Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance Kenneth Williford

In this study I argue for the following claims: First, it’s best to think of subjective Author character as the self-acquaintance of each instance of consciousness—its ac- quaintance with itself. Second, this entails that all instances of consciousness Kenneth Williford have some intrinsic property in virtue of which they, and not other things, bear [email protected] this acquaintance relation to themselves. And, third, this is still compatible with physicalism as long as we accept something like in re structural universals; con- The University of Texas sciousness is a real, multiply instantiable, natural universal or form, but it likely Arlington, TX, U.S.A. has a highly complex, articulated structure, and “lives” only in its instances. In or- der to make these cases, I give a characterization of subjective character that ac- Commentator counts for the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is relational in some sense (or involves a subject-object polarity), as well as the competing and Humean intu- Tobias Schlicht ition that one of the supposed relata, the subject-relatum, is not phenomenologic- [email protected] ally accessible. By identifying the subject with the episode or stream of con- Ruhr-Universität sciousness itself and maintaining that consciousness is immediately self-aware Bochum, Germany (“reflexively” aware), these competing intuitions can be reconciled. I also argue that it is a serious confusion to identify subjective character with one’s individual- Editors ity or particularity. I argue that deeper reflection on the fact that consciousness has only in- Thomas Metzinger complete self-knowledge will allow us to see that certain problems afflicting ac- [email protected] quaintance theories, like the one I defend, are not the threats to certain forms of physicalism that they might seem to be. In particular, I briefly consider the Grain Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Problem and the apparent primitive simplicity of the acquaintance relation itself Mainz, Germany in this light. Jennifer M. Windt Keywords jennifer.windt@ monash.edu Acquaintance | Consciousness | Direct realism | First-order representationalism | Monash University For-me-ness | Harder problem | Heidelberg school | Higher-order representation- Melbourne, Australia alism | Individuality | Individuation | Intrinsic property | Mineness | Naturalize | Particularity | Phenomenal consciousness | Phenomenal intentionality | Physical- ism | Qualitative character | Reflexive awareness | Reflexivity | Relational prop- erty | Representation | Representationalism | Same-order representationalism | Self-acquaintance | Self-knowledge | Self-representation | Sense of self | Sense- datum theory | Stream of consciousness | Structural universals | Subject | Sub- jective-character | The grain problem | Transparency intuition

1 Introduction

In this study, I argue for the following claims: Second, this does indeed entail that all in- First, it’s best to think of subjective character stances of consciousness have some internal rela- as the self-acquaintance of each instance of con- tional property (or intrinsic property) in virtue sciousness—its acquaintance with itself.1 of which they, and not other things, bear this acquaintance relation to themselves. And, third, 1 As will become clear shortly, contrary to ordinary ways of speaking, this is still compatible with physicalism as long I do not hold that persons must be the “subject relata” of acquaint- as we accept something like in re structural uni- ance relations. Rather, I hold that episodes of consciousness are, fun- damentally, the subject relata. versals. There is always a price, but in this case

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 1 | 27 www.open-mind.net it’s arguably no more than the price we pay to be. In particular, I briefly consider the Grain be scientific realists.2 Problem5 and the apparent primitive simplicity To make these cases, I must consider some of the acquaintance relation itself in this light. important preliminaries. I give a characteriza- Preliminary to all this, we must first tion of subjective character that accounts for briefly consider the inadequacies of representa- the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is tionalism, and at least adumbrate some of the relational in some sense (or involves a subject- motivations for the recently renewed interest in object polarity), as well as the competing the idea of acquaintance (see e.g., Chalmers Humean intuition that one of the supposed re- 2003; Tye 2011, pp. 96–102; Gertler 2011, pp. lata, the subject-relatum, is not phenomenolo- 87–128, 2012; Balog 2012; Howell 2013, chs. 3 & gically accessible. If the latter is true, it is hard 4; Goff forthcoming). I argue that, indeed, we to explain how we could have immediate evid- need to lose our fear of moving beyond reduct- ence (as opposed to some sort of inferential ive naturalistic representationalisms, especially knowledge) of the existence of this relational in regard to subjective character. My conclu- structure—evidence we do seem to have. If we sions, and in many cases arguments, are not en- identify the subject with the episode or stream tirely new, but I attempt to cast the material in of consciousness itself (however we individuate a new light, in a spirit of synthesis. or ontologize these)3 and maintain that con- The dialectical structure of this study is sciousness is immediately self-aware (“reflex- somewhat circuitous. In section 2, I argue that ively” aware4), then the intuition of relationality the most plausible representationalist theory of and the Humean intuition of the missing sub- consciousness is a self-representationalist one ject can be reconciled. (or “Same-Order” representationalism) because I also argue that it is a serious confusion it captures subjective character, which I view as to identify subjective character with one’s indi- essential to consciousness, with the smallest the- viduality or particularity. This will be con- oretical cost. However, I argue, all forms of rep- sidered first from a phenomenological point of resentationalism about consciousness are ulti- view, in relation to our tendency to describe mately implausible. This leads to a focused dis- subjective character in terms of ownership or cussion of the notion of subjective character in “mineness”, and then from an ontological point section 3, the notion that motivates higher-or- of view, in relation to the metaphysical indi- der and same-order representationalisms. In viduation conditions of distinct streams of con- that section, I argue that subjective character sciousness. should be identified with the self-manifestation Further, I argue that deeper reflection on or self-appearance of consciousness. Conscious- the fact that consciousness has only incomplete ness, the claim goes, appears to itself no matter self-knowledge will allow us to see that certain what else appears to it. This in turn allows us problems afflicting acquaintance theories, like to make sense of the competing relationality the one I defend, are not the threats to certain and Humean “no-self” intuitions mentioned forms of physicalism that they might seem to above. Combining these elements from sections

2 This is not to imply that scientific realism entails physicalism, of 2 and 3, I argue in section 4 that we should un- course. derstand self-manifestation in terms of self-ac- 3 This is a difficult issue I will not enter into. See e.g., Dainton (2000, quaintance rather than self-representation. In 2008); Strawson (2009). 4 I will occasionally use the terms “reflexivity” and “reflexive section 5, I clear up what I regard to be the not awareness” to denote just this characteristic of consciousness uncommon confusion of subjective character (i.e., that of its always being aware of itself). It is not to be con - fused with “reflection” in the sense of introspection. It is more with individuation. And in section 6, I argue like the logical usage of “reflexive” (as in “reflexive relation”). The acquaintance relation is reflexive on the domain of conscious 5 The Grain Problem, customarily attributed to Wilfred Sellars, is a prob- states, according to the view accepted here (as well as being anti- lem for any identity theory according to which sensory qualities are symmetric). But not everything that stands in this relation is really brain properties of some sort. Roughly put, the problem is that self-acquainted—episodes of consciousness are, but they are also brain properties are complex and structured while sensory qualities seem, acquainted with sensory qualities, and these latter are not ac- on the face of it, ultimately simple and unstructured. For good discus- quainted with anything. sions with references to Sellars see Clark (1989) and Lockwood (1993).

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 2 | 27 www.open-mind.net that though the view espoused here implies that ileged-Object (P) representationalisms as a dis- being conscious is a matter of having certain in- tinct category. For these, the state must be direc- trinsic properties, this is compatible with a cer- ted at some special type of entity—a model of the tain type of physicalistically acceptable hylo- organism as a representational or embodied morphism—the view that complex kinds of homeostatic system, a “proto-self” or, less natur- physical objects, properties, or processes involve alistically, perhaps an enduring substantial ego the concrete instantiation of real structures and entity.7 cannot be properly understood in abstraction There is, however, no obvious reason why from such a “marriage” of form and matter. there could not be unconscious representations with any of these contents. And, generally, it 2 Representationalisms: From first-order seems implausible that something could be con- to same-order scious in virtue of representing a certain type of object—this is Alvin Goldman’s so-called “Prob- In the theory of consciousness, the term “repres- lem of the Rock” (thinking about or seeing rocks entationalism” has, aptly but somewhat confus- does not make them conscious, so why should it ingly from a historical point of view, come to des- make anything else conscious?), which seems to ignate any view according to which being phe- apply to H, S, and P theories—but see below (see nomenally conscious is equivalent to representing e.g., Goldman 1993; Gennaro 2005; Lycan ms). the right sort of things in the right sort of way. For F theories, since it is admitted there can There is, of course, much internecine disagree- be conscious and unconscious states with the ment over these things and ways, but the main same sort of content, another distinguisher idea is simple and attractive enough. If we could between conscious and unconscious mental states understand consciousness in terms of representa- will have to be found. For F theorists, this has tion and representation in terms of some natural- typically been a functional constraint placed on istically acceptable relations, then we could “nat- the representations (e.g., poise, feeding into the uralize” consciousness. I’ll call representational- mind-reading system, becoming available to the isms that are coupled with naturalistic theories of global workspace, see, e.g., Tye 2000 and re- content reductive representationalisms. latedly Baars 1997; Dehaene & Naccache 2001), Representationalisms are typically divided sometimes coupled with the necessary condition up into various “orders.” These orders have, in a that the properties represented must be represen- way, to do with the kind of content (or object) a ted in a “non-conceptual” way (whatever that is conscious representational state supposedly must taken to amount to).8 For the H theorists, it has have. For First-Order (F) representationalisms the been a somewhat different story. relevant states are, fundamentally, just directed at H theorists are generally motivated by a worldly objects and properties (typically the sens- phenomenological inadequacy they see in F the- ible properties of tables, chairs, etc., see, e.g., Tye theorist. S theory is also often called self-representationalism. 1995, 2000; Dretske 1995). For Higher-Order (H) 7 For naturalistic versions, see e.g., Damasio (1999 and 2010), Metzinger representationalisms, the states must be directed (2004), and Sebastian (forthcoming). I am sure that Damasio, Met- zinger, and Sebastian would reject this label, but the point of it is that at mental states of “lower-order”—possibly but all these theories identify subjective consciousness, in one way or another, not necessarily first-order (see e.g., Rosenthal with the representation of a “self,” understood in a naturalistically ac- 2005; Lycan 1996). For Same-Order (S) represent- ceptable sense. See e.g., Metzinger (2004), p. 302: “In short, a self-model is a model of the very representational system that is currently activating ationalisms, the representational state must be it within itself” (emphasis original); and Damasio (2010), p. 180: “… directed at itself (or, perhaps, some part of itself, [T]he brain constructs consciousness by generating a self process within an awake mind. The essence of the self is a focusing of the mind on the or a whole of which it is a part, or another part of material organism that it inhabits.” It should be noted that Metzinger al- the whole of which it is a part).6 I also add Priv- lows that there could be conscious experience that does not involve sub- jective character (see Metzinger 2004, pp. 559-560). Thus my categoriza- 6 See e.g., Gennaro (2012); Kriegel (2006, 2009); Weisberg (2008, tion here applies at most only to his theory of subjective consciousness. 2014). Williford (2006) can be taken to express a pure S view—the Since, for me (as for Damasio), all consciousness necessarily has subject- conscious mental state has itself for its own object, not some portion ive character, this difference in detail will not loom large in what follows. of itself. We can also classify Carruthers as an S theorist; see Car- 8 See the excellent discussion of the “non-conceptual content” literat- ruthers (2000, 2005). Gennaro would not describe himself as an S ure in Hopp (2011).

