View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by St Andrews Research Repository A NAVAL TRAVESTY: THE DISMISSAL OF ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE, 1917 J. Allan C. Macfarlane A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2014 Full metadata for this item is available in Research@StAndrews:FullText at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/5022 This item is protected by original copyright This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License J Allan C Macfarlane A Naval Travesty: The Dismissal of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, 1917 PhD Dissertation Submitted January 2014 DECLARATIONS 1. Candidate’s declaration I, J Allan C Macfarlane, certify that this thesis, which is approximately 79,700 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. I was admitted as a research student in September 2008 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in September 2008; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2008 and 2014. Date Signature 2. Supervisors declaration I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolutions and Regulations appropriate to the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree. Date Signature 2 3. Permission for electronic publication In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to my thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below. The following is an agreed request by the candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic publication of this thesis: Access to printed copy and electronic publication of thesis through the University of St Andrews. Date Date Signature of Candidate Signature of Supervisor 3 CONTENTS Acknowledgements Page 5 Abstract page 6 Abbreviations page 8 Chapter I Introduction page 9 Chapter II A Difficult Inheritance page 37 Chapter III The Convoy Controversy page 65 Chapter IV Justified or Unjustified Cause page 96 Chapter V Conspiracies page 126 Chapter VI The Dismissal and its Aftermath page 171 Chapter VII For Better or for Worse page 206 Chapter VIII Conclusions page 247 Bibliography page 263 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Gerard De Groot. A few years have passed since his inspirational teaching on the First World War in my final undergraduate year led me to the path that has ended in this dissertation. He has been encouraging when doubt was apparent and indulgent and supportive when other commitments have interfered with progress. His perceptive comments on the drafts of chapters submitted to him have been extraordinarily helpful and his response times in returning work quite remarkable. Secondly, I would like to thank my wife, Susan. With little interest in the subject, she has persevered in reading early drafts and pointing out the more glaring typographical errors occasioned by my ineptness on the keyboard. More importantly, I owe much to her forbearance and equanimity over my frequent and at times lengthy absences from home that has allowed me to complete this work. 5 ABSTRACT This dissertation relates to the dismissal of Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord from November 1916 to December 1917, by Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty, at the behest of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. The dismissal was peremptory and effected without rational explanation, despite Jellicoe having largely fulfilled his primary mission of combating the German U-boat threat to British merchant shipping. The outcome of the war may well have been affected if the level of shipping losses sustained through U-boat attack in April 1917 had continued unabated. The central argument of the dissertation is that the dismissal was unjustified. As an adjunct, it argues that the received view of certain historians that Jellicoe was not successful as First Sea Lord is unwarranted and originates from severe post war critism of Jellicoe by those with a vested interest in justifying the dismissal, notably Lloyd George. Supporting these arguments, the following assertions are made. Firstly, given the legacy Jellicoe inherited when joining the Admiralty, through the strategies adopted, organisational changes made and initiatives undertaken in anti-submarine weapons development, the progress made in countering the U-boat threat was notable. Secondly, the universal criticism directed at the Admiralty over the perceived delay in introducing a general convoy system for merchant shipping is not sustainable having regard to primary source documentation. Thirdly, incidents that occurred during the latter part of 1917, and suggested as being factors which contributed to the dismissal, can be discounted. Fourthly, Lloyd George conspired to involve General Haig, Commander of the British Forces in France, and the press baron, Lord Northcliffe, in 6 his efforts to mitigate any potential controversy that might result from Jellicoe’s removal from office. Finally, the arguments made by a number of commentators that the Admiralty performed better under Jellicoe’s successor, Admiral Wemyss, is misconceived. 7 ABBREVIATIONS The following abbreviations are used throughout: BL British Library, London CA Churchill Archives, Cambridge NA National Archives, London NLS National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh NMM National Maritime Museum, Greenwich PA Parliamentary Archives, London PRONI Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast 8 Chapter I Introduction Background It has been said of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe that ‘he was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.’1 That remark proffers no exaggeration. When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, its standing army was about one tenth of the size of Germany’s army. It has been described by one historian as an ‘antique fire engine: spotless, shining and in perfect working order, but not good at putting out big fires’.2 In economic terms Germany’s industrial output had outstripped Britain’s since before the turn of the century. More significantly, in the context of this dissertation, Britain imported almost two thirds of its food and, usually, did not maintain a stock of more than four to six weeks supply of raw materials for its manufacturing industries.3 Maintenance of Britain’s naval supremacy was therefore imperative to its survival. Not only had the Royal Navy to protect Britain’s vital ocean trade routes, it had to deter any attempted invasion, blockade Germany’s sea trade, and, as the British Government had decided to provide military support to France and Belgium, prevent enemy interference with the 1 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, (London, 1927), III, 112. 2 Gerard de Groot, Blighty, British Society in the Great War, (London, 1996), 14. 3 Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, (London, 1961), 1, 358. (References to this work in footnotes are hereafter abbreviated to FDSF). 9 movement of troops and supplies across the English Channel. Moreover, if the raison d’etre of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet was to be wholly fulfilled, it would have to seek out and annihilate the powerful German High Seas Fleet. After two years of war, Jellicoe, as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, had, with one exception, met those objectives. Germany had not invaded Britain; the blockade of German sea trade was beginning to have an adverse impact on its economy and its population; and the cross Channel traffic was secure. The exception was that the Navy had not annihilated the High Seas Fleet. That Fleet had barely ventured from its home port during those two years. The only time that the main body of capital ships of both fleets fought was at the Battle of Jutland in May 1916 and, whilst it is arguable that the High Seas Fleet scored a tactical victory in the battle in as much as more British than German ships were sunk, strategically, the victory was clearly British. Under the onslaught of the British guns, the High Seas Fleet under Admiral Scheer turned away from the Grand Fleet and returned to harbour. It would rarely venture forth again during the course of the war and never with the intention of confronting the entire Grand Fleet. Ultimately, Germany’s submarine fleet represented a greater threat to Britain’s maritime superiority. Although during the first two years of the war the U-boat had affected the strategic and tactical criteria under which the Grand Fleet operated and caused some damage to Britain’s merchant shipping, it had not had a major impact on Britain’s war effort. However, as explained further in Chapters II and III below, in February 1917 that situation was to change significantly when Germany embarked on a full, unrestricted submarine campaign of attacking British, Allied and neutral merchant shipping sailing in the waters around Britain.