Cooperation with the International
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EU Political Conditionality and Domestic Politics: Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Croatia and Serbia By Jelena Stojanovic Central European University Department of International Relations and European Studies Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science Supervisor: Dr Ulrich Sedelmeier CEU eTD Collection Word count: 79,142 Budapest, 2009 1 DECLARATION I hereby declare that no parts of the thesis have been submitted to no other institution different from CEU towards a degree. To my knowledge nor does the thesis contains unreferenced material or ideas from other authors. Jelena Stojanovic ---------------------------------------- CEU eTD Collection 2 Summary Starting from the literature that analyzes the influence of the EU on domestic conditions in member states the thesis attempts to expand the scope of literature by focusing on candidate and potential candidate states Croatia and Serbia. The thesis identifies the main factors that influence the fulfillment of the specific EU membership conditions, especially the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The main question is which factors hamper of facilitate compliance with political conditionality and how the variation of the compliance record between the states and within the same states during different time periods can be explained. The research uses rationalist arguments, where actors are studied in terms of how they react to external pressures in light of their interests in the domestic political arena. The factors are threat of incumbent government losing power, attitude of governments towards the ICTY and EU, partisan veto players, institutional veto points and size and timing of EU rewards. The two countries are divided into seven cases, on the basis of the elections held in the last twelve years. The conclusions can be summarized as follows: EU rewards are necessary but not sufficient to tip off the balance in favor of fulfillment of the conditions for membership. As both Croatia and Serbia demonstrated there are certain issues related to national sovereignty that are not easily sidelined. Therefore, when domestic conditions are ripe CEU eTD Collection and if they do not endanger government position and are not against fundamental principles on which the governing party makes its policy, then the conditions are fulfilled. 3 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Ulrich Sedelmeier for supporting me and believing in my research, sometimes more than I believed in it myself. Without his guidance and assistance this research would not have been finished. My special thanks go to Mr Zeljko Hodonj project manager of the Vjesnik Newspaper Documentation center in Zagreb, for allowing me to use their archives and copy all necessary materials free of charge. Without these essential materials the chapters on Croatia would not have been complete. I would like to thank Julia Paraizs and Iren Varga for administrative support related to the PhD program and other organizational issues, but mostly for being there to listen to all the problems that came up during the program and for always finding the right solutions. I am indebted to Julia Szelivanov for letting me use her flat and for always providing necessary documents to help me with the bureaucratic issues at Hungarian Immigration services and tedious process of renewing temporary residence permit. My deepest gratitude goes to my family, especially my father, who provided me with emotional and material support over the years of my education, and whose encouragement helped me to keep on working on my research. CEU eTD Collection 4 List of tables Table 1: Factors that influence compliance……………………………………………..27 Table 2: Heads of state/government in Serbia and Croatia 1993-2000…………………38 Table 3: Number of veto players based on the system of government………………….40 Table 4: Types of government, veto players and how it influences decision making….. 40 Table 5: Changes in electoral support for party blocs 1990-2000……………………...218 Table 6: The left right position of Croatian parties 1990-2000………………………....219 Table 7: Powers of the president of Croatia before and after 2000……………………..220 Table 8: Institutional structure for cooperation with ICTY …………………………….221 Table 9: Serbia-summary of factors and outcome of cooperation with the ICTY……....264 Table 10: Croatia-summary of factors and outcome of cooperation with the ICTY….....265 CEU eTD Collection 5 Chapter 1 - Introduction...................................................................................................................... 8 1.1 Research Question ........................................................................................................................ 10 1.2 Evolution of EU relations with former Yugoslav republics............................................................. 11 1.3 Review of literature....................................................................................................................... 17 1.4 Explanatory framework................................................................................................................. 34 1.5 Case selection and methodology.................................................................................................... 41 1.6 Brief overview of chapters ............................................................................................................ 48 1.7 Summary of findings..................................................................................................................... 52 Chapter 2-Serbia 1993-2000 ............................................................................................................. 61 2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 61 2.2 Actors: general positions and power costs...................................................................................... 64 2.3 Institutional veto points................................................................................................................. 67 2.4 Partisan Veto Players .................................................................................................................... 70 2.5 External pressures and incentives .................................................................................................. 79 2.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................................... 86 Chapter 3 -Serbia 2000-2003............................................................................................................ 89 3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 89 3.2 Actors: general positions and power costs...................................................................................... 90 3.3 Institutional veto points................................................................................................................. 94 3.4 Partisan veto players ..................................................................................................................... 97 3.5 External pressure and incentives.................................................................................................. 100 3.5.1 Arrest and extradition of Milosevic and the law on cooperation with the ICTY...................... 101 3.5.2 New indictments, the protests of the Special Forces and assassination of the Prime Minister.. 112 3.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 124 Chapter 4- Serbia 2003-08 .............................................................................................................. 126 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 126 4.2 Actors: general positions and power costs.................................................................................... 127 4.3 Institutional veto points............................................................................................................... 132 4.4 Partisan veto players ................................................................................................................... 137 4.5 External pressures and incentives ................................................................................................ 141 4.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 157 Chapter 5 - Serbia 2008 - present.................................................................................................. 159 5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 159 5.2 Actors: general positions and power costs.................................................................................... 160 5.3 Institutional veto points............................................................................................................... 165 5.4 Partisan veto players ..................................................................................................................