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 3 | 27 www.open-mind.net ory. F theorists generally stress the so-called problems here. If the represented lower-order “Transparency Intuition”—the idea, roughly put, state (L state) of, say, visual perceptual that first-order consciousness reveals only proper- awareness were different from the representing ties and objects in the world and nothing directly H state in terms of relevant content (e.g., if about consciousness itself, the perceiving mind, the one represents a phenomenally green ball the subject, or the vehicles of representation (see and the other a phenomenally red one), what e.g., Harman 1990; Tye 2000; Byrne 2001). H would we consciously see? “Red. No, green. theorists, on the other hand, are with varying de- No, red…” This is the Problem of the Division grees of explicitness motivated by the equally of Phenomenal Labor, or mirepresentation powerful intuition that consciousness involves problem, as I will sometimes call it, and is re- some sort of “for-me-ness” or “to-me-ness,” often lated to deep and probably insoluble problems termed “subjective character” (see e.g., Rosenthal about the epistemology of introspection that 1986, p. 345 and Gennaro 2006. See also Levine are pertinent to such models (of both H and S 2001, pp. 104–111). This gets encoded in the H varieties).11 If the L state simply did not exist, mantra that the conscious states are just those would your conscious experience in that case that one is “Aware of Being In”, those that one is be a sort of Meinongian hallucination? This is aware that one is oneself in (see e.g., the “Intro- the Problem of Targetless H States.12 duction” to Kriegel & Williford 2006). The To take up the latter problem just a bit, thought is that F theory simply does not capture if one takes literally much of the talk one that intuition. F theorists and their fellow travel- finds in the literature on H theory, the H ers would consider such “essentially indexical” thought is supposed to make the L state con- contents or the “sense of self” to be more ad- scious. Being conscious is a kind of extrinsic vanced cognitive products or artifacts of social (external relational) property of the L state, a cognition, certainly not in the very ground floor property it has in virtue of its being represen- of consciousness (see e.g., Edelman & Tononi ted by the H state. Thus, if there is such an H 2000, pp. 103–104 and Macphail 1998, pp. 2–5). state, it does confer at least a relational prop- There is here an important bifurcation in in- erty (the property of “being made conscious tuitions about consciousness. Some significant by the H state”) on the L state. In the cases percentage of us thinks that subjective character in which the L state does not exist but the H (however we ultimately understand it) is essential state directed at it does, some non-existent to consciousness, is in the ground floor. And some object, the L state, is made conscious by an H significant percentage of us thinks that it is not; state. Thus the L state would literally have a that somehow qualitative character (perhaps un- relational property; it would stand in a rela- derstood as having the right sort of representa- tion, even though it does not exist. This lit- tional content) is essential but that subjective eral interpretation of the view entails some character is derived, secondary, or tertiary. This form of Meinongianism (at least about non-ex- bifurcation shows up in neuroscientific and psy- istent L states) and that you can seem to chological thinking on consciousness as well.9 We yourself to be conscious when you are not. will briefly return to the significance of this bi- Thus, presumably, it should not be taken so furcation point in the next section. literally.13 The H theorist has a few options about 11 See e.g., Neander (1998); Horgan & Kriegel (2007); Weisberg (2008); the exact content of the H representation, the Tye (2011, pp. 4–8). See Kidd (ms) for an excellent discussion of these higher-order thought (or perception [or global epistemological issues in the (not interestingly different) case of S theory. 10 12 See Mandik (2009 and forthcoming) on the “Unicorn problem” and state]). There are serious and well-known Block (2011). See Rosenthal (2011, 2012); Weisberg (2011a, 2011b); Kiefer (2012); Wilberg (2010), and Berger (2013) for discussions of 9 For example, Tononi & Koch (2008, pp. 240–241) do not seem to various strategies for dealing with Higher-Order-Thoughts (HOTs) think that the “sense of self” is essential (though Tononi (2014) without Lower-Order-Thoughts (LOTs). may have recently changed his view); Damasio (1999, 2010) is in 13 What I am calling the “non-literal” interpretation is, in effect, the the opposing camp; see also Northoff (2013). position in Berger (2013). And in Rosenthal (2011, p. 436) he in ef- 10 I’ll not go into the Higher-Order Thought vs. Higher-Order Percep- fect claims that the non-literal position (as I am calling it) has al- tion debate. See e.g., Gennaro (2012). ways been his view. See Mandik (forthcoming) on this.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 4 | 27 www.open-mind.net

The non-literal interpretation, however, is that you can represent yourself as being in a inimical to one of the reductive pretensions of state or that a conscious state of yours is occur- the H strategy. It’s not inimical to reductive ring now? Find that out, the promise goes, and representationalism as such. But it does draw in we will understand consciousness. But, I would to question the idea that a reductive theory argue, none of the theories of representation we must construe the property of being conscious have to go on tell us anything very significant as an external-relational property of otherwise about such states. The beaver’s tail splash, says unconscious mental states (see Rosenthal 1997). Millikan, to take one sort of example, can rep- Thus, it could only be in virtue of the specific resent the very time at which it occurs (among content or structure of the H state itself that other things; Millikan 1995, p. 98). This does there is consciousness. One would then be put- not make it conscious. This particular example ting forth the presumably phenomenologically applies directly to Same-Order theories, but motivated a posteriori identity hypothesis that surely the beaver’s tail splash could have repres- the conscious representational states are just ented a previous tail splash and its content or the ones with that content. There may be differ- its simultaneous front paw splash, etc., but that ences over the specific content (e.g., Is it about would not in itself make anything conscious some of my other mental states, or is it just either, right? about the non-mental objects and properties of Naturalistic theories of representation will the world?) and differences over other criteria not themselves tell us anything that interest- (e.g., poise); but otherwise, on the non-literal ingly distinguishes H states (or S states) from F interpretation, H theory is structurally just like states (or P states for that matter). In every F theory. We can of course wed either of these case (F, H, S, P), it is just a matter of some to a reductive theory of representation, but this physical representational vehicles standing in will only make “being conscious” into an ex- some set of external (or externally mediated) re- ternal-relational property to the extent that the lations to other physical objects (and sometimes theory of representation adopted makes all rep- to themselves). From this point of view, we see resentation an external-relational matter. nothing that interestingly distinguishes the the- If one is still conscious when the L state ories. does not exist, then the H state would seem to Moved by these problems, H theorists be doing all the work. And that’s what we might try to go the “essential indexical” route should focus our explanatory efforts on. What (cf. Weisberg 2012). After all, on Rosenthal’s could be special about it? Again, putting aside original formulation, the conscious states are other types of external relations (e.g., being those one is aware of oneself as being in. But available to the global workspace), it must have here they are faced with a difficult choice. If a special sort of content. But it is not in virtue they presuppose a teleosemantic theory, then of being represented that a state could be con- they have to face the fact that on this theory scious. Rather, on this non-literal interpreta- there are no literally essential indexicals (see tion, it is in virtue of being a representation of e.g., Millikan 1990). Change the relevant history X (where X is a special object of some sort, e.g., and other external relations and you change the oneself being in a state) or that p (where p is a content—now an indexical, now a proper name, proposition with a special content) that the now a substance term, etc. If they abandon tele- state is conscious; and we can, as with any osemantics, they could go back down some Fre- other sort of contentful state, try to figure out gean rabbit hole.14 That way lies murk or per- how different naturalistic theories of representa- haps triviality (see Cappelen & Dever 2013). tion would construe states with that content. But it seems inadequate just to postulate that

