Structure and evolution of the political landscape during the transition

Salah Eddine AL JOURCHI

Everyone – including politicians, observers, activists and researchers – agrees that what happened in was not part of a preconceived plan, but rather that it occurred spontaneously. It was produced by several factors, the pace of which was accelerated a few days before the regime began to unravel at the end of President Ben Ali’s mandate. With the conflicting information and the escalation and expansion of the protest movement, the political act became clouded with confusion. It was shrouded in mystery and its proponents came from a place of fear and improvisation. This opened the door to questions and doubts about the future of rule under the leadership of President Ben Ali, and made the most important component of power proceed to prioritise its interests and aim to survive before the ship sank with everyone in it. This was the general landscape in Tunisia during the ten days leading up to Ben Ali's decision to leave the country for Saudi Arabia.

There was no party that had prepared itself to ensure the transfer of power, whether peacefully or violently. It may be said that not all parties anticipated that Ben Ali’s regime would fall at that speed. With the exception of the slogan raised by the then President of the Congress Party, Dr Mohamed (“The regime is not fit nor will it be fit”), and the radical position that was adopted by the Tunisian Communist Workers Party against the previous regime, the rest of the Tunisian parties, including the repressed and pursued Ennahda Movement, were not eager to interfere with the regime at that stage. Their demands did not rule out the search for a political agreement on the relative freedoms for partisan activity, the release of political prisoners, the settling of the matter of their social status and the lifting of restrictions from the media.

The Sudden Collapse

The social mobility, which began on 17 December 2010 was evolving and expanding without any clear prospect. It was not framed by an organised political force that truly had the will to assume power at the moment the existing regime collapsed. This does not mean that the opposing partisan organisations were completely absent from the public scene during the development of the protest movement, for it is certain that many began to gradually support it, and some gradually joined it. It is difficult, however, to say that this was what initiated the collapse. When the youth who were not shaped by a party or politically in many areas began expressing their anger in spontaneous ways, some currents began to keep up the pace and follow suit. They did not, however, assume leadership of the protest in an apparent and obvious manner. Even the two huge marches that were organised—one in the city of and another in Habib Street Bourguiba on 14 January—were attended by many members of political parties, trade unionists, activists, intellectuals and ordinary citizens without having an overwhelming specific partisan or ideological nature, before Ben Ali withdrew permanently from the political arena.

The Ill-Fated Party was Weakened

It became clear that the party that ruled Tunisia since its independence and until 14 January 2011 had transformed over the years, because of autocracy, into more of a political deadweight. It was not the ruling party in the conventional sense as much as it was a party awaiting its demise. Ever since the independence, the party had been totally reliant on the strongest person whom it could compromise according to its interests and desires. Former President, Habib Bourguiba, insisted on remaining in power at all costs, which proved fatal to the Constitutional Party and made it more like a ship without a captain. This is what enabled General to carry out his famous coup.

After his removal of Bourguiba, there were two options for the new leader: either adopt the Constitutional Party’s solution and proceed to build a new party that would help him establish authority, or keep the party’s structures and make some changes to them, especially at the level of the individuals and officials in the leadership. Those close to him at the time advised him that it was not in his interests to eliminate a partisan entity that was old, rooted in all regions of the country and had historical legitimacy. Accordingly, Ben Ali made a series of patches that led to the activation of the inherited partisan mechanism, and thus the so-called “Constitutional Democratic Rally” was born. It was not a great invention as it was claimed to be by those who flattered the new regime, but a continuation of the coup approach that began during the Republic and ended with the acquisition of the structural framework of the ruling party after it had relieved most of its officials out of fear and in search of new members whose loyalty was certain.

What happened with the overthrow of Bourguiba was repeated with the collapse of Ben Ali, who was abandoned by almost everyone when he left the country, and he did not find anyone of his aides and advisers who had the courage to publicly defend him. When the blow struck the regime represented by the head of state and head of the party, the “Constitutional Democratic Rally” seized up. Despite its considerable magnitude, it became somewhat handicapped before the acceleration of the events and developments that shook the entire country.

