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Home , Distinction (philosophy), Meta, Metaphysics (Aristotle), Protrepticus (Aristotle)

THE STRUCTURE OF IN 'S The New Synthese Historical Library Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy

VOLUME 52

Managing Editor:

SIMO KNuUTTILA, University ofHelsinki

Associate Editors:

DANIEL ELLIOT GARBER, University ofChicago RICHARD SORABJI, University ofLondon

Editorial Consultants:

JAN A. AERTSEN, Thorrws-Institut, Universitiit zu Koln, Germany ROGER ARIEW, Virginia Polytechnic Institute E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH, University ofWaterloo MICHAEL AVERS, Wadham College, Oxford GAIL FINE, Cornell University R. 1. HANKINSON, University ofTexas JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University, Finnish Academy PAUL HOFFMAN, University ofCalifornia, Riverside DAVID KONSTAN, Brown University RICHARD H. KRAUT, Northwestern University, Evanston ALAIN DE LIBERA, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Sorbonne JOHN E. MURDOCH, Harvard University DAVID FATE NORTON, McGill University LUCA OBERTELLO, Universita degli Studi di Genova ELEONORE STUMP, St. Louis University ALLEN WOOD, Stanford University

The titles published in this series are listed at the end ofthis volume. THESTRUCTURE OF BEING IN ARIS TOTLE , S METAPHYSICS

By

JlYUANYU State University of New York at Buffalo, U.s.A.

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS :MEDIA, B.V. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN 978-94-010-3991-8 ISBN 978-94-010-0055-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-010-0055-0

Printed an acid-free paper

AII Rights Reserved © 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2003 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2003 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. To Yajie CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix Abbreviations xi

Introduction xiii

Chapter 1 Per se Being and /actual Being 1 i. Per se being 1 ii. PotentiaVactual being 9 iii. The scope of the focal structure of being 18

Chapter 2 From Being to Substance 21 i. The focal connection ofper se 22 ii. PotentiaVactual being and substance 36 iii. The science of being 42

Chapter 3 and Its Two Approaches 49 i. The composition of substance 51 ii. Two hylomorphic approaches 57 iii. The new start ofMetaphysics vii. 17 65 iv. Re-grouping the central books 76

Chapter 4 Subject, Form~ and 83 i. Substance and subject 85 ii. Form and subject 92 iii. Substance and essence 96 iv. The identity of form and essence 105

Chapter 5 Form: Tode ti and Toionde 113 i. Primary and 115 ii. Separation, tode ti, and toionde 118 iii. Tode ti, particularity, and individuality 122 iv. Separation 127 v. Tode ti and definition 132 vi. Form as toionde 137 vii. The and toionde 145 viii. The ending of Metaphysics vii 150

Chapter 6 Substantial Potentiality and Actuality 155 I. Kinesis and energeia 156

vii viii CONTENTS

ii. Substantial generation 162 iii. Substantial activity 169 iv. Substantial unity 176

Chapter 7 Actuality and the Prime Mover 181 i. From actual form to the Prime Mover 181 ii. The Prime Mover and 188 iii. The Prime Mover and the world order 197

Chapter 8 The Unity of Aristotle's Metaphysics 201

Bibliography 211

Index of Passages 223 Name Index 231 Subject Index 235 Acknowledgements

The central idea of this work is that the distinction that Aristotle draws between per se being and potentiaVactual being should be taken seriously. I argue that a correct application of this distinction to the central books of the Metaphysics leads to a distinct interpretation of these texts and to a better understanding of Aristotle's science of being. Some parts of the book have appeared as journal articles, though in all cases they have been substantially altered or recast. Sections i and iii of Chapter 2 are from Apeiron 34 (2001). Part of Chapter 3 has appeared in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 15 (1997). Sections iii and iv of Chapter 4 can be found in the Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2001). A remote ancestor of Chapter 5 was published in the Philosophical Inquiry 16 (1994). Permission to re-use these materials is gratefully acknowledged. I am deeply indebted to Jorge J. E. Gracia, who spent a whole week reading the penultimate version of the manuscript and who provided detailed comments. I am truly fortunate to have a supportive and passionate colleague like him. I am also grateful to Kenneth Dorter, who greatly helped when I worked on the first version of this project. Many other colleagues and friends have read chapters of this book at various stages of its development or versions of papers which have become parts of this book. For their help and encouragement, I thank David Bostock, Lesley Brown, Nicholas Bunnin, Roger Crisp, Michael Frede, John Keams, Gareth Matthews, Christopher Taylor, and Wang Zisong. Ingrid Krabbenbos of Kluwer Academic Publishers deserves special thanks for her patience and encouragement. Jonathan Sanford, Marcus Marenda, and Mark Niswonger, as graduate assistants at different stages of this work, provided valuable assistance. When the manuscript was accepted, the Julian Park Fund at the College of Arts and Sciences, State University of New York at Buffalo, generously provided me a grant to cover the costs of the proofreading and the preparation of the indices. I am grateful to Gerol Petruzella for his careful and critical review ofthe final version and his skillful compilation of the indices.

