CEU eTD Collection Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree forthe oftherequirement fulfillment in partial submitted Dissertation Cooperation thewith International Criminal Tribunal EU Political Conditionality andDomestic Politics: for the Former Yugoslavia inCroatia and Serbia Department of International Relations and European Studies of in of Doctor ofPhilosophy Science Political Supervisor: Dr Ulrich Sedelmeier Ulrich Dr Supervisor: Central European University European Central Word count: Word count: 79,142 Jelena Stojanovic Budapest, 2009 By 1 CEU eTD Collection ------Stojanovic Jelena ideas authors. material or from other unreferenced contains thesis does a nor the Tomy degree. knowledge from CEU towards different I hereby declare that no parts of the thesis have been submitted to no other institution DECLARATION 2 CEU eTD Collection fulfilled. principles on which its governingthe policy, party makes conditions then the are fundamental against not are and position government endanger not do they if and sovereignty that arenational to issues related certain are there demonstrated Serbia and Croatia As both not easily sidelined.sufficient Therefore,to tip off the balance in favor of fulfillment of the conditions for membership.when domestic conditions are of heldbasis in elections years. the lasttwelve the ripe and size and timing of EU rewards. The two countries are divided intoseven cases, on the governments towards ICTYandthe EU,partisan players, veto institutional veto points attitudelosing of power, government incumbent arethreatof arena. Thefactors how they react to externalexplained. pressures The research in useslightrecord rationalistbetweencompliance the of of variation their the how and arguments, interestsconditionality the political wherewith compliance actorsinstates the are domesticstudied in termsand political of hamperfacilitate factors of Themain iswhich question formerYugoslavia (ICTY). withinthe for Tribunal Criminal International the the with cooperation the especially conditions, same statesmembership EU specific the of fulfillment the influence that factors main the identifies during different thesis The statesCroatia andSerbia. candidate andpotential focusing on candidate time by literature of toexpandthescope thethesisattempts memberin states conditions periods can be Summary The conclusions can be summarized as follows: EU rewards arenecessary but not EUon domestic the influence of analyzes the that literature from the Starting 3 CEU eTD Collection encouragement helpedmetokeeponworking onmyresearch. emotional andmaterialsupport overmy education,andwhose theyears of especially whowithMy deepestgratitudegoestomyfamily, father, me provided services andtediousprocessrenewing of temporaryresidence permit. necessary documentstohelp mewith thebureaucratic issues atHungarianImmigration alwaysI amindebtedtoJuliaSzelivanov lettingmeuseher providing andfor for flat solutions. theright always finding and for all theproblemsthatcameupduringprogram the PhDbut mostlyforbeingthere program andotherorganizationalissues, tolisten wouldI administrative liketothankJuliaParaizs support for andIren relatedVarga to Croatia would nothavebeencomplete. necessary freeofcharge. materials Withoutthese essential materials thechapterson Documentation center forallowingme tousein Zagreb, theirarchives copy all and VjesnikMy specialthanks managerofthe Newspaper go toMrZeljko Hodonjproject Without hisguidance andassistance this research would nothavebeenfinished. supporting meandbelieving inmyresearch, more sometimes than Ibelievedinitmyself. Firstsupervisor andforemost,Iwouldliketo DrUlrich for thank my Sedelmeier Acknowledgements 4 CEU eTD Collection Table 10: Croatia-summary of factors and outcome of cooperationwith the ICTY….....265 Table 9: Serbia-summary of factors and outcome of cooperation with the ICTY……....264 Table 8: Institutional structure forcooperation with ICTY …………………………….221 Table 7: Powers of the president of Croatia before and after 2000……………………..220 Table 6: The left right position of Croatian parties 1990-2000………………………....219 Table 5: Changes in electoral support forparty blocs 1990-2000……………………...218 Table 4:Types of government, veto players and how it influences decision making….. 40 of government………………….40 system the on based players of veto Number 3: Table Table 2: Heads of state/government in Serbia and Croatia 1993-2000…………………38 Table 1: Factors that influence compliance……………………………………………..27 List of tables List of 5 CEU eTD Collection Chapter 3 -Serbia 2000-2003 3-Serbia Chapter Chapter 5 - Serbia2008present 5 Chapter 2003-08 4- Serbia Chapter 1993-2000 2-Serbia Chapter 1-Introduction Chapter Chapter 6- Croatia 1993-1999 Croatia 6- Chapter Chapter 7- Croatia 2000-2003 Croatia 7- Chapter Chapter 8- Croatia 2003-05 Croatia 8- Chapter . ocuin...... 86 2.6 Conclusion...... 2.5 External 79 pressures and ...... incentives 70 2.4 Partisan Veto ...... Players 2.3 Institutional 67 veto points...... 2.2 Actors: general positions 64 and powercosts...... 61 2.1 Introduction ...... ocuin...... 124 3.6 Conclusion...... 3.5 External pressure 100 and incentives...... 97 3.4 Partisan ...... veto players 3.3 Institutional 94 veto points...... 3.2 Actors: general positions 90 and powercosts...... 89 3.1 Introduction ...... 1.7 Summary 52 of findings...... 1.6 48 Brief overview ...... of chapters 1.5 Case selection 41 and methodology...... 1.4 Explanatory 34 framework...... 1.3 Review 17 of literature...... 1.2 Evolution of EU relations with former Yugoslav 11 republics...... 10 1.1 Research ...... Question . ocuin...... 157 4.6 Conclusion...... 4.5 External 141 pressures and ...... incentives 137 4.4 Partisan ...... veto players 4.3 Institutional 132 veto points...... 4.2 Actors: general positions 127 and powercosts...... 126 4.1 Introduction ...... ocuin...... 189 5.6 Conclusion...... 5.5 External 180 pressures ...... and incentives 167 5.4 Partisan ...... veto players 5.3 Institutional 165 veto points...... 5.2 Actors: general positions 160 and powercosts...... 159 5.1 Introduction ...... ocuin...... 219 6.5 Conclusion...... 6.4 External 205 pressures and ...... incentives 6.3 Institutional veto points 202 and partisanveto ...... players 6.2 Actors: general positions 195 and powercosts...... 193 6.1 Introduction ...... nrdcin...... 246 8.1 Introduction ...... 243 7.5 Conclusion...... 7.4 External 230 pressures and ...... incentives 7.3 Institutional veto points 226 and partisanveto ...... players 7.2 Actors: main 223 positions and ...... powercosts 222 7.1 Introduction ...... 3.5.2 New indictments, the protests of the Special Forces and assassination 112 of the Prime3.5.1 Minister.. Arrest and extradition of Milosevic and the law on cooperation 101 with the ICTY...... 6.4.2 Debates about law on cooperation with the ICTY and 211 responses to ...... indictments 6.4.1 Attitudes towards establishment of the ICTY and the beginning 209 of its work...... 7.4.1 Domestic debates concerning indictments of the generals of 233 the Homeland war...... 8 ...... 126 ...... 246 ...... 61 ...... 89 ...... 193 ...... 222 ...... 159 ...... 6 CEU eTD Collection References Conclusion 9- Chapter . ocuin...... 267 8.5 Conclusion...... 8.4 International pressures 252 and incentives...... 8.3 Institutional veto points 250 and partisanveto ...... players 8.2 Actors: general positions 247 and powercosts...... 8.4.2 The pressures forGotovina's 257 arrest...... 8.4.1 Cases of Norac and Blaskic in domestic 253 debates...... 279 ...... 268 ...... 7 CEU eTD Collection 3, (2006):6. [Online article]: cited [<10 Nov 2006>], 3 etc. 2 Systems”, 1 topic. research agrowing currently andis toinvestigate seems important andpotential candidates equally candidates membership EUinstitutions onEU states andthe Thisimpactof applicant countries. as isan impact understood Europeanization of EU on a numberthe issues of inmember of thepurposes notdeal research will of thiswith For paper, Europeanization. definitions There havebeen some contesting opinions regarding thisbody literature; however,of this asEuropeanization. commonly known literature growing in aseparate, been studied domestic arena.” is the European them; the to “how levelin policy delegation outcomes another the affects of one just is sovereignty delegating while processes, two comprises integration Still, bodies. supranational give to competence agreeto states why reasons tothe been related main andits actors and have the questions processesof the development, evolution. The its theinterests and ideasof creation factors, andimpeding its integration: accelerating has of focusing been on primarily The study process the Union (EU) European of the - Introduction 1 Chapter fast-growing research area.” research fast-growing Europeanization of new members and states isapplicant a “still comparatively small, but research of the that, concludes and Index Citation Science Social of the search key word Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in new member and candidate states”, candidate and member innew “Europeanisation Sedelmeier, Ulrich Some of the authors include Milada Ana Vachudova, Frank Schimmelfennig, Judith Kelly, Jan Kubicek, Klaus H. Goetz and SimonHix (eds.), “Europeanised Politics, European Integration and National Political The influence of the EU institutions, rules and principles on member states, has West European Politics 1 3 , Special Issue, 23, no. 4 (October2000): 3. 2 As Ulrich Sedelmeier summarizes the results of a 8 http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-3 Living Rev. Euro. Gov ., 1, no. CEU eTD Collection European Politics, 4 EU. the with relations institutional the of improvement the to lead they how and systems explain national howthese are transformedintoconditions political compliance through to necessary is more research accordingly, politics; domestic with the engagement of the impact the with EUdeals topic the on conducted membershipresearch the of most though Even countries. conditionality and accession candidate on analysis EUinfluence of the for abetter been used has the EU conditions for membership are fulfilled, onthe body of literature on conditionalitydomesticwith the EU institutions, politics, and as the institutionalin relationship the is inferior countries candidate the of position the as used. However, relations there move to a higher levelimpactis only stillif of the EU onnot domestic asan generally taken literature, background. Europeanization using theoretical one enough political systemsmembers of ofa member/applicantthe ‘return to Europe’ countrymakes it difficultcan be Europeanization. than rather as‘EU-ization’ some to frame the research differenton and seems to bethe mostly driven by the desire to jointopic the EU, thus being termed by been EUinfluence which tothe member has isresponse their why countries arenot states particular These states. applicant influences EU the how is question additional The abideby. needto now they rules that in creating part were nottaking that new- comers and EU, influenceof the EUon the the makingof in process the decision participate the its members,which EUon of the between influence the incircumstances differences the Jan Zielonka and Peter Mair (eds.), :The Enlarged European Union: Diversity and Adaptation”, and Diversity Union: European Enlarged :The (eds.), Mair Peter and Zielonka Jan The main dilemma in this fast growing research area has been how to account for account to how been has area research growing fast in this dilemma main The This specific circumstance of many of the new EU members and potential new Special Issue, 25, no.2, (April 2002): 102. 9 4 West CEU eTD Collection and conditionality innew democracies towards atheoretical integration”Grugel in Jean(ed.), 6 University Press: 2004), 10. explained. The research will use rationalist arguments, where actors will be studied in bestudied will actors where arguments, userationalist will research The explained. record betweencompliance the of variation the how and conditionality the political with compliance states and hamper factors is of The main facilitate of fulfillmentwhich conditions. question within the ordebilitate of andhowthey process facilitate the the specific membershipcondition, same states during different former be Yugoslavia will thefocus. timemembership specifically and cooperationInternational with forwith Criminal Tribunal periods canextent potential EU members Serbia andbe Croatia comply with political conditions for political conditionality within national political systems. Tothis end, the question whatto background of conditionality, this research will look into domestic implications of the EU 1.1 Research Question players. domestic and conditions international of interplay the into research continue to essential 5 democratization,itis important tounderstand more precisely how they work.” of to process the contribute crucially factors international “Since countries. certain democratize to in attempts tool policy aforeign as particularly research topic important is more research innecessary.” conditionality particular, political and general in conditionality of implications domestic practical the understand “To Hans PeterSchmitz and KatrinSell, “International factors inprocesses of political democratization: Judith G. Kelley, The thesis will try identifyto the main factors that influence the fulfillment of this andnew membersagainstthe applicants Withinof theEuropeanization of context Conditionality has been used as a diplomatic tool has been for decades.It has tool beenusedasadiplomatic Conditionality Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power ofNorms andIncentives , (London: Routledge, 1999), 33. 10 Democracy without borders:transnationalization 5 , (Princeton: Princeton , (Princeton: 6 It seems It CEU eTD Collection 9 8 SPS, no. 97/7, 10. Department, Sciences Social and Political Institute, University European Effective?”, 7 beto used in 1989, conditionality seenwas not as a legalinstrument. 1.2 Evolution ofEU relations with former Yugoslav republics political arena. terms of how they react to external pressures in light of their interests in the domestic UN sanctions have been imposed. have been UN sanctions suspended explicitly on groundsthe ofhuman although inrights, framework the of the been has external agreement No for theEU. be difficult seems to conditionality, negative former Soviet republics contain this clause. respected.” not are principles democratic and rights if human agreement the of suspension permitting the countries “aclause with third ininclude agreements the decidedto inin Councilofficially However, 1992,the the region. stability long-term establish ensure European the reformin hoped to Community countriesinorderto (EC) these countriesEastern Europe in(CEEC) period. post-1990 the By applying conditionality, conditionalitycooperation developed agreements first and wereto the used highest to promote extent human in relationrights. Smithwith Centralemphasizes and that projects is rare. Humanitarian aid and aid for non-governmental foris projects non-governmental and rare.Humanitarian not areusually aid aidprojects consultations are before organized taking Completesuspension anyaction. of ongoing Ibid., 29. Ibid., 14. Karen E. Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How The EU started using conditionality after the end of the cold war. When it began it When war. cold the of end the after conditionality using started EU The Breaking off relations that have already been established, which is a form of 8 All agreements with the CEEC and the partnership agreements with the with agreements partnership the and CEEC the with agreements All 9 Usually, agreement is Usually, upheld possiblewhenever agreement and 11 EUI Working Papers Working EUI 7 Trade and CEU eTD Collection 15 140. 14 1999), 29. EU quickly reached agreements with the countries of Central Europe. ofCentral countries with the agreements EU quickly reached As said above, after the disintegration EUthanifthe continued. support the of the Soviet Union,fragile destabilized reforms,democracies and initiated leading thus more to problems for the countries of Furthermore, in case feared CEECitof the the was thatcutting helpmighthave the influence bytheEU. there canbeno with astate norelations are there if because 13 Belgrade of negotiations relations in April Agreement Belgradeon signed 1, 1980. with the EEC. EECandthe (SFRY)wastheCooperation of Yugoslavia FederalRepublic the Socialist foreignindependent policies. that the whichshowed duringYugoslavia, individual ECdeveloped with relations the 1970sthe EC would Before disintegration,excludedfrom Agreement. the theEuropean of process the signing extend gainingindependenceconflict.a violent theirthrough Asa countrieswereresult, these benefitsintention to join theto EU expressed that are countries remaining The of full EU. members the now are countries thethe countries countries of former Yugoslavia, then in the processof of Eastern Europe for their suspended. Ibid., 141. Jelica Minic (eds.), Minic Jelica Karen E. Smith, “EU Enlargement: a historic opportunity” 26 March 2001 Ibid., 35. Ibid., 30. 10 In addition, Smith points out that negative measures are notalways effective The Making of EUForeign Policy the Case of Eastern Europe EU enlargement: Yugoslavia and the Balkans 13 The starting point of the institutional relations between relations institutional the of point starting The 11 12 14 > This agreement was an outcome of , European Movement in Serbia, 1997, Serbia, in Movement European , , (London: Macmillan, 15 Yugoslavia was 12 All of these All of CEU eTD Collection http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/region/europe_integration.pdf 21 20 19 18 17 16 with EFTA. Agreement a FreeTrade ECand the with agreement SFRY had a vision ofconsidered for aidand itbecame it recipientof the in July 1990. the relations with Community'smarket. access tothe the EC,in as of suchhadterms country regarded a developing and as treatment preferential planning to sign an association agreement could not be reactivated. not could agreement by notice.terminated in party either Thisnotice the upon 1992andexpired therefore country. The Cooperation had a agreement provision by itwhich couldhave been by betweenco-operation Yugoslavia interrupted break-upof the thethe ECwas and becamesame year, PHAREprogram. beneficiary of the Yugoslavia of bilateral relations between the EU and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, andHerzegovina, Albania, Bosnia the EUand between bilateral relations of development the for as pre-conditions conditionality and political decidedeconomic on in of In Approach, the1997, framework Regional the ECGeneral Affairs the Council and its focus was regional projects connected with civil society, culture and human rights. Agreements aimedimplementingone Thefirst Dayton Peace atthe (1999). Stability Pact Regional andAssociation (1997),Stabilization Approach (SAP)(1996), and Process region. andprogramsseveral inthe SEE policies more. EUonce the with their relations “Building on theModel of EuropeanIntegration” 26March 2001 available at: Ibid. Minic, Ibid., 71. Smith, Ibid., 142. In December 1989,Yugoslaviawasamong the fourcountrieswere that implementedin EU 1995, the PeaceAgreement After Dayton the signingof the EU enlargement: Yugoslavia and the Balkans, The Making ofthe EU Foreign Policy theCaseof Eastern Europe 16 20 As a result, the former SFRY republics had to start had to republics former SFRY the Asaresult, 13 144 21 These include the Royaumont Process Royaumont Theseincludethe , 68. 19 17 18 However, successful In September of the The government of CEU eTD Collection conditionality with a view to develop a coherent strategy for relations with the countries the for with relations developstrategy acoherent aviewto conditionality with affairs. home and justice in co-operation and democracy financial assistance, helpin problems, buildingrefugee civil andsociety strengthening and economic liberalization, trade asymmetric include These used. be will policies specific process, the of goal ultimate the is which region, in the development economic and toachievepeace,security order In aremet. criteria the provided membership EU the for offering possibilities clear beaarrangement Thisothers. will contractual country, and each will progress individually at its own speed regardless of the progress of countries. five the and EU of the relations the marks of individual circumstances program This each country. ahistoricin turning point FRY and FYROM joining possibility the of theEUand this approachis adapted to Croatia, Herzegovina, republics Albania,Bosnia and SAP offers excluding Slovenia). whatwas laterWesternand allformer calledor (Albania Europe Balkans Yugoslav the well as international and regional organizations internationaland financial institutions. and development to the region. It links EU instrumentdirectwas supportedbut by andbring aimed to EU, the the peace,stability EU, Russia, the US, Japan, SEE countries as http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/region/road_map_to%20_europe.pdf 24 23 the support of the EU.with signed was and republics two the between relations the redefined which Agreement Belgrade the in envisaged was referendum The Montenegro. in independence on referendum the after independent became Montenegro. In 2003, itchanged the name to Serbia and Montenegro and June in 2006 the two countries 22 FRY “Road Map to Europe: Stabilization and Association Process” 26 March 2001 available at: available 2001 March 26 Process” Association and Stabilization Europe: to Map “Road FYROM –FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia FRY-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created in 1992 and was a federation of Serbia and 22 and FYROM SAP conditionality was based on the Council conclusion on the application of application the on conclusion Council the on based was conditionality SAP SAP was a new framework for the relations between the EU and South Eastern 23 . Stability Pact wasanEUinitiative inJune 1999.Itwasnot a 14 24 The approach is tailored to fiteach is to The tailored approach CEU eTD Collection 27 26 available at http://europa.eu.int/avc/coc/pff/bull/en/9704/p202001.htm Union’s relations with certaincountries of south-east Europe”, Bulletin EU 4 – 1997: 2.2.1 29 April 2001 25 on 29 April 1997. of wasadopted which southeastern European the region, other countries of region. the of countries other extend cooperation wherepossibleto engageto incrossborder advantages and similar to country beneficiary of the readiness to the refers co-operation Regional evaluated. the assessment and development of relations regional co-operation will be especially will progress at its own pace regardless of the progress in other countries, at all stages of conclusion the inof war the is Yugoslavia. it former Although the saideach that country madeat peaceagreements from the stem obligations countries’ some country. Naturally, conditions that apply to all countries as well as specific conditions for each country. andindividual countries EU.These the between conditions arevery andinclude clear, general relations of development the guide would that conditionality on decided EU relations with the SEE countries. In ordergoal to make their topolicy promotetransparent and clear, the peace and stability in the region, the EU decided to start bilateral International Tribunalin bringing war criminals tojustice obligation under the peace withagreement, includingthoserelated to cooperationthe states, member EU inthe illegally are who concerned states the the persons of persons,of readmission anddisplaced of included:refugees return in Bosnia. (OHR) High Representative of Office the OSCEand the the UN, as such intheregion international organizations/bodies from reporting account meeting conditionality usingrequirements, allmechanisms atits disposal and taking into ibid. ibid. European the of development the governing conditionality of principle the on conclusions “Council There is a range of general conditions as well as some specific conditions for each 26 The Council will monitor and evaluate progress made in made progress and The monitor evaluate Council will 15 , a credible commitment to commitment a credible , compliance with the 27 General conditions 25 With the CEU eTD Collection and Bosniaks within Bosnia and Herzegovina. 28 Federation/Croatia and compatibility itsRepublika Srpska/FRY of with neighbors, cooperative relations steps of first of implementation media, independent of harassment and treatment discriminatory economic of absence bypublic authorities, minorities of harassment and treatment discriminatory reform, of generally absence elections, these of results of the implementation proper proven basisthe anduniversal of equalsuffrage of citizensadultballot, and bysecretfull and readiness on intervals reasonable at elections fair and free of holding rights, minority and human to entercomplyengaged indemocratic reforms to standards and of with generally the recognized into a good neighborly and Kosovo within the borders of the FRY. In addition, it had to institutions functional start as well as in bringing Bosnian Serb war criminals before the ICTY. a true dialoguein makingfederal Bosniangovernment pressureon exercisecredible 2006) had to with the Kosovo Albanians on the status of Tribunal. International the before justice criminals to war evidence that government influenceisCroatia the of its inusing Croat bringing Bosnian Croats to co-operate of Bosnian credible the pressure on Croatiabetween Srpska,evidence and Republika in the establishmentobligations Agreement underon Slavonia,eastern Basic the opening of customsorder the and functioning specific Croatia for the include with compliance Theseconditions policies. refer to of the Federation as well as Republika Srpska is a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Federation refers to Federation of Croats Federation to refers Federation while Herzegovina, and ofBosnia a part is Srpska Republika The then FRY, and later Serbia (after Montenegro proclaimed its independence in itsindependence proclaimed Montenegro SerbiaThe then FRY, (after andlater In addition, for every country there are specific conditions, which by definition 28 agreements with the Dayton withpeace agreements. Dayton the agreements 16 CEU eTD Collection 30 29 beneficial agreements have been applied widely in the post-war world. mutually bilateral or multilateral for states powerful or organizations international enlargement. Conditionality broadly defined as political or economic terms set by unclear for becamestudying thescholarscountries. task However, this muchmore EU of for former Yugoslav conditionality EU considers what it very became clear Thus, 1.3 Reviewofliterature for EU membership. negotiations aboutthe later insisted SAP and of since start membersthe the have andonwhich all EU set by EU the cooperation with the ICTY as the mostimportant political condition for the two countries the focuson only will mentioned research this themselves.all conditions, Outof means cancels byno withcooperate this and ICTY; the to Serbsrespectively Croats influence Bosnian the obligation of these two countries to cooperate with the Tribunal protection of human rights and democracy. to fulfillment related of certain conditions the inthe organization to membership defines political conditionality used in the EU framework as a way to link benefits of conditionality into structuralist and agent-centered. According to them “research should “research them to According and agent-centered. structuralist into conditionality approaches. in a country fulfilling these conditionsmembership for has led tosome varying it wasintroduced. However, studying this in a way to explain the process that this created Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries”, 6. Olav Stokke (ed.), Although in specific requirements, it is stated that Croatia and Serbia should Hans Peter Schmitz and Katrin Sell divided literature on democratization ondemocratization and literature SchmitzKatrin divided and Hans Peter Sell Aid and Political Conditionality 30 17 , (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 12. Thisisactually,SAP what envisaged when 29 Karen Smith CEU eTD Collection 33 32 new democracies, (London: Routledge, 1999), 24. integration” in Jean Grugel (ed.): Democracy without borders: transnationalization and conditionality in 31 casestudies.” is mixin identify particular scholars the to for challenge international factors should not beas understood determining change. domestic The “However, institutions. ininternational countries newly of democratic integration and country recipient a in adaptation values, and norms democratic of diffusion membership. Theyview this process institutionalization as happenedthrough that agents, took placein Central duringand Eastern Europe of the process their EU analysis.” actors, their preferences, behavior and interactions as the most relevant units of have structural the approaches by “Agency-based challenged paradigm establishing recipientend,i.e. complying countries with conditions andmain the of behavior actors. focus itis on to important morethe they Furthermore, argue substantive democracy. the actual participation of citizensin the democratic processes and exercising their rights- focus on consolidation phase of i.e.democracy, notonly institutions,creation of butalso politics.” of domestic changethecourse actually based from norms generated and models may and internationally conditionality, political change supplementing existing influences studies…International such as pressures identify more precisely linkages between ‘inside’ the and ‘outside’ of domestic political purpose purpose of democracy and integration in institutions. EU the “The EU possesses an for the pressure put to asanactor also but opportunities for economic attractive only Ibid., 39. Ibid., 32. atheoretical towards democratization: political of processes in factors “International Sell, and Schmitz Geoffrey Pridham agrees with their analysis and adds that he views the EU as not They point out that such process of internalizing western normsvia domestic western internalizing of suchprocess that out They point 32 18 31 They maintain that it is important to important is it that maintain They 33 CEU eTD Collection 36 2007), 88. Graziano and MaartenP.Vink (eds 35 conditionality innew democracies (ed.), Jean Grugel in Europe”, of Eastern case The 34 in CEECs.” EU the of the domestic change impact on Sedelmeierhave out,“has pointed made ‘conditionality’ focus central the studyingof the the EU. Thus, the recentliterature on new members, as Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich members of EUhasthe been fulfillment done through membership of conditions set by this interaction, which ultimately decides on the outcome of conditionality. the EU is enormous, of influence international the notes As Pridham but democracies. new for domestic incentive powerful forces interact membership be for membershipseemswith but opportunities orother most the to EU these external pressure, many international specifyandEuropean organizations to conditions orpre-conditions and it is now seen as the most is It otherwise. or deliberately of democratization, course the may affect that pressures important externalinstitutionalized which framework regional readily of transmits thekind influences and actor in Europe.” countries or those aspiringbecomemembers.countries orthose to EU Therefore, this study will be focusing only on political conditionality for EU candidate rules and Europeanization of state structures,democratic conditionality, focusing executives on effects and the adoption of the specificand EU policyadministrations focusing political focusthe on asfollows: or respect tothe can be with subdivided, of CEEC. Ibid., 89. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Candidate countries and conditionality” in Paolo in conditionality” and countries “Candidate Sedelmeier, Ulrich and Schimmelfennig Frank Geoffrey Pridham, “The EuropeanUnion, democratic conditionality transnationaland party linkages: Domestic adaptation to European integration for those who strive to become , (London: Routledge,1999, 60. .), Europeanisation: New research Agendas 19 Democracywithout borders: transnationalization and 35 According to them, the literature 34 Conditionality is used by , (Palgrave Macmillan, , (Palgrave 36 CEU eTD Collection and Eastern Europe, 40 European Integration online Papers 39 System”, 38 Macmillan, 2007), 7. 37 ismost literature of based the neo-institutionalistthe thinking.on decisive. Similarly, researchis the dividedinstitutionalist into and agent-based, though more is politics domestic that contend others while in change, domestic factor important Some scholars as“the broadly understood domestic toEuropean adaptation regional integration.” maintain that the promise of the EU membership is the single most the accession process had a long term because it ‘Europeanization’ embedded had impact accession the a long term process integration.European to national reaction of in patterns explaining 'logicappropriateness' of the refers to other The effect. in Europeanization understanding of consequentiality' 'logic -the calculations utility individual stresses One constructivist. and rationalist mechanisms: different as states two inmember of Europeanization explanation institutionalist offersliterature and lackof in the Union’s membershipprecision criteria.” “theinconsistency countries dueto in shape candidate policy the effectively to public the use potentialsnot EUdid the conditionality in through CEEC,concluded that the countries membership HeatherGrabbe,analyzing asanincentive. using Europeanization candidate potential in candidate and reforms certain through succeededin pushing EU whether the asto conclusions havevarious authors Different conditionality. outlined. briefly be will Heather Grabbe, Heather Change”, Domestic and Europeanization Home: Hits Europe “When Risse, Thomas and Borzel A. Tanja Klaus H. Goetz and SimonHix, “Europeanized Politics? European integration and National Political (Palgrave Agendas, Newresearch Europeanisation: (eds), Vink P. Maarten and Graziano Paolo Here is where general literature on conditionality intersects with with Europeanization, intersects conditionality on literature isHere wheregeneral This mostly research utilitywill calculationfocus in on analyzing EU West European Politics, The EU’sTransformative Power.Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), xi 39 Below some of the approaches to the study of EU conditionality Special Issue, 23, no. 4, (October2000): 15. (EIoP), 4, no. 15,(2000),2. 20 40 However, she concludes that sheconcludes However, 38 International relations 37 CEU eTD Collection a multi party system, free and fair elections, and a marketeconomy”. anda elections, free andfair system, a multi party that linked trade and cooperation agreements tofive conditions: rule oflaw human rights, addition of the suspension clause to all Europe controls. border and nuclear to safety related Agreements concludedby the EU, avoidinglong transition periods on CEEthe side and acceleration of activities after May 1992 desired system andeconomic political shapeof the member states: the of spheres interest 1998-2002. Opinion Accession in1997,andfinally of (avis) commission the the from Partnership in culminatingcriteria andthe theCopenhagen 1989 trade secondly, programs, aid post the firstly, Europe: Eastern and Central the from applicants the and EU the between 45 44 43 42 41 suspended onpolitical grounds. first country to which this suspension clause was applied was Slovakia. Moreover, it was 1997 when issued Commission the the first opinion on progress the integration,of the beingentrants orunfit to take unstable on pressuresthe forces.market from In EU the new of minimize possibility the to attempting conditions these focused on further criteria countries.” inthecandidate processes stop the process of integration once the country started it, it is easier for the EU to prevent Ibid., 14. Ibid., 9. Ibid, 30,31. Ibid., 7. Ibid. What was the novelty in the relations between the EU and the candidates was “the three with inline was Partnerships Accession of the content the that She claims 42 45 Although Grabbe points out thatit is more difficult to 41 Grabbe, identifies three phases of the relationship the of phases three identifies Grabbe, 21 43 44 TheCopenhagen CEU eTD Collection framework whereby EU conditionality is seen as a formal positivist instrumentnarrowly “a as is seen it because of the understood transpositioncompletely isnot conditionality establish, then they claim conditionality could be just amyth. Their main argument is that to possible not is this If change. normative or adjustment institutional policies, at looking countries by in target outcomes andthe between conditionality causal relationships Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe,The Myth of conditionality for the CEECs.” viewaccepted of conditionality beingas “a incentivepowerful and structure disciplining part of the CEE. capacity, political salience of the issue, andmacro strategy of adaptation to the EU on the institutional and EU, of the part the problems on were the uncertainty influence, and influencedimpacton both accessingEU andCEE that Diffusenessof countries. theEU acquis commented in member-state hadimplemented no more1993, that than 80% of the the implement continuouslyand definite conditionality followed by a certain benefitevolved. but it was a process that She especially criticizes the insistence on the CEEC to fully 49 48 47 46 1990s. a country from joiningit Croatia the process, as did Yugoslavia and to during the James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, Ibid., 90. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 88. .” 46 Grabbe criticizes the ‘moving target conditionality’ stating that there was no clear wasno there that stating conditionality’ target the‘moving Grabbe criticizes James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon challenge the widely 47 In conclusion of her analysis, Grabbe underlines several factors on the part of acquis 48 49 They advocate that if this is true, then it should be possible to trace when “ahaveCommission to when was widely senior reported official, 22 Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU’s , (Palgrave, 2004),2. CEU eTD Collection University Press, 2004), 7. pressure. normative is other the and conditionality membership is straight one behavior: state influence to use institutions international methods two identifies she analysis, her In policies. these influenced significantly institutions issues,European arguesthat onethnic members’ policies aspiringof adoption EU 53 52 51 50 norms of use the on solely rely but behavior of incentives concrete any link not do actors “external whereby processes socialization the to refers The second actors. international the by sanctions of incentives to response in preferences their maximizing as states during factor of enlargement.” importance external the andconstrain actually conclude institutional “domestic madechoices during the early transition outweigh period they Moreover, CEEC. the of outcomes and conditionality between links causal clear make to they were unable thus, by Commission; the in its application inconsistencies were there that and defined clearly not was conditionality that showed analysis CEECs.” tothe templates institutional and norms rules, EU’s the of between international incentives and rules and domestic transition factors.” transition anddomestic rules and incentives international between as interaction a dynamic process of enlargement the adeeperunderstanding offers engaged in arising of from actors behavior perceptions process, and political the the and includingformal requirements set by EUas the “thewell as informal pressures as aprocess seen which, of EU conditionality definition be awider should there authors, Judith G. Kelly, Ibid., 8. Ibid. Ibid. On the contrary, Judith G. Kelly, in her analysis of the role of the EU for the Ethnic Politics In Europe: The powerNorms of and Incentives 23 53 The first refers to the , (Princeton: Princeton , (Princeton: 50 According to the to According 52 51 Their CEU eTD Collection 57 56 55 54 in and resultwhen.” compliance approaches deploying techniques such normativeas pressure, andconditionality,is, that which byselectively minorities on ethnic institutionsand influencedomestic policies can how when “about hypotheses makes she analysis her in and behavior is variable dependent andmethodologically incorrect, shethus focusesTherefore, onbehavior. only her with other factors is therefore important.” interacts domestic politics the how of “detailed understanding outthat points well, she as are under-researched; conditionality of implications domestic practical ofthe aspects lot of a and vary can criticism effects the conditionality, membership from different is conditionality aid can besanctions. and conditionality of success the similar. conclude others while slowness, There and ineffectiveness, ownership lack of hazard, moral for approach criticize some results, is specific criticismmonitoring, opening ofnegotiations. of EU conditionality.recommendations, twinning, andasfor conditionality,benchmarking gate-keeping, and and treaties providing teams, experts legal visits, hoc field/ad in the missions The inreports, written andargumentation guidance anddeclarations, statements official direct thenormative asfor pressure, follows: are as mechanisms international two these intochanging persuade, shametheir to praise policies.” actors or Ibid., 31. Ibid., 6. ibid., 9 ibid. She claims that treating these two outcomes as comparable wouldbe Kelly lists numerous studies on sanctions, aid conditionality that produce different 56 24 57 54 The tools related to 55 Although, CEU eTD Collection decrease the institutionaleffectiveness of involvement ashypothesized, the international did clearly opposition that “while domestic shows her evidence domesticaspect, to the 60 59 58 conditionality inwould haveworked isolation fromnormative pressures. it, ‘didmost lifting’, of heavy the conclusive thoughtheresults are not whether norms. than democratic for domesticimportant leadership more nationalist strong has parliament the opposition, increases parliament in the preferences group political or firmcompatible outcomes and may hindereven institutional Thisefforts. happens a when position of probability on the increased domestic opposition decreases hypotheses: domestic an issue; corruptionand increase subsequently ofmembership effectiveness the Thirdly, incentives. the levers, add credibility, build andadmission for mechanism and incentives personal gradual credibility; gain are of enhancesits likelihood success; effectiveness the on the conditionality of depends normativepressure with fail;combined conditionality to tends pressure normative alone, hypotheses: strategy the Secondly, outcomes. policy improves engagement institutional necessary.” order changeto the“conditionality isinpolicy most casesnotonly butalsoeffective in that claims She behavior. of change i.e. change, policy into materialize always not does pressure of the outcome change asan ifchangeis inpolicy evenpreference, a there governmentdosomething it wouldhave not doneotherwise securing without some gain. Ibid, 182. Ibid., 52. Ibid., 39. In her analysis, Kelly argues that normative pressure alone notIn hernormativeKelly becausework argues pressure does that analysis, She derives three groups of of hypotheses She derivesthreegroups Her qualitative and quantitative analysis concluded that conditionality, that she put Her qualitative analysis as andquantitative concluded 58 She defines conditionality as enticement, i.e. the purpose is to make to is purpose the i.e. enticement, as conditionality defines She 25 59 . Firstly, the engagement hypotheses: engagement the Firstly, . 60 With With regards CEU eTD Collection 59, (Fall 2005):827-860. Party Constellations Sustainedand ComplianceCentral in andEastern Europe”, conditionality was necessary condition for sustained compliance in those CEEcountries in those compliance for sustained condition necessary was conditionality and has conditionality has been successful in countries liberal with and mixed party constellations failed that concludes article The countries. in target party constellations to varies according in anti-liberal this approach, to according Socialization, and time. over compliance of benefits costs of and reinforcement, dependsonthebalance between international the and domestic regimes. Moreover, it asserts that EU and NATO 63 62 61 issues.” compromise evenquite controversial arewilling European the case, on to politicians is asin very attractive, conditionality whenmembership incentives, effect of the positive impede does “while opposition is domestic important shedraws that conclusion mostthe Probably werenecessary. major adjustments no domestic when weakand was opposition only when worked thatsocialization itSheargues for granted. take likewise not but does promise a credible is membership that believes i.e. assurances, has country target a when is ideal leader. situation authoritarian shearguesthatthe absence In addition, a strong of constraints.“ domestic strong override to usemembershipincentives extent, a surprisingly great institutions could, to towards liberal human rights and democracy norms. democracy and rights human liberal towards rationalist approach to explain international socialization of Central and Eastern Europe factors. domestic the outweighs Ibid., 189. Ibid., 183. Frank Schimmelfennig Similar to Kelley’s factors and questions, Frank Schimmelfennig usesthe and Frank Schimmelfennig questions, Kelley’s factors Similar to 62 Thus, unlike Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, Kelley shows that conditionality , “Strategic Calculationand International Socialization: Membership Incentives, 61 Another relevantfactor that she identifies is presence or 26 63 Socialization is seen in isseen aprocess Socialization International Organization CEU eTD Collection 66 65 European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic change 64 fulfill the conditionsis to means anincentive there that This i.e.conditionality. by reward, reinforcement in orderthe capabilitiesto become a membertheyif certainitadopts community norms orpunishedif it Here allnot. does organizations use have ofto implementthe organization, these. Theycalculations.” cost-benefit claim political which individual of that is EU theand NATO basis the on actstrategically states- their target and agencies socialization “…both actors choose all that underscore they However, socialization. international to approach institutionalist community.” international Western the norms and values of liberal core the at expanding andaimed international by organizations out carried process institutionalized a formally debate. They sum up their position as follows “…international socializationinstitutionalist in – socialist Europe is rationalist of light in them analyze they and factors socializing community.” international an of rules constitutive the inducedadopt are into which states it as “aprocess andtheydefine these questions answer try to to socialization’ ‘international use They countries. in other unsuccessful impact onHeikoKnobel. questions They ask such as: howand when western organizations had an the transformationfactors. than rather domestic conditionality EU to goes weight the again Thus, norms. liberal violated initially that of Europe, why they were successful in some and Ibid. Ibid., 6. Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, Heiko and Engert Stefan Schimmelfennig, Frank Their central socialization mechanism is reinforcement where a state isrewarded state a where is reinforcement mechanism socialization central Their andin project ajointwith Engert Stefan Schimmelfennig expanded hisresearch 65 In this sense, they hold isinline thesociological Inthissense,they this with that 27 66 International Socialisation inEurope: 64 They see Western organizations as organizations TheyseeWestern (Palgrave, 2006), 2. 2006), (Palgrave, CEU eTD Collection political conditionality. They claim that political conditionality has had the highest the had has conditionality political that claim They conditionality. political cycle of interms in astop-and-go leading acountry win, theconservatives times at other is a conflict in the party constellation; thereby, sometimes the pro- reform forces win, and there where constellation, mixedparty is the interesting findmost they The one practices. socialization as the party constellation favors nationalistideologies and authoritarian endorses the norms thatsocialization process isare quick and relatively easyrequired. as the party constellation already the case, first the In mixed. and anti-liberal liberal, Inkinds: three into theconstellation anti-liberal party volatility.account into party electoral They divide taking formingin agovernment, constellation, there is no compliance.” adaptation costs EU (and for some countries,“ that analysis shows and is their effective socialization international conditions NATO) conditionality 68 67 in liberal consist mainly rules is mainmechanism the and because“the Western international community’s constitutive by reward reinforcement authors, the For fulfill conditions. state help target to assistance formersupport, the non-compliancelater additional including punishing and the distinguish mechanisms, other two by reinforcement by andreinforcementpunishment They either. punishment no but reward, no is there fulfillment, no is there If reward. Ibid., 10. Ibid., 7. In terms of adaptation costs, they identify party constellation as the crucial factor crucial the as constellation they identify party costs, of adaptation In terms Therefore, the main question they are answering in their work is under which under is work in their answering are they question main the Therefore, 68 .” 67 are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of conditions sufficient jointly and necessary individually are political membership incentives membership norms, the corresponding strategy was 28 and low low domestic political political credible CEU eTD Collection political power and extractconcentrate to elites for ruling opportunities creates competition political of absence rents over the “how show timeto tries She change. political of model and illiberal or liberal across initiates country countries.” quality of political competition at the time of the regime change determines whether a 72 71 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 3. 70 69 arena.” political competitive an is function of open a liberal democracy is not simply a function of having liberal democrats on hand in it1989- of development “The competition. quality of political the the regime, which determined communist the to opposition the of existence the was variable important most single liberties, such as speech, assembly, religion, and property.” basic uphold also They economy. the and state the between boundaries and power of law, rule of aseparation the uphold They all of liberties citizens. andthepolitical powers their on limits juridical respected rulers elected democratically and institutions state where system “a political as democracy liberal describes She membership. for incentives why ruling elites in liberal and illiberal countries in the CEE reacted differently to the EU asks members, new the of systems political national on influence EU the of study her major parties among the target states that produces the uneven socialization process.” impact in such countries. In short, they try explainto “the variation in the constellation of based. Heris agent- it i.e. analysistransition, communist post the for explanation institutional to showsexplanation that Polish and Hungarian communists transformed because Ibid., 21. Ibid., 5 Milada Anna Vachudova, Ibid. Her main argument in the analysis of six CEEC in the post 1989 period is that the Similar Schimmelfennig’s is to approach thatofMilada Anna who, Vachudova in Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism 29 72 Vachudova prefers political elite 70 71 She claims that the 69 , CEU eTD Collection 76 75 74 73 environmentand the institutional environmentto the advantage ofmoreliberal political change to theinformation by society working through system competitive political domestic policies of illiberal governments in a direct way but it “did help to create a more change so effective to was not activeleverage that EU asserts She costly. noncompliance and membership,costs make desirable, benefitsand of to compliance while mediate meritocracy andthe to enforcement asymmetric interdependence EUused that in process. accession the used conditionality leverage concrete active EU isleverage. i.e.incentive passive, One of as potential membership is such, and other the their efforts to concentrate and prolong their power.” economic intolerance sabotaged in reform and fostered warped democratic institutions, “They change. of political pattern illiberal she calls what followed Slovakia Bulgaria and society while talk becomingto to already open 1980s.Onthe during Romania, contrary, internal started reforms and they opposition thus strong by they the were challenged leverage, i.e. conditionality in process. accession i.e.the conditionality leverage, changes in the CEEC wascompetition, economic corruption and ethnic nationalism theto win and keep power.” quality political restricted useof “their on depending weredifferent elites to the The costs others. of politicalmembership is thatcompetition forEU incentives for why to elites responded differently ruling to posedquestion the as some elites the costs and of compliance the EU’s were much activehigher than for Ibid., 106. Ibid., 72. Ibid., 64. Ibid., 38. Looking at the EU’s part of the process, she distinguishes two types of EU In terms of active leverage of the EU, Vachudova claims that what causedthe that claims Vachudova EU, the leverage of of active In terms 30 73 76 In her analysis, she tries to show to tries she analysis, her In 74 Her answer to 75 CEU eTD Collection target countries where ‘the benefits of joining outweigh the costs. the outweigh joining of benefits ‘the where countries target to make more difficult changes, which policies. certain was also in in reforms implementing line with behind lagging were ifthey accession the with withfurther the domesticproceed to allow them to asnot states liberal against situation or accession process start them to in to EUwhenthe itused threat of exclusion illiberaleither against as notstates toallow 78 77 countries as a settingresponse conditions, andtheother isthat focused more on domestic processes in target to the and EU rules focuses on that into one canbedivided literature countries target of the conditionality. mostFourthly, cover of try studies though the both EUsidethe to andthedomestic side The main questionsThirdly,rationalist. institutionalist and approaches agent-centered can be distinguished. are behaviormost of constructivist andrationalistintocouldbe are approaches butthe divided of the literature Secondly, the forfor meeting membership. asimportant criteria the factors domestic and conditionality EU identify authors mentioned Firstly, conditionality. EU indemocracy Europe. Eastern of development the for repercussions some have might this that warns She arena. domestic inthe parliaments over the apparatus executive tothe more power andgiving context inthedomestic competition political undermining foreign rules, the of imposition Theseare process. of accession the effects negative several potentially point out forces.” Ibid., 225. Ibid., 107. In short, she argues that EUmembership incentive was crucial for the target states Thus, we can derive several points from the above summary of the literature on 77 Thus moreinterdependenceshe contends asymmetric credibility that the gave 31 78 However, shedoes However, CEU eTD Collection administrative reform in Eastern Europe”, Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 Turin, of Workshops, March 2002, 2. Sessions Joint ECPR the for Paper Europe”, Eastern in reform administrative 79 accessions.” and ongoing the understanding[andhelp“the thus in better of] process EasternEurope of transformation by “beyondmemberits tocontribute attempts states scope existing expanding the EU this researchTherefore, ones. andwhich matter factors domestic how andespecially states member tries to EU of potential in cases the explore to interesting moreis even This states. applicant combine somenumber elements of studies of the above on thementioned EU influenceNote: Summary of the reviewed literature literature on domestic and politics-legitimacy of-incentives new -(un)clearmembers benefits -credibility conditionality target and-moving -inconsistency -uncertainty -diffuseness ofinfluence EU compliance influence that factors 1: Table 1below. in Table are summarized analysis their in authors the by identified factors main The others. than incentives EU the to better respond countries why to some for as thedifference reasons or compliance states, target Dimitris. G. Papadimitrou, “Exporting Europeanization: EU enlargement, twinning the exercise and In short, the above review of the literature showed that there are a growing 79 32 regime change -quality of political competition at a time of volatility -electoral -Party constellation -resonance -identification -corruption/personal gains/costs -authoritarian/democratic government influence -nationalist/liberal -strict policy preferences strategy -macro of adaptation salience -political capabilities -institutional Target countries CEU eTD Collection co-operates with the EU, or amends, modifies or changes its existing administrative and administrative its existing changes or modifies amends, or EU, with the co-operates way influencein which a country the that i.e. factors, variables asetof developed Wright, Husseindynamics and and Kassim, processwithin political B. G.Peters astate. Vincent moredomestic on focused that in literature mentioned factors other some will use decisive. than rather complementary its role butthat faced actors, was bydomestic opportunity the altered structure it that a sense in conditionality EU by driven been have may regionalization that argues in new membersdiscussing Martin andCzech regionalization Slovakia Republic, Brusis Republic and Slovakia”, and Republic 81 May 2007, 2. Poland, Wroclaw Meeting, Association Studies International European East and Central at the presented 80 legitimacy of the EU the contexts, domestic the accessionof as “the diversity such the issues marginalizes studies processin such compliance on focus the out points rightly and Lindstrom Nicole As incentives. the sustainability ofdichotomy reforms.” Kelley, challenge However, Vachudova. thesis Schimmelfennig, will and the the of liberal/illiberal movesisinby countries, certain which of with analyses target accordance the the policy for incentive acrucial was EUconditionality the that will thesis argue the be. Thus, governments would gain the what and do should they what on doubt no in actors domestic the leaving as a very crucialearly on, wasstated membership of benefit andthe andprecisely made very clearly factor were conditions the Yugoslavia, i.e. former the of countries potential EU candidates, for responding to EU Martin Brusis,“The Instrumental Use of EuropeanUnion Conditionality Regionalization inthe Czech paper Responses”, and Challenges Conceptual Five East: Travels “Europeanisation Lindstrom, Nicole That is why this research, in addition to the explanatory factors mentioned above, mentioned factors explanatory the to addition in research, this is why That The thesis will argue that, unlike the mentioned criticism above, for the remaining the for above, criticism mentioned the unlike that, argue will thesis The East European Politics and Societies 81 33 , vol.19,, no.2: 297-316. 80 Similarly, CEU eTD Collection 2002). 83 Level this oneis progressnot the towards EU membership would beif difficultimpossible. not and met are conditions other all if even that means just it important not are requirements not mean does this Naturally, with EU. the signtreaties tobeableaccession to in order countries these that for condition important most single the became ICTY) (the Yugoslavia Former otherEU and especially International cooperation forwith the the Criminal Tribunal the conditionsAs SAPthe wasbeingimplemented, these conditions were followed very by strictly the 1.4 Explanatory framework relatedinterplay in a way that leads to change of policy or not. to democraticis quoi.e. whocontrolsis. politicalhave power, status Actors that where power political principles and economic 82 is institutions. veto players Tsebelis’ withintheory on political system. political i.e. thingsthe the how aredone through processes, andbureaucratic administrative it i.e. inertia refers within the Thelatter groups. to interest party and refers to system preferences, policy the of terms in parties different among power of distribution opportunity are regarded as structure most the relevant. Theformer refers to the thepurposeFor of this and study, political opportunity structure administrative operation, political the and opportunity structure the administrative opportunity structure. government structures. