Subject, Form~ and Essence 83 i. Substance and subject 85 ii. Form and subject 92 iii. Substance and essence 96 iv. The identity of form and essence 105 Chapter 5 Form: Tode ti and Toionde 113 i. Primary reality and knowledge 115 ii. Separation, tode ti, and toionde 118 iii. Tode ti, particularity, and individuality 122 iv. Separation 127 v. Tode ti and definition 132 vi. Form as toionde 137 vii. The universal and toionde 145 viii. The ending of Metaphysics vii 150 Chapter 6 Substantial Potentiality and Actuality 155 I. Kinesis and energeia 156 vii viii CONTENTS ii. Substantial generation 162 iii. Substantial activity 169 iv. Substantial unity 176 Chapter 7 Actuality and the Prime Mover 181 i. From actual form to the Prime Mover 181 ii. The Prime Mover and eternity 188 iii. The Prime Mover and the world order 197 Chapter 8 The Unity of Aristotle's Metaphysics 201 Bibliography 211 Index of Passages 223 Name Index 231 Subject Index 235 Acknowledgements The central idea of this work is that the distinction that Aristotle draws between per se being and potentiaVactual being should be taken seriously. I argue that a correct application of this distinction to the central books of the Metaphysics leads to a distinct interpretation of these texts and to a better understanding of Aristotle's science of being. Some parts of the book have appeared as journal articles, though in all cases they have been substantially altered or recast. Sections i and iii of Chapter 2 are from Apeiron 34 (2001). Part of Chapter 3 has appeared in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 15 (1997). Sections iii and iv of Chapter 4 can be found in the Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2001). A remote ancestor of Chapter 5 was published in the Philosophical Inquiry 16 (1994). Permission to re-use these materials is gratefully acknowledged. I am deeply indebted to Jorge J. E. Gracia, who spent a whole week reading the penultimate version of the manuscript and who provided detailed comments. I am truly fortunate to have a supportive and passionate colleague like him. I am also grateful to Kenneth Dorter, who greatly helped when I worked on the first version of this project. Many other colleagues and friends have read chapters of this book at various stages of its development or versions of papers which have become parts of this book. For their help and encouragement, I thank David Bostock, Lesley Brown, Nicholas Bunnin, Roger Crisp, Michael Frede, John Keams, Gareth Matthews, Christopher Taylor, and Wang Zisong. Ingrid Krabbenbos of Kluwer Academic Publishers deserves special thanks for her patience and encouragement. Jonathan Sanford, Marcus Marenda, and Mark Niswonger, as graduate assistants at different stages of this work, provided valuable assistance. When the manuscript was accepted, the Julian Park Fund at the College of Arts and Sciences, State University of New York at Buffalo, generously provided me a grant to cover the costs of the proofreading and the preparation of the indices. I am grateful to Gerol Petruzella for his careful and critical review ofthe final version and his skillful compilation of the indices. ix Abbreviations of Aristotle's Works APo. Analytica Posteriora APr. Analytica Priora De. De Caelo Cat. Categoriae DA. De Anima D/. De Interpretatione EE. Ethica Eudemia EN. Ethica Nicomachea GA. De Generatione Animalium Ge. De Generatione et Corruptione HA. Historia Animalium MA. De Motu Animalium Meta. Metaphysica Meteor. Meteorologica PA. De Panibus Animalium Ph. Physica PN. Parva Naturalia Pol. Politica Pn. Protrepticus Rh. Rhetorica SE. Sophistici Elenchi Top. Topica Aristotle's works are cited in standard form: abbreviated title, book. chapter, Bekker page, column, and line. Except where it is otherwise stated, quotations of Aristotle are from The Revised Oxford Translations ofThe Completed Works' of Aristotle (abbreviated as "ROT"). When a technical term is the subject of the discussion but is open to various translations, I leave it untranslated both in quotations and in discussions. All necessary Greek is transliterated and explained. xi Introduction In his Metaphysics, Aristotle claims that he is seeking to establish a science of being. Being, at the most general level, is divided by Aristotle into the following four types: 1. Accidental being 2. Being as truth 3. Potential/actual being 4. Per se beingl Per se (kath hauto) being can also be translated as "being in its own right" or "intrinsic being". This type of being has been referred to by Aristotle in different ways. The list of per se beings includes substance, quantity, quality, place, time, etc., and this is also the list of categories. At Meta. ix.l, 1045b28 Aristotle calls this list the "categories of being" (hai kategoriai tou ontos). At Meta. vi.2, 1026a36 and ix.1O, 1051a33-b2 per se being is called "being with reference to the figures of predication" (ta schemata tes kategorias, or "figures ofcategories,,).2 Of these four types of being, accidental being is briefly treated in Meta. vi.2-3 and there Aristotle claims that the study of accidental being can be dismissed on the grounds that accidental being is indeterminate and cannot be the object of knowledge. 3 He also does not pay much attention to being as truth and treats it briefly in two short texts: Meta. viA and ix.1O. His reason is that being as truth depends on combination and separation in thought but not in things, and hence ''that which is in this sense is a different sort of being from the things that are in the full sense (for the thought attaches or removes either the 'what' or quality or quantity or one of the other categories), and that which is accidentally and that which is in the sense of being true must be dismissed." (viA, 1027b30-34) The science of being, then, is mainly concerned with per se being (or categorial being) and potential/actual being. 1 Meta. v.7. cr. also Meta. vi.2, 1026a34-b2, ix.10, 1051a33-b2. 2 The relation between being and category will be discussed in Chapter I, section I. I shall use the term "categorial being" interchangeably with "per se being". 3 Meta. vi.2,1026b4, vi.2, 1027310, viA, 1027b17. xiii xiv THE STRUCTURE OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS According to the structure ofthe Metaphysics as we have it, the discussion of these two types of beings occupies the central books of the Metaphysics: Meta. vii, viii, and ix. 4 Aristotle himself indicates explicitly that these two kinds of beings are the subject-matter ofthese central books: We have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred - i.e., ofsubstance.... Since being is in one way divided into this thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potentiality and fulfillment, and of function, let us discuss potentiality and fulfillment. (Meta. ix.I, 1045b28-35) This passage singles out per se being and potential/actual being from the four­ fold division of being, and indicates that these two types of being belong to separate investigations. The central books of the Metaphysics have been regarded as the most mature and fundamental texts, but they are notoriously difficult. Indeed, almost everything said in these books is open to various interpretations and debates, and the scholarship on these books is marked by numerous controversies and debates.
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