ix Abbreviations of Aristotle's Works

APo. Analytica Posteriora APr. Analytica Priora De. De Caelo Cat. Categoriae DA. De Anima D/. EE. Ethica Eudemia EN. Ethica Nicomachea GA. De Generatione Animalium Ge. De Generatione et Corruptione HA. Historia Animalium MA. De Motu Animalium . Metaphysica Meteor. Meteorologica PA. De Panibus Animalium Ph. Physica PN. Parva Naturalia Pol. Politica Pn. Rh. Rhetorica SE. Sophistici Elenchi Top. Topica

Aristotle's works are cited in standard form: abbreviated title, book. chapter, Bekker page, column, and line. Except where it is otherwise stated, quotations of Aristotle are from The Revised Oxford Translations ofThe Completed Works' of Aristotle (abbreviated as "ROT"). When a technical term is the subject of the discussion but is open to various translations, I leave it untranslated both in quotations and in discussions. All necessary Greek is transliterated and explained.

xi Introduction

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle claims that he is seeking to establish a science of being. Being, at the most general level, is divided by Aristotle into the following four types: 1. Accidental being 2. Being as 3. Potential/actual being 4. Per se beingl Per se (kath hauto) being can also be translated as "being in its own right" or "intrinsic being". This type of being has been referred to by Aristotle in different ways. The list of per se beings includes substance, quantity, quality, place, time, etc., and this is also the list of . At Meta. ix.l, 1045b28 Aristotle calls this list the "categories of being" (hai kategoriai tou ontos). At Meta. vi.2, 1026a36 and ix.1O, 1051a33-b2 per se being is called "being with reference to the figures of predication" (ta schemata tes kategorias, or "figures ofcategories,,).2 Of these four types of being, accidental being is briefly treated in Meta. vi.2-3 and there Aristotle claims that the study of accidental being can be dismissed on the grounds that accidental being is indeterminate and cannot be the object of knowledge. 3 He also does not pay much attention to being as truth and treats it briefly in two short texts: Meta. viA and ix.1O. His is that being as truth depends on combination and separation in thought but not in things, and hence ''that which is in this sense is a different sort of being from the things that are in the full sense (for the thought attaches or removes either the 'what' or quality or quantity or one of the other categories), and that which is accidentally and that which is in the sense of being true must be dismissed." (viA, 1027b30-34) The science of being, then, is mainly concerned with per se being (or categorial being) and potential/actual being.

1 Meta. v.7. cr. also Meta. vi.2, 1026a34-b2, ix.10, 1051a33-b2. 2 The relation between being and category will be discussed in Chapter I, section I. I shall use the term "categorial being" interchangeably with "per se being". 3 Meta. vi.2,1026b4, vi.2, 1027310, viA, 1027b17.

xiii xiv THE STRUCTURE OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

According to the structure ofthe Metaphysics as we have it, the discussion of these two types of beings occupies the central books of the Metaphysics: Meta. vii, viii, and ix. 4 Aristotle himself indicates explicitly that these two kinds of beings are the subject- ofthese central books:

We have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred - i.e., ofsubstance.... Since being is in one way divided into this thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potentiality and fulfillment, and of function, let us discuss potentiality and fulfillment. (Meta. ix.I, 1045b28-35)

This passage singles out per se being and potential/actual being from the four• fold division of being, and indicates that these two types of being belong to separate investigations. The central books of the Metaphysics have been regarded as the most mature and fundamental texts, but they are notoriously difficult. Indeed, almost everything said in these books is open to various interpretations and debates, and the scholarship on these books is marked by numerous controversies and debates. 5 However, although these books have been the subjects of intensive discussions, the distinction between per se being and potential/actual being has been commonly treated as something verbal. F. Brentano representatively expresses this widely-shared indifference toward this distinction: 'They [per se being and potential/actual being] have in common that the science of being, metaphysics, is concerned in the same way with one as with the other.'06 Commentators usually say that Meta. vii and viii deal with per se being, and ix with potential/actual being.7 Yet, to divide the texts in this way is a matter of convenience in exposition rather than a division of any philosophical significance. Even this expository division can be seen as an indication of how trivially the distinction has been treated. For it has been noted that the most evident difference between Meta. vii and viii is that potentiality and actuality