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, (New York: Russel Sage foundations, Hussein Kassim, B. Guy Peters, Vincent Wright, , (Oxford University Press, 2000). Another useful theory for explaining the internal dynamics within a target country 82 These factors include the policy style, the conception of co- of conception the policy style, include the factors These The National Coordination of EUPolicy: The Domestic 34 83 The main question here question main The CEU eTD Collection institutional relationship with the EU if it meets certain criteria. Each level of level Each criteria. certain meets it if EU the with relationship institutional intoa higherlevel of ispromoted country wherebythe approach, ‘ladder climbing’ Tribunal for former Yugoslavia -the ICTY. Criminal International with cooperation i.e. area, issue specific in conditionality EU relationship. institutional inthe stagnation and EU the with compliance belackof of course would of this Theconsequence Tribunal. any other communicationcases. with the tribunal crimes impartially war process to courts fordomestic as wellcreating opportunities and disregard of any ICTY, the with communication regular and documentation, witnesses to requests access indicted, made by the of is demandsincludingtransfer the co-operation with unconditional all ICTY the continuum. the on positions extreme two these between is changing but constant not is cooperation is why That be reversible. could but evolutionary not is another to cooperation be as will outcome defined initiation When ofinstitutional in thereis no with the question, relations country the the EU and the country in question,cooperation with ICTYandthe upgrading of institutional level the of between relations the outcome of cooperationis When with ICTY. the there cooperation more specifically and conditionality, will be defined as No cooperation Thus, main the independentvariable is EU adjustment pressure,operationalised as As mentioned above, the dependent variable is defined as the compliance with EU EU approach on conditionality is not based on sanctions but is more of agradual of more is but sanctions on based not is conditionality on approach EU Roughly, beasfollows. variation the variable can the of defined of the ICTY means complete lack of co-operation, no formal formal or no lackco-operation, of means complete of ICTY the no cooperation 35 . Theprocess ofmoving from one type of Full cooperation full . CEU eTD Collection of the EU, among the members, is sometimes crucial, as well as between aswell EU andthe between is crucial, amongmembers,as of EU, the sometimes the is is case,it reward the ismarked negative, ofthe longfactor andintheopposite the value of materialization the and condition the of fulfillment the between time if the Likewise, fulfillment membership. of condition is connection andbetween close rewardof the and membership, of reward the and conditions the of fulfillment between office. Thus, the size of size Thus,office. the ismarked of rewards as fullycooperate governmentseenwill notifits in during time rewardsarenot own the isincumbent reward the crucial. The and getting between fulfilling condition the the of Similarly, on the side of potential candidate countries, the countries, candidate potential of side the on Similarly, linked rewardofmembership. the to of conditions isdirectly whether fulfillment the and rewards by the EU is crucial. The individuals inbanks of EU member countries. In sense,this role the of external pressures sanctions in the form of imposed ban warcriminals, EU the indicted of directly in Only cases either. sanctions on entering the EU, and freezing financial assets of criteria. of the ofthefulfillmentthese process the EUandthe ofmoving prospect alevel ladder can very up the be incentive powerful in country in to isshowing question genuine meet criteria This by efforts the set. approval level of relations to another by favorably assessing the fulfillment of conditions, if the from the progress onefulfill can inencourage EU theconditions. to country the question of determination the on dependent is speed The relations. institutional of level each with increase which rewards, financial and political to leads relations of institutionalization positive. In case of non-fulfillment, there is no promotion of relationship, but there are no are butthere of relationship, isnopromotion there non-fulfillment, In caseof In addition, for both of these external pressures the (dis)agreement on the part size of rewards of size 36 negative needs to be taken into account, i.e.account, intobe taken to needs if is no clear connection there timing of the rewards timing of positive if there , i.e. CEU eTD Collection cooperation with the ICTY. The value of this factor is seen as negative in as value factor cooperation. important isdefined The of isalsovery elections terms incompliance. efficiency its influence sometimes ICTY. Givingmixed a signals to governmentwhich is trying meet to conditions the can ICTY bloc in parliamentthe lowerthe likelihood to cooperate fully. lowerlikelihood the cooperate fully;to stronger the Euroskepticthe anti-thebloc and/or likelihoodthe tocooperate fully;lower public the the for the support EU membership the view on cooperation with the ICTY. thethat governmentwouldlose powertoanother party/coalition based ontheir positive the power and what status quo (current policy). i.e.controls is who controlled, power the wayinwhich playersby is veto the determined attitudes to EU/the ICTY, institutional obstacles and partisan veto players. The number of governmentlosing government power, incumbentof follows: threat areas cooperation for the identified asrelevant are that factors The explanatory factors. mediating domestic the reward the higher likelihood for the government to cooperate fully. fully;cooperate thecloser to likelihood for the government thehigher reward the greater reward of fully;membership, forgovernment the cooperate thehigherlikelihood to the Hypotheses Hypotheses incumbent governmentlosingpowerNo threatof The above pressures and incentives of the EU are in constant interplay with the with interplay in constant are EU the of incentives and pressures above The if non-loseanother party/coalition is to that supports there possibility power to : the stronger fulfilling stronger connection : the between conditions andthe : thelower the public support for cooperation with the ICTY the lower 37 , i.e. possibility of losing positive if there is no ifthere threat CEU eTD Collection situations when there are negative attitudes towards the ICTY/EU. the towards attitudes negative are whenthere situations players that cannot bloc the implementation. Here it is important to note note are there itthat is to important implementation. Here bloc the cannot players that slow down compliance; and multiple bloc either vetoplayers areor completely situation there where that describing high.low or described as also are factor this of values The ICTY. with the wholethe national from administration top to local level which have partin cooperation cooperation specialas: such inpersonnel ministries, courts, agencies andbodies within of all individuals within thestate apparatus are that especially in influencea position to positions alsobut government tothe partisanand intheparliament andactions positions the players to refer veto Partisan parties. opposition to only exclusive necessarily are not and government coalition thesame within be they note can that to important especially is It above. mentioned attitudes tothe are related which ICTY, the with cooperation the whichareagainst otheractivities electorate, parties the the of inmobilizing parliament or towards is ICTY/EUin the government valuethe marked as the no attitudes negative when thereare values. Thus, party in positionsother the embedded or based party or theleader, the program on leading government the position party the of can It inminister beideological president. or primethe the personified of person the apparatususually state fraction or or of strongest unified,the of government the government towards the EU the lower likelihood to cooperate fully.likelihoodcooperate theEUlower to towards government likelihood lowerICTY the tocooperatefully; stronger negative the the attitudes the of Hypotheses Attitudes towards theICTY/EU Partisan veto players : the stronger the negative attitudes of negative the stronger of : the governmentthe attitudes towards the positive refer to the partisan positions in the governmentor inthe positions partisan the refer to when there are no veto players or insignificant veto insignificant or players veto no are there when refers to the position of the government if it is if it government the of position the to refers 38 positive . It is negative Negative, in CEU eTD Collection veto players interrelated.important, making veto thus twofactors are these pass a newlaw partisan to or constitution procedures, change operational certain order to differentdepartments, orjust less inefficiency fulfilling the obligations.in Naturally, procedures of operation. Fragmentation system the of allows for shifting the blameto services) includingtheirMinistry forces,secretto different Interior of police due in the process of cooperation (e.g. Ministry of Justice Ministry of Foreign Affairs, involved ministries different between of power fragmentation the to refer also obstacles likelihood tocooperatelikelihood fully; higher the numberof in crucialthe positions cooperation institutional is thevalueare of obstacles as described factor the cooperation factor is valueof the defined this as bodies for necessary or operational legislation provisions, areconstitutional there directly or indirectly, or non-existence of operational bodies necessary for cooperation. If constitutional obstacles or non-existence of legislation that influences co-operation policy change, in this case compliance with the ICTY institutional obstaclescertain arein a seen as interested directly ministers influential and Presidents, Ministers, Prime as itself could from come and government the membersgovernment have differing cooperation, opinion on the veto points then partisan some and government is coalition if there that means This system. the of fragmentation or system the of is centralization there whether and position ministerial important most whether there is coalition governmenti.e. politics, domestic in situation the players according to veto inthe differences or a strong one party government, who holds the Hypotheses: Lack ofinstitutionalobstacles: the higher the number of institutional thelower the number of the obstacles, higher the parliaments, government, individual offices such offices individual government, parliaments, 39 positive and in a situation there andinasituation where negative . Institutional . CEU eTD Collection to cooperate fully; ICTYparties,the institutional the likelihood thelower tochange and therefore obstacles higher-the number of crucialthe positions in cooperation with ICTYisthe held by anti- fully; highernumber-the institutional of lower to cooperate the the the likelihood obstacles, fully EUlowerthe tocooperate towards likelihood stronger the negative-the the attitudes likelihood tocooperate fully; lower the ICTY the towards government the of attitudes negative the stronger -the likelihood tocooperate fully lower the anti-theblocskeptic intheparliament ICTY bloc and/or the Euro stronger -the fully; cooperate lower-the for thepublic the supportEUmembership the lower likelihood the to fully; cooperate likelihood lower lower cooperation for public ICTYthe -the to the the with support fullycooperate forlikelihood the thehigher to closergovernment reward -the the fully; likelihood tocooperate for the government thehigher greater reward -the the higherthe likelihood for the governmentto cooperate fully; membership, fulfilling andtherewardof theconnection stronger conditions between -the asfollows: summarized making process on the ICTY cooperation, the lower likelihood to cooperate fully. decision the fragmented more fully;the cooperate to therefore and obstacles institutional change to likelihood the lower the parties, ICTY by anti-the is held ICTY the with Hypothesized outcome of cooperation for the mentioned factors can be 40 CEU eTD Collection Union which when and federation they the within issues and are factors relevant cover will analysis the but for thegovernment, Serbian ICTY on only focuses cooperation. research the because Serbia term only use I of clarity sake the For union. the to leave decided Montenegro (1992-2003), then Unionof Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006) before it became Republic of Serbiaafter 84 in seemingly countries. of similar constellation power Why domestic two politics the of is the inunder time record periods compliance different different puzzling the that isand elections in in2000, hadearly change countries democratic experienced 2003. It both change; government of patterns similar followed have to seemed and regimes 1999 when program them; both hadwas offerednationalistthe to authoritarian and in conditions, weregiven same the underconsideration Both countries domestic factors. Serbia EU than the towards progress mademore accelerated Croatia EU. with the relations institutional Therefore,question. interesting very a be to seems extent same the to not do theothers while incentives two countries momentthe has still not appliedmembership. for Why some countries respond toEU were chosen toat behind, and lagged Serbia being conditions, same the hand, offered otherthe despite try to explainsigned the SAA, appliedfor the membership begannegotiations 2005. On and in October variation in Croatia of process, the launching the since Nevertheless, consistently. were applied progress with and for andAlbania)werethe same, Slovenia former republics, except (the Yugoslav Association Program (SAP), the conditions for all the countries eligible for the program As the iswork focusing on specificthe offered program inEU Stabilization 1999, the and 1.5 Caseselection and methodology likelihood to cooperate fully. lower cooperation, the ICTY onthe making process decision fragmented the more -the During periodthe that isanalyzed here 1993-2008, Serbia was within Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 84 andaddress are thebyfocusing on variation this trying thus cases to 41 CEU eTD Collection available at:http://europa.eu.int/avc.coc/pff/bull/en/9704/p202002.htm Union’s relations with certaincountries of southeast Europe”, Bulletin EU 4 -1997: 2.2.1 29April 2001, 85 of governments by authoritarian wascharacterized firstperiod Namely, powers. the aredividedperiods variation in according politicalconstellation to the domestic of the country. Thus, ineach processes integration EU ICTY,and the cooperation with amongpower whichexamineisif actors, political how this usedto affected and of changedtheconstellation which by markedis elections, the consideration.period Each view of factthe cooperation that with ICTYisthe themainmembership condition under in of ICTY is the as theyearof year creation the chosen beginning The several periods. justifies the narrowing down of the research to this specific condition. which states, with these agreements any oninstitutional tostart negotiations order way. Moreover, it is one fruitful in most the countries two the of systems national of through domestic processes the most important conditionsmost sensitive issuedomestically incountries. Thus, both this condition enables tracing that the EU has put becauseforth the EU made it the most importantin condition to be fulfilled; as well, it was the conditionsfor themembership, be will specialfocus ICTYcooperation the the put on the of fulfillment the around debates and processes domestic the on be will emphasis withsoutheastEuropean Union’srelations certaincountriesofEurope the conditionality governing developmentof Council conclusions principleof the onthe in the former Yugoslavia of the forcountries the set especially be conditionality the accession in the countries processes two will be explained.the for inthe canbedifference and speedthe this of isso, what domestic factors accounted “Council conclusions on the principle of conditionality governing the development of the European the of development the governing conditionality of principle the on conclusions “Council The research is comparing Serbia and Croatia between 1993 and 2008 divided in 1993and2008divided between is Croatia Serbia and comparingThe research As mentioned above the conditionality used for the purposes of this research will 42 in 1997. 85 As the CEU eTD Collection institutional relations in this analysis will be positive assessment of compliance with the with compliance of assessment be positive will analysis in this relations institutional relations between EUandthe questions. the country The forin reason upgrading institutional of upgrading bethe will with EUconditions compliance of indicator the Thus, ICTY. the with cooperation of condition sensitive very this of terms in especially Serbia Croatia Country/ period Table 2: heads of state/government Serbiain and Croatia 1993-2000 leaders. the all of list a gives 2 Table is. minister prime the than influential more periods. For the last prime forpresidents forperiod, such followingor first the the ministerssuchas as two period for Serbia, Boris Tadic as the president negotiations country the EU for membership. started of Serbia is muchand finished largely was with ICTY the time cooperation the bythat because 2005 endof isuntil only researched however marked. Croatia is new period 2008 a is from that why Serbia is In early 2003-2008. elections in was 2008 there a changein and government shift within constellation political domestic sothatisof forpower whythe period third in 2008and present.Although had inSerbia elections early major 2007,there nowas three periods for both countries plus additional period for Serbia between early elections cases- areseven there early Therefore, election. hadanother andin2008Serbia elections democratic had governments.In2003,both elections,in had early 2007 theyboth regular new was termed what installed and regimes ended these that hadelections countries both Franjo inTudjman MilosevicSlobodan Croatiaand andSerbia, respectively.2000, In Within each period compliance is assessed. Measuring it is not an not easy itis is Measuring task, compliance assessed. Within period each is Each markedby personality period within either regime strong the one Milosevic Tudjman 1993-2000 Djindjic Racan 2000-2003 43 Kostunica Sanader 2003-2008 Tadic 2008- CEU eTD Collection in the two countries as in the Table 3 below. players numberthe in of veto of the periods given wecouldtime categorize each period, countriespolitical organization the two within during the mentioned periods. Byapplying of types different identify to inspiration an as used been has theory players veto Tsebelis’ membership conditionality only. on EU the beinvestigated willbe andemphasis will although put not relevant, These, pressures. institutional international of forms other and sanctions international will not deal research The withconditionality. related the and conditionalitynegotiations membership EU of context the as such, taken targeting is specifically research the full member.Therefore, in a become and EU criteria general the fulfill terms,to order in issue national sensitive i.e.potentially a with deals aidgovernment a how conditionality, is focus main The conditions. the of fulfillment the around processes domestic to trace beused ICTYcooperation the understandingwill Inthis case, of politics. better domestic name one example. Choosing highly sensitive issue or‘hard case’ for compliance enables to States in Baltic minority the right as such country, each candidate to issues related sensitive there werespecific last EU enlargement, to the respect with negotiations all countries. issues. In this way itis attempted to show independently the compliance record of the two followedthese which organizations, of other reports and ICTYreports primarily the but of compliance for assessment beused will only not EU sources Hence, ICTY. In order to evaluate compliance and see what factors influence it, the most the influenceit, factors seewhat and compliance to evaluate In order isIt theseobvious conditions that countriesthe are specificmentioned, forin but 44 CEU eTD Collection York: Russel Sagefoundations, 2002). 86 constant change of balance of power among them. policythe interplay andthe on between is the change dependent actors political the of outcome The policies. certain implementing suggests EU the in which manner the or being mean not necessary liberal orsupportingdoes being pro-EU, recommendations, all by means of liberal/illiberal by dichotomy Vachudovaused Schimmelfennig or because within both countries, therefore, the change of policy would mean starting cooperation. cooperation no from of policy the start all they because here, casesexamined For the weak support government Fragmented with support comfortable government Fragmented support by parliamentthe weak United government by supported parliament United government rule man One process decision-making influences it how and players veto governments, of Types 4: Table players acertain leads veto to in outcome ofpolicy change: terms number of and certain eachsituation with power, of constellation following government players tothe veto corresponds number of the from whereby theory This wasderived the Serbia Croatia Country/ period of government system the on based players of veto number 3: Table Summarized theory presented in George Tsebelis, George in presented theory Summarized It seems much more accurate to divide the political system in this way than in rather way system this divide political the to more much accurate It seems Note: this is based on the Tsebelis’ theory onveto players, see table 4 One One 1993-2000 Many Mixed Mixed Few One players Veto Mixed Mixed 2000-2003 45 Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work Many Mixed 2003-2008 stability quo/noStatus change/ change necessarily, incremental Possibly, change necessarily, incremental not but Possibly, Ad hoc(unstable policy Ad hoc(unstable policy) Decisions Many 2008- 86 but not but , (New CEU eTD Collection its bodies on the cooperation with the ICTY, reports of international organizations in the in organizations international of reports ICTY, the with cooperation the on bodies its results of parliamentary votes, statements and interviews, reports of the government and laws were reviewed as well instances. particular as implementationmaking process will be explained in cases of both compliance and non-compliance in of issues,adecision- specific looking atthese were. By of opinion preferences public the these throughimplications would there had been if there had been dissenting majority. Finally, what the officialposition of was.a government Fourthly, how bigparliamentary was and support what documents,Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the Prime Minister’s office). Thirdly, what the collectiveor crucial relevance for the complianceoffices holding were individuals or party which Secondly, compliance/non-compliance. (the Ministry of Foreign to leading decision a certain Affairs, for/against were parliament and the government the Ministry of ICTY. with the cooperation of process the monitoring with are dealing that NGOs some of asrepresentatives as well representatives ICTY the diplomats, EU ICTY, the forwith cooperation relevant offices certain incharge of officials members, government party with wereconducted Interviews internet. the via sources in electronic or copies hard in either officials government and leaders of party statements manifestos, party political organizations, international magazines,newspapers of national official governmentdocuments, and reports other and by reviewing collected were materials Empirical ICTY. the with non-cooperation The research is done through a process tracing of the cases of cooperation and In order to assess the existence of institutional obstacles, constitution relevant and constitution institutional obstacles, of assess existence tothe In order in actors political which Firstly, addressed. specifically were issues following The 46 CEU eTD Collection newspapers statements of international actors, the ICTY reports and indictments that andindictments reports the ICTY actors, international of statements newspapers on specific questions relating to compliance. Expert analyses were used as well as polls publicopinion the to according assessed were also theelection but results through where relevant. topic, on the policy. Statements of the officials of the EU were analyzed, as well as academic analyses external EU the of context wider in the state member the of position the influenced directly they if wereanalyzed inmember states debates domestic when necessary Moreover, where relevant. parliament in European the debates asthe Council, aswell questionin theframework of the SAP, and other background documents, decisions of the of on progress the applied: countriesthe in of annualreports EUCommission the officials. party andmain leaders ofthe from the statements butalso manifestos from party the taken mainly were involved used.Party positions werealso process, decision-making inthe thesebodies, from all actors the of media appearances and Statements necessary. office).Minister’s Prime the as well as Interior of Ministry the Justice, of Ministry the Affairs, In addition, Foreign of Ministry (the ministries relevant for applies also This used. were bodies two the actionsparliament i.e. existenceofsuch as theICG,haveassess alsobeen used.Inorderto andposition of government judiciary, of partisan vetothe ICTY reports.players, Reports of the NGOs working on human rights and conflicti.e.official regions, capacitysitesrelevant of administration, and documents including EU reports onof the progressthesecourts, with the SAP as well as were used where In terms of cost to power, preferences of national electoral bodies werereviewed bodies electoral national of preferences power, to of cost In terms In termsmethods of ofsimilar influences gathering evidencewere external 47 CEU eTD Collection consequently not very friendly relations with the EU for its insistence on cooperating on insistence its for EU the with relations friendly very not consequently creation, and as an ICTY artificial the towards enmity of wasone stance official political the much life not for alternativeand public leaving space whilethe positions of powergrip EU/the the most Milosevic controlled of ICTY.In positionsshort, towards andtheir of actors i.e. categorization Milosevic, in of Serbia structure administrative new countries emergedthat from This isYugoslavia. followed by andpolitical includingYugoslavia, creation the of ICTYandthe evolution EU policyof the towards factors facilitate or prevent cooperation with the ICTY and thus EU integration process. main The processes the trace explain is domesticstructures. within political aim to which to tries and ICTY the with non-cooperation and cooperation of cases isolates chapter political the on power relative their and actors political main the identify chapters all stagegeneral, and especially do same the infollowingduring named andthechapters three of period, Croatia.case In Serbia track chapters four first their The above. mentioned along periods time go the Chapters positions1.6 Brief overview of chapters towards with outcomes. factors the of some correlation EU and theleast at show bethe will usedto incentive external or condition certain before andafter ICTY. Then,show causality, comparisoneach of factors and constellation of to power amongpossible not is domestic it When actors causality. show to possible been always not has it analysis, conditions. the of fulfillment non of case in action international potential to werereferring and individuals, accusing were directly The first chapter starts with brief historical note on the disintegration of disintegration on the note brief historical with starts chapter The first Finally, even though process hasbeenmainlytracing used as a methodof 48 CEU eTD Collection ICTY as it echoes the mood and atmosphere within the society structures. andmood society the and state asit the atmosphere within echoes ICTY of the prime minister in 2003is another turning pointin the relations with the EU and the The assassination before ICTY. be they the prosecuted would that membersUnitthis of fearof the namely the cooperation, connection in ICTY the with isas itdirect explained is foroperations special of Unitthe protest The ICTYprosecution. the to related arrest other mentions chapter the addition, In ICTY. the with cooperation on law the of passing issues arrestof andthe Milosevic and preparation cooperation, the surrounding were met. The chapter primarily deals with mostthe important issues related to the ICTY conditions the once weretangible rewards the that but present still were conditions set the that meant which in Serbia, regime new democratic the towards actors international international support from this period sawenormous perspective EUandthe other the From regulations. laws and rigid the changingof prevented that players veto cooperation with ICTYdueto the complexthe federal andstructure partisan numerous in obstacles institutional overcome to problems the outlines It in Serbia. government andthebeginning markeddemocratic of of Milosevic end elections, which the ICTY. the with cooperation no ruling regime propaganda. Thisimpoverished duetocontrolled world,the in terms economic and restricted media and period saw the lowest level ofconcludes cooperation with opinion polls, with which the are a EUreflection despite limitedmaneuver. theirEU/the ICTY,Thechapter room positionsto the towards of a society isolated from the rest of with tribunal.the introduces chapteralso The opposition leaders andparties and pinpoints The second chapter follows Serbia from The follows from second chapter Serbia 2000presidential the federal and 49 CEU eTD Collection wanted the ICTY indictees, Radovan Karadzic. This left only two indictees at large, indictees at leftonly This two Karadzic. Radovan indictees, ICTY wanted the the most of of one arrest the led to have to seemed which cadre, new a with were staffed balance of power shifted, there was a new itprimeunstable led new to the in elections 2008. ministervery became coalition government the as and eventuate, and not did This ICTY. the and the government bodies EU the towards position itmeant changed that expectation with Serbia with negotiations elections in 2007, and entrance to the government of some DSmembers, the EUrenewed lack duetothe After cooperation the negotiations with of discontinued ICTY. the 2005. However, this was pending on the cooperation with the ICTY. In May 2006 the EU in October agreement Association and with Stabilization EUon the negotiations started major problems with Serbia resultingin apositive assessmentof cooperation and Serbia have did not ICTY the surrenders voluntary considerable were there factthat Due tothe EU. the policy towards a coherent lot to obstacles of and created cohabitation difficult country was Boris Tadic (DS) from they only supported voluntary hand, surrender. Ontheother of newpresident the the party of the late Prime meant EU.Thenewthe slower towards that leading position toprogress also decreased Minister, which led to a position towards the ICTY cooperation and the cooperation with this institution had Kostunica new The headedbyVojislav (DSS) different Prime government, Minister. change theperiod. throughout The balance shifted in assassination the 2003 after of the not did power of constellation in the essence, so, minister sameaswell prime as the the ministers There but inmajority wereregularelections the government of the were 2007, The final chapter on The final on Serbia follows after theevents chapter 2008elections.the The The third chapter follows developments after early elections of 2003 until of2003until after early 2008. followselections chapter The thirddevelopments 50 CEU eTD Collection organizations of had but increasing Croatia newgovernment tostrike of organizations was the acareful the nationalitypassed a declaration that stated that all committed crimes had to be punished regardless of in 2000 Parliament Croatian new the but ICTY the towards positions such overcome of the perpetrators.government of Croatia.The support aggression for responsible Croatia. against The newof opportunityRacanthe EU governmentand itabout andlaw passeda on it.cooperation with Tudjman’s alwaysgovernment used to othercriticize didinternational until of death the inTudjman 1999.Despite its criticism of ICTYCroatiathe haddebate thenot ICTY have foron the side in the anwar,not which was the victim easy crimes of no beingbe an aggression.could there that was Thisposition the stance Tudjman of didregime not changerepressive taskthe During efficient to uneasy. very became it with cooperation the Tribunal the by indicted be to in began Croats bringing the when 1995 to after however, Croatia, against aggression exercised who to try those justice thoselater position towards the ICTY. Croatiawar in inCroatia thebeginning left of 1990s alegacythat in politics Croatian and onthe welcomed the creation of the ICTY as a forum 8,000 Muslims in in Srebrenica 1995, willbe regardedas full cooperation with ICTY. the about of killing the for indicted is who Mladic, general of arrest the only that determined isSAA Agreementisthough appliedby unilaterally the Dutch The Serbia. government ratify is to refusing government Dutch becausethe Serbia EUand the between relations froze almost justice. This to be brought would indictees if these all at when or clear not is it Still, end. an to drawing is ICTY the with cooperation the that indication giving The dealssixth chapter Tudjman with post the period and the firstdemocratic The fifth chapter is thefirst chapter on Croatia andit starts with briefa look at the 51 CEU eTD Collection He and some of the top SPS personnelindicted He and top the by some tribunal.were wereno of the There regime. Milosevic’s for costs personal players and veto partisan obstacles, institutional In 1993-2000the in values period first the factors for all Serbia werelow. were There 1.7 Summary offindings hundred Serbsleaving thousand Croatia. Gotovina, who was indicted for the Croatian actions Ante General indictee, Storm Croatian most wanted of the arrest the December 2005with and Flash that saw couple of openingthe of negotiationsthe membership forin October 2005.This was confirmed in Croatia ledto fullycooperating EUthat the which Sanader inpersuading was succeeded no opposition EUintegration, work onsettinghavingtowards previous path the and governmentgood to the right of reformedthe benefits HDZ,party presidentTudjman. former the of of the the Ripping of their political spectrum,elections. thedomestic This inaddition opposition. growing early economicto problems led to new HDZ headedgovernmentcouldnotpush ICTYdemandsthe Gotovinathrough toarrest andappease by IvoCroatian by EU diplomats. decision aharmful as wasseen werearrested indictees and the legislation with opposition domestic the points relations the EU,Racangovernmentwaslosing with allowing againstpoints Racangovernment. the significant Despite progress institutional towards access to documentshighly.As pressuresthe from ICTYincreasedthe the inopposition Croatia usedit gain to of the ICTYcriminalizeandnot to theHomelandvery warwhich majority populationof regarded the casesICTY, the with cooperation included even that aspirations integration EU the between before balance the The seventh chapter deals with Croatia after 2003 elections, which saw the return 52 CEU eTD Collection changed within domestic arena. When the prime minister manageduse special When arena. prime changed within the to minister domestic tribunal. the to sent manipulated into assassinatingminister the prime because afraidthey were they would be were units military of special some members where an atmosphere creating society cooperation position profoundlywith ICTY,the the ICTY the of politicsdivided and the andactionstaken views towards issue.ministers pragmatic primeDespite the handle to how in views opposing had minister prime and President contention. of bone numerous. There were points veto partisan and wasInstitutional mandate. clear their within seen been have pro-EU policy but cooperationpotentially good for the incumbent government, on as the fruitsthe of the cooperation ICTY would proved to be a with which SPS, supportersamong hadstill numerous public.the there were but potentialindividuals the for costs personal no were There ICTY. the with costscooperation handle to losing to powerhow on members government as coalition the among Radical differences of terms in players party offered alternative, veto legacywerepartisan duetothe regime.obstacles There institutional of Milosevic’s together with the ICTY and thus with the EU. cooperation of terms in decisive more been have to seemed factors domestic Thus, rewards. potential these materialize on not andthuspro-EU did was not government join,ideological Serbian of the position offered to Serbia when and the EU created SAP for cooperation incentives with EU and in thushypotheses are confirmed.Even 1999 The period 2000-2003 was much more ambiguous. There werenumerous wasmuch moreThe period 2000-2003 ambiguous. During this period cooperation shifted from full to none as the balance of noneDuring cooperation this period shifted asthefull to from balanceof power Although SAA wereveryclearand the timingwas seen through EU rewards 53 CEU eTD Collection institutional obstacles but partisan positions were such that there was no real in suchthat there wasnoreal activity positionswere butpartisan institutional obstacles no were there Thus ICTY. andthe Serbia between and reciprocity equal treatment demanded it acceptable and were surrenders only was that government the of position EU but the conditionsnoopposition tothe There governmentwere decisive. was positions in of parties the the of the ICTY cooperation non-cooperation. towards balance were alwaysit butencouragehappen. cooperation didnot tipped Domestic constellation power of the difficultwas notconfirmed. incentives High by EUandthe good timing weresupposed to to fulfill.personal power,and costto which political confirms thehypothesis. Thehypothesis last The by indirectly for Hence, cooperation ICTYindictments. the wasnosupport there to due or directly andwerethreatened bodies in government the werestill former regime the from Inindividuals some addition, government. forthe limitedof action space strong with the cooperation. The high likelihood of losing power, as the opposition (SRS) was hypothesis.the non-cooperation, points leading numerous confirms which negative to veto andpartisan were obstacles institutional Therefore, join EU. sacrificethe to iswhat acceptable individual interestsand led party by personal different gains and alsovisions different of of mirror a are they and shift governments the of positions the that demonstrates This assassination. the after complete non-cooperation leading to halfhearted, prime politicalother forces ministeroutvoted cooperation andhis supporters, was provision extradite of Milosevic,Serbian constitution to full. cooperation was When The period 2003-2008, was similar in terms of strong EU incentives, The strong EU 2003-2008,wassimilarintermsperiod but of the manyplayers veto interfered but EUand theICTYwerepositive Position towards 54 CEU eTD Collection did not significantly improve. Many veto players made it impossible for the policy to policy the for impossible it made players veto Many improve. significantly not did theinheritedplayers ICTY andthecooperation governmentwith veto political difficult new The together. government the hold to factor decisive prove not did it continued SAA Even after electionsthe in 2007 when DSjoinedthe government negotiationsthe for towards ICTYcooperation.the This led discontinuation to of negotiationsthe for SAA. resentment domestic overcome to enough not was that however, SAA, for negotiations for governmenthighest reward the wasin 2005when opened theOctober EU the poweramong The politicalplayers. of domestic domesticdistribution and positions lednon-cooperation,cooperation, whichis to again, whatwashypothesized. inenhances the parliament bystrong position Radical of party, which was also against supportlosing fear the towards Negative led of ICTY, and government DSS position of nocooperation. players veto numerous because led to expected as confirmed- again was Hypothesis control. civilian under not still were services secret and army The ICTY. full ICTYprevented the the with position clear partisan government against cooperation relations with the ICTY and attempted to avoid cooperation with this institution government wasinfluenced byDSSled byKostunicathis. has had always uneasy the of position the that be said cannot it parliament, the in seats of number highest ICTY. Though there is still a threat of SRS taking over the power, as they always win the with by ICTYwas the supported againstSPS andSRS,which openly the were vociferous fulfilltrying This the ICTYrequirements. bypass to of position to trying cooperation the The last hypothesis was not confirmed because incentivesEU did not prevail over Therefore, there were no institutional obstacles but within the bodies of the 55 CEU eTD Collection Yugoslavia.Croatia Therefore,introduced rhetoric, SAPwas once pro-EU position the Thoughtherewasclear changed. wasuntil displeased 1995betried, would also Croats the that clear became onceit However, its work. welcomed there was for bodies cooperation ICTYand with institutional the allnecessary early created clear at cooperationit fluctuationseemed – from full and enthusiastic cooperation to non-cooperation. Croatia very with SAP the wasICTY, completion of the cooperation withonly the ICTY.even createdfew months of and governmentthe it remained tobe seen if lead wouldthis tothe firstleastinbeen Ministry Thus, have all,the confirmed,of of hypothesis at the Interior. as a substitutedminimal because the DS controls all ministries relevant for the cooperation, except for the players are veto thepartisan and obstacles institutional no are there EU accession, for would offerconsent. Public tacit majority opinion and the isin the government for the itbecould SPS thatthe concluded doanything with ministry havingarrest, the as to and his himself distanced just Karadzic, extradition of the to directly didobject not of Interior asMinister Dacia (SPS) account that into Taking new problems. creates ICTY supported the extraditions it remains to be seen if the continuation of cooperation with the directly not has SPS the that fact the to due but happened not has it far So coalition. ifinis with the anymajorthreat except SPS losingthere conflict the of imminent power, factors. Despite the narrow majority astandstill. is on in the process integration led EU the condition in political domestic the stalemate The change. parliament the government does not have In Croatia, the analysis of the period between 1993 and 2000 showed quite a quite and 2000showed between 1993 period analysisthe of In Croatia, the The period in Serbia after 2008 seems to have positive values of all mentioned 56 CEU eTD Collection respecting homeland war. There were clear incentives from the EU. Croatia signed SAA signed Croatia EU. the from incentives clear were There war. homeland respecting from accuse not power of thegovernment every opportunity HDZ, which to used jurisdiction of the ICTY over operations accepted been andthe newgovernment ICTYhadearlier cooperation the passed, with Storm and Flash. However, there was threatto theto right of the governing by Hague,whichwassupported parties toThe opposition the heroes was against sending coalition. There werebetween nocooperation institutional with the ICTY, which wouldlead to EU, and public opinion, which obstacles as law for rewards. EU over warprevailed Homeland legacy of timing weresupposed be providingto incentivefor cooperation protectionbut of the government. Storm and Flash were investigatedby tribunal,the veto players werefound within the suppressed butas positionthe within governmentthe changed after1995when operations was players opposition asthe veto partisan no were There with ICTY. the cooperate institutions important positionthe through bodies thatweresupposedto the and of overcome butinstitutional persisted in1996with the Lawoncooperation the obstacles the same government and within the same period regardless of the potential EU rewards. within positions weseeshifting caseaswell in this Hence, either. favored EU by not the and including return of refugees, the position shifted. In addition, regime of Tudjman was conditions demanded cooperation with the ICTY in termsbefore membership SAP promised for successful candidates. However,in once of 1997 sending Croats to it as well The period 2000-2003 was difficult as the new government struggled to balanceThe struggled newgovernment 2000-2003wasdifficultasthe period to rewardsand timeAtthe confirmed. EU not was hypotheses of set The third were which obstacles constitutional were there hypothesis, first of the In terms 57 CEU eTD Collection with the ICTY were in place. HDZ government, although minority government, had government, minority although government, HDZ place. in were ICTY the with Institutional and partisan veto players removed as alllaws and institutions for cooperation capitalized on it by fulfilling condition on the ICTY cooperation. ledgovernment HDZ were seenand cleargains of membership, EU accession forapplied Croatia it. Once tooppose actors political enough strong no were there because ICTY the for itin cooperation,government through could thecooperation government with push HDZ had to fearobstacles no onefor theto cooperationwhen domestic political balance of is Havingpower right. institutional inherited no its right. with theWhile ICTY and beingas enough not was an incentive external that the showing opposition strongest right of wereimportant, but moreEU rewardsandtiming thus domestic washigh factors again wingparty party, it criticized ledlowercost losingof cooperation,whichconfirms to elections, hypothesis. supporting view opposition therelosingof and wasclear high threat power.Therefore, the was andit war–electorate Homeland of disregards dignity importance claiming thatthe opportunities with to cooperation.criticize ICTYby Opposition usedall cooperation the cooperation. help not did obstacles institutional no were there factthat the to cooperate agreement no was asthere was confirmed, and growing dissatisfaction of publicthe leadingtoa new elections in 2003. Hypothesis from attacks opposition the by fuelledconstant coalition, the cooperation were dividing inmembership 2001andappliedfor 2003.However, inFebruary positions ICTY the The first hypothesis was institutionalconfirmed no veto points led tocooperation. canwork how incentives external here,demonstrates analyzed period The last Position on the ICTY was changing as the coalition parties had different views on 58 The value CEU eTD Collection decided by the constellation of decidedby constellation of power mainof the the actors. is outcome the of which in processes, governments make political domestic that decision sense, EU conditionality should not be looked at as something so different from any other issues.Inthis short oncertain their term political gainspositions according political to conditionality. of fulfillment the to comes it when illiberal/undemocratic and liberal/democratic between of membership,the anditis much more complex issue than dividing the countries rewards the expecting just than conditionality EU the of fulfillment the to more much is there is show that to tried this research What exception. than rather a morerule, of much are power of constellation in domestic changes and inpositions shifts are where there as clear. Situations in cases was not other situation cooperation. all However, leading to positive, factors values of all were the case onCroatia inlast in Only the place. factors obstacles domestic no were asthere decisions, make difficult to government the for i.e. itwas easier conditions, domestic favorable with conjunction and good timing ledtocooperation hypothesis was confirmed in casethis but only in hypothesis disagrees high The Hypothesis with confirmed.thirdrewards policies. the that EU. No fear of oflosing the government powerwas clearly foras full electionscooperation with the ICTYhas and gettingjust closer been to won and no opposition that its moves with regards to the ICTY tothe regards movesits with criticize to right the to opposition vociferous have not did and parliament in the support Most importantly, this analysis demonstrated that actors behaved in terms of their of terms in behaved actors that demonstrated analysis this importantly, Most all have we rarely very that shows cases seven these of analysis conclusion, In . The second hypothesis was also confirmed. Position 59 CEU eTD Collection its policy, then the conditions are fulfilled. government position and are notagainst fundamental principles on which the party makes sidelined. when Therefore, domestic conditions areripe andif endanger not they do easily are not that sovereignty national to related issues certain are there demonstrated Serbia and Croatia both As membership. for conditions the of fulfillment of favor positions. political than itgains rather is questionthe of a country sliding liberal from illiberalto while they were ICTY.in Inopposition. addition, the same by the with status candidate the incooperating led to Croatia samegovernment the 2003 party,Thus, and itsit leaderis more in 1990sandthen withtheICTY cooperate late the HDZdidnot Ivo actors. certain political Sanader a case were againstof of changinginterests shows just it illiberal or is democratic less agovernment show that not does cooperation strategiesof power to waswin not allowing certain conditions in return for the potential rewards. That To sum up, EU rewards are necessary but not sufficient to tip off the balance in balance if domestic enough the werenot incentives external showedthat All cases 60 CEU eTD Collection Frank Cass, 2002), 173. 87 The Serbian by nationalists. Croatia,won in and by Slovenia was followed elections the This leave congress. the to Slovenians the caused Serbiandelegation the Yugoslavia), of Communists theLCYof (League federal of congress last the leadership, at and all refusing proposals from liberal,the and pro-Western secessionist Slovenian beginningrevolution’. were the of ‘anti-bureaucratic so-called the heand inKosovo, organize used ethnic demonstrations tension to the opportunity that power within the League of Communistsin Serbia. With risingthe economic problems gain advantage of to situation this Milosevic took Serbianwelfare.Slobodan for the AcademyMemorandum by Serbian Yugoslaviacriticized asthe of solution the Sciences In became infamousSerbia, the more leaderships andbetween more apparent. republican the only president death of the after morebecame pronounced even This its republics. each of of leadership of SFRY,by the for self-determination duetorisingnationalism beand calls eroded slowly to Josip Broz, and, to them. and reactions domestic and incentives atexternal pressures will look furthermore, players. finalsection The partisan veto the with ICTY,and obstacles for cooperation the in the 1980s andactors their general and costs, positions power which will be followed byinstitutional differences main i.e.the willbepresented, structure domestic political the Next, ICTY. tothe related andissues theactors introduce asto note with historical a brief willstart This chapter 2.1 Introduction 1993-2000 2-Serbia Chapter Sinisa Malesevic, Sinisa At the same time, at the federal level, with its strategy of using ethno-nationalism using of strategy its with level, federal the at time, same the At During 1960sand the Socialist Federal 1970s,the Republic of began Yugoslavia Ideology, Legitimacy and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia 61 87 , (London: CEU eTD Collection democratic institutions. The isproblem by exacerbated violentthe civil war that left of iscomplexwith structure impedimentgovernment to ethnicthree an groups fordevelopment hasof future asinadequate country, the the anda country been contested the of Republika Thedivision and the andHerzegovina Federation Srpska. of Bosnia entities: the two with country recognized asaninternationally Bosnia andHerzegovina inPeace Agreement(Muslim) population.Dayton The warand the 1995 ended created military leading Croatian with Bosnian proclaimed toandconflict Srpskaalso Republika refugees is still ongoing. actions forced some 200.000 Serbs leaveto Croatia and the problem of the return of these operations ‘Storm’ and ‘Flash’, Croatia regainedfull control of its own territory. These Croatia was not in the control of that part of its territory until 1995 when, during military areaand inthe established was presence international a fewclashes, military independence, callingitself Republika SrpskaKrajina,whichpavedwar. theway After to Republic of Yugoslavia –in 1992. anewcreated federation Federal and whileSerbia – the independence Montenegro forlikewise, opted in of andHerzegovina. andBosnia Macedonia, Croatia war independence. of proclamation the to eventually and Croatia and Slovenia in referendums the to led which reached, not was solution the theleadershipask forprompted ‘asymmetricbut of Croatia and Slovenia tofederation’, centralization on insistence elections. Serbian andthe won (SPS) of Serbia Party Socialist branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) changed the name into 88 Ibid., 174. In 1992, a war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There Bosnian inBosnian outSerbs There In 1992,awarbroke Herzegovina. Bosnia and In in Serb 1991, the of Croatia partpopulation Knin the around its proclaimed 62 88 This, in turn, resulted inthe resulted inoutbreak This,turn, de facto CEU eTD Collection Karadzic for involvement in crimes in Bosnia because he was the president of of Republika president becausehewasthe in ininvolvementBosnia for crimes Karadzic indicteesmost in wanted in are Radovan andBosnia. Croatia involvement The war indirect for indicted was Seselj Vojislav (SRS), party Radical Serbian of President he of duringthe period. indicted for Kosovo becauseSerbia waspresident SPS wasalso Serbia of party Socialist Milosevic’s from also Milutinovic, Milan in 1999. confirmed involvement in the wars in for indictees. wereSlobodan ones issue Thetop Milosevic extradition of important was Bosnia and for the war in it.most with The second cooperate finding to legalway an acceptable government Kosovo. These indictments for laterwhichand subsequent Milosevic’s wasthemain government position of then were until governmentchangethe in 2000. community international the from Serbia of isolation full completed That country. the of bombing i.e. sanctions, military in culminated which sanctions, diplomatic and economic neighboring Albania andMacedonia. During period this Serbia strong was under during the period of NATO bombing in 1999, when more than a million Albanians fled to clashesthe Kosovo Albanians between in Serbian police 1998aswell as and1997 and involuntary. and difficult been always has operation countries,the its subject to jurisdiction, have haduneasy it, with relations and co- roleall important although punish hadanincreasingly to The ICTYcreated warcriminals sensitivein issue diplomatic relations countriesand their bilateral of these co-operation. most of one the theendof war after years ten more than andisstill paramount most beenhas of the one war crimes of The200.000 deadandmillions question displaced. The main issues related to the ICTY in Serbia were firstly ignoring its existence, its ignoring firstly were inSerbia ICTY the to related issues main The during Kosovo in happened that events the over jurisdiction has also Tribunal The 63 CEU eTD Collection grip over the media and all political life in Serbia. From the very beginning of the work the of beginning very the From in Serbia. life political all and media the over grip wouldlostis power beenhigh. have That why the periodduring he was putting stronger relations. all marked endof complete diplomatic That June1999. March to and reached of its NATOcommunity peak during bombing Serbia from deteriorated international and Serbia between relations Bosnia, in war the ended that Dayton in in a figure securing andkey peace in1995wasseen agreement Milosevic as peacemaker and media. the West abriefapparatus of After relations with when the good period 2000, Socialist party Serbia heldof within all key positions state the government, in fallthe regime Milosevic’s YugoslaviaDuring breakupof the from to theof period 2.2 Actors: general positions and power costs cooperation and non-cooperation with the ICTY. biggestthe important andcases most beinassesswill reviewed to order instances the of only therefore, mentioned, be could extraditions and indictments of instances all not say, followed casesother below, in indictments. Needless some along chapters the with of to Srpska in Bosnia fulfill itsto responsibilities towards the ICTY. These issues will be Republika pressure on put also but to Serbiancitizens whowere indictees those extradite According EUpolitical the to conditionality not did had only Serbia obligation to out the patients from a nearbyhospital hill Vukovarto killingOvcara and in them 1991. in taking beinginvolved accusedof were for They Ovcara. Vukovarthree the Radic, or controversial most butsome of the military from personnel indictees other There werealso cases inMladic and outactionsSrpska, Karadzic’s General Ratko whocarried politics. basedon Croatia were Veselin Sljivancanin, Mile Mrksic and Miroslav Moreover, Milosevic indicted by was ICTYin the 1999 and forcosts him if he 64 CEU eTD Collection 89 country. own the towards narcissism and xenophobia good indication this.of in area andgerrymandering pollsopinion theperiod Surveys results. elections the of some and in theregion, peace and of stability factor a as Milosevic presented bymedia misconceptions that real the spread of controlled sources: supporters the SPS, governmentand alwaysstrong support in This parliament. the stemmedseveral from more Russia turned towards and China than rather Western Europe. either, asitwas blamed what for hadhappened inYugoslavia and foreign policy was denialwith it.not and contacts EUwasthe all refusing Theposition favorable towards political creation, had nojurisdiction over Serbia and the policy towards the Tribunal was inof ICTY the 1993, Milosevic’s governmentpositionthe took theTribunal that was sanctions as difficult but did not linksanctions butdidpolitics.not the asdifficult Only them current 10% of to the citizens it accepted showed that andthat surveyquestions the to inreplies contradictions concluded wereenormous The survey events there that inBosnia Herzegovina. and in war 55%believed mediaforeign Bosnia andHerzegovina. werebiasedinthat covering blamemost wasfor for responsible theattitude Serbia the wereto the organizations that foreignbelieved policethe countries,international 20%.24%foreign that andpoliticians parliament Yugoslav of Serbia; butthe army enjoyed trust of 28% of surveyedthe and it. changedo anything to willing to were not wasacrisis but there that were aware done by the Institute for Social Research in Belgrade showed that most of the citizens “Spite Barometar” (Barometar inata), (Barometar Barometar” “Spite In May In increasedin public May 1993, the signs showed Serbia opinion polls of Milosevic andduring SPSenjoyed quite high support 1990s.SPShad the unified There was low trust in the government bodies, 32% distrusted the government and Vreme , 21 June 1993, 26. 65 89 The results of the opinion polls CEU eTD Collection 91 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=01&dd=21&nav_id=228593&nav_category=418 Available at: January 2007 90 oppositionthe was between 4 and 1993and 5%between 1999,with per small oscillations detail. more in below mentioned All parties willbe in opposition than in parties. thethese governing the opposition wouldIn coalitionsmore get11%. general, surveyshowedthat the successful would be the DSS and 3% for the NewMarkovic. In terms of closeness Democracy.with opposition parties, 16% opted for the SPO, 15% for The DS, with group distributionthe JUL Milosevic’s16-8-10. was party of GSS wife Mirjana and Social Democraticfor one of the opposition parties. Sill, 43% of the surveyed felt closeParty to the SPS-JUL-SRS for SPS-JUL-SRSvote survey,vote the andAccording22% would 13%would to only said they woulddone in September 1999,57%of surveyedthose werepolitically butundecided, only 8% not vote, which elections due to unfair conditions they believed wouldfollow the elections.was low in elections in 1997, the numberto 110butmany dropped comparison boycotted opposition parties the elections infavor 1993,which inSPS whichchanged won situation the At 123 seats. the to 40% abstinencewhich has 250 members. rate.Milosevic in wereAtpoint, taken 101MPsin had SPS that 1993. 40%or parliament,the him33% rated as ‘very favorable’ 25%ratedwhile him as ‘fairly favorable’. surveyed and thoughtSPS Slobodan Milosevic responsiblewere warin for the Bosnia. Chronology of parliamentary elections (Hronologija parlamentarnih izbora), Beta news agency, 21 agency, Beta news izbora), parlamentarnih (Hronologija elections ofparliamentary Chronology Vreme , 25 September 1999,4. In January 2000, the public opinion polls showed that the support for leaders that of the support public showed polls opinion In January 2000, the situationHowever, slowly the changed towards end of 1990s.Inasurvey the of ratings these as in opposition, movement strong no was there that shows This 90 Milosevic used this to increase his power and organized early andorganized increase hispower to this Milosevic used 66 91 CEU eTD Collection Law 94 93 DPS).” Socialist PartyConstitution of Serbia, was federal “The constitution of SFRY. the inApril 1992,replacing newwas enacted country a result SPS) of andan arrangementThe constitution Montenegro. Republic consistingthe of Serbia and of of Yugoslavia Montenegro between ledtothecreationAs mentionedof Yugoslavia disintegration above, of (the Federal the the Democraticruling2.3 Institutional veto points parties Partyof Serbia of (thedomestic factors. Socialists,these against incentives and pressures international with end will chapter the and players followed veto by withcooperate partisan be ICTYwill reviewed, the capacity to the country once conditions living of was improvement and outsituation economic better a for of expectations isolation. Below the only it. membership Most6% wasagainst who of supported those did so out of institutional frameworkforin agreedand FRYfull the membership support 48% expressed EU, 29%generally of the country and 92 isolationism. favored only while 11% countries, with integration European populationthe were increasingly InJanuary positive. in favor 2000 56%was of However, despite his orientation towards 31%at and fellthen 13%intheto 1999 butwas still higher any to of oppositionthe leaders. east, the attitudesyear. towards Europe among Petar Teofilovic, “Crisis inYugoslav Public Law”, “Support for Europe, after all”(U Evropu, ipak) “Situation inSerbia” (U Srbiji prilike su tak’e), , Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, vol. VI, spring 2000, 73. 92 Support for Milosevic was very inhigh half firstthe 1990s, theof highestin 1995 94 As mentioned abovethe surveys confirm only for SPSand support the Milosevic. The Constitution regime, TheConstitution byfew tothe was drafted close allowing people no Vreme Vreme 67 Annual Survey of International and Comparative , 8January 2000, 12. , 29 January 2000, 18. 93 As high as CEU eTD Collection Milosevic and his wife Mirjana Markovic. “All important decisions are made in parallel made are decisions important “All Markovic. Mirjana wife his and Milosevic Slobodan of parties liedin that political of power centers camefrom political power All state bodies wereand he his used of FRYposition presidentbeyond again allowed constitutional powers. only a screen and becamelesssignificant Serbia of president rolethe of the by assembly FRY, federal the a simulation of state of Serbia he and oversteppedconstitutional powers once president he to was appointed functions while the real the position Milosevic occupies at any given moment.” any given at occupies position Milosevic the ispower highly personalized, personifiedMilosevic, in Slobodan and shifts according to elections. inThus, the stalemate absenceof leadconsensus would and system the to new eventually was envisioned by FRYConstitution the could have only if worked was there consensus. fixed by The appointed 20deputies republics.republics had of Thesystem chamber the voters. withper 65000 deputy one bysecretballot elected aredirectly where deputies Chamber of republics. The first one had representatives according tothe size of electorate 96 last accessed on26 January 2006 95 had power. significant highest body is Assembly Federal the but federal government andfederal ministerprime member-republics. andfederation strong aweak created order constitutional the out, points Teofilovic AsPetar public debate. Teofilovic, 75. Constitutionof Federal Republic of Yugoslavia available at: However within Serbia which had semi-presidential “the of had real system, centre within semi-presidential However Serbia which According to the federal constitution, the role of president is ceremonial one, the one, ceremonial is president of role the constitution, federal the to According 95 The assembly had two chambers - Chamber of Citizens and Citizens of Chamber - chambers two had assembly The 68 http://www.montenet.org/law/fryconst.htm 96 During his term Duringhisas apresident term CEU eTD Collection be explained in more detail. in more be explained Belowcriticize its these will existenceand and positions work. to useevery opportunity no mechanisms, procedures or bodies for cooperating with it. The policy was to ignore it position were there with Thus, Tribunal. the cooperate not should country the that and conviction ideological an of more was It ICTY. the with cooperate to obstacles institutional government. in the positions official other and ministerial significant had nonetheless Milosevic’s wife Mirjana Markovic, which had littlein support but electorate the 99 Montenegro) 1990-1996: Analyses,Documents and Data 42.6% of SPS/JUL. ruling the to scored only 22% compared (Zajedno), ‘Together’ called Pesic of (GSS) Vesna of Alliance Serbia andCivic Djindjic Zoran DSS butincluding(DS) of party Democratic without time this opposition parties, 17% compared SPS31.5%. to only winning Assembly Federal the for 1992elections December badly atthe relatively called movement(SPO) DEPOSdid Serbianrenewal Serbia and VukDraskovic’s (DSS) Milosevic and hisSPS.The fist coalition of Kostunica’sVojislav Democratic party of final the regime of Slobodan blowto unite a andgive within democraticto opposition 1990s. years ofstruggle throughout The1990sasthethe election show results clearly unite in stay failed to mainactors The parties wasableto Milosevic inopposition power. 98 97 rulingthe parties.” mechanism within through relevant institutions to powerandaretransmitted centers of Ibid., 194. Vladimir Goati (ed.), Ibid. 76 Having control Having control of all politicaland institutions SPS have Milosevic didnot Thus, all underhis having axesand of dividedpower control using opposition, 97 Elections to the Federal and Republican parliaments of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 98 In the next federal elections another coalition of coalition another elections federal next the In 69 , (Berlin: Sigma, 1997) 193. 99 JUL, the party of CEU eTD Collection ‘active participation’ in Non-alignment Movement is put as the main aim of foreign of aim main the as is put Movement in Non-alignment participation’ ‘active 101 102 of the country.” aggressorand tothe freedom independence determined defended resistance dignity and forces under the leadership of the president Slobodan Milosevic showed unified and defense andall police “Yugoslav army, country leadersaved the who extraordinary as is depicted Milosevic Slobodan sametime, the At USAadministration. the and disappointmentis expressed towards Europe, which followed the course of actions of conquering and enslaving towardsYugoslavia.ambitions The USA is labeled imperialist which described barbaric. The NATO asgenocidal was ashaving and wasdescribed challenges. international to Response entitled section a had which ‘Reconstruction-Development-Reforms’ reverse their failed policy of aggression against FRY. existtribunal was an and not did indictment so-called of the to attemptNATO countries the that said Geneva in UN in the FRY of representative the brought, was Milosevic pre.phtml 100 was still not takingit seriously. May On 27 withcooperate itto and byit, lateas1999when regime as was indicted the Milosevic Milosevic refused of in the government 1993, ICTYwascreated the fact that the Despite 2.4 Partisan Veto Players Document taken from B92 special election coverage, available at: available coverage, election special B92 from taken Document Ibid., 28. Pierre Pierre Hazan, Improving relations with ‘friendly as countries’ Russiasuch and China as well as In February for its2000, 4 last accessed 28January 2006 Justice in a time of war 102 101 Serbia was portrayed as a victim of the NATO aggression, , (Texas A&M Univeristy Press, College Station:2004), 45. th Congress, SPSpublished the adocument 70 th 1999,when indictmentthe against 100 http://www.b92.net/izbori2000/index- CEU eTD Collection score political points by keeping contacts with Bosnian Serb leaders while Kostunica leaders while with Bosnian Serb contacts by political keeping points score was trying to DSthat it wasDjindjic’s stance, nationalist more pronounced the Despite 104 103 butit,left ashe though itwas “too soft on national issues” others, and Djindjic Zoran with together (DS) Party Democratic the of was aco-founder Kostunica was expelledfrom university the heconstitutional hadtaught where law. He A of Democraticand an dissident 1974constitution,the Serbia (DSS). of Party opponent Kostunica’s Vojislav of part was question Serbian the for concern and nationalism before Yugoslavia.committed not permanent,tribunal.Another argument by the Ministry of Justice was the objectioni.e. that the court was the exclusive, havingjurisdiction objection forinonly the war Yugoslavia and not anindependent thus wasthe Ministrythat of thereJustice put werearguments noagainst trials the recognized by regime.the ICTY forfor being otherad hoc, political,the war SPS program andcrimes and there in favorable very not was in inparticular andtheEU Europe the West, general towards is no mention of the forbombing crimes orientation prosecuted during Thus,the of committed Serbia. NATO ICTY because the tribunalinstitution. the however,responsible The document, be that demands NATOofficials was never body mentionedof this asa was not ICTY butthe in UNCharter, the duties vested legal allinternational acknowledgeand FRY the does that respects policy. document The against Milosevic, Dejan Anastasijevic andAnthony Borden, pitomci), (Haski cadets” Hague “The This negative attitude to the ICTY was shared by other parties as well. Latent well. as parties by other wasshared ICTY tothe attitude negative This toBelgrade, presidentRichardGoldstone In 1994,duringvisitthe ICTY the of (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2000), 7. 103 Vreme Out of Time: Draskovic, Djindjic and Serbian Opposition , 17October1994, 8. 