Whatever theory of content we adopt, 14 I assume here but will not argue that teleosemantics is the most we’ll want to know what salient or interesting plausible naturalistic theory of content. There may be other natural- properties, from an explanatory point of view, istic options that allow one to make good sense of the notion of es- sential indexicality in a way that could help H theory here, but I such representations have. What is it about you doubt it.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 5 | 27 www.open-mind.net the H state contains a definite description that code the essentiality of subjective character to happens to pick oneself out. Thus the H theorist consciousness. If that intuition is good then, of might be led to consider what is in effect a P the two classes, H theories are the better ones. theory. One then tries to find a suitable entity But H theories face the non-existent L state to play the role of the privileged object (a priv- problem. To solve it, they must either embrace ileged signified, if you will): the proto-self, the murk or metaphysical baggage (if they go in the self-model, or what have you.15 direction of some P theories), or embrace the It is hard to see how any of these possible postulation of certain epicycles, or go same or- objects would somehow help us to make sense of der. S, in my view, is evidently the best option subjective character. And it is hard to see how for the representationalist. representing some special object could be that S theory avoids ad hoc moves, better re- in virtue of which something is conscious. If “es- flects the clarified phenomenological intuitions sentially indexical” content is either explicable that are the real motivation, can ground a the- in terms of something more basic (as seems to ory of indexicals, and does not commit one to be the case to me), or impossible (as on teleose- an enduring self-entity of any sort; nor does it mantics), or metaphysically fraught in an ulti- seem to attempt to get subjective character out mately un-illuminating way, then it seems like of something’s representation of something else the best bet is to adopt a version of S theory. that is structurally similar to itself, as this last For one thing, we can reduce the meta- move runs afoul of the Fichte-Shoemaker Re- physical load that threatens to plague the no- gress.19 S theory evidently does not fall prey to tion of essential indexicality and solve the non- the non-existent L state problem, even if it does existence problem at once.16 All we need are not avoid the misrepresentation problem. In the token mental states representing themselves. As end, however, it is itself nothing more than a a corollary, we can give a deflationary account type of P theory. The Privileged Object is just of “essentially indexical” content in token-reflex- the token mental state (or episode) itself. ive terms17 that is potentially compatible with Clearly, there is no self-evident reason why teleosemantics (or whatever non-Fregean ac- something’s representing itself should make it count one prefers) and find some other way to conscious, even if it is in fact true that all con- capture the grain of truth reflected in the opa- scious episodes do represent themselves. city arguments presented by Castañeda, Lewis, We surely cannot seriously imagine that and Perry.18 In my view, anyone committed to consciousness emanates from a special object it the intuition motivating H theory should be- needs to look at, even if that object is just the come an S theorist, if for no other reason than current experiential time-slice itself. Further, because of the non-existent L state problem. something’s representation of itself, naturalistic- The other possible solutions (e.g., Gennaro’s ally understood, is no more theoretically inter- “WIV”) introduce a kind of theoretical ineleg- 19 See Henrich (1982); Frank (2002, 2007); Shoemaker (1968). The is- ance that renders them less plausible. sue, which is part of the “essential indexical” problematic, is, when H theories are better than F theories, put into a “self-model theory” context (which is not to be identified with Metzinger’s views), just that modeling something structurally given my intuitions anyway, because they en- isomorphic to oneself is not sufficient for knowledge that one is mod- eling oneself, as opposed to having behavioral control through such 15 See Sebastian (forthcoming) for a Damasio-inspired turn toward a P an interface (I could be controlling my doppelgänger unwittingly and theory (at least, that was my interpretation of it). just as effectively). One would need to know that the thing modeled 16 We can’t eliminate the misrepresentation problem, however. But we is oneself (and not something else that happens to be isomorphic to bracket that for now. See Kidd (ms) and Weisberg (2008). it, like one’s counterpart in a close possible world). One cannot, on 17 A la Higginbotham (2003 and 2010) and before that (implicitly) pain of regress, derive such knowledge from a set of descriptions of Smullyan (1984); see Cappelen & Dever (2013, pp. 160-161). The hy- oneself without already knowing that at least one of the descriptions perset model in Williford (2006) is the skeleton of such a theory. See does indeed apply to oneself. So one must have some direct self- also Kapitan (2006). knowledge, such as knowledge by acquaintance that one is the relev- 18 See Cappelen & Dever (2013, ch. 10). They attempt to capture this ant so-and-so. An S theory wedded to a teleosemantic theory of rep- grain by appealing to relatively un-puzzling epistemic limitations. I resentation and externalist theory of justification has the advantage believe they are on the right track, even if I would characterize the of being able to accommodate direct reference and non-inferential specific limitations in question a bit differently (see the discussion knowledge of oneself, though one will regard this as a mere simulac- below on our ignorance of what fundamentally individuates us). rum of the phenomenology.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 6 | 27 www.open-mind.net esting (or even surprising) than its representa- It is not that one cannot concoct a response to tion of the world or of one’s other thoughts and the objection; it is, rather, just the very fact perceptions. Thus, that does not, a priori, ap- that the view invites such objections in the first pear to be the sort of thing that would be more place. It demands a rather serious and ugly epi- likely to be equivalent to consciousness than cycle; and that counts strongly against it. But if something’s representation of something else. we reject teleosemantics and adopt an internal- Perhaps adding functional constraints would ist theory so as to escape from Swampman, we help here but no more than it might help H or face equally difficult problems that we cannot, F theory. unfortunately, go into here.21 Even if it is true that all conscious states The view then is that H theories are bet- are self-representational, it is, of course, far ter than F theories on phenomenological from clear how that fact should help us explain grounds and that S theories are better than H consciousness. The same can be said for H the- theories on dialectical and phenomenological ory and other P theories. Rather, in all these grounds. But all versions wedded to naturalistic accounts, we are merely trying to isolate what historico-externalist theories of representation we take the unique content of consciousness to are shipwrecked on the Swampman problem, be and then to apply our theory of representa- and internalist versions face other equally diffi- tion to states with such content. Absent some cult problems. What then shall we do? strong phenomenological intuitions to the con- We might consider trying out a non-re- trary, the conscious mental states, it seems, ductive representationalist version of S theory. might well have been all and only those states This is a possibility we will return to in section in which dogs are represented. In the end, 4. But first we need to reflect a bit on what H, though, all “normal” physicalists (i.e., those S, and P theories are trying to capture in the who reject Russellian Monism, Panpsychism, first place. What is the phenomenological and Pan-proto-psychism) are reduced to some datum designated by this phrase “subjective such strategy. All “normal” physicalists, repres- character,” and why is it that F (and related) entationalist or not, will identify consciousness theorists don’t see it as essential to conscious- with something that is not a priori known to be ness, while H, S, and some other theorists do? equivalent to it. We return briefly to this famil- iar problematic at the end. 3 Subjective character But, perhaps most alarmingly, reductive S theories (and H theories, and everything in Subjective character is often described as a cer- between) are either subject to a version of the tain “for-me-ness,” “mineness,” or even “me-ish- old Swampman objection or otherwise unten- ness” that is phenomenologically manifest and, able.20 Since the conscious states are, on the presumably, always accompanying, even if in a theory, just special representational states, they muted or background form, any consciousness are subject to the constraints of the underlying whatsoever (see e.g., Zahavi 2005; Levine 2001; theory of representation (in this case, teleose- Kriegel 2009 and Block 1995). F and related mantics). If they don’t have the right history, theorists point out that it also seems that one then they don’t have the right content. And if can become so absorbed in one’s actions, at one they don’t have the right content, they are not extreme, and perhaps so dulled at the other conscious. Surely there is something simply ab- that one loses all sense of oneself (see e.g., surd about the idea that one might or might Tononi & Koch 2008, pp. 240–241). Moreover, not be conscious depending on how one’s atoms they might argue that it does not seem reason- happened to get into the current arrangement. able to suppose that worms and bees have a

20 See e.g., Tye (2000, ch. 6). I will not be able to go into the back and 21 See e.g., Carruthers (2000, 2005) and Gennaro (2012, pp. 45– forth over Swampman. Suffice it to say that despite hearing many 49). Briefly, the sort of functional role semantics Carruthers attempted rejoinders over the years, I still find the objection to be a embraces derives actual, occurrent content from dispositions, reductio of representationalist theories of consciousness wedded to and it is actually subject to variations on the Swampman historico-externalist theories of content. theme.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 7 | 27 www.open-mind.net sense of self at all, and yet they may be con- Different intuitions about what is essential scious. A common reply from the defenders of to a phenomenon drive different models of the subjective character to the first claim is that we phenomenon. As long as enough people (and are not talking about focusing on oneself or don’t ask for a number) share one’s phenomeno- one’s current mental state as an object of atten- logical intuitions, one’s project won’t be, we tion or concern, and that, if they tried harder, hope, insane or unmotivated. In regard to the F theorists would realize that even in the most present bifurcation point, many otherwise sane, dulled or, at the other pole, absorbed state, rigorous, and careful thinkers in many widely they are still aware at some level of themselves distributed traditions and disciplines have had (or the very experiential state they are in). To some version of the intuition that consciousness, the second objection, the typical reply is that somehow, involves a sense of self or sense of it- the sort of subjective character we are en- self.23 visaging does not require the sort of conceptual Now, how should we characterize subject- sophistication or reflective capabilities that ive character at the phenomenological level? It would make it impossible for dogs (or even bees does not add much to say that it is a “sense of and worms) to count as conscious beings (see self.” What sort of a sense of self are we talking e.g., Gennaro 2012, chs. 7 & 8). Of course, the about? To say that it is “mineness” or “for-me- replies can be replied to, and so on. And we ness” makes it seem as though we are talking won’t enter into these debates here. Suffice it to about the ownership of experiences. But this is say that, unsurprisingly, those who think that probably just a certain analogy based on the subjective character is essential to consciousness ownership of property. Yes, for all that matters have ways of answering objections, just as do here, it may well be the case that, always, if I those who deny its essentiality. As commonly am in a position to know, without having to ob- happens, the answers drive us back to questions serve any behavior, that there is a pain in the that are themselves at least as hard to settle as room, then I am in a position to know that it is the ones we began with. Moreover, appeals to my own pain in the room. But it does not do the neuroscientific and psychological literature much good to say that “me-ishness” or “mine- in the attempt to decide these issues sometimes ness” adheres to my experiences like a property get what plausibility they have from interpreta- or haecceity. It is not as if I just see that my ex- tions of the experiments and results that are as periences have Willifordhood instead of Zahavi- questionable as the claims they are supposed to hood or Gallagherhood, and thereby know support. whose are whose—like distinguishing two other- My view here is that one should follow the wise qualitatively identical coats by different modeling path inspired by one’s “phenomenolo- name tags on the inner pockets. gical muse” and give up fighting phenomenolo- Note that looking for a special property of gical intuition wars. If you find subjective charac- the experience is not that different from seeking ter to be essential, develop models of conscious- out its relation to a special object (its owner or ness that encode that, and see where they lead. If The Self) that one may be directly acquainted you don’t find it essential but find other things to with. In both cases we are looking for a special be more important (multimodal information in- something that individuates the experience. tegration or availability in the global workspace There is no interesting difference here between a or whatever), model those. And let’s not forget special unique property that only my experi- that we might all be working on different parts of ences have and a special unique self-object to the same elephant, so perhaps we will be able to which they all relate. combine models fruitfully one day. Eventually we 23 For just a few examples of the historical pedigree here, see Caston may have ways of more or less decisively testing (2002) on Aristotle, Williams (2000) and Coseru (2012, ch. 8) on the 22 the different models. Indian and Buddhist debate, Thiel (2011) on the early modern prob- lematic, Frank (2004) on the German Idealist and Romantic discus- 22 See Kriegel (2007) for an excellent discussion of phenomenological im- sion, and Zahavi (1999 and 2006) on the Phenomenological move- passes. Thanks to Jennifer Windt for reminding me of this lucid article. ment.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 8 | 27 www.open-mind.net

