The Zionist Commission and the Jewish Communities of Greater Syria in 1919 Andrew J. Patrick
At the end of the Ottoman Empire, many community leaders and individuals within those communities were faced with “critical choices” that often determined the fate of the particular group to which they belonged.1 Having witnessed what had transpired in the chaos of World War I, people realized that making the wrong choices could harm their standing at best, or destroy their communities at worst. The deportation and subsequent elimination of vast numbers of Armenians and members of other communities during the war served as distressing evidence of this. In making these choices, people had to weigh past loyalties against new realities, and the apparent situation at present against what might come to pass in the future. The summer of 1919 and the events Chaim Weizmann and the Zionist Commission, King-Crane Commission through Greater 1918. Also pictured: Edwin Samuel, W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore, Israel Sieff, Leon Simon, James de Rothschild and Joseph Sprinzak. Source: Wikipedia. was the product of political wrangling at the
Jerusalem Quarterly 56 & 57 [ 107 ] Paris Peace Conference and represented American President Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to interject his ideals into the post-war settlement of Ottoman lands. Originally planned up solely of Americans after the French, British, and Italians declined to send delegates. Their mission was to gauge the political aspirations of former Ottoman subjects in order Greater Syria, representing perhaps the most sensitive topic among the Allies, wound up being their main focus. With the arrival of the King-Crane Commission in Greater Syria (June 1919), individuals and groups in the region had to decide which political stance they would take before the Americans. The issues on which they were forced to form opinions included whether the Arabic-speaking Ottoman lands should form one new country or several, whether or not they would ask for independence or help from a mandatory power, and whether or not Zionism should move forward in any form. In sum, the commission made Greater Syria, with its already charged atmosphere, a One particularly pertinent example of this came in the testimony of the region’s Jewish communal leaders in front of the King-Crane Commission. In 1919, many of Greater Syria’s Jews were ambivalent about Zionism and feared the backlash that might come if they voiced support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. With this being the case, many Jewish leaders were poised to tell the King-Crane Commission that they were indifferent to Zionism. Ultimately, however, the region’s urban Jewish elite professed support for Zionism to the Americans and these decisions were made partly as a result of the Zionist Commission’s labored but successful campaign to obtain such testimony. The Zionist Commission, having been established in March 1918 in order to advise the British government on the implementation of the Balfour Declaration,2 also waged a small and mostly fruitless campaign to obtain pro-Zionist testimony from non-Jewish groups. Their minimal success in this endeavor, when compared with their success in obtaining pro-Zionist testimony from Jews, illustrates the rift that the issue of Zionism was causing in the region. Generally speaking, the leaders of Greater Syria’s communities were forced to make measured and fateful political choices in front of the King-Crane Commission which altered the social fabric of the region. The new, post- Ottoman division of the region’s communities had begun, and this article provides a window into this process by examining the Zionist Commission’s role in the creation of the new communal landscape during the summer of 1919.3
The Political Setting in the Region
In 1919, many inhabitants of Greater Syria were optimistic about their political situation but they also realized that there were powers larger than themselves hoping to gain from the post-war division of Ottoman lands. The British occupied much of the region and the French had a divisive presence on the Lebanese coast. Amir Faysal, a leader of the Arab Revolt, may have been accepted by most people at the Paris Peace Conference
[ 108 ] The Zionist Commission and the Jewish Communities of Greater Syria in 1919 as the de facto spokesman for Greater Syria, but he was viewed with skepticism by many of the region’s elites for a number of understandable reasons: he was not from Greater Syria, had been installed as leader by force of British arms, was largely funded by the British government, and had an inner circle of advisers whose members were composed mainly of “young, transnational elites,” many of whom had little connection to Syria.4 The notables of the region were somewhat annoyed by this and remained cool to Faysal. In addition, Faysal was far more amenable to having a mandatory power with substantial control over Syria than were the majority of politically active people in the “al-Fatat” (the “secret society” of nationalists Faysal had joined during the war), who remained deeply divided between asking for independence, a British mandate, or an American mandate.5 had already been formed with the intent of stopping Jewish immigration to Palestine. One set of these groups were the Muslim-Christian Associations. Formed in late 1918 in the major cities of Palestine, these associations were generally comprised of wealthy and established notables who presented a united front in opposition to Zionism, though internally they often did not agree on other aspects of the region’s political future. Other regional groups, such as al-Nadi al-‘Arabi (the Arab Club) and al-Muntada al-Adabi (the Literary Club), were generally composed of “the young Arab intelligentsia” and were similarly anti-Zionist, though they too were often not in total agreement about what to request beyond the cessation of Zionism.6 Despite their internal differences, opposition to Zionism provided these groups with a central organizing principle and this opposition was voiced emphatically to the King-Crane Commission. Despite being taken aback when it was announced that the King-Crane Commission was actually going to happen, the Zionists were well-prepared for its visit. As the commission arrived in the region, the local Zionists received instructions from their European and American leaders. American Zionist and future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, for example, cabled from Paris on 13 June that the Zionists should “make [a] full presentation of [the] achievements [of the Zionist] colonist[s] despite their claim should not be judged “merely by numbers in Palestine” but was instead a “historical claim” which “rested on [the] ardent desires [of] millions [of[ Jews” who 7 Chaim Weizmann repeated these arguments in a (rather belated) 21 June cable and added that the local Zionist Commission should “Inform them [the King-Crane Commission] [of] our cooperation with Feysal and our desire to work harmoniously with [the] Arab population for [the] good of Palestine.”8 The Zionists in Palestine, however, required few instructions along these lines. They knew that their job was to get the commission to endorse Zionism and also knew that they had to accomplish two things in order for this to be a possibility: get all of the local Jews to back Zionism in front of the commission and try to minimize or undermine the expected anti-Zionist testimony (a challenging task by the summer of 1919).