71 104 and created his own DSS. CEU eTD Collection only way forward towards keeping only upwith and technological economic,way forward towards political in 1990,asin socialism1993 that not was winningthe option anddemocracy that was the itstressed Although stance. by nationalist some wascharacterized in DOScoalition, the participatemain The not of thatdid SPO,one of opposition 1993 program the parties the one. a moderate into yearsturned the over but nationalist a hard-line as career political which hesaw problems ascontributingtothe Serbia. of because importantly, he West, towards his negativethe most attitude of gainedsupport him appeal moreliberalto both In to andaddition, more radicalvoters. and probably 106 105 opposition. the nor regime the of supporters neither disillusioned supporters of oppositionother leaders as well thosewhountilas were then from receiving Kostunica Montenegro, the whostayed support started inSerbia position in While Milosevic’s mostwar-cabinet. spent of Djindjic timethe in aministerial Draskovicin accepted 1999, campaign NATO the Duringcollapsed. Draskovic, of coalition the DjindjicEventually, Milosevic. overthrow to threatening were protests mass when and Vesna Pesic, the in coalition join(Together) 1996 Zajedno to the wellrefused leaderevery DSSas The poll. of the Civic Alliancethen the DSS refused jointo any coalition, while alwaysmanaging winto enough seats at of Serbia (GSS)Draskovic, to create the DEPOS coalition but it did not do well at the elections and since from Srpskaduring war. Republika the his Bosnianself-determination distance kept Serbs of to although supporting right the Ibid., 8. Ibid. Vuk Draskovic, leader the of Serbianthe Renewal started hisMovement-SPO In DSSjoined1992, the the (SPO) led MovementSerbian Renewal byVuk 105 72 106 His moderate nationalism nationalism allowed Hismoderate CEU eTD Collection 109 108 at: 107 this century”. lands,our for regions, which churches and graves... we diedterribly on two occasions in room “unifying breaksif beingtheloss all state Yugoslavia up.The reason the of over face could people Serbian the price that the program stresses the in world, the movements creation of the Serbian Guard was a response to the formation of the Zbor National National Guard of Zbor the formation tothe was aresponse Guard of Serbian the creation Karadjordjevic. II Aleksandar Prince Crown command of paramilitary Serbian the unit, tobeunderGuard, whichwassupposed supreme the form a to SPOpassedadecision the in presidency of June1991,the for peace, Yugoslavia Serbian forthe 1980s hethoughtthat nation. wasadisaster the calls Despite in nationalism but moremoderate late the Draskovic took -SRS. Party Serbian Radical laterfoundingleft memberswasVojislav who hisSeselj,and party created own the nation. Serbian the for beneficial not was Yugoslavia that and genocide by threatened was nation Serbian that felt he because countries. neighboring incooperation with expresses specialinterest and and andJapan, Russia EU,NATO, Serbia between relations friendly traditionally the of renewal advances SPOprogram the impossible intertwined and duetothe roots sharedsettlements. Unambiguously,however, the borders with the Croats, of demarcation it clear demands the settlement, of place language and faith, of change while it underlines thatrelations with formerthe Yugoslav republics andcondemns genocide, killing,forceful demarcations with the Muslims is Anastasijevic andBorden, 26. Ibid., 20. ‘Serbian Renewal Movement program’ document taken from B92 special election coverage, available coverage, election special B92 from taken document program’ Movement Renewal ‘Serbian http://www.b92.net/izbori2000/index-pre.phtml Reportedly,in 1990, Draskovicsaid he justwas lending himselftopolitics 107 Even though program the maintain necessity emphasized to good 108 last accessed 28January 2006, 1. SPO was created in 1990, and one of the 73 109 Draskovic later said that the said later Draskovic CEU eTD Collection 110 had be to first. investigated crimesorder to investigate in crimes Serbsin the the against 60years1999, previous the in that thought he as Kosovo in investigations ICTY the to negative also was Draskovic beindicted by to Milosevic ICTYfornotacceptingthe 1996elections.the of results for called Draskovic because asurprise Thiswas and pressure. provocation were political they he thought because 1999 May in himself against indictment ignore to Milosevic same inway”. the and must bepunished Muslimcrimes Croat duringheincommitted war by, from formerthe Yugoslavia on orders or certain Serbs. were manythat crimes for horrible responsibility from collective Serbpeople the individual:“Favoring cooperation absolute my with HagueTribunal,the party defends letter to thefor full cooperation of thepresident FRY with the ICTY. During the same year, Draskovic wrote a with the ICTY. of In early the1996, the SPO submittedICTY to the federalurging parliamentambition. his always was which a bill opposition, callingthat responsibilityrefused it, asitwould endangerhisposition potentially as theonlyleader of the headed bythecrown andtheheadprince Serbian of Church, Orthodox the Draskovic for crimes2000, at thehad meeting with todiaspora beand thethis monarchism of SPOturnedthe out tobe only a way opposition,ingaining When,of power. it wasEventually, proposed SPO. the to linked way in any be to want tonot did createthey that statement issued a body men Finally,leaders SPOasvolunteers. in the approached the early Guard the 1992, of in Croatia, adding that, after the formation of the Serbian Guard, tens of thousands of Ibid., 58. The SPOandin Draskovicclaimedthatthey of favor were ‘absolute’ cooperation 74 110 Moreover, he advised Moreover, CEU eTD Collection In 1994, the DS proposed FRY-Republika ’Declaration the Serbian parliament DSproposed to the a on In 1994,the solution”. and temporary illogical werea“hypocritical keep Bosnia together to plans community’s international that he thought later but Serbs Bosnian the among radicals to the international community on the issue of Milosevic’s the ICTY indictment. be first they were infavorof reached withinwith then compromise and Serbia regard to peacefully.Consequently, make off power himletgo Milosevic asto compromise with fear of civil war, Djindjic and other opposition leaders were in favor of a kind of 113 112 111 consequence. Theproblemis Milosevicthe within notMilosevicus himself.” regime propaganda, oppositionthe had toplay safe,the card. nationalist, the due to that he recognized Milosevic, always against hewas though Milosevic. Even by as accepting waroption propagated the accusedbytheCroats party were thus his and He state. in one live to Serbs all or majority for was question Serbian the resolve Milosevic’sthought means were wrong. solvingof the question in butatthe sametimehe territories Serbs hadathey scattered problem as different were part of the population. He strived to create a modern,large, centrist party. and entrepreneurial educated urban,better the in The party appealedto president1994. hein its became 1990, in DS of the co-founder Milosevic’s The shared power regime. andmeetings as unlike Milosevic,butwell as Draskovichadsecret never with Draskovic Ibid., 98. Ibid., 90. Ibid., 77. As for Bosnia,in 1993, Djindjic firstly he stated that had no sympathy for the Zoran Djindjic, the leader of the Democratic Party-DS was a pragmatic leader; apragmatic was Party-DS Democratic the leader of the Djindjic, Zoran He stated, “Milosevic is the cause of our problem and on the otherHis position ontheir the concept of Greater Serbia was ambiguous. He did say that 75 111 He thought that to 112 Out of 113 CEU eTD Collection 115 114 in Srpska showed This interest of Republika solve SPS Yugoslav crises. the to negotiator leadership RSthe could haveendangered of position the Milosevic as only of able the by the independent, morebecoming that, SPSwas concerned instigating waragain. The survival of Serbianthe people wasfought; leadersthus, opposition areaccused of politicalstating interest, was that this supportlacking when decisivethe battle for the wasclear. Karadzic in interestsupporting so the Srpska, in branch SRShasan the Republika Moreover, active ofits voters. expectations and havingstrong representation in the Serbian and federal parliament fulfilled actually uncompromising whenitcame tothe position on uniting territories inhabited bySerbs, in leadership Republika Srpska of of a demonstration solidarity. visiting andgroup were thecontact accept of peace plan the to not Bosnian Serbs authorities.” ignorance of of because Belgrade-based gettingthe the killed stop Bosnian Serbs and that it was “high timeDjindjic tosaid that itdefine was Milosevic’s fault that this was lostthe as he imposed the blockadeSerbs on national goals, years,for several forces so international was under minority of and control Serb that they will actionsfinally in 1995 that governmentallowed theCroatian fully to control its territory peace plan After acceptable military independent. if Croatian as Srpskawas Republika Radovan Karadzic toplan and settingvisited up sanctionsMilosevic was against Republika Srpska,Djindjic discuss this confederation. confederation’. At wasSrpska time the Serbleadership refusing when peace Bosnian the The DS and Djindjic saw the Dayton “Our man in Pale” (Nas covjek na Palama), na covjek (Nas Pale” man in “Our Ibid., 100. The SPS accused these new relations between opposition and RS as focusing on focusing andRSas opposition between new relations these The SPSaccused The leaders of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), DSS and DS were supporting Vreme 76 , 16January 1995, 22. 115 The SRS was always 114 CEU eTD Collection “destroy “destroy world”.the calledfor integration the with Russia andBelarus thenew against world thatwould order theSRS its congress, Patriotic Fifth integration, at European supporting increasingly 118 117 1994, 29. 116 persuade theregime toorganize to weretrying parties Theopposition appearing strong. Serbia. any partof in aggressors of the troops the against was SRS the and stay to forces military Serbian said that the plan was completely unacceptable for the SRS because it did not allowMilosevicagainst butit fought against crime andforprotection of national interests. the his details.talk that about Hestressed notacting party inwas either favorof Karadzic or wantdidsome to bybutnot he Milosevic hesaid that knewabout ordered warcrimes Dubrovnik and andfor strikingOsijek, Tudjman deals with insteadoffighting him. Still, invadefor together with Milosevic’s refusing special blamed Seselj Milosevic to units. in someandMilosevic his operations worked planning strategies volunteers that with together said heparticipated Seselj avoidedfollowers, andlaterresponsibility. anationaliststance, gained took Milosevic iscaused warandsanctions. that what and Bosnia in Serbs the on influence his show to wanting for Milosevic blamed Seselj warSlobodan wanted butlater ledescape responsibility. occasions that Milosevic to to republics despitethat the its regime rhetoric. was notThe completelyleader of the detachedSRS, Vojislav from Seselj,the war saidin the on formermany Yugoslav “The Radicals against America” (Radikali protiv Amerike), protiv (Radikali America” against Radicals “The Milosevicu), rekao sam (Sta Milosevic” to said I “What “My volunteers with his special forces” (Moj dobrovoljci sa njegovim specijalcima), Despite the NATO campaign, as late as December 1999, the regime was still was regime the 1999, late asDecember as NATOcampaign, the Despite Seselj and intervention NATO of end the after conference apress held The SRS 118 117 Although in beginningof the 2000, the public opinion was 77 Vreme Vreme , 5June 1999. , 29January 2000,19. Vreme , 8 August 116 CEU eTD Collection coverage available at: 122 121 120 119 JUL and SRS. early elections at all levels, but the regime was not threatened due to its support from the community community in used their with relations Serbia second the during partof 1990s. the with the “community of European states.” footing equal an on again Serbia placing to aim an with state the of organization political towards Europeat the early elections, also did not mentionwas the question of the ICTY.clear Still, the orientation The program of Democraticthe Opposition Serbia,of unitedfight in 2000, to Milosevic and unambiguous. gaining than power theaddressing issueof forof responsibility Milosevic’s warcrimes. It mentioned early elections. regarding reforms inmakeinfluenceregime some concessions current the tryingto to difficultwhile situation all aspectsa very in opposition the puts which freedom cases in some and positions their lose of Covic stated that this warrant gives the regime two options either to stay in power or to from Milosevic organizing early elections. favorablevery for theit oppositionin as Serbia,it that wasbelieved would deter not was which Mladic, Ratko and Karadzic Radovan Milosevic, Slobodan for warrants democratic change will bedemocratic changewill higher. for chance the is –namelyworse, situation asthe better’ the thesituation worse ‘the motto the an with ‘vulgar Marxism’ of approach a adopted community international ‘Election program of the Democratic Oppositionof Serbia’ document taken from B92 special election Ibid., 9. “ The lowest league politicians” (Politicari iz betonlige), “The time is running out” (Rok istice, ponavljaci), The next section will address the policies that the EU and international and EU the that policies the address will section next The of prospects the with moreconcerned was opposition the itappears Hence, 119 In the beginning of 2000, the US government printed public governmentprinted arrest beginning US In 2000, the of the http://www.b92.net/izbori2000/index-pre.phtml 121 The leader of the Democratic Alternative, Nebojsa Alternative, Theleader Democratic of the 122 78 120 Vreme Kostunica was reported saying Kostunica wasreported the that , 11 December1999. Vreme, 11 March 2000, 7. , last accessed 28January 2006, 1. CEU eTD Collection 126 125 problems with which the ICTY was faced in its initial working phases will be mentioned 124 123 the tribunal had been compromised,American personnel - atno charge to the United Nations.”there was no other solutiontribunal’s disposal initialfor an years, of period two paidfor byWashington, the for the tribunal to start wars in the Balkans,the ICTY can be helpful diffuseto theypressure that was mounting as the media was covering decided to “place twenty-two high-level functionaries at the ICTY. 808 creating the February United1993, the Security Nations Council votedunanimously for resolution the role in pressureon putting countriesthe ithad jurisdiction over, until early 1999. In ICTY. of the creation in EU members the but thecooperation for participated with countries, framework these mentionedintroduction, develop started inmidonly inthe its 1990sto EU the the As ICTY. for Yugoslavia-the Tribunal Criminal International the of creation was the endin the war the former Yugoslavia. One wayof dealing within war the Yugoslavia In beginningthe of 1990s,the main the internationalfocus of community was helping 2.5 External pressures and incentives accused, logistics or even a prosecutor. prison, statute, offices, without was it in 1993 work its commenced Tribunal the When media. in basis the a daily on werepresented news warcrimes the of asthe countries Ibid., 52. Hazan, 44. Pierre Hazan’s book documents this in more depth but for the purpose here only Hazan, 7. some aspects of the The ICTY, although officially created in 1993, did not have a clearly influential clearly a have not did in 1993, created officially although ICTY, The 123 Its creation was more to appease the public of creation of Western the more public toappeasethe Its was 125 In the beginning of that USrealized beginningof Inthe 1994, the 79 126 Although impartialitythe of 124 CEU eTD Collection 128 accessed 2 February 2006 127 Srebrenica. to place prior Karadzic, president the to of Republika Srpska,on 25Julyfor events 1995 had that taken Radovan Republika and Srpska, of Mladic, army the of indicted Ratko general the Srebrenica, several when Muslimswere killed Serbs,Goldstone byBosnian thousands after However, be prosecuted. not would they that assured almost were conflict work the evenof trialsthe hadnot leaders of bybeginning commenced 1995, the of the to setting upthe tribunal itsand functioning. wererelated main as the its jurisdiction problems under countries the with of cooperation mention not in of first does high reportimportant ICTY the question 1994 The officials. indict failed asGoldstone judges weredisappointed 1994 andFebruary to 1995 butthe in November came indictments fist The work. to started ICTY the and tribunal the of criticizing the ICTY for accepting US help. working. didnot governments European offer todoanything similarthey while were the deal despite the fact that he, along with Karadzic and Mladic, was accused of wasaccused he, Mladic, and Karadzic along with fact that the deal the despite by striking West of the a partner and a peacemaker as of process the out came Milosevic atan 1992 inDecember on International Yugoslavia sidelined.conference Moreover, included tribunal the not peace negotiations, itself in was again thus process, the the governments of the West not to allow Karadzic and Mladic to participate in Dayton Hazan, 66. Annual ICTY 1994,report available at: As it, alipservice tribunal the and by was given whichcreated as countries, the inFinally, July appointed RichardGoldstone asthefirstprosecutor UN 1994, the 128 Although judges the putmanagedpressure ICTY the on of to http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1994/index.htm 80 127 last CEU eTD Collection be arrested before they could learn about it and before they could create systems to evade to systems create could they before and it about learn could they before arrested be scenario of the Dutch troops being taken hostage as in the case of Srebrenica. countries which had their as havein tocooperate formerAmericans theEU not they Yugoslavia while, troops did troops there were afraidand of thereprisals prison ofand the the ICTYrepetition was empty. of Thethe Europeans maintained that it was easy for tribunal. ICTY and there was no referenceDayton in December 1996, the British Prime Minister did not invite representatives of the to the obligation after conference London the aswell, at indicted persons; arrest the soldiersIFOR to of to of the States to giveagree butshefacedmandate to didnot problems. EUcountries prosecutor the same cooperate with the Krajina andSrpska.” of Republics self-styled asthe such authorities facto de assome aswell Montenegro), bein theshould FederalRepublic andYugoslavia particular made to of (Serbia cooperation: havereference withheld any some States “Regrettably,mentioned that havethose over which itjurisdiction.was supposed to is it 1995 Inthe report, annual and it, which created it thus was even moremarginalized sidelined,by andunrecognized had been mentioned but in finalthe version his name disappeared. 131 last accessed 2February 2006 130 129 crimes. Hazan, 93. Annual ICTY 1995,report paragraph 191. available Ibid., 30. 129 The new prosecutor started with the secret indictments so that the indicted could the that so indictments withsecret started the The newprosecutor On October 1 On October The negative attitude towards the ICTY continued on the part of the countries 131 Similarly,in in indictments1996, againstdraft Karadzic and Mladic, Milosevic Except for US,no the Except other governmentshared information with tribunal the 130 st , 1995, Louise Arbour succeeded Richard Goldstone asthechief Arbour Richard Goldstone Louise succeeded , 1995, 81 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1995/index.htm CEU eTD Collection was drawing to a closure. This crucial event in the tribunal’s work came West asthe work in tribunal’s the event This a closure.crucial to was drawing 135 e/1997/index.htm 134 e/1996/index.htm 133 132 presidentMilosevic on May 25 Louise proactive Arbourtook role in asthe Kosovo unfoldeddevelopments andindicted fornon-cooperation tribunal. the measurewith Yugoslavia wasnothere taken against in Dayton 1998, infollow December upto and the government heads of states fifty to the Serbian territory.” indictees on its territory and especially Ratko Mladic who was allowed to freely move on any arrest madeto says Serbia noaction Report The insuch legislation thefuture. withcooperate andmade itenable her ICTY, the itclear to intend did that make not to to pass legislation failed to andit Agreement, Peace Dayton the with complies Srpska Belgrade duetosome procedural questions itwas not setup. Dayton Peace Agreement. Although the government agreed to have office of the ICTY in accordingcooperate to influence RepublikaSrpskatotaken toobligations under the Republic Yugoslavia, whichfailed passnecessary legislationto for cooperation, and filed Federal lackthe of vociferous about cooperation of ICTYwasmore the 1996 report, Only in 1998were the French officers allowedtotestify before the tribunal. tribunal, isolated, with its whileFrance remained only tribunal. towards negativeattitude a positivein ledto the approach Likewise, Britain government to changeof the arrests. while beingin forces international attemptingare protected thisas well, way arrested; the Hazan, 111. annualICTY 1997,report paragraph 188, available at: annual ICTY 1996 report paragraph 169 available at: Ibid., 102. Despite the appeals by the new president of the ICTY Gabrielle Kirk Gabrielle McDonald ICTY the by newpresidentof Despite theappeals the RepublikaFRYensure failed that that stated to The ICTY1997annualreport , last accessed 2February 2006 las accessed 2February 2006 134 th , 1999just as negotiationthe for ending NATO bombing 82 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu- http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu- 133 132 In the In 135 CEU eTD Collection Nijhoff, 2003), 133. 136 region. the to stability bring in to peaceand Eastern Europe order measures inSouth and positive conditionality sanctions,addition sincemid to Community 1990s the approach encompassed positive human rights wasalso evolved former that policy one in Yugoslavia.EU towards In theissue of towards theattitude shows, aboveAs the countries. section former Yugoslav role. proactive not possible were negotiations that realize with governments Western Since Milosevicintervention. NATO the after any longer, the came Carla toofficein newDel Ponte, information. prosecutor, The 1999 September ICTY from then on assumed a new, more areal made theICTYbecome mediaactor. again,coverage this ignored Eventually, as a compromise,by media. covered the Yugoslavia, widely wasrefused which entry to prosecutor Walker was allowed ICTY sametimeat the the to However, 48hours. leave country within asked to the stay and, although the was and Milosevic of by regime the non-grata persona he proclaimed was Immediately, ICTY was the crime.investigate come invited and to ICTYrepresentatives Walker, the William mission, OSCEobserver the headof the inRacak when of village the occurred Kosovo. On January of form coming15 reports were atrocities realized that Milosevic could not stay as the only negotiator in the region and as the Elena Fierro, Elena During EUusedforms the 1990s,the various FRY of pressure on and other cooperating Western started governments with andsharing tribunal the The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice 136 The first refers to the promise of benefits if the recipient country 83 , (The Hague: Martinus Hague: , (The th , 1999, a massacre , 1999,a CEU eTD Collection available at: Union’s relations with certaincountries of south-east Europe”, Bulletin EU 4 – 1997: 2.2.1 29 April 2001, 139 accessed February 2006 Available at: 138 137 policies After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the EU implemented several and programs rights.” human of promotion meets inthe conditions; and positive measures referthe to “awarding of funds for the South East European region. sanctions. Nevertheless,i.e. measures, EUusednegative the in area, that progress i.e. rewarding conditionality, that was positive on and clause rights not human on focused clearly always that SAP with policy efficient. In Februaryits specified EU Before clear no reward. was asthere meet conditions, these to countries 1998,the for incentive an there whenwas nor this, controlled EU the thewhich in way systematic EU with One of the main conditionsthe mentioned in this ICTY.Council conclusion was cooperation However,1997. prior countries of southeasternthe European region, by adopted council the April on 29 to the formulationconditionality of application the on conclusions the on based were conditions The conditions. general of SAP withprogram,introduction, to start negotiationsa for the SAP, vieweligible countries had to fulfill some theretoAssociation -SAPProcess (1999)and Stability the (1999). AsPact mentioned in the developing was no Stabilization (1997), the Approach (1996),theRegional Royaumontand Process a coherent strategy for relations with the “Council conclusions on the principle of conditionality governing the development of the European the of development the governing conditionality of principle the on conclusions “Council “Building on theModel of EuropeanIntegration” 26March 2001 Ibid., 100-103. 139 http://europa.eu.int/avc/coc/pff/bull/en/9704/p202001.htm http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/region/europe_integration.pdf 137 84 last accessed February 2006 138 These included the last th , CEU eTD Collection 141 140 governments. both in ministers of list a as well as Marjanovic Mirko Serbia of minister prime the and Bulatovic Momir Yugoslavia of minister prime the Milutinovic, Milan Serbia of president the family, his and Milosevic includingSlobodan president member states toEU hada banonentry FRYand Serbia adopted new measures of sanctions according of regime Milosevic. Slobodan the itinfluencing was directly clearwhethernot to which moreCouncil than of Ministers 300 introducedofficials a ban onof flights the by Yugoslav airlines to the EU, it was beginning of beginninginstitutionalnegotiations for of with relations ICTY.Thisindicatesthe that for the conditions specific clarified that theSAPprocess leading to conditionality positive from military sanctions, economic and political sanctions topositive measures and could be used by for hisMilosevic measures. repressive NATO air strikes to the by repair made damage the be usedto could that and equipment technology services, infrastructure, and,and finally, EU FRY werebetween a flights bancommercial or private All FRY. on the and Serbia of exportbanned. governments the of equipment Moreover, that thegovernment. the for worked that those or of control ban coveredfrozen as wellexport as assets of individuals who were close to Milosevic and companiesto under havebeen abroad the FRYandSerbia assetsof the regime.Inaddition, tothe close the FRY of the directors company in media or the whoworked asthose such regime the to close persons goods, “The list of unwanted is getting longer “(Siri se spisak nepozeljnih), “Not a single flight” (Ni muva da poleti), In 1999, along with the NATO air campaign, the Council of Ministers of the EU Thus, EUuseda during the1990s, ofmeasuresrange against FRYand Serbia, Another ban was imposed on the private sector to finance exports for the profit of Vreme , 12 September1998, 10. 85 141 The ban on travel,as well,included the Vreme , 15May 1999, 16. 140 CEU eTD Collection were high for Milosevic as well as members of his regime because they were indicted by indicted ofhisthey were forregimeas members because were high aswell Milosevic costs Personal institutions. these of representatives the with contact every through shown 2000 eventually that him proved ashewrong, had his toaccept in defeat end.the in October elections early am for he called that position in his confident Milosevic made media, the and government the of structures all life, political of aspects all of control in feelingby its position and wasnot threatenedThehold opposition. the onpowerand securefeeling very of Milosevic following. was the regime governing demonstrated The chapter this player veto partisan and obstacles institutional ICTY/EU, the to resistance problems SRS,the the offacingwarcrimes persisted. opposition. Though orientation European was shared by leadersall opposition for except time,the be seemed preoccupied to bickering with aboutwhoshouldbe leadingthe repressive measures keepat to and the top, wasassisted by dividedthe opposition at that, his Milosevic used along. played parties andthe for parties the winningstrategy the nationalism during elections thewas 1990s As show, results and polls publicopinion the 2.6 Conclusion in Serbia. domestic political actors to more attractive become and their timing bombing formulationand of EU policy underframework SAP did the role ofEU rewards cooperation in enforced any way. Only escalation the after inof conflictNATO Kosovo, who were later accused of war crimes,negotiating andthus with actors the achieving peace focusing on part of 1990swas the the role of the ICTY was the first as similarly, before 1999; formulated EUclearly the from norewards not were there as strong, nor was The position to the EU and the ICTY was openly negative and hostile, which was which hostile, and negative openly was ICTY the and EU the to position The and costpower in this chapter, were analyzed that factors In termsthe of 86 CEU eTD Collection which confirmsattitudes, there was no political will createto mechanismsfor cooperation with the ICTY, anti-ICTY and anti-EU the with because preferences government of was aconsequence the hypothesisthis obstaclestocooperation. wereinstitutional However, there obstacles wasconfirmed, focusing on alliance with Russia and China.The hypothesis high institutionalon that the it influencenot cooperation with did EU andwas theregime,the whichwasagainst highercooperate fully likelihood confirmed.to was not There for waspublicsupport theEUbut anti EU/ICTY EUthelower for the lower public the the hypothesis support that The membership. andattitudes reward of EU membership conditions of fulfillment between connection the Therefore, cooperation. lead to not did did notthe play a role, naturally lowlower support as wereproved, theEUand for ICTYcooperation support the the as the regime did not want an EU were negative, proving thus outcome expected the cooperation. -no article this in analyzed and introduction in the outlined factors the of values all Therefore, the countries Milosevic of indictedhad been and the official position of governmentthe was regarding EU as enemiesverynot launching before clear 1999and SAP the program; however, of by time that for participatingcooperation with the ICTYin and thusthe with the EU. NATOAt the samepreventinginstitutionalin anychange would the that structure enableinitiation ofthe time, thestrikes EU rewards had against playersSPS partymembersveto partisan the andnumerous, theirthus supporters, were Serbia. institution.recognized the existenceof by this wereoccupied Asall institutional positions never Milosevic of government the Officially, ICTY. the with cooperation prevented the tribunal. Thus, it is no surprise that there were many institutional obstacles that Regarding hypotheses we can summarize the following. Hypotheses relating to Hypotheses the cansummarize following. hypotheses we Regarding 87 CEU eTD Collection cooperation. man central cooperation noinrule, the the which and wasagainstposition resulted because therewasone was centralized making process The decision the opposite. quite cooperation, the lower likelihood to cooperate fully was not relevant, as the situation finalwas hypothesespositions in cooperation with the ICTY are held by anti thatthe ICTY parties was proved. The crucial the when thehypothesis cooperation of likelihood more the Thus, policy. the change fragmented thepositionsforact relevant ICTYcooperationindependently the not attempt would to to decision making government were loyalthe occupiedby SPS individualsthat whichmeantcadre incrucial process onforall tothepositions cooperation. fact likelihood thatin relevant This wasalsorelated the ICTY 88 CEU eTD Collection conditions for EU membership, and especially cooperation with the ICTY. political the meeting the by conditioned were EU the with relations institutional further and governments, individual and organizations international various from assistance financial However, international organizations. in other theUNand membership ofinternationalresults. Support community visible, asYugoslavia regainedfull was see quick to and they step amajor expected as community was seenbyinternational government cooperate with of the ICTY.The change to newgovernment pressure on the way. same in the viewed always not was it, implement to by cooperation wassupported but waysinthe with all ICTY the coalition partners, which principle In issues. different on positions same the have always to Milosevic, against united whowere parties for all was difficult as it partners thecoalition within arose difficulties the parliament, the in majority had it Although parties. eighteen of consisted institutional Federal between YugoslaviaRepublic relations of Union.and European establishing for EUcriteria of conditions the having inmindthe and ICTY, the MilosevicSlobodan is beginning the betweenopen new of cooperation government the difference between thisstarted in period that October 2000,andtheprevious period under 2000 and especiallyparliamentary in elections December of samethe year. The striking inSeptember elections presidential thehave federal placesince taken that Montenegro) and (Serbia Yugoslavia of Republic in Federal developments follows chapter The 3.1 Introduction 2000-2003 -Serbia 3 Chapter During this period the EU, the US, internationallotof US, During puta the EU,the thisperiod organizations wasthe inThe government Democratic power Opposition Serbia- DOS,which of 89 CEU eTD Collection claimed there should be another round. This provoked protests in claimed round.This shouldbe provoked that there another Belgrade Although unitedthe opposition claimed victory in the first Milosevic’s round, regime united opposition. from the a candidate (DSS) was of Serbia of Democratic party and his party Left), the JUL(Yugoslav United the presidentof wife.Vojislav Kostunica, Party SPS(Socialist leading the Serbia) of (FRY) wereSlobodan Yugoslavia Milosevic The main for thepresident December 2000. of of Federal then the Republic candidates in elections Serbian electionsparliamentary parliament in 2000,and September Opposition The Democratic and Serbia -DOS-united of federal presidential the won and era. markedtheendFederal elections of Milosevic the elections andpresidential of 2000 3.2 Actors: general positions and power costs influences. external the of light in above, mentioned as events related ICTY the main the traces section This pressures. and incentives external on focuses section final The players. veto partisan on section and it within points veto the and ICTY the with andpositions followed of actors powercosts, byinstitutional for cooperation framework ICTY. with the cooperation the prime minister in March 2003,which arguably the was consequence of beginningthe of the of assassination the was second The government. the of mandate the during event related ICTY the important most single the was This economy. Serbia’s of reconstruction money forraise the wassupposedto conference, which donor the eveof happenedthe on in 2001,which his June and was extradition inMarch of 2001 arrest that Milosevic cooperation with the ICTY, as well as first arrests and extraditions. The most significant The period was marked by domestic political struggle over passing the lawon the overpassing by The period wasmarkedstruggle political domestic The chapter is divided into several sections. The first isis intofirstThe several The dealingwith sections. chapter divided general the 90 CEU eTD Collection Serbian Renewal moreMovement than a million votes (SPO),went to the SPS, though moreSRS, than alltwo million citizens votedthe for the DOS, the electionSerbian resultsof showed that whichUnity Party (SSJ),shared andMilosevic’s the nationalistin opposition strong was Socialistsgovernment the to threat Another emerge. to began issues other sentiments. and the on differences the Serbianthen and achieved, was on, agree could It everybody goal a Radical was which was Party SRS led byamong began its bevisible.coalition partners maingoal The to of ousting Milosevic, Vojislav Seselj. differences formed, was newgovernment as the As soon Even elections. before the voters coalition partners to agreeparliament out of asthe overall how250, had a clear majority,to it wasachieve sometimes difficultfor the the goalsSerbian government. Although DOScoalition,the with 176 MPsin the Serbian set as they had promised to the government. was in backgroundthe ofmost of importantthe events during theof mandate the leaders, political two the between rivalry concealed, sometimes open sometimes This, showed the winbutnever forvoters Kostunica. Ministermanaged to support same the vote to the DOS. Zoran Djindjic their gave voters from million a half and two Democratic about likewise, elections, Party parliamentary (DS)Serbian became the Serbian Primethe for As commission. electoral federal the of results final the to according 50.23% or isand this markeddate in asthebeginning transition of democratic Serbia. when protesters losttwo theirlives. Milosevic finally thevictoryaccepted Kostunicaof culminated on 5 on culminated However, thiswas only one of problemsthe functioning in thesmooth of new the votes Kostunica for The of won presidentthe 2,470,305 DOS candidate FRY, the th October 2000 when the Federal Parliament building was set onfire and 91 CEU eTD Collection 41% believed he both for should betriedof abovebut feelings 13%voiced the against election,etc., the cheating at power, abuseof heforbe corruption, should tried thought survey in December2000,3%believed Milosevic shouldbe for warcrimes, tried 32% inimprovement livingtheir support began the standards, decrease. Accordingto a to feel any not did people andthe yearsas the passed voters, of the support enormous responsibility for what had been done in the name of Serbia. never werecommunity theinternational the and into country the thereintegrating for and abroad from EU, assistance politicians financial having been a pariah as with cooperation represented necessary was crucial Tribunal the the evil was for that state during Milosevic’saddressingany for DOS, Therefore any cooperation. wereexplicitly against activities and regime. Almost ICTY bythe affected directly were parties these thus ICTY, by the indicted were the problemcombining their votes.ofPeoples SPS,facing and SRS wereParty partiesfederal the level. whose(SNP) Although leaderspast the the sharedat DOS power of the as aconsequence well was This practice from advertised. widely Milosevicwon 58 seats,and theMontenegro not was and ICTY the SPS/JUL, with Seselj cooperation open but taking countries western thethe and EU the with SRS and the Socialist could always outvote cooperation. the opposed that parties strong nationalist were as there theICTY, with the DOSdifficult predictwhetherto orresist public cooperation the direct would support opinion coalition by After the initial euphoria of ousting Milosevic when the DOS coalition enjoyed Hence, the position of the new government was strongly in favor of co-operation 92 CEU eTD Collection 145 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=40&order=priority&dd=12&mm=4&yyyy=2001 144 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=30&mm=3&yyyy=2001 143 Between Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia,( Belgrade: CEDET,2003) 142 more conservativesupporting the Kostunica than the actual prime minister. Kostunica. popularelection victory 2000,andpolitician most the wasVojislav October of economic problems.Peace. The most important integration in and process, gradual Partnership the European foremost for participation event of the centurya 75% supported survey revealing that Center forCivil- carried out Relations Military for the citizensinto wasaccount the that its popularitypeaceful in conflictthe solution to of Serbia. Thus, south the had government the totake was a on offer to third the the and ICTY, the with deal decline.to second the economy, revive to been have Still, inshould Aprilgovernment the of responsibility prime the of that the thought survey the in sameincluded year, the him standing trial,notknow. 11%did and Vojvodina, 29% could not earn enough for basic living costs. individuals. indicted the of policies of supporters the not though they were ICTYeven support theextraditions tothe didnot 45% against himbeing tried for warcrimes. Thiscouldmean that werethosewhothere factdespite the that the supportfor him fell from 49% in 23% in 1994 to 1999, therewere that is interesting is What distributed. evenly is which in favor, 44% and crimes war 14 April 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 12 April 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 30 March 2001, B92 news agency available at: Vujadinovic Dragica in Montenegro, and Serbia in of Transition Peculiarities Darmanovic, Srdjan 144 In March 2001, as inIn March 2001, arrestof beingthe Milosevic was northern planned, It similarly indicated that citizens of Serbia were occupied with social and social with occupied were Serbia of citizens that indicated similarly It 145 Despite the genuine support for democratic reforms, the majority majority democratic Despitefor genuine the the reforms, support was 142 93 That makes 45% againsthimbeing tried for 143 last accessed January accessed last Majority of those last accessed last , 152. CEU eTD Collection January January 2006 147 2006 146 January 2006 legal and constitutional no was there Serbia, and FRY the In numerous. were ICTY the Institutional veto points for fulfillment of EU conditionality, and thus cooperation3.3 Institutional veto pointswith not to lose voters to more rightwing parties by cooperating with the ICTY. other the on and hand, one the on assistance financial necessary secure and community international into country reintegrate to in order ICTY the with cooperating between balance to had and cautious was government new the Consequently, SRS. in the option political another had ICTY the opposed who Those SPS. the and Milosevic of supporters he should be extradited only after trial at home. for corruption, abuse of political position and rigging the elections believed 48%, and that Milosevic,it. against while 1/3was possible inlate June 2001,concludedhalf that theof citizens supported extraditionthe of make extradition that Milosevic’s decree the justof adoption the before conducted Anopinion poll thenewgovernment. give to achance as to wasnecessary patience that supported out DOS,pointingthe inthesurvey the Similarly,participants 70%of 18% undecided. for and were 37% extradition, wereagainst the participants 45%of which to according asurvey, conducted of Social Science Institute the and Research Political for Center the http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=40&order=priority&dd=13&mm=4&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=20&order=priority&dd=25&mm=6&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=14&mm=6&yyyy=2001 25 June 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 14 June 2001, B92 news agency,available at: During June 2001, when the question of extradition of Milosevic was at its extradition peak,Duringof of question the June2001,when Milosevic was at As the numbers show, the society was split on the issue. There were still loyal 146 However, the trend of support for the extradition was on the increase. the was on for extradition the of support trend the However, 147 That he should be tried for the war crimes but also 94 last accessed January accessed last last accessed last accessed last CEU eTD Collection Montenegro. This created an institutional void as the ministries, bodies and officials of andofficials ministries, bodies the void as aninstitutional Thiscreated Montenegro. the name from the Federal changed state the on, then From Solana. Javier CFSP, for the EUHigh representative the Republic of Yugoslaviafor Redefinition of the Status of the Future Federation, which was done in the presenceinto of the State Agreement Belgrade socalled signed an agreement, MontenegroMarch 2002,SerbiaUnion and of Serbia and of federation future On14 asthenegotiationscontinued. the the forredefinition of worse thus the EU. and ICTY, the with cooperation the to obstacle institutional aserious was extraditions institutional veto points, finding a legal remedy for the fact that constitution did not allow the votes of the SPS/JUL, the SRS and the SNP. Under such circumstances, with manyso by As above, be DOScould inthefederal indicated majorities outvoted the parliament. as well as decisions government of in terms obstacles institutional were there level, federal the theparliament. Thirdly, themback to laws at sign and return not to certain Presidentas the had who rightmember the SPS, of a the timeMilutinovic, Milan the was at of Serbia president the factthat the was obstacle Second, theICTY. with cooperation wasworking lawto start passing on denominator on a common cooperation. The opinions of partiesthe in coalitionsthe both at federal and republican level. realized on the basis of the UN Charter and the statute of the tribunal, there were different been have any and cooperation could legal that create procedures noneed special to was there that belief actors’ international other and ICTY the of spite In nationals. FRY allownotthe extradition of FRY did the of for such Constitution cooperation. procedure Moreover, the relations between the two federals units became progressively became units federals two the between relations the Moreover, issue of the on consensus reach not could members DOS eighteen Firstly, 95 CEU eTD Collection police and military structures were filled with the personnel that were loyal to the former loyal the to were that personnel the werefilledwith military structures police and for these thisThe main wasthat in reason courts. domestic the shouldbe prosecuted they crimes, any were if there that, was position General Tribunal. the with cooperation against in principle were (MUP) Forces Interior of Ministry the of members and Yugoslav Army National (JNA) its thatchanged name Army into the of Yugoslavia (VJ), However, tohelp the inarrestingarmy indictees. the weresupposed and police the process of cooperation withBefore law the involved were oncooperation not structures was passed, these inthe the ICTY. However, once the law was passed obstacles. in 2002,institutional the with the ICTYpoliticians, to avoid aswell theMontenegrinattempt of anyresponsibility cooperating because it andMontenegrin between Serbian federation future views on the inthe differences was seen as a solely Serbian question, were some of the http://www.gov.yu/start.php?je=e&id=38 149 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=26&mm=8&yyyy=2002 148 formed.” - was of Montenegro state andthe of Serbia state -the states member Union two based its Montenegro, 2003, “the on equality Serbia andof of State newstate. foundation the whichof alegal was Charter, Constitutional EU. and ICTY the both with cooperation of properorganization the to wasan obstacle additional future state the of the redefinition of manyon issues because thesejurisdictions were in process the of being Thus, changed. the FRY were not sure of their jurisdictions andwere not willing to take responsibilities Official site of the government of Serbia and Montenegro, available ate: 26August 2002, B92 news agency,available at: Additional institutional was obstacle position the of army and police leadership. In August 2002, governmentsIn August of Serbia and adopted Montenegro textthe of the last accessedJanuary 18 2006 96 last accessed January accessed last 148 On 4 March 149 However, CEU eTD Collection views on how to deal addition,with the evenICTY. among Similarly,In level. federal so atthe wasnot this Serbiangovernment, of level at the members DOS coalition the partners,positions leaders of ministries, of different especially parties had different http://www.humanrights.gov.yu/files/doc/Zakon_Saradnja-MKT_Srpski_lat.doc 150 performed. decision, there were manymake a finalpoints decision and the Federalwhere Minister of Humana anddecision Minority Rights to sign the Ministrycould beof postponed,Interiorcourt; relevant the to indictment transmit (MUP) and receive to delayed,Affairs to Foreign of issueMinistry arrest or not warrants and perform the arrests, the court to by law.the were prescribed that performing duties and werenot lawprovision of cooperation on the holding the public office relevantfor the cooperation with the ICTY, who disregarded the law on cooperation was passed. They are mostly seen in the actions of certain individuals government. The shown mannerinwhich second vetoplayerspartisan the was after were not only opposition inparties butalsoSerbia some Montenegrin parties in federal the Thesewere law beingandpassed. from drafted the ICTYandwhich were preventing the wereagainstthe cooperation with that of parties incertain personified representatives the were players veto Partisan passed. was ICTY the with cooperation on law the before Duringplayers this period veto partisan in ways. wereexpressed two Thisfirst was 3.4 Partisan veto players obeyed orders. the andjust country own their protecting they was did what wereconvinced that regime or Law onco-operation with the ICTY, available at: As cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro with As cooperation ICTYdependedonthe the of Serbia andMontenegro 150 Although all of the ministerial positions were held by the DOS coalition 97 last accessed January 2006 CEU eTD Collection surely meant the ruin of the country. the of ruin the meant surely at, federal or some other level.be ICTY had solvedlevel regardless it to duringthe month June 2001, of was done the of He claimed that if there were no solution it would have Djindjic until Djindjic’s inassassination March 2003. months after that, remained a bone of contention between him and the prime minister 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=14&mm=6&yyyy=2001 152 151 television. resolutely question sayno”, Milosevic he issue,I the over told Serbianstate the a tool of politicalcommunity’. She obtained a dry public response from Kostunica: The ICTY, he said, was pressurebe backinto international andif fully the are to accepted thepeople of Yugoslavia of theready for Milosevic at any timeif … there isU.S. beto a true and lasting peace in the Balkans administration.in is VojislavKostunica,The Haguecourt affirms elected president’, the ‘that she which to sent‘amessage Ponte CaraDel ICTYprosecutor 2000 the 6, “On October Djindjic. “Every timeone I betweenam asked thethe presidentgovernmentwas visible throughout its mandate. of the FRY issues,alwaysagree on notthe case,andfragmentation the within which was the Kostunica government officialsand and important political governing holdingparties had positions to the prime with all ICTY the cooperate andconsequently membership criteria tomeetEU order minister former In the regime. to loyal held bythose still were interiorandjustice, of ministries of Serbia 14 June 2001, B92 News agency, available at: Pierre Hazan, Justice in a time of war, (Texas A&M Univeristy Press, College Station:2004), 151 Djindjic stated many Djindjic questionon stated occasions thatthe with co-operation of the One of the biggest conflicts on the issue of cooperation with the ICTY wasthe ICTY the with cooperation issue of the on conflicts biggest One the of 151 This Kostunica, whobecameposition fewof of thepresident FRY the 152 He was referring to the donors’ conference 98 last accessed January accessed last CEU eTD Collection 154 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=03&mm=4&yyyy=2001 153 government. federal in the adopted be could law the so that best priorities,finally totheposition arriving he that woulddo use hispoliticalhis authority to extradited. He tried to do that by putting the extraditionwas hischanging promise be thegiven election during not Milosevic that lowerwould on the agenda of political Kostunica issue,important most became the his and extradition power fraud of and abuse passing alaw before oncooperation any extradition bewould possible. line with constitution the and legal system. is why That he andhis party insisted on in done was extradition any that sure make and sovereignty and system legal its protect legalpreserved. Kostunica heldmore acountry that position and procedural had to He thought it was important state be that civil protected, and war prevented SPS that it was clear that the US would have approved the help without Milosevic’s arrest. Kostunica saidarrest that of no wasinMilosevic connection with US help$50m of and international whichand couldchoose notcommunity preferred. obligations also on occasionsas amember underlined that the UN, FRY of had obligations towards meetnecessity EUmembershipto the includingthe criteria ICTYcooperation. Djindjic sanctions and NATO bombing of 1999. Therefore, this was pragmatic way of looking at a years the of of economic after infrastructure Serbia and ruined economy of reconstruction scheduled end for of June 2001,whichsupposed was to raise money for the http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=290470 Magazine [Time] Magazine 3April 2001, B92 news agency, available at: Once Milosevic was arrested inOnce March wasarrested Milosevic domestic2001 onthe to related indictment cooperation. against generally always was extradition on position DSS The Vreme, 546, 21June 2001, available at: last accessed January 2006 January accessed last 99 154 lasta accessed lasta 153 CEU eTD Collection minister were unavoidable. were minister invoices domestic politics of Serbia were convincedthat measuresthe taken by primethe Arguably, the assassination of the prime minister could mean that not all of the dissenting extraditionand arrest were home. These at justifiable werethus and andpressures incentives of Milosevicconditionality by minister coincided external prime that with pushed through the This section instances will membershipcooperation several with of describe EU the and3.5 External pressure and incentives adoption country. of reform ofthe the law histhrough agenda,main whichhadtwo goals: quick EUand the accession economicto on cooperationpush balanceto prime wasforced minister betweentheseopposingendsinan to attempt andthe possible, was not However, that slate. from a clean starting and sympathizers with the purgingor from Milosevic’spast, supporters remainingthe allpublic offices ICTY. the with cut a clear advocated hand, other the on Djindjic, functions. public and political Milosevic’s regime and allowing the members of the former regime keepto some of their meant coalition. legalismthe insistence following Kostunica’s on laws the setby the between, fightinglegal for Thus, framework. he tobe proved the biggest vetoplayer in andand joinEuropean institutions.in- Kostunica international was world somewhere current advocated cooperation with the ICTY in order for the country to regain credibility other The defeat. the accepted world the until crises existential facing even and isolation Therefore, two different currents formed in Serbia. One that advocated complete advocated One that in formed Serbia. currents different two Therefore, 100 CEU eTD Collection power in power continueSerbia,set threeconditions USgovernment to the inorder providing criteria, which always included cooperation with the ICTY. of certain by fulfillment conference the at participation their conditioned countries many influential but FRY, democratic new and the of recovery economic for the raisemoney wasto thedonors’ conference. Theaim inRepublic 2001was Yugoslavia of theFederal towards community international by the pressure form a of as exercised activities themain of One conditionality. useof more decisive for a well called NGOs as governments dealing of with governments the countriesthe Western the Balkans.of The byallwestern conditionality of atougher use advocated She elsewhere. and government in forlooking allies US the was Carla Ponte, Del prosecutor, ICTY the period, that termination financial of help if waslack there of co-operation with ICTY.Throughoutthe no sanctions. conditionality set, there was no institutionalupgrading of relationships, were there though sanctions butonly rewarding If steps. wereno positives steps towardsfulfillingthere the using or deadlines setting without strategy supportive adopted EU The important. The includedSAP(1999). cooperation conditions that with most ICTYasthe the Pact Stability the and (SAP) Association Process and Stabilization the Approach (1997), 2006 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/region/europe_integration.pdf 155 region. European East South in the programs and policies several implemented EU the above mentioned As Arrest3.5.1 andextradition ofMilosevic and the law oncooperationwith theICTY “Building on theModel of European Integration” 26 March 2001, available at: In March 2001, just afew months after democratic the coalition DOS took of The US government, on the other hand, used forms of punishment, such as 155 These included the Royaumont the included These 101 Process (1996), the Regional the Process (1996), last accessed January accessed last CEU eTD Collection one police officer seriously. police officer one inwounded, incidentthe andduring action thewhole of arrest seven injured,people were were police officers them. Two against opened firewas the premises enter to police tried and protestors the As hooligans attacking the the football SPSsupporters. the whowere between 400 peopleof front residence. Someinsidethe clashesoccurred in about with security membersguard Milosevic’s of were30 policethe asthere delayed, hadbeen of action The Hague. The to be sent to going not he was stating clearly was government arrested on 31 March of and charges the 2001 on abuse of power corruption; still, the was equalbefore with law the andmustco-operate authorities. the everybody that but bloodshed, and conflict civil worth not was Milosevic that warned Kostunicaseemed arrest insight. andthe 2001, the Milosevic circlearound wasclosing reschedulingdebt. of financial channels crucial for the reforms and development andnot agree on the Milosevic’s extradition was not renegotiated with the US administration, they might close Internationalfor Serbia of republic the of Minister ones. Albanian the especially prisoners, political Economicthe Relations, ICTY; full Goran implementation Pitic, said that of ifDayton the deadline agreement; of Slobodan rule of law and release of all 2006 158 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=31&mm=3&yyyy=2001 157 January 2006 156 FRYthe with help $100m. worth about http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=23&mm=3&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=01&mm=4&yyyy=2001 1April 2001, B92 news agency available at: 31 March 2001, B92 News agency, available at: 23 rd March 2001, B92 news agency, available at: As the deadline for the prolongation of the US help was coming closer in March 158 156 102 These were unconditional co-operation with last accessed January accessed last last accessed January accessed last 157 Milosevic was last accessed last CEU eTD Collection 2006 160 2006 159 FRY allow the for help to not USgovernment the to made a plea Watch (HRW) Rights arrest. the with be connected not should certification ambassador to the US said Milosevic was the main news of the day in the US, but that the postponed decision on certifyinghelpfor FRYthe until April 2 2001. The FRY followed in Belgrade helpUS andifneeded. developments offered to Belgrade They attempts to fulfill in their these government of levels conditions. Serbian and federal between differences diminish might this During the attempt to arrest Slobodan operationMilosevic, the would influencereason. EU decision on economicwas not only the but that ICTY, the concerning in Belgrade theposition ‘softened’ help as well. She commented that arrest. beencouldbut not tothe prior that have majorpredicted order, of disruption public without out turned end in the which step, risky very a took government the Thus, been. beoutnot to turn massive violentas politiciansthe and some fearedthey of have could every in Belgradehis of front central the but did prison protest asking for release, the protesters of werecouple thousands there wasarrested he After public. of the reaction predict the could not government asthe athreat, always presented arrest of the Milosevic http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=31&mm=3&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=30&mm=3&yyyy=2001 31 March 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 30 March 2001, B92 News agency available at: 159 Although US financial assistance and EU integration were very strong incentives, strong very were integration EU and assistance financial US Although Del Ponte, the ICTY prosecutor, believed that US conditioning of economic help She said that the EU also informed the government in Belgrade that co- 103 160 After the arrest, the Human last accessed January accessed last January accessed last CEU eTD Collection 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=11&mm=4&yyyy=2001 164 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=08&mm=4&yyyy=2001 163 January 2006 162 2006 161 endthe year of the see inTheHagueby Milosevic to expected and andpositive wasincreasingly FRY the ICTY the between co-operation that she added but extradited, not was if Milosevic FRY pressure on the FRY. Del Ponte saidinternational organizations, the ICTYwas active mostthe inlobbying governments toput she would ask the UN to set sanctionsdeadlines.put did not EU the wasthat only the EU;infact, difference the against the membership. He said there was for candidate as a potential into account taken beseriously nocountry’ andcould difference between the conditions democratic real ‘became Serbia that stated Prodi Romano EU Commission, of the set by the US and from Frenchthe saidgovernment sympathy France had for great Kostunica. favor of conditionsalso relating deciding on financial to extradition, helphand infor indictment the to Milosevic FRY. in order Whilefor the Francerest of helpGreat to be processed. Britain The wasEU was of 50m help, and wanted Serbian authoritiesandagainst toallow the general secretaryGermany of the ICTY to wereit. in An unofficial FRYthe governmentand wouldpressurenot put on extradition. The USonly 5out gave source financialapproved help one day Milosevicafter was arrested. until Milosevic wasin Hague. The http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=06&mm=4&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=01&mm=4&yyyy=2001 11 April 2001, B92 news agency available at: 8April 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 6April 2001, B92, news agency, available at: 1April 2001, B92 news agency, available at: Javier Solana, the EU representative for the CFSP, said the EU had confidence in confidence had EU the said CFSP, for the EUrepresentative the Solana, Javier 164 . 