Subjective character should probably not either incoherent or, at best, strains credulity. be thought of as a matter of a constant relation Yet this seems to be exactly what F and related to a self-object or as a special property of mine- theorists are committed to—aches and pains ness or me-ishness that all experiences come that can appear (be phenomenally conscious) with, all the more is this so if it is possible to but appear to no one. misattribute ownership to certain sensations.24 If we accept that there is a dative of mani- The first-personal dimension (Zahavi), the sense festation, that objects and qualities appear to of self in the act of knowing (Damasio), for-me- someone or something, we are closer to but not ness, me-ishness (Block), ipseity, être-pour-soi quite up to subjective character just yet. Sub- (Sartre), Selbstvertrautheit, and so on—these jective character, recall, is supposed to be some- are all suggestive names for the phenomenon in thing phenomenologically detectable. And one question. But we’d like to know if there is not might raise the following sort of worry. Suppose an at least somewhat less ambiguous way of phenomenally manifest objects and properties characterizing it. are manifest to something or someone. It does One name for it that I do rather like de- not follow from this alone that that to which pends on a grammatical analogy that can be they are manifest is itself manifest or even fleshed out a bit more. Every experience, we manifestable. Nor does it follow that the fact may say, involves the appearance of something that they are manifest to something is manifest to something (or someone). The former can be or even manifestable. In other words, there called the genitive of manifestation (appear- could indeed be a dative of manifestation and ance-of), the latter the dative of manifestation yet no direct phenomenological evidence of this (appearance-to).25 The genitive of manifestation at all. In fact, Hume’s famous failure to find his corresponds to the intentionality of conscious- own self and Moore’s similar but more tentative ness—its directedness at objects; the dative of musings on this issue can be taken as expres- manifestation corresponds to subjective charac- sions of the intuition that we do not find a dis- ter. The identification of subjective character tinct subject relatum in experience.26 And and the dative of manifestation may not at first surely it is true that we do not find a little ubi- be so obvious. quitous homunculus—the constant and ever- The primary intuition here is that there is present thing Hume might have been seeking, no such thing as the mere non-relational phe- like the little face at the bottom of old first-per- nomenal appearance of an object or quality. Ob- son video games like Quake—to which all our jects and qualities don’t just phenomenally experiences relate—nor do we find a self-haec- manifest—full stop. Rather, anything that phe- ceity forever re-instantiated by our conscious nomenally appears, appears to someone or episodes. something (cf. Strawson 2011, pp. 41–46). If There is, however, this strong intuition this were false, phenomenal consciousness would that phenomenal consciousness is relational, be more like a monadic property of its objects that it involves a subject-object polarity. And than like a relation between a subject and an the strong intuition that we do not find any en- object of some sort (see Butchvarov 1979, p. tity or special criterial property that could be a 250). The idea that consciousness could be phe- self-entity, me-haecceity, me-ish quale, or sub- nomenally manifest but manifest to no one is ject-relatum is in some apparent tension with this intuition of relationality. Moreover, a hid- 24 See e.g., Lane & Liang (2011). (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer den subject-relatum would not account for the for pointing this nice article out to me.) If, as I shall argue, subject- ive character is not fundamentally a representational matter at all, phenomenology of subjective character, evid- the issue of representational immunity to error through misidentifica- ently. There is a real question here. How is it tion is orthogonal. To the extent that the attribution of ownership is a representational matter, it may or may not be possible to misat- that consciousness seems to have a subject-ob- tribute ownership, as far as the view defended here is concerned. ject relational structure, and yet we do not 25 The terminology apparently derives from Prufer (1975) and is very common in phenomenological quarters. See e.g., Zahavi (1999); 26 See Moore (1910); Butchvarov (1979, p. 250, 1998, p. 55), and Willi- Crowell (2011, p. 16). ford (2004). On Hume in this regard, see Strawson (2011).

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 9 | 27 www.open-mind.net seem to be able to find the subject-relatum, one been phenomenally manifest to us. If we of the relata of the relation? Isn’t it the case haven’t, then it has not. And think of this gen- that if something non-inferentially seems rela- erically—it’s what experiencing the taste of cof- tional, then we are non-inferentially aware of its fee has in common with seeing the blue sky and (at least) apparent relata? Speaking naïvely and with feeling one’s own existence.27 Now, the barring certain irrelevant counterexamples, if I claim is that an episode of consciousness is phe- see that the cup is on the table, don’t I see the nomenally manifest to itself whenever anything cup and see the table too? In the case of the else is phenomenally manifest to/in that epis- subject-object polarity, do we imagine or pro- ode. Whenever anything else appears to con- ject this relation? Is it a product of reflection sciousness, that act or episode or stream of con- and memory? sciousness appears to itself as well. And it is im- It seems to me that the F theorist should portant to remember that this does not mean say that it is somehow a product of higher cog- that one is reflecting on one’s experience or that nition that is projected onto normal adult hu- one has any propositional attitude towards that man conscious experience. But if one is really experience or that one is paying any attention committed to the intuition that subjective char- to that experience as such. acter is an essential and hence ubiquitous fea- Now, let us suppose that this is the case. ture of conscious experience, then one will Can we recover a notion of subjective character simply have to abandon self-relatum and self- from this in a way that accounts for both the haecceity accounts as characterizations of the Humean intuition that the subject-relatum is, in phenomenology (and as explanatory models, for some sense, invisible and that, nevertheless, that matter). What we need is an account of consciousness has a subject-object relational how it is that consciousness manifestly and non- structure that is phenomenally manifest and inferentially appears to have a relational struc- non-inferentially knowable? Yes, we can, and at ture even though one of the relata is, in a cer- a relatively low price. tain sense, invisible. The subject-relatum, on the current pro- Here the view that consciousness is self- posal, is just the episode of consciousness itself. manifesting can save the day. An episode or The episode appears to/in the episode. Other perhaps stream of consciousness, on this view, things (qualities, objects, etc.) appear in/to the appears to itself at every moment while other episode as well. The episode is a unified whole, things appear to it as well. This will require the differentiated qualities and objects appear- more unpacking, but at present we just want to ing in/to it are like its parts (stressing “like”— clarify the putative phenomenological content of it’s an analogy).28 We do not find episodes that the claim as best we can. We leave the notion of do not have parts (except perhaps in some very appearing or of phenomenally manifesting un- special circumstances), but it is foolhardy to defined. Or, if you prefer, we define it ostens- look for some special entity or haecceity that is ively by inner ostension and hope that our in- separable from all the other parts or like a part terlocutors know what we are talking about and among the parts. There is no such thing. And have similar conscious minds (cf. Fales 1996, pp. that, arguably, is the sort of thing Hume was 147–148). failing to find. No such subject is given, hence Let’s say that phenomenal manifestation is we don’t find it. Nonetheless, the true subject- just the appearance to/in consciousness of relatum, the episode of consciousness itself, is something. Let’s leave it open what that some- not invisible. It is manifest. thing is (qualities, facts, objects). We all can 27 Cf. Moore (1910, p. 57). (This paper of Moore’s is not as well known know what phenomenal manifestation is, in this as his “Refutation of Idealism,” but it deserves to be.) 28 I will not attempt to offer an account of the (synchronic or dia- purely phenomenological sense, if we are con- chronic) unity of consciousness in this paper (again, see e.g., Dainton scious and capable of normal reflection, atten- 2000) or of mereological principles governing “parts” of episodes of tion, memory, and conceptual cognition. If we consciousness and episodes as “wholes.” It is enough for my purposes that one recognize that conscious episodes are internally variegated have tasted coffee, then the taste of coffee has unities of some sort.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 10 | 27 www.open-mind.net

The main price to pay here is that we consciousness would still have subjective charac- must try to wrap our heads around the idea ter. It would simply fail to be more or less auto- that an episode of consciousness could be the matically enriched by memory, projection, fa- phenomenological subject of consciousness. I say, miliarity with one’s body and dispositions, and say truly, that such and such appears to autobiographical idealizations and distortions, me or that I see, feel, hear, or am conscious of etc., that is, by the autobiographical representa- such and such. If I am a subject of conscious- tional grid through which our experience is nor- ness and all subjects of consciousness are just so mally spontaneously filtered. Perhaps such a many episodes, then am I just an episode of person could not think “I” in the sense in which consciousness?! I’ve seen the incredulous stares we normally think it. They may lack an “auto- with my own eyes and have been told that the biographical self” and even “extended con- sentence expressing the view that the subject of sciousness”, as Damasio would put it (see Dam- consciousness is the episode of consciousness has asio 1999 and 2010). But their experience would the same status as sentences like, “Pink dreams be self-manifest and other things (“parts”) sleep furiously.” would be manifest in/to that experience as well. Indeed, this claim seems wildly counterin- Still, isn’t it a bit too odd to hold that the tuitive at first. But once we realize that there is whole episode is conscious of its “parts”—how- a certain temporal element connoted in our us- ever we end up construing these? Or that the age of “I,” then this can be ameliorated. “I” “parts” are phenomenally manifest to/in the normally refers not just to the present experi- whole they belong to? Doesn’t this still seem ence but to a whole history of connected experi- like a totally bizarre thing to say? We have to ences and much else besides. So it would be a remind ourselves that there is no thing in con- mistake to infer from “I’ve seen the incredulous sciousness, no ego entity, no homunculus that stares” the claim that “Incredulous stares were these qualities could be manifest to. We don’t seen in/by this current episode of conscious- find any such thing; and no hidden thing could ness.” Instead, in the spirit of Four Dimensional- allow us to account for the phenomenology. ism, one should translate thus: There was a past However, we agreed (I hope) that consciousness series of conscious episodes suitably connected has a relational, subject-object structure and to each other and to the present one; incredu- that this structure is itself phenomenally mani- lous stares were seen by/in them for some time; fest and not inferred. and the episodes are being recalled in/by the Another way to put it is to say that there present conscious episode, which bears the same is a kind of contrast present in our experience relation (transitively conceived), or some suit- all the time. Something is before me, and it is able analogue thereof, in the case of broken not me. Something is present to consciousness, streams, to that sequence of earlier episodes. but it is not that consciousness. Given our Note, however, that fundamentally the use mereological analogy, this contrast is a bit like of “I” is anchored in moment-by-moment, self- that between a whole and its proper parts. The manifesting conscious experience. Imagine a whole is not a proper part. Yet, at a suitably person with severe anterograde amnesia and ret- generic level, it bears the same relation to itself rograde amnesia as well. Such a person might that it bears to its constituents (everything is a think, from moment to moment, “I am seeing part of itself too, though an improper part). this,” “I am feeling that,” but beyond a certain Assuming that this relational structure is perhaps necessary amount of working memory, not projected onto the experience in reflection, they may not carry any of that information into assuming that is, that this is a genuine “prepre- their future. We can imagine truly minimal sub- dicative” structure of experience, the contrast jects that have only the minimal amount of between the subject-pole and the object-pole is working memory required for consciousness, manifest, even if it normally remains unthemat- supposing that some amount is required. On the ized or attended to as such. On the hypothesis view proposed here, such a conscious being’s that consciousness is always self-manifesting,