The first shock that ravaged the country occurred when the small group that found itself driven towards filling the void left by the departure of Ben Ali sought to leave a small window that made it possible for him to come back to power. The pressure exerted on that group, however, made it back down quickly from its stance, compelled to move from Article 56 to Article 57 of the old constitution. That was enough to permanently rule out the return of the dictator on a constitutional basis.

Despite the continuation of the efforts of old familiar faces to handle the first part of the transitional phase by maintaining the control of the RCD party over the government and state affairs, the issuance of a judicial ruling that provided for the dissolution of the RCD Party and the confiscation of its property aborted those endeavours, and made the party an indissociable part of an unwanted past. The result of this judicial ruling was the collapse of that huge edifice that was the political structure at a phenomenal speed. It was left in pieces, with small groups meeting in hotels and homes waiting for the outcome of this political earthquake that ended a long and complex phase in Tunisian history.

The era of the strong and tyrannical man ends

The political scene in Tunisia started to take form in a different way on 15 January 2011. There was no longer a strong man driving the country according to his will and entirely on his own. Things began to calm down after the previous situation ended and the rules changed. The political map began to be drawn differently.

Culture of Resorting to the Constitution

For the first time in the history of the country, the 59 Constitution is of paramount importance. Despite complaints about the gaps that it contains, all parties have accepted it to give a constitutional nature to the process of the peaceful transfer of power. As soon as the constitutional article was changed, even former President Ben Ali realised that his role was over, his regime had collapsed, and governance would be different to what it was before. What gave further symbolic importance to this process of political transition was that those who carried out its noteworthy aspects were not from the new political forces, which began seeking to impose their presence, but were among those involved in the previous regime. These people were not known to have desired change, and not one of them was said to have given advice to the former president that even hinted at the need to change the administration of the affairs of the country. Nevertheless, the circumstances they went through unquestionably forced them to sign-off on the end of an era and the entrance of the country into a new and different phase. In other words, the regime was changed from within. This was despite the fact that those who revolted against it and rebelled against its structures were from outside the regime and were its victims, and that those from the former regime who carried it out did not do so willingly, but found themselves in exceptional and difficult circumstances from which they could not escape.

This means that the revolution that took place in Tunisia from the outset was reformist in nature and was based on constitutional change. It had a peaceful nature, avoiding political estrangement and with elements of the former regime without prior planning or direct or implicit collusion, with reliance on gradual progress and taking into account the balance of power. This would be reflected in the overall steps that were made later, which gave the Tunisian situation a special and exceptional nature that distinguished it from other experiences of political transition, at least in the circles of the Arab world.

A New Phase: Things Calmed Down for the Sake of Power

Afterwards, the upheaval of the revolution was assuaged and all partisan and ideological parties felt that their chances were close to gaining power and the country's leadership. This explains the state of dispersion that dominated the first multi-party and democratic elections held in the post- revolution phase, which led to the selection of the National Constituent Assembly. These elections were an opportunity for each party to understand its following, as each party or current claims that it is the most representative of the . Although the objective of the Constituent Assembly was establishing a new constitution after the suspension of the constitution of 1959, the goal of each party at that stage was to grab power which had previously belonged to the dominant party and to a president who had a monopoly on leadership. The National Constituent Assembly elections were not a battle for the drafting of a new constitution as much as they were, from the perspective of the competing parties, a battle for power. This had a direct impact on the rest of the transitional path in Tunisia.

The mechanisms that contributed to the framing of the situation of political transition in Tunisia are divided into two types. The first type relates to the procedural aspect, which is represented in the collection of practical rules embodied in the structures and rules that have been adhered to and that are subject to the realisation of the common objectives set by the active parties that are influential in this phase.