Jerusalem Quarterly 56 & 57 [ 109 ] By the summer of 1919, the Zionist Commission seemed to have accepted that they cause mainly because of growing anti-Zionism among Muslims and Christians. Because of this, they mainly focused on convincing the Jewish communities of Palestine to express support for Zionism. They also realized that they needed to pay close attention to the political space of Greater Syria, thus the Zionists decided that they would send their agents to the towns on the itinerary of the King-Crane Commission a few days before they arrived in hopes of convincing the Jews throughout Greater Syria to support Zionism. The divisions within the Jewish population of Greater Syria set the Zionists the complicated task of trying to convince all of these communities to support their cause, with many different communities and leaders having different agendas. It was the “Arabized Jews” both in and beyond Palestine, having (in the words of scholar Moshe Behar) “practically a zero role in the formation of Zionism” and being “profoundly non- separatist, non-irredentist, non-political, non-national and certainly non-Zionist,” who worried the Zionist Commission most.9 This push by the Zionist Commission was also in front of the King-Crane Commission.10 The Zionists, then, were attempting to make support for Zionism part of the regional (and global) Jewish identity. Yet the further they
The Jewish Communities of Palestine
The King-Crane Commission landed in Jaffa in June of 1919 and the tension in Palestine was immediately manifest. This was illustrated by an incident within the Jaffa Municipal Council. The council had been invited to speak before the commission, but its president neglected to notify its Jewish members that this was to occur. The Jewish council members, who had only heard about the council’s testimony after it was given, protested to the council president and received the following explanation (according to a report by the Zionist Commission): “the President [of the municipal council] explained that he did not notify the Jewish members for the reason that he knew that the Moslems wanted to protest against Zionism, and he felt it might be uncomfortable for the Jewish members to be present.” Despite this rather partisan incident, the Jewish community in Jaffa did have the chance to air their pro-Zionist views to the King- obtained.”11 In Jerusalem, the Zionists faced more pronounced opposition. According to a Zionist agent, there was a string of meetings on 13 and 14 June at the homes of prominent Jerusalem Muslims (like Kamil al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem). In these meetings, there were contentious discussions among the region’s Muslim elite about which “demands” they should “hand over to the commission.” Although there was knowledge of the meeting’s proceedings) noted that the only non-controversial matter discussed was the “request against Jewish immigration”.12
[ 110 ] The Zionist Commission and the Jewish Communities of Greater Syria in 1919 While it appeared there was little the Zionist Commission could do to convince Jerusalem’s non-Jewish populations to support Zionism, their lobbying efforts among the local Jewish groups appear to have been more effective. Every Jewish leader interviewed by the King-Crane Commission supported Zionism. This surprised commission member William Yale, who claimed to have witnessed anti-Zionist sentiment among Jewish groups in his time living in Jerusalem before and during World War I. Yale, who was organizing the delegations the American commission would hear in Jerusalem, even sought the testimony of Jews whom he believed to be anti-Zionist. One particular choice Yale made that angered the Zionist Commission was to have Haham Bashi (Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem) Nissim Danon speak before the Americans, apparently because they thought he would give anti-Zionist testimony. In protest, the Zionists claimed that Danon had been a Turkish appointment and represented no one.13 Despite these protests, Danon spoke to the King-Crane Commission and seemed to surprise both Yale and the Zionists by endorsing the Zionist project.14 Annoyed by Yale’s behaviour, Zionist leader Harry Friedenwald protested to his superiors in Paris, claiming that Yale (who us before the Commission.” Despite this, Friedenwald proudly reported that among the “Jewish deputations heard,” there was “practical unanimity in their demands, and not a single discordant note from any of the parties.” Friedenwald further stated that this was the result of the “excellent labors” of certain members of the Zionist Commission.15 Another member of the King-Crane Commission, Albert Lybyer, asked the Spaffords of the American Colony in Jerusalem about the disappearance of anti-Zionism among the Jews. The Spaffords replied to him that the “Jerusalem Jews [were] now all for Zionism – much money spent.”16 Later in their time in Palestine, the King-Crane Commission faced large crowds in Nazareth and the tension was high. The following is a description of Nazareth during the commission’s visit, as reported by a Zionist delegate, and it illustrates the major political moment spawned by the commission:
We went to Nazareth at night. The road was full of riders for the American commission; some faces looked friendly when we met, most of them showed open hatred or at least some embarrassment in our presence. We found Nazareth full of delegates. […] The Nazareth Christian population, or at least the poor, greeted us Jews very heartily in the streets and shops; reproaches were addressed us for not settling there: the city is in despair, “Should the Jews not come to revive its business, they [the Christians] will have to emigrate to Jerusalem, where a living can be made.”17
Despite moments like this, calls for “No Jewish Homeland and no Jewish immigration” remained the norm among Nazareth’s population.18 In Tiberias, Zionist operatives ran into dissent among the Jewish population, having found a “French Jewish subject” who “claimed to be representative of some hundred French subjects” and was “considering” asking the King-Crane Commission for a French mandate. They were able to change his
Jerusalem Quarterly 56 & 57 [ 111 ] mind “after an explanation of the situation” and, on 23 June, this group gave the standard testimony suggested by the Zionist Commission.19 As the King-Crane Commission left Palestine, they were under the impression that the Jewish communities were uniformly for Zionism. The Zionist Commission had successfully advocated for their cause among groups to the north.
Zionist Commission Agitation