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 11 | 27 www.open-mind.net there is no problem here. The relevant contrast the phenomenological point and the virtues of is like the contrast between the parts and their this way of articulating it. unified whole. The parts are manifest. The whole is manifest (self-manifest). So all the 4 From self-representation to self- needed elements are present for their relations acquaintance (of differentiation, unification, and inclusion) to be manifest. I gave up on reductive self-representationalism Moreover, the idea that the difference for quite general reasons, reasons affecting all between the parts and the whole is prepredicat- representationalisms. As such, one might be ively manifest is no more implausible than the tempted to suggest adopting some non-reduct- idea that the difference between parts and other ive form of S theory. For example, if one adopts parts is prepredicatively manifest, something al- the phenomenal intentionality30 view, one might most no one would deny. If I see a red patch on hold that whatever phenomenal representation a black background, I have a differentiated, con- is, consciousness represents itself in that way. It trastive visual experience. The same goes for seems like this view might be just another way differences between the sensory modalities: we of describing the same phenomenological facts see and hear simultaneously, etc. If those sorts belabored in the previous section. If that is so, of contrasts can figure into the ground level of the phrases “phenomenal intentionality” and experience, why not the contrast between the “acquaintance” are going to be basically syn- unified self-manifesting whole and all its mani- onymous, and the advocate of the former ter- fest “parts”—the totality of simultaneously minology can just translate. If we build nothing manifesting qualities (however we understand into the notion of representation other than the them exactly) in all modalities (sensory and idea that something (an object, property, epis- possibly cognitive, conative, and affective)? ode of consciousness, or whatever) is phenomen- Subjective character then, on this view, is ally manifest (to someone), then the views are just the self-manifesting character of an episode indistinguishable at the phenomenological level of consciousness. This view has the nice feature and, maybe, the ontological level as well. that it allows us to simultaneously account for If this is not what is intended, however, the Humean-Buddhist “no-substantial-self” in- then it is probably because the phenomenal in- tuition and the intuition of relationality, with tentionality theorist wants to mark an import- its attendant minimalist “sense of self”—as sub- ant distinction between intentionality (repres- ject-pole.29 It does this with less metaphysical entation) and acquaintance. Perhaps they would cost than self-entity and self-haecceity theories, prefer not to be committed to acquaintance if even supposing that those theories are not en- possible, and there are several reasons they tirely phenomenologically implausible and ex- might want to avoid such a commitment. But I planatorily bankrupt. Let’s remember, however, will argue that in a certain sense, to be plaus- that this is meant as a phenomenological claim ible at all, all forms of representationalism, re- fundamentally: consciousness is self-manifest ductive and non-reductive (including a phenom- just as the unified totality of sensory qualities enal intentionality-based representationalism), (etc.) is manifest; and their contrast is manifest ought to embrace a type of acquaintance rela- too, just as the contrast between such qualities tion. (etc.) is manifest. This phenomenological claim Consider, for a moment, fictionalist repres- has an ontological significance only if we accept entationalism about sensory qualities (projec- that consciousness is indeed how it seems to be tionism about colors, for example). One could upon reflection. A claim that I accept in this embrace a view according to which the sensory case, but one need not accept it to appreciate qualities are phenomenally manifest, though they in fact are never really instantiated by 29 I defend this view also in Williford (2011a, 2011b) and in Williford et al. (2012); Dreyfus (2011) is an articulation and defense of a sim- 30 See e.g., Kriegel (2011) and the papers in Kriegel (ed.) (2013), as ilar view from a Buddhist perspective. well as Kriegel’s excellent introduction to that volume.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 12 | 27 www.open-mind.net anything. In such a case, one would not want to intentionality pseudo-relation it pseudo-bears to think of sensory phenomenal consciousness as a phenomenal colors. matter of bearing a real acquaintance relation Thinking of consciousness as “being-ap- to such qualities or quality instances. Instead peared-to-existingly” does not help here, since one might prefer an adverbial construal of the that applies to phenomenal colors and all other situation that avoids any commitment to any- perceived pseudo-objects and pseudo-qualities as thing literally having (or perhaps even to there well. Any theorist committed to self-manifestation being) the properties phenomenally represented. should not try to construe this as just a case of On this view, one denies that there is a relation phenomenal intentionality as just described. From that supports existential quantification over our self-consciousness we can conclude that we do these immediate objects (whatever they are), exist, and this is not just because we know by in- and one cannot conclude from the fact that one ference or in some other way that we are the is phenomenally conscious of a red patch that bearer of a property, as in Reid’s Ambulo. We there exists a red patch of which one is con- must be acquainted with our own existence—in scious. the sense that every episode of consciousness, Of course, this failure of existential quanti- however individuated, is acquainted with its own fication won’t apply in the case of one sort of ob- existence. This applies to the subject-pole. What ject, namely the conscious episode itself. But it about the object-pole? will not be because it is an object of phenomenal In the context of the theory of perceptual intentionality that one can validly, existentially consciousness, I think it is a mistake to maintain generalize from it; generally that fails, just as in that any view according to which one can always other intentional (and intensional) contexts. legitimately quantify over the “immediate objects Rather, it will be because it is the subject or of conscious awareness” is committed either to bearer of phenomenal intentionality that one can some form of direct realism (or perhaps a dis- validly generalize from it. In other words, we take junctivist version thereof) or to old-fashioned episodes of consciousness to be individuals that sense-datum theory. Any plausible form of repres- have this pseudo-relational property. That is why entationalism—fictionalist or realist, externalist or we can quantify over them, and not because of internalist, reductive or non-reductive, is, I’ll ar- anything that they pseudo-bear that pseudo-rela- gue, committed to such quantification, though tion to. Such “objects,” after all, can be nonexist- this must be understood in a particular way. I am ent. Thomas Reid’s “ambulo ergo sum” would be not, of course, saying that if we seem to con- appropriate here, not the Cartesian Cogito con- sciously visually perceive a pink rat then we can ceived in a phenomenologically performative way. infer that there exists a pink rat that we see. This situation is rather paradoxical. If the There is, however, something other than just the only mode of awareness of our own consciousness conscious state itself (qua whole) that we can le- (even supposing ubiquitous self-manifestation) is gitimately, existentially quantify over. via phenomenal intentionality so construed, then Our conscious perception of differentiation our evidence for the very existence of our own (in unity) entails, even on a representationalist consciousness is really no better than our evid- view, that there exists something of which we are ence for the existence of phenomenal colors. Just aware, namely, at the least, differentiation (or as we might be persuaded that there really are no contrast) itself. For example, suppose I hallucin- phenomenal colors, perhaps we could become per- ate purple and pinkish smoke clouds arising from suaded that there is no such thing as phenomenal stereo speakers as “Fairies Wear Boots” comes on. consciousness either. I regard this as absurd. It is Evidently I cannot conclude that those purple like saying that perhaps we only think we think, and pinkish clouds exist. Still, I maintain, we can or that perhaps it only appears to us that things conclude that there exists some differentiation or appear to us. Consequently, consciousness must contrast of which we are aware. By hypothesis, we bear some evidentially relevant relation to itself cannot say that the difference is that between the and to its own being, other than the phenomenal pink smoke cloud and the purple one, since they

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 13 | 27 www.open-mind.net do not exist. Differences between non-existent ob- in the case of hallucination it cannot be that we jects cannot be appealed to in order to make are aware of a real difference in the objects of rep- sense of real differences.31 But we are aware of resentation. Moreover, it cannot be a difference in some real and phenomenally manifest differenti- something that is hidden from conscious aware- ation here. If we say no to that, we’d have to as- ness—some difference in the externalist conditions sume that reflection is simply inaccurate when it determining the content of the representational comes to such hallucinations; that we seem to states, for example—that we are aware of. The have a differentiated experience when in fact most plausible candidate, then, is that we are dir- there is no phenomenal difference at all. But if ectly aware of (acquainted with) differentiation or that itself is a phenomenal state, say a conscious modifications in consciousness itself (and hence reflection on an ongoing hallucination, we have the Transparency Intuition (see page 4) is, strictly the same problem all over again. speaking, false; we are indeed aware of features of If the difference we are aware of is not and consciousness itself even in so-called “first-order” is not to be accounted for by a difference in the awareness). This applies to both reductive and objects (since they do not exist), it must be a non-reductive forms of representationalism. If this matter of the difference in the representations. line of thought is correct, representationalist the- Hence, albeit in an indirect manner and, as it ories really presuppose some sort of non-repres- were, under the guise of a difference in the pink entationalist, acquaintance theory. and purple clouds, we must be aware of some dif- Implicit in the above discussion is something ferentiation inherent in the representational states like this definition of acquaintance: themselves.32 If we reject disjunctivisms, then we ought to maintain that in every case of differenti- Acquaintance =Df (1) the relation (R) the ated phenomenal awareness we are, in fact, ac- subject (s) of consciousness (i.e., the epis- quainted with (and not merely representing) the ode or stream itself) bears to the differen- differences inherent in our episodes of phenomenal tiated phenomenal manifold (D), such that (2) if sR[D< x1, the most plausible account, even if the considera- x2….xn>], then we may infer truly that tions just given don’t absolutely clinch it. Again, (∃ x)(sRx). it is not that there cannot be some sort of repres- entationalist response.33 It is, rather, that I regard Of course, clause (2) can be taken as redundant, the line I take to involve fewer epicycles. given the usual understanding of real relations We cannot make good sense of the appear- and that the R of clause (1) is so taken. But in ance of a phenomenal difference without direct this context it is important to emphasize the awareness of differentiation. But, by hypothesis, point. The first clause is just an inner-ostensive phenomenological characterization that assumes 31 We could possibly hold that even if the property instances are not that the relational appearances are indeed the real, the universals represented are, and try to account for the differ- ence in phenomenology in terms of those real differences. But this reality; the second is a logico-ontological charac- sort of view does not allow us to make sense of the concrete but hal- terization. Importantly, we can “quantify in” lucinatory representation of different particular instances of the dif- ferent properties. here: If, in any concrete particular case, we 32 I have briefly made similar arguments in Williford (2013). stand in that relation to some phenomenally 33 In particular, a representationalist could say that the represented dif- differentiated field, then we can truly infer that ference between the pink and purple clouds is just as hallucinatory as the clouds themselves. This is, in a sense, correct. However, rep- there exists something differentiated we stand in resentationalists hold (or ought to hold, anyway) that phenomenal that relation to. However, it is in general not differences always correlate with differences in the representations themselves (and only normally in the objects of representation). If the represented (or intentional) objects that we there are phenomenal differences, there exist some differences inher- are thus acquainted with. It is, rather, the com- ent in consciousness that are not merely the objects of representa- tion. What I am claiming is that we are acquainted with this differ- mon factor of all episodes of phenomenal con- entiation under the guise of differences in objects represented. An sciousness, be they hallucinations, dreams, or adherent of the Transparency Intuition would deny this, of course. the “perceptions” of brains in vats. This, again, And I don’t take these considerations to constitute a knock-down ar- gument. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this up.) is often precisely what is denied when one says