The second type relates to a set of values and ethical and political controls that imposed themselves in the transitional context, and reflected the reformist culture passed on from generation to generation in Tunisia, which revealed a stockpile of civic values retained by Tunisians within the process of accumulation of their historical experience.

Reference Mechanisms for Political Transition in Tunisia The Tunisian political class adopted a number of mechanisms that enabled them to ensure that the political transition process went smoothly despite the difficult situation and the complex internal and regional challenges. It will suffice in this short text to discuss the following mechanisms:

- The Election Mechanism: After painful experiences with the former regime in the era of Bourguiba and in the Ben Ali phase, where elections were just a formality devoid of freedom of choice and real pluralism just as their results were known in advance, a radical shift occurred after the revolution in the electoral practise that was not seen by the country before. Tunisia witnessed three electoral events during this phase: the National Constituent Assembly election, the election of parliament and finally the presidential election. No serious party doubted that these three elections took place under good, democratic conditions. Even if several parties differed about specifying the degree of fairness of these elections, they did not call into question the final results, with which all parties involved were satisfied - including the parties that were defeated.

This was a first in the contemporary political . From these three experiences, a new electoral culture emerged that gave most citizens freedom of choice, including the right to vote for any candidate, and voters resorted to punishing some of the parties by not voting for them. This led to a reduction of their weight down to their final exit from Parliament and down-scaling them by turning them into marginal political parties against the rise of other parties to power in a matter of a brief period, as had occurred after the collapse of the alliance and the rise of the Tunisia Appeal party or the party, formed by businessman Salim Riahi, which ranked third in the 2014 elections.

It was also for the first time in Tunisia that access to power and the exercise of power was through obligatory participation in the elections and according to the will of Tunisians. This represents an important and significant step towards the establishment of a democratic system based on the peaceful transfer of power that is satisfactory to all rival factions.

Alongside the electoral processes there was also a network of mechanisms, institutions and initiatives that contributed effectively to the protection of the elections, and the reduction to a large extent of the fraud and forgery ratio or the possibility of questioning the credibility of the results or marginalisation of voters or candidates of parties and independents. Contrary to what is happening in the whole of the Arab world, the are organised by a body independent of the Ministry of Interior and the government. It ensures its protection and supervision and has all the administrative, financial and legal powers. This is the “Independent High Authority for Elections”.

By virtue of the credibility gained by the elections and its direct impact on political life, providing a guarantee for the protection of the process of transfer of power peacefully from one group to another, public opinion in Tunisia was formed to be able to choose and settle the results in favour of one party or another, though there is still a need for a deeper political culture in order to prevent the manipulation and enticement of voters whether with money or with ideological or regional affiliations.

When the Constitution becomes a Reference Authority

The Second Mechanism: A Democratic Constitution: Most Arab countries have constitutions, but the new Tunisian constitution is distinguished from them by two essential factors. The first is by virtue of its having various guaranteed rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of conscience, and laying down protective mechanisms for them. This made the constitution a binding and secure document by all citizens. Secondly, the constitution was not produced by one party at the expense of others, but was a result of the conflict between different political parties and civil society with its multiple components, which had an impact on the drafting. This led to broad consensus and made it a reference document supported by the various political and social forces involved in the process of democratic transition in Tunisia. It is sufficient to mention in this context that the percentage of votes by members of the National Constituent Assembly in favour of the constitution document amounted to 200 deputies who voted for, 4 deputies who abstained, and 12 deputies who voted against the text of the constitution. This made the vast majority support the new constitution with vigour and conviction.

Tunisia's new constitution has other dimensions that are no less important. Thanks to the stormy controversy and sharp conflict that accompanied the drafting, article by article, what was common among Tunisians was reinstated, and the Ennahda movement specifically was pushed to resolve the issue of belonging to the Tunisian peculiarity. This movement, which represents the most prominent faction of the phenomenon of political in Tunisia, found itself driven in that hot atmosphere, towards the acceptance of a societal style peculiar to Tunisia, which made it give up a number of its previous demands, first and foremost being “Islamic Shariah” law. This requirement was the one around which most of the religious forces in Tunisia gathered, from the Salafists in their various trends, through the Hizb ut-Tahrir, and to the various components of the conservative trend in religious circles. Because of this demand for Shariah as a source of legislation, the Ennahda Movement almost became divided in itself after the conservatives within it exerted all forms of pressure in order to stick up until the last moment to the need for stipulating Shariah law in the constitution.

