The Reform of Presidential-Election Rules in Latin America: Plurality, Runoff, and Ranked-Choice Voting

THE REFORM OF PRESIDENTIAL-ELECTION RULES IN LATIN AMERICA: PLURALITY, RUNOFF, AND RANKED-CHOICE VOTING Prepared for delivery at the 2019 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, May 24-27, Boston, USA, Massachusetts. Cynthia McClintock* Dept. of Political Science George Washington University [email protected] *The author would like to thank Joseph Cerrone, Ph.D. candidate in political science at George Washington University, for his outstanding research for this paper. In recent decades, there has been a major reform of presidential-election rules in Latin America and world-wide. The most common rule has shifted from plurality (first- past-the-post) to majority runoff (a requirement for a second round between the top two candidates if no candidate reaches a certain threshold of the vote—usually 50%). In the 1950s,plurality was used in more than 50 percent of presidential elections but, between 2000 and 2011, in less than 30 percent; by contrast, in the 1950s majority runoff was used in less than 10 percentbut between 2000 and 2011 in about 60 percent.1The shift has continued. Among the countries classified as “electoral democracies” in 2016 that directly elected their presidents, 73 percent in Latin America, 88 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 86 percent in Europe, and 63 percent in the Asia-Pacific used majority runoff.2In Latin America, the only country that used runoff prior to 1978 was Costa Rica; by contrast, as of 2014 twelve of the eighteen countries holding competitive elections used runoff. Even more recently, an additional electoral rule has gained considerable attention: ranked-choice voting (also called “instant runoff,” the “instantaneous vote,” and “the alternative vote”). With this rule, voters rank their top candidates. If no candidate wins more than 50 percent of first-choice votes, the candidate with the fewest first choices is eliminated and voters who chose this candidate have their ballots added to the totals of their second-ranked candidate; then, the ballots are re-tabulated. This process continues until a candidate reaches 50 percent. Ranked-choice voting has been adopted for presidential elections in Sri Lanka (and also in Ireland, where the position is ceremonial); nation-wide legislative elections in Australia, India, and Papua New Guinea; and many sub-national elections, including elections in cities in six U.S. states. First, this paper examines the implications of the shift from plurality to runoff for the quality of democracy in Latin America between 1990 and 2018. It argues that the runoff reform succeeded: the rule lowered barriers to entry into electoral arena for new parties, but at the same time required majority support and impeded the election of a president at an ideological extreme. Especially given that a major challenge to many Latin American democracies during the 1980s-2000s was the incorporation of the previously excluded political left into the electoral arena, these effects of the reform were particularly advantageous. Second, the paper asks whether or not the positive impact of the runoff reform in Latin America is holding true in Latin American presidential elections in 2018 and 2019. The paper suggests that, for the most part, the advantages of the reform are holding true. However, political polarization has increased and, as a result, the possibility that the “Condorcet winner” (the candidate who would defeat every other candidate in a pair-wise contest) has also increased. Third, the paper asks if ranked-choice voting (RCV) would be superior to runoff. A key premise of RCV is that candidates will seek not only first-choice but also second- choice and third-choice votes and, thereby, reduce political polarization—arguably, a major advantage in the current era. However, RCV is rare and research on RCV is scant, and the statements in this paper are largely speculative. I. THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF RUNOFF REFORM FOR DEMOCRACY First, this section describes the author’s quantitative analysis of the effect of runoff versus plurality rules on democracy in Latin America during the third wave (1978- ). Then, it seeks to explain the success of the runoff reform. Whereas the data for the test of runoff versus plurality rules begin in 1990 and end in 2018, most other data are available only for 1990-2012. Throughout, “Latin America” refers to the eighteen Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries that were electoral democracies, with the exception of Bolivia, for the reason indicated below. A.Quantitative Analysis of the Effect of Runoff versus Plurality on Levels of Democracy In the elaboration of the dataset, I made decisions about classifications for plurality versus runoff, indicators for levels of democracy, and the start year for the analysis. For most Latin American countries, the classification of runoff versus plurality is straightforward. Throughout the third wave, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela used plurality. Either