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 14 | 27 www.open-mind.net that a state is one of representation as opposed 2006). Finally, (4) appeals to the “Transparency to acquaintance. If it is true that I represent A, Intuition” (in Tye’s sense of “transparency”) I cannot infer from this that there is some X thus carry no serious weight. All the phenomen- such that I represent X. Adverbialisms and ological data in question are accounted for by other forms of representationalism were, recall, 1–3, and there are good independent lines of developed precisely around this insight in order reasoning for each of these (that we do not have to overcome the problems of sense-datum and time to go into here). other relational theories of perception. Is the I’ve argued that the notion of acquaint- theory I am suggesting here a form of old-fash- ance, when interpreted in the rather minimal, ioned sense-datum theory? phenomenological, and logico-ontological way Unfortunately I cannot give a short answer proposed, is the proper notion for characterizing to that question and can’t give all of the long the relationship between consciousness and the answer here. This will have to suffice: (1) We differentiated but unified multimodal experien- can regard sensory qualia (or hyle) as being tial manifold. Moreover, on the view proposed complex, relational properties of consciousness here, consciousness bears this same relation, (and its concrete embodiment in brain pro- generically understood, to itself. cesses); in fact, they could be something like ir- If the episode of consciousness bears the resolvable structural properties that appear relation to itself, then evidently there is some- simple precisely because they mark a limit of thing to which it bears that relation. But, non- our sensory resolution. (2) In order to flesh this trivially, we could not have the sort of direct out, we must reject the Revelation Thesis—the evidence of its existence that we do have if con- thesis that acquaintance yields up all of the sciousness were not self-acquainted—and ac- properties of sensory qualia. In particular, we quainted with its own existence. And if the epis- can (and should) reject the idea that acquaint- ode of consciousness bears the relation to the ance tells us all of the categorial properties of differentiated manifold that constitutes the sur- sensory qualities. There is no good reason to be- face that serves as its contact with a differenti- lieve that it does. Hence, they could fail to seem ated reality beyond it—i.e., if it bears it to a relational and yet still be relational. This is a differentiated portion of itself—then there is solution to the “Grain Problem”—a problem something differentiated of which it is non-rep- arising from the fact that brain properties are resentationally aware. One is directly aware of “complex” and relational while sensory qualities the difference or differentiation even if one only, (phenomenal colors, tones) do not seem to be. If strictly speaking, represents what the things so we infer from the appearances then we cannot differentiated happen to be or interprets them consistently hold that they are identical to as being such and such (mental, physical, sur- brain properties. But we have no good reason faces of objects, internal sense data, quotidian for making that inference.34 (3) It is not hard to objects, etc.). In other words, I can see that red understand why the sensory qualities would be is not blue even if I do not know what colors integrated into a spatialized and “intentionally are exactly, or if they are in physical space or animated” grid that can serve as a “user inter- only in a virtual space in my brain. One does face” for us to deal with the external world, not merely represent this difference or differenti- yielding a “transparent” manifold in Metzinger’s ation. One is acquainted with oneself and with sense, a manifold we are built to systematically the differentiation one contains. Of course, one and automatically “see right through”—causing is also acquainted with the apparently intrinsic us to suffer from a sort of delusion of direct properties that mark these internal differences, realism (see Williford et al. 2012; Williford but again, this need not mean that the proper- 2013; Metzinger 2004, p. 163, and Revonsuo ties are in fact non-relational and simple. In fine, we are self-acquainted and acquainted with 34 I’ve argued this is in a bit more detail in Williford (2013). For relevant a differentiated manifold and thus, at some background ideas see Williford (2005 and 2007). For a discussion of the Revelation Thesis see e.g., Stoljar (2006, ch. 11) and Goff (forthcoming). level, with real differences in the mind, the

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 15 | 27 www.open-mind.net world, or world-mind boundary. 35 The acquaint- sciousness—for-me-ness or me-ishness as a spe- ance relation consciousness bears to itself is, cial property that no one else can share. Rather, generically speaking, identical to the relation it subjective character is a common form that all bears to sensory qualia (or hyle)—which are conscious states have; but having this form does taken here as ultimately just transient modifica- not alone make something the individual it is, tions in the unfolding embodiment of conscious- evidently. It may be that in virtue of which we ness. It is important to understand that this can be aware of ourselves as individuals, but it does not imply that there is a special type of is not that in virtue of which we are the indi- sensory quality (a “me-ish” quale) peculiar to viduals we are. Yes, there is a determinate indi- consciousness. It is as diaphanous as G.E. vidual (somehow construed) that is acquainted Moore said. Remember that the acquaintance in with itself. No, this does not necessarily mean an instance of acquaintance with phenomenal that it is acquainted with that in virtue of red is identical with the acquaintance in an in- which it is individuated. That could be stance of acquaintance with phenomenal C#, whatever it is that individuates physical ob- even though phenomenal red and C# are ut- jects. Or, perhaps, nothing is metaphysically in- terly heterogeneous. dividuated by anything else. But it ought to be One might reasonably ask for a more sub- clear that simply in being aware of myself I stantive definition or account of acquaintance. need not be privy to anything non-trivial about The definition given relies on phenomenology my metaphysical individuation conditions.36 and logic and is otherwise quite empty. But this You are aware of your consciousness as is as it should be, in my view. Any further ac- something individual. You are a self-aware indi- count of the nature of acquaintance, of what the vidual, if you prefer. But this does not mean that acquaintance relation is, will be the result of your subjectivity consists in being directly aware empirical inquiry and a well-supported a pos- of what individuates you or the very property in teriori identification. virtue of which you are the individual you are. Or, perhaps, one may be aware of this property 5 Self-acquaintance, subjective or set of properties, but only in the guise of being character, and individuation an individual that is thus and so. The “thus and so” part (all your contingent properties, your Earlier I briefly noted that at the phenomenolo- “facticity”) is radically changeable. You need not gical level we should probably not construe sub- have been thus and so. (You could have been a jective character fundamentally as a matter of contender! And if only you’d been rich!) You can “mineness” or a “sense of self” where the latter also be aware that you are a particular instance. is thought of as a sense of oneself as an owner of So, yes, you can become aware of your particular- experiences. It is not that I do not think this ity. But everybody is aware of their own particu- description contains a grain of truth; I do. The larity. And it is, in a way, an empty and non-ma- worry, though, is that if we go this route, we terial (in the “formal vs. material” sense) prop- might come to the conclusion that subjective erty. It’s not as if my particularity has a special character involves acquaintance with a haecceity something that yours lacks and vice versa. Hence, —Zahavihood and Gallagherhood once again. I would not be able to tell, by phenomenological Here I want to consider the same issue from a intuition alone (or in any other way for that mat- more ontologically oriented point of view. ter), which of the infinitely many duplicate and We are indeed individuated and aware of near-duplicate worlds I am in (cf. Elga 2004). Am ourselves (something individuated). And we can I in the world in which one of Napoleon’s buttons be aware of ourselves as distinct individuals and had a bit of his blood on them the morning of the owners. But this does not at all entail the doc- Battle of Jena or in the world in which that was trine of haecceities immediately present to con- 36 I have briefly argued this before in Williford (2011b). I was pleased 35 I have considered our acquaintance with a differentiated manifold to find that a similar line of argument was pursued by the eleventh- qua mind-world boundary in more detail in Williford (2013). century Buddhist philosopher Ratnakīrti; see Ganeri (2012, p. 217).

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 16 | 27 www.open-mind.net not the case? I cannot tell by introspection, yet, univocal notion or must resort to some sort of depending on the correct answer, I am one type hopeful brute resemblance nominalism about sub- of individual (and of course, one token of un- jective character and maintain that we cannot not countably many of that type) and not of the really know that, say, I, qua subject, am in any other type (which type also contains uncountably meaningful sense like you, qua subject. This is not many individual counterparts of mine). I am indi- a very good dilemma to be in.37 I think the more viduated, and I know that; I belong to just one of plausible view is that self-acquaintance is not the these worlds. But I do not have complete access source of the individuation of consciousness but to my individuation conditions or the conditions, rather something that both concretely depends if there are any, that determine that this indi- upon individuation and enables the knowledge of vidual is in one world as opposed to another. I individuality and, consequently, self-location in have uncountably many counterparts who feel ex- surrounding spaces. actly the same way because, to speak loosely, It is misleading, then, both phenomenologic- they don’t know that they are not me; none of us ally and ontologically to refer to subjective char- can tell the difference. I cannot locate my Home- acter principally as “mineness” or “me-ishness” or world on the map of worlds that contains my rel- “for-me-ness,” even though subjective character is evant counterparts. one of the bases of the sense of individuality. We It is a mistake, then, to make subjective should not think of self-acquaintance (and sub- character depend on the sense of individuality; jective character) as anything more than this rela- this reverses the proper order of explanation. Self- tion all episodes of consciousness bear to them- acquaintance and concrete instantiation yield the selves. It is a perfectly uniform structure and a sense of individuality, and they do it again and kind of universal—in that sense, supposing one is again in many places and in the same way. Evid- some sort of realist about universals, there is in- ently, the contingent filling that experience and deed some identical thing that unifies all episodes history infuse into the formal shell of conscious (or subjects) of consciousness, namely the very subjectivity is not relevant at the level we are property of being self-manifesting; but we are all concerned with. Hence, it can also be metaphysic- distinct instances. Thus, in a very special and ally, not just phenomenologically, misleading to non-Vedantist sense, we could say that there are use terms like “for-me-ness,” “mineness,” “me-ish- many instances of consciousness but only one ness,” etc. That is to make something derived subject, with some instances connected to each seem like something basic. The basic things are other and grouped together in other important self-acquaintance (“reflexivity”) and actual, con- ways as well. But there is no substantial self. In crete instantiation or constitution. The sense of this regard, I am with Hume, Sartre, Parfit, individuality comes from these, not the other way Strawson, Metzinger, the Buddhists, and other around. “non-egological” theorists of consciousness. Note Of course, if you are a real, concrete indi- that this does not mean that consciousness is “an- vidual, you are individuated. But individuation is onymous” in the sense of “subjectless.” Every evidently not self-acquaintance. The latter is, stream of consciousness has its transient subject however, required if one is to get the sense of be- (viz., itself) but that is not a substantial self. ing an individual, to know, feel, and be concerned with oneself as an individual. If we generally 6 Self-acquaintance, intrinsic properties, equated self-acquaintance with something’s being and physicalism the individual it is, then we’d have to hold either that every individuated thing in the cosmos is Should we really regard self-acquaintance as a self-acquainted and conscious, or that conscious relational matter? Is it really a matter of some things have one type of metaphysical individu- ation conditions, and non-conscious things an- 37 Previous episodes of consciousness normally connected to the present other, for very obscure reasons. Moreover, we episodes (the ones producing this document) found themselves trying to live with the latter horn of the dilemma in the flawed Williford either must not take subjective character to be a (2005).