161 However, the government of the US officially US the of government the However, 104 last accessed January accessed last last accessed January accessed last 163 162 last accessed last last accessed last Of all the President CEU eTD Collection was adoption of the law on co-operation with the ICTY; the second was extradition of the 2006 168 2006 167 2006 166 2006 165 for him. of seemed atparticipate two conference, unrealistic which US to the conference.planning at toparticipate was not donators’ the the FRY unless there was co-operation wit the ICTY, statinghelpno be to that given saidof president USwasdetermined would the the House that that at that moment the US certification UShelpthe of end atthe The spokesperson of March 2001. for theWhite made had the since becausebeen noprogress pressure ontheFRY visible especially moreputa timefor concrete the EUshouldto Milosevic’s andthat frame extradition put agreedit departmentwas important saidand forDel Powell state Ponte the spokesperson ICTYand on its fulfill FRY the extradition obligation indicted. to to all of the of Milosevic. extradition operation with ICTYbutthethe thought that FRYnotbe should conditioned by French minister of foreign affairs said France was supporting Serbia’s concrete co- ICTY. tothe of FRYcitizens the extradition on conditioned be should conference donors’ the for date the that and Milosevic, of extradition the Human Rights Watch asked Colin Powell to condition the help for the FRY on the http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=5&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=09&mm=5&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=03&mm=5&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=01&mm=5&yyyy=2001 29May 2001, B92 news agency,available at: 9May 2001 B92. news agency, available at: 3May 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 1May 2001, B92 news agency, available at: As the conference for raising money for economic reformsAs theraisingmoney for for wasbeingscheduled, conference economic The prime minister of Serbia pointed out that there were three conditions of the of conditions three were there that out pointed Serbia of minister The prime 166 Carla Del Ponte went to the US to demand concrete pressure demandto the USto went concrete Carla Del Ponte 105 165 The spokesperson of the last accessed January accessed last January accessed last January accessed last January accessed last 168 Thefirst 167 The CEU eTD Collection with the ICTY regardless of the deadlock between DOS and SNP. to agree.TheCouncil officials of Europe top on cooperate called FRYthe to authorities February inabilitya standstill,2001 wason duetothe andSerbian Montenegrinof parties on ICTYshouldthe only help co-operation the itrather than hinderin any way. law new the Additionally, documentation. to access getting and witnesses with ICTY the extradition of FRY citizens as well as Bosnian Serbs on the territory of the FRY, assisting 171 2006 170 2006 169 and theconferencebeen donors’ hadnever made. Milosevic of the extradition between connection thatthe stated Commission European the ICTY was an institution of the UN and as such did not need ratification. The cooperation withconference shouldmake financial and other help to FRYthe conditioned uponthe the ICTY. donors’ in the participating countries the of governments the as well as institutions for suchan give did options action. not country had laws and institutions whichhadtobe respected and which momentat that package as well as that the members of the government could notjust decide todo it. The a of sending a matter not itwas because realistic were not two last the that He said Milosevic’s extradition. of procedure the towards steps clear was third andthe indicted, extradition extradition wouldall ensurethat showed up invited donors and had concreteproposals. http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=22&mm=6&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=18&mm=6&yyyy=2001 22 June 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 22 June 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 18 June 2001, B92 news agency available at: The process of drafting the law on co-operation with the ICTY that started in The International Crisis Group (ICG) maintained that international financial international that maintained (ICG) Group Crisis International The 169 Co-operation with the ICTY should include arrest and arrest include should ICTY the with Co-operation 106 171 They, nevertheless, claimed that the that claimed nevertheless, They, 170 last accessed January accessed last January accessed last They reminded that CEU eTD Collection 174 2006 173 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=13&mm=4&yyyy=2001 172 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=22&mm=6&yyyy=2001 in SNPRepublics. Chamberof the the parliamentary were level majorityfederal the at points veto the Thus, procedure. held parliamentary the byfrom the SPS, SRS and SNP as well aswish a decisive to have position negative of vote sothat Asfederal thedidnot parliament, arenospeculations afterwards. there parliament on this important piecenot of vote legislation, for the law in the federal the parliamentlaw ICTY. the with law on cooperation draft the was andremoved that they request public session of the wouldrepublics ways on decide concrete the ofimplementinglaw. this provisions: thefederal law would framework lay down for co-operation while the from aggression’. defended country that ‘patriots of the forvote thefederal at to partners the level, ICTYlawenvisioned extradition refused that have been ideal inoperation could havea been country,done with direct application of the ICTY Statue, it would not whichfinally Milanpossibility that Milutinovic could sign refuse to law.the Although co- the wants and law to the of adoption the protectduring parliament republican in the obstacles overcoming its rule of law. onwhatcouldspeculations be done. The law atthe level republicthe mean of would The SNP, DOS http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=290470 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=14&mm=6&yyyy=2001 14 June 2001, B92 news agency, available at: 13 April 2001, B92 news agency, available at: The negotiations for the law on the federal level were on a standstill. There were There were on astandstill. level lawfor on federal the the The negotiations magazine [time ] adopted ballotin a secret ministers by the of majority the The FRYgovernment, Vreme 546, 21 June 2001 available at: available 2001 June 21 546, last accessed January 2006 January accessed last 174 107 173 The however, SNP, confirmed they would 172 Thenew SNP suggested law last accessed January accessed last last accessed last accessed last CEU eTD Collection 2006 176 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=23&mm=6&yyyy=2001 175 weeks after two just July, In wasextradited. Milosevic US participation, of confirmation from the hours Within ICTY. the with co-operation the complete for requirements legal other as well as individuals, indicted other and Milosevic of extradition on government phone,whoassuredthe him the would its that fulfill obligation, inwith Djindjic and Belgrade talking after decision USambassador the consultingafter conference. donors’ the at participation the confirmed officially administration US the June 2001, Milosevic, 27 extradite action to the of beginning the day of On the conference. donors’ at the participation hoped to raise about 2.1 organizers $3.9 andthe billion atabout of wereestimated needs inSerbia Reconstruction that sum. The US administrationbutany in by requirement step Belgrade authorities co-operation bewelcomed.would had not yet confirmeda specific not forMilosevic was scheduledBank 29June2001.Extradition of was the unilateral institutional Serbian actions. avoid took the deadlock, this government Court to decide on the constitutionality of the decree and suspension itsof application. To Constitutional to arequest filing thus of emergency, state introduced the decree the stated government. federal of the part i.e.Serbian DOS, the of majority with the by cooperation ICTYwasadopted with the federal the government23 June2001,only on on decree The go parliaments. tothe haveto not itdid pass adecreeas easier to it with decree was co-operation ICTYbecause i.e.on the solution passing agovernment http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=27&mm=6&yyyy=2001 As it became clear that the law would not be passed, the DOS resorted to another 27June 27June 2001,B92 news agency,available at: 23 June 2001, B92 news agency,available at: The donors’ conference organized by the European Commission and the World 176 The Secretary of State, Colin Powell made that Powell Colin State, of TheSecretary 108 last accessed January accessed last last accessed January accessed last 175 The SPS CEU eTD Collection 178 2006 177 risk the at was country the case which in indefinitely, ICTY the with co-operation the of importantly, mostcountry. the Thirdly,suspension question Decreepostponed the andof led the risk ICTYwas the disgrace andhumiliation of of postponed, unprecedented to the decree being suspended and the fact that, for the infinite period of time, co-operation with Governmentto pass a decreefor the with co-operation possibility ICTY.The the this of attendof basedonthe decision Federal many the decidedto forcountries which conference, donors’ the of organization the mentioned Djindjic Secondly, decision. their from Milosevic’s be and theof new regime, boundgovernment Serbia notto by decided Federal Constitutional Court tosuspend Judges Decree.The the of were Court the people authorities. overthose take casescould in individual and temporary, Serbia of Government the of bodies the units, federal both for interest of in that whenfederalcases functioning organs were not werenot or able make to decisions decision. ofmaking within hours that action the andthatwas taken three Statute of ICTY the Government, in co-operation Serbian the that stated Djindjic, Minister, Prime The Hague. to been extradited had with the ICTY, brought Milosevicunconstitutional,of June 2001,the confirmed governmentSerbia that 28 on a decision to act according to the FRY.for the extradition,the EUCouncil the ministers approved of 300million of financial helpeuros http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=16&mm=7&yyyy=2001 16 July 2001, B92 news agency, available at: magazine [voice of the people] the of [voice magazine the of decision was the First Djindjic. to according motives three There were federal Decree the was going proclaim to court constitutional As the http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/srpski/arhiva-index.html 178 Thegovernment applied Constitution article the 135of Serbia, whichread of 177 Glas Javnosti 109 28 June 2001 available at: available 2001 June 28 last accessed January 2006 January accessed last last accessed January accessed last CEU eTD Collection of the co-operation with the international community and the return of the FRY to it. This necessity the itcame to DOSwhen in the difference no was there that hediscussed DSS, the party, his own DOSand the between rift the to With regard crimes. try war able to crimes against Serbs not comprehending the as well, judiciarynot be would why Serbian included dealingthat with co-operation tothe insistedworld. andreturn isolation on He thus selective but co-operation or non-co-operation with it would http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=291433 180 January 2006 179 abyss’. ‘legal complete to led and rules legal all broke that extradition by annulled was solution legal a for looking andcallnew elections. parliament peopleMilutinovic official,suggested agreedwith that SPS the who dismiss the should and criminal DOSleadership. wanted the protest against proceeding decision. hurried of with were then SPSandSRSorganized co-operation The this ruined from morealland state the protection had that beenefforts that thelegal for done means FRY deserved citizensthe of the that Heargued federation. lawthe future of of the and economic andfinancial organizations, including the EU. andstand-by in aplace in membership arrangements, IMFandthe international full humiliation, butthis would also endanger rescheduling the writing of debt, off debt, be Notonlywould isolated. to of country the internationally becoming exposed http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=20&order=priority&dd=02&mm=7&yyyy=2001 2July 2001, B92 news agency, available at: magazine [Time] Vreme, 548, 5 July 2001, available at: In an interview after the extradition, Vojislav Kostunica stated that all the work on Kostunica assessed this as unlawful and unconstitutional as well as a threat to rule 180 He added that the court was American and not international, not and American was court the Headdedthat last accessed January 2006 January accessed last 110 be choosing between 179 About 10,000 last accessed last CEU eTD Collection suicide. his directly as they againstled decisions ofthought the to protested government the forhis had thedeath. republican government accused accused of war crimes by suicide; ICTY,committed the in he the left letter behind, he of Interior, former Minister the Vlajko Stojiljkovic, thelaw been hadafter adopted, day The act. this unconstitutional about legalsomebody that responsibilities take would operation with the ICTY. thelaw co- on adopted parliament of Citizens federal the accused. TheChamberof already those to longreferred asitlaw as the accepted DSS compromise. The to agreed was it, since but, against theinternational standingof country the inwas question, they lawonco-operation. the of draft the adopted governments’ representatives 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=11&mm=4&yyyy=2002 184 183 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=08&mm=4&yyyy=2002 182 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=23&mm=2&yyyy=2002 181 be for law passed. the will to political no was there because political was problem andthe write, easy to was relatively law itself the that explained Vodinelic, VesnaRakic ICTY, the with law co-operation on with the ICTY continued. One member of the DOS expertdestroying the principles of teamone’s own rule of law. for the creation returnof the to the world, the world where the rule of law is supreme could not be done by 11 April 2002, B92 news agency, available at: 23February 2002, B92 news agency,available at: Ibid. 8April 2002, B92 news agency, available at: After the extradition of Milosevic efforts towards passing the law on co-operation 183 The SPS, SRS and JUL were vehemently against, warning 181 Finally,in April 2002, republican and federal 111 184 About 200 supporters About of SPS the last accessed January accessed last January accessed last last accessed last 182 TheSNP CEU eTD Collection access to the FRY military and state archives. state and FRYmilitary the access to the FRY had the right to protectKostunica, while inLondongave aninterview to the Sunday in heTimes which said that its state secrets and the ICTY would not get arbitraryand thus improvementof co-operation. more arrests, for andthe waswaiting start, ICTY to co-operation actual for the necessary did not approve of the FRY position that the law on co-operation with the ICTY was 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=25&mm=11&yyyy=2001 186 e/2001/index.htm 185 of Milosevic. arrest the praised especially and ICTY operating, the submitting. of newof ICTYReport The 2001readthat FRYthe government wasco- was of ICTY the prosecutor thatthe reports annual wasespecially the governments Prime Minister 3.5.2 New indictments, the protests of the Special Forces andassassination ofthe ICTY. the by end whowas directly were afraid upin wheregovernment instances to those attacked other some outline will this section of part next The bytheindictments. threatened also had to face criteria conference.and donors ensure political Inaddition to government the opponents, such instances by taken meetcooperation with actions the and the to further government the ICTY of suicides and individual actions of those directly 25 November2001, B92 news agency, available at: Annual ICTY Report 2001, paragraph 196, available at: Just a week before Del Ponte submitted a report to the UN later that year,later that areport to theUN submitted a weekbefore Del Just Ponte This section showed difficulties of the Serbian government to pass a law on the Main source of monitoring compliance of Serbia with the ICTY for the foreign last accessed January 2006 January accessed last 112 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu- 186 He claimed that country was still 185 However, the ICTY last accessed January accessed last CEU eTD Collection package of help to the FRY. help the to package of 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=2&yyyy=2002 191 January 2006 190 2002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=28&mm=1&yyyy=2002 189 January 2006 188 2006 187 be no continuation of this help. 31 after co-operation clear no was if there FRY, the to allocated state. the of integrity and citizens of rights institutions, endanger might extradition arbitrary and unstable end of the March 2002, Serbia was forced to take some clear actions in terms of of co- in terms actions sometake clear forced to was Serbia theMarch 2002, endof Montenegro. followed Solana’ssuggestions the form futurethe stateunion on of and of Serbia said referendum of Montenegro on independence should be postponed. Much discussion suggested that the best waypromoting thisview of EU activity, was Solana inagain Belgrade,which on occasion he for the FRY towards the federation. EU. of thefuture concerning Montenegrothe at diplomaticincreased aimed activity individuals.andbe of not hostage theFRYshould several FRY co-operation with the ICTY. It was not a question of conditions but of credibility http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=07&mm=2&yyyy=2002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=04&mm=1&yyyy=2002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=12&yyyy=2001 21 February 2002, B92 news agency, available at: 1April 2002, B92 news agency, available at: 21 December2001, B92 news agency, available at: 7 February 2002, B92 news agency,available at: 28 January 2002, B92 news agency,available at: m although was that $115 reminded USCongress In December 2001,the Before the US administration decided on the certification of help for Serbia by the 190 During February, with regard to the increased diplomatic activity During to inregard activity February,theincreased with diplomatic 188 Djindjic pointed out that the EU was notsatisfied with the 187 InJanuary EUapproved2002, the another financial 113 191 The OSCE representatives TheOSCE 189 st of March, there would The EU and the US last accessed January accessed last Janaury accessed last last accessed January accessed last last accessed last accessed last CEU eTD Collection 2006 198 2006 197 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&nav_category=64&dd=12&mm=9&yyyy=2002 196 2006 195 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=5&yyyy=2002 194 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=26&mm=4&yyyy=2002 193 2006 192 ICTY and extradited 14 persons so far. 33 requestsmade FRYthe bythe ambassador UNinformed responded to tothe that operation. level of co- the with was dissatisfied ICTY the of prosecution again, September Patten in saidtheEUwouldBelgrade helpincrease FRY tothe by one third. Chris for external relations, Commissioner withThe ICTY. the co-operate to Serbia thePowell help to certified unblocked and FRYthe assistance surrendered, politicians former and andseveral generals wasadopted co-operation the decision, ofhelpmillion by the euros FRY. 1.5 giving to operation with the ICTY. indictments. extradition and article 39 of the law did not allow for co-operation in case of new FRY of lackthe of will adoptto the Constitutional Charter, and warned that credibility of http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=10&yyyy=2002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=10&yyyy=2002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=03&mm=7&yyyy=2002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=3&yyyy=2002 29 October2002, B92 news agency, available at: 21 October2002, B92 news agency, available at: 12 September2002, B92 news agency, available at: 3July 2002, B92 news agency, available at: 21May 2002, B92 news agency,available at: 21 March 2002, B92 news agency,available at: 26 April 2002, B92 news agency, available at: continuedcommunity against international EUandDel the pressureon Ponte 196 Del Ponte threatened to inform the UN about that. Especially lackof Especially that. UN about inform the to threatened Ponte Del 197 The UN was considering the ICTY negative report on the FRY. The FRY 192 The EU continued assistance to the FRY regardless of US 198 The EU officials accused the authorities of the of authorities the accused The EU officials 114 193 Asin April2001 lawthe on 194 Last accessed January accessed Last last accessed January accessed last January accessed last last accessed January accessed last January accessed last Last accessed Last 195 last In CEU eTD Collection the Office of Prosecutor to see that the government was balancing between its between balancing was government the that see to Prosecutor of Office the constant pressure of the ICTY, especially after Milosevic was extradited. The inability of prosecutions butwere withholding them. ininvestigations and her Prosecutor information the assist would that important the ICTY. The fully co-operate with to obligations with FRY the inconsistent Thisforce. was came into ICTY report theaccused law prohibited thethe extraditionArticle of 39 with ICTY.However, the co-ordination which for responsible created, was FRY authoritiesto the Tribunallaw of any accusedon toco-operation indictedholdpassed a six Federal Parliament voluntarily. ICTY, The the to accused weresurrendered afteror thehave law access with theto ICTY and the National Council for co-operation was e/2002/index.htm 200 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=29&mm=10&yyyy=2002 199 operation is far from being full and proactive.” isco- that assessment “The overall basis. a case-by-case andon areas inselected republic operation with the federal level, though more co-operation was experienced at the level co- of little very and government coalition the within instability political the by affected and varied complicated, as co-operation assessed Report 2002 negative. The were still agreements with the Balkan countries unless they co-operated with the ICTY. continue for association to negotiations not asked the EU European parliament authorities in Belgrade wasin question. The government inThe notunderstand and government Serbia especially could the opposition the Annual ICTY Report 2002, paragraph 227 available at 29 October2002, B92 news agency, available at: lawEven though the was passedinApril ICTYreports on the cooperation 2002, last accessed January 2006 January accessed last 115 199 After Del Ponte’s visit to the EU, the 200 Duringnine period the reporting http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu- last accessed last CEU eTD Collection the ICTY or were afraid of just for legalframework it. with ICTYorwereafraidthe co-operation of requested They armored vehicles. armored membersprotest, of blocked in JSOthehighway the theof centre Belgrade using and crimescommitted against civilian probably the population. Onthethirddayof the former Yugoslavia inthe inconflicts formations active paramilitary members of were the resignation of the Minister of Interior. Atapress protest. the insisting stop forthey should the conference, they asked were manipulated and reassured them that none of them was wanted by the ICTY, passed. activity in relation to the ICTY before the law on co-operation with this institution was said they were notinformed whom they were arresting, and they refused tobe part of any arrest. the with disagreed protestingbecause they started arrest performed the 2006 204 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=10&mm=11&yyyy=2001 203 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=09&mm=11&yyyy=2001 202 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=08&mm=11&yyyy=2001 201 indictment by the ICTY. based on brothers Banovic arrested 2001, were OperationsNovember –JSO.In Djindjic’s government. international obligations and domestic opposition was a source of frustration for http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=12&mm=11&yyyy=2001 12 November2001, B92 news agency, available at: 10 November2001, B92 news agency, available at: November 8 2001 , B92 news agency,available at: 203 The members of the JSO had reasons to fear the ICTY because some of them 9 November2001, B92 news agency, available at: A clearfor example opposition of this of Special Unitthe was aprotest The chief of the Security Forces of Serbia stated that the members of unitmembersthe of the that stated of Serbia Forces Security the Thechiefof 204 They their denyingrepeated they demands,not recognize that did 201 The JSO of the State Security Forces of that of Serbia Security Forces State TheJSOof the 116 last accessed, January accessed, last January accessed last last accessed January accessed last last accessed last 202 They CEU eTD Collection claimed that he had no influence on the JSO, as they were under the government of government the under were as they JSO, the on influence no he had that claimed in participated asKostunicawho this action described ‘strike’, the of JSO.Kostunica the those against proceedings criminal no were There government. the of control the under minister and of the order onlybydirect and used unitan anti-terrorist into transformed 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=17&mm=11&yyyy=2001 207 accessed January 2006 206 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=14&mm=11&yyyy=2001 205 investigations. internal MUPwasalsocarrying the because forneedno that therewas because ICTY memberactive no again of stressed be MUPwouldto the the of that extradited Interior Minister The Control. Public Security underthe Security placed and State of the control in change government the ministers be would able to Ministerthe of warninggroup noInterior people that of dissatisfied with their position country in question. On the fifth day of the protest, Djindjic did notaccept resignation, of can win changes in the government by using their access to arms, then democracy of such were broken, andpeopleany without legal extradited werearbitrarily arrested basis. in laws andargued oflawgovernment absence on the evenexisting that co-operation, accused the andindirectly became doubted that JSOsuddenly Minister legalist, of the Interior DSS, the partyit. any They that denied organization political wasbehindtheirthough protest, the of Kostunica. At the same time, the DSS accused the http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=17&mm=12&yyyy=2001 17 November2001, B92 news agency, available at: 17 December2001, B92 news agency, available at: 14 November2001, B92 news agency, available at: Finally, eightthe on day, finished JSO the protest. the This form of protest was very dangerous because, if any police or military unit 206 117 205 . The JSO was removed from the 207 The unit was to be last accessed January accessed last January accessed last Last CEU eTD Collection January January 2003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=30&order=priority&dd=01&mm=7&yyyy=2003 210 January 2006 209 2006 208 VJ. inthe staff of chief former theinvestigationconcerned ingeneral about the ICTYthat wasdone about Pavkovic, uniforms they wear on duty and nothing else, which made it only a labor action. in uniforms, professional the theprotest their own functioningattended traffic. They of Serbia; as well, he stated that they did not endanger security of the country, except for the negatively influenced themorale. influenced negatively investigations about generalsthe participated who in defending theirin country 1999 Commander of the Third The ICTY. from the wasreceived request before any official be would actions taken Army, General Vladimirno that and speculations nobe thereshould waswhy which accused, they were that Lazarevic, argued didinvestigations butthat mean peoplenot were different indicted or those that be would the reports about prosecution in prosecution Serbia; ICTY. commanders. The VJ would cooperate with the ICTY exclusively through the law on the questions of responsibility of NATOandKLA the Liberation Army)(Kosovo responsibility and apolitical he question; likewise, was whynobody asking raised any defendAlthough he himself. to time said co-operations wasstate with ICTY the http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=05&mm=12&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=11&yyyy=2001 1 July 2003, B92 news agency, available at: 5 December2001, B92 news agency, available at: 29 November2001, B92 news agency, available at: In addition to the JSO protest, in November 2001, the VJ top inofficial the became VJtop In addition JSOprotest, the November 2001, to Despite the fact that the parliament adopted the law on war crimes and their and crimes war on law the adopted parliament the that fact the Despite 210 aswell Kostunicaas thefact that dismissed General Pavkovic 208 209 The Federal Minister of Interior explained that there that explained Interior of Minister TheFederal He was ready to appear before the domestic court at domestic court the before Hewasready to appear 118 , last accessed January accessed last , , last acessed last , last accessed last CEU eTD Collection January January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=20&order=priority&dd=25&mm=3&yyyy=2003 214 2006 213 2006 212 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=25&mm=6&yyyy=2002 211 from his position of the commander of the VJ surrendered voluntarily surrendered voluntarily and pleaded notguilty. February 2003,Serbian president Milan Milutinovic alsosurrendered andlater pleadedguilty. not In Vojislav inBosnia. of crimes accused Gruban Momcilo Serbs, Bosnian leader of Seselj,former the Martic, Milan officer, JNA former the theMrksic, Mile government, federal leader of the viceof former the the president former Sainovic, general,Dragoljub the Ojdanic, Nikola Radical Party togovernmentresponded call issued.for surrender,guarantees were included These (SRS) wasdefend some of not thosewho publicthe For them were disappointed did them. indicted, andguarantees. support ensuring government surrenderthus within days,indicted personsto federal three asked23 government side took the accused. government the of the democratic authority, ICTYwouldthe generals)national endanger security survival Serbia andof of to police two and Lazarevic (Pavkovic, generals four the extradition of the view that with the in that, Belgradeobserved LawCentre The Humanitarian deal past. the with http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=17&mm=5&yyyy=2002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=20&mm=4&yyyy=2002 25 March 2003, B92 news agency, available at: 17May 2002, B92 news agency,available at: 20 April 2002, B92 news agency, available at: 25 June 2002, B92 news agency, available at: After the law on co-operation with the ICTY was adopted inthe April 2002, adopted ICTYwas the with lawon Afterco-operation the 119 212 211 214 Several former generals surrendered, and surrendered, former generals Several , the government has not done enough to enough done not has government , the last accessed, January accessed, last last accessed January accessed last January accessed last 213 TheFormer last accessed last CEU eTD Collection federal government, and whose arrest proved one of most difficult. one of proved the andwhosearrest federal government, the of call the to respond not did who Sljivancanin, Veselin and extradited been already eastern Croatia in 1991. The other two members of the group were Mile Mrksic, who had accusedinvolvementin of killingthe 200 of about civilians in townof the in Vukovar and toThe Hague. wasalso transferred arrested so-calledthe group, Vukovar 2006 218 217 January 2006 216 January 2006 215 on which in ICTY, the co-operation with to evaluatethe setup progress USCongress the US help, though the arrest had taken place just before Thethe Federal Minister of 15Interior denied this arrest had anything do to with certification of staying; 50 policemen were injuredis andit still not known how many demonstrators. building onthe were destroyedwherebroken Sljivancanin was aswellwindows and stungrenades disperse Ten to the crowd. vehiclespolice andmany vehicles private fire.gas usedtear vehicles on Thepolice policethe andset attacked drunken hooligans supporters andof wereobstructingSljivancanin supporters police the action. some These accused. were Operations for Special of Unit the creator the extradited and guilty.extradited not pleaded http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=12&mm=6&yyyy=2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/3035781 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=02&mm=6&yyyy=2003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=07&mm=5&yyyy=2003 12June 12June 2003,B92 news agency,available at: 17 May 2003, BBC online news available at: 2June 2003, B92 news agency, available at: 7 May 2003, B92 news agency,available at: He was arrested on 12 JuneHe wasarrestedon 2003. Jovica Stanisic, the former chief of State security services and Frank Simatovic, security services and of chief State former the Jovica Stanisic, 216 Miroslav Radic, a war crimes suspect, amember of crimes suspect, awar Miroslav Radic, 120 218 Some1,000 leaders political and about last accessed January 2006 January accessed last th 215 June,2003deadlinewhen They were immediately They were last accessed January accessed last last accessed last accessed last 217 Hewas CEU eTD Collection 31 March for the help to be31 Marchforthe help continued toSerbia. to before be had Mladic arrested to that talks last inthe Djindjic to gaveamessage crimes for membershipin for ofSerbiaandMontenegro The Europe. US of Council the vote in to see progress in ICTY the with order co-operation Britain needto insisted that and not only help in wantedtofugitives, if detailed catchingthese Serbia intelligence they seriously give more give some to needed countries Western said but ICTY the by indicted the reportsarrest to of moreinvest effort to needed forces their police the that commented be Djindjic done. hadit to appearance somewhere. British andMladic. Karadzic of arrest especially ambassador units. two the of market internal the of harmonization and Charter constitutional the of EUwasadoption the enter to Montenegro and for Serbia way the that stated holder, 2006 222 2006 221 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=09&mm=1&yyyy=2003 220 January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=01&mm=1&yyyy=2003 219 territories. respective their were on indicted that 25 arrest to countries the pressure on put Zagreb to and Sarajevo to Belgrade, crimes paid war avisit for TheUSambassador ICTY. the over Tribunal. in the was Sljivancanin the continuation of the US economic aid worth $110m depended. Two weeks later http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=1&yyyy=2003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=19&mm=1&yyyy=2003 21 January 2003, B92 news agency, available at: 19 January 2003, B92 news agency available at: 9January 2003, B92 news agency, available at: 1January 2003, B92 news agency, available at: US help was to be directly conditioned on the co-operation with the ICTY and In the beginning of 2003, the US was losing patience with countries with losingbeginning Balkan the patience In USwas of 2003, the the 219 In a document on the Western Balkans, Greece, as the EU presidency EU as the Greece, Balkans, Western the on Inadocument 221 121 The state department ambassador for war for ambassador department Thestate 222 He said Mladic was in Serbia and that last accessed January accessed last last accessed January accessed last January accessed last last accessed last 220 CEU eTD Collection important. several covered Study Feasibility the of evaluation the that asserted Commission European the fields including co-operation with the ICTY, which was one of the most January January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=20&order=priority&dd=11&mm=10&yyyy=2003 226 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&nav_category=64&dd=10&mm=10&yyyy=2003 225 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=9&yyyy=2003 224 223 territory. Montenegroco-operating of not half enough and that 17fugitivesthe of wereonits 2003,Del accused in address totheUNSecurity Serbiaand Council Ponte October to show EU support for the country’s way towardsbelieve that if they did notkill the prime minister theythe would end up in the ICTY. EU. allowed to were JSOunits the of members obvious investigation the the was that during yetWhatbecame isclear. not of thepolitical assassination the background arrested, were members of JSO, the assassinators, Although the was assassinated. Minister work.forenvironment Serbian to In the Serbian March 2003,the government Prime cooperation culminated that in of protest the JSOunitsthe avery in2002created difficult ICTY the forces about police and military the of uneasiness on government, the attacks 31 March. administration was to decide on the help to Serbia and Montenegro on 15 June rather than 11 October2003, B92 news agency, available at: 10 October2003, B92 news agency, available at: 29 SeptemberB92 2003, news agency,available at: In September 2003, the European Parliament president, Pat Cox, Belgrade visited Pat president, Parliament European the In September 2003, opposition Serbia, within tensions rising with abroad from Increased pressures http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=16&mm=2&yyyy=2003 225 223 Powell said Mladic and Karadzic were still a priority. . 122 224 However, in her annual in her However, 226 last accessed January accessed last The spokesperson of last accessed last last CEU eTD Collection e/2002/index.htm 227 hadjustbeen assassinated. theICTYpolitician pro because themost notonly agenda, high cooperationfor wasnot newelections theon the ICTY duringwhichperiod the apparentand more party every prepared even became inthe visiblegovernment cracks consequence of the assassination the political constellation of power changed, the already more Asfocused and governmentthe on order a assassinators. finding preserving public Prosecutor’s right tohave full, unimpeded access to the relevant evidence.” inintolimitand thequestion region, authoritiesstill of this the put country or the Montenegro in and Serbia occurred have that changes thedemocratic all and existence Security Council.UN the with FRY the of non-compliance “Itreported ICTY the of remainsPresident in 2002, a serious concern thatMontenegro, including Ratkoeven Mladic. Due to lack of effortsafter to locate and arrestfugitives ten years surrendered whilethere werestill be believed16 fugitives of in to territory the Serbia andof the ICTY’s accused Three proactive. nor full was neither co-operation that was assessment deleted the controversial developmentthat was seenintheprocedure aproblem. good One federal levelwasstill article 39 at of co-operation Minimal the Djindjic. Minister LawPrime of assassination the on with especially co-operation with the ICTY. developments anddramatic uncertainties political bythe affected operation was Overall and as Montenegro wasevaluated improving butstill complex, andvaried. partial Co- Serbia of behalf on Co-operation warrants. arrest Tribunal outstanding the of most upon act to failed Montenegro and Serbia surrender, voluntary some of extradition in assisting Annual ICTY Report 2002, paragraph 245, available at: The 2003 the ICTY report criticized failures to arrest the indicted. Except for Except indicted. the arrest criticizedfailures to ICTYreport the The 2003 The failure cooperateto further with the ICTY was because after the assassination last accessed January 2006 January accessed last 123 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu- 227 CEU eTD Collection assassination of the prime minister, and subsequent lack of lack with the of ICTY minister, andassassinationsubsequent cooperation primethe of hypothesis,defied almost butthe Serbian this unilateral government of action obstacles the lower likelihood of full cooperation. The extradition of Milosevic, by highthe institutional numberof highernumberwas confirmed,obstacles theof the Serbian leadingone, likelihood tolower of cooperation.the Theyhypothesis to relating and federal both parliaments, inthe blocs skeptic Euro strong were There integration. EU support wassplit issueon the ICTY, the of itthough was generallyhigh for thesupport of in governmentinwith afragmented support Thea comfortable public parliament. the set in classification players wascharacterizedbymixed this period introduction, the veto were confirmed. rewards during term.its the hypotheses sizethe on of rewards the timing and Hence, government new as the favorable wasrelatively timing big andthe were size of the EU rewards had enough of factors Hence, the assistance. included economic that process accession the regarding time to fulfill rewards inits very clear EUwas The ICTY. the with mainly cooperation criteria, the conditions certain of fulfillment forthe in exchange rewards offering were institutions international inwith order the EU. In toterms start ofdomestic factorsexternal that interfered with the cooperationenjoying with the ICTYrewards, and thus closer ties and show newgovernment of the not the changein position triedThis the to chapter only the the EU3.6 Conclusion but also the US and other government. of change new the and elections early the with deal will chapter following The However, the domestic factors were not so favorable. According to the to According sofavorable. not were factors thedomestic However, 124 CEU eTD Collection domestic dynamics prevailed in the process of compliance with the ICTY. with the assassination culminated anddivisions factors domestic EU. The with the inthecooperation progress of the prime ministerMinister. showing that, in ThespiteSlobodan ofcooperation externalMilosevic, of extradition unconstitutional on bordering almost and forced rewards,the whichfor except further, was done purelywith because thethe values on ofthe domestic the factors were low,ICTY not allowingdetermination the cooperation to proceed was of thusthe Prime lacking,likelihood of cooperation. and there numberthe of crucialthe beingpositions heldby anti-the ICTY party members thelower was minimalfragmented decision making process the lower likelihood of cooperation and the higher more confirmed hypothesisin thatthe hypotheses confirmed Also, the the end. were In short, despite high values of size and timing of the rewards offered by the EU, 125 CEU eTD Collection Zivkovic’s interim government took the stance that potential arrests of of acting stancethatpotential the arrests officers took interim Zivkovic’s government Lukic). Sreten and Lazarevic Vladimir Djordjevic, Vlastimir Pavkovic, (Nebojsa Kosovo in conflict the for general police one and military three against indictments issued ICTY 2003,the In October wereexpected. the newelections because especially ICTYwerepostponed, tothe related decisions of the most instability, and turmoil position in government. the Giventhe circumstances of of state the emergency, political country. Zoran Zivkovic from DS, asa deputy prime minister took over the leading led ofthe the government vice during presidents which introduced was of emergency cooperation with the ICTY and on relations with the EU. on its had effect which changed, structure country the of of organization political institutional This independentthat states. meant separate astwo andcontinued Serbia referendum independence infollowingon June of Montenegro 2006, which Serbia andindevelopment Montenegro 2005.Another important October was ofKostunicagovernment was upof foropening SAAbetween negotiations EUandthe iswhy taken significant period a this mostevent duringas whole. The first the some joining other the governmentand Kostunica remained the minister,prime which is constellation of power did notchange, i.e. the same parties stayed in the government with inearly May election Although were regularthere in elections 2008. political 2007, the looks atThis periodchapter the from early the elections inDecember 2003until another 4.1 Introduction 2003-08 4- Serbia Chapter In the aftermath of the assassination of the prime minister in March 2003, a state 2003, in March minister prime the of assassination the of aftermath In the 126 CEU eTD Collection government andbetween governmentthe and shifted, opposition the making the coalition the within of power balance the Djindjic, Zoran Minister Prime of assassination the Upon 4.2 Actors: general positions and power costs influences. external these against cooperation and non-cooperation pressures andincentives willbe done through a processtracing of instances of for cooperation with positions and powercosts for actors willthe be outlined,followed byinstitutional structure ICTY and partisan veto players. The finalrenewed elections the after in in Serbia 2007. section on externalfor wereonly ayearand suspended were The negotiations and extradited. arrested Carla Del Ponte was notsatisfied with the cooperation and especially that Mladic was not in Thisof May2006,asthe Prosecutor happened ICTY actually ICTYdeteriorates. the October of that year but with the caveat that they could be stopped if the cooperation with with ICTYimprovedthe in middleof the negotiations2005, the for SAA were opened in the period. As cooperation between the issuecontentious ICTYandSerbiathroughout the large, a Mladicremained at were still which Karadzic Ratko and indictees Radovan wanted most two the four generals those to In addition made noarrests. and indictees elections in a Decemberadopted policy 2003 encouragingof voluntary surrenders of the until took that 2008. The newgovernment in office the beginningof the 2004 after indictments. based noICTY on arrests were there Hence, national security. for the in might have more be turbulence caused and armedforces destabilizing the potentially The chapter will follow these issues through several sections. Firstly, general Firstly, sections. several through issues these follow will chapter The continuedThis from no theperiodarrests situation middle through out of of 2003 127 CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=03&dd=01&nav_id=134054 230 229 http://www.b92.net/specijal/izbori2003/istorijat.php?nav_id=127265 228 during previous the government. relationship between Djindjic asprime minister andKostunica aspresident of FRYthe was the minister of wasagaintense, as KostunicaSerbia asprimepresident and Tadic between became electionsThe relationship presidentof Serbia atthe inJune2004. opposition became irreconcilable. DS Thus,the extradition over proved Milosevic of disagreement party. The situationcommunity was by exerted international the pressures was very Despite parliament controversial. toadditionally include in for the minority andof the SPSsupport as partgovernment government thus the complicated DS in thegovernment. government, when Borisminority for the while voted Thegovernment. the SPSsupported 113 wereagainst Tadic DSS–DS (DS)members. DSS the both were Police and Justice for Ministers rivalries dating coalition agreement was backsinged between DSS, SPO, NS and G-17 plus. to andmore 22for SPS.After the than negotiations,a month February of on 19 2004, a the SRS, 53 for the DSS, 37 for the DS, 34 for the G17 Plus, 22for the coalition SPO-NS Serbia SPS7,6%. Renewal MovementSerbia DSS17,7%,theDemocratic G17Plus 12,6%,the Party-DS 11,5%,theSerbian -SPO and Democratic 27,6%, the won The Serbianof Party Party SRS Radical December 2003. the Nova Serbiaeven more difficult towork and-NS leading to the early elections, which7,7% were held on 28 and the Socialist Party of B92, Special report on Elections 2003 available at: SRNA Beta , 1March 2004, The DSS got nineThe DSS G17plus the four. got and portfolios, The four, SPO-NSgot the , 3March 2004: 230 The EU, US and other international actors did not like to see SPS or SRS 228 In terms of the number of seats in the parliament that meant 82 for http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=3&mm=3&yyyy=2004 128 last accessed March 2006 March accessed last 229 Furthermore, 130MPs CEU eTD Collection elections only a year after the government was formed. thegovernmentyear only a after elections new the to led finally fragility This parliament. in the SRS SPS, from opposition strong Minister of Interior again positions primeandminister the Kostunica of wasthe Parliament. the DSSgot and Justice.as a coalition partner of the DSS. DS gotMinistry of Foreign Affairs and the president of This was a the governmentvery together. The G17plusfragile was in the government coalition as well as the NS minorityafter months of negotiations, DS and DSS overcame their differencesgovernment and agreed to form EU governments with would a likenecessary to see the reforms DS within to bring the thegovernment furthercountry with the ICTY if it wascloser formed fromcoalition. the parties to thatthe were willing EU. to carry ourIn the theeven Mladic’swithout arrestif newgovernmentthe showed willingness cooperate to end continued be could SAA the on negotiations the that said explicitly EU The government. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=01&dd=15&nav_id=227709&nav_category=11&order=priority 232 231 seats. G17plusthe had SPShad 19,the 16and Liberal the Democratic Party had-LDP 15 into 81seatsin DS translated The parliament. the had DSS-NS coalition had 64,the 47, that votes SRS gotthe highest numberof showedthat January The results 2007. endthe werecampaigningfor newheldin the of all were which elections, 2006, parties responsible for EUintegrations resigned. The coalition survived few more months andby negotiations with Labus EUwerethe from Miroljub minister suspended G17plus http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=22&mm=1&yyyy=2007 15 January 2007, B92: 22 January 2007 FoNet news agency available at: 231 This coalition was based on the common aim of joining the EU. As soon as the After the elections, there were four months of negotiations about the new the about months ofnegotiations four were there After elections, the 129 232 Here it was implied that the CEU eTD Collection accessed March 2006 233 the believed that 38% as innocent, saw generals who of those as heroes; saw them guilty. partially thought innocent and61%not guilty they 31% were and24% Of those, generalsbelieved ofthesurveyedthat wereguilty, the 23% percent generals. Four four those toextradite itinterest of Serbia was in the position that with the agreed 40% completely notagree. anddisagreed 22%did On otherthe hand, 18%generally and Djordjevic.Moreover, Lazarevic generalsextradite the Pavkovic, Lukic, Serbia to new sanctions. to indicted, of all outstanding Half of the surveyed would choose cooperation with the ICTY even in case of extradition 75% forDS voters, voted cooperation andonly among voters with ICTY the 23%. SRS Among with ICTY. the cooperate Serbia should believe that institution. Similarly, 51% legal 13% as only and aspolitical viewedthe ICTY 76% of citizens that Serbian attitudes towards ICTY. the about Kosovo, Serbia, excluding to the governing was always party. athreat of cooperating with the ICTY, the fear of parliamentary majority led by the SRS and SPS more and interms had proactive evenifthegovernment was minority been government, responsible only to the prime minister and was staffed with DSS personnel. In addition,it service for secret which wasarguably the relevant cooperation aswell as with ICTY the DSShadthe the position primethe of minister andthe control mainthe of positions as government joined DS the after even changed not has This arrests. voluntary favoring The position towards the ICTY during both cooperation during waspassive governments ICTY the both The position towards Ministry of Human and minority rights of Serbia and Montenegro available at: Generally speaking, 62% of all surveyed did notagree that it was in the interest of in a survey out carried Rights Minority and Human of Ministry the 2004, July In 130 233 The main results showed Themainresults www.gov.yu last CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=19&nav_id=178757 234 voluntary, if the cooperation was mutual and based on equal treatment of both sides. institution and cooperation was foracceptable Kostunica’s government ifonly itwas a political as Tribunal indicted.Kostunica sawthe those against weretaken actions no but evil necessary as accepted was ICTY The surrenders. voluntary the beyond ICTY ICTY cooperation, i.e.governmentpredominantly holdingministerial strategicallypositions important for the the Ministries of Justice and Interior, equally bring obligations. not to cooperate with understanding of peoplethe joining that the EUwould notonlybring benefitsthe butwould was supporting EUaccession; percentage fallinthe this wassupport explained bythe vote. to be and16refused against while would 12 a survey,64% offor membership carried EU out vote citizens wouldshowed that which position. this with 48% disagreed 38%, believed in Serbia four generals try the to concession the for return in Mladic extradite to it beacceptable would Serbia. That to cases remaining all transfer itall surveyed believedconvincewas international that the to possible community to heroandhe 67%of 24%that wasa innocentwas and 30% partially guilty, 23% guilty, Mladic 8% believed while25%agreed; Mladic Ratko extradite to interest of Serbia the guilty. not were they that world whole the show thus and surrender voluntarily should generals Thus, it was not because of the public opinion, butit was the position of the In October 2005, the office of Serbian government for cooperation with the EU in was it that position the with agree not did surveyed the of 48% Furthermore, Beta , 19October2005, 131 234 In in asimilar2004, 71% survey, CEU eTD Collection arrest warrant. The Ministry of Interior was then responsible for arresting such for arresting responsible then was Interior of The Ministry warrant. arrest it whichfora relevant was forwarded anarrest issuean court, wouldrequest to then a was it If bodies. relevant to requests these forwarded then which Montenegro, and all requests from the ICTY were sent to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia ICTY, the with law cooperation the on to According beexamined. role will first only the requests, and the other is assisting the indictees in their defense before the Tribunal. Here, complex. is relatively cooperation of the body procedure as the Nevertheless, the position of the president does not ensure the smooth functioning of this official institutional communication was flowing between Serbia and ICTY. From resumed work. 2003 December until July 2004this body was not working, and no Minority Rights, untilwork pointJuly 2004.Atthat RasimLjajic,federal for HumanMinister and nor meet, not did body this minister prime the of acceptedassassination the After mechanisms. the bodygovernment and any enforcement without an wasonly advisory or role executive position of the president federation. the of member each of level of national and Montenegro and Serbia of the Union State the in level Council, federal intertwined wasbetween that with had structure ICTY complex the cooperate which then to bodiescreated the in 2003.However, ICTY the with for cooperation Council National lawpassing on thewith the ICTYin2002,amendedcooperation in2003andforming the by duringcooperation whichwereresolved governments, previous with ICTY, the for prohibitions constitutional no were there obstacles, institutional of terms In 4.3 Institutional veto points The Council has two main roles; one is cooperation with the ICTY and its under Djindjic wascreated ICTY the with for cooperation Council The National 132 CEU eTD Collection interview is onfile with the The authorBelgrade. 2005, June Council, National the of Office the of Secretary the with an interview through 235 Councils by the suggested were members. Three nine had andoriginally weeks every once three of Ministersfor ongoing the for information. casesand requests other National meets The Council ormilitarywitnesses from requestsfor sending relevant secrets, state documents keeping of Serbia and Montenegro, if surrender but Serbian is the there strictto government procedure. wanted they no and the Council hasinformation no on this Usually, either. would volunteers approach three Also, voluntary by surrenders are, notregulated definition bylaw, as arevoluntary they by Serbianwith give National the for Council cooperation and theCouncil anydataon this.cannot andthe cooperation that refers to thethree arrests is done as explained above and has nothing to public.the open to donot as confidential are by andviewed government the by right numbers on the issues related toget the to is it difficult at and very place one the arenot cooperation on data any statistical cooperation. Moreover, most of the issues archivesor the involved ministries Becausethere were several process. the complicated are Serbia. of of Justice Minister the of signature Serbia and of federation left the Montenegro After coincide. positions two these that necessary Montenegro,also the president of Nationalthe Council forcooperation with ICTYbutitthe was not the samethe federalprocedure Minister by of decision this wassigning final The step extradition. the for fulfilled were conditions of Humanapplies and Minority all make whichwouldwhether adecision court, tothe were then taken individuals who Rights.only Rasimnow Ljajic the was atfinal that moment step is the All information regarding the National Council for cooperation with the ICTY were gathered were ICTY the with cooperation for Council National the regarding information All releasing role are more active has Council the where forms of Other cooperation alsoformshad2004 which This procedure some prior different to additionally 133 235 The part of CEU eTD Collection a more efficient work. Although the Council is in almost daily contact with the ICTY, it ICTY, the with contact daily almost in is Council the Although work. efficient more a itallinefficient involved tobemore in theprocess of usually cooperation resulted those invited Council the whenever However, power. real no has Council the it in general but moreefficiently work to employees their influence can ministers and these procedures judiciary of arrests the for responsible are ministries whose ministers are Council members of the role, itexecutive nohas secret.Therefore, keep astate to an obligation of awitness release to or by theICTY asked a document from secrecy remove to Serbia) the Council ICTYof and forwardsMinisters them to relevantcooperating; it has dealsonly coordinating Itwith role. arrive all requests that from the ministries, (or orafter has advisoryNational Councilrole hasMontenegrin no executive when power or any power itto sanction suggest any body for not to removes theindependence, secret status and Montenegro of Serbia of Ministers Council the that arecommendation Council gives of the document beforeto itthe can be sentgovernment to the ICTY. Thus,Council had regularmeetings and performed its duties. the of attend the meetings of Councilfrom the September 2004onwards. Despite this, the as deputy federal minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia but and Montenegro, they notdid aswell MinistersJustice of Montenegro, were deputy of from DefenseMontenegro and members three The Serbia. administration of state of Minister Loncar Zoran and Serbia of Justice of minister deputy Bjelica Branislav Serbia, of Interior of Minister as (DSS) Jocic wereDragan members Serbian of Defense. Ministers Federal as Davinic (DS) president, VukDraskovic (SPO)asFederal Minister of AffairsForeign andPrvoslav membersDuring 2004-2006 period Montenegrin were,Ljajic asthe the government. When there is a request for some documentation to be sent to the ICTY, the 134 CEU eTD Collection these but these data, they bewould confidential. National The 850 about Council processed have would Interior of Ministry Only arrests. on information no had also They Serbs. most indictees in of Serbia because were Bosnian Bosnia Srpska and Republika these of National the haveCouncil not could confirmed this. Office butthe in nine six Serbia, were outof those claimed that ICTY of the Prosecutor Vlastimir whom was Serbsbynationality butonly beinwere known one General Serbia, to Djordjevic, In were arrested. June weresurrendered or there nine stilllarge, 10indictees at 2005, of whowas in butlast middle the were arrested, arrest the In total,37people either of 2003. was one June 10 persons to from 2005; November 2004 14 of voluntary whom surrenders, out of the fourNational Councilfor 2000until period the June October from thefollowing: 27 2005 are mentioneddue to the fragmentation generals. of the processfunction. its of interpretation correct not is ICTY the with of non-cooperation cooperation.However, Estimatedcriticism theof work of the Council, orreferring the to decisionsdata ofthe Councilthe justifyto of the officeon of the individualis it ultimately but problems, arising with deal to cases in special meet can it do, to what ministries councilthe forimportant is coordination the andadvising ministries and the government toThus, Minister. Prime the and/or fulfill ministers individual also but Council the of president the requestsSerbiameetthe would onher to visits has.The prosecutor National Council the that from thewould herassessments give of cooperationthe based onICTYdata and noton data the Tribunal. of Usually,submit ICTY the ICTY.Prosecutor to the duty the hasany no to reports Therefore, any The Council also had no information how the cooperation was done between done was cooperation the how information no had also Council The available, not with cooperation ICTYare dataon the As mentionedabove unified 135 CEU eTD Collection look atpartisan veto players. for the institutional framework for the cooperation to work. The following section will efficient delayor it. Therefore, party onICTYcooperationpositions are crucialinorder individual holding relevant for position cooperation can make more cooperation the ranks and thus enable better cooperation with the ICTY. This is only one example how an army inreplaceindividuals certainthetop ofinability Kostunica to Draskovic accused Moreover, generals. military police and four against the were Zoran and Zivkovic, werereceivedin 2003during TheseKostunica. indictments governmentof the October armyagainstfirst Court top and discussing policegenerals the without issuewith andKostunica happened when MFAforwardedthe indictments to Belgrade District integration between him EU rift Allegedly,cooperation andwith biggest ICTY. the the (SPO) became the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), he immediately started working on whowhy itimportant holdsis positionsrelevantfor cooperation. Once Vuk Draskovic is be That could delayed. action or where adecision intheprocess many points are there percent. hundred almost fulfilled are Tribunal claims there were no delays with cooperation with for Council ICTY the cooperation weeks. National The had within previous arrived and that response to the requests that ones wereonly the andwere being few processed the that to been fromhaveresponded the from the obligation to keeprequests for differentdocuments and 290 information and people about werereleased state secret. According to their records, almost all requests This brief description institutionalstructure for cooperationof shows the that 136 CEU eTD Collection 236 integration in membership the final European aim full of processes with the accession to findgovernment to solve away to problems. meanttensions. Heclaimedcooperation, democracy new andallowing deliberation that social enhance and Party, Radical nationalist ultra the strengthen only would extraditions extraditions. solve were than neededSerbia to that problems important more because were there thefour generals extradite wouldgovernment not newthe Kostunica argued that elections, the be voluntary. Upon The Hagueto to transfers the preferred and any indictees arrest want to not they did body, thus was legal it that never accepted but reality asapolitical ICTY the accepted They very particular. Kostunica and hismembers, party whose position on cooperation with ICTYwas the active cooperation. this as notan excuse tocooperate, butin essence his and his party position was against ofKostunica assassination.new unstable adopted the after The government situation to of in 2003 due part second the therewerearrests very especially wasnot good, ICTY mean change the that impossible. of bewouldpolicy or incremental would which points, veto many were there Thus, support. parliamentary weak relatively governmentswith werefragmented and2007-2008 2003-2007 Kostunicaperiods inboth of governments the introduction the in mentioned classification the to According 4.4 Partisan veto players Beta organizations and of European “participation inthework stresses DSS program were ICTY with the cooperation prevented that i.e.players,actors veto The main with cooperation the the becameprime minister before Kostunica As already , 21February 2004, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=21&mm=2&yyyy=2004 137 236 He pointed out that out pointed He CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=02&dd=24&nav_id=133599 239 238 http://www.spo.org.yu/action.php?objekat=Program&akcija=Pregled 240 http://www.dss.org.yu/zasto_postojimo/program.php?id=65 237 European Union.” institutions, and courts conventions.” international other or Council Security Charter, UN the of responsibility non justify was necessary. cooperation ICTY was problematic, but it was the reality, it existed, it was a UN institution and thus, cooperation with for strategy national the focusedof president necessity the on of the Serbia inJune 2004, the ICTY. dignity.” national of full respect law, mutual…with the be to according to needs this cooperation cooperationpowers, with is ourinternationalICTY duty which is unavoidable.However, legalis transform institution, into and iteasy aninstrumentto of politics the big of the more is it political “Although which than ICTY ICTYfor said, full cooperation with the warrants were arrest the in Belgrade, court the District to indictment the MFA sent that fact the Despite not acted upon,the SPO was asfederal the ministerHowever,Minister this position and an active role in the cooperation while Draskovic, president for of ICTY. the with Foreign cooperation of in support vociferous ofbeen always has affairs, Affairsforeign Interior did not lead was of minister later asthe of party, tothe president the addition, In ICTY. the with cooperation changefrom in thethe policy. DSS which ibid. SPO party program, available at: DSS party program, available at: The position of the SPO was that “National, state or any other reasons can never can reasons other any or state “National, that was SPO the of position The In response to Kostunica’s position on the ICTY, Boris Tadic (DS) who became RTS 238 tv report, 24 February 2004, 237 However, itseems thattheDSS didnot link achievingthis with the 239 Tadic acknowledged that from the legal from a that perspective, Tadicacknowledged 240 Thus, clearly it shows the SPO position for 138 lastaccessed March 2006 last accessed March 2006 March accessed last CEU eTD Collection 241 was government the and that be extradited, not would four generals that stated again DSS indictment, statingitwas change a routine at the end of previousthe government. Ministry the denied newgovernmentdowithhis had and that the removal anything to the of the indicted generals, was removed from his position within the Ministry of Interior, one Lukic, Sreten when 2004, In March officers. active still were indictees generals four the Service might have had on the indictees would be only given to Kostunica directly. Kostunica information 2008. Reportedly, andall Bulatovic to wasonly that responsible in following elections until this the Services, at post remained and RadeBulatovic Secret from the DSS. The DSS did not give up the right to choose who would be the Director of an efficientjob because the ICTY indictees were still at large, there was no clear responsedo not did Service the that in 2007 out pointed was it When January. in elections the after also mentioned in this February question before 2007 new the governmentwas formed Milosevic’s Andregime. even 2007elections. the after problem this The persisted EU responsibility of cooperation. Council for cooperation with the ICTY, which shows that there were many ways toavoid National of from Office data the the contradicts of Draskovic statement This members. werearmy indictees the as council of the be president should Defense of Minister the that not even part of the National were Police and of Justice becausetheMinisters cooperation was against whoitwas clear Council for cooperation legal Draskovic ICTYis the that argued voluntary surrenders. body, not byencouraging with the andcooperate insistence international ICTY. tofindattempted waybetween amiddle to duty He also inferred The DSS also did not make any other personnel change; even though some of the staff loyal the still for was keeping that to Kostunica Draskovic criticized also B92 , 5March2004 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=5&mm=3&yyyy=2004 139 241 The CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=03&dd=04&nav_id=134383 forin law the pass. total),whichwasenough to 2004. The law forby voted wassuggestedbythe SRS, DSS,SRSandthe SPS(141MPs the Law on the Rights was controversial most Oneof the ICTY. the with of cooperation effects the mitigate to of the ICTY indictees in order seats, numberof considerable had wherethey theparliament, through legislation and their familiesexecutive adopted on power,30 March and thusall relevant positions forwere cooperation and it did not allow change. not ablemembersgovernment such changeas Draskovic to quo, this status theDSSwas holding to do so. Butwas supporting such position. Thus,of regardless some individual of cases some theygovernment the that and own' its of 'one werearrest to want not did Interior of Ministry the that active in passing 243 242 motivateindividual werenot Kostunica's government givingSerbia,governments to did and organizations international other and EU the that incentives international the even seems that them. It of extraditing responsibility international fulfilled the government the before even a priority, as seen was protection their and criminals as indictees the view not did three parties that those madeclear actually law for areview.The Court Constitutional credibility by supporting thelaw. Thelaw was suspendedimmediately and sent the to this was the only concession to the SPS for their support of the government, the DSS lost NS andduring SPOMPswalked against theout voting. Thevoted law. the Although DS government, onlyfor DSSvoted law. the TheG17plus abstainedthe voting, from the ICTY. the with cooperate to how in ways different for looking The directlySPS andSRSwerenot cooperation as hadnopreventing they International Crisis Group (ICG) report, Belgrade/Brusses, 22 July 2004, available at RTS television , 4March 2004, 140 243 Out of four members of coalition 242 This is clear example is clear This www.icg.org CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=03&dd=31&nav_id=136938 with the ICTY. possibility that the new governmentwas established by the support of the SPS. 248 247 246 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=02&dd=11&nav_id=132489 245 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=02&dd=04&nav_id=131872 244 cooperation.shows relatively good assessment. negative confirmed TheICTYreports reports. theICTY basedon US were was not seen as contributing to the cooperation. Most of the pressures from the EU and cooperation with the in March 2004, whichcriticized lackin of ICTY. reforms policelack andjustice system, of reforms. with continue to able be whichwouldform government all it to forces the expected democratic that authorities During the months after elections the in EUrepeatedly2003, the theSerbianreminded 4.5 External pressures and incentives pressures. and rewards international change the position on the ICTY. The following section will look closely at the assassination of primethe The government minister. was more focused on solving almostnobecame slower less and cooperation leadingto enthusiastic autumn 2003. after and after the assassination of the Prime Minister, Djindjic, in March 2003 the cooperation Annual ICTY Report 2003, available at: B92 Beta , 31 March 2004, , 31March2004, In March 2004, the US discontinued help to Serbia cooperation thelack USdiscontinueddue to In Marchto 2004,the of help Beta Beta, 4February 2004: forThe ICTY report 2003which fromcovers period July 2002until August 2003 The report clearly shows deterioration in communication with the ICTY after the after ICTY the with communication in deterioration shows clearly The report FoNet , 6 February 2004 11, February 2004: 246 The EU representative in Serbia presented the new EU report on Serbia http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=31&mm=3&yyyy=2004 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=6&mm=2&yyyy=2004 247 244 The new law on the assistance with the ICTY indictees Both EU and UN members expressed worries about the 248 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2003/index.htm This was, however, the period of DOS government 141 , 245 CEU eTD Collection 250 e/2004/index.htm 249 placetook inSerbia. during in nineperiod, only Outof showed deterioration arrests that the one cooperation. government. preventing by full cooperation not fulfillingrequests by from ICTY asked the the state difficultas to cooperate with the ICTY. The assassinationwell proved that it could be fatal for as governmentthe control did not army,the services security and police,more makingit for those withintheassassination showed Moreover, thecountry. order internal keeping problems, structures that government did not have control of, suspended anycooperation with Tribunal.”the practically Serbia and Montenegro From of beginning 2004 the by authorities. the Cooperation waspoliticizedcomplex,variable 2003. and of usually until partial end the in Serbia and from December 2004 to 25 April 20 accused the from 2005, surrenderedto in December 2004to Serbiaand arrested accusedwas In October2004one compliance record. better aslightly presented 15fugitives,that including Mladic, werestill believed tobein Serbia and Montenegro. again in showed May2004.Thereport MontenegroCouncil of UN Security the tothe surrender not.to The or ICTYpresident, wasforced therefore, toreportSerbia and needed for referendum they whether lifeof Serbia calling in were openly political active 2003 in October indicted persons four of three addedthat were.She where accused the clear was it though even tribunal the by issued warrants arrest on act to government the Ibid., paragraph277. Annual ICTY 2004,report paragraph 268, available at, The ICTY Report2004 coveringfrom period August 2003 Augustto 2004 The report of The reportof 2005 coveringfrom 2005 August 2004toAugust period the last accessed March 2006 249 “Cooperation by Serbia and Montenegro continued to be 142 250 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu- The Prosecutor was noting inability of CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=11&dd=22&nav_id=156352 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=11&dd=08&nav_id=155289 wait only would but them arrest not would he stated openly Kostunica and Serbia, in residing freely Council, saying there wasnochange since theprevious report inMay 2004.Twelve indictees were extradition ofRatko Mladic.254 Likewise, in November 2004,Del Ponte addressed UNthe Security weretrue. speculations these they had supposed seensomething see.were not to they Itwasnever confirmed whether There werespeculations they mighthave that death were ambiguous. because beenkilled by provoked deathof soldiersthe causes barracks inarmy two inBelgrade,whose of This was of army. the on premises hiding the indictees were whether theICTY about accusations counter and goingbig accusations on, debate a therewas domestic politics 254 253 252 e/2005/index.htm 251 ICTY. the with cooperation was if there assessed positively thereport. be accordingto in to believed Serbia were butarrested least not indictees werestill of still six of reach 10remaining the at and out MladicRatko was ICTY, the to voluntary transfers enabled 14 2005 Serbian government in progress to regard interviews waiversthe and for some documents.” efforts of the President of the National Council for Cooperation, Rasim Ljajic, produced positive and The speedy. consistent of complete, being yet point reached the not has ICTY. Beta Ibid., paragraph189. ICTYAnnual report 2005, paragraph180, available at: Beta , 8November2004: 251 , 22 November 2004, November 22 , Also in November, the US Congress again conditioned help millionof 73 dollars to the In November 2004, the EU again stated that the feasibility study thatthefeasibility study be only would In EUagainstated 2004, the November “Cooperation by andMontenegroSerbia started to improve late in 2004, butit 143 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu- 253 Duringin this period, 252 Although in Although CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=07&dd=01&nav_id=144885 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=05&dd=08&nav_id=140222 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=04&dd=23&nav_id=138986 do it. did not Ministry Interior the because of indicted servedto the were not they court, the to served being indictments the Despite indictments. the on act not did above,discontinue becauseAs noted SPSdid the notsupport government Kostunica’s if fourstop supporttothegovernment werearrested. generals the to (SPS) threatened Dacic indictees. of the arrest proceed tothe to thecourt on andwasnow theICTY with 258 257 256 255 in Belgrade. court country the generals to Pavkovichimsurrender totalk to about tothe ICTY. individually. he said he would indictedlargeregardingindicted forwho generals stillbut thesearch four those at were talk to government. In April of Jocic2004, MinisterInterior said (DSS) wascontinuous there them to find by non-arrests DSS the of policy the of consequence direct USwere from EUandthe the the best solution for unacceptable. was attitude an the such that warned She surrender. voluntary a as statepresented and was it purposes fordomestic for that and arrested actually was surrendered them voluntarily that person last the that claimed She results. produce not did policy this reported Ponte Del surrender. their for http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=1&mm=7&yyyy=2004 Beta, Beta B92 B92 , 1July 2004 , 23 April 2004, , 1July 2004, 8 May 2004: In July 2004,the Ministry AffairsForeign of sent indictmentsthe four against incentives of discontinuation and reports negative these above, mentioned As 255 The Minister of Defense still waited for the two generals Lazarevic and generals Lazarevic for the two waited still Defense of TheMinister 257 14 This was in line with the law on cooperation on law the with line in was This 4 256 258 CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=07&dd=16&nav_id=145977 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=08&dd=20&nav_id=148885 262 261 260 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=07&dd=02&nav_id=144962 259 when. and werenecessary extraditions decide whether showed that 60%showed that of Serbian citizens were absolutely against extraditions of any Serbian was a parties. problem thinking leading the with the of ICTY. the inwith it lack of cooperation was clear and that process of European view future of the common the for will lack of political wasa there that stating resigned EU integration in Augustcooperation.2004, the chief However, for andof Montenegro office Serbia the ICTY. the by andespecially seriously were not public, but international organization, taken the Kostunica, as Nationala Councillaw for cooperation has no executiveexpert role, it is only advisory body. wascooperation. aware As explained above the under institutional frameworkof for cooperation, this.ensure to ofwasresponsible bodies; government Serbia the different coordinate His statementselse it. The wanted National hadjurisdictionCouncil no arrestanyoneto butonly to could only confuse constituted and Ljajicbecame its president. the itnew Council was constituted would it. Finally,in with deal July,the was Council the once that and timely, not were extraditions the that Council previous the of position B92 y B92 , 16 July 2004, , 2July 2004, Kostunica stated that it was the duty of the National Council for cooperation to Vecernje novosti, daily 20 August, 2004 B92 The ICTY position was that bureaucracy could not be the reason for lack of 261 , 16 August 2004, Although Tadic said that non-cooperation with ICTY was catastrophe there catastrophe was ICTY with non-cooperation that said Tadic Although http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=16&mm=8&yyyy=2004 145 260 He said he accepted the position as no one 262 259 At the same time a survey He added that it was the CEU eTD Collection source in the Serbian government revealed that Kostunica was only ready to cooperate with the ICTY the with cooperate to ready only was Kostunica that revealed government Serbian the in source government showed that it was reluctant to arrest anyone. According to the to According anyone. arrest to reluctant was it that showed government the in atmosphere The respect. and courage of deed extraordinary an as praised tobe supposed was it indictment, the accepted indicted the of one finally when and anyone, extradite to ready up by the law on cooperation but waspurely basedonpolitical relations. Thegovernmentwas not set procedures or legality on based not was ICTY the with cooperation the towards attitude whole the the acceptance of indictment and was not arrested almost ayear after the indictment. This shows that for thanked was indicted someone that principles legal all against seemed It indictment. the accepted general the indicted, been had he after year a Almost respect.265 of worth deed a as Tadic president a façade they resigned. Once Councilwas only National they cooperating the that while wasnot. realized Serbia were they that stating always cooperation, ICTY the of responsibility accepted for cooperation with the ICTY resigned from the posts. