THE MYTH: HOW HITLER AND THE ALLIES MISREAD THE STRATEGIC LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II PDF, EPUB, EBOOK

John Mosier | 320 pages | 01 Dec 2004 | HarperCollins Publishers Inc | 9780060009779 | English | New York, NY, The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Lessons of World War II PDF Book By his own account, Churchill was indeed shocked, as he had every right to be. See details for description of any imperfections. Mosier, John. Select a website referencing style: Copy to Clipboard Copied! The Second World War was ultimately decided by attrition - the Germans lacked the manpower and resources to win, and were gradually worn down, and the land campaigns particularly in the East were fundamental to that process. Read an excerpt of this book! On page he quotes a wildly inflated and discredited number for the deaths at Dresden. It's an entertaining read and it if you are new to WW2 history it will make you want to investigate further like it did with me. Aug 21, Cheng Jun rated it really liked it. The author lumps both these theories under the catchall phrase "Breakthrough" and discusses how misunderstanding of them distorted planning. The second theory, advanced by Italian airman Giulio Douhet, was that strategic bombardment by aircraft could on their own cause so much damage that the enemy's will and ability to resist would collapse. Jun 20, Brian rated it really liked it Shelves: wwii. View Product. Dec 27, Steven Raszewski rated it it was amazing. In point of fact, Hitler was one of the few Germans who believed in the Breakthrough doctrine, and he attempted to use the strategy once he took over military affairs. The author only focuses on the western fronts; he has almost nothing to say about in Russia and almost no explanation for ignoring it. Dec 31, Jarrod Zhang rated it really liked it. Give it a try. Thankfully, he does acknowledge Montgomery's shortcomings, especially when it comes down to , the ill-advised plan to drop airborne troops in Holland to take a bunch of bridges and then have an armored spearhead drive up the road to meet them. The Germans made more use of radio and younger commanders like Manstein, Guderian and Rommel believed in leading from the front, using radio, and giving commanders more freedom to act sometimes much more than more senior German commanders liked. Additional Product Features Dewey Edition. The approach, taken in the book, and the material, we learnt about the Blitzkrieg Myth from other textbooks and lectures, differ considerably. Too many weak arguments and a main premise which seems to misrepresent the importance and roles of armor and in WW2. John Mosier shows how Hitler, Rommel, von Manstein, Montgomery, and Patton were all equally seduced by the breakthrough myth, or blitzkrieg, as the decisive way to victory. In the first two examples he uses he does well to present his position, using and the to show that the Germans weren't really doing anything new and that the Poles and the Dutch actually gave a better accounting for themselves than is generally presented in books on the war. His views on are in many ways less supportable, but the are still plausible. Jul 10, Darth Readius rated it it was amazing. The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Lessons of World War II Writer

This is a good read for students of WWII and armchair tacticians, especially those who enjoy wandering off in Google searches. A large part of the Allied victory was the of German cities that severely disrupted German industry, especially munitions. Refresh and try again. From the corridors of power inWashington to the frontlines of the waron terror, Dale Brown Allied generals who tried the strategy inevitably found that the Germans were able to quickly shift defenses to halt the attacks. How to His position on the Poles has been being presented more and more often in recent times, giving a great deal of credence to his views. The approach, taken in the book, and the material, we learnt about the Blitzkrieg Myth from other textbooks and lectures, differ considerably. Well researched, and well written. In his. As a result The Germans could react to the tactical situation much faster than their French counterparts, who often received orders that were inappropriate to a changed situation. But I don't fully understand his interpretation of operation Market Garden. It is unclear exactly how influential these two theorists were. What about the big picture? But he gets two major things right. He says the Sherman was under gunned and under armored, generally true compared to the later German . But this is the vital point the historian Churchill understood only too well: An army can indeed recover from a rout or a breakthrough -- if there is a reserve to plug the gap. He could have presented his points, and then addressed refutes immediately so the reader has things fresh in his mind. It will give some insight in further reading. I found the contents fascinaing but the delivery stilted. The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Lessons of World War II Reviews