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 17 | 27 www.open-mind.net sort of thing standing in a relation to itself? On concede, win on this ontological point. Dieter the one hand, there is no special problem either Henrich, Manfred Frank, Henry, and Zahavi logically or phenomenologically speaking with have all maintained that self-manifestation the idea of something relating to itself in this could not be a relational matter (e.g., Henrich way. Appearance is appearance-to. That’s rela- 1971, 1982; Frank 2002, 2007; Zahavi 1999; tional. There is no a priori reason why some- Henry 1973). And they are very close to being thing could not appear to itself. It does not lead right. I think, however, that it is more accurate to a regress.38 One should put aside misleading to say that even if it is a relational matter, it is and question-begging spatial analogies—con- not an external relation we are dealing with. So sciousness is not like a knife trying to cut itself. there must be something about the internal Advocates of self-acquaintance will claim, op- structure of consciousness that grounds the rela- posing one analogy with another, that it is more tion. In short, as Henrich and Frank have long like a candle’s flame illuminating itself by emis- said, there must be some intrinsic property in sion while it illuminates other things by the re- virtue of which episodes of consciousness (out of flection of its light; it does not require another all other things in the world) are self-manifest- candle flame for it to be illumined.39 Moreover, ing. What could this property be? Are we left one must remember to exclude from one’s mind with something that cannot be physical, or, the sort of objectification and description-based even if it is physical, is nevertheless irreducible cognition that normally overlays the phenom- in some sense? enal manifold. We are talking about the sphere It may seem now that David Rosenthal is of immanence, to speak Husserlian, and not having his revenge.40 In effect, I have been ar- about intentional objects or constituted ob- guing against the extrinsicalist view—the view jectivities given via Abschattungen. Again, we that something’s being conscious has to do with are talking about immediate self-acquaintance, external relations the thing stands in—be those not the representation of oneself as being such external relations to other mental states or ex- and such. It is indeed more like the emission of ternal relations to historically distant states of light than the reflection of light, if we must pick affairs or to other parts of one’s cognitive ap- an analogy. paratus. Now, to our chagrin, it seems we are Nevertheless, even if we accept the rela- left with something explanatorily basic. At this tional construal and remember that it is an im- point we are left with two problematic mediate and direct relation not mediated by strategies. We could go the panpsychist route concepts or descriptions, we still have a prob- (Strawson 2006): It’s no surprise that we’re con- lem. It is not as if conscious episodes just hap- scious if everything is! Or if, as I do, one thinks pen to be self-manifesting. The property of be- (after Locke in a similar context) that “every ing self-manifesting is not something that a sleepy nod doth refute” this, we can hold that thing can have and then not have—like chan- only certain physical complexes instantiate this ging coats of paint. It is of the very essence of a particular property (or set of properties). This conscious episode. This is not an external rela- will mean either some form of property dualism tion to itself or one mediated by convention or or some form of identity theory (possibly with history or anything else. Hence, it must have its “Harder Problem”; see Block 2002). If one some set of intrinsic properties in virtue of does not want to be a dualist or a panpsychist, which it is self-manifesting. Thus, the Heidel- what can be said? berg School, Michel Henry, and Dan Zahavi, I’ll Here is the sort of approach that seems 38 This is demonstrable. First, obviously, there is no logical problem most attractive (to me, anyway). We want to with reflexive relations. Second, it requires special and highly ques- hold that consciousness is indeed some sort of tionable premises to generate another regress here. See Williford (2006). See also Kriegel (2009, p. 124) and Janzen (2008, p. 110). physical process. It’s not, however, just a mat- 39 The knife blade and candle flame competing analogies loom large in ter of the satisfaction of some functional role. I the Indo-Tibetan debate on this issue. Clearly, the analogies will be found, by opponents and proponents, to be exactly as plausible as 40 Though even Rosenthal’s own view was pushed into being (or always the views they encode. was) problematic in this regard, as noted above.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 18 | 27 www.open-mind.net think it also has a functional role. But it is not pearance as “consciousness qua acquaintance rela- in virtue of playing that role that something is tion appears simple.” Rather, we read it as “con- consciousness; rather, consciousness is suitable sciousness qua acquaintance relation does not ap- for that role because of its properties.41 In prin- pear complex.” These are, in many cases, phe- ciple, many different things could play that role nomenologically indistinguishable, but they are (at least if we specify it entirely in behavioral logically different.42 The first reading, coupled terms). Or, at least, this is an open question. with an infallibility thesis (or with just a strong Consciousness has a functional role, but it is presumption in favor of the deliverances of naïve not to be identified with just any arrangement introspection), leads to the view that acquaint- of elements that can play that role as causally ance is simple. But the other requires a Revela- and behaviorally specified. There is some spe- tion (or completeness) thesis to get the same res- cial, distinctive physical process that is con- ult. Revelation is, again, totally implausible. And sciousness. It plays its functional role in virtue even if we were to assume infallibility, we have no of its having the properties it does and not vice a priori reason to favor one interpretation of the versa. But then does some version of Russellian phenomenological data over the other—the Monism start to seem attractive (see e.g., Stol- “seeming non-P” vs. “not seeming P” formula- jar 2006, ch. 6 and Pereboom 2011, chs. 5 and tion. We do, however, have plenty of a posteriori 6)? Am I saying that the functional role is just inductive reasons for preferring the latter: It does being (contingently) satisfied by a (somehow) not seem complex, but it is (or at least could be unified and self-manifesting group of qualia? Or for all we can tell phenomenologically). something wild like that? Since we have an extremely limited resol- Here we play the same sort of trick we ution when it comes to penetrating into the played when dealing with the Grain Problem. nature of consciousness by introspective Consciousness is self-acquainted, but we are also, means, we are quite free to adopt another as Fumerton and Fales would say, acquainted strategy. We can accept an a posteriori iden- with acquaintance; we are given givenness tity theory. Consciousness is identical to some (Fumerton 1985, pp. 57–58 and Fales 1996, pp. sort of recurrent physical process unfolding in 147–148). The relation does not seem complex or the brain. Fundamentally, what we get from to involve many layers of relational structures. introspection is a sort of structure and some But we cannot infer from this appearance that it irresolvables—the sensory qualities—that are is in fact such a simple relation. Again, its not like reflections of the materials in which the seeming complex does not, without controversial form or structure is instantiated. Since we and implausible completeness assumptions, entail have rejected Revelation (completeness) its being simple. Moreover, once we realize that theses, we can accept that sensory qualities normal consciousness involves a great many in- (and the acquaintance relation itself) are com- tricately related aspects—at least (non-contin- plex and involve layers of relations even gently) differentiated unity and temporality, and though they do not seem this way (just as the (contingently) animation functions operating on a headless woman43 in the famous illusion does differentiated sensory manifold, iterations of these not seem to have a head—absence of appear- functions, pattern extractions, etc.—we have all ance is transformed into the appearance of an the more reason to suppose that there is complic- absence; see Armstrong 1968 and 1973). ated machinery hidden from our introspective view. In fact, it will be noted in a Sartrean and 42 They are phenomenologically indistinguishable in the way that the stream of consciousness’s being temporally continuous is, plausibly, Moorean vein, that consciousness, both as ac- phenomenologically indistinguishable from consciousness’s being quaintance relation and subject-relatum, seems punctate or discrete, or in the way in which consciousness’s seeming free from causal determination is phenomenologically indistinguish- mightily empty. Once we realize that Revelation able from its simply not seeming determined (because the causal re- theses fail, then we no longer need read this ap- lations are inaccessible, as Spinoza suggested). 43 See the following links: 41 Here I am in considerable agreement with Langsam (2011, ch. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXOqD5B5Sxc 3). http://www.deceptology.com/2010/10/headless-woman-illusion.html

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 19 | 27 www.open-mind.net

We can use what structure we are aware ated set of phenomenological descriptions gives of, however, to build models to guide our search us not just the way consciousness seems, but for the neural correlates of consciousness. One the way it in fact is, along with our identity thing we see is that the (only apparently postulate, we can be sure that something in the simple) acquaintance relation involved is such brain has a structure corresponding to this, no that whenever xRy, xRx; while it is not the case matter how transformed by “layers of abstrac- that if xRy, then yRy (in the case where y is a tion” it may be. sensory quality or manifold thereof). And we What is more, self-acquaintance will de- have some idea of what the qualities in the mand that we explore models in which real re- manifold could be—e.g., limits of resolution or flexivity can be encoded. Hofstadter’s model is irresolvables operated on by a spatializing filter. one of these.44 But following D. Rudrauf and We can also see that spatial projection, integra- further encouraged by D. Bennequin, I have tion of multimodal information, temporality, moved in the direction of considering projective and the modulation of attention are involved geometrical models. There is no space to go into (along, of course, with more advanced things this here, but suffice it to say that there exist like intentional animation, cognitive filtering mathematical frameworks that allow us to con- and reprocessing, and poise for action). We have ceptualize and investigate more deeply the self- a self-manifesting totality containing a unified acquaintance-related features of consciousness and spatialized but differentiated manifold. by considering the interplay of the space we Consequently, we do need to look for processes project and the origin of the projection (see that can do information integration and bind- Williford et al. 2012 and Rudrauf et al. ms). ing, but that is only necessary, not sufficient. The goal of such work would be the refine- We need to look as well at processes that spa- ment of mathematical models of the structure tialize the multimodal (and multidimensional) of consciousness. Upon the achievement of that information (see Williford et al. 2012). end, we would then try to determine how such This does not at all mean we are looking models could possibly be physically realized in for a little room in the brain that has patches of the brain. Once we can say what the physically red, yellow, blue, and green mental paint in it. detectable signatures of such a realization might Rather we must look for more abstract corres- be, then we could one day meaningfully test pondences. In the case of the sensory qualities, such theories. Were we to verify the existence of we are possibly looking for higher-order rela- such a structured process in the brain, explain- tions between fairly complex structures, struc- ing consciousness would reduce to explaining tures that can transiently be pulled into and how the process is realized—what parts have to “rendered” by the core process. Basically, this be in what order doing what and at what time panoply of contrast-related irresolvables gets scale. generated in a real-time and transient fashion, It will always seem to be a brute fact, at now occupying this virtual “location”, now oc- some level, that consciousness is physical pro- cupying that, depending on a whole host of in- cess X, however X gets fleshed out. But we’ll put factors (head orientation, background, con- just get used to it, as long as there is some ceptualization, etc.). These “locations” map somewhat intelligible bridge (in this case onto (we hope) real physical space at a certain provided by mathematical models) from the scale, but it is not a matter of finding a “bubble lived phenomenon to its brain correlate. We’ll within a bubble.” It is a matter of an abstract get used to it just as we’ve gotten used to water correlation of structure. The isomorphisms (or being H2O. It could be that there will be mul- homomorphisms) could be there even if the in- tiple ways to implement such a process. Sup- ternal “space” of experience is entirely virtual, a 44 While Hofstadter’s Gödel-inspired model might be problematic (both kind of computational “movie in the brain” to in terms of physical implementation and in terms of the strong use another phrase of Damasio’s. Assuming the mathematical realism it might presuppose), it is certainly in the right class of models we should be considering. See Hofstadter principle that the positive and critically evalu- (2007).