Had it not been for the compromised wording reached by the head of the movement, , the movement would have split. In this he leaned towards the interpretation that the movement had triumphed when the final text of the constitution began considering that Islam is the state religion, and since Islam is wider than the Shariah, sufficing with this makes the Shariah a part of it. This is loose wording, but it was enough to push the Ennahda movement and its supporters to accept a new constitution that does not explicitly mention Shariah as the sole or major source or even as a source of legislation in Tunisia.

Despite the fact that this incited the rest of the factions of in the Tunisian arena against the Ennahda Movement and deepened the gap between the two parties, especially the so-called “Jihadi Salafists” who would later turn to taking up arms in the face of the state and society. Ennahda's commitment to the constitution and its desperate defence of it has strengthened national unity and enabled Tunisians to reach a constitution that is progressive and inclusive of all Tunisians. That was a historic moment and a giant step successfully taken by the experience of democratic transition in Tunisia, because the integration of the main faction of the Islamists and the Tunisisation of it. In the deeper sense of the word and not in its common folklore concept, was an historic achievement that saved Tunisians from deep division and stopped them from falling into the fate of a catastrophe similar to what happened in the rest of the Arab countries that tried to move in turn from tyranny to democracy, but were hit by sectarian obstacles and tendencies to understand Islam and its role in society in a literal way.

Thirdly: Consensus after Consensus

Similarly, one of the dimensions of the writing of the constitution and the consensus around it is that it formed a historic and necessary occasion that enabled Tunisians to remember that they have a long constitutional path that extends to the nineteenth century when their ancestors created a document. The left in turn realised the importance of identity and the cultural dimension of Tunisian society, which made its most prominent trends and factions evolve their positions during the conflict over the contents of the constitution. This scored some points in its favour during the discussion on the constitution document, but it in turn amended part of the ideological and political visions towards various other matters pertaining to Islam and the cultural components of Tunisia. It also represented an important step that in turn helped to reach common ground that brought together the left and the Islamists on a constitution document, even though each had its own interpretations of a number of articles which had previously been a source of friction and conflict. There is no doubt that transcending the ideological barrier between the Islamists and leftists through the harmonic wordings that have been reached, has provided the opportunity for the completion of the constitution and voting it in with the very broad majority.

National Dialogue and the Elite’s Bypassing the State of Division

The Tunisian elite do not constitute an exception when compared to the rest of the elite of the Arab world in terms of their ideological and political divisions. Despite this, the facts of the political transition in Tunisia have proven that its elite have managed on more than one occasion to go beyond its narrow calculations, which are many. Also to succeed in managing their differences in a positive way, making it more able than others in most Arab States to go beyond some of the structural difficulties faced by it during the first phase of the transition process.

The term “national dialogue” is regarded as one of the best achievements of these elite and received a positive response on the Arab and international levels, given the importance of the gains resulting from them. It gave more individuality and peculiarity to the Tunisian experience as compared to other Arab experiences that coincided with it but eventually failed as it did in Syria, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

Dialogue is a communicative value. “National dialogue” is a mechanism for bringing together conflicting parties in order to overcome the differences existing between them, to help them curb the dispute, to build common ground between them, to gradually move towards establishing a minimum level of trust. Also to encourage everyone to make significant concessions that would achieve the same quality results that helped to overcome the impasse and improve the national situation to the finest degree. Overall banishing the spectre of civil war, maintaining a minimum of the gains achieved, and opening up the possibility of pushing towards the country's reaching better conditions.