at the start of the third wave in the country or subsequently, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, and Uruguay shifted to majority runoff (runoff with a threshold of 50% of the vote). However, there are some anomalies. First, until 2009, Bolivia’s rule was that if no candidate tallied 50%, the president was selected by the legislature from among the top two finishers (or, prior to 1990, the top three finishers); following conventional scholarly opinion (McClintock, 2018: 14-15), I omitted Bolivia from the study. Second, how should runoffs with thresholds for victory below 50 percent be classified? The countries applying a reduced threshold are Argentina since its 1995 election (45 percent or 40 percent with a ten-point lead), Costa Rica (40 percent without a lead), Ecuador since its 2002 election (40 percent with a ten-point lead), and Nicaragua for its 1996 election (45 percent) and for its 2001, 2006, and 2011 elections (35 percent with a 5 percent lead or 40 percent). I classified thresholds for a first-round victory between 40 percent and 50 percent as runoff but thresholds below 40 percent as plurality. Why? Because a threshold below 40 percent is widely deemed so low as tantamount to plurality (McClintock, 2018: 15). The only country with such a threshold for more than one election was Nicaragua. The threshold was promoted in 2000 by former president Daniel Ortega, who at the time was seeking re-election but doubted that he could win more than 40 percent in a first round or a subsequent runoff. How should the level of democracy be indicated? Of course, democracy is a disputed concept. But, in recent years, both Freedom House scores, measuring political rights and civil liberties (www.freedomhouse.org) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) scores (www.v-dem.net) are widely considered the best measures available. As is conventional practice, I added Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties, so that the best possible score was 2 and the worst possible score 14, and normalized scores, so that 100 was the best and 0 the worst. Of the five varieties of democracy in the V-Dem project, Liberal Democracy, emphasizing civil liberties and effective checks and balances, is the classic variety in my analysis. The year 1990 was selected as the start year. Countries were only included after they were widely considered to be holding free and fair elections because election rules usually matter only in free and fair elections. Prior to 1990, five countries (El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Nicaragua) were still widely considered not to have transited to democracy, and the entry of a new country or set of countries shifts the average score nominally for runoff or plurality towards the traditional level of democracy of the country entering the dataset. (In other words, when Chile entered the dataset, the average score for runoff countries increased.) Figure 1 graphs the trajectory of Freedom House scores under runoff versus plurality between 1990 and 2018 and Figure 2 graphs the trajectory of V-Dem scores. The trends for Freedom House and V-Dem scores are similar. Between 1990 and 1998, scores with runoff were slightly inferior to scores with plurality, but after 1998 scores improved with runoff and plummeted with plurality. Figure 1 Presidential-election Rules and Freedom House Scores, 1990-2018 Figure 2 Presidential-election Rules and V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) Scores, 1990-2018 To assess whether it was presidential-election rules or other factors that affected levels of democracy, I conducted regression analysis. A runoff rule was coded as 1 and a plurality rule as 0. Control variables included: GDP per capita (in constant 2010 U.S. dollars); the annual percentage change in GDP growth, the Gini coefficient of inequality; education (percentage for completion of primary school); the age of the democratic regime; and the effective number of political parties (ENPP)calculated through the index developed by Murkku Laakso and Rein Taagepera. In addition, because the relationship between ENPP and levels of democracy was non-linear (McClintock, 2018: 33), I introduced a quadratic (squared) term of ENPP. To account for potential unobserved heterogeneity, I used a random effects linear model. (However, the results from an Ordinary Least Squares model were similar.) In the regression analysis, presidential-election rule was statistically significant. Runoff was significant to superior Freedom House and V-Dem scores at the .05 level. Among the control variables, only the Gini coefficient was significant at the .05 level or better; surprisingly, more severe inequality was positively related to V-Dem scores at the .01 level. B. Why Was Runoff Superior? Lowering Barriers of Entry to the Electoral Arena Runoff opens a presidential election to new parties. In Latin American presidential elections between 1978 and 2012, a “new party” became a “significant contender” considerably more often under runoff than plurality (McClintock, 2018: 61- 64).

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