4 Some commentators prefer to use Z, H, and e to refer to these three books respectively. For the sake of consistency, I modify the references in relevant quotations. 5 J. Barnes summarizes the situation in this way: "The argument is tortuous in the extreme, and it is far from clear what Aristotle's final views on the subject are-if indeed he bad any final views." (1995,67) M. Loux in the preface to his Primary remarks: "Having had at least ten different opinions on virtually every sentence I am not naive enough to suppose that the views I express here will be my final ideas of vii and viii." (1990, xi) 6F. Brentano, 1975,27. 7 The following comments of W. D. Ross on the treatment of the four types of beings in the Metaphysics are routinely followed among the commentators: "Of the four senses of 'being' mentioned there [Meta. v.7], ta kala sumbebikos [accidental being] is briefly discussed in vi.2 and 3, to hOs alithes [being as truth] in vi.4; to kota ta schemata tis kotigorias [being with respect to the figures ofpredications] or rather substance, the first category, is discussed in vii and viii, and to kota dunamin koi entelecheian [potentiality and actuality] in ix." (1924, i, 358) INTRODUCTION xv are the main subject-matter ofviii, but not of vii.8 If the distinction between per se being and potential/actual being is taken as a serious one, one might wonder whether it could still be maintained that Meta. vii-viii are, as a unity, concerned with per se being, while Meta. ix is about potential/actual being. Consequently, so far as I am aware, it has never been taken to be the case that in these central books there are two separate and distinct discussions: one belonging to the study of per se being, and the other to the study of potential/actual being. Rather, the assumption that is often made is that in these central books, the issues raised and discussed in Meta. vii are further explained and developed in Meta. viii and ix. Furthermore, books viii and ix are considered to be supplementary to or some development of the argument of vii.9 Accordingly, these central books have been thought to constitute a complex but single argument, and the doctrines in all three books are taken to address the same question. What I try to do in this book is to explore the significance of the distinction between per se being and potentiaVactual being in Aristotle's metaphysics. I will show that Aristotle is utterly serious in setting apart these two types of being and in claiming that they need separate discussions. His metaphysics of being, in its core, contains the following two studies:

1. the investigation of per se being which is about the basic constituents of reality and is related to predication, categories, and definition, and 2. the study ofpotential/actual being which deals with the motion, process, and function of the world, as motion is defined by Aristotle as ''the actualization of the potentiality as such".

These two studies are ofcourse connected, yet each has its own perspective and agenda. It is not accidental that he never puts potentiality and actuality on the list of categories. As I shall argue, the distinction between per se being and potential/actual being suggests that Aristotle views the world in two ways: statically and dynamically. Indeed, in his discussion of the soul, Aristotle

8As W. D. Ross says: "The expressions potentiality and actuality, almost entirely absent in vii, play a considerable part in viii." (1924, i. cxxiv) The same observation is also made in the Notes On Eta and Theta: "while a concern with substance as actuality is the mark ofviii, it is conspicuously not a mark of vii." (M. Burnyeat et al., eds., 1984,3) 9 The dominance of this position can be seen from W. Jaeger's remark made earlier in the 20th century that the discussions of substance "begin with vii; then came viii; viii was presumably followed by ix, as now" [1948/1923, 201-2], and from T.H. Irwin's comment that viii and ix "explain some ofthe major claims in vii" (1987, 207). M. L. Gill holds a position that there are two stages of development in these central books and that much said in book vii is denied later. Nevertheless, she insists that "Aristotle's works can be approached as an intelligible whole and that his systematic of cross-references is our most reliable guide in deciding how the treatments relate to one another." (1989, ]]4) xvi THE STRUCTURE OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS himself expresses clearly that he has these two ways of approaching the study of the soul:

First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of the summa genera soul lies, what it is, is it 'a this-somewhat', a substance, or is it a quale or a quantum, or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished? Further, does soul belong to the class of potential existents, or it is not rather an actuality? Our answer to this question is ofthe greatest importance. 10

By exploring the implications of this distinction, I seek to develop an alternative understanding of the program that Aristotle pursues in the Metaphysics. Given that these two types of being are discussed in the central books of the Metaphysics, if the distinction of these two types ofbeing is serious, we are led to think that these books contain two, rather than one, doctrines of being. Since substance is primary being and the question of what being is is investigated in terms of what substance is in these central books, we would like to think that there are two of substance in them: one takes substance as a per se being, and the other takes it as a potentiaVactual being. Furthermore, since in these central books substance is the composite of form and matter and is discussed in terms of the matter/form relation, it should be the case that the matter/form relation is treated in two different ways:

1. One belongs to the study of per se being in which the matter/form relation is not associated with the potentiality/actuality relation. 2. The other belongs to the study of potentiaVactual being in which the matter/form relation and the potentiality/actuality relation are interwoven.