By reference to the Tunisian case it can be argued that national dialogue has achieved most of those results if not all. Three important factors assisted in this:

The first is the quartet who managed the national dialogue: This quartet was represented in the quality of civil society organisations that took up the task and achieved a significant proportion of success that spared the country a serious setback on the transitional path.

It was not possible to achieve this level of success without the symbolic importance enjoyed by these organisations. This initiative brought together civic bodies of importance that enjoy a measure of sufficient credibility that made them heard by the parties to the dispute and conflict.

The presence of the Tunisian General Labour Union within the quartet helped a lot to achieve a significant measure of trust among the political parties, including the Ennahda Movement, which during the rule of the Troika was in a real crisis with the Union because of the escalation of strikes. The Union, although no longer the sole representative of workers after trade union pluralism was legally recognised, remains the most powerful organisation in the defence of the working class in Tunisia.

The involvement of the Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts in this initiative for the first time together with the Labour Union in turn constituted another factor helping to bring a measure of seriousness to this dialogue because the role of businessmen in Tunisia differed greatly after the revolution from what it was before. They found themselves in the phase of political transition motivated to protect their interests directly after the ruling authority in the pre-January 2014 phase was the one that assumed that in exchange for political loyalty and support for the regime. The role of the National Bar Association and the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights gave special significance to the dialogue because of their status in the area of defence of freedoms and rights.

Given all these considerations, we can say that this quartet provided a historic opportunity for civil society to play a leading role in a difficult stage of the country's history. This made the leader of the Ennahda Movement, Rached Ghannouchi, acknowledge that it was civil society who led the parties in the process of achieving political reconciliation and not vice versa.

Now let us discuss the second factor that characterised the success of the national dialogue in pushing the parties to the conflict towards achieving mutual agreement on the minimum level. Despite the fact that this agreement was not easy and required major effort, reaching it has revealed the advantage of the Tunisian political elite with all its major components. This advantage has been the willingness of politicians to concede major concessions when they feel that the country's security and unity will be in certain danger. Each party put forward its conditions, and everyone held on to their demands to the last moment, but the country was on the verge of civil war, especially in light of the implications of what was happening in Egypt after the overthrow of former President at the hands of the military establishment.

Some of the opposition parties in Tunisia incited the overthrow of the Troika government through the use of violence and calling the Tunisian army and security units to move and rebel against those holding power at that stage even though they were elected by the people. This made the ruling coalition at the time hold its breath and prepare to take serious action against its opponents. These were defining moments in the history of the country, and also in the path of the experience of political transition, where the choices were level. The Egyptian atmosphere almost washed away the Tunisian experience and terminated it by tossing it into the midst of chaos.

Consensus was not an optional thing as much as it was absolutely necessary at a moment when everyone felt the danger and realised that they could lose everything if they did not let wisdom prevail and cling to a political reconciliation of their differences.

In this context, it must be acknowledged that the leadership of the Ettakatol party had played a positive role in those difficult moments. That was when the President of the National Constituent Assembly, Mustapha Ben Jaafar, decided to suspend meetings of the Council waiting for the return of the retreating deputies. He only did this because he sensed the real dangers that had begun to threaten the country and the people. The conflict between the blocs had surpassed its political limits and began to endanger everyone if not brought under control. Although that stance split the ruling coalition from within, it helped in turn to provide the best climate to reach a collective agreement that had the effect of closing one of the difficult pages of the transitional path. The decision placed the country on more solid ground after the Ennahda Movement accepted the dissolution of the government, the departure of the executive authority, and the acceptance of the technocratic government. More important was the involvement of everyone in a heated and sometimes sharp debate in order to reach a consensual constitution. Regardless of the series of manoeuvres adopted by everyone to reach this important result, what happened in the national dialogue would not have been possible without this feature in the culture of the elite. By this we mean the feature of consensus, which is considered to be one of the most important components of the Tunisian reformist movement, by virtue of which this movement was able to achieve many gains during its long journey.