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 20 | 27 www.open-mind.net pose, just for example, that it has to do with The identity theory only adumbrated here generating certain types of fields and that mul- would be neither a crude type-type identity the- tiple substrates, not just brains, can generate ory nor a causal-role functionalist token-token and support the relevant sorts of fields. Then identity theory where the realizers do not mat- consciousness will be, to that degree, multiply ter at all. Since any concrete consciousness is a realizable. Suppose it is a matter of realizing a marriage of form and matter (and the self-ap- certain computational organization. Then, in ef- pearance of that marriage), and since there no fect, implementing a certain program will be doubt are physical constraints on what sorts of equivalent to being conscious; and if machines materials can be put into that form, we want to made from different substrates or with different identify consciousness with neither a specific architectures can run the program, conscious- type of material (or “wonder tissue” in Den- ness will be multiply realizable in the sense of nett’s phrase) nor with an abstract, disembod- computational functionalism. Your particular ied form that seems trivially realizable by prac- consciousness then, as you know and love it, tically any set of elements—since purely ab- would be just the concrete running of the pro- stract isomorphisms may be a dime a dozen.45 gram in your particular brain. In other words, we need a non-eliminativist and We might wonder, in such a case, what it non-idealist account of what it is to really real- is to “run” a program or to “have” a certain ize a structure, instantiate a form, or, as the structure or to “instantiate” such an arrange- case may be, to really run a program or com- ment or system of fields or whatever. Of course, pute a function. To my knowledge, no one cur- this is a quite general metaphysical problem rently has such an account. that we should not confuse with any problem At bottom, this is just the old metaphys- specific to consciousness. However, given that ical problem of the Methexis—the relation of we are acquainted with our own individual ex- universals to particulars or of form to matter. istence, it seems that somehow its instantiation When I am feeling optimistic, I imagine that makes its very instantiation available or mani- I’ve reduced the problem of consciousness to fest in some non-representational way. This is another, more general (as well as ancient and rather peculiar. If we are going to be physical- probably insoluble) metaphysical problem. We ists who are nonetheless responsible to the phe- may not know what it is for matter to really nomenology, however, this is what we have to and mind-independently take on a certain accept, or so I have argued. Something is con- form, but it is hardly an implausible meta- scious if it has a certain internal structure and physics that says that this happens. It is argu- attendant dynamical profile. Being conscious is ably this type of metaphysical view that having that structure and profile. We will never would best explain the success of applied be able to explain why that is the case because mathematics, engineering, and the sciences: it is simply a confusion to think that identities they are successful because the world really like this admit of explanation; they can only be does have (or approximate) the relevant math- discovered (Papineau 2002, ch. 3). We must, of ematical structures—these are in re structural course, give evidence in favor of the relevant universals. This seems to be a commitment of identity claim; uncovering such evidence is the scientific realism. But perhaps we will never goal of scientific research on consciousness. Our get beyond a rather crude operationalism choice is between this sort of view and the view when we empirically investigate such matters; that there is something else, something non- perhaps the metaphysical nature of property physical that just is consciousness. Of course, instantiation will forever remain obscure to us. we’d never be able to explain why that is the That should not, however, discourage us from case either. So in the absence of compelling ar- carrying on such empirical investigations in guments for dualism or panpsychism, Occam’s the case of consciousness. Even if there will be Razor would lead us, as Smart pointed out so 45 For discussion, see Chalmers (1996) and Buechner (2008, ch. long ago, to embrace an identity theory. 3).

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 21 | 27 www.open-mind.net a residual metaphysical mystery, it is a gen- certain properties. One of these could be the eral one, not one specific to consciousness. property of being self-manifesting. That prop- The main point here, and the concluding erty could itself be a complex relational prop- one, is that consciousness could be self-ac- erty having a certain unity. The account quainted, where this is not a matter of ex- sketched here presupposes a certain realism ternal relations, and still some form of relat- about the instantiations of mathematical and ively non-mysterious (hylomorphic) physical- computational structures—that there are de- ism could be true. One might balk at the idea terminate, mind-independent facts of the mat- that this would not be a matter of external re- ter about this. We cannot go further into this lations, especially if we go the computational rather large and complicated metaphysical functionalist route. But think of it like this: If hornet’s nest. Suffice it to say that a real, uni- we are realists about the implementation of fied, concretely instantiated structure could, computational structures, then even though in a certain sense, be relational and have com- the structures involve parts and elements, ponents even if it is, in another sense, an in- there is still a unity to the pattern as imple- trinsic property. mented. It is, in a certain sense, an indivisible whole that is not just the mereological sum of 7 Conclusion its parts. Analogously, the circle has its own structure and characteristic properties even I have argued that the best way to character- though it is made of points. What we really ize subjective character is in terms of self-ac- need, and may never have (but who knows?) quaintance and not, for various reasons, in is a theory that tells us when we have a real, terms of Higher-Order, Same-Order, or Priv- concrete unified whole, (where this is not ileged-Object representation. I argued that simply a functional or conventional character- every episode or stream of consciousness is ac- ization but is a matter of more basic physical quainted with itself, and not with a self in relations) and when we have unities and some other sense—a homunculus, substance, wholes (and instantiations of structures and or haecceity. This is, I maintain, the best way properties) that are only conventionally real. to make sense of the intuition of subject-ob- Suppose then that we adopt a sort of ject polarity and the Humean intuition that realism about computational (or otherwise we do not find a self-entity. Moreover, one’s structural) wholes, which we have some inde- sense of being an individual is a consequence pendent reason to do. Circles have remarkable of self-acquaintance and concrete existence properties, qua circles, even if they are made and not to be conflated with subjective char- up of points. Concrete circular things approx- acter as such. Such conflation leads to poten- imate these. Simultaneous cycles have certain tially misleading descriptions of subjective number-theoretic properties just qua cycles re- character (as “mineness”) and, if taken liter- gardless of what they are cycles of (e.g., repro- ally, to metaphysically and epistemologically ducing cicadas and cicada predators, see undesirable consequences. We are individuated Baker 2005). Likewise, for the concrete imple- and self-acquainted, and that is enough to al- mentation of consciousness, it is surely the low us to derive the sense of self or “mine- case that certain elements must be put into a ness”; but self-acquaintance is not itself what certain arrangement, realizing a certain struc- individuates us, nor does it necessarily make ture and dynamics. This would not mean, us aware of what does. however, that consciousness as such is to be Nevertheless, I conceded to Henrich, identified with either those elements or the ar- Frank, Henry, and Zahavi (among others) that rangement abstractly conceived. Rather it is consciousness must have some intrinsic (or in- the concretely implemented organization of ternal relational) property in virtue of which those elements qua whole. In virtue of being it is self-acquainted. But I argued that this an instance of that form or structure, it has does not nullify the appropriateness of de-

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 22 | 27 www.open-mind.net scribing subjective character as being a matter to thank audiences at the Johannes Guten- of a very complex relation, though it does not berg-Universität Mainz (seventeenth meeting seem to be so complex. of the MIND Group), the Berlin School of Finally, I argued that the position ad- Mind and Brain, the Institut Jean Nicod, ZiF, vanced here is not incompatible with a form of SMU, the SSPP, TCU, and Tucson TSC for (hylomorphic) physicalism. Sensory hyle, the ac- relevant discussions. I would like to thank quaintance relation itself, the self-manifesting these institutions and the symposia organizers episodes, could all be brain processes and prop- (and in particular, Thomas Metzinger and erties. On the phenomenological side, this gains Jennifer Windt; Manfred Frank, Marc Borner, plausibility once we take to heart the incom- Andreas Heinz and Anna Strasser; Brad pleteness of introspection (and of pre-reflective Thompson and Philippe Chuard; Pete self-awareness as well): not seeming complex Mandik, Rik Hine, and Blake Hestir; and and relational does not entail not being complex David Chalmers). Thanks to the College of and relational. On the ontological side, I argued Liberal Arts and the Department of Philo- that even some form of computational function- sophy and Humanities at the University of alism could be true. But, generally, the import- Texas-Arlington for research and travel fund- ant thing to remember is that consciousness is ing in this connection. I should thank (in al- the marriage of form and matter. It cannot be phabetical order) Katalin Balog, Daniel Ben- simply equated with either. This opens up space nequin, Jacob Berger, Alexandre Billon, Marc for multiple realizability, but it might also mean Borner, Philippe Chuard, Christian Coseru, that not just any old substrate will do. It’s an Justin Fisher, Manfred Frank, Brie Gertler, open question. The metaphysical commitment Robert Howell, Tomis Kapitan, Bob behind this position is just some form of realism Kentridge, Chad Kidd, Alex Kiefer, Uriah about structural universals and their mind-inde- Kriegel, Greg Landini, Stefan Lang, Pete pendent instantiation conditions, which is argu- Mandik, Thomas Metzinger, Charles Nuss- ably a commitment of scientific realism in any baum, David Papineau, Gerhard Preyer, case. Absent dualism, panpsychism, or idealism, Harry Reeder, David Rosenthal, Amber Ross, that is what we will have to accept, I believe. David Rudrauf, Susan Schneider, Miguel Se- (Eliminativism is, of course, a non-starter.) bastian, Charles Siewert, Anna Strasser, Brad We do not need a theory of the Meth- Thompson, Keith Turausky, Michael Tye, Josh exis, however, in order to attempt to find the Weisberg, and Dan Zahavi for discussions, neural correlates (correlation conceived of as questions, criticisms, suggestions, etc., that indicating identity here) of consciousness by were in one way or another of help to me in building mathematical models of the phe- relation to the material presented here. In the nomenology and figuring out how the brain same regard, I should thank two anonymous might implement the structures so modeled. reviewers from the MIND Group for helpful In fact, just such an approach is quite in line feedback on an earlier version of this article; with scientific practice generally: We know their feedback helped me to see some of my that the world we investigate with our relat- less-than-admirable tendencies as a writer of ively crude means is, in multiple ways, a play philosophy, even if it did not enable me to of matter and form even if we do not really correct all their manifestations. Special thanks know what the Matter ultimately is, what to Ying-Tung Lin of the MIND Group for her Forms are, and how the latter come to live in help. Special thanks to Trish Mann, Swathi the former. Prabhu, Emma Nwokonko, and Anya Williford for help with the references. And very special Acknowledgements thanks, once again, to Thomas Metzinger and Jennifer Windt for launching and managing Different parts of this material were presented this unique and ambitious project and to the at many places over several years. I would like Barbara-Wengeler-Stiftung for its support.

Williford, K. (2015). Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-Acquaintance. In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570054 23 | 27 www.open-mind.net

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