March 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 4

Drawing the Right Lessons “graduate level warfare.” Intellectually, Israeli communications during the 2006 then, it was easier for the U.S. Army war, it is worth noting that in cases from Israel’s War with officer corps to go back to defending when encrypted communication failed, Hizb Allah the Fulda Gap against imaginary Soviet IDF soldiers simply used their personal tank divisions using the same tactics cellular phones to communicate on By Andrew Exum employed in the Second World War. In the battlefield.3 It is hard to imagine a the same way, the belief that the United U.S. Marine Corps gunnery sergeant a recent article in USA Today States might someday fight like Israel allowing a similar situation. announced that the U.S. military was did in 2006 is being used by some to learning from Israel’s 2006 war against argue for a reversion back to what the In the same way, it is similarly hard to Hizb Allah in southern Lebanon. U.S. military does best and finds easiest: imagine the U.S. military’s professional The lesson, at first, seems to be clear. conventional warfare. and non-commissioned officer corps “ tactics,” USA allowing the kind of institutional Today reported, “could leave U.S. forces That said, the comparison between the complacency that haunted the IDF in vulnerable to the kind of coordinated IDF and the U.S. Army and Marine the years following 2000. Simply put, attacks that stymied Israel.”1 Echoing Corps is admittedly tempting. Following the cultural differences between the these concerns and writing in World Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from southern U.S. military and the IDF—and the Politics Review on March 4, West Point Lebanon, the IDF grew accustomed to differences between conscripted armies professor Gian Gentile argued that the operations in the Palestinian Territories and professional armies—must be taken U.S. Army had already become like the into account before any comparison is Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), “so focused made between historical experiences. on irregular and counterinsurgency “Whereas the U.S. warfare that it can no longer fight large military, post-Vietnam, is The greatest mistake the U.S. military battles against a conventional enemy.”2 can make in studying the lessons of Is this true, and is the U.S. military a professional military, the 2006, however, is to study the 34 days drawing the correct lessons from the IDF is still largely manned of fighting that took place in southern 2006 war? Lebanon in July and August of that year by conscripts.” without any context. Nevertheless, this It is impossible to gauge the degree to seems to be what is happening. which the U.S. Army’s conventional combat skills have been eroded by the In January, during a conference in focus on counter-insurgency warfare which, in some ways, closely resemble which the author participated at the in and Afghanistan. It is certainly the counter-insurgency operations U.S. Army War College on what lessons likely that the high operations tempo, currently being undertaken by the can be drawn from the conflict with endless deployments and shortened U.S. Army and Marine Corps in Iraq. respect to information operations, training schedules have more to do The IDF then grew complacent and Hizb Allah was widely considered to with any erosion in collective task rusty. Furthermore, although many have cleverly manipulated the media proficiencies than counter-insurgency units performed admirably in southern during the conflict. Yet, if one were to manual FM 3-24. Yet, the U.S. military Lebanon, as a whole the IDF was ask Hizb Allah about their information is almost certainly drawing the wrong caught off-guard by the kind of fighting operations during the conflict, the lessons from the 2006 war if it is they experienced there. The reserves, internal assessment would be much more used to ignore the hard won lessons of especially, were poorly prepared and negative. Indeed, during the 34 days of counter-insurgency and revert back to inadequately equipped. fighting, Hizb Allah’s performance in the kind of conventional war-fighting the sphere of information operations was with which the U.S. military has always There are several reasons, however, uneven. Where Hizb Allah enjoyed the been more comfortable. why this analogy does not hold as much most success in information operations water as some would like. First, the was in the years before the conflict— Drawing the wrong lessons has happened U.S. Army and Marine Corps are not the carefully setting the conditions within before. In the aftermath of the Vietnam IDF. Whereas the U.S. military, post- which the battle would be fought—and War, the presence of a conventional Vietnam, is a professional military, in the weeks and months after the threat from the Soviet Union allowed the the IDF is still largely manned by shooting stopped. The information U.S. Army and Marine Corps to shelve conscripts. While the IDF soldier’s operations campaign is not confined to a the counter-insurgency lessons learned ferocity, patriotism and tactical 34-day window of time, and an attempt during more than a decade of fighting decision-making have often been noted to understand Hizb Allah’s success in in Southeast Asia. Counter-insurgency as being among his strengths, individual that field is doomed to fail if confined warfare, as John Nagl is fond of saying, is soldier discipline is rarely mentioned as such. as a trait for which the IDF soldier is 1 Tom Vanden Brook, “US Learns from Israel-Hizbollah praised. Some units take particular In the same way, the U.S. military’s War,” USA Today, February 14, 2008. pride in their indiscipline and scruffy insistence upon only studying the 2 Gian P. Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. appearance. This may have positive Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” World Politics Re- effects on morale in some cases. Yet, 3 Personal interviews, IDF officers, November 2006 and view, March 4, 2008. in asking how Hizb Allah intercepted January 2008. March 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 4 tactical lessons provided by the 34 power in unconventional war, historical American University of Beirut. He is days of open fighting between the IDF evidence suggests that air power based currently a Ph.D. candidate in the War and Hizb Allah is also misguided. As punishment strategies such as that Studies Department at King’s College U.S. Army Captain Daniel Helmer employed by Israel in 2006 are not London where he studies Hizb Allah and persuasively argues in his study of the effective against guerrilla groups in military innovation theory. A former U.S. IDF’s failed counter-insurgency efforts hybrid wars.6 Army officer, Mr. Exum led a platoon of in southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, light infantry in Afghanistan (2002) and Israel never dealt with the root political Mastering hybrid warfare means then a platoon of Army Rangers in Iraq problems in southern Lebanon that led mastering the tactics found in both FM (2003) and Afghanistan (2004). He is the to the rise of Hizb Allah.4 The 2006 war 3-24 and FM 7-8. U.S. Army and Marine author of This Man’s Army: A Soldier’s did not take place in a 34-day vacuum; Corps units must be proficient in both Story from the Front Lines of the War it was merely the latest bloodshed in a conventional combined arms combat as on Terrorism (2004) and “Hizballah at dispute between Israel and Hizb Allah well as the kind of population-centric War: A Military Assessment” (2006). that has been fought with varying approach encapsulated in the new degrees of intensity since 1982. counter-insurgency doctrine. This is clearly asking a lot of the officer corps, The 2006 war was not evidence, then, but perhaps not any more than what that Israel had over-learned the lessons has been asked of it already in Iraq and of counter-insurgency, but rather the Afghanistan. opposite: Israel has never effectively learned counter-insurgency in the Hybrid warfare also means civilian first place. Even in the West Bank and and strategic decision-makers must Gaza, the IDF continues to approach be realistic about what military power the fighting there as a counter- alone can accomplish in such conflicts. terrorism mission instead of a counter- By all accounts, the IDF was sent into insurgency mission. Moreover, while southern Lebanon with an impossible the presence of both a radicalized settler mission—to “destroy” Hizb Allah. By population and historical animosities 2006, however, Hizb Allah had grown might preclude the application of an into a political-military organization effective counter-insurgency strategy claiming the loyalty of perhaps 1.5 in the Occupied Territories, Israel has million Lebanese Shi`a. Hizb Allah runs never developed and applied counter- schools, manages hospitals and elects insurgency doctrine along the lines of members of parliament. No military on FM 3-24 despite years of experience in the planet could have been expected to irregular warfare dating back to Jewish destroy the organization in 34 days of guerrilla groups in pre-state Israel. fighting.