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=09&dd=30&nav_id=152188 265 264 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=08&dd=31&nav_id=149904 263 citizen to the ICTY. Finally, in September 2004 Sreten Lukic accepted the indictment, which was viewed by the by viewed was which indictment, the accepted Lukic Sreten 2004 September in Finally, Beta B92 FoNet , 22 September2004, , 30September 2004, , 31 August 2004 , 263 In September, all Montenegrin members of the National Council National the of members Montenegrin all September, In http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=22&mm=9&yyyy=2004 146 264 Montenegro never fully never Montenegro Blic daily, ananonymous CEU eTD Collection surrendered voluntarily; whether there were some secret talks between them the and them between talks secret some were there whether voluntarily; surrendered want tocooperate with the ICTY. possessdidnot Thisany power. just Kostunicashowed that his and party not simply did for the new government. Finally, if the state was fearful of the retired generals, then they someone. Secondly, the decision of the formerarrest to governmentorder in decision was apolitical for not waited impedimentcourts that toimpossible action was it Firstly, conclusions the arreststhe would security not be performed.it endanger would because thearrest generals to not decided former government the that This of position the was countrysomewhat illogical. and until this conclusion was annulled by some other http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=9&mm=10&yyyy=2004 be arrested. not would generals the thus that and of Serbia destabilization calls, the Minister ministersof invited all extradite countries to those indicted by ICTY. the of over lack of the ICTY cooperationJustice on which some EUmembers insisted. The EU council of thatSerbia it might be stillcompleted bymaintained spring 2005. Still, relationsthat the with thearrests EU were still wouldtense mean 269 268 267 266 seen. was improvement from the EU,ICTY or USand onin still insisted trials Serbia. if the indictees surrendered voluntarily.266 The source that Kostunicapressuresadded stillresisted http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=10&dd=01&nav_id=152237 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=10&dd=19&nav_id=153607 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=10&dd=13&nav_id=153122 Blic B92 B 92 Beta daily 1 , October2004, , 9October2004: , 19 October 2004, October 19 , 2004: October 13 , It is not still clear what were the incentives, if any, for those indictees that In October 2004,one ICTYindictee surrendered andEUofficials somethat stated 267 They also said that the feasibility study was worked on and 147 268 Despite these Despite 269 He stated CEU eTD Collection 271 270 ICTY. the with cooperation full were avoiding Montenegro and Serbia increased. In January Human 2005, the WatchRights authoritiesthe claimed that of four generals. andpeople November2004 surrenderedbetween including voluntarily June 2005, all 14 above mentioned as fact, butin yet clear, not are The motives surrender. want to not did they because integration EU from country own their prevent to not patriots and government;if or the government played on the card of their responsibility as individuals repeated that international obligations, especially the ICTY cooperation, were crucial for crucial were cooperation, ICTY the especially obligations, international that repeated indictment. on the eventually acted indictees who the linkbetween international surrenders andpressure, butthey the hadeffect on potentially directshow to is itdifficult Therefore, assistance. receiving with obligations international Departmentlinkedbecause thegovernment of fulfillmentUS State of Serbia never of decision the the at surprise expressing cooperation was regularly, done that repeated government Mladic. Serbian The andlocate arrest to authorities Serbian duty the of Hesaid it the only counts. was full cooperation notacceptable, that and cooperation was partial that warned TheUSambassador ICTY. the with lackcooperation to the of banned the JAT airways to fly to the US. Serbia to withdrewsuspended assistance for 2005, partof from staff Belgrade, and government US the January, In surrenders. voluntary on depended and non-cooperation in Kostunica wasstubborn had i.e.that asserted, what already ICTYreports the repeated http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=01&dd=13&nav_id=159916 B92 Beta , 13 January 2005 , 14 January 2005 The number of voluntary surrenders increased as the international international pressure increased asthe surrenders The numbervoluntary of Olli Rehn, EUEnlargement visitedcommission end atthe Serbia of January, and http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=14&mm=1&yyyy=2005 271 148 These partial sanctions were introduced due introduced sanctions were Thesepartial 270 The HRW CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=2&mm=3&yyyy=2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=02&dd=02&nav_id=161313 275 274 273 272 not. or integration join to decideitwas up to they wished to citizens whether that EUintegrations,emphasizing the followed. had been hadbeen largefor 10years. at fine but still, in her opinion, it was not cooperation. She demanded answers for those who were surrenders Voluntary impressed. not still was Del Ponte accused. were individuals the crimes mention of wasnowhat Perisic, there or for Lazarevic either statement In the finally working. Indictment Perisic against wassecretuntil he was served the indictment. same. surrendered, in March the former chief of staff general Momcilo Perisic decided todo the After Lazarevic surrenders. voluntary to apositive approach have such not itearlier did Kostunica and Lazarevic. generals NATO gaveamnesty to the against andtoAlbanianterrorists. fight aprivate war but foughtfor the country, and was also worried that these indictments he dobecause didnot to decide should what authorities that earlier surrenders, stating is the hismindashewasagainst end.country changed unclearwhy Lazarevic to It serve the to hedecided important, most the were interests national as Kostunica; Minister Prime to talking after decision this Lazarevic made that stated of Serbia government Beta B92 B92 B92 275 , 2February 2005 , 28 January 2005 , 24 January 2005 , 3March 2005 On General surrender. 28 January 2005, the decidedto Lazarevic Vladimir The church, as well, took part in Patriarch the to part - talked Pavle negotiations the The took church, aswell, Kostunica was pleased with his method of cooperation, i.e. surrenders were i.e.surrenders of cooperation, his method with waspleased Kostunica http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=28&mm=1&yyyy=2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=24&mm=1&yyyy=2005 272 274 Again a pressure EUput the and voluntary another surrender This is also a change in the position of the church because church the of position in the a change also is This 149 273 The CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=03&dd=15&nav_id=164291 280 279 278 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=03&dd=30&nav_id=165392 277 276 but appear before domestic court charge,another on the failed to because Pavkovic done wereinterrogated. allies hisclosest and flat wassearched Pavkovic case.His and delayin negotiationsCroatian made theof government Serbiathe harder work on confirmed. was cooperation justpoliticization. were all speculations that claiming other Lukic wasarrested, Justice that denied of Minister The histreatment. with and progress medical he providing authorities, reports from wasregularly contacting responsibility; violated andunderstand hedid not why he was away becausetaken not hedid run away were rights his that argued lawyer The in Belgrade. center medical the from pajamas, his unclear whether he went voluntarily. Lukic’s lawyer saidhe was taken against his will, in fulfill authoritiesthe again to to appealed their obligations. the EU was serious. The that and werenecessary, arrests messagePresident that the got inSerbia authorities the Gotovina, of the ICTY visited beginningthe ofnegotiationsmembership for with Croatia due to non-extradition of Serbia in mid March 2005, and with the ICTY was put forth. Montenegro. andSerbia to USambassador the said withheld, still was assistance Serbia, in democratization about Department State the Beta , 15March2005: The EU was pleased seeto some improvementin the cooperation but as it delayed Ljajic talked to the ICTY representatives, reporting that positive assessment of positive assessment ICTYrepresentatives, reporting the Ljajic that talked to General Sreten General Lukic wentSreten toTheHaguein April 2005. B92 Beta FoNet B92 , 6April 2005, , 30 March 2005, , 5April 2005, , 4April 2005, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=6&mm=4&yyyy=2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=5&mm=4&yyyy=2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=4&mm=4&yyyy=2005 279 This incentive forincentive This receivingfeasibility study positive the 150 277 Still, as a main condition, cooperation 276 Despite a positive report of report apositive Despite 278 However, itwas However, 280 This was CEU eTD Collection 283 282 281 concerning there with the ICTYcooperation stated that European Union Agreementthe Association and negotiate Stabilization the to and Montenegro of preparedness Serbia were the motiveonly anddeniedthat feasibility the study had anythingdo with to this. he Nonetheless,this andhislawyer attitude. and patriotism professional duty claimed madeis still whatcontradicted his mind unclear statements change Pavkovic as his earlier professional duty, as he did not wish to be an obstacle to the progress of his country. ICTYtofulfillthe his to going hewas On 22April confirmed 2005, Pavkovic would adoptthefeasibility instudy light of Pavkovic’s case, which was still pending. consistent as it was withbe EUwould the that asserted Serbia Montenegro and Germany to of ambassador Croatia a month earlier, andgot the positive study Montenegro feasibility and April on 12 2005. that the EU council of Ministers this talked phoneKostunica. on the about with Rehn of with cooperation final ICTY. The Haguein the toreceive the confirmation order in Pavkovic expected they that stated EU the Similarly, surrender. voluntary a as transfer him forced they portrayed surrender, the and actually arrested or persuaded himto lawsuitand searched hishome basedondomestic they whether really remains unclear itis why such which accepted treatment, never The government was related. ICTY meant searchfor thisthat him courts, also ICTYhassupremacy domestic since the over Thus, inThus, April staff Commission 2005, the paperthatdealtworking with the improving, wasseenOnce cooperation wassolvedas the Serbia and ICTY this B92 B92 B92 , 22 April 2005, , 14 April 2005, , 12 April 2005, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=22&mm=4&yyyy=2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=14&mm=4&yyyy=2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=12&mm=4&yyyy=2005 151 281 However, the 283 282 It CEU eTD Collection 286 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0476en01.pdf Stabilization Associationand Agreement with the EU,April 2005,COM (2005) 476, 6. 285 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/sam_feasibility_report_staff_working_paper_en.pdf Stabilization Associationand Agreement with the European Union, April 2005, SEC (2005) 478, 15. 284 ICTY. the with cooperation for obligations international its in meeting progress significant made Montenegro startpreparedness to SAAnegotiations andSerbia study the concluded that and in March 2005. accused ICTY of the assets the freeze lawto the of adoption also was decisions positive Among Mladic. arrest failure to mentionedbut constant period, in recent ICTY the to the surrenders of number voluntary EUreportacknowledged andthe transfers aconsiderable access to the documents but were against cooperation with the ICTY. On the positive side had who army the in especially and administration the in those by prevented sometimes implementation was the underlining that ICTY, referred tothe report The problematic. stated that the ICTY was the only part of the Dayton Peace Agreement that was still large. at werestill most wanted the though somebeen improvement had the ICTY the Serbiaand Montenegro and negotiations, the during before both process, the of stages various the progress through “in to study order reads, in theprogress eventcontinuous inwas all expected areas outlinedas in thestudy. The that Study the reads also Nonetheless, negotiations. Council recommended the that open sufficiently prepared for SAA negotiations with the EU. The EU Commission ibid., 8. (original emphasize) negotiate to Montenegro and Serbia of preparedness the on Commission the from Communication a negotiate to Montenegro and of Serbia preparedness the on Report paper, working staff Commission This report wasused This as feasibility forreport the a basis Montenegro study of and Serbia , and achieve full cooperation without delay.” 285 Thus, it was concluded that Serbia and Montenegro was 152 must continue to co-operate with 286 284 The report CEU eTD Collection 20 January 2006, B92 order=priority 290 289 288 t_cs_en.pdf http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1428_final_progress_repor 287 full co-operation with the ICTY.” and Charter of Constitutional the implementation effective the capacity, administrative particular in on legislativeframework developingprogress country’s the and its will dependin of “thethat negotiations the paceandconclusions stated however, whichMontenegro, on were officially inBelgrade 10 October2005. opened pressure against Serbian in order to arrest Mladic 2006. before July toarrest inorder Serbian pressure against Del demandedbeen arrested. same the hadnotPonte General Gotovina indictee Croatian open because not were onEUaccession negotiations 2005,when inMarch Croatian January 2006, Del asked EUthethe from beenPonte same pressureasithad putto negotiations for SAA, Serbia continued thea large. indictees still andthat number at its were of limits, hadreached surrenders’ same passive policy assessmenttowards of ICTY cooperation, the EU report noted that policythe of ‘voluntary ICTY. In provision. addition, despite positive In had this obligationsMontenegro under the same Association process.” and Stabilization the under conditionality of integral EU’s the political andpart an post-accession commitments of Europe Council “under obligation an also was but Accords Dayton the of signatory and member as aUN Montenegro and of Serbia obligation international only notas was mentioned said thisin meeting a with Rehn, and the EU Commissioner responded that the EU might http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=01&dd=20&nav_id=185816& Brussels,9 November 2005, SEC (2005) 1428,Serbia and Montenegro,2005 Progress Report, 5 On 3 October 2005, the EU decided to open negotiations open with Serbia and to EUdecided 2005,the On 3 October Ibid., 22. Ibid, However, after a brief period of intensive voluntary surrenders and opening of opening voluntary intensive and surrenders of abrief after However, period 288 Again, the obligation of ICTY withthe Again,cooperation obligation of the 153 289 It reiterated that reiterated It 290 The prosecutor 287 The report CEU eTD Collection 1 February 2006, FoNet order=priority 293 1February 2006, B92 292 28 January 2006, Beta order=priority 291 submitting a report on the cooperation withfive ICTY. hourfrom the Army of Serbia (VJ). Three days after thislong the Supreme Defense Council had a session from also Srpskabut only assistancehide. not did the Republika Mladic Reportedly, get Djogo,was arrested. Jovo Srpska where Republika of Army the of colonel security, Mladic’s of chief the former the January 28 chiefcooperation announcedwith ICTY.Del the SerbiaPonte avisit for February to 2006. On of in the military improvement no is there if Serbia with SAA the on negotiations the suspend security intelligence unit was enlargement again stated that the Prosecutor informed him of non-cooperation of Serbia non-cooperation of informed him of Prosecutor the that stated again enlargement visited Belgrade on6February 13 Februaryand alreadyno EU commissionerfor in force Brussels enter beforeon fewdays 11 February. and wassupposedto Del Ponte wasadopted and EU,which the Montenegro and between Serbia Partnership document, Serbia. the itwas “losingobligationsICTY, butthat patience understanding” and towards with untildate David its said givewhen EUdidnot aprecise should fulfill the Hudson Serbia presented tothepublic.was not but the reportindictees, ICTY presented assisted have might who those for responsibility criminal determine to of the session of the Council was given state secret status and http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=01&nav_id=187121& http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=01&dd=28&nav_id=186730& http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=1&mm=2&yyyy=2006 293 On 1 February member2006, a of EUCommissionthe delegation in Belgrade, The cooperation with the ICTY was one of the main principles of a new EU 291 He was arrested on the charges of helping Mladic to helping Mladic on Hewasarrested chargesthe of 154 292 The Council said it was necessary itwas said TheCouncil CEU eTD Collection on on 3 May 2006. andBelgrade,visits from EUdecided the EUto the tosuspend negotiations on the SAA monthsnegotiations After by of of April. end the arrested not he was assisting Mladic, 3May 2006, B92 298 31 March 2006, Beta 297 27 February 2006, FoNet order=priority 296 16 February 2006, B92 295 13 February 2006, Beta order=priority 294 with the ICTY. time. some more give Serbia decidedto theEU basisthis on on the that Mladic,and extradite and arrest locate, wasdoneto everything that Kostunica from assurances received to doanother review by cooperation of he April. endof the that confirmed Olli Rehn month give and more one to Serbia ofindictees. On31March EUdecided the arrests the on breakthrough major no still was there but March of end in the EU the of Minister of continue. to negotiations for the order in indictees remaining all extradite i.e. ICTY, the to obligations all fulfill to Montenegro On Montenegro. 27 February, Council the Ministers of of EUinvitedthe Serbia and onnegotiationsEuropean futurehavewould andon of Serbia and effects negative continuing. was ICTY the with cooperation the as long as only continue would negotiations the that inwas onlyinterested and words not it that very deeds, was stated in clear 2005 October http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=27&nav_id=189859& http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=13&nav_id=188508& http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=3&mm=5&yyyy=2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=31&mm=3&yyyy=2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=16&nav_id=188747&order=priority 297 Despite some activities in taking into custody those who were suspected of whowere suspected those custody into in taking activities some Despite 295 He repeated that if the full cooperation with the ICTY was not reached it reached wasnot ICTY with fullthe if that cooperation Herepeated the 294 298 Three days later Rehn was in Belgrade and again repeated that the EU the that and again repeated RehnwasinBelgrade later Threedays Del Ponte claimed the authorities knew where Mladic was ten days ten was Mladic where knew authorities the claimed Ponte Del 296 This request was repeated again by the Council by was repeatedagain the Thisrequest 155 CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=04&dd=16&nav_id=242155&nav_category=11 299 parliamentary elections as well. advocated parties andsome thepresidential elections for year inthe preparations passed the of end The thegovernment. of president the as Kostunica remained DSS. of control not change substantially.Negotiations with EUresumedinthe June cooperation 2007, butthe with ICTYdid the one. fragile very a albeit government, coalition the on an agreement to came DS andDSS The same ICTY. the with and cooperation positionsnegotiations on the SAA once new governmentrelated showed willingness tocontinue reforms restart TheEUofferedto EU. the to closer bring country the would that reforms to cooperation necessary undertake be SRSwould ready to governments including SPSor the that were stillhad EU, The doubts newinincluded DSbeing government. the the towards preferences under EU still suspended.remained cooperation with the ICTY was not on the agenda and therefore, the negotiations with the questionssolving to related newlyindependence. As the state a consequence, gained and newconstitution and preparing newbecame preoccupiedthe adopting with elections, Politiciansstates. inSerbia new constitute had independent and to Serbia Montenegro This inbothindependence. members was accepted of federation the and both itfailedhad todowhat promised. thegovernment becausehesaid resignation Labus (G17plus)before, but did notwho arrest washim. Based chief on her report thenegotiator EU made the decision. Miroljub with the EU on the SAA submitted his 16 April 2007, Beta After elections the in fromJanuary 2007 the statements EUwere showingthe voted for majority had where a referendum In June2006,Montenegro 299 Eventually, after months of difficult negotiations the negotiations difficult of months after Eventually, 156 CEU eTD Collection it or do not fragmentedcooperation isso involvingmany andtherefore steps, it delay to possible was take a certaininstitutional obstacles and fragmentation of the decision-makingstep process. The process of which on hypothesis for the alsogoes lacking. This was cooperation the overcome and led to ICTY bloc inthe impossiblewere proved. Thesenegativeproved parliament attitudes to the failure of cooperation.proved this Hence, for administerwere not decided thesehypotheses noarrests. period to thus and illegal was ICTY the that principles its more valued government the Thus, as enough the that the timing and the size of the surrender. reward,eventually who indictees the with this discussed inunofficially this case negotiationsnot ontempted SAA, were not bybut thethe DSS governmentrewards, was determinedfor Serbia, had The EU high rewards ICTY. the with cooperation firm passive on policy at toleast follow its principlesnot officially. on the ICTY, and was4.6 Conclusion It is difficult changes. these deal with to prove whetherelections changed the political constellation of power within Serbia. The next chapter will it obstaclefor governmentcontinue the work to together. to In May 2008 parliamentary two issues linked neverwhich EU.Eventually, by were impossiblethe proved this recognize Kosovo, the link on Serbia continuedto signingofSAAwith pressure the to rift between the DS and DSS on cooperation with the EU became final. The DSS On 14 February proclaimed2008 Kosovo its independence and from then on the The hypotheses relating to negative attitudes for ICTYcooperation andanti- for negativeThe hypotheses attitudes to relating Regarding the hypotheses on timing and size of the reward, this period showed fiveIn yearsofKostunica'sconclusion, mandates, governmentin showed two 157 CEU eTD Collection heldby anti ICTY parties, thelowerlikelihood of cooperation was confirmed. hypothesis that the higher number of the crucial positions in cooperation with the ICTY is 158 CEU eTD Collection vice president of the Djindjic government and very close collaborator of Djindjic, of collaborator close very and government Djindjic the of president vice was Cedomir party Jovanovic who of LDP,Liberal democratic government coalition. the as abig sawthis period Milosevic's of return backSPS from step and refrained entering president Someof government. the belonged tothe opposition that parties bloc the during successor the Dacic Ivica positions. ministerial prime deputy two and portfolio without tominister MilosevicMilosevic. SPSmade coalition with government DS and holds 4ministries including one as the presidentSlobodan leader former the of party the (SPS), Serbia of Party of Socialist power of SPS is the ministerhe remained at this position since then. of InteriorSerbia and As Montenegro. this isposition very politically sensitive andnot very popular and assumed in 2004 whilehe was minister federal for human in vicerights governmentthe of he position the ICTY, the with Cooperation the for Council National the of president social hisisforpolicy, role thebecause ICTYcooperation relevant he the remained and labor of minister is SDP from Ljajic Rasim Although minorities. representing parties partners G17 plus has six,Out SPO of one,26 ministers SDP Kosovo. one for minister the as well as and rights DSminority and human SDA hasjustice, finance, Sandzakdefense, eleven, one.plus affairs, Thethe foreign of ministers lastpositionminister, prime the of positions twothe held DS others, Among areof prime minister. Their asDemocratic leadingpower Party overtook in(DS) the position government. the coalition The afterperiod the inMay elections changethe in 2008 marks constellation the of 5.1 Introduction -present 2008 5-Serbia Chapter Another important shift that happened after the elections of 2008 was the return to 159 CEU eTD Collection 5.2 Actors: general positions and power costs extraditions of the last two fugitives was still expected. fullthe cooperation with membership, ICTY,and the EU cooperation butcontinuous and closer These steps to weredeemed Karadzic enormous wascarried out. fugitive Radovan important arrests most the of governmentwas formed, 21July ICTY the of 2008, one on newAsas elections. the soon after the soon inJune happened Zupljanin of arrest Stojan ratification. before with theICTY full insisted on the cooperation member states other some with along especially, Netherlands The members. by all SAAwasratified the applymembership for before encouragenot Serbia to relations with EU.TheEUdid the furtherinstitutional towards progress ICTYcooperation tothe beforerelated any fulfillobligations all had to Serbia that pressure increased EU EU.The the towards path reforms partiesare abletoimplementthe on andcontinue that Serbia should choose that was international other organizations from USand EU,the pressure The the government. in formed was thedebate newly the first (SAA) that and Agreement Association of the independence andof Nova Serbia (NS) moved to the opposition, as well Kosovo.as Serbian Radical Party- SRS. ICTY.Thethe former governing parties Kostunica's Democratic Party Serbia of The(DSS) parliament and co-operation is pro with inline LDPissues which pro-EU with program, were that had to againstthey fought duringthegovernment LDP decidedtosupport 1990s.Yet, on the ratify thewant withshare because governmentnot party the to power hedid toenter not decided Stabilization and Two most important events related to the ICTY cooperation were two arrests. The EUandissue the with cooperation issues were main the elections, As before the 160 CEU eTD Collection Tanjug, 7July 2008 301 Tanjug, 12May 2008 300 for and27against. supportingminority was an notgovernment option for them. NS. SPS's position was that it would either join the government or stay in the opposition,government with hadformDS. SRS enough seats to a government with SPS and DSS- with SPS butLDP wantjoindidnot also towantdid such government, DSS not toform one of the parties to form a government on its own. DS had choice to form a government and% of 7,6 votes 20seats; LDP andvotes of 13seats. 5,24% 11,59% whilewon DSS-NS voted ofvoters,SPS-PUPS-JS coalition which was30seats, while or 102seats, votes in or 78seats votes won29,36%of for SRS parliament; the G17plus,minorities: representing SDP SPO,parties andSDA of won 38.44% Sandzak) Serbia(DS, for European List the Committee, Election Republican the to According making the country prepared to be a fullfledged memeber of hebememeber EU,andtheendof to a fullfledgedthe of makingprepared country the by status year andimplementation reforms, the of the endof achieving candidate the first tasks of the new government would be the ratification of the SAA in the parliament, the agenda of the new government.responsibility,fightandcrimeagainst membership corruption. and EU of wasonthetop Prime minister statedthe two main issues for the new government,in alonghis with stronger economy,speech social that onefrom DS, focusedof on the EU futurethe and unacceptance of the independence of Kosovo as Cvetkovic Mirko elect, Thespeech minister prime the inthe parliament. deicisions of government have there always been in forproblems major securingenoughvotes http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=7&mm=7&yyyy=2008 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=12&mm=5&yyyy=2008 New government was approved by 127votes July 2008 was New governmenton parliamentthe 7 with approved 301 This is a very narrow margin and since the creation of the new the of creation the since and margin narrow very is a This 161 300 allowThis didnot any CEU eTD Collection 15 May 2008, FoNet 302 taking instructions from the president who is on trial before the ICTY. detail below,look didfavorable not ona that wouldcoalition includethe SRS which was elections. from Many actors internatianl the community, be which will explained inmore it from depended approval earlierthe the on andthat Tribunal, tothe wasnotrelated thus ICTY.on trial at the been scheduled had visitthat aregular saiditleadership was SRS visiting of party the because Hague the president Vojislavwere inthe they is Seselj, who government the of formation on negotiations the during present not were Todorovic justice. social development, European integrations but Kosovo within with on SPSinsisted Serbia and agreed. These included:Kosovo within fight againstSerbia, corruption, economic negotiations among and SPS,SRS five DSS principles for potential cooperation were initial the In parties. the of principles main and aims the showed which parties, for all.acceptable solution Albanians Kosovo attemptthe reach an would anewdialogue with initiate to to it would use all diplomatic and legal measures in order to solve the status of Kosovo and Kosovo andthat Serbia of thatwould never recognize independence agreed government coalition the of members All equally. treated were crimes all that insist would fulfilllaw international respecting of policy continue all and partners other and US the Russia, internationalgovernment's Heunderscored that mandate. the country would strengthen with ties obligation. Regarding the ICTY, he said that the government http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=15&mm=5&yyyy=2008 The deputy president of of The deputy SRS president TomislavDragan andthe vice Nikolic president various between wasgoing dialogue government the on decision Prior tothe 302 162 CEU eTD Collection that it would ask the EU to insert between ground twothe positions. one amendmentfind middle a from to SRS tried elections Nikolic after the but this, of side DSS on with one sentencemade these thattwo issues Kosovo was the issueintertwined of SAA and how it related to the issue of the independence isof Kosovo. DSS while the duringdiscussions onmaking the negotiations new coalitions new for the government EU side kept it separate. SRS was on the Russia. On the other hand, DS expected SPS to fully cooperate with the ICTY. from son and wife Milosevic's of for extradition withdraw request to Serbia wanted SPS reconciliation. historic of process the starting hand living, other of increase andon the standard the of accelerated for conditions creating capacities for the defense of Kosovo. Additional dimension of their cooperation was itswhich would enlarge developmenthad were for asociety balancedeconomic SPS that society with social justice and equal chances for each citizen. Tadic also said that DS International,both parties for social and worked reforms would prosperity which leadto of preconditionsgood for partnershipthis becauseboth parties shared ideology of Socialist apartnership. Tadic of Accordingcreating on possibilities the butpositions to were there shared the same ideology. He specified thatit was not negotiations on government parties two party, the Democratic with because SPS Tadic, Boris negotiated they said At the same time SPS was negotiating with DS also. President of Serbia and of Nikolic said that a new government would negotiate about SAA with the EU and EU the SAA with about negotiate would government a new that said Nikolic of point main the again was and elections the to led that contention of bone The Reportedly, from Milosevic'sDS rehabilitation family. asked SPS and Dacic of 163 CEU eTD Collection 306 305 2June 2008, Tanjug http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=02&nav_id=301548&order=priority 304 303 Serbia.within did not support extraditions to that Tribunal, while 42% did; 43% believedRatko extraditions 43% Tribunal, that support 42%did; while didnot tothat ICTY. the with cooperation 70% ofsupported showed that surveyed ICTY, the with cooperation the for council National the for Marketing Strategic by done Survey was to itstrue original onallissuespositions including theICTY, Kosovo and others. some of the SPS supporters he was trying showto how SPS didnot change its policy and would continue as long as the aims of both parties were the same. through. He claimed there was no compromisecitizens on what SPS stood for and that andcoalitioninterests. that commonSPS didandhave not that its but personal narrow real only convictions protected policiesoutgoing were prime identifiedminister and DSS president withsaid it wanted. iswhatDSS of Serbia, which interest was DSgood SPSwhich national showedprotect could modification its how show itsto trying document the wouldreal of analysis face, be carrieddetermined wasmuch However, more DSS modification. but only partial cancellation, complete in its positionsand that that it thewas SAAenough was notfor legalythe Socialists, valid. DSS andstarted he said a legalthat DSS was not asking for http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=25&nav_id=310152&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=05&dd=29&nav_id=301038&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index/php?order=priority&dd=26&mm=6&yyy=2008 25 July 2008, B92 26 June 2006, Beta FoNet, 29 May 2008 Although SPS leaderAlthough knewhisjoinSPS move to with government DS would distance Kostunica DS, with coalition into wouldSPS enter that clear became Once it 305 Dacic defendedSPSby saying thatthe coalition is in interestthe of Serbia 303 Hesaid was they had that what suggestedduring the election campaign 164 304 306 Still, 54% CEU eTD Collection of Kosovo they had proposed should have been on the agenda and not the one prepared one the not and agenda the on been have should proposed had they Kosovo of SAA, but DSS MPs shifted the discussion to another issue, as they believed the resolution inparliament middlethe of haveJul 2008wassupposed to discussedthe ratification of agenda. the on documents other and laws the on discussion than the rather voters, the with scoringpoints towards directed were speeches the television, national on live broadcasted were sessions parliamentary the As level. local a at power political of division the to related issues or disagreements political daily discuss the parties used their discussionstart had problems time, the from (SPS), notconductingDjukic-Dejanovic Slavica toparliament the of dealpresident new The times. thewith sessions the points of the parliament.on the agenda,at wasdifficult institutions thefunctioning main the political of Kosovo, EUandthe The main but reasonto of issues the on wasgovernment new the and thatformer the of view of points different the Given 5.3 Institutional veto points ICTY. with the on more factors influential cooperation were points veto partisan could have claimed for certain what the reactions of the public would be. Institutional and action was not a major threat to government decision to cooperate. Nevertheless, nobody public publicor that opinion again once demonstrated arrest, againstthe protests for the smallturnout relatively Karadzic, arrest of After the in Hague. The Karadzic and Mladic very largely not publicfavorable ICTYwasnot tothe seeing opinion, though against againstworked Serbsbelieved the 82%saw 86%and as apolitical Thus,the it court. biased and ICTYwas whilehim asacriminal.the ahero, 17%saw Karadzic That was Mladic Karadzicand Radovan mustbe inThe Hague.One third surveyedthe thought of Often the work of the parliament was interrupted. The first session of the new the of session first The interrupted. was parliament the of work the Often 165 CEU eTD Collection 308 307 DSS. MPsof tothe apologized parliament by The government. the regular continued president session the of only after was the ratification or to create confusion among those who confusion tocreate ratification issue. or werestill those among undecidedon the attempt to use institutional obstacles by some political actors in order to prolong the already agreed on the text and the legality of the SAA was notin question. This was clear impossible require agreementmembers be nextto which countries all as all would EU would it text the change to order In text. the on agreement mutual and negotiations by was drafted Agreement members both EU longpartieswhich andSerbia signed after the of text the addition, In jurisdiction. no had court the and Parliament in the ratified not contract international is an the SAA because initiative the rejected court community. The bodies of International bythe is becauseitKosovo, administered to be applied not will agreement the that reads inquestion article The in act case. this to Court for the preconditions noprocedural because therewere rejected initiative the Serbia. The Court for deciding whether article 135of SAA the in was with accord Constitutionthe of initiative tothe Constitutional development of Serbia the submitted of court democracy initiative Serbia. of part was Kosovo if as system legal internal to do legalityin rejectSAAnot ifit radicals saidthat the Vucic wouldAleksandar the were regarded analysis of the SAA. the agenda. on points the discuss and to not Parliament the Along similar of in work the incorrect what was talk about to MPscontinued asthe smoothly continue lines, the Fund for the Ibid. FoNet,17 July 2008 Once the discussion returned to the ratification of SAA, SRS Secretary-general ofSAA, ratification the to returned discussion Once the http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=17&mm=7&yyyy=2008 166 307 Still, the work of the parliament did not 308 At the same time, DSS had an CEU eTD Collection custody and the court intois taken indictee After the and anindictee. locate arrest to services andsecret Interior confirms that all legal whicha relevantMinistry court indictment, whichis instructions sentto of to gives then preconditions for the receives Justice of Ministry law, the the to According Tribunal. the with cooperation extraditionthe for obstacles institutional no arewere there in principle met, Djindjic, Zoran of government the in the with Since ICTY 2002,duringcooperation lawon the theadoption of the 5.4 Partisan veto players cooperation. section on will issue,andhowthe thisinfluenced party explain what positions were next The joined government. the SPS because came arrest the that and with arrest the involvement any had Ministry the that he denied time, the at Interior of Minister already leader was Even IvicaDacic arrest. SPS the though about anything denied they knew the parliament.closed down parliamentthe for aweekin topreventany order on issuethe discussion in The thus SPS and arrest the about known have andto parliament the of president the the and coalition President of The accused the governing opposition wasarrested. camea day beforejust Karadzic the parliament week one for parliament the of session the of interruption The obstruction. of parliament who was from the hadstilllocal SRSstillwhere notbeen presidentof governments accused the created, the SPS municipalities local of parliaments the from minutes the read to sessions parliamentary MPs used (SRS) Party's Radical Serbian Although later. week one parliament the president of the party decided to stop the session and continue the work of the As the debate in the parliament continued on the issues not related to the agenda, tothe related issues not the on continued in parliament the debate As the 167 CEU eTD Collection government, state apparatus, secret services all made significant success incooperation services secretallmadesignificant apparatus, state government, ICTY with one personnelchange within administration. Ljajicunderlinedprevious that achieving stability. political Hesaiditbe cooperation toequate would wrong with the was important more as identified Ljajic What ICTY. the with cooperation for crucial not the national council for cooperationof Ljajic president the Rasim by ICTY, indicted fugitivesthe three last the andcapturing with the ICTY said that the role of Vukadinovic is believed to be very close ally of previous Prime Minister Kostunica (DSS). Bulatovic submitted his resignation as soon as the new government took over. He was 309 suggested Vukadinovic for the job. himself Tadic president media reports, some to According service. i.e. secret Agency, and Information ofSecurity director new as the Vukadinovic Sasa unanimous decision Asoperation.newas power in soon government the to July came it by 2008, appointed or to professionals, partyimpartial to give were personnelICTY the with cooperation for relevant thatpositions followed the positionassessis not.That would is to the whether beor whyitimportant out procedures carried of the party regardlessissues of theof lawthe on co-ICTY were alwaysJustice. detrimentalof minister by the issigned which extradition on adecision issues of Justice asministry to whether the institutional and legal http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=17&nav_id=308996&order=priority Although it was expected that the biggest task of was locating that the biggestAlthough it newdirectorthe task was expected 17 July 2008, B92 the on positions partisan the that speculations always were there Nevertheless, 309 The former director of the Secret Service Rade of Secret the former director The 168 CEU eTD Collection 21 July 2008, FoNet, Beta 313 20 July 2008, Beta Tanjug 312 311 310 Under humanity. against crime and genocide for them indicting also was and Srebrenica crimehumanity. against confirmedAnother16 Novemberon one, referring to 1996was indictmentwas Mladic andagainst himandgeneral genocide them of wasaccusing and on cooperation with the ICTY. taken to the War crimes department of the County court in Belgrade, inline with the Law Hewas andlocated arrested. Karadzic was services Radovan of secret actions Serbian indictees. point 43 mentioned Serbia extradited He alsouptothat that searach. continuing the they that were but were, fugitives three last know wherethe not did they said Ljajic would have already beenby decided poplethe who put Vukadinovic to this position. steps these that but go, would Service the in which direction the of reflection the show Service for ten months of the director inwas the who Petrovic Goran theService. of reform be the also should 2001 said that the first steps from party,the i.e.another through that for or challenge nepotism, Vukadinovic DSS and that a new director thetakes period would when Bulatovic was director of Hague. The the to sent indictees were twenty-one Service new personnelwith werethe ICTY.brought He remindedin that during the period when Rade Bulatovic was director http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=20&nav_id=309335&order=priority Ibid. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=18&nav_id=309067&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=7&yyyy=2008 18 July 2008, Blic daily news paper The first indictmenthimagainst confirmed 24th was on July 1995. The first On 20 July 2008, President of the National council for cooperation with the ICTY, that suggest services of police andsecret whofollow work the Security analysts 312 The following day the National council gave a statement that after the that a statement gave council National day the following The 313 169 310 311 CEU eTD Collection respected. respecting duties towards the ICTY, at the same time domestic and international law were lawandthat for international respect isof principle the government the of creation the fairly indicted all beforepersons it. Cvetkovic onethat of said basicthe principles during fugitivesinvitedsurrender. thetwo last to Heexpected thetribunal try andwill equally 315 314 had would review government, underwhich Karadzic the askfor the of circumstances the joining with KaradzicSPS wasconnected arrestof the notion that because of wrong this precisely SPS, that Dacic explained newgovernment. SPS entered factthat with the do had governmentnothing to and was a heritage arrest from the previous the said that law. international of basis the on integrity territorial and sovereignity life of defense andmore efficient for better basis in ensure and region the reconciliation for international respect law respectwould isuniversal whose principle enable the that said He Serbia. for and them for better be should which voluntarily, surrender ICTY ofnewgovernment. and the actions the of war.laws andcustoms humanity, crimein against genocde, the breaching participation genocide, Karadzic of accuses indictment new The Mladic. and Karadzic against indictment joint was that which until secret remained 2002, and one October this was from divided earlierthe one 2002the On October madeICTY indictment14th made the on 31stMay2000 public international he pressure withdrewlife from in1996 public and since inthen was hiding. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=309595&order=priority Ibid. 22 July 2008, FoNet,Beta, Tanjug minister, president, aswell andviceprime SPS Interior as of Minister the Dacic, In their statements about the arrest the parties expressed their position on the 315 He said that Serbia made an enormous step and he invited other indictees to 170 314 Prime minister of Serbia Cvetkovic, of minister Serbia Prime CEU eTD Collection 317 316 Healso Kosovo. of independence legalise to new pressure putting USwere andthe EU the when in atime integration in European a progress as shown being was Karadzic criticized theICTY for not treating all equally crimes justly.and interes. He congratulated all who participated in this important state issue but also in national and interest in their asitsurrender was to indictees of invitedthe rest the also and with that country the arreststepped upon this ladderthe Europeanintegration. to He legalresponsibilities international domesticand respect to chose new the government that when it comes to the defending our sovereignity of Kosovo.“ and ICTY the with cooperation our to comes it when and law international of rule the and stability. regional for the peace Weplayer and to regional of EU, the dedicated are truly ityesterday. our future weshowed withincomes EUand to the Webe amemberto want agenda.We very has European ambitious it of government when Serbia serious very are beginning of the session directions. both in go to had ICTY the with cooperation the that repeated he and of the Councilinparticipating findingitthe of Karadzic, andarresting was but by done secret service, of Ministerssaid. He alsoof atwork this position, butitis heritage from previousgovernmentthe the of Serbia.“ pointed EU and saidoutservice butI do notbelive arrestofKaradzic thatthe isaconsequence his fourof day that„the notnew of secret new director the of significance diminish the want to not „I do been arrested. a single member of the ministry of interior was Ibid. Ibid. Kostunica president of DSS and former prime minister, said that the arrest of showed Karadzic of arrest the said (DS) Sutanovac Dragan of defense Minister the before media the addressed (DS) Jeremic affairs, foreign of Minister 171 317 316 Dacic CEU eTD Collection criteira for all indictees before the ICTY and also said it would insist on reconsidering the same the having on insisted also DS Kosovo. of integrity territorial in defending also in not berelation law ICTY only international the respected to would butcooperation territory formerof Yugoslaviabehad to determined. againunderlined DSonce that the on crime committed who individuals of responsibility the that fact the and Serbia of law, international laws of respect to the new government the of commitment of the result Kosovo. of independence the accepting be and third,as hesaidwouldof the arrestKaradzic andfavor wasthe second the of from EU were which independencethey withdrawn they after recognized Kosovo of countries the to ambassadors the was returning favour first socialist'. the the As hesaid, was whoto those hadreturningform the favor helpedhim 'unnatural to with government he arrest with this that and his dictatorship' 'strengthen Tadic because to extinction started Serbia way the wason to and for Serbia that was horrible news arrest the said that SRS from also Vucic Aleksandar regime. his overthrow to fight political of means all use Tadic Heaccusedpresident SRS would Serbs. andand that myth the among a treason of legend became a hea warcriminal andthathe rightfully but wasnot that was arrested crimes. which longerhad couldjustly of accused asa any anylegitimacy try those war court judgements toHaradinaj and Oric, Serbia had to reopen the question of whether the ICTY 318 ICTY. from the were released Ramus Haradinaj Oricwhen Nasermoment and in camea this arrest outthat pointed Naser Oric is Croatian indictee who was released and Haradinaj is Kosovo Albanian Kosovo is Haradinaj and released was who indictee Croatian is Oric Naser DS issued a statement which said that finding and arresting of Karadzic Karadzic was a of andfinding arresting which said that astatement DS issued Kardzic when Serbia of history in day a difficult was it said SRS from Nikolic 318 DSS twice warned that because of the realeasing 172 CEU eTD Collection what would the EU bring Serbia, and asked for the referendum joining the EU. the on for bringwhatwould Serbia, andasked EU the EU. Though, the heasked to closer itbringwould Serbia that but arrest surprised bythe of Karadzic. arrest the Ministry Interior,of headed involved wasnot byIvica for and (SPS) Dacic insearching extraditions, was bewantto a subject of political because manipulation thefull supportedincludingcooperation, by all not SPSdidmade Kardzic public. arrestof were parties the information about all that relevant of the former andhad ask would Karadzic beenarrested underwhich circumstances would reconsider government. SPS2000 changed legaland constitutional allowedprovisions extraditions. SPSsaid they claimed that after fact that lawandthe international under responsibility was this cooopeartion that statement that the party indictees. SPSsaid inthe extradition ofarrested boiledonly directionsto down not and was against the extraditions of Serbian citizens Milosevic. of regime 'terror' the of period the from criminals despite the fact arrest many, it alsomentioned to way was important EU. SPO the to that unpunished still the on obstacles removed Serbian arrest by this that and nation whole the from removed be could guiltindictees collective by arresting thatonly SPO alsorepeated future. muchforward fasterandit was states forall intime turnand thetoEurope region to the collective guiltwouldbe overonly crimesindividualised. wereonce Serbia had togo of time The obligation. international fulfilled and laws implemented that a country Oricand Haradinaj. against in processes of court the the decisions NS leader Ilic, who was in the coalition with DSS for the elections, said he was SPS said that the ICTY cooperation had tobe mutual, i.e. that it shouldin go both it saidwas that in coalition G17plus, proved another Serbia party the government 173 CEU eTD Collection pointed out that there were many people within the service who could havecouldconcealed servicemany who the within were there outthat people pointed http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=309596&order=priority 319 minister. prime Serviceandthe the chief of the between was only information flow of the that and information of he hadmonopoly service secret the came to Bulatovic once believes that Stojadinovic Military Ljubodrag analyst Security council. theNational heading was of Serbia president that fact as the as well service, secret hide. to indictees other wayenabled intheKostunica same and Bulatovic was surethat inacation. DHSS hide by andindictees or whohelped to action others their two againstthese procedeengs urgently earlier. crimianl invitedbeen to DHSS prosecutor start arrested the Therefore, not had Karadzic that responsible solely Bulatovic were director services secret former and he thatKostunica have claimed been arresed. not Therefore, otherwise hewould Karadzic, about long time for a information had operational service secret said that Serbia. fulfilledSerbian for andhe government whynothingall wasdone asked requirements Serbia. of rebellion of way symbolic last the Mladic and Karadzic of hiding considered a whole nationfair. not which was Heclaimed released, were andall court others the at weretried Serbs was punishedheHaradinaj andOric, only saidthat Hague.Referring to tothe andextradited transfered beand would Serbian all whatwas that Karadzic proved of arrest the that hesaid Also, also a partAccording to him ofdecision itson joining the EUterritory was not a job for one person or one party. was taken away. He 22 July 2008, FoNet,Beta, Tanjug of top was achange on for arrest the factor key the agreethat analysts Many inDjindjic's government, justice leader of was minister DHSS Batic, who Vladan 174 319 He also CEU eTD Collection that was how he was located. was howhe that suspected of who were beingin helpershadKaradzic's a network of beenfollowed and before the arrest though the preparations lasted longer. lasted preparations the though Ljaji before arrest the information from services. from foreign secret information received of basis the media, on bysome asitwas reported not, and associates Karadzic's following of madeas aconsequence was arrest successful the that againconfirmed once fugitives. two They for other the in investigations the couldbe used decadeandthat last information because they were still working on the reconstruction of his movementin the avoidto any duringcasualties thearrest.They said they nothavecould givenmore 320 very limited way. is whyitwouldbe not clear whatreally happened and the public had informedbeen ina wanted to distance themselves from the arrest while others wanted to score points, which of the arrest, and the arrest itself had to be done by MUP. It is clear that some politicians servicebeen involved just did becausesecret have not and securing scene the jurisdiction their control. service under secret surely were putting individual officials. StojadinovicFor thiswas a proof thethat authorities slowly but afraidhenot was and of protect threats stateand to the wassimply determined not andthatthisservicein meant wereaccord secret heading of person professionalism the the and will political that maintained He chief. the from information important http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=22&mm=7&yyyy=2008 Ljajic said that this showed how they were not choosing time or place for the 22 July 2009, FoNet,Beta Vuk Others believed that it was not possible that MUP-Ministry of Interior had not þ evi ü and Ljaji and ü said that the actions leading to the arrest started the day the started arrest tothe actionsleading the said that 320 Action team was waiting for Karadzic to tansfer in order tansfer to for Karadzic waswaiting team Action 175 ü said that a group of of people a group saidthat CEU eTD Collection 322 321 for government new criticized They led. was country the way the with dissatisfied were join because andorganizebig DSSdecidedto on29July they a demonstration 2009.NS investigation on whohelped Karadzic personal get ID. of the results about the fugitive. nopublicstatements help now there were to Until a questionsthe of service, secret the and MUP and the position abuse of within authorities heyearsThisID and to wascaptured. before inBelgradefor live wasvery closely related Karadzic. extradited that Tadicand infor president participatinggovernment the SPS criticize and public to order. andthreats scale demonstrations large any or disturbances, major no were there injuries, serious them causing journalists, there. wasalways Karadzic They by were usually supported of SRS MPsandthebrother Radovan Karadzic, Luka Belgrade. of walk central streets on andthentakea the speeches give of center Belgrade, wingby would organisations. right abouthundredprotesters Every gatherinthe day locatingledKaradzic. to and arresting ininvestigations newinformation the but Karadzic, arrest the of expected noone almost arrest Mladic that and to pressure international therewas He said indictees. of arrest http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=23&nav_id=309878&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=24&mm=7&yyyy=2008 24 July 2008, FoNet Beta 23 July 2008, FoNet,Beta andProtests walks aroundBelgrade continued every day and SRSwasplanning to Still, was this overshadowed by questionsthe howKaradzic managedgetfalse to organized againstthearrest Karadzic wereprotests of there arrest Following the 321 Except for several brutal attacks by protesters on 176 322 SRS used these protest to attack DS toattack SRS protest usedthese CEU eTD Collection 325 324 323 Service. the only one who havebeen seemed to who nephew fact Karadzic's that the some criticized Karadzic, and communicated with him from citizens. the family, was indonot stability security country for the any arrestpresentthe political and of danger not followed in involved. Belgrade about not saidthatprotests the Healso service andthatMUPwas by the leadingWesternnot butpro politics. Serbian whois president of the Parliament committee for the defense and security said that all in country.the circumstances general social due to such arrest do it to was impossible that arrested, not was because Mladic stopped EUwere the with negotiations the said,once service director secret former Bulatovic i.e.of someone helpers, Karadzic's that deliberately thisallowed tohappen.Rade voluntarily. surrender should indictees that partners coalition somethe of of a wish was there that also and ICTY the with cooperation the about government new inthe unity a was there expecting the positive report from the ICTY prosecutor Serge Brammertz. Cvetkovic said was who Cvetkovic Prime of wereseenin Minister address ICTY issuethe the on of the and from ininterests of Serbia. are arenot abroad the instructed that making steps was http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=27&nav_id=310402&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=26&nav_id=310266&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=25&nav_id=310084&order=priority 27 July 2008, B92 26 July 2008, Beta 25 July 2009, B92 Discussing the reasons for low efficiency of the secret services in locating Mladic Questioning the wayin Karadzic which was Draganarrested, Todorovic (SRS), andthenew government one, between The Kostunica's previous the differences 325 This could have alsobeen used to cover others who were part of the network 324 He also confirmed that the arrest of Karadzic was done by secret the wasdone Karadzic of arrest the that Healsoconfirmed 177 323 DSS spokesperson DSSspokesperson said thegovernment CEU eTD Collection 29 July 2009, B92, Tanjug 327 28 July 2008, B92, FoNet, Beta Tanjug 326 before ajudge. allowedheinform wasnot to andanyone the arrest, about brought 48hhe for wasnot of informed reasons the arrest, the not about Karadzic was because werebreached Serbia circumstances of the arrest showed that during the arrest the Constitution and laws of something most of partiesthe could agreeon.However,leaderis SRS who on in trial the SAA contains of implementation the for law the that parliament in the suggested Nikolic ratified. be a provision theSAA for in order to important was in parliament andhis the role process integration that clearly states pointthe was not tooverthrow(destroy) butBoris Belgrade Tadic, presidentSerbia. of Kosovo telling calm demonstrators them them.down tried the to president Nikolic SRSdeputy was part threw at hoolingas that teargas rocksand the to as a response bullets of rubber police used Serbia. fire trafficbroke shopwindows,rubbish containerssigns. pushedandseton The This was was hooligansunder control mostly supportersoffootballthough clubs broke police. There were46injured,25policemen 21 civilians. and clashed in bigAfter the byand organised protesters protests with the Belgrade NS, SRS breached. wasnot Serbia system of legal concluded that committee the Therefore, laws. with the in acord was done arrest the that day.next concluded committee The be the organised were to that SRS of protests the prepare to committe the of session the accused of committee misusing andthe facts Todorovicfor as his opinions presenting of members Other involved. were service military secret neither MUP that nor account into http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=28&nav_id=310505&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=7&yyyy=2008 Despite the rhetoric against Tadic, Nikolic and SRS showed support for the EU 326 Todorovic by'a taken Karadzicthird wasarrested party', that suspects 178 327 MUP said the situation the said MUP CEU eTD Collection previous SPSregime. Opposition members whose parties leaders or during Milosevic's of convictions and actions from itself the distance not leadership did SPS because current but aims its of because not Declaration, such criticized many Nevertheless, citizens. andits goal was tofocus common on –EUgoals life and membership better for the Tadicaccorting to The Declaration in marked of past politics ofthe end confrontation the was maintain enable betterpurpose for futureto Serbiancitizens. politicalstability and to sign itsmain because for anyparty was open to reconciliation political on Declaration Declaration on reconciliation in 2008. Declaration on reconciliation October of mostthe powerful partiesopposition since democratic elections in 2000, SRS. some unusal coalitions new for the governmentand finally led to divisionthe within one created then itled the newelections, to First in 2008. late Serbia landscapeof political against.DSS andvoted Thedebate onratification NS SAA of detrimental inproved the parties, SPS and their coalitions partners, plus LDP voted for the ratification. 