Uh-oh, it looks like your Internet Explorer is out of date. On page he quotes a wildly inflated and discredited number for the deaths at Dresden. His views on France are in many ways less supportable, but the are still plausible. Mosier attributes the German success primarily to a loss of nerve by the French and British high command and politicians. Will the collapse of international cooperation push France, Turkey, Japan, and Saudi Arabia to the top of international concerns? Rather than the being a uniquely French expensive exercise in futility, the use of extensive fortifications was also adopted by the Germans in the west - which unlike the Maginot line ran from the full length of 's border and the east. Dec 09, Andrew rated it it was amazing Shelves: ww2-books. But to enact this type of warfare you needed to disperse the decision making which empowers officers at all levels to make decisions. In his. Douhet does not appear to have been studied in the the UK, the only country that attempted to build a strategic bombing force before the war. Allied generals who tried the strategy inevitably found that the Germans were able to quickly shift defenses to halt the attacks. It will give some insight in further reading. Everyone with an interest in World War II or modern military doctrine and theory should read this book. His skills in editing and writing also promise that this book is written in clear and comprehensible English. According to Churchill, Gamelin replied "Aucune", there is none. Mosier quotes sources that say that every German soldier was equal to about 1. Mosie Conventional history holds, according to Mosier, that the of France was won by new blitzkrieg lightning war tactics used by the Germans, leveraging their superior armoured forces and air forces against French forces sheltering behind the expensive and ineffectual Maginot Line. He has the distinct advantage of not being a of any of the big names in World War II, and so offers probably as close to a fair assessment of Rommel, Bradley, Montgomery, etc. It is something that comes up fairly often in German accounts and some of the Russian ones that are available. The T glacis was sloped at a better angle, and it had thicker side armor, also sloped. Overview A bold reinterpretation of some of the most decisive of World War II, showing that the outcomes had less to do with popular new technology than old—fashioned, on—the—ground warfare. Readers also enjoyed. Mosier shows that, despite what we have been told, Germany did not have a clear superiority in tanks at the beginning of the war, and that the Germans did not subscribe to the "Blitzkrieg" strategy to invade Poland and France. On the contrary it would be more accurate to say that truth is the first casualty of the theories of war. See all 2 pre-owned listings. The lack of reserves were critical. Totally recommend though! I think Mosier could have greatly enhanced his arguments by being honest with the facts and acknowledging the challenges to his opinions. Check the price of your paper. Mosier omits to mention that he came to Paris on the 16th to hear the facts from Gamelin himself. Jul 23, Dj rated it liked it. By doing so, he obscures the fact that the German position was untenable even before their failed counter-attack at Avranches, which he blames for the German defeat. The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Lessons of World War II Read Online

Learn how to enable JavaScript on your browser. The book is heavy on heroes and villains, particularly on unconventional ones. Error rating book. A almost exact replay of what happened during the . Fuller's was noted for his acerbic criticism of his peers and superiors, and his support for the the British fascists prior to the war made him highly suspect. Mosier repeats this approach in his chapter on the Battle of , where he dismisses the American breakthrough at Avranches because it went "backward", i. He had the victory within his grasp would he have managed to tame his demons. Most countries and companies are not prepared for It is something that comes up fairly often in German accounts and some of the Russian ones that are available. Which can be entertaining at first but upon further reflection it can be slightly annoying. His minimization of the paralyzing affect that the German armor columns had on High Commands is also wishful thinking. From the corridors of power inWashington to the frontlines of the waron terror, Dale Brown According to Mosier, it was this that led to a general collapse of the Allied position, which up to then had been, at least according to Mosier, tenable. As a result The Germans could react to the tactical situation much faster than their French counterparts, who often received orders that were inappropriate to a changed situation. Indeed a major challenge to the conventional wisdom, and a serious accusation. Dec 09, Erik rated it it was ok. He presents both types of notes: which he could agree with, and which he could argue. The fact that no Nation has ever actually surrendered from just an air attack does a great deal to make his point for him and the US Strategic Bombing Survey does as well. But that becomes academic when the German 50mm PAK38 L60 could penetrate both well beyond meters. This is an excitingly heretical book.

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