The bulk of this book seeks to establish and justify that the distinction between these two kinds of being runs through Aristotle's of substance in these central books. In my reading, a demarcation of these two studies of being in the central books is Meta. vii.17, a text which starts with an announcement that ''we should say what, and what sort of thing, substance is, taking another starting• point." (l041a6-7) As most commentators do not take seriously the distinction between per se being and potentiaVactual being, they also dismiss vii. ITs claim of a new start and view it as a mere figure of speech. However, there are strong to believe that this claim is seriously and should be taken accordingly. I shall argue that the approach initiated in vii.17, which takes form as a formal cause, is continued in books viii and ix, but is contrasted with the

10 DA. i.l, 402313-7. INTRODUCTION xvii main argument in vii.3-I6. Accordingly, I submit, the three central books should be divided into two groups:

1. vii.3-I6, which belong to the study ofper se being, and 2. vii. 17, viii and ix, which belong to the study of potentiaVactual being.

Each has its own distinct set of issues to discuss. Vii.3-I6 is concerned with which element of substance-form, matter, or the composite-is primary substance and with the universality and particularity of primary substance. In contrast, vii. 17, viii, and ix deal with the issue of how a sensible substance can be generated and unified and how it functions. The theory of substance in this group of texts is neither supplementary to nor a different stage of the argument of the same theory that is investigated in vii.3-I6. The common practice of lumping them together is probably one major reason why Meta. vii-ix are so controversial. To separate them in the way that I recommend will help us to see the internal agenda of each group of texts, and also to set many disputed issues in different perspectives, which I will try to present when we move on. To treat seriously Aristotle's distinction between per se being and potentiaVactual being also sheds new light on the relation between Metaphysics vii and the Categories. In the Cat. the concrete particulars are said to be primary substances, whereas in Meta. vii form is the claimant to the title of primary substance. How to explain this inconsistency has been one of the central issues in understanding Aristotle's metaphysics. My view is that these two texts belong to two levels of discussion in the study of per se being. They are complementary and do not conflict. The Cat. deals with the relation between substance and other categories, while Meta. vii mainly deals with the relation between form, matter, and the composite--a relation that is within the category of substance itself. However, the approach to reality in these two texts is similar. Both seek to distinguish different elements and to determine which one really exists in virtue of itself (per se). The Cat. divides beings into different categories of beings and argues that substance is the most fundamental, while Meta. vii divides substance into form, matter, and the composite and takes pains to determine that form is primary substance (being) among these. Further, as the Cat. distinguishes between universality and particularity within each categories, and in particular within the category of substance, Meta. vii also tries to determine whether form is particular or universal. It is true that in Meta. vii substance is divided into form, matter, and the composite, a division which was missing in the Cat. But this does not entail that the theory in the Cat. is denied or replaced in Meta. vii: Meta. vii.I does not mention the division of form and matter either, and its discussion of the relation between substance and the other categories is continuous with Cat. 5. Hence, Meta. vii should be seen as presupposing the essential truth of the xviii THE STRUCTURE OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS theory of the relation between substance and the other categories in the Cat. It proceeds to discuss the per se being of substance itself in terms of the relation between form and matter. A serious treatment of the distinction between per se being and potential/actual being also opens a new avenue to understanding the relation between the Metaphysics and the . Since the concepts of potentiality and actuality are related to motion and change, the study of potential/actual being discussed in Meta. viii and ix are continuous, not with Meta. vii, but with the Ph. In Ph. iii. I Aristotle defines motion in terms of potentiality and actuality, and in Meta. viii.l-2, when Aristotle starts to associate the matter/form relation with the potentiality/actuality relation, he immediately refers back to the analysis ofchange in Ph. i. The concept ofnature as the inner source of motion, which is the theme of Ph. ii., is explicitly said to be a kind of potentiality in Meta. ix.8:

And I mean by potentiality not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself regarded as other, but in general every principle ofmovement or ofrest. For also is in the same genus as potentiality; for it is a principle of movement-not, however, in something else but in the thing itselfqua itself. (l049b5-1O)