28 MPs of Blic,daily newspaper 19October2008 329 Kurir daily newspaper, 10 Sep 2008 328 abstained from voting. number of leadershipSRS joined Nikolic. which progressivemembers initially (SNP) Party had morethan 10,000 anda certain heon 12 September from hewasInOctober formed anew SRS. Serbian expelled party resigned from SRS on 6 September 2008.Hestarted uphis ownparliamentary and group ICTY support vote thedecision notdid for ratification the of SRS to of SAA and Nikolic http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=61402 http://www.kurir-info.rs/clanak/politika/kurir-10-09-2008/ratifikovan-ssp-i-gasni-sporazum Following this collaboration on ratification of SAA, DS and SPS signed a signed SPS and DS SAA, of ratification on collaboration this Following The parliamentratified SAA on 9 September and 2008 SRSandnew SNP MPs 328 All members of governing coalition DS, G17plus, SPO minority 179 329 Boris Tadic president of DS said DS of president Tadic Boris CEU eTD Collection EU integration processes in order for Serbia to get candidate status by the end of the year. balanced two principles –continuation of the protection Kosovoof and acceleration of the 330 organisation. international any of member a become not did Kosovo also and higher, be would number the that expected was it though even Kosovo recognized because only43states action was the working Itwassaid plan vote. that unanimous by reached was decision The plan. Action the of revision partial a was This Kosovo. of independence recognised the states after those actof as protest an they were withdrawn from memberstates which EU tothe return its by ambassadors to Serbia started deciding steps by both sides, Serbia As as soon new the was government confirmed, theKaradzic arrestof and followed the and the 5.5 External pressures and incentives EU, were made to show improvement roadtomembership.the of relations. on EU the from incentives and pessures i.e. conditionality, political EU the against bend ICTY. could partisan convictions see how and if thesestrong interestingis to The most behaviour when holdingbombing, for which they blamed Milosevic, werean also against the Declaration. mportantdidpreseidentmention not this. familyAlso, members killed of those during NATO the positionthere that relevantsuch weredissatisfied prison evenassasinated or put to attacked, regimeSPS weredirectly victims for cooperation of political with the regimes were not mentioned and that current SPS http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=24&nav_id=309912&order=priority This decision came after a series of positive statements by the EU and other 24 July 2009, B92, FoNet partisanIn short, positions and goals of partiesthe influence party members 180 330 This decision This CEU eTD Collection coalition with pro European parties could contribute to the European future the of tothe European European couldcontribute parties coalition pro with 12 May 2008, FoNet 332 12 May 2008, B92, Beta 331 in Serbia. precondition that EU members ratify SAA. fullcoopearationonly with theICTY Kacin. againthat according was Hereminded to andinfuture status candidate membership tothe such waycan EU Serbia getcloser the relations towards Serbia. Priorites should be cooperation with the ICTY, because only in infuther by leaders should beEU fact to respected that important very which wasa Serbiancitizens majority of orientation of proEU showed elections the of result the that to advancequickly. signing Stabilisationand the Association position in Agreement, agood the country was advencement of Serbia towards EU, which would help her on that way. He said that after for the criteria the meeting reforms and the to beit would dedicated that and shortly be formed of Serbia would his hope newgovernment thatthe Javier Solana expressed for CFSP, EUhigh values. which elections share European representative parties atthe thereformist Hewelcomed successof including the candidatestatus. Serbia giving EU, the into of Serbia road the accelerates to of thereadiness EU repeated He Balkans. reforms on the way Europe,to and that Serbia could become the drivingforce of Western his belief wouldrepresenativethe new Olli Rehn expressed the government that continue in international newto the governmentSerbia. organisations thatgavesupport http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=05&dd=15&nav_id=298757&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=05&dd=12&nav_id=298256&order=priority US amabassador to Serbia, Cameron Munter, also expected pro-EU government MEP in parliament, for saidinLjubljana the SerbiaEU Jelko KacinaRapporteur 332 American ambassador in Belgrade, Cameron Munter stated that SPS in that stated Munter Cameron in Belgrade, ambassador American 181 331 EU CEU eTD Collection 12 June2008, FoNet, Beta 334 9June 2008, B92 333 trasforming more into nationalist party. it was interesting which were for the regionthat to be stable, prosperous and within the EU. He commented SPSthat was changingto the EU. He also underlined that Russia and the Westand had the same goals in the Balkans, becoming morewouldSerbia electionsleadbe government andthatwould getthe that would her another modern while DSSwhat persuadeanyoneintodollars should to bedone. was influential peopleSerbia but of hethat pressuring was not anyone or offeringmillions of tycoons. Serbian butalsogovernment said majority influenced thatinwasalso the by the parliament time and with strengthening of business and cultural ties they could be better and better. with that belief expressed and healthy' 'essentially were Serbia and US between relations future. the said American ambassador and European economy with strong accord such in governmentplay rolevery important solving social problems pensions, and could whichwasin SPS well. as Socialists with integrations Euroatlantic of continuation beand elections to could results, contribute prefered according prosperous to for Europeand future of citizens Serbia clearly country. European the opted the that stated in He theelections. wanted they peopleshowed with whatthe in accord country,benot surprising would becauseit whilepossibility be would SPS-SRS-DSS of http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=12&nav_id=303342&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=05&nav_id=302128&order=priority Spokesperson of DSS accused US ambassador that he was creating the new which ifcitizens itproEuropean, was new government, Serbian He said that 333 British ambassador, Wordsworth saidhe many wasmeeting 182 334 He believed the worst outcome worst the believed He CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=16&nav_id=303886&order=priority 336 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=05&nav_id=302128&order=priority 335 be questioned. was legallyinvalidthus firm EU the took document, thestance that Agreementcouldnot the region to fulfill the necessary conditions. commitedthe to European future of the Western Balkans and encouraged the countries of membership. all after membersEU ratify itstart Agreement the negotiationswould be to possible for basisthe havewhich of wouldmember ratified the EU Only states signedagreement. the before signed itmoreWhat in crucialisthecooperation2009. was waswith the ICTY on valid and the that government Kostunica of in pre-signedtheAgreement November 2007 legally was completely Hesaid Kosovo. agreement the of and question the agreement that of signing between connection any see not he did So discussion. long a during and representatives government Serbian of involvement the with was prepared document Austria and Slovakia asked that EU confirms to the countrieswith the ICTY, of implementthe SAA Westernand work on meeting the criterif forbalkan visa liberalisation. that and wasformed wouldbe once anew if governemnt cooperate discussed government this could status Olli candidate said necessary the Rehn that reforms. which would accelerate program be European in with aclear to newBelgrade government expectedthe leaders includedbe bemilder. to this not askedfor the wording or Netherlands to Also, EU the However, status. The candidate EU including receiving its accession to accelerate When DSS tried tochallenge SAA on the basis that it didnotinclude Kosovo and EU: rasprava o zapadnom balkanu, 16 June 2008, B92, Beta, Tanjug EU: SSP pravno validan, 5 June 2008, FoNet, Beta Tanjug In June the EUremains Councilofministers repeatedthat 2008,EU strongly 335 EUCommission representative inBelgradeJosep Loverassaid that the 183 336 The ministers suggested that Serbia that could suggested Theministers CEU eTD Collection Affairs, Jeremic in Brusells. in Jeremic Affairs, Foreign of heMinister met force after SAA to that comes immediately Rehn suggested Serbia. Netherlandsset couldnewnot conditions,keep butwouldhave promisethe to given to cooperation with Tribunal.the HesaidifSerbiafulfilled given then conditions The complete but needed was Mladicthat of arrest only the was not It as well. necessary 22 July 2009, B92, Beta 338 June 2008, Beta 83 337 Tribunal. for the necessary statements the to be arrested and that the witnesses had to be protected in order to be able to freely give agreement. Lisbon accepting maintainedpresident thatitwould be difficult imagineto further enlargements without connected. were not However,of andparliament EU enlargement process process the Rehn andRupel, Lisbon saidthe Both of ministers this.confirmed EUcountries the rejection Lisbon of the Agreement. Commissioner Rehnsaidin Luxembourg thatthe their accession would not be disturbed due to the internal EU problems about the Irish new events Serbia should get some incentives. In its conclusions, the council of Ministers in Mladic. light arrest Buthe the of Ratko suggested that of the especially fugitives, all nationalist past. But he also saidit wanted In his showed to close Serbia this opinion, andforget about chapter the that the condition for the force. to between come should and EU Serbia agreement temporary Karadzic applicationof arrest the of SAA was still http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=309661&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=22&nav_category=64&nav_id=3049 After the arrest of Karadzic in July 2008, diplomatic rhetoric was stepped up. Olli Dutch minister of foreign affairs Verhagen said that the indictees still at large had at indictees still the said that Verhagen foreign affairs of minister Dutch 338 According to him, the EU Commission believed that after 337 184 Access documentsthe andarchiveswas to CEU eTD Collection 22 July 2008, FoNet 339 ICTY.the towards responsibility fulfill to government Serbian of determination significant showed operation this that ability of the new Serbian government tocooperate with the ICTY. President of the OSCE follow. SerbsRatkoMladic leader hadmilitary Bosnian of former to welcomedAlexander Stub, the arrest andaccount very practicallysaid and very quickly.the But he actadded that after was this, extradition a of postivetheStrasbourg messageloud and this clear, itinto andthathewas would take sure Brussels sign of the further. institutions even in Serbia connect with Hesaidthatthey European received Belgrade to determination of the about aclearsignal thissaid that was de Pucalso 60 years wascaught. last in the in Europe violations rights human worst the of some for responsible man the improvementsignificantly contributed tothe as image of theSerbshaveinEurope, the arrest the that said Davis arrest. Karadzic's Radovan Terrywelcomed also Davis in former Yugoslavia. conflict law the during of Europe Council of general Secretary the direction of punishing those accused of serious breaches of international humanitarina in criteriathe set Roadmapthe for achieving this goal. visadialogue liberalisation Serbiafollow with asked new about to and the government to the their commitment Theyrepeated thispath. continue on Belgrade to ecouraged They EU. tothe road phaseSerbia's on important asan Karadzic of arest the welcomed http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=309599&order=priority The US and NATO also welcomed the arrest. The White house issued a statement issued a The house The USandNATO White arrest. the welcomed also President of the parliament of the assembly of the Council of Europe Lous Maria UN Secretary General Ban, also showed appreciation of the action Serbia madein 339 NATO spokesperson also said it was what NATO itwas what said also NATO spokesperson 185 CEU eTD Collection 26 July 2008, B92 341 23 July 2008 Beta 340 position Netherlandstook. the Mladic toTheHague,whichwasthesame wasextradited force before Ratko coming to woulddepend not only hison report butalso whether Serbiafulfilled other conditions. Ratko Mladic. Hesaid Brammertz's position importantwas very though finalthe decision of in case the cases, andespecially in two these necessary was full cooperation and that large Frankindictees atEurope werestill two outthat Timermans and pointed this, said force. come to should EU andthe Serbia between agreement trade temporary todecideindictees whether inorder thelast by two on report the Brammertz Djindjic because he was murdered had arresedMilosevic. Tadic, primeremindedminiser Holbrook that courage. heneededenorumous because outthatitpointed issuewas enorumous for,him, ashe called pro-Western, president cleansing.Holbrook creator of ethnic was worse andwasintellectual Milosevic than large, but that Karadzic was more important of the two. According to Holbrook Karadzic step forward for Serbia also an extraordinary as sawthis Mladic. Holbrooke Richard Ratko including indictees and its wish to jointcontinue the toarrest from askedremaining Serbia to efforts expected Serbia and the West. He said that Mladic was still at cooperation between the ICTY and Serbia, they were willingOfficials to fromdo everythingthe EU said as soon as tothey make received a the report and knew the nature of the http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=26&nav_id=310277&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=23&nav_id=309744&order=priority Swedish minister of foreign affairs Carl Bilt excluded the possibility of SAA for waswaiting Netherlands firm. The still were conditions praises, the Despite 341 The EU ministers waited for the report by the ICTY. 186 340 Dutch minister for CEU eTD Collection successful cooperation did not only depend on political will but on successful cooperation not only on operational did depend onpolitical willbut capability in the point saidone Mladic. Croatia, However, ICTY at asthe arrest prosecutor was mostto diplomats insistence of the Karadzic,though even it arrested and possessed difficult know. to What seemsbe to the case is that the new government acted on the data is act to not chose government previous the or act, to government new the for ready was Thus,just the previous finalized either government collection information the of itand government. previous the from inherited were that information the on done been have to seemed Karadzic of The arrest indictees. of other arrests onthe progress make further cooperate with the ICTY it dit not yet have all intelligence information or enough time to conditioned on the full cooperation between Belgrade and the ICTY. was from SAA, issues covers all trade of that Termporary implementation agreement SAA and of ratification Belgium, and Holland of positions the of because and agreementon 29 inAprilas a but Luxembourg, withincompromise EU resultthe of 2008 Serbia signedSAA report. insistedBrammertz's accompanied temporary on and Italy and Slovenia acted for Serbia getto green light. But some countries such as Holland Slovakia, EU countries,especially Cyprus, Romania, and agreement. Most light on trade green for the werenecessary of Brammertz andpositive report of Karadzic extradition Marin that Karnesaid also newsteps. the decide about andde onthatwould depending situation the follow TheEUwould decision. change that to elements new no were there 342 in forward toSerbia suport direction step tangible the of http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=29&nav_id=310601&order=priority It is important to note here that although the new government had willingness to willingness had government new the although that here note to important is It Press representative of French presidency said the agreement was still frozen as 29 July 2008, Beta 187 342 CEU eTD Collection charge of charge of tracking fugitives was generally slow was andthere a lack of coordination“,but „Duringfirst part the of pace reportingthe the of period, of work in security agencies indictees were transferred and that happened after the elections. The report points out that two only period large.During reporting the atfugitives still are two that as thefact aswell ICTY the of concerns strongest the of wasone This testify. to voluntarily appear failed to wherewitnesses numberof occasions wasincreased becausethere intimidation they which witnesses saw as the with wereinterferences suggested there report Although appearance of ongoing trials. witnesses, some important the Serbia facilitated Annual ICTY 2008 n.pdf 344 343 improvement. large fugitivesissuestwo still needed and mentionedare still at other that underlined but that listed positiveof acts cooperation report relationsSerbia. The with which most of the EU governments expected to see in order to know what steps to take in large.of still indictees at the cases other for is relevant it as case the about more revealed have not could they that and Council for cooperation also that confirmed they thissaying availableon the acted data National the of president The available. is what on act to had but information intelligence tohavemore wasconstituted, in governent the month when couldnot, same the from the Westit theencouragment indictees acted on remaining government toarrest and professionalism of peoplethe includedin the search of fugitives.the http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/AnnualReports/annual_report_2008_e Gotovina General indictee ofCroatian case 8 onthe Seechapter In August 2008, the ICTY prosecutor Serge Brammertz issued SergeBrammertz 2008, the ICTYprosecutor In August annual the report 344 There were still obstacles in accessing some archives necessary for necessary archives some in accessing still obstacles There were 188 343 Though the Though CEU eTD Collection 347 fully.cooperate new The governmentof and Serbia understood thatfulfilling accepted likelihoodmembership,conditions government for to of higher the the and reward fulfilling the the connected between thestronger hypothesized, beginning. Aswas in the sum listed hypothesesthe through To go concludingremarkswill analysisthe above up 5.6 Conclusion was achieved. membershiptowards for Serbia oncefullwould bepossible cooperation with the ICTY _incl_country_conclu_en.pdf 346 345 theICTY.“ with cooperating fully is Serbia that decides Council as the soon as Agreement Interim the implement submit the fully complied agreed with.29April2008EUministers Council the of to In conclusions SAA to theiremphasizes thatinternational be „Fullcooperation akey remains mustobligation which parliaments made somecooperation butacknowledges with document on progress ICTY, the for ratification light assessingof a Commission met country's inthe readiness“ opinion and the are if toSerbia conditions in2009, the grant candidate status itbe to should possible that and the considers Commission areas. The inpriority reform Community progress and tangible with ICTY the membership.„Serbia needs build to onpositive developments agreedfullthrough cooperation to Strategy andMainChallenges2008-09 Tribunal.“ with the in cooperation improvement Serbia’s the „demonstrate last arrests the two Ibid., 48. COM (2008), 674 final, 5.11.2008, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper 78. paragraph Ibid., In CommissionNovemberissued 2008,the adocument EU the of 345 347 Therefore, the EU confirmed once again that the progress Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009 where it referred to the prospects of Serbia's EU 189 Enlargement 346 , 15. The CEU eTD Collection were used as the government had clear aim of arresting the ICTY fugitives. As it is itfugitives. As ICTY arresting the aim hadof clear government were usedasthe had Service the data operation that the service suggest Secret of the top on change the and new government creation of the Karadzic the of after arrest quick The cooperation. duringleast i.e. waspersonnel, cadreof this period, held what party positions for relevant to the improvement of cooperation with the ICTY. led ICTY EUand the towards government the of position the positive ratification. Thus recognizing the independence of province,the buteventually didnotpreventthis mean would ratification that SAAclaiming of the with ratification the Kosovo link of independence to the attempted The DSSand narrow. SRS if very majority, even had asthegovernment decisive factor SAAas wasnot the whole ratification of prevent to confirmed. in fororder EUmembership, whichincluded extraditions.conditions Therefore, these hypotheses were all fulfill to mandate their received government the and results, election disturbances. In general is publicthe opinion pro-EUwhich was expressedthrough the major provoke Karadzicnot indicative arrest the public was Whatof did was more that political court, the public was split on theconfirmed. issue whether indictees were hypotheses the Therefore, follow. would reward the met, are conditions once should be sent mainto goal of the government forits it. mandate. It was clearly stated by the EU officials that conditionsmembership,lead would to mainrewardand which was the coincided with the The crucial factor that seemed to have influenced cooperation atseemed havewith cooperation that ICTY, the influenced to The crucial factor which attempted in bloc parliament the and anti-ICTY The existenceof anti-EU ICTY majority saw the that showed surveys public opinion fact that the Despite 190 CEU eTD Collection membership were clear, as were the conditions. The decision-making process seemed to process The decision-making conditions. aswerethe were clear, membership ICTY cooperation. The public opinion dissentingwas not andthe incentives for EU with the ICTY, would have any implications on the further cooperation. this position chief of police,the of which beof should part cooperationthe mechanisms from being involved inarrestKaradzic,it of the and be will see interesting to whether his Ministry and himself distanced Dacic (SPS) Interior of Minister because important is especially This andeffectively. professionally working ICTYare the cooperation with this but the remaining cases fugitivesof will prove whether all employed resources on the cases of no it were thecaseof seems there Karadzic prove.For determine or to difficult superiors thus hiding evidence and preventing effective cooperation. However this isvery their to information all disclose to not choose members service secret some that possible process ICTYcooperationon the lower the likelihoodcooperate to fully.could It be caseof cooperation. asuccessful leading to positions relevantforICTYparties wereheld cooperation by pro with ICTY the the ICTY parties, tocooperatefullywaslikelihood thelower case confirmed. Inthis the anti- by held are ICTY the with cooperation in positions crucial of number higher the information but decided not toact, i.e. not tocarry out the arrest. Thus the hypothesis that it. By default, from availableinformationthe thethat new leadershiphad theinformation and actedon it could work service,of readilySecret which are not available public,the to wecould only derive be implieddifficult to provethat this due to the sensitivity of the issuesthe and the procedures relatedgovernment to the of Kostunica had the same In short, for this In short, was positive period, the government EUandthe the towards making thedecision fragmented more hypotheses, hand,On the related other the 191 CEU eTD Collection initial instances of cooperation that have been shown. been have that cooperation of instances initial this after finished will be ICTY completely the with cooperation bewhether the seen supportingpeople or belonging the government to andremainsitsEU policies. proIt to heldby were within administration most crucial of quickerpositions the as have worked 192 CEU eTD Collection organization of the country. According to Ivan Siber and Christian Welzel, in 1990 the in 1990 Welzel, Christian and Siber Ivan to According country. the of organization 1980s was disagreement of the investigations. elites as to what ICTY to the subject not defense, of actions as wereregarded as such and aggressors, constituted by Serbian the occupation from freedthe actions Croatia that important seen as most the the most appropriatefor indictments re- against Blaskicthose and how the governmentinvolved cooperated in these case and inthe criticisms the of the ICTYoperationsNaletilic 'Storm' Tuta and 'Flash'.andand passing of lawthe on cooperation with the ICTY; Vinkothe cases of extraditions These of Mladen wereMartinovic draftthe on Serbia; work of the in aggression ina victim warYugoslavia the against the Stela, as wella distinction between a victim and an aggressor inas a war, whereby Croatia held thatvoluntary it was to related ICTY.Thesethe issues include: thecriticismsurrenderfor againstmaking not ICTY the issues some with dealt Croatia of of government the influences, Tihomirexternal these against how, structure. The final section will important externaloutline andpressures incentives and and cooperation for with ICTYand the fourththe will look atparty positions within such and powercosts will follow. The section third be will on general institutional structure the main political actors. After the introduction, the section on main actors, their positions set understanding Croatia to scene the better for inorder of subsequentpositions the of in war the to leading events of the overview historical withbrief a starts This chapter 6.1 Introduction 1993-1999 Croatia 6- Chapter The main problem of The main Socialist problem Federal the of inof Yugoslavia Republic late the 193 CEU eTD Collection Frank Cass, 2002), 223. Srpska Krajina) announced its independence from Croatia thus making further conflicts unavoidable. conflicts further making thus Croatia from 351 independence its announced Krajina) Srpska and later to exist thoughbothde jure it ceased to exist in1992 whenmost of the states recognized Croatiaof and Slovenia themand in December Mesic independence resignedits asproclaimed the presidentMacedonia became ofSeptember In the SFRY direction. presidency.this Army in the Thus, the SFRY influencing as de factoleadership ceased the UN state members.anymore to defend, itwanted to defeat Croatia and international community started to view the Serb 1991 the warAlso escalated and the JNA attacked Dubrovnik and Zagreb.in Although itwas clear the JNADecember informinghad no Europeanstates about it. In July the JNA left Slovenia but not Croatia where until September clashes1991,and Slovenia in in clashes killed reported were in people 40 Serbian presidency of the Croatia session of the time the At republics. of the bothby agreed were Croatia were and ofSlovenia Krajina ofindependence decisions onthe intensifying.moratorium months three and fire cease a Presidency, of (Republikathe President elected finally was Mesic on 1July EU, from JNA was actingborders. This was resisted by the Slovenian territorialcompletely defense leading to a short war. With the mediation on350 its own and Mesic349 saw1992/93 Sabor Elections in Croatia: Analyses, Documents andit Data as a coup 348 Croats were more in favor of Yugoslavia as a confederation than were the Serbs. their own institutions. During 1991, the conflict between the Serbs and the police force of creating and started newstate the notrecognize did majority heldthe where theSerbs Croatiaits proclaimed independence from Yugoslavia in rural 1991, the parts of Croatia lednameschanging increased of streets) insecurity to Serbs, the of andeventually when Thiswas defined asone andother(such ethnic Croats. of of actions governmentthe as haveindid not enough of governmenttrust Communist the SFRY. the Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War, and that was also why Croats support for an independent creation of thirdthe Yugoslavia. states.” sovereign Croatiafederation was suggested republics the of Two options. three were there Yugoslavia, of Presidency the and legacy late May Stipe1991, according to Mesic, the last andpresident contested of rotatingthe socialism of the andbrief the establishmentremaining four ofwanted a confederate “union of Sinisa Malesevic, Sinisa the protect to allegedly in, moved JNA and independence its proclaimed day Slovenia same the On Stipe Mesic, (ed.), Siber Ivan in Croatia” in Behavior “Electoral Welzel, Christian and Siber Ivan On parliament Croatian 1991the 25 June proclaimed independence. its The Demise ofYugoslavia: A political Memoir Ideology, Legitimacy and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia 349 Thehim third accordingbe to would astruggle of Serbia for the 194 , (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004), 21. , (Berlin: Sigma, 1997), 85. 351 The new state The 1990 and (London: 350 348 The In CEU eTD Collection dependent on the mobilization of the masses. Secondly, this created a situation where asituation created this Secondly, masses. the of mobilization the on dependent was stability system’s the and movement the and party the state, the between borders no movement,into an exclusivelink to the Croatian Democratic Union -HDZ. There were nationalist Serbian the against Croatia, of movement mass the of transformation andbuilding. thedemocratization state on consequences warhadsevere thatthe inargues Kasapovic Mirjana Croatia. took development 6.2 Actors: general positions and power costs Croatia. backsovereignty brought to important in actions warthat Homeland asthe most the and atrocities these regarded about the of operations the leaders themilitary highof responsibility the about controversies are still numberterritory Croatia.of During these ofoperations, some 200,000 Serbsfled toSerbia and there refugees.police carried out two operations ‘Storm’ and ‘Flash’ and established full control over the CroatiaKrajina between and 1994.In 1992 May August 1995 and Croatianthe army and the has always denied that there were any Sveucilista, 2000) politics 1990, elections, parties and the parliament in Croatia], (Zagreb :Fakultet politickih znanosti 352 a war andcreated stopped the intervention constitutional Eventually, Yugoslavia. protecting UN the of role its exercising JNA was thatthe had position the Serbs whilethe Croatia, toattack power military the used who officers by ledSerb JNAwas the believed that Croats JNA. The rolethe legitimate of what wasthe on agreed elite The never for Vukovar. battle as the during as mostcontroversial events Zagreb warwereattackson and the well Dubrovnik Croatia awar,which involved ledto theJNA(the Yugoslav Army) National as well. The Mirjana Kasapovic (ed.), Hrvatska politika 1990-2000 Izbori, stranke i parlament u Hrvatskoj [Croatian Many authors agree that the war had important influence on the path path democratic influence onthe important warhad the agreethat Many authors de facto Serbstate in part of the Croatia calledRepublikaSrpska 195 352 Firstly, the war led to the CEU eTD Collection promoted the return of the promoted of return emigrants At andralliesincreasedbirth Croatian theparty rate. 356 Croatia.” independent establishing of dream “realize 1000-year-old the independence andto seen by his followers as a leader God-given reestablish history to and Croatian Spring for nationalist official accountsof history Croatian and wasimprisoned in theCroatian 1971 after writings, thus commissar. political he Tito’s and history becamein Yugoslav a martyr for a Croatian cause. He was 357 war inYugoslavia been associated with the charismatic leader of the party Tudjman. leader of party Franjothe charismatic with the been associated 355 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_parliamentary_election,_1995 354 353 and in 1995 45%. HDZwon 44% the elections, In the 1992 Mesic becamethe Primeand Minister. Stipe meeting in of Sabor May FranjoTudjman1990 elected was Presidentthe of Republic the seats in the first chamber of the parliament and the majority in Sabor. multiparty first and with gainedelections 41 percentof 80available vote, the 54of the 1990s. In inlife HDZwonthe monopoly 1990, the Croatia throughout over thepolitical country. the destabilize intentionally to attempt asan seen was regime the of position the from deviation identity. Thirdly, the war undermined the role of otheralternative political politics was not allowed and andsocial the party could conflicts. impose ideology of national Any David Bruce MacDonald, Bruce David Malesevic, 230. William Bartlett, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_parliamentary_election,_1992 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_parliamentary_election,_1990 Tudjman established HDZin the 1989. June The HDZ established itself as the most important party very early on and had very a important and party early on most asthe itself The established HDZ 357 The party program was against what it called Serbian hegemony and it and hegemony Serbian called it what against was program party The (Manchester: University press, 2002). Croatia Between Europeand the Balkans 354 The party won all of the elections in the 1990s and its success has Balkan Holocausts? Serbian &Croatian victim-centered propaganda and the 196 355 , (London: Routledge,2003), 33. 356 He started as the youngest general youngest as the Hestarted In challenging1967 he started 353 At the first Atthe CEU eTD Collection League of of (SKH)in December 1989. League Croatia Communists of leader of the Ivica Racanwaselected Communists. League of the developed from that populist and liberal. Croatia. Budisa reconciled,in his presidential position two wings of the party: nationalist- lifepresence gainsupport, the partiesother HSLShasaconstant inthepolitical of to andin11%. Although 1995 about during the domination of HDZitthe was for difficult position in Croatian the sceneforpolitical along time. In 1992 the elections it won 17% reforms. never Despite wining the independently,elections HSLSheld secondthe largest economic with ideas liberal and intellectual combined It society. civil developing 361 360 359 358 movement. in participantsthe imprisonedbeen for Spring had taking and of partthe Croatian the among were Tudjman, as well as Budisa, intellectuals. liberal non-communist other and Liberal Party socijalno-liberalnaHSLS (Hrvatska stranka).was led It by BudisaDrazen back.gavewho statehood its Croatia him of father as anational saw people wherebythe majority rule, almost hadplebiscitary 61 percentof vote. He within about elections winningthepresidential inJune1997 authoritarian tendencies, personalpopularity Tudjman’s highandhesucceeded remained undertones.” nationalist with archaisms linguistic and folklore of elements various “used Another party that has been influential on the Croatian political stage is SDP the stage political Croatian the on influential been has party that Another Bartlett, 35. Bartlett, 33. Malesevic, 231. Ibid. Social in inearly1989wasthe Croatian The first Croatia party established 360 358 The HSLS was a centrist party, targeting educated voters and interested in andinterested voters educated targeting Thea party, HSLS was centrist Although his party Although hisduring show theparty domination 1990sbeganto 359 197 361 The party soon The party dropped soon CEU eTD Collection 364 363 362 clear is that the parties were mostly basing their programs on nationalist platforms, which is What Assembly.Istrian Democratic such as left byregional parties was IDS- occupied the HDZ while the and HSS the were centre of the right Just centre. the HSLS occupied SDP was on the left, HNS on the centre left, policies. while andconservative party very nationalist rightwith is extreme the HSP on the extreme War. This party of in theSecondWorldGermany andduring Italy 1941with support the right; the of ofBosniaCroatiaIndependent and State Croatia Herzegovina intheareaof parts and the created who Pavelic, Ante by led nationalists Croatian were Ustashas program. territory.“ by frustrated situationthe in Croatia andby occupation the of one-thirdits of liberal party in Croatia. The HSP was young supporters who “voted for HSP in protest, centre-left is another Democrats Party-Liberal People's Croatian HNS- The class. middle problems.” social and economic for rural concern with nationalism Croatian andanti-clerical “combined republican The Croatian Peasants’ Party -HSSparty. Inthe1990elections the democratic party won 22% of the while vote, in 1995 only 8%. social andleft centre is It the SDP. Croatianabbreviation same the with Party Democratic Party of RightsIn merged1994 it with Social Democrats of Croatia and thename changed into Social -HSP. The HSS SDP. or Change Democratic Party of simply the itself of andcalled name part the firstthe Ibid., 47. 46. Siber, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_parliamentary_election,_1990 Thus, in the left-right spectrum, the parties could be classified as follows. The multiparty first elections. the gain influence after to started A fewmore parties 364 The HSP was on the far right, and was in favor of reintroducing the Ustasha 363 At the same time it wanted to appeal to the urban 198 362 CEU eTD Collection list 365 in surrounding wider of modern and developed Europe.” integrated open state as only be stronger and can Croatia develop that belief from the also to the values and achievements ita pro-European orientation feelingand was because deeply “our of ofbelonging rooted of western Europeandoubt(HDZ) said without therewasin that in the Croatian political and structures public cultural and civilization Mintas-Hodak Ljerka shifting.Minister theICTYwere towards attitudes the shown, but circle but beenhas the always EU towards of positiveduring attitude 1990s.The the the course a healthy pluralist party system. was understandable due the to war. However, thissituation hampered the development of made in its fight forindependence. they that saw asinfringing sovereignty upon Croatia’s undermining Croatiaor the efforts cooperation a criticize butused every as reality opportunity to the actions of Tribunal the Other the accepted parties ICTY. the with cutting relations suggested completely the off with included toThe ICTYthat the Croats sending Hague,someit andat even occasions shared by all mentionedthe was parties. OnlytheHSP openly any againstcooperation less Thismore or theICTY. was towards negative very became Croatia aggressors, defense from represented the of Croatia actions that for the especially onwards, Croatia from indicting andCroatian citizens. Oncethestarted Tribunal Croats 1995 theICTYaslongsupported focused against committed onprocessing asit crimes the Tribunal itsavery 1999.Croatia began hostile to work towards and relationship uneasy “Croatia is forEurope only Western Balkans” (Hrvatska je za Europu samo zapadni balkan), 23 October1999. Regarding the positions towards the EU and the ICTY, there were some changes However, the position towards the ICTY changed from a very positive when the when positive very a from changed ICTY the towards position the However, 199 365 Jutarnji CEU eTD Collection 368 367 366 were governments other later and government led HDZ The independence. its to path the in awaycriminalize thus, and with ICTY cooperate the to whether situation delicate with one. positive percent ICTYtoonly 13 negative aboutthe this. general 48percentsaidtheyhad Still opinion to negatively answered percent 11 only while ICTY the with cooperation continue should enough was not andmuch. 25percentbelievedbelieved itwas too 76percent Croatia believedit percent 23 enough,though ICTY was the with cooperation government the of believedpercent said 'yes'. 33percent whileandsaid 'no' 50percent 20 only objective Bosnia and Herzegovina. in law ofhumanitarian Bosnian Muslims against was violations serious of accused 26 percentwere for and 30percentdid not know howanswer. to This group of Croats extraditions of Tihomir Blaskic 26 percent whobelievedopposed to itwas political. when it came to However, and other Croatsas moral, was ICTY the of to creation the thefor reason ICTY,important most the that believed 33 percent were against; it46 percent did. 7percentthought by sovereignty the ICTY;only cooperating with Serbian believeside did didandnot 71percent thatCroatia its wascompromising believed that Croatialaw oncooperation with ICTY,andonly the percent it. Also9 opposed 76percent should cooperate the percentsupported theICTY69.8 in believed the partiality of Although 52.9 percent with the ICTY regardless of what Bosnian and In earlyin 1996, publicthe opinion was supporting work of the court. the “Parliament is judging ICTY”the (Saborsudi Hagu), Available at “Croats support the Hague” (Haagu podrska Hrvata ), Havingfoughta warand winningits Croatia independence, was a in a very In 1999, in a survey when asked whether ICTY the couldbe saidbe to impartial http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm 367 368 200 Obzor, Obzor last accessedApril 11 2006 , 23January 1999. 25 March 1996. 366 CEU eTD Collection 370 (Zagreb: Slovo M, 2004), 230. 369 chance. was a ifthere Herzegovina and inBosnia receiveterritories Croatian to opportunity the administrative borders of the SFRY when it came to Croatia, but not to lose historical amongcaused confusion political actors. of Croats Bosnian later indictments therefore and acknowledged war wasneverpublicly Bosnian in Croats the of involvement the addition, In cooperation. of trend incoherent an to lead which obligations international and interests national between balancing especially the situation where Croatian soldiers were involved in atrocities. “Their in involved atrocities. were soldiers Croatian where situation the especially follow. not of did these awareness and public the atrocities the of coverage the However, national unity. of a government call for forced to shame to Croatia and deeply divided its electorate.” brought onlymonths“Thein few againsttheir Bosnia earlier. war compatriots committed neighboringunlike Bosnia.Croatians not werecommitting hadbeen that atrocities those which further conflicts caused and fractions. it,aware of not members were HDZ support theofficialview, even the continued to and they double strategy aware of this leaders werenot Opposition aggressive war. population in Bosniadefend to itself seenby was some aslegitimate and by opposition as the Croatian enable and Herceg-Bosna create to decision the Eventually, partition. its Milosevic on with it agree tried to its butfor borders unofficially proclaimed respect Vesna Pusic, “Croatia at the Crossroads”, atthe “Croatia Pusic, Vesna Zdravko Tomac, The Croatian regime of Tudjman was struggling to achievegoals protect -to The Croatian two to regimeTudjman was struggling of In the aftermath of the war, the Croatian media investigated war events andinVesna Pusic(HNS)said in that began 1993 Croatia asanaggressor acting 369 Therefore, the HDZ government had a double policy on Bosnia: officially it President: against lies and oblivion (Predsjednik Protiv krivotvorina i zaborava), Journal of Democracy 201 370 , vol. 9, no. 1, January 1998, 115. The HDZ itself split, and was CEU eTD Collection 374 (ed.), 21. 373 372 Connecticut, London 2001, 135 371 commit crime.” a war not could soldier in hisowncountry, a defensepresident of publicly that, Supreme court declared “Milan Vikovic, image. such havean encouraged seemed to Thegovernment aggressors. bad Serbian fought the against who just, andthe the strong, asthegood, represented face.” to ready not was public Croatian the that cruelties by led to imposed war conditions extraordinary the werethat general observations of the country. the of electorate. due respectheenjoyed the among to the voters and slowly began to controlby for support independence CroatiaHaving voters the enormous Tudjman enjoyed won all poles of 6.3 Institutionalpolitical veto points and partisan veto players life, which was not sanctionedposition. by the control HDZ mostto of media politicalthe lifeand spread the such only andenforced problems for cooperation with ICTY.Moreover,the thepolitical system enabled that the the liberal-democratic rights and the norms of and life. normsof the rights political liberal-democratic the violated all which nepotism corruption, rights, human and ethnic of violations religion, of politicization intolerance, in ethnic principles main its basing was that party ruling the of andnature majority 1990s;secondly,charismatic and the parliamentary the throughout Mirjana Kasapovic,”Democratic consolidation and electoral policy in Croatia” in Mirjana Kasapovic Ibid., 136. (eds.), Selnow W. Gary and Malovic Stjepan Ibid., 21. Constitution guaranteed disproportionate power to the institution of the president the of institution the to power disproportionate guaranteed Constitution 373 Additional causes of this were: firstly, ‘harmony’ between thebetween president ‘harmony’ firstly, were: causes this of Additional 372 This became an official stance of the HDZ and created The People, Press and Politics of Croatia 202 374 371 Croatian soldiers were , Westpoint, CEU eTD Collection units not based on the number of voters, but based on the number of inhabitants. of number the on based but voters, of number the on based not units the result the HDZ governmentmaximize to Inorder success. military capitalize the on to inorder werecalled elections changed the electoral early the territory, Croatian majority of the liberated that military operations successful system to determine the 1995 the After system. electoral the changed HDZgovernment the every election At electoral elections. atthe advantage its own to districts electoral sizeof i.e.the systems, electoral ofbalance maintained news.” a and diet impartial reasonably “remained mediaOnly a few Radiolist, (Novi independent 101,Feral Nacional,Tribune, Globus) party HDZ and that Croatian TV- HRTV was “run by,for and about the leading party.” newspaper dominantthe 379 378 377 (Duke University Press, 1997), 276. 376 375 regime. following the as placing commercial obstacles in their way limitto their business expansion.” such control means of bymore media subtle opposition for the make difficult life able to magazines such as close tothegovernment.were those Thus manyjournalists resigned. opposition Butother new owners the and of privatization renewed process to wassubject government, the rule. HDZauthoritarian the Ibid., 55. Ibid, 16. Malovic, and Selnow, 4. Jasminka Udovicki, James and Ridgeway, Bartlett, 5. Vlatko Cvrtila examined the ‘electoral geography’, i.e. Cvrtila used Vlatkoparty ruling geography’, howthe the ‘electoral examined Controlling the mediaControlling increase in and the main security were services means of Tudjman controlled television and that many newspapers were attacked for not many wereattacked newspapers that and television Tudjman controlled Novi List Vjesnik Vecernji list Slobodna Dalmacija and was Tudjman’s “mouthpiece.” Tudjman’s was Feral Tribune Burn ThisHouse: TheMaking and Unmaking of Yugoslavia was influenced strongly by the leading political leading the by strongly influenced was 203 were freely sold. “The government was government “The sold. freely were , an independent daily that was critical of 376 Other authors agree that agree authors Other 378 375 379 377 , CEU eTD Collection Some other indictees were extradited by Germany or arrested in Bosnia. Thus, although a in in 1997and voluntarily October Blaskic Rajic surrendered Ivica was arrested 2003. Rajic. 381 380 personnel. military flatas a allocated was Rajic Ivica while in Zagreb, seen was Kordic media Dario and Blaskic inAugust wereannounced 1995. November side during the war. The indictments for Croats Ivica indictees. of the extraditions Rajic, Dario Kordic cooperationand Tihomir work through with legal and thediplomatic thelaw in criticizeadopted cooperation butits to April usedevery opportunity on 1996 ICTY means. Thusbut it alwayscooperation ICTY.Unlikeignoredwith the which Serbia, ICTYcompletely,the Croatia in tried effect to prove thatfor Office of the Council of the president the was Justice of Minister wascrated. ICTY there there was waswith verythe ICTY. Afteralmost thecoordinate relationswas responsibleof Seks (HDZ),viceto governmentthe president law was nopassed cooperation in 1996bodies, but there wasno special bodies for cooperationthe with the ICTY. Minister Vladimir Office for cooperation ministriesindividuals, through searching relevant the for these whichwasdone and on with the and indictments general of legal out lawaccepting setprocedure cooperation. The of the law on cooperation with the ICTY there were no special institutional rules for “Panic among Hague candidates” (Panika u redovima haskih kandidata ), “Pride and prejudice” (Ponos ipredrasude), 381 In such circumstances the HDZ held all ministerial positions. Before the passing During the 1990s, neither Croatia nor Serbia extradited those who fought on fought thosewhoSerbia on Duringtheir Croatia nor extradited the 1990s,neither However, they did not deny that Kordic was in Zagreb and, as well as Blaskic. 380 The Croatian Ministry of Defense denied that it indicteeprotected Ivica TheCroatianDefense deniedthat Ministry of Novi List 204 , 7 April 1996. According to the Croatian Novi List , 27 October 1996. October 27 , CEU eTD Collection Program was launched by the EU, it stressed again those obligations. The EUandother obligations. it again those by stressed EU, the launched Program was improving relationswith EU.In the 1999 when Association Stabilization the and for condition important most of the one was ICTY the with cooperation where again conclusions with for former the cooperation of countries passedin Yugoslavia 1997, inprovision This important was reiterated Council of the most agreement. the which ICTY asthe of the peace agreement includedthecooperation Dayton 1995, with 6.4 External pressures and incentives of Croatia ledposition to open this conflict where with the ICTY. instances several mention will section following The ICTY. the thisto communicate position ofCroatia to attempts by is marked the whole period that the Croats could not be united bodies,military legal forces aswere in and police government position well as the tried because they were said thatall within structures the of and Croatian includinggovernment administration defending their own country.it Thus,can beprosecuted. werenot crimesside onCroatian committed thatindividuals The Croatia which wasdefending itselffrom madeitclear aggressors, the whyin Croatia because could crime a singlea war statedwhonotCroat commit that Supreme Court List 382 1998. of end until war crime inCroatia of a hasbeenconvicted not asingleCroat fact that warcrimes wasseeninthe towards arrest indictees. to decisions formal difficult rarely cooperation position governmentthe was tribunal with the took “Tudjmaninitiated aseries of ICTY”(Tudjman onthe attacks inicirao seriju napada sud),na haski , 31 December1998. Croatia asallcountries in had region the tocomplywith provisionsthe of the The Helsinki committee added that the real position of government Croatian of real position the that added committee The Helsinki 382 205 Milan Vukovic was still president of MilanVukovicpresident of wasstill the Novi CEU eTD Collection Zagrebu predlaze uvodjenje viza Hrvatima za zemlje EUa!), 383 provisions referred to the returnbut of refugeesthat itas well had as cooperation for Peace toPartnership to was welcome Croatia that for said NATO spokesperson Shea, follow with the Dayton,ICTY. The adding that Daytonassume more firm stance on wasdemanding all set conditionsthe to be fulfilled. Bible afterfor all. the conditionalitysee any improvement on this issue and theremained situation unchanged. Only in 1997 for theyears no did two The following join EU. the aspired to that bythecountries be tolerated former Yugoslavposition. This was at the time onecountries of the tools which the EU used to show what would not was keptthis weresuspended.betweenNegotiationsfor Croatia EU the The PHARE EU and formulated did measuresimmediately civilians EUtook the the of of anddeaths destruction, refugees EU in explained morebelow. detail participatedon cooperation in ‘Storm’law the on debate the to was related conflict another discussions; many vehement cause and andin which victims conflict, the between make aggressors inability adistinction to the ‘Flash’with the theTribunals was over important actions.most The ICTY. with the conflicts open had occasions ICTY Theseand indictmentsconflictsalways clearly seen. withdemanding these conditions to be met.the Dissatisfaction with againstthis and other conditions wasICTYin always consistent UNwere the NATO, as the such institutions, international will somebe of those who had “OSCE chief of mission suggests imposing visa regime for Croats for entering EU!” (Sef OESSa u Other institutions positionOther also took of February conditionality.1998, Jamie In interms very controversial were which and‘Flash’ ‘Storm’ operations After the onseveral Croatia community international from Against demands the these 206 Slobodna Dalmacija , 28February 1998. 383 Dayton CEU eTD Collection implementation of it in Bosnia and Herzegovina. and in Bosnia it of implementation to contribute to agreement Dayton the implement to continued government strategic many was of the EU one tothe accession that clearly emphasized president goals the 1998, of Croatian congressofHDZ on21February and fourth general parliamentthe the on 27 January at national policy and development. The MFA claimedfurtherinstitutional suggested anend to with relations EU. the the accords. Dayton asfulfilling aswell in Podunavlje normalization and process andpeace stability to of Croatia and government were not ready to cooperate with ready EU. to were not of government Croatia and president accept theassessmentthat not it could that reacted Affairs Foreign Ministry of same level as FRY andwere still suspended.Belarus Although there were no threats becauseof sanctions, Croatia was put on the EU conditionality had not been fulfilled. The arehigh.” criteria youbutour you realizein that have to company, message EUwas“Wewant of the our not overlooked but discussed and EU was ready to follow progress of Croatia. The sindikalnog prosvjeda Hrvatska ni 1998. nece uci u PHARE program), u PHARE uci 387 nece 1998. ni Hrvatska prosvjeda sindikalnog PHAREenter 1998”in even (Zbog Tudjmanova govora naSaboru HDZapolicijske i akcije protiv 386 385 list Novi 384 type of isolation from EU. in any not was Croatia that Brussels in meeting the after said affairs foreign of Minister and OSCEmentioned economicA month discrimination. Ivo this, after Sanader, deputy countrieswestern from to Podunavlje of Serbs departure dissatisfiedthe NATO with was “Unnecessary political pressure” (Nepotreban politicki pritisak), not will Croatia unions, against action police and HDZcongress the at speech Tudjman’s of “Because ibid. Hrvatskoj), o komisije Evropske izvesce (Tvrdo Croatia” about Commission of European report “Tough , 6March 1998. However in March 1998, the report of the EU office in Zagreb was negative and negative was inZagreb EUoffice of in the report the 1998, March However 385 The criteria were not economic but political, especially contributing especially political, but economic not were criteria The 384 The meetings at different levels showed that problems problems that levelswere showed atdifferent Themeetings 207 Vecernji list Globus 386 , 13 March 1998. 387 , 14 March 1998. PHAREnegotiations In hisbefore report CEU eTD Collection Vecernji list, 390 389 Hrvatsku u kojoj je HDZ na vlasti ), 388 overall the ICTY, in the were Croats Bosnian several Although return. to safe feel to in for theSerbs Croatia atmosphere create to government form Croatian required democratization, respect for human and minority rights and freedom of the media, the EU September/October 1998.In addition asking forimprovementto in level the of improvementby with wasno if there Croatia agreement preferential trade abolish to threatened EU The conditions. set fulfilled not had Croatia that concluded EU. with the cooperation regime, no conditions for participating in PHARE and no conditions for negotiations on evennot agenda.The on the suggested statusquo,i.e.Commission noindependent trade ICTY. of with satisfied andthe cooperation refugees with return especially cooperation, the long as in HDZ was Thepressurepower. continued inApril 1998. The EU wasnot as welcomed not was Croatia was that said they what effectively and HDZ undemocratic announced de-militarizationbut tiesBosnian HDZ with cutthe address to was EUdemand the attempting to Tudjman state. wanted a democratic to establish that forces with those would cooperate was not obligations. international going as planned.itfulfilled its innotwelcome the EUuntil was that Croatia March 1998,whosaid The EU was not happy with “More is required from Croatia than from the others “ (Od Hrvatske se trazi vise nego od drugih), “Dayton andErdut keysCroatia” for (Daytoni Erdut-kljucevi Hrvatske ), “EU does not count on Croatia where HDZ is in power” (Europska unija ne racuna na Republiku 389 One of the strictest warnings came from the UK foreign minister Robin Cook in At the Council of At Councilthe of Ministers on 15 April ministers1998 inLuxembourg, the Thus, Croatia was not reintegrated in PHARE and bilateral negotiations were negotiations bilateral in PHAREand reintegrated not was Thus,Croatia 27 April 1998 . 390 388 The Dayton agreement was seen as the most important; EU important; most as the wasseen agreement TheDayton Globus , 27 March 1998. 208 Vecernji list, 16 April 1998. CEU eTD Collection RH zadovolji uvjete), 391 from formerYugoslavia.the institutionalized relations with EU; the only relation was preferential trade which was left submission start 1999,Croatia InOctober evidence and of not still documentations. did delayin with –there was inICTY the yearsnocooperation progress three hadmade integration. if further said thatCroatia EU presidency political towards go will would was there Zagrebexpected influenceto Bosnian Croats. cooperation with ICTYshouldthe beenand improved have intheCouncil of Ministers 392 allowwhen had the UN representatives he to government, the of vicepresident Kostovic, beNovember 1993,Ivica punished.In crimesbelieved hadto against Croatia that 6.4.1 Attitudes towards establishment oftheICTY andthebeginning ofits work thus better institutional relations with the EU. and ICTY the with cooperation the on hindrance were which ICTY the of criticism main big prosecution andit nextof sections will criminals.neglected some the The of outline means of Croatiapressure on andhe policyequitable added thatthe ICTYwasnot the of disappointing: it did not show to what extent Croatia cooperated. The ICTY was still the MinisterJustice of Zvonimiras assessed (HDZ) Separovic surprising the and report October1999. ICTY!” (Predsjednica Haskog suda8. studenoga izvijestit ce UNo hrvatskoj nesuradnji!), 393 list, “Negotiations with EU afterRepublic Croatia fulfils the demands” (Lipponen: pregovoris EU nakonsto “Croatia is forEurope only Western Balkans” (Hrvatska je za Europu samo zapadni balkan), “President of the ICTY will on 8 November report to the UN about the non-cooperation with the 23 October 1999. October 23 In July 1999 Osmo Lipponen, Finish ambassador whose country heldIn Finish ambassador EU July 1999Osmo the Lipponen, Initially, the official government position on the ICTY was very positive as itwas thatCroatia-cooperating. 1999,theUNreportagain In late stated wasnot 391 He agreed with the ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour that Croatia in the lastin the Croatia that Arbour Louise prosecutor ICTY with the Heagreed Vjesnik , 22July 1999. 392 . 209 Jutarnji List Jutarnji Jutarnji , 24 393 CEU eTD Collection ratni zlocini nece ostati nekaznjeni), ostati nece zlocini ratni 395 394 is wife his when killed, are parents old or child young his when impulsively react plan of committing were condemnedwar as they “often ignore the fact that the Serbs arecrimes aggressors with rational in order international organizations The viewof position. tothat andCroatia stuck been attacked to expand territory, in contrast to nationalities. of criminals all Croats who courts, Croatia failed todemonstrate enough judicial independence to prosecute war Croats. Despite no were there among these However, law. humanitarian crimesagainst who committed trying 127persons it andarrested convicted point up tothat with that cooperate ICTYandthe to show howexpansion, which was done in mostthe brutal way. it could processby wellplanned of Serbsthe werepartly andsystematic part ofterritorial politics war committed crimes the that said Drobnjak Vladimir Representative UN Croatian the and criminals FRY wasworried the that wasnotcooperatingestablishing peaceand stability. Croatia beforehelp not would guilt collective as domesticnation, whole the not and crimes the of executors and organizations initiators, try to itwas crucial was saidthat It UN. the to mission Croatian andand aggressor victim footing. the putthe equal on investigate all of them. The main objection was attempt of the court to make guilt relative meansto have not financial did tribunal crimesbutthe committed whereSerbs localities guilty.” was everybody that show to noticedof a“finepolitical court investigate in the somecrimes tendency to Croatia, “The work“The court of is the a message thatwar crimes will not remain unpunished” (Radsudaje poruka da “Attempts to equalize guilt” (Pokus izjednacavanja krivnje), izjednacavanja (Pokus guilt” equalize to “Attempts It was not even imaginable that war crimes could be made by the side that had In November 1994Croatian for the ICTYwas support again by confirmed the Vjesnik 394 , 15November1994. Croatia protested against this and sent a list of all 210 395 Danas He also said that Croatia wanted to , 30 November 1993. November , 30 CEU eTD Collection fought, i.e. if there were crimes they should be investigated and prosecuted and that was and and that prosecuted beinvestigated if i.e. theyshould were crimes fought, there it itscreate had foundations state foron which the neededto Croatia secondly,Europe; was in interest of Croatia law).the Everybody Croatiawanted in European and world integration and thus this law said Pasalic. Firstly,the law, and if possible all of them (HDZ did nothave 2/3 majority that was necessaryit for would lead in theCroatia parliament of who was a bigger Croat, it was important that asmany MPs voted for to the Council despite mechanisms accused.Headded accusations vehement the the protective for that of lawit had the tonote important that was MP, hesaid, of each struggle personal Despite of cooperation with the ICTY that wouldnot violate the constitution of the country. which were in the midst of debate on the law of cooperation with the ICTY. parties among Croatian arguments heated created and‘Flash’ ‘Storm’ in actions the participated whocoo againstthose indictments ICTYwaspreparing the information that The its ownsovereignty. it as defending for action regarded accept anyindictments that 6.4.2 Debates aboutlaw oncooperation the ICTY with andresponses toindictments werenotexpecting.” Croats the after fifty darkness, communistyears of Such Europe, inof territory Europe. the and the victim, “again EU itsdemonstrates inability justlyto solve oneimportant problem ethnic or other war. While applying this logic of erasing difference between the aggressor (Croatia)any itaggressor (Serbia)not anotheragainstand state of kind religious, was 397 396 raped.” 396 Ivic Pasalic, the advisor to Tudjman said that the law was the only possible way possible only the was law the that said Tudjman to advisor the Pasalic, Ivic not could it and strong very war on Croatia of position the above explained As Ibid. “War crime – relative” (Ratni zlocni-relativan), The position of the government was reiterated that it was a war of one state – 397 211 Obzor , 20 November1995. CEU eTD Collection 399 398 have bound ourselves to cooperate“We said, Granic ICTY. the with cooperation issuesof tosolving consequential approach with the ICTY and we will respectstance that, of but different we will ministries, from in andHDZ, deniedany andboth Granic and Affairs difference Defense, Susak as the positionitspresented position on ICTYasunifiedthe The andcoordinated. of Ministers Foreign of Croatia had to be based on united shouldCroats not go toTheHague. and should from be inCroatia because and herself wasdefending tried aggression Croatia by puzzledissue passivity the andbelieved tothis thatCroats public Croatian the of were against the law that, as they saw it, inquestionable whichlegal it way DjapicAnte be should andhisfardone. HSP cut right through Croatian sovereignty. He cooperatewas with the ICTY andalso that those who committed crimes should be tried,butit was to had Croatia that fact the about questionable nothing was there said also He level. an and aggressoron courtwould victim the the equal were afraid putthe people that who of homogenization Croatian thisledto law. that stressed the above He higher validity have would it as better been have would Organizations International the with agreement cease. would whether cooperate, should aboutCroatia mean debates the not that cooperation did whether these two had any Croatia. interest of in the direct connection, but the fact that there was a law on April 1996, and it joined the Council of on6 NovemberApril 1996. joined Council Europe of 1996, andit the “After‘Storm’ 4654 trials” (NakonOluje – 4654 sudska postupka ), “Why is the Hague important?”( Hague the is “Why Despite the differences among different parties, during this period the government special that legal form; best the not law was the that thought Arlovic (SDP) Mato 398 Croatia passed the law on cooperation with the ICTY on 26 on ICTY the with cooperation on law the passed Croatia Zasto nam je vazan Hag?), jevazan nam Zasto 212 Vjesnik , 16April 1996. Vecernji list Vecernji , 9 September1997. 399 It is not clear CEU eTD Collection subpoene), 403 402 Dalmacija, 401 400 ICTY.” see we when itcriticize Hague and explaintheiractions for sending not materials). suspended ICTY the (i.e. in process appeal the won Croatia of implementation cooperation. actions justify and before court appear the to officials its demands for from court the wanttoreceive not did of subpoenaCroatia ICTY, the with Croatia of cooperation it the disregarded as for Croatia shocking – the thendecision to come thathis toBlaskic possession related to case duringyears the two in of war Bosnia if notand the Croatian ICTY to Kirkexplain McDonaldofficial ordered Ministerhis of inabilitygoesDefense Gojko to Susak to hand Croatia. of togovernment over doall materialsas the of requested. policy the form in different was it that and policy own their had ministries the ICTY in a Officecooperation matters. for cooperation its implementedand policy council towards unified way,government. so it was statementunfounded to talk sayingabout situation that that policy some towards the ICTY was unified, coordinated by the found legal way to deal with unpopular decisions of the ICTY. UN representative of “Hague: implementation the of beensubpoena has suspended” (Haag: suspendirano izvrsenje “Strange demands from the Hague”,(Cudni zahtjevi Haga), iz “Unified policy Hague the towards tribunal” (Jedinstvena politikaprema haskom sudu), “Government, Ministers, Hague”the (Vlada, Ministri, Hag), The biggest conflict between the ICTY and Croatia came when Judge Gabrielle 400 Vjesnik 4 March 1997. Croatian government, i.e. Office for Cooperation with the ICTY, issued a 401 According to the law on cooperation government dealt with all with dealt government cooperation on law the to According , 1August 1997. that there is not objective or there is biased position of the 213 Vjesnik Vjesnik , 6July 1996. 