Finally, unless the Mexican government In some wars, history teaches us that dissolves and a modern-day Pancho you cannot shoot or kill your way to Villa begins to lob Katyusha rockets victory. As U.S. Army H.R. across the border into Texas, it is McMaster has written, “the principal unlikely the U.S. military will ever face lesson of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq an adversary exactly like Hizb Allah. and southern Lebanon might be that Yet, in more general terms, Israel’s war military campaigns must be subordinate against Hizb Allah belongs to the kind to a larger strategy that integrates of conflicts that political scientist Erin political, military, diplomatic, economic Simpson labels “hybrid wars.”5 These and strategic communication efforts.”7 wars occur when nation-states go to war Guns, bombs and tactics from the Second against non-state or sub-state actors World War are simply not enough. and combine elements of conventional This has been the harsh lesson of the warfare with characteristics of irregular U.S. military’s counter-insurgency warfare. Although air power enthusiasts campaigns since 2001, and this is also such as Major General Charles Dunlap the enduring lesson of Israel’s war with have argued for a more robust use of air Hizb Allah.

4 Daniel Isaac Helmer, Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Leba- Andrew Exum is a graduate of the nese Incursion Between 1982-2000 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: University of Pennsylvania and the Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007). 5 Erin M. Simpson, “Thinking about Modern Conflict: 6 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims,” paper presented in War (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996). to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 7 H.R. McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned,” Sur- Association, Chicago, April 7-11, 2005. vival 50:1 (2008): pp. 19-30.