Thus, the Ph. can be viewed as a part of Aristotle's discussion of potential/actual being. Accordingly, the distinction between per se being and potential/actual being appears to inform the basic framework of Aristotle's metaphysical thinking. No matter what the biographical sequence of his treatises is, the metaphysical doctrines in different treatises of Aristotle can be grouped under two headings: the study of per se being and the study of potential/actual being. Aristotle's doctrines within each heading are more sophisticated and complete in some treatises than in others, and in this sense we can say that there is a process of development in his thinking. Nevertheless, his main concerns and programs show no fundamental change. Hence, the issues of chronology are of relatively little significance for my discussion. It seems to me that the Meta. is the most important and foundational metaphysical work of Aristotle precisely because in this work the substantial core is the basic framework of his metaphysical thinking, that is, the distinction between per se being and potential/actual being. When I say that Aristotle's science of being contains two distinct inquiries, I am not thereby committing myself to endorsing the position that the Meta. is a disparate work. On the contrary, it is through a serious treatment of the distinction between per se being and potential/actual being that we are led to an alternative understanding of the age-old debate regarding the relation between the science of being and theology in Aristotle. The science of being, INTRODUCTION xix however, contains both the study of per se being and the study of potential/actual being, since substance as primary being is the focal referent of both per se beings and potential/actual beings. The study of per se being does not concern motion and does not lead to the theory of the Prime Mover. However, Meta. vii.17, after announcing that it will start anew in investigating substance, immediately claims that: "for perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substance." (l04la7-8) This implies that the new start will lead to theology. As I shall argue, Aristotle's theology belongs to the study ofpotential/actual being and is an intrinsic part of the science of being. The science of being contained in the current Meta. is an unified enterprise because together these two studies of beings provide a complete picture of the world as both a static and a dynamic reality. This book is divided into eight chapters. Chapter I explains what per se being is, what potential/actual being is, and what the distinction between these two types of beings implies. It also argues that the focal structure of being, which is the subject matter of the science of being, includes not only per se beings, as is usually thought, but also potential/actual beings. Chapter 2 shows the different ways that per se being and potential/actual being are focally connected to substance. It reveals Aristotle's rationale that substance is not only the focus ofthe study ofper se being, but also ofthe study of potentiaVactual being. The chapter will also offer a different theory about the relation between the focal structure of being and the nature of the science of being as being. Chapter 3 documents that there are two distinct approaches to the matter/form relation in Meta. vii, viii, and ix, corresponding, respectively, to per se being and potential/actual being. It also argues that vii.17's new start is a real demarcation between these two approaches. Chapters 4 and 5 interpret how the matter/form relation is discussed as a study of per se being. In chapter 4, I first explain that Aristotle's criticism of the subject criterion in vii.3 suggests that the substance/attribute relation is of a different nature from the matter/form relation. I then argue that the discussion of form and matter in vii.3 and the discussion of essence in vii.4 are related because they represent two analyses of the individuals that are considered as primary substance in the Cat. On such a basis I develop an understanding of Aristotle's rationale in identifying essence and form. In chapter 5, I demonstrate that Meta. vii.3-l6, taken as a whole, implies an aporematic discussion regarding whether primary substance is universal or particular. This aporematic discussion is based on the dichotomy of tode ti ("a this") and toionde ("a such") and is presented as follows: xx THE STRUCTURE OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

(a) form is either "a this" (viL3's program), or "a such" (vii.7-9); (b) fonn cannot be "a this", for a this is not an object of defInition; (c) fonn cannot be "a such", for the universal is not a substance (viLB). Is fonn, then, universal or particular?

On my account, this aporematic structure results from Aristotle's response to 's Third-Man fallacy. Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with Aristotle's study of substance as potential/actual being. Chapter 6 demonstrates that Aristotle presents two different types of substantial potentiality and actuality. One is substantial change, in which potentiality and actuality are at different stages of development, and the other is substantial activity, in which potentiality and actuality are different aspects of the same entity. Both types of relationship are implied in the thesis of substantial unity in Meta. viii.6. Chapter 7 discusses how the study of potential/actual being leads to an understanding of the Prime Mover. As the theory of potentiality and actuality explains what motion is, the theory of the Prime Mover accounts for the continuity and eternity of motion; as the theory of potentiality and actuality explains substantial unity, the theory of the Prime Mover accounts for the order ofthe universe. Finally, in Chapter 8, I argue how the distinction between per se being and potential/actual being helps clarify the relation between the science of being and theology.