403 , 17 February 1997. This showed that Croatia 402 This was Slobodna CEU eTD Collection 1997. 405 odbijamo suradnju s Haagom, trazimo postivanje suvereniteta), 404 ICTY in the public already. The HSS thought this debate was necessary and thatit should the of work the of wasdissatisfaction there that believed he as discussion, parliamentary Croatian shouldforhappy those Hewas havecourts jurisdiction. also not the about war werecrimes‘Storm’ and but‘Flash’ criminal not of murder acts (in and peace time) after crimes saidthat from HSLS Budisa Drazen crimes. war of be guilty could generals indicted possibly whether in Croatia, check to mechanism a have to like would they HDZ againstproposition and abolition againstlaw on of cooperation with ICTY,but the unilaterallyattemptto cutties very withthebe ICTYwould be so SDPwouldrisky, suggesting cutting off cooperation with ICTY.DavorkoVidovicthe any saw that (SDP) sovereignty and respect of the Croatian law on cooperation with the ICTY. of law, respect international public was against It Croatia. of territory investigate seen as a unilateral decision investigateinvestigators of of events during ICTYto the and ‘Storm’. after and without theagainst expressing ofletter presidentand protest strong the ICTYa the arrival prosecutor agreement of the Croatiancouncil government ofto justice of Minister of the investigate andpresident the operationsand ‘Flash’. to ‘Storm’ Office wanted ICTY asthe started ICTY the and Croatia between exchange vehement Another for cooperation with of Croatia. sovereignty be of state with respect to cooperation the ICTY,Croatia Ivan SimonovicMiroslav said there was no refusal Separovic,to cooperate. Croatia only wanted the sent to the “Unilateral actions of Haguethe tribunal” ne (Simonovic: of sovereignty” respect want wejust ICTY the with cooperate to refuse not “Wedo As soon as such reports started coming from the ICTY, the HDZ began solvefurther with thenot ICTY. However, theproblems cooperation this of did (Jednostrani postupci haskog suda), 214 Novi list Novi , 23 September 1997. September , 23 404 Vecernji list, 405 It was It 21 May CEU eTD Collection predsjednika Tudjmana neosnovano je, asvrha je politicki pritisak) 408 1999. transferring Croats to Hague”the (HVIDR-a prestanak trazi slanjaHrvata uHaag ), 407 406 ourselves." Bobetko said theirfor Novi life.List Croatiathat The needed'‘We military every could man retirementwho Janko Bobetkofought stressedget that military invalids for hadwassanctions the highest rightthe to warn that betteragainst Croatia but and was we any readyshould to Croatia andinternational sacrificecommunity on any cooperationquestion. not spit onbetween support any not IDS wouldtension international conflictcommunity. with with the campaign tohomogenize HDZ,whichof the wanted body its electoral logicon the of ICTY. General aselection saw debate IDS from this the Ivan longJakovcic been have ago. done Janko creating Herceg-Bosna that was supposedtobe joined that with Croatia. creating Herceg-Bosna in and in Bosnia in war involvement of Tudjman Franjo accused Prosecution the Blaskic, Tihomir of case the In exacerbated. only were ICTY the with relation tense Zagreb, stopgovernment sending to Croatian soldiers andofficers toTheHague. the wanted they that said (HVIDR) veterans war of Association the of president His position was that Croats were tried because they defended their own country. The for the president by the ICTY. HSLS also did not accept the announcements of process of announcements the accept not did also HSLS ICTY. the by president the for pressure on Tudjman and Croatia. HSP, Djapic said that parliament had to stop this ‘hunt‘ political as viewed them and for accusations these legal grounds wereany denied there “The ICTY’s calling “The onTudjmanis unfounded the and aimis political pressure” (Hasko prozivanje “Associationof Croatianmilitary invalids of Homelandthe waris asking for stoppagethe of “The Hague judgment” (Haski usud), in general forveterans, the Croatian committee parliamentary of the President When in 1999indirect accusations against reaching Franjo Tudjman started 406 Bobetkowas worriedhe because wasacting general operations. the during Feral Tribune 215 , 25 January 1999. Vjesnik , 28 July 1999. 408 Vjesnik 407 HDZ officials HDZ , 30January CEU eTD Collection jurisdiction jurisdiction stop‘Flash’ bilateral it and‘Storm’ Thus, over threatened to actions. help, as ICTY the to objections Croatian and Naletilic, Mladen extraditing not for reasons za eventualna kaznena djela Bljeska i Oluje), i Bljeska djela kaznena eventualna za 412 Haski sud i Hrvatska [The ICTY and Croatia], [Time] 410 409 asked Croatiafulfill government to its obligations. standings. ininternational position the of influence Croatia Thus Arbour was directly involved politics indomestic Croatia.of Plus this would indicted Tudjman, it wouldifall. Arbour at that notcooperate believed it knownthatFRYdidSome FRY was when have been very difficult as Croatia saidbehaved that prosecutor by the fact that wasinsulted Croatia the ‘Storm’. for HDZ to be reelected of to outstanding related issuesincluded documents Naletilic operation transfer other that year. indictments. domestic Croatianlawsuits against since 1997due tothe authorities them in courts on domestic accused in1998for warcrimes in Bosniain 1993. Also, both them were inthe custody of Tuta. Naletilic Mladen and Stela Martinovic Vinko extradited for warcrimes. process and calculation mistaken political madebutbetween adistinction Bosnia waswrong, toward policy the that itaccepted Tudjman, president though against campaign of Croatia” (Tuzeci Hrvatsku UN-u, tuziteljica Arbour ukljucuje se u hrvatsku predizbornu hrvatsku u se kampanju), ukljucuje Arbour tuziteljica UN-u, Hrvatsku (Tuzeci of Croatia” campaign 411 report Croatia to the UN for not fully cooperating. to threaten or ICTY, the from requests outstanding fulfillother all to wanted Croatia “USA: the ICTY has jurisdiction overpossible crimes in Flash and Storm” “SAD: the ICTY je nadlezan http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/454/9.html http://www.icty.org/sid/7743 “By reporting Croatia to the UN prosecutorArbour isdirectly involving herself into the election The US shared the ICTY dissatisfaction with cooperation with the ICTY and ICTY the with cooperation with dissatisfaction ICTY the shared US The Croatia September and August in actions ICTY the to objections these Despite Vjesnik, 13August 1999. 410 Before Naletilic was extradited, the ICTY prosecutor still prosecutor ICTY the extradited, was Naletilic Before Vjesnik 216 , 27August 1999. Vreme 454, 18September 1999 412 411 The US did not accept Croatian Except for the extradition of 409 Both of them were CEU eTD Collection 4 September 1999. document showedthatCroatia also not try didinmurder foranybody 'Storm' and 'Flash'. The ICTY. the with cooperation andCroatia’s crimes war concerning government 414 Haskitribuanl nije nadlezan za BljesakOluju), i 413 ithelped orhindered Croatian position. justpossibility werein these that political election year.the pressured the ICTY had no jurisdiction. The government of Croatia could not fully exclude was legallyfounded in line andlegally carried out with international law and therefore cooperation. About ‘Storm’, the Croatian government said that this action was justified,it and slowed it down his was medicaldue to was butthere conditions, no non- question of there were conditions for whether andestablishing of process courts the before domestic the hewastried Naletilic, him to be extradited so materialsthe requested tribunal.the to accused andsubmitted process on this case those italwaysforce extradited was and that entered law cooperation the on after especially ongoing It stated it was always and cooperatingsupportingit court. the of thewas creation non-cooperation, Croatian governmentdisagreed with assessmentthe and reminded that for 'Storm' and 'Flash' wouldbe it dropped, isclear. not whetherfulfilledif were it or demands these accusations was believed the that cooperate to forced Croatia criticisms Whether these institutions. international inother Croatia to help support not would US the that meant have would this addition, In ICTY. the with did cooperate not hadthat for states aprovision that wasspecialamendment there “’White “’White book’- more damage thanuse?” (‘Bijelaknjiga’- vise stete nego koristi?) RH: (Vlada Storm” and Flash operations over jurisdiction no has ICTY the government: “Croatian When in 1999 issuedgovernment theWhite it book, speculations created whether Referring to the report of the ICTY to the UN in which Croatia was criticized for Vjesnik 414 217 The document listed all activities of the , 27, August1999. 413 Concerning Mladen Slobodna Dalmacija, CEU eTD Collection (Bijela knjiga je dokument i povjest , ali i dug prema brojinim zrtvama agresije na Hrvatsku!), 415 actions. these over itjurisdiction had that prove ICTYto for the waited operations. Croatia during two the alleged crimes investigate was anditsshow purpose with it. Croatiato that had cooperated always continuously ICTY the with work of chronology showed also part second law. The international and Croatian with inline police-army operations as legitimate wereseen ‘Flash’ and ‘Storm’ inwar worst warandinduring the the crimes committed secondabout Croatia. the ministries.several has onthevictims document first data part the In anddestruction the theICTY. with cooperation on data i.e.international Security alsoCouncil,butpublic domestic forthe public as itcontained theICTY. towards it itimproved in of was Croatia information thequestionable position thereport, whether such With ‘Flash’. and ‘Storm’ over jurisdiction no had ICTY the that position the assumed from May 1998Croatia 18 itfrom that inMay, after ICTY the got details and general Ante Gotovina formore 'Flash' and 'Storm',for the operations Croatia asked talk to wantedto inApril that1998 theICTY alsoJanuary data to contained 1994. It have onactivities data any of in forces from Muslim and Bosnia Herzegovina September Muslim activities in butCroatian 1994, replied theICTY government to they that not did The White book also revealed that the ICTY asked Croatia to give them documents of istrazitelja), 416 September1999. informed the prosecutor Del Ponte about this. She replied that Croatia could not decide “White book is a document, history but also a debt to numerous victims of aggressionagainst Croatia!” “Croatia is not allowingof “Croatiaisnot Hague arrival the investigators” (Hrvatska dopusta ne dolazak haskih In November 1999 Croatia refused to allow arrival of the ICTY prosecutors to The government defended the document because it was prepared for the UN Jutarnji list , 14 November1999. 415 The document was compiled by experts from 218 416 Minister of Ministerof Justice ZvonimirSeparovic Vjesnik , 4 CEU eTD Collection country. The clear membership promise only came in 1999 with the formulation of informulation country. membershippromise 1999with Theclear only came the SAP of which by was objected to want Croatia, asthey notbe regardedasaBalkandid to theregion, towards so clear.TheEUhadcommon notmembershipapproach EU were questioned in any way. or be criminalized to independence Croatian led to that actions allow the to not and faced in an attempt to fulfill EU conditions and cooperate with the ICTY on the one hand, This at looked a periodchapter between 1993 and2000 problems the thatCroatia 6.5 Conclusion with the ICTY cooperation after the new government was formed. changed atwhat look will chapter next year.The held following the which were elections for new an ripe atmosphere created factors All these time. for some was concealed andin situation anillness, 1999FranjoTudjman deteriorated after which died December economic negative, also were EU the and organizations international with relations ICTY, which was creating a lot of pressures on the politicaldenying jurisdiction of ICTY. the actors within was over which Croatia events the not investigation were the of subject if come the only Croatia. The crimes in its own territory.sovereignty He said that CroatiaICTY had nojurisdiction. Ministerwas again said thatcould Croatia would not allowbreached that her allow theShestop cooperationit saidthat should because not decided Croatia the unilaterally that ICTY investigatorsand that what the Tribunalto wouldinvestigateonly and reported Croatian’s non-cooperation to the CroatianUN. courts had the right to investigate Throughout 1990sCroatia the its stressed European but prospects position the of Thus in the end of 1999, Croatia was at the lowest point of cooperation with the 219 CEU eTD Collection of cooperation was centralized and again it did not help to improvehelp The the cooperation. not to andagainitdid of was centralized cooperation making notconfirmedbecausewas also fragmentation decision process the process of the the on hypothesis The government. Croatian by the set interest national of principles based on prevented was butthe cooperation institutional werenoobstacles there confirmed because was not likelihood of cooperation thelower obstacles institutional itlead cooperationbutdida better not higher to numberwith ICTY.The the of The Hague. opposition wereparties cooperation against includedthat tryingCroatian in defenders for cooperation low ICTYwereconfirmed.the Even hypotheseswith support on reward and time of the beenconstantly disputed. reward were has its jurisdiction of actual the acceptance ICTY, the with communication regular the not an incentive law passing period. the on the cooperation Despite Theseand persistedthrough problems Tribunal. international an at tried be could country own their of defense forthe for fought Croatia. whoaccept thatthose not could andingeneral itsled independence to operations that In addition,during the whole period, Croatia jurisdiction didnotrecognize of for ICTY the twothe the Croatia from extraditions only acceptable.two were There wasnot period during that would be gained only reward the Moreover, very distant. also were they and cooperating of oncesee clearrewards cooperation withEU thefor ICTYnot cooperating the wasand ICTY the with situation fulfilledconflicting in was Croatia then by fullyHowever, EU. the by whichwith the for Tribunal. Croatia Therefore, the Tudjman regime did not The hypothesis that was notconfirmed was that there was high support for the EU clear lackof the confirmed, were of rewards time the sizeand on The hypotheses 220 CEU eTD Collection against cooperation inagainst cooperation criminalized cases defense the that of independence. Croatian crucial wasposition factor of governingthe and party most of oppositionthe which was 221 CEU eTD Collection were accused same the in for Ademi operation pocket. Medak the in indicted 2001 was Norac Mirko Ademi and officersother Rahim in 2002.Two made September public general foragainst Medakpocket Janko Bobetko near (territory in city Gospic, of 1993) Ante Gotovina for operationthe ‘Storm’ (1995), which madewas publicin June 2001; general against were indictments important most The EU. the with relations institutional on them in order to fulfill cooperation with the ICTY and in this way improve opposition. These indictments were also atest for the government because they had to act indictments from the ICTY that created conflict between the government and the was formed. new ‘Flash’, the wasfollowed continued after bysome government This allow the ICTY to have jurisdiction for the crimes committed in operations ‘Storm’other institutions. and to the cooperation with the issues related ICTYsomeimportant at look will lastsection issue.The the on positions partisan against the pressures and incentivessecond willexplain theinstitutionalfor cooperation structure ICTYfollowedwith by the from the EU and the early electionsresults. This chapter looks atin period from the formation of 2003.the new government in 2000 to The first elections the wasexpressedthrough that environment new political Tudjman created section of death the and willsituation economic deteriorating process, setintegration EU the with out some general conditions;As mentioned above over tensions the cooperation the with ICTYandthe laggingbehind 7.1 Introduction the 2000-2003 Croatia 7- Chapter The debate that started duringThe that debate the Tudjman whether Croatiagovernment, should 222 CEU eTD Collection Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia,( Belgrade: CEDET, 2003),204 420 419 418 417 situation gradually began tochange. issues became more diverse and as the voters began discoverto other political options the as the However, state. an independent to create clear, its aims were of HDZ as favor efforts to create and Homelandliberate war and thus were only showing the unity of the population and the elitein the independentlegacycommunist and the following elections two (1992,1995) were held the during Croatia. During thescene. 1990s the voters wereelections in of January the2000 HSS, showed IDS, HNS the and real LS had constellation parliament:the theSDPand together HSLShad seats(40%),the HDZhad 65 46(26%), 25, the HSP had four of andpower the onHKDU Croatian had one. politicalAssembly-IDS and the Liberal party -LS. Croatian coalition of SDP-HSLS, togetherPeasant with the bloc of four other parties run together with: the On 3 January held party-2000 Croatia parliamentary elections, which brought victory the to the 7.2 Actors: main positions and power costs HSS, the Croatian for courts crimesthe in committed 1991. Nationaland in was Norac in2004. However,already Norac 2003 on intrial Croatian domestic Party-HNS, Istrian Democratic Table 5: Changes in Electoral Support forParty Blocks 1990-2000 1,6 1,8 inmillion Support taken fromtaken Goran Cular, The Croatian Party system 1989-2002, in Dragica Vujadinovic Ivan Siber, “Political behavior of voters in elections 1990-2000” in Mirjana http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parlamentarni_izbori_u_Hrvatskoj_2000Kasapovic, (ed.), 66. 418 Ibid., 75. Based on the election results the coalition had the following number of seats in Thefirst more from expression elections the in liberation of 1990 were the the 1990 1992 419 Please see the tables 5 and 6 below. 1993 223 1995 420 1997 Between Left 2000 . 417 The CEU eTD Collection parliament. morehad1992 and the second largest inthe timesMPsthan did six 1995, HDZ party number of the HDZ MPs thanks domination of HDZ inthe parliamentwas onlypossible duetothe disproportionate to the electoral law that favored the leading party. In 422 421 present. more and evident more became opposition the and government evident Then, decreasedandas1995. warefforts asthe themonopoly HDZbecame the of in all about until lasted situation this and opposition the of aspectsmaneuver for room the limiting ofaway from the HDZ and towards parties of the left.Croatian The government of national unity was social life, the conflicts between theTable 6, The Left-Right position of the Croatian Parties (1990-2000) HDZ led*HNS, HSLS, HS, IDS, SDP 2000 1995 1992 1990 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2 1,4 Ibid., 101. ibid., 208 Nenad Zakosek deals with the reasons for the shift of the preferences of voters of for the shift preferences of the reasons deals with the Nenad Zakosek Others HDZ,HSP HDZ,HSPLeft block * SDP SDP SDP SSH SKH-SDP; Left -3 Others block Left HDZ LS HSLS HNS IDS IDS 4 Others block Left HDZ,HSP IDS HSS HSS HNS HSLS HSS HDZ HSLS HNS 5 224 Left block Left HDZ HDZ,HSP HSP HDZ HSP HDZ HDZ HSS,KNS, 6 421 Others Left block Left HDZ,HSP HSP HSP 7 HDZ Others HSP HDZ, block Right-8 422 The CEU eTD Collection Before 2000 Semi-presidential system 425 Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia,(Belgrade: CEDET,2003) Table 7: powers of presidentthe in Croatia before and after 2000 elections and the powers of the presidentwere as table 7 shows. 424 423 law.force of with the PR could decrees pass legislature, Governmentand agenda the puton In all issues hedeemedimportant. terms of deputy ministerwas ministers.prime within It and hisconvene powerto of sessions the the andrelieved of duty appointed PM’s suggestions the andat prime minister(PM) addition, the government was subordinate to the PR he appointed and relieved of duty the representatives vote and In of judgesinthe a2/3majority all Constitutional Court. Constitution. of aviolation for impeachable only he theGovernment; was or either Parliament to The Budisa was. Drazen than wasbetter Mesic Stjepan (Stipe) round second motion early elections. forfrom SDP’s positionthe onthe cooperation HSLSimpeachment from then with on thehadinstead Granic. of of Goran government the ICTY,two fractions. which was one Eventually, appointhappenelections andnot thatdidhe Racantohim once ofwanted vicepresidentthe the reasons the requiredforHSLS started win Reportedly, expected presidential presidentof Budiaša HSLSDrazen the to the the movingHSLS. the from was Granic awayGoran government the of president vice the and SDP a the from all were interior and 2/3justice affairs, foreign of ministers The minister. prime majority of all Ibid. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goran_Grani%C4%87 Arsen Bacic, “ The SDP-HSLS coalition formed a government. Ivica Racan (SDP) became the became IvicaRacan(SDP) formed agovernment. coalition The SDP-HSLS Between 1990 and 2000 the President of the Republic (PR) was notaccountable of (PR) was Republic the President the Between and 2000 1990 The Constitutional system of the Republic of Croatia The president of inin president of February 2000 whenthe The Croatia waselected 225 423 After2000 Parliamentary system Racan did not accept this and allegedly, 425 ” , in Dragica Vujadinovic Dragica in , 424 This after2000 changed ,60. Between CEU eTD Collection Ministry Ministry of Interior of Justice Ministry Parliament Government whose leader was the PR Parliament was ruled by a majority of the party majority One party government due to parliamentary Government subordinated to the President one no to accountable and parliament the President allhad executive power; was superiorto http://www.vlada.hr/Default.asp?ru=17&sid=&jezik=1 428 427 http://www.vlada.hr/Download/2002/12/12/Zakon.Suradnji.Haag.htm 426 ICTY. the with cooperation more efficient enabled and this keep state andmilitary to procedure of of the secrets, witnesses obligation releasing the and monitoringlaw of co-operation.the not Croatian have to The did provisions related control full had in Croatia government the Thus, body. relevant the to them forwards then stipulates that all requests1996, gave highestthe for the government co-operation. the responsibility from the ICTY should The provisions of Lawthe on co-operation inbewith ICTY,whichwas the April adopted directed to the government,Since institutionalized1996, Croatia and hadvery regular communication with ICTY. the which 7.3 Institutional veto points and partisan veto players Table 8: institutional structure forcooperation with the ICTY bodies were responsible for cooperation with the ICTY. Summary of the information collected from the following official governments sites: Constitutional Law on cooperation of Republic of Croatia with the ICTY, article 2, http://www.projuris.org/tribunal_zakon.htm SDP SDP the parliament Comfortable majority in voting qualified majority IDS; decisions made by HSS, HNS, LS, HSLS, of SDP, Coalition 2000-2003 226 No dominant majority No dominant Coalition government Government subordinated to the Parliament of power distribution President to has co-operate withother actors within HDZ HDZ HDZ majority Parliament controlled by Tudjman by HDZ president and controlled Government , and 1990-1999 www.sabor.hr 428 427 Table 8shows which 426 Thelaw CEU eTD Collection Haagu) 5 March 1999 Resolution about co-operationwith ICTY, the (Reolucija osuradnji s medjunarodnim kaznenim sudom u sudom uden Haagu)14 April 2000 429 yearbefore. a resolution passed ICTY. the with cooperation on debates vehement always were there Thus, actions. these criminalize would that anything do to not very careful were led issues that andmilitary to all the independenceof actions Croatia, police parties of the on Especially majority. parliament the of attitudes general the of independently acted cooperation. for responsible was This because haveespecially government couldthe not activities,monitor thusmeans byno they theiror could presidents be seen assolely cooperation nothavedo executive functions andwereonly coordinate to andthere for national councils above, mentioned Serbia As caseof in the from SDP. the were ministers All Picula. Tonino Affairs foreign of Minister and Mimica Neven Integration European for Minister Lucin, Sime Interior of Minister Ivanisevic, Justice of Minister president of the National council for cooperation with the ICTY. Relevant ministers activities,were Goran Granic as the vice president of the government was appointed the also stated that the Republic of of crimes nationality the perpetrators. punished shouldregardless the committed be of Croatia did ICTY the 1999.The throughout newin government its in Declaration allthat 2000 stated not question the right inthey be Thisin should prosecuted national all courts. with a waystopped cooperation of the ICTY to startled liberationthe Croatian were anyindividualcrimes that to theof operations during Declaration about co-operation with the ICTY, (Deklaracija o suradnji s Medjuanrodnim kaznenim s Medjuanrodnim o suradnji (Deklaracija ICTY, the with co-operation about Declaration As the government isAs governmentthe maincoordinatingthe for body all ICTYrelated the In April 2000, the new Croatian Parliament passed a Declaration that opposed opposed the a Declaration passedthat newthe In April Parliament Croatian 2000, http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/270239.hml http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/272976.html 429 The Resolution of 1999 had a provision that if had of aprovision TheResolution that there 1999 227 It CEU eTD Collection 431 433 432 u Haag?), Naletilica ‘preselile’ Zagrebu 430 ICTY that was closer to the HDZ than the SDP. few monthsall issues, HSLSthe onthe inthe firstassumed position of government the its completion. immediately Warafter and duringHomeland the determine committed for investigations crimes the to responsibility victims of war asked for Associations of In andcooperation January 2001, overturned. was soon volunteers the full terminationin War, improvement the early duringcommitted this Homeland the of the operation of cooperation with the ICTY. Croatia. to some betransferred cases that tonegotiate government of the efforts government. of the activities the and cooperation with againstthe ICTY the to organize demonstrations opposition parties 9years was in released, in2004he to decreased and was his caseused by 2000 imprisonment. 45 yearssentenced to involuntarily 1996,was who insurrendered fact Blaskic, March2000,Tihomir the that unacceptable political qualifications and attempts to revise the results of torevise of the unacceptable Homeland the attempts results qualifications political and decisively which positionsof supports the of President the deny government Croatian the “energeticallydevalue and condemningallattempts to denying theWar Homeland and Parliament: the of Conclusions the by followed was this July, In respectively. pocket 2001 the ICTYindicted generals for Ademi Gotovina and operations'Storm' and Medak http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/cis/en/cis_blaskic.pdf Hrvatska i haski sud, ihaski Hrvatska “A court against a court” ( Sudom protiv suda), protiv Sudom ( court” a against court “A u demonstracije li (Jesu Hague?” the to Naletilic ‘transferred’ Zagreb in demonstrations the “Did Although always thewithin governmentcoalition cannot there beagreementon Despite the Declaration in 2000 that allowed the ICTY to investigate crimes investigate to ICTY allowed the in2000that Declaration the Despite http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/pubs/archive/data/200003/00313-002-pubs-zag.htm 432 Slobodna Dalmacija, According to Racan those demonstrations undermined demonstrations those Racan to According 431 Although heappealedandlaterhispunishment Vecernji list 228 430 The bad start for the government was 11 March 2000 , 15January 2001 433 In June CEU eTD Collection 18 April 2000 (90,8% gradjana smatra dasvaki zlocinmora biti kaznjenbez obzira na to tko ga je pocinio) 435 u Haagu) 434 completely2.5% were satisfiedatall and12.8%werenot notsatisfied, 19%did while with the relations of the ICTY towards Croatia and only 14% were mostly satisfied. Only they certainly did notand 9.6% were undecided. However, 50% were mostly notsatisfied 1.6% believed not, said they probably did weresurethey believed 18% did, 4.3% 65%, war crimesHomeland duringcommitted all.Croatian defenders probably at That 39%, while 32.3%saidit was mainly andright 22.7%said mainly no, and 2.8%said not undecided. New governmentcrimebe should punished regardless who it.of committed 6.5% disagrees, 2.7% were was right to allow the ICTYA survey was doneby agencyMediathe on meter issue.the to investigate all crimes been couldhave there war crimes. that accepting and wasnot said action as anti terrorist war theHomeland regarded HDZgovernment thatthe electorate maneuver.government parties to The ontherightremindused every opportunity to the in the war and some of associations who inthegovernment, partners ofthose coalition the participated their familiesobstacles to cooperate with the ICTY but the fact that the opposition in the parliament,were against cooperationto do with righteous aims of the Homeland War. haveand and individualcrimes responsibility donotanything command punishing which left very littleit as whatregarded legal militaryitand legitimate butsupported investigatingoperations, spaceit.” criminalizing mean even might that War for the Conclusions aboutco-operation with the ICTY, (Zakljuccio suradnji s medjunarodnimkaznenim sudom “90,8% of citizens believe every individual crime must be punished regardless of who committed it” The government was in a very delicate position. It did not have institutional http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/232666.html 229 434 The Parliament was against criminalizing against was Parliament The 435 90.8% agreed any that 90.8%agreed Jutarnji list, CEU eTD Collection 438 437 on 25 May 2000. Peace for amemberof became Partnership Croatia arena. from international the rewarded the Homeland war The Declarationbrought of newthe parliament that allowed the ICTYinvestigate to operations of immediately7.4 External pressures and incentives some rewards. incentives. external the against This balanced was new power of constellation domestic Croatian this how outline will section following policy was radical option to their sharpeningnegative ICTY. towards the attitudes of the right, whichhave politicswas not and In should been showed changed; this undecided.20% general advocated if towards extradition ICTY the believed wasrequired that generals 18%thought of 61%; less cooperation itThat Croatiachange shouldandwere 78%;politics 8%wasundecided. 12% supported withitas just; generally and just notseeit10% did all. at Against of extraditions generals the ICTY.that it did not. 56% thought that Hague tribunal was generally notjust; The and only 14% saw Hrvatskoj), 436 was closed down. from mission unitmonitoring on Croatia and 1 NovembertheOSCE the Croatian police president. the reality of the situation, still a half was notfavorable to the relations with the ICTY. know. Although surveyshowsthattheelectoratethe understood issuesthe involved and Bartlett, 83. http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm more wasa as there power, to of costs threat real had a government Thus, Racan Croatia”strongeratmosphere“Anti-Hague gettingin antihasko is (Zaostreno raspolozenje u A survey lack in inAugust2000showed of done ministerand confidence prime Jutarnjij list, 436 52% thought that Hague wanted to criminalize Homeland war and only criminalizeand31% only to Hague wanted war Homeland that 52%thought 438 437 The closing of these two missions showed that Croatia fulfilled all of On 26 September theCouncil of withdrewEurope its monitoring 19 August 2000 230 CEU eTD Collection justified their position by Bobetko theirwasjustified fact that the havingin position health Hedied problems. government The he was. where knew they though even indictment the him serve not did government the in 2002,and September was indicted (1993) actions inMedakpocket Moreover, General the Main CroatianJanko Bobetko Chiefof of army Staff the during in office. term Racan the throughout ICTY the with for cooperation obstacles important arrested andthis most of the one not indictee caseremained Gotovina was other officially signed in in Luxembourg.October negotiations with EU.The the SAA was presigned inMay2001 Brusselsand Zagrebinthe invited summit SAP of countries 2000CroatiaNovember opened 441 Agreement 440 439 in(area near in1993surrendered July2001. pocket Gospic) actions arguments cameled that new 2001 inJune indictments about to mentioned two the above As and Croatia. cooperation with2005. the ICTY. in February effect took agreement the and agreement ratify membersthe to EU for the Rahim Ademifor applied membershipbut was not process going the further because it fourtook years accused for the Medak EUconfirmedall 2000 the for EU. arepotential that countries SAP candidates in June summit Fiera the at that was for Croatia reward biggest the Process, Association in the area and Europe of well or itperforming was intheCouncil criteria fullmembership the for the the OSCE mission. As invited in 1999 to join the Stabilization and http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/cis/en/cis_ademi_norac.pdf http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/default.asp?ru=143&sid=&akcija=&jezik=1 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm The reason for this delay was the deterioration of the relations between the ICTY the between relations the of deterioration the was delay this for reason The 231 440 In February 2003 Croatia officially Stabilisation and Association 441 However, the However, 439 During CEU eTD Collection 447 446 445 444 443 442 government. Croatian sometimes selective and slow but the Prosecutor was in direct and regular contact with Government.” the on warrant arrest the of following service escape to allowed “was and Gotovina However, problems in still persisted gaining specific access to anddocuments witnesses wasmarked. archives andwitnesses differentin accessto improvementbasis regular and Relations between the Office of the Prosecutor and CroatianCroatia’s continued improveco-operation 2002 to according to ICTYreport. the government were kept on a co-operating andallowing collectcrucialto the prosecutor material for outstandingissue. Croatia improving,”ICTY report. isgradually readthe 2001the Tribunal in Zagreb. liaison the for andProsecutor created office to documents forwarded Storm/Flash, All of these were 2000 newthe recognized government thatjurisdiction ICTYhad the over operationsvery positive developments.arrests and with cooperate forevidence. regards to search to willingness “Co-operation with the criticism of the ICTY remained that Croatia was not cooperating. longerdeal with havebut did indictmentany April this the government to 2003, thus not problemsin still existed accessgaining prompt tospecific for purpose the documents of Tribunal. the to voluntarily nonethelessnegotiations allowed abscondfollowing him him failed surrenderto with to ibid., 241 the ICTY Annual Report 2003, paragraph 240, 226 paragraph ibid., ICTY Annual Report 2002, paragraph227, ICTY AnnualReport 2001, paragraph 196 ICTY AnnualReport 2000, paragraph 159 The ICTY 2000 was relatively positive as it stated Croatiaitmore that stated showed The relatively positive ICTY 2000was as The 2003 Report stated Croatia that had responsibility to apprehend Croatia had but Gotovina stated to responsibility thatThe 2003Report 445 447 Access to different Access archives andto witnesses wasimproving; 446 Croatian was co-operation assessed asimproving though http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2001/index.htm http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2002/index.htm http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2000/index.htm http://www.un.org/icty/rappanny-e/2003/index.htm 232 443 New government was Newgovernment 442 By March 444 CEU eTD Collection 448 Seperovic. minister Storm after which were reluctantly in by given the White Book government previous compliments to the new governmentfor handing over documents related to processes CroatianIn April talking of 2000 DelPonte to Stjepan Minister Justice Ivanisevic, gave war ofthegenerals of Homeland Domestic concerning indictments the 7.4.1 debates Bobetko. General Janko against warrant and arrest indictment the Croatian co-operation. In addition, Croatia failed to act immediately upon the issuanceongoing investigations. of Gotovina was still a fugitive, which was the strongest criticism of ICTY as astate. Croatia eliminate would and county of the war veteransstatement saidit would undermine legal system,and parliament constitution a but In warveterans War, during the were dissatisfied. committed Homeland the cooperation with the ICTY that allowedjurisdiction to the ICTY to prosecute crimes ratovati), 450 Vecernji list, 449 returns it to Zagreb but there was no one to accept it. Chronology of main theICTY related issues during Racan’sthe government “Defenders ready to go to war again over the declaration” (Branitelji zbog deklaracije spremni ponovo spremni deklaracije zbog (Branitelji declaration” the over again war to go to ready “Defenders 448 1 July 27 April 29 August- Special forces order have toarrest Gotovina. 27 July - the ICTY publicly indicted Gotovina for‘Storm’ 25 July - Rahim Ademi voluntarily went to the Hague 24 July – arrest warrant forgeneral Gotovina issues 17 July – PM Racan attempts to negotiate change of the ICTY statute 10 July – government wants to defend generals and HDZ procedurestarts to change law onthe 7 July- emergency government session 5 July – indictment forgeneral Gotovina “There are no secret indictments against Croats” (Nema zapecacenih optuznica protiv Hrvata), protiv optuznica zapecacenih (Nema Croats” against indictments secret no are “There closer ICTY onthe position opposition and government the makes case ‘Bobetko’ September 21 20 September – Croatia returns the indictment to the ICTY; then the ICTY made it public and public it made ICTY the then ICTY; the to indictment the returns Croatia – September 20 indicted Bobetko general – September 19 4 May – Government suggest that Croatia courts deal with the ICTY indictments Jutarnji list 7 April 2000 2001 2002 – list of Croats indicted by the ICTY was published , 15 April 2000 -the ICTY does not want to change indictment against Gotovina 449 This was just after the government passedadeclaration Thiswas government the justafter on 233 450 Ivica Pancic, Minister of Minister Pancic, Ivica CEU eTD Collection Hrvatskom ne poteze pitanje suradnje sa Haskim sudom), Haskim sa suradnje pitanje poteze ne Hrvatskom 452 concluded. ICTY. Strategic aim of Croatia in the period 2000-2004 was accession to the EU, Mimica but should there bestrengthening dialogue of with office chief of the prosecutor of the cooperation with the ICTY. Mimica said there was no change in policy towards the ICTY needed to fulfillmentionedCroatiaspecifically ICTY.The EUdidthe focus ICTYbut on the that not conditionsnegotiation team said that regional cooperation was important as well as cooperation with set in the 1997 Council conclusions one of which was ruralnog i urbanog zabuducnost Hrvatske?), 451 negotiating SAP18 DecemberEU on with 2000. other, mostly rural, that did not accept any form of criminality of Homeland war. warof And during the defense. a righteous if werecommitted bethey punishedeven hadto individual crimes that acknowledged urban,that predominantly One, rural Croatia. and urban between divide the as it viewed Some public. the to explain to manage not did newgovernment the that ICTY the about misconceptions some There were defenders. the wouldgovernmenthave defend to and the protect Croatian country, by was created which governmentit lag,before his oneof defenders removed put a response that, wooden the to representativesway relationsorganizeto proper with theprevious ICTYthat the governmentavoided.As a only but defenders, on attack an not was declaration the that explain to tried andDefenders said that as long as there were those like him, the “Negotiations between EU and Croatia: EU is not raising the issue of the ICTY” (EU u pregovorima s “Zagreb and the Hague: the fight of rural vs. urban for the future of Croatia?” (Zagreb i Haag: Borba Haag: i (Zagreb ofCroatia?” future the for urban vs. of rural fight the Hague: the and “Zagreb In the midst of the new debate over the ICTY cooperation, Croatia started Croatia cooperation, ICTY the over newof debate the midst In the Vjesnik, 234 11 August 2000 Vjesnik 452 Neven Mimica, leader of the Croatian , 19December2000 451 CEU eTD Collection 454 sama), potpuno ostala i Haagom and remained all alone” (Nastojeci se u Hrvatskoj svima svidjeti Racanovavlada zaostrila je odnose sa 453 because thatwas byCroatian begovernment accepted not war would Homeland inindictments for the an In points. Racan stated interview that suggested December cooperation and wassupporting cooperation expressing thus dissatisfaction with the conditions in country.the Mesic, presidentof the republicconditioning wasagainst could be seen inprosecuted as as order chronological they had happened. This waspolitical and request asking frombe crimesthat should absurd request had The crimes. an had government committed the ICTYwho individuals influenced have not could moreindictees the objectively where responsibility time to stabilize criminalization. war andits economic preparation of publicforthe inevitable indictmentsthe againstgenerals ofhomeland– and social ICTY. Itwasseen by asgenuinesome redefinition of butrelations sawitothers only as opposition ICTY, the to made governmentthe called so thirteen relatedconclusions tothe needed voters. government andthe local wereclose as elections voices, appease domesticdissenting move to was seenasa be It had done. to what for public domestic the gradually prepare to reasons Brusselshopingmove was thatthis government wasmotivated byinternal only political international community saw this asgetting tothe HDZ, closer though Racan it.denied The War. Homeland the operations during to the insometestify casesrelated theICTY. before Stipetic Petar General of testimony postpone “Getting The Hague out” (Istjerivanje Haaga), (Istjerivanje out” Hague The “Getting “Trying to satisfy everybody in Croatia Racan’s government put a strain on cooperation with the ICTY A worsening of relations was seen inindefinitelyA was of governmentdecision seen worsening relations to In late 2000, tofind In late2000, anddomestic balance between EUcriteria the some Republika, 454 The government could not accept indictments on command on indictments accept not could government The 15 December 2000 December 15 Feral Tirbun, 235 16 December2000 453 He was supposed to CEU eTD Collection transkripata uHaag), transkripata transcripts to the Hague”456 (Vlada mijenja Zakon o suradnjina kidtat Haaskog suda razorio bi vladajucukoaliciju), jer ne moze vise kontrolirati455 Mesicevo slanje specific of crime. against or whom doubt evidence those werereasonable there considering changing law that would mean that the ICTY could onlygovernmentif were given13 points up on. ask extradition of was strong assomestay HSLS coalition said andnotonly wouldpartners in not they the like.investigations of didnot liked ICTYthey Butthethe or pressure government on the repliedPonte condition thatCroatia could not cooperation by choosing which indictment. for amatter been have not could view in government’s that something independently sending all they evidence in possessed cabinetof the president.the have acted to his They seemed of cabinet. led and Croatia by current President sovereignty Croatia increatinga and those who thirdly, participated independent and Croatian somewanted balancedcan which protect cooperation that in government the HSP andwing right other and secondly, parties theirmajority supporters: of acurrent the firstly, a current that didnew notlists want of almostpotential any received Government cooperation, transfer such suspectsAfter each conversations. president former the from from whichthe ICTY. was ledThus controlMesic’s cabinet, whichwassendingtranscripts could government not president by therethe HDZ, were three currentsthe that law was of change the reasonfor Another means. diplomatic and political forming: PrimeGranicby legal, ICTYwouldthe Goran Minister with besolved saidthe deadlock “Government is changing Law on cooperation because it cannot control any longer Mesic sending Mesic longer any control cannot it because cooperation on Law changing is “Government pristanak (Vladin coalition” ruling break would Hague the from dictate ofthe acceptance “Government In 2001 as the indictments of the two generals were received, Croatia was generals werereceived, Croatia of two indictments the In 2001as the Glas Slavonije, 6 January 2001 236 Vjesnik, 23 December2000 456 Deputy 455 Del CEU eTD Collection to know when Gotovina would be arrested as it was believed he was still in Croatia. crucial if Croatia wanted a positive report on cooperation. be arrestwould Gotovina’s that UNand the to she reported before country the visit Granic met Del Ponte in bywarcrimes. independence a closed meeting butCroatia got that as they all presupposed Croats affected Generals accusation of speculations were that wantthey not tostopcooperation butjust did Croatian toprotect defenders; andbelieved she would again cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY to which Croatia committed herself. The HDZ said butthey cessation rejected by as they mighthavewere governmentthe ledto of documents. necessary andgive in investigations further full continue cooperation assurances to made Croatia and in Zagreb testify could Stipetic general was agreedthat It points. isolation. to back have gone would Croatia otherwise in as Zagreb, for diplomats was arelief Government, whichended –there positively between andtheCroatian Del talksPonte biti uhicen Gotovina), 460 20 July 2001 with theICTY” (Saboropet predlozio Vladi da razmotri promjenu Ustavnog zakona oHaagu), 459 Beogradu), okrece se Haag Ponte, 458 odstupiti od 13 haaskih tocaka ilice Hrvatska ponovo potonuti uisolaciju.), 457 and Croatia. “Carla Del Ponte wants to know when will Gotovina be arrested” (Carlu del Ponte je zanimalo kada ce “Parliament againsuggested togovernment to considerchanging Constitutional law cooperationon “Racansaved with talks Del Ponte, Hague isturning to Belgrade” (Rracan je spasio razgovore sDel ”Racan has to give up his 13 points on Hague or Croatia will again wither into isolation” (Racan mora In July 2001 The HDZ proposed changes to the law on cooperation with the ICTY International community was disappointed with the tensions between the ICTY the between tensions the with disappointed was community International 458 Racan was constructive inthetalks andgovernmentdid not insist on 13 the 457 13points had by beenrefused aslegally After the ICTY the unfounded. Slobodna Dalmacija, Republika, 459 In September, in order to mitigate the tensions, Goran tensions, the mitigate to in order InSeptember, 2 September2001 18 January 2001 237 460 Del Ponte reportedly wanted Republika, 12 January 2001 Jutarnji list, CEU eTD Collection should’. technical butitit seemed problems was that going a warningthat‘things werenot asthey EU parliamenthim. Non cooperationdid notarrest to wanted and wasdetermined Croatia assurances that shegot that but extradited withdiscuss the ICTY caused Croatian beenshePonte toldGotovina theUNSecurity that Council hadnot wasdisappointed that Croatia some international SAA.legalbodies didwhatwas let heGotovinasure thatall duty.their Del go,wasrelevant Thesoft sanctions. officialeasily disowned its own heroes. Luka Trconic(HSS) said it was unlikely that government reasonsICTY treated Croatia and saidwere that Croatia was the onlyeconomic- said shebelieve didnot country governmentletbut she Gotovina go in was howdisappointed the in recent history that so 462 list, 461 written objection ICTYindictments the againstto generals AdemiandGotovina, which implementation on based indicted been have not could he a result, as and do to bound legally of thesecommanded military legitimate operations in in 1993 Medakthe Pocket,ashe was militaryservegovernmentdidindictment.not him the Government AccordingBobetko the to activities.that it was cooperating. Gotovina was still at large, Bobetko was in Croatia but the Later the Government submitted similar in indictment. person of a secret the detention immediate havefor Gotovinathe have asked should preventively. Croatia arrested not She could “Delay because of Gotovina?” (Odgoda zbog Gotovine), Croatiangovernment allowedto Gotovina run away” (Vlada RH da pustila Gotovinapobjegne) 28 November 2001 November 28 VladimiritSeks (HDZ)maintainedfault had Del Ponte’s was Gotovina left. that In 2003 the government was not managing persuadenot community international to was In government 2003 the 462 238 Vjesnik , 27November2001 461 Vesna Skare Ozbolt (DC) Jutarnji CEU eTD Collection 467 466 vladi), Racanovoj suda haaskog zahtjevi novi 465 464 463 rejected. ICTY the government gave mixed and unclear signals to international community. international to signals unclear and mixed gave government EU membership toput strong pressure on Croatia and toincrease tension to the limits. institutionsdo totheir Granicsaid duty. wasDel Ponte using candidacy bid Croatian for the of and readiness wasresponsibility there nothat question be could butthere arrested said therebe could discussion in governmentwas whether not successful him or getting knew whereGotovina wasand they that information received his He about whereabouts. few had on they becausethey Granic they denied occasions. such opportunity wanted if Gotovina arrest could government Croatian claimed still She archives. to global access for they never asked possible andthat as asprecise for documentation was request the still the about actionswaiting documents for of army inCroatian Bosnia. EU soquickly.” refused then itmeans it does not follow the rules, which again means that it will not enter Croatia wants toenter EU it has to follow the rules of EU if cooperation with the ICTY is information from contradictory Croatian side.the A saying:diplomat wasquoted “if was there as suspects, ICTY the for catching unit special was there whether clear the SAA.the made Thusitstartimpossible it for Croatianegotiation to for EUmembership. arrested. not Gotovina was Ibid., OSCE mission in Croatia, Report Bobetko, 10 “London: Arrest Gotovina, or…” (London: uhitite Gotovinu inace…), Gotovinu uhitite (London: or…” Gotovina, Arrest “London: “Last inthe Hague: round new requests of ICTYto Racan’s government”the (Zadnja runda u Haagu: “Granic: Hague is deceiving the public” (Granic: Hag obmanjuje javnost) obmanjuje Hag (Granic: public” the deceiving is Hague “Granic: Western European diplomats were growing impatient with Croatia. The Croatia. with impatient weregrowing diplomats European Western The UK asked the UN Security Council to introduce if Croatia against sanctions Council to UNSecurity askedThe the UK 466 463 The ICTY spokesperson Florence Hartmann said that they were 467 The UK kept Croatia in a form of sanctions by not ratifying Jutarnji List, Jutarnji th October 2002 October 239 26 April 2003 Globus, Glas Slavonije, 29 August 2003 464 465 She believed 8 March2003 It was not CEU eTD Collection Pozitivno izvjesce jedino ako Vlada uhvati Gotovinu iducih 6 dana), 6 iducih Gotovinu uhvati Vlada ako jedino izvjesce Pozitivno 469 u Domovinskom ratu pocinili ratni zlocin), crimes Homelandduring war”(U Hrvatskoj je 3212ljudi podvrgnuto sudskom procesu zbog sumnje da su 468 submitted. Thereportshowed how much with Croatia cooperated ICTY. the EUwas for thequestionnairefinished the prosecutionbefore not report of State was the application to the EU, which was submitted they wouldto not ratify the SAA. the EU in October 2003.even However,worse. Thethe UK wasway. consistentNobody contradicted withcontext of years UNSecurity the Council resolution after not being of mentioned insuch its theposition UK on this, that whichsame level. it important Symbolically was also very because Croatia wasputagain in the until made Gotovinadiplomatic was the accepting they were at that was not andCroatia andMladic position Karadzic with together arrested of Croatia The most difficult for Croatia was the fact that Gotovina was put in the UN resolution would be negative due to the failure to arrest Gotovina.arrest failure the dueto be to negative would cases were started independently of creation of the ICTY and its work. was that more important was What them. came to cases that with in accordance decision served. This been had already andthose issued 106 of wereverdicts Since 2000,457convicting meant thatand released. verdict had 436were a cases solved; 563 caseswere 1999 and2003, 999 Croatian courts did not flatter the ICTY but were making know where Gotovina was. know where Gotovina confirm not enough.Mesicto did President DelPonte againthat they called Reportedly, more arguments to prove what they were doing because these arguments were not “Hague: Positive report could only happen ifgovernment arrests Gotovinain the next 6days” (Haag: “InCroatia 3212people have beencriminalunder proceedings undersuspicion that they committed Despite this Croatia was fulfilling the questionnaire for membership the Despite thisCroatiaquestionnaire the wasfulfilling Despite all this, Florence Hartmann she expected the 2003 Report UN 2003Report sheto the the expected Florence Hartmann Despite all this, Vjesnik, 240 22 September2003 469 Jutarnji list, Government needed to show to needed Government 3 October2003 468 Between CEU eTD Collection 472 471 je strane ponor”, je strane 470 although new parliamentary the scheduled.elections were already was lastthe fulfill attemptto new goal the governmentpromised –EUmembership, embarked upon a tour of the main European capitals lobbyto for his country. His mission some negative publicity Croatia hadwith regards tocooperation with ICTY,Racan the will decide on ratification of of SAA.” onratification will decide UK the which of basis the on Ponte Del by sentences two on depends EU for candidacy of our fate the is that clear success.It guarantee not moves do right even and hell, are walking on a narrow path and abyss is on both sides… any wrong move can take us to did or did not do diddid butnot or wayit the andpresented was done office prosecutor’s to the andto government that its secret services were out of control and that it was notso much whatit of wholethe region and appealedtothe UK to supportCroatia. mean whichcould destabilization beeasilydestabilized was thatCroatiaargument could punishedfor something she have couldobjectively not finddone, i.e. him.Racan’s be not Croatia should that but ICTY go tothe hadGotovina to that Racan accepted taken.” ICTYfugitives most arenot for the wanted extradition steps of significant membership future if EU be “thereCroatia noreal steps towards Serbiacan and indicted. extradite theirCroatia British to ministerforDennis Europe warned MacShane both forSerbia and pressure wasnecessary But theUK wasthat of position report. the appeal Croatia to tosupport UKdiplomats the of negativeto report regardless potentially ibid., ibid. “Racan: We are on a narrow road and abyss is on both sides” (Ivica Racan: Na uskom smo putu a s obje In a diplomatic mission helpto bid Croatian for EU membership andmitigate The ICTY pressure continued in October 2003 as Del Ponte accusedCroatian as Del Ponte 2003 in October continued The ICTYpressure Jutarnji list, 4 October2003 471 That is why Racan went to London inanticipation London to went Racan is why That 241 470 Racan stated, “We Racanstated, 472 CEU eTD Collection October2003 (Josipovic: OdlukaSabora odnose za Hrvatske i Haaga nema nikakvihpravnik ucinaka), 475 19 October2003 474 vise nisam nadlezan), nisam vise 473 insisted that the EUintegrationthe was addressingobvious. DelPonte, OSCEmeetingthe in Vienna EU requirementbut thepressurefrom ICTYcontinued.the Thelinkbetween ICTYcooperationthe and for Croatia must be Gotovina’swere against. arrest, wouldit. There implement were in70 MPs voting favor50abstained from otherwise onlyfour and government the that but decision the regretted he hethat said Racan However, position. nothavecoalitionin the government which did that unified the government, proved party the ICTY statute. laws and Croatian against such regulation was that law.repeated Hartmann breaking the in participate wantto he not did andthat was unlawful this Granic said indictment. the to relevant documentation have could in ICTY, the not are who those of accused, even lawyersall of that made aregulation passed Theparliament ICTY. the with relations andimminent opposition the used every create newopportunity waysto of exacerbating already were The elections break. to slowly started that government coalition influenced andit all opposition getting wereincreasing,domestic External was stronger, pressures from the position of president of National Council for cooperation with the ICTY. moreCroatiaAs didmuch countries in he than other a regions. resigned the consequence, others. the “Josipovic: Sabor decision has no legal consequences for the relations between Croatia and the ICTY” the and Croatia between relations the for consequences legal no has decision Sabor “Josipovic: “Hague condemned decisionof Sabor”Croatian (Haag osudio odluku Hrvatskog sabora), “Granic: Iam longerno responsible issues forthe of ICTY”(Granic: Za the posloveHaaskim sa sudom The Racan government was falling apart and the new elections werescheduled, andnew was falling elections the apart The Racan government 473 Granic as President of National council for cooperation repeated again that repeated for cooperation council of National GranicasPresident 475 474 Vecernji list, The proposition of this parliament decision was made by the HSLS, a 18 October2003 242 Jutarnji list, Vjesnik, 20 CEU eTD Collection suradnji sa Haagom treba dijeliti moguce od objektivno nemoguceg), 476 to wasdifficult ICTY the towards position the candidacy.However, forthe application preparing was in 2000and for negotiations SAP started country the rewards wereclear, to bring Croatia closer to the EU, the position towards the ICTY was ambiguous. The EU limitingthus the room for maneuverfor government.the eliminated but partisanthe veto players, from especially opposition the were numerous, government from the right wing oriented parties. Institutional veto points were formally the for to power threat was aconstant there Therefore, react. might public the how unsure they were because decisions certain implement to government the for difficulties created had with the always Thispublic and of Homeland the HDZ appeal efforts. position war betraying of it andaccuse government hand criticize the itfree ato that gave opposition operationsFlash. and Storm and thisdebate, the However, stirred asHDZwasin the for the cooperation withingovernment The newpower. government of Racan allinstitutionalremoved obstacles the ICTY,a for be may they tempting how bymatter no accepting incentives, external the than factor stronger that the ICTY had The period isof 2000-03 ademonstration that domesticthe jurisdiction can constellation power beof 7.5 Conclusion of the samethe wereremained. demands early backparliamentary elections power, brought the inNovember2003,that HDZ to after Even continued. pressure external the Gotovina about information no was there that never bearrested. might “In cooperationwith the ICTY it is needed to divide betweenpossible from objectively impossible” (U Though the position towards the EU was clear and the government did everything 476 Despite the justifications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 243 Vjesnik, 6November2003 CEU eTD Collection division between coalitionthe andanparties end to governingthe coalition. sustainableled final was notthe by problems to exacerbated that to other pressure, importantbeCroatiana value independence compromised. wastoo The to government on how to deal with indictments problems facewere clearbutdomestic EUcandidacy the from problems. serious Gains against generals thatthrough were seenthe newas heroesparty constellation.obstacles institutional who newcreate to i.e. cooperation, law on annul the to cooperation, helped reverse to threatened Andconstantly parties, right the this of especially is positions, party wheredifferent the Racan government position governmentthe of became There ambiguous. werenoinstitutional butobstacles began to Homelandmany war, voices dissenting even within governmentbegan toemerge and the when the indictments started to cut deeply into the questions of national defense, of same time Croatian governmentEuropean policy,was always all forefforts cooperation were put withto get defended the thegeneral with all possible legalmeans. an ICTY.EU candidate However, status government the Bobetko, i.e.of Racan surrender,inGeneral Janko caseof did the not for Croatia. At theindicted and the Intheonly case where guarantees. necessary support all would provide government their knew they because voluntarily, went mostly they and citizens its of any neverhas arrested Croatia is that why Probably crimes. potential ininvestigating ICTY the of role the obstructing not still while interest national its protect to means political independence. had country the and gainedits that patriotic pride sentiments the balance againstthe This demonstrates responsibility.governmentThis took that demonstrates clear was pro There legal ICTYand and reality used all the and of Croatia existence the recognized 244 CEU eTD Collection governments had towards the legacy of the Homeland war that was difficultto overcome. that legacy of war Homeland the had towards governments all that of special the is position relations aconsequence This government Hague. positions of the indicteesthe anddefended did government not the even issue cases in some theNevertheless, arrest clear. completely not warrantsis but sent objections to The colleagues arrest want not they to military did that and personnel police solidarity among previous HDZ government and thus they didfollow not the orders, or it was a question of notdoing their job. Whether this was because they were staffed by loyal supporters of the control of allthe had truly stategovernment the whether is unclear remains bodies. What EU. the with relations The ICTY mentioned in theposition ICTYandimproving ofthe governmentwascooperation with institutional one report that secret servicesto the werefact that preventingthus, full makingcooperation. The decision was notfragmented process due all of the relevant into numerous a someparliamentary that decisions problems; way created institutional ministriesled which players veto partisan numerous were there but obstacles institutional no were were held by less hypotheses. whichmade likely There parliament, the cooperation these confirming SDP and that the general increased. domestic costs the more difficult were well, demands as the but started cooperation Actually, government the had ambitious plansfor cooperation inand the beginning the confirmed size asthe andthetimingenough rewardwasforthe of thecooperation.not Hence, concerning the hypotheses, the ones on reward and size were not There was low public support on cooperation, and very strong anti- ICTY bloc in 245 CEU eTD Collection with EUandthe progresstowardsmembership. forrelations improve Croatiacondition institutional to important became most the arrest month.Ante Gotovina proved beto a difficult casefor Sanader's government as well.His Both of them were indictedin February 2004 andvoluntarily surrendered the following Gotovina. Ante caseof relatedcasesto the general were two These 'Storm'. operation for the Cermak Mladen Markacand Ivan of generals werethose indictments important indicted himdo TheHague in Other hewastransferred prosecutor July 2004. of, Croatian the casethat war crimes for adifferent asentence serving inCroatia prison in was issued Medak Pocket 1993. Indictment inMay in 2004 and was as already Norac was exposed to. government the pressures that and incentives international of light in cooperation the regarding issues main some and partisan veto players for the cooperation with the ICTY. The final section will look at firstly general outline andpowercost, positions then explain institutional the structure will chapter The priority. main the as integration EU the and ICTY the with cooperation complete whichmeant government, stancefrom HDZ previous the completely opposite positions as the governmentparty. The HDZled byIvoitsSanader, new a president took elections broughtThe ICTY. the with cooperation the backcontinue and HDZ the especially theopposition, HDZ to power and this chapterappease with ofRacan dealt The previous to the struggle government chapter the will look8.1 Introduction at what were their 2003-05 Croatia 8- Chapter The main issues related to the ICTY were indictments of General Mirko Norac for 246 CEU eTD Collection 481 Europe and the Balkans 480 479 478 320. [Demokratizacija Hrvatske: uspjesi ikompleksi suvremene hrvatske politike], (Prometej:Zagreb, 2004), 477 structures.” power displeased mutual theand with “inefficiency, arguments focusing on in own positions the critical. ‘too was opposition the and inefficiency’ government,the of whileincumbent the governmentcomplained that 8.2 Actors: general positions and power costs Croatian Croatian independence.” for head formerTudjmanist for whatalthough hedid wearegrateful state the of party to longer a Weno are party. center-right democratic, areformed, now “We are agenda. the EU membership was a priority and that cooperation with party. the opposition becamean TheSDPof Racan parliament. ICTY was high on the party of andpensioners) the SDSS(Serbiandemocraticin independentparty) the decided to form a minority government. majority create coalition to had enough government with togetherthe with coalitionsupport partners the HSLS and DC thatof got 3 seats;the and the HSP HSLS,with 9, it HSU (Croatian minorities in the government marked a radical shift for the party hadimage itsformarked built party the a radicalshiftthat in minorities thegovernment representatives. minority have not did which government, Racan’s from different was also but minorities marginalizing of policy HDZ Tudjman’s minority not onlyfrom support of which adeparture Serbian andparties, other was Ibid. Quoted in Dejan Jovic, “Croatia and the European Union: a long delayed journey”, Ibid., 323. Ibid., 321. politics Croatian ofcontemporary complexes and successes of Croatia: Democratisation Dekanic, Igor Towards theTowards November 2003elections, focused theopposition on ‘passivity the As soon as Sanader took over the position of prime minister, he madehe that clear minister, prime of position the over as Sanadertook As soon 478 , vol. 8, no.1, April 2006, 98. The HDZ headed by Ivo Sanader, won 66 out of Theof andby Sanader, won 66 out HDZheaded 152 seats Ivo 480 The reformist character of HDZ was confirmed by the 477 The polls showed that the citizens were the most 247 479 Surprising everyone, the HDZ 481 Representatives of Representatives Journal of Southern CEU eTD Collection Pad popularnosti Sanadera, Vlade i HDZ-a [Fallingsupport forSanader, the government and HDZ]the http://www.vjesnik.hr/pdf/2003%5C12%5C23%5C04A4.PDF 482 as compared 21.3%in to before. month the government The by was supported 56.5% government. Thesecond most popular party SDPandwas the by wassupported 22.8% the of popularity the in decrease a been had there month same the During 26.4%. to followingmonth Mesic, PresidentSanader wassecond andhis fell from to popularity 32 Skare-Ozbolt. Vesna Justice of Minister for the except HDZ the from the cooperation with theintegrations and EU supported in the parliament most because of parties the achievable ICTY, which the HDZ set as dependedits priorities. All ministersonit that the fact Despite government. party one wasastrong Sanader's government other were partiesits position increaseor power costs for the party. Although it wasaminority government, inendanger to enough not was thethis However, HDZ. the of position new the parliamentunderstand not society,to especially those directly influenced by warthe such as veteranscarry of war that could out in elements were there that It wasclear fewbefore. years until only nationalism on its policies, that goal was 483 from %. 