Consensus may drive those involved in it to multiple forms of manoeuvring, fabrication and the adoption of different types of tactics. However, its importance lies - as evidenced by the Tunisian experience - in that it drives those involved in it towards overcoming obstacles, and makes them more able to avoid resorting to violence in order to resolve their differences. Consensus may make them discover in the end that they moved from tactical adjustments to strategic changes in their thinking, intellectual and political plans, and visions.

It can be seen from the foregoing that the Tunisian political landscape has changed significantly since the absence of former President Ben Ali from power because of its inability to put an end to the protest movement that almost devastated the whole country. So as not to lead to a state of chaos, parties, civil society and independent personalities bore the responsibility to fill the void and to assume the responsibility of securing the transitional phase. This process has undergone many mechanisms, some of which we have mentioned. The aim was not to know about all of these mechanisms, but to highlight the underlying peaceful and democratic characteristics that marked the transitional path in Tunisia, in spite of the difficulties and obstacles faced by the country and which still remain.

Economy and Security are two Parallel Lines

The political class, especially those that were in the opposition box in the era of President Ben Ali, were not ready for governance. They totally lacked the necessary experience, and they did not have real programmes to cope with the large amount of problems inherited from the previous phase, which was further aggravated after the revolution.

Adding to the complexity of the transition was that the old and new parties caused many problems for themselves when they made promises to Tunisians in order to win their support. However, as soon they rose to the level of responsibility they found themselves unable to fulfil those promises given the huge gap between reality and expectations. This put all of these parties, without exception, into a situation of default when it clashed with the difficult variables that occurred in the public domain, and in particular issues related to the economy and social climate.

The Tunisian elite have succeeded in laying the foundations of a political system inspired by democratic experiences, but it failed to even write this text to reach the point of laying the foundations for new lines of development. This was after a wide majority of politicians and economists acknowledged that the old vein had exhausted its purpose and had become unable to achieve development and social justice. For this very reason the Tunisian model is facing real difficulties that have made it fall apart sometimes almost entirely due to the rising tide of strikes and sit-ins as a result of the deterioration of social conditions of the poor and middle class. This has made the successive governments after the revolution resort to even more indebtedness to the extent that the volume of debts has exceeded fifty per cent. Most of these loans have gone towards securing wage increases without achieving the corresponding desired balance between production and consumption.

Given the wide gap between the volume of demands and the state’s ability to respond, a large part of public opinion discovered that political democracy together with the freedoms, elections and building of institutions that it implies, is not enough to secure a democratic transition with the complete dimensions and contents. It is not enough to lay down a constitution, organise democratic and fair elections, for the press to become free, and to segregate authorities, until the conditions of citizens improve, there is guaranteed progress in the areas of social justice, and development proceeds unimpeded.

It is true that democracy is an important factor to achieve development, but it is conditional on the availability of the political will to achieve integration between democracy as mechanisms for governance and the actual policies aimed at the development of national wealth; and everyone is able to benefit from the accumulation that would result from this collective effort. Political democracy benefits the major parties, but all citizens will only realise the importance of the transition from autocracy to a regime based on the power of the people when they feel that their economic and social conditions have begun to improve.

In light of the foregoing, it can be said that Tunisia has become, thanks to the changes that occurred “an emerging democratic state.” It is a true historic achievement, but that alone did not guarantee that the Tunisian people will enjoy continued stability. Due to its worsening economic crisis and complex security situations on account of the threats represented by the phenomenon of the armed Salafi groups that have adopted terrorism as a means to undermine the national state on the local and regional levels. If we add the severe turmoil in most Arab countries, especially Libya, the Tunisian state remains the only political exception in the region. But it is a fragile exception and is prone to a relapse if Tunisians are unable to protect their national unity, overcome the economic and social dilemma, and confront by virtue of their collective will the risks of security threats that seek to blow up the democratic transition and enter the country into the circle of savage wars into which several Arab countries have fallen.