35.2 to31.8 most popular party but popularity the had dropped3.4percentin toApril comparison HDZ government byMay2004.The HDZwasstill andthe haddecreasedslightly the Integration. Affairs, Mlinaricfor Marijan and Interior, Kitarovic Kolindafor Grabar European Foreign Zuzul for Miomir were The ministers (DC). Center 2000 shejoined Democratic beto amemberFranjo HDZandan the of from advisor to Tudjman but the 1990s, during Sanaderovavlada: pet jakih, pet nepoznatih i sredina, http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/09/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 Due to the major shift in the policy of the HDZ, the popularity Ivo Sanader, the Sanader, Ivo popularity the HDZ, the of policy in the shift major the to Due 483 After being the most popular politician April,during the 248 online isue of Vjesnik, 23 December 2003 482 Though she used Thoughshe CEU eTD Collection with the author 485 484 aims and interests. During Racan’s government the HDZ was using all means discreditto seemscooperation.Sanaderin that tofulfill It order acted political hisandparty’s of power supporter and hewith once hebiggest became ICTY, the cameto the was leading againstinto theEU.During rallies Sanader Racan’s cooperation term office, cooperation with the ICTY, or if he was acting pragmatically with an aim bringto Croatia and war Homeland the towards position his changed completely Sanader whether interests. on just acting as this saw others while HDZ, of positions the policy inmarked shift asignificant ICTY, the with ofcooperation andunconditional pronounced HDZ of the 1990s. Some hadpeopleinformation noreal EUorCroatian about progress. accession viewed thismuch that but of surveysshowed that the standards economic for concerns showed as an evolutionaryoverwhelmed placesurvey justshifttook before and country the candidate status gained the public was with inpoliticization the because lower Shefound support the perception reasonsforprocess. of accession the based on anyreal wasnot skepticism saidthis becauseshe was worried Kitarovic Grabar- of the topic.supportJust over 50%didEU membership. integration not for Minister Kolinda EU Her ministry had regularand third the wasRacan with 10.7%. surveysmostwas the popular politician droppedtosecondplacewith 27.7%; Sanader with 26.4 that who said they were satisfied with its work, as compared to 64.4% in April. Stjepan Mesic Interviews with members of political parties HNS and SDP in June 2005 in Zagreb; interviews on file http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/08/30/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 Euroskepticizam In short, the victory of HDZ and consequent coalition with minority parties and By August 2004,the opinion rising showed polls Euroscepticism inCroatia. 249 485 It was not clear Itwasnot 484 CEU eTD Collection cooperation with Hague], the 486 including thewith cooperation theconsensus ICTY.Thus broad was formain the there a government’s resolve toreachits aims joining of EUby the fulfilling allits obligations positions the onlybeand deserve not portrayed did to assuch. criticismslegalThe Haguewere with dealt by whichwerenothing procedures, spectacular standard thatcamefrom that requests not The necessary. were ICTY the with for cooperation Council came fromand not thepolitical legal of matter a concern. was HSPcooperation that showing This were changes these wasbelieved supposedwereDirectorate, to show that formernot special ablebodiescourts such as to shakewasin for Moreover, cooperation January Directorate the international with 2004, criminal formed the ministries, the governmentdid have not within any formal and legalinstitutional obstacles. the withcooperate ICTY.Withthe its firm cooperate,to position and having control in all Ministryhavedeal to Sanader of toinstitutional obstacles not The new did Ivo with government of Justice.8.3 Institutional veto points and partisan veto players run. long and a instance oncepowerthey took wasmorefor theybelieved in Croatia profitable the in opposition, time duringthe party interests their in narrow suited a way that electorate cooperate with to ICTY.Consequently,hethe andhis the mobilizing party were what he thought was beneficial for Croatia, i.e. EU membership and thus it was necessary government; acting incumbentSanaderbecamethe primeafter minister he on started Haag ‘preuzela’ Uprava Ministarstva pravosudja [Directorate within the ministry of Justice take overto All parties, except for the HSP, were left of HDZ, thus in terms of partisan Slobodna Dalmacija , 8 January 2004 250 486 Jaksa Muljacic, head of headthe of JaksaMuljacic, CEU eTD Collection Bandic Bandic and Demo], 487 Homeland war). the during operated that units forces-paramilitary defense of HOS(Croatian volunteers the Associationis for guilty defending Croatia'. Velimir AccordingKvesic, to apresident of the of‘He text with the Gotovina Ante indicted General of posters of anappearance circles was the Organizations political stirred within Croatian political that debate incident InJune2004,one indictees. the expressed activities sympathiestowards that werepartiesthere whichsupported ofHomeland war and coming to terms with the ICTY indictments for this war. Unofficially,Volunteers in ICTY. the War they goal fulfill Sanader’s governmentof to including EU political cooperation criteria with were distributed by term, was that Racan always had to be careful of whether Sanader would take SDP votes Racan’shis to duringin contrast made easier Sanader HDZ.What of theposition to the and past chameleon the politics. whatwashappeningstatementthat backlash behavior the destructive wasa on HDZ of mass protestswhen Split in saying was opposition, the in then werewas who Sanader, Ivo what reminded organized against SDP The SDPofficials. by itthe denied was butfinanced this, SDP the that speculations the ICTY in 2001. Thedefending SDP official said against protested volunteers policies the HDZ which were not of the they thought in the the and the heroes were andMarkac Cermak Gotovina, generals HSO the For indictments. generals, the defenders and the Homeland war. There were some HVIDRA: Tiskanje plakata financirali Bandic i Demo [HVIDRA: printing of posters was financed by However, a bone of contention was always balance between defending Croatia’s defending between balance always was of contention abone However, Despite these occasional statements, the SDP never posed a serious political threat Vecernji list Vecernji 487 They protesting ICTYandthe againstwere new accepting against , 8 June 2004 251 CEU eTD Collection Application for Membership of the European Union, European ofthe Membership for Application 488 into integrated of SAP andare fundamental element area conditions “These operation. Council on 29 April 1997 andtheyincluded cooperation with ICTYandthe regional co- beseen. could conditions fulfillment membership 2004,evolution EUissuedinthe politicalof the of the April of ICTY. the with cooperation full the upon conditions upof opening the membership, for negotiations the for 17March set 2009, Council the European Nevertheless country. ascandidate Croatia Council confirmed positive opinion on Croatia's application for membership and in June the European moreApril issuedbecoming visibleand In within2004theEUCommission reach. Despite the demands to cooperate with the ICTY, the incentives from the 8.4 InternationalEU were pressures and incentives took. step Sanader’sgovernment that was cooperation a necessary ICTY toachievethis,the inand EUwasprimary order the theaccession to clearly goal thus and power losing government incumbent the of threat imminent no was There chose. new government the power, to came had Sanader before removed were even ICTY with the for cooperation an easier positionwere thuslimited andmostly notsignificant, appeased or and while institutional obstacles to handle cooperationhands to implement policieswithhis policies. Thus in theterms of the thatbalance of power in the domestic arenaICTY, Sanaderthe had free government if it set of rightso HDZ the influence could on political the spectrum that endangerhisposition or to fulfill. As partisanby nothave thenationalSanaderappealing issue. the did to anyone inpower Once to veto players http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=504DC0257 COM(2004)257 of 20 April 2004, Communication from the Commission Opinion on Croatia's In the European Commission Opinion on the application of Croatia for Croatia of application the on Opinion Commission European In the 488 The EU stated that the SAP conditions were defined by the 252 CEU eTD Collection undertaking measures to locate accused tolocate Gotovina.” measures undertaking newindictments andinfacilitated surrenderof two all to whilestill regard accused, immediately acted 2003, in December Government the of change the after “Croatia, read, at the time the reportstill been in andhadnot extradited who 2001 indicted general Ante Gotovina to wasreferred written. This corroborated ICTY.” the to transferred and located were indictees remaining the ensure that the ICTY report to allsteps take necessary neededto Croatia However, ICTY. fully with the co-operating for 2004, which months.significantly April in Croatia is statedthat In now thepast 2004 theProsecutor EU Council of conclusions 29 April reads, “Cooperation1997. The report has improved membership referredtothe defined forby Croatia’s obligations specifically application countries. on states intheir theCommission applicant The with relations opinion Zbog Gotovine pod prismotrom i Haag i Hrvatska [Because of Gotovina The Hague and Croatia under Croatia and surveillance] Hague The Gotovina of [Because Hrvatska i Haag i prismotrom pod Gotovine Zbog 493 492 491 490 489 press in in Zagreb April. shesaid only Of the course that question was the outstanding TheHague”, with fully cooperating sayis we can that Balkans in have state the we “Finally on cooperation ICTY. the with 2004 wasagood of period 8.4.1 Cases of Norac andBlaskic indomestic debates until Gotovina isin The Hague.” docontinue their utmost to to areexpected Croatian authorities However,the this stage. at Croatia of of Government efforts the isthe with satisfied “The Prosecutor concluded, beingwas toarrestGotovina. extremely as praised efforts cooperative injoint report The SAAsignedwith Croatia.” the ibid., paragraph 276 paragraph ibid., theICTY 2004,report COM (2004) 257 of 20 April 2004, 31 ibid., 5. http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/04/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2004/index.htm 489 492 The ICTY was high on the agenda of The ICTYwashighonthe agenda EUmemberthe of 253 491 The new government of of Sanader Thenew government 493 paragraph 275 Del Ponte said to the 490 This CEU eTD Collection 495 496 Clanstvo u Europskoj uniji nacionalni interes i prioritet [EU membership national priority and interest] po pregovori kandidat, Hrvatska 494 Croatia to be transferred to for wholecase the waiting were they and that Justice Vesna Skare Ozbolt said that arrest warrant was notserved by the ICTY for Norac of Minister lot of itunrest. created inJuly2004 indicted was hissentence, was serving and in Croatia tried who wasalready Norac, when general cases. However, two these on wentto ICTYvoluntarily monththe following and the wasnot there much debate public of the EU accession by trying to get cheap points in the daily politics. political andsocial to beactors to anything responsible endanger andnot to prospects the relevant those invited also He priority”. national and interest national is our EU the that understand. tookdetermination It and vision and aboveallit was necessary understand to obstacles whothose didof not understand andevenmore did of wantwho those not to added that gettingstatus and saidmembershipstrategic the EU wasthe most important aim Croatia. He of closer2005. to the in start would negotiations the and that EU acandidate was Croatia that confirmed officially was not alwaysfugitive Gotovina that it and shouldbenot forgotten. In June 2004, European council easy: “It required crushing the protests againstprotests newindictments for In Norac. June 2004 associations of defenders of the organize to itthreatened Otherwise war. Homeland the about Declaration for the respect for the They innocent. him ascalled becausesaw toNorac they support unrestrained Norac nije kriv [Norac is not guilty], http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/19/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/19/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=1 494 Although in Although February generalsindicted were Markac2004 two and Cermak,they Associations of defenders in the Homeland war were protesting. They gave In June 2004, President Mesic addressed the nation in relation to the candidacy the inrelation nation Mesic addressedthe to President InJune 2004, þ etkom godine [croati a candidate: negotiations next year] next negotiations acandidate: [croati godine etkom Novi list Novi , 24May 2004 254 news agency HINA agency news 495 496 . CEU eTD Collection Sanader: Istrazit cemo tko je zadrzavao dokumente [Sanader: we will investigate here are the documents] the are here investigate wewill [Sanader: dokumente je zadrzavao tko cemo Istrazit Sanader: 499 Norac u Haagu 8. srpnja [NOrac in theHague8 onJuly] 498 Neka se vlasti izjasne je li Norac zlocinac ili heroj Domovinskog rata [Is Norac hero of war criminal] 497 be proven in the his release and said,ICTY.” “The decision is an example how real truth of the Homeland war can Blaskic and to sentence the with his satisfaction expressed Sanader Minister Prime crime. committed the that military the hadcontrol units over hehadnot as itwasconcluded months inprison during histrial. charges The foragainst him dropped murders the were reduced to 9years andhe finishedit servingbecause he already spent in years and 8 4 Croatia45 years hissentence to in was after returning was firstsentenced to was prison decide whether Norac should be tried again before a domestic court or before the ICTY. statement, but was insuring that he would not stay there. would theICTYtogiveNorac goto a that Justice of confirmed Minister authorities. Croatian ICTYand the with in cooperation created was politically his prosecution criminal.For the defenders Norac was a true hero of the Homeland war and they believed war washeroor Norac clearly state whether to authorities and of political parties in supportof Norac city organized protest Splitof assuminghis office, new IvoSanader prime minister, calledme andsaid that the explained why therewar. homeland was fullcooperate withprotectimportant achievements to ICTYin the to of order the cooperation with the ICTY. “On the second day of http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/07/30/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/07/02/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/28/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 On the positive side, General Tihomir Blaskic who hadinOn surrendered side,General positive who the 1996 andTihomir Blaskic Del Ponte June 2004, in in Croatia while gave interviewDel Ponte In an 499 Sanader could use this to justifyit Sanader hisposition to was use this could that 255 497 They asked all representatives of 498 After this the ICTY would CEU eTD Collection However, in the absence of International Criminal forTribunal the former in Yugoslavia HagueThe confirmation ICTY). (the of full cooperation, wasfullcooperation there opened thatwith UN on17March the 2005 provided the Council on European Council accession that 16/17 December 2004decided negotiationsof would be 16 March 2005 when negotiationsthe for membership supposed startwith were to Croatia. “The in March apparent very became This integration. EU with continue could Croatia whether in political process. role the any have to want not did She a role. had she that presume she did nor decisions EU in role any have not did she but it gave she opinion an for her asked EU the If Tribunal. 501 interview of Del Pont for Vecernji list, Vjesnik and Slobodna Dalmacija, Vecernji list, 5 June 2004 500 right.” was sure results would in be seen a fewweeks because “we are everythingdoing She claimed that theyfind Gotovina. necessary to instructions all ICTY accept the was ready to government the were working hard with Mladen Bajic,andsaid prosecutor the state with closely wasworking she She revealed the governmentintelligent. politically government his called She Sanader. ofIvo of government Croatia the with and that she problem such wasno but there question, waspolitical there anytime suffered cooperation previous allowed be governments themselves to influenced politically and that immediately extradited. were Herzegovina and inBosnia of warcrimes accused Croatians andsix other That is what she calledasked for.” ‘full cooperation’.Governmentwould fully Thatiscooperate. what happened. Hefulfilled everything we She underlined that ibid Sander je ispunio sve sto smo od njeg atrazili [Sanader fulfilled everything we asked from him] joint 501 This is interestingvery position she took,especially decidedbecause her reports She said that her job was to make sure the countries cooperate with the 500 She mentioned that results were seen instantly. Generals Cermak, Markac Cermak, Generals instantly. seen were results that mentioned She 256 CEU eTD Collection dissatisfaction with Sanader’s government, which shows correlation. The trend of the of trend The correlation. shows which government, Sanader’s with dissatisfaction the wasclosefor to EU support Decreaseinthe agricultural products. of standardization membership,itsbut inharmonization also economic changes unpopular and Open hunt of Gotovina was not forgiven by a part of ICTY. the with HDZcooperation of constructive actions be unpopular electorate the could Some reasons as well as some of 505 504 503 502 Less than 49% of the population was supporting EU. hisarrest. on work accelerate to weekends in haveorder to right not would general Gotovina arrest to actions fulfilling whoseserious wererelatedtothe positions about those allobligations and be done. moreto needed that noted and status candidate gaining after self-satisfaction criticized Croatia’s Diplomats 2005. betweenperiod Gotovinain June March ICTY and arrest the 2004 and inability to the This inMarch 2005 decision was a consequenceof deterioration of with relations the 8.4.2 The pressures for arrestGotovina's opportunity butGotovina was captured.still not forceincentives,offered inFebruary entered the wasaware2005. Croatia SAA of the Gotovina Thein EU notarrested. wasstill Croatia respects, all wascooperating other postpone theopening 2005 decided negotiations.” of to accession Strah od Europe raste kako se bliže pregovori [The fear of EU groing as negotiations get closer] get negotiations as of EU groing fear [The pregovori sebliže kako raste od Europe Strah Gotovina] on hunt [Open Gotovinu na lov poceo U zadru Gotovina] of because Croatia on [Pressure Hrvatsku pritisakna velik Gotovine Zbog EU- Croatia Relations, At the same time of the efforts to arrest Gotovina, the support of the EU dropped. http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/10/11/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/09/24/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/09/23/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 504 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm 503 However, 257 Vjesnik 505 The fell 49%. support from 70 to reported, the government was government the reported, 502 Despite the factthat the Despite CEU eTD Collection fullICTY cooperation] Gotovina jedina prepeka zapunu saradnju Hrvatske sHaaskim sudom [Gotovina the only obstacle left for blocked] accounts 508 [Gotovina’s racuna Gotovininih svih Blokada assests] Gotovina’s freeze to [Croatia 507 imovinu Gotovininu zamrznuti mora Hrvatska 506 Ante Gotovina. Mladic and Ratko Karadzic, was 49% itin andin in 2004 decrease clear: 200077%wasproEU October was 2002 79%while the government for approval. government the support to the efficient fulfillmentICTY fugitives Ministry of of Justicethe of CroatiaICTY made a mandate,draft law about special measureswhich of had couldto comply soon bewith given this. to In order to follow the EU decision on freezing of assets to the andhe that was sure thatstate structures didnot support him. withinstructures some parts of governmentthe fugitivethey thatsupport werenot true Minister of Justice in charge of the ICTY cooperation said that accusations of the existing the to assistant Muljacic Jaksa full cooperation. for obstacles were there authorities state Gotovina but they had not been fruitful and also it seemed that within structures of the of arrest the towards activities increased noted The report The Hague. to transferred and arrested hewas until Croatiakeep pressureon the to community international ICTY. that Ante Gotovina was still an of Gotovina. obstacle for the full cooperation of Croatia with the http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/11/24/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/11/11/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/10/22/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 508 EU Council made a decision to freeze assets of the ICTY indictees, Radovan indictees, of ICTY the freezeassets to made adecision EU Council In November 2004, Carla Del Ponte again reported to the UN Security Council UN Security againreportedtothe In NovemberCarla DelPonte 2004, She was then defining thearrestof Gotovina asfull cooperation and asked 507 Behind this long title the law was set to freeze the assets freeze the to set law was the title long this Behind 258 506 All candidate countries, including Croatia countries, All candidate HINA news agency CEU eTD Collection Ante Gotovina in line with their jurisdiction. their with line in Gotovina Ante units, Ministry of Interior, State prosecution, ICTY. in the appearance Gotovina’s with negotiations to accelerate search forit sincewas expected EUconnected Mesicthought decision while with the was surprised the ICTY fugitive as planned. concludedCroatia cooperating wasnot in that negotiations enough tostart inMarch order no progress in the cooperation inmemberbecome 2009. EU of a couldexpect to with the ICTY.startif not Croatia on Croatia 17 March and that everythingwentasplanned, would2005 In February with negotiations the report ICTY the positive 2005, without that said Rehn Olli there. been the EU Commissionalways had but new, nothing was ICTY the for condition that and Croatia of affirmation assessedbefore negotiations the were supposedtoopen. Sanader said wasanother this Gotovina ] of arrest and search the for ask SAnader and [Mesic Gotovine iuhicenje poteru traze Sanader i Mesic 512 Croatia] Rehn tvrdi da je Gotovina u Hrvatskoj, Sanader iznenadjen, Mesic nije. [Rehn claims Gotovina is in 511 HINA news agency 510 Pregovori pocinju 17. Ozujka [Negotiations openon 17 March] 509 Luxembourg and presidentof EUsaidthe that Gotovinabe had to in HagueforThe transferthe of remainingthe fugitive. Juncker, Jean-Claude prime minister of again full totake they for readiness Theyexpressed measures. wanted all and undivided ininformation not hadin they Gotovina was lightCroatia but of pressuresfrom the EU March 2005. http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/02/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/01/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=2 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/01/20/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/12/18/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=1 Mesic and Sanader asked all relevant administrative bodies, including intelligence including bodies, administrative relevant all asked Sanader and Mesic The EU's December2004decision was toopennegotiations with Croatia on 17 511 509 Rehn asked for political will to extradite Gotovina. It seemed that Sanader seemed It that extradite Gotovina. to for Rehn will political asked Still, full cooperation with the ICTY was necessary and it would be again itand would was necessary ICTY the with full cooperation Still, 259 512 510 They again stated according to that stated Theyagain By the beginning of Bythebeginning2005there was of CEU eTD Collection Pregovori odgodjeni [Negotiations postponed] 518 Pristupni pregovori nece poceti 17.ozujka [Negotiations will not start on17 March] 517 Carla DelPonte presudila: Hrvatska ne suradjuje S Haagom [Del Ponte : Croatia is not cooperating] 516 Sanader pozvao Gotovinu da domoljublje pokaze uHaagu [SAnader called on Gotovina to surrender] 515 Sanader] and Britanska vlada podupire Mesicevu iSanaderovu zajednicku izjavu [British government supports Mesic 514 open] HINA negotiations news before agency Hague the to [Gotovina pregovora. pocetka prije Haag u mora Gotovina 513 surrender. was, and onhim called to Primethe ministerand and president repeated that goGotovinahad to to ICTY. the negotiation. membership open Croatia to Ministers did not giveMinisters didnotdate exactnegotiations.of opening of positive. network helpedthat himbutactionslate were too and marginal change to into the report of Croatian They government. measures take did tofreeze anddisable hisassets to positive.makeinformation within Shesaid helpedthereport reach herto Gotovina was negative report. gave Del Ponte locateeverything to fugitivethe failedfind but to and arresthimby 9 March 2005 when Gotovina, while some EU members interpreted cooperation only as an arrest. Croatia andlocate did arrest to out been carried had everything that wasshowing cooperation of negotiations until it was concluded that Croatia fully cooperates. Croatia that it concluded was until negotiations of openingpostpone theEUdecide to lackconsensus of Duetothe justifications. Croatia’s intoaccount take anddidnot report ICTY on the solely relied and Sweden Denmark http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/01/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/17/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/16/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/09/ http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/08/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/02/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 In March 2005, Sanader still repeated that they did not know whereknow Gotovina not did they repeatedthat still In March Sanader 2005, Despite all activities, negotiations did not start on 17 March 2005 and the EU the start on March 2005 and not 17 Despite negotiations did allactivities, 516 She said cooperation was not full and that no new no that and full not was cooperation said She REUTERS 515 513 He said that Croatia’s understanding of full 260 British government appreciated the letter of letter the appreciated government British 517 The UK, the Netherlands, 518 EU still said the 514 CEU eTD Collection Biscevic coordinator za Gotovinu[Biscevic coordinator] Gotovinu[Biscevic za coordinator Biscevic 521 viewed was document the when taken notes the 520 519 minister. forcoordinator following upon Actionthe plan and wassolely to primethe responsible andmain Foreign Affairs of Ministry the secretary of state assistant appointed ICTY cases trials. In for the judiciary domestic of andpreparation illegal activities; organized crime and fight order to follow up the fugitive;support tothe foreign coordination with to services and ICTY;activities the work on action plan of force downthe network to Hidajet and legal efforts procedure and concerted coordination Biscevicof maintenance agencies; intelligence of was efficiency and credibility improving fugitive; show that Gotovina included:was The awareness campaign to raisingpoints The Hague. to Gotovina transferring at aiming Action plan sixpoint Sanader presented andApril CroatianPonte Minister Sanaderon by led 2005. with delegation 26 Prime plannedApril for 2005 . pointthat as he saidwould that mean the governmentdid not doanything before. inuntil theactivities anything tochange ofintegrationSanaderrefused future processes. the ICTY‘s in the not and hands inCroatia’s was it that and Croatia for open were doors document by the EU Council, Del Ponte maintained her position that Croatia was not was Croatia that position her maintained Ponte Del Council, EU the by document assessmenthave positive enoughto developments benew no would there andthatprobably progress of cooperation andCroatia. ICTY before the EU summit in June 2005. According to the An EU diplomat allowed me to view the document but not to photocopy it; this information is based on based is information this it; photocopy to not but document the view to me allowed diplomat EU An http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/croatia/eu_croatia_relations_en.htm http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/04/29/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 The meeting of extended EU troika on Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY was Despite this detailed plan the Task force concluded that there was no substantial no was there that force concluded Task the plan detailed this Despite 521 Still Mladen Bajic, state prosecutor was the main coordinator between between the was coordinator main prosecutor the state Bajic, Mladen Still 519 The task force on the ICTY-Croatia met separately Del with met separately force ICTY-Croatia on the Thetask 261 520 CEU eTD Collection everything to locate and arrest Gotovina. and locate arrest to everything and didCroatia cooperated fully statedthat DelPonte membership. negotiations onEU Gotovina.” locate Ante failed accusedthe promises, to numerous anddespite expectations Hrvatskoj pregovori! [Negotiations for Croatia!] for [Negotiations pregovori! Hrvatskoj 524 523 522 so far notand entities in regionthe and the international pursue andcommunity arrestthemto have borne Governments the to Repeated appeals justice. of administration for proper the concern results.” andAnte Gotovina, despite of is several Security the grave resolutions Council, of Mladic Ratko Karadzic, asRadovan such high-level accused, arrest failureto read, “The detailedinformation soon hisas whereabouts to arresthim. Hagueor inThe hermeant Gotovina foreither full thatcooperation and authorities Croatian of reach waswithin General Gotovina sources intelligenceher according to Del repeated network. that GotovinaPonte passinginfo the support in or to supporting police and159 involved inZadarwereremoved havingpolice working forofficers been toGotovina; of Croatian chief the network supporting againstthe aggressive actions and such as changes personal positivesteps mentioned some she cooperation. Still, for necessary was conditionality that this showed Del To Ponte, March 2005. Gotovina membership onlyafter EUwithheld the to open the right negotiations on 16 fully cooperating andshe stressed thatSanader tookseriously herfor extraditing requests ibid., paragraph 186 theICTY 2005,report http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/10/04/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 In October 2005, the EUcouncilIn Octobermeeting 2005,the would that Croatia start decided The new the ICTY report in August 2005 had negative Thereport had inAugust qualifications. new 2005 theICTYreport The 523 http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2005/index.htm 522 The report specifically noted “Croatia, contrary to contrary “Croatia, noted specifically Thereport 524 262 She praisedCroatian cooperation with giving , paragraph, 182 CEU eTD Collection constituted whatconstituted she defined ascooperation informedshe theEUthatCroatia wasfully shereceived intelligence Since the his location. on intelligence orproviding clear arrest Yugoslaviato the Security Council, 15 December2005 526 Europe] to ! [Welcome Europu u Dobrodosli 525 was. where Gotovina Del said 2005, 29 September on “indisputable that demonstrated Ponte Croatiaevidence” in UN the Council December Security Hague.Addressing toThe Spain and transferred in he wasarrested inafter December 2005, inThe answercame was notHague. The wasachieved. ICTY with the full cooperation confirmedthe that CarlaPonte that Del he fact the said“Absolutely decision, make this negotiations with Croatia, Olli Rehn came to Zagreb. Asked to state what was decisive tocooperation withStill negotiations provision the that be could stoppedif wasnothere continuous the ICTY was said there stillhad been improvement in cooperation without qualificationstanding. of full cooperation. easier, who were ready to open negotiations with Croatia evenImmediately in case that Del Ponte only after EU decided sources. international and Croatian with to open contacts as aswell other prosecutor state Bajic, Mladen herbetween and communications everyday werealmost forthere Gotovina andthatin participating search departments from Croatian her received office that reports based130 on was positive assessment her and necessary documents and efficiency Zagreb. She said praised professionalism of Address by Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former the for Tribunal Criminal International of the Prosecutor Ponte, Del Carla by Address http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/10/10/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 It was puzzling that Del Ponte gave positive report in October, while Gotovina ministers for EU the madethedecision this report media that said The Croatian 526 She repeated her criteria of assessing cooperation, which was his whichwas of cooperation, hercriteria She assessing repeated 263 525 www.un.org/icty CEU eTD Collection Znat Znat 529 528 527 Croatia and the ICTY.” between plan operational joint effective an and ICTY, the with co-operation full the to provided mainlyby policy European the Union’s consistent of conditioning EUaccession incentives, international of success will.“Thewas acombination key to political include to had which actors, national with cooperation to inaddition actors international Del praised thisstrategy Ponte effectively combiningas EUpressureand other 2005. October cooperating. Onthebasis of negotiations open with 3 on EU decidedthis Croatia to achieve that and how to defend the truth about the Homeland war. Homeland the about truth the defend to how and that achieve in the government, which knew in each moment what was the best for Croatia and how to havetrust to and news accept the all to asked Sanader Croatia. in cities other and Zagreb started to show their dissatisfaction with the arrest by protesting outcome. andpositive brought causing effectiveness operational damage in and will andof this completion political of task combination the sheconcludedthat leadership.” strong backingfrom political the prosecutorwhohadreceived proper, the of State professionals hard ofsmall numbermotivated “underleadership work of capable and the of a result was This summer. late in off pay to started in April minister prime Croatian EU conditionalityby insisting Gotovinabut Croatiajoining before extradited the NATO, sheunderscored as the most significant. She said that the Action plan set out by ibid. ibid. http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/12/10/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=3 ü emo obraniti istinu o Domovinskom ratu [We know how to defend the truth of the Homeland war] Homeland of the truth the defend to how know [We ratu oDomovinskom istinu obraniti emo However, the situation in Croatia after the arrest was very sensitive as some 528 They were able to guide all other relevant services to the successful 527 Del mentioned the USprovidedpressure that Ponte also extra 264 529 He said that he CEU eTD Collection 533 532 Zagreb] in turnout [Low uZagrebu odaziv Slab ] problems major 531 without [Protest izgreda bez potpore Skupovi 530 were locations. Protests ondifferent in evening the alsoearlier organized Gotovina were governmentmembers. Thepolice took11peopleinto custody. in Protests support of sang songs ofbuilding. The protesters weresupport carrying Gotovina’s photos as well as Croatian flags and toremovetried500-700 protesters from to just about infront square the of governmentthe the officers general, police 100 about of cordon a when violent turned protest The bottles. and stones whistled and insulted the Prime Minister and substances. explosive with bottles throwing as aswell stops transport and rooms vandalizingfire,incidents mainlysetting trees and blocking toppling streets, waiting 30 about were there born, hadbeen Gotovina where region the In arrest. of Gotovina's Gotovina fought for. like whonot what did those of asrevenge by seen veterans was the arrest praised andhis were Gotovina and war homeland again where people, many attract not did Zagreb in A protest legitimate. was which independence, Croatia’s for fighters all and Gotovina show respectto wanted to in protests Split. The protests peaceful organized veterans inSome protests of Gotovinasupport passedwithout problems. emotionsunderstood of peoplethe everybody butthat should refrainviolence. from governmentbuilding andviolence.refrainfrom protests to policeon citizens called Zadar fatalities. or injured no were There accidents. traffic two led to activities of the http://www.iskon.hr/vijesti/page/2005/12/09/0011006.html http://www.iskon.hr/vijesti/page/2005/12/09/0025006.html http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/12/12/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=5 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/12/12/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=4 There were many cases of violence and destruction all over Croatia on the night On the night of the arrest 11 people were injured protesting in front of the 533 531 . Protesters broke broke windows .Protesters two onthegovernmentbuilding using 265 530 Association of War 532 Some CEU eTD Collection 535 534 were nomajor political problems for Sanader the government. there arrest, led the to that developments the and explain parliament before the appear to minister for calls thePrime Except the from came Belgrade. arrest newsthe the of that itwas terrible hethought arrestbecause the in to relations government of actions the Djapiccourt. said HSPaskedfor Sanader tocome to Parliamentthe and explain the buthegeneral, beforewould the alsosaidhesure hisinnocence prove Gotovina was that the Croatialoved Croatian respected for all and defenders for and all and those who party HSP, Anto solution open forof problems Croatia andfor himself. Gotovina of wing President right Djapic calledIvica Racanthe dayformerand ofdisregard Gotovina’s PM andfor thepresident accusations government of protests, supported partiesother that HSPthere wereno the ICTY. Responsesarrest of to as,except a thevoices SDP dissenting appease these to task hadan easier of Sanader government very arrest said ofdifficult Gotovinathat the was. Nevertheless, independence the Croatian of anddefenders heroes home as viewed at were arrestof twoone types. for was a step in the cut forwhereoff awhile protesters traffic byburning on tires roads. the organized in Dubrovnik as on well as highwaysthe Zadar, Primostenaround Kastel and were from defended itselfshow during support heroically war.Protests city the that the general. arrested to the showed support also organized50 in where veteransGospic about andvolunteers of Homeland war Once again this demonstrated how sensitive who were those issueof the arresting Once this demonstrated again http://www.iskon.hr/vijesti/page/2005/12/08/0274006.html http://www.iskon.hr/vijesti/page/2005/12/09/0001006.html 534 They called the arrest shameful they wanted to 266 535 CEU eTD Collection but to work on implementing its policies. its implementing on work to but elections the at loses potential fear to not freedom government the gave that and this on bloc theactivities. Most of parties,the were except HSP, the supporting government the would that parliament the within opposition strong have not did that was ICTY the on element. However what is the most significant arethecrucial aandoperational activities process, the political part of wasonly will factor for the success of Sanader'sresults. Therefore, it was not only policythe position in favor of cooperation that was important, gave put the government pressure the but isunclear, this becauseof indelay cooperation Gotovinaagainst extradition isknow difficultto and what the governmentdid prevent to were who agencies intelligence or military police, within individuals any were there Whether minister. Prime the to responsible directly was plan Action the of coordinator the and were employed all capacities andspecific, very clear madeit Action the plan centralized, very was cooperation of process The in theparliament. blocs ICTY anti-the opinion was slightly changing but general attitude was pro-EU. There were no anti-EU or governmentthe put extra work in finalizing cooperation with ICTY. the finalincentive very period oftime,membership goal the and ashort within of reachable as a candidate state, which its Croatia EUconfirmed term of the start aswithin fewmonths hadagood government was a resultSanader's ICTY. of the with thecooperation the finish to previousin order government Croatian government's effort. of cooperation the accelerated sizehow rewards the and time of that showed This period With such 8.5 Conclusion The positions to the EU and cooperation with the ICTY were positive. The public 267 CEU eTD Collection applicant countries into accepting the EU norms, the countries that already have liberal have already that countries the norms, EU the accepting into countries applicant in socialising interested is especially EU and organisations, international since is that idea state respectsdemocratically, elected were judicialinstitutions where systems as political democracies liberal limits of the system and liberties of their citizens. (Oxford University Press :2005), p. 3 537 Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic change (Palgrave: 2006). 536 conservative; or nationalist more are that those and formed is EU the which on principles and values share already that parties between distinguishes positionsto the of mentionedsome authors above,for example who Schimmelfennig refers This compliance. thatdetermines factors main domestic asonethe of literature the isin used that dichotomy liberal/illiberal the challenged thethesis However, literature. here. is reviewed the with This inaccordance investigated inthe policy countries choices scene. political domestic the within interests party their of light in incentives and external pressures to they react examinedin how were actors The membership. EU for conditions political specific of fulfillment hinder or help factors what identifying infocus specificallyon parallelEastern EUaccession. Europe with was ongoing the The in transition of process the of understanding better offer and country; candidate potential andone candidate one by analyzing literature of the scope broaden the to attempted thesis the politics, domestic on influence EU the on literature existing the from Starting Conclusion 9- Chapter Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy,Leverage and IntegrationAfter communism, See forexample: Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, International Socailisation in The thesis argues that the EU conditionality was a crucial incentive for some 268 536 or Vachudovawhodefines or 537 Namely, the CEU eTD Collection 2000-2003 positive 1993-2000 positive Serbia ICTY the with ofcooperation outcome and factors of -summary Serbia 9: Table with the ICTY for both countries is summarized in tables 9 and 10 below. periods according to different governments in power. The outcometime of thein different cooperation analysed were These obstacles. institutional and players veto partisan towards the EU and the conditions (in these particulargovernment incumbent cases the of cooperation attitudes power, losing with thegovernment ICTY), incumbent of threat as such factors other thesisidentified the rewards, of of the timing size and factors external them thewithin boundaries intereststhe inof of partiesthe in Thus, power. addition to among power balance of of change constant andthe actors political the between interplay the on depends change policy the is that argument main The illiberal. and liberal between influential in incentives, of terms responding toEU and gobeyond thisbroaddistinction were problemscompliance. with and were sharing basic rules democratic were respecting elected, weredemocratically examined governments principles of the EU, restof the the of powers their the positions, times overstepped at andMilosevic Tudjman which they of regimes the where wanted countries, both in periods first the for Except countries. to these join, but still therecharacteristics would pass easier through this transition, i.e. power costs would be less for Thus, the thesis proposes that there are some more specific factors that are more that factors specific more some are that there proposes thesis Thus, the Milosevic) of extradition (until power losing of threat No Negative Positive ICTY towards attitude Government negative negative points veto Institutional 269 negative assassination) positive players Partisanveto (until negative positive pressures rewards/ External cooperation No Cooperation cooperation of Outcome CEU eTD Collection to cooperate in terms of visible rewards. However, sanctions could have potential led to potential have sanctions could in cooperate However, visibleto of rewards. terms incentives external low very were there that meant This forces. allied NATO by bombed i.e. it Serbia Moreover, underwas inmilitary sanction, undersanctions. also was 1999 from Croatia were and PHARE) (e.g. integration processes EU related suspended from Serbia in Kosovo in 1999. They were both sanctioned for suchbehaviour bybeing military withinoperations their Croatia territory, actions ‘Storm’ ‘Flash’ inand 1995,and democratic both conditionality wasset.In countries addition involved in that were minimum fulfil not did countries both as negative were rewards external timing and size The negative. have been mentioneddo above so. All factors to if theleadersdecided have shifted could cooperation the countries in both leader by one wascontrolled regime 2003-2008 positive 2000-2003 Negative 1993-2000 Positive Croatia Table 10: Croatia -summary of factors and outcome of cooperation with the ICTY 2008- 2003-2008 positive For the first two periods in wasmainly non-cooperation with the ICTY, but as the power lowing of threat No High negotiations) suspended (until EU Positive arriving) started war Homeland for indictments (after negative negative ICTY towards attitude Government High Negative positive positive negative veto points veto Institutional High positive 270 positive negative negative veto players veto Partisan High negative Positive positive (after1995) negative pressures rewards/ External High 2005) during (except negative cooperation Full cooperation No cooperation No cooperation of Outcome Cooperation cooperation No CEU eTD Collection former never manageddo. Thisformer never factor to costs. isthe bestdemonstration on power the of However the later government made full formedCroatia than in of in2000wasstronger formed 2003. that government the cooperation within government the the of ICTY position the that seems possible,it Thus HDZ. the of government whichminority the following for Croatia period 2003-08wasmixedagain, with unified but strong the the is that interesting is especially What majority. parliamentary strong relatively and parties. For Croatia the number of veto players was also mixed with coalition government Serbia it meant strong parliamentary butfragmentedmajority made governmentmany of players,basedby mixed in veto characterised 4.For presented on table classification the negative valuesof all factors which led tono cooperation. by for wasmarked bothcountries period the leaders.In short, any opposition the of than support andenjoyed popular more leaders charismatic andtheirwere parliament, the in majorities comfortable than more had always they as opposition the to power losing of threat real no had governments both style authoritarian their With war. Homeland hadjurisdiction1999 passed the courtno aresolution that actionsover the inthe cooperation within cooperation the alawbut in though passed ICTY. Croatia on 1996, for mechanisms institutional no were there that no surprise itwas institutions, political all of holding monopoly regimes both with and negative and EUwere ICTY the towards bethe Naturally tried not ICTY. victimsattitudes by were the andthuscould the ICTY and Croatia kept communication with itbut only in order to show that the Croats popular andthus unrest help over. opposition the ignoretake Still, Serbia continued to the cooperation because much they too put strain on governmentthe and could provoke The periodsecond wasmuch moreinteresting for both countries. Itwas 271 CEU eTD Collection indicted during aswell generals Racan’s andgovernment, two Ademi),as (Bobetko in was Gotovina of Homeland war.General the thatparticipated indictments generals ICTY andthe ICTY the with cooperation find between balance a not Racan could was closer to the HDZ position on cooperation with the ICTYto thanthe it wascooperation with the SDP. with breaking was due coalition the Governing power. losing threatof hadaserious government ICTY. The other party Racan’s above asexplained However, rewards. very strong all in were These negotiations. the coalition government openingup for and date of set the status in theconfirmed candidate over EU 2003, the - HSLS office Croatia and signedthe membership. appliedfor SAA EU As as took soon Sanader the EU and ICTY. Size and timing of rewards was very tempting. During Racan’s term in citizens. thedissenting mobilize didnotinfluence position government because wereno there strong opposing parties to declinein andsome it EUsupport the was relatedtotheICTYcooperation. of Butthis on extraditionsICTY and made inthis more itway for difficult government the make to tough decisions of indictees. with the cooperation the whoopposed war veterans and other of associations mobilized Duringto its the right HDZincluded cooperation with ICTY.Thethe government led of 2000 by hadSDP, the HDZ governmentwhich was that that theEUand ofjoining accepted sharedthe aim all parties the parliament, of theone opinionof the in the in minority were which wing parties extremeright for the except contrary, mostpolls vociferousshowedthere was no strong opposition to the cooperation with the ICTY in the parliament. To the that fact was the wanted options itchoose freeto more government made HDZ the What parties against cooperation that Attitudes of Attitudes both governments in Croatia of 2000 and 2003werepositive towards 27 2 CEU eTD Collection incremental incremental andPrimechange used Ministerhis Djindjic role as the chiefof the againstparties mobilizingvoters ICTY. the governmentwith supportnot HSLSdecidingthe ICTYcooperation to and opposition partisanthe government inRacan’sveto playersand inhis dueto wasprevented had for potential incremental change but potential wasfully this in used Sanader’s andboth governments players.more 9 power 10 show veto partisan and Thus,astables governmenton otherhandthe had highvaluesfor all exceptfactors for threat losingto fullwhich Racan’s lose cooperation. lead power to to threat nocooperation and to the ICTY and EU, no supportmajor in the parliament. All of the parties that were opposition to the HDZ were for EU. veto players, itplayerswas unitary government and did not fear break up of coalition or the loss of veto or fewerpartisan were there because was possible this Nevertheless, daily politics. institutionalgovernmentas politicallygive not intelligentand does one that intothe of pressures the vetocooperation anddescribed wasfull stated Sanader’s that The ICTYprosecutor points toyears.largefourfor whowasat General located made Gotovina to efforts government all prevent butalso the andCermak, of Markac voluntary surrenders were there cooperation, immediately accepted they power, to came government Once Sanader ICTY. HDZ to its right to mobilize the Having negative. wascompletely ICTY with the cooperation butthe went voluntarily the public contributed didextraditeAdemi any them, of not the government As aconsequence Homeland war. to the lack criminalize to regardedasan attempt Croatialot within asitofwas of debate which created cooperation with the In Serbia, the second period of mixed constellation of power had a potential for hadapotential of power constellation mixed of period second the In Serbia, Sanader’sIn short, governmenthad strong external incentives, positive attitudes 273 CEU eTD Collection a reason to continue such policy and to justify it as continuation of of justifyprevious as continuation it andto continue such policy a reasonto haltin cooperation with the ICTY after the assassination of the former Prime Minister, as Milosevic. leading to no major improvement in cooperation with the ICTY after the extradition of prevented cooperation despite the incentives and the proactive role of the Prime Minister, players veto partisan Once again, the legality. of rigid expense atthe easy solutions favoring minister prime the of style pragmatic the with impatient growing was DSS the passing alawoncooperation withinwith ICTY,butalso the thegoverning coalition as for cooperation.structure These onlynot seeninwere the federal level blocked which to the EU, there were still partisan veto players thatprevented the creation institutionalof conference was another financial incentive) and attitudes of the government were positive organisations, EUmembership was a clear option if the conditions were fulfilled, donors’ during(country tomost Djindjic’sbeinginternational government was re-admitted high were incentives external the although Therefore, actions. such to them mobilized society who Thishave in turn accessled to a haltoperations during Milosevic and eventually led to assassinationthe of primethe minister. on tocooperation arms wereas itthe became government against clear provoked that some move coalition began fall apartwith In addition such some leaving of to DSS eventually DOS. cooperation, elementsunrest among of thethe forcesSerbian government’s decree was seen bymany as unconstitutional, andunlawful. The that usedor tosome participate thepolitical ICTY. His insistencein on warextradition of Milosevic, which was done on the basis of the executiveactors tomake difficult some and decisions cooperation animpetustothe give with the used whoKostunica, by led was in 2003 Serbia of government next The 274 CEU eTD Collection when there were fundamental disagreements on the future of Serbia within the EU. cooperate in was impossibleforinterpreted by governmentto the DSS.It way this the independence accepted Kosovo. This of not in was wayimpliedany by butwas EU the if DSSbelievedKostunica andthat the this SAAit meantthe also Serbia accepted Kosovo proclaimed independencemembers in EU February 2008, itrecognized and shifted once focus The term. of the middle in the voluntary surrenders somedespite nocooperation, becamecomplete in term office by second Kostunica’s endthe the of which players ofcooperation it veto determined the outcome supported and that partisan indictees.andattitudes governmentarrest extradite Thus not to government’s position withholdingof threat credible the also and considerable, quite were which rewards EU case the thenocooperation leading of back suspension negotiations inMay2006.In tothe this to rewardswere no volunteersin there as However, SAA. the on casenegotiations the of up opening and EU the among with relations the ofmost wantednon-compliance, Karadzic surrenderedmiddle leading between end the of 2005 improvement2004 and of of to and Mladic, the voluntary surrenders ofindicted generals from army the and the police, since 14 of them cooperation slid actively,but it didbutwithdo positionthe Kostunicaof governmentthe of cooperate with notto ICTY the onlynot encourageoutweighfragmented government and small margin in the parliamentary support, but it had more to voluntarypolicy change didnot muchfrom nocooperation. However,thiswas notdue to the the surrenders. The be accepted. would voluntary andthatonly surrenders real was not institution legal Itgovernment’s decision. This wasonly his hisdisguising and party position thethat ICTY is still unclear what motivated 275 CEU eTD Collection cooperation and havingno despite institutional obstacles and having despite EU support mostseen in clearly Kostunica’s government wasagainst and third second the period. cooperation was by attitudesplayers. anddetermined factors: the is veto This partisan show herethat isto important is most What certain outcomes. thatleads factors to of because changed somefactors duringtheperiods theirvalueanditis alwayscombination itthen is only a technical issueoflocating most this wantedfugitive. assume that there are no partisanlocatingindictees. If forwe necessary alsoprofessional expertise but havewill political veto points amongcould the be, as Del Pontestaff said after Gotovina whowas arrested, works that it was not necessary on only theit. explanation One to areripe for factors if the yetall of arrested isnot Mladic General arrest, why is unclear still It Karadzic. of extradition and ICTY the with cooperation successful Tadic.all Allfor meantwere favourable cooperation andthus factors led that this tothe and loyal president the service)DS supporters with to the as theSecret cooperation (such ICTY and players veto partisan wereminimisedby staffing for bodies relevant ministriesheldmajor werewhichwith bythe cooperation, for cooperation DS was the for legal obstacles no were there because well as positive was obstacle institutional positiveview cooperation the to EUintegration.and to The valueof factor on the the negotiationstook The government ontheSAA. new EUrestarted the government The values of the timing and size of rewardsformed indictees inJuly of wasarrested. Karadzic wanted 2008, one Radovan most the were increasing as after the formingandgovernment in weaksupport parliamentthe but, assoon newthe governmentwas of the The new government still had many veto players due to the fragmented the to due players veto many had still government new The In short, tables are only generalization of all factors and could bemisleading and could factors all of generalization only tables are In short, 276 CEU eTD Collection veto points prevented cooperation, but all these could have been overcome ifpartisan could beenovercome have but all cooperation, these points veto prevented institutional that was alsodemonstrated cooperation. It leadto cannot only incentives ifisbutimportant EUand againstICTY,the the against the government the especially examined asthey interacted. Thus,it was emphasized that EU rewards and their timing is settled. was Kosovo issue of the until integration EU with continue to inclined less became he Consequently, sovereignty Serbia. of and integrity territorial undermine would EU the with relations that position However, thischanged once EUcountries andrecognized Kosovo a Kostunica took Kostunica inwas always ICTYbutintegration. the was for against principle EU importantalso should It office. lose to government the threat not does it that such tois players veto note that thethe head of government believes there shouldpositions be cooperation but alsoif the distribution of decided are government ICTY,i.e.the towards the in attitudes the whether on principle could be differentcouldlead loss tothe outcome the of power, is nocooperation.usually Thus, position of to the ifit ICTY, and even supports cooperation,ifveto players partisan the are strong and it ICTY and to when the incentiveshasnot attitudes work towards thegovernment negative EU do the EU. obstacles. institutional overcome wereattitudes asitbut to helped helped decisivefactors the incentives this, high external institutional ledobstacles, the governmentto find away extradite Milosevic.to Naturally, itis DjindjicFor policy. tocooperation, that clear positive government attitude despite during one period of term the in incentives these wereenoughoffice, change not to the What this shows is that these factors and the hypotheses derived from them were them from derived hypotheses the and factors these that is shows this What weredecisive. ICTY the towards isattitudes seen is Croatia that clearly For what 277 CEU eTD Collection control of all actors involved in the fulfillment of set conditions. was notlimiting the government policy choices due to the fear of loss of power or lack of accord with its ideology and principles and if domesticthe political distribution of power with in incentives were believed the if cooperating However, they only government worked ICTY. the the of conditionality political sensitive fulfill to governments motivate to werecrucial incentives external that established thesis the Inshort, actors. main political of the power of relative constellation by the constrained politics, domesticthe day-to-day maneuver it within had theroom to illiberal, butwhether liberal or government was the decisive. opposite position on the ICTY, otherwise the governmentattitudes towards the ICTY was a party had losing the to that of power was underthreat especially government when the positions and thus influence cooperation. The hypothesis on public opinion was relevant different couldtake actors or other political government within coalition partners different fragmented is making process When the decision veto players.partisan to cooperation and which forholds positionsparty cooperation, relevant referring areboth opposition.the Thehypotheses onfragmentation on makingdecision for process in as coalition government within beplayersthe can found veto partisan that underscore ICTY blocto less likelihood of cooperation, which has been confirmed in all cases and thisanti- can preventleads bloc anti-ICTY stronger that hypothesis to the refers also It connected. are closely institutionalisationcooperation with ICTY).Therefore,the partisan vetoplayers and institutional veto points veto players agreed of the tocooperation. create mechanisms It is significant for fulfilling to the criteria (in this case To sum up, these cases demonstrated that the key to cooperation was not whether not was cooperation to key the that demonstrated cases these up, sum To 278 CEU eTD Collection Hughes, James, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, Graziano, Paolo and Maarten P. 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CEU eTD Collection haskih istrazitelja), haskih dolazak (Hrvatskanedopusta investigators” allowing not is Hague of the arrival “Croatia inace…), Gotovinu uhitite (London: or…” Gotovina, Arrest“London: Slavonije, javnost) obmanjuje Hag (Granic: public” the deceivingis Hague “Granic: “Getting The Hague out” (Istjerivanje “GettingHaaga), TheHagueout” nesuradnji!), with suda8.studenogaizvijestit ICTY!”(Predsjednica the Haskog ce UNohrvatskoj “On report Presidentof non-cooperation UNabout ICTYwill the the Novemberto the 8, balkan), “Croatia isfor Europe Western only Balkans” je (Hrvatska samo za zapadni Europu August 2003 slanje uHaag), transkripata kontrolirati Mesicevo totheHague”sending transcripts (Vlada mijenjaZakonosuradnjijer ne moze vise is “Government Law it control because changing on longercannot cooperation any Mesic “The Haguejudgment” (Haski usud), izjednacavanja toequalize krivnje),“Attempts guilt” (Pokus eachnewspaper: for by andchronologically name the of newspaper order alphabetical the hereinwhich is newspapers.Theyarepresented areCroatian Serbian all weekly, others magazine inArchives Exceptfor inDocumentation Budapest. Zagreb and OSA Newspaper archives: Vjesnik the in werephotocopied All articles these of ARTICLES NEWSPAPER Zielonka, Jan and Peter Mair (eds.). “The Enlarged European Union: Diversity and Vujadinovic, Dragica et al. et Dragica Vujadinovic, MiladaVachudova, Anna. Adaptation”. Montenegro, Croatia. Belgrade: CEDET,2003. After Communism Jutarnji list, 8 March 2003. JutarnjiList Jutarnji list West European Politics 23 October 1999. . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. , 24October 1999. Europe Undivided:Democracy, Leverage andIntegration Between Authoritarianism andDemocracy: Serbia, , 14November 1999. Feral Tribune 282 Special Issue 25,no.2 (April 2002). FeralTribune, GlasSlavonije, , 25January 1999. Danas 16 December 2000. 6 January 2001. , 30November 1993. Globus, Vreme Glas 29 , CEU eTD Collection haski sud), na napada seriju inicirao (Tudjman ICTY” the on attacks of a series initiated “Tudjman komisije o Hrvatskoj), of “Tough Croatia”European report Commission izvesceabout (Tvrdo Evropske 23 September1997. ne(Simonovic:suradnju odbijamo s Haagom, trazimopostivanje suvereniteta), of sovereignty” justwant respect we with ICTY the cooperate refusenot to “We do 1996. October ), haskih (Panika kandidata u redovima candidates” “Panic Hague among “Pride and prejudice” (Ponos i “Pride and (Ponos predrasude), prejudice” Jutarnji list, sabora), (Haagosudio“Hague condemneddecision of Sabor” odlukuCroatian Hrvatskog smo putu a s jeputu smoobje ponor”, strane “Racan: We are on a narrow Jutarnji list, road and abyss iducih uhvati izvjescedays” 6dana), Gotovinu ako Vlada jedino(Haag: Pozitivno is on both “Hague: could if report Positive Gotovina onlyhappen next government arrests in sides” 6 the (Ivica Racan: Na 2003. uskom vladi), suda Racanovoj novi haaskog zahtjevi runda u Haagu: in (Zadnja of newround “Last ICTYtoRacan’s the Hague: requests government” The pobjegne) Croatian allowedrun away”government Gotovina to RH (Vlada pustila daGotovina zakona o Haagu), o zakona predlozio Vladi opet cooperation razmotri Ustavnog promjenu da ICTY”(Sabor with the “Parliamentagain suggestedgovernmentconsider to to law Constitutional changing on u Hrvatskoj), raspolozenje antihasko (Zaostreno Croatia” in stronger getting is atmosphere “Anti-Hague spremni ponovo ratovati), deklaracije gotowaragain zbog ready thedeclaration”over “Defenders to (Branitelji tko gajetko pocinio) gradjana it” dasvaki (90,8% committed smatra mora biti zlocin nabez obzira to kaznjen “90,8% of individualcitizens believe every mustcrime be regardless punished whoof Jutarnji list, Novi List Novi 3October 2003. 19 October 2003. Jutarnji list, Jutarnji list, , 31December 1998. 28November 2001. Novi list Jutarnjj list, Jutarnji list 20 July 2001. 18 April 2000. , 6March 1998. Jutarnji list, , 15April 2000. 19 August 2000. 283 Novi List Novi 4 October 2003. , 7April 1996. JutarnjiList, Novi List Novi Novi list 26 April , 27 , CEU eTD Collection “Unnecessary political pressure” (Nepotreban politicki pritisak), politicki (Nepotreban pressure” “Unnecessary political Dalmacija EUa!), zemlje za Hrvatima viza uvodjenje predlaze uZagrebu OESSa (Sef EU!” entering for Croats for regime visa imposing suggests mission of chief “OSCE Slobodna Dalmacija, “Unified Hague policythe politikatowards tribunal”haskom premasudu), (Jedinstvena list, tribunal” Hague of the actions “Unilateral with theHague], cooperation over Justice totake withinHaag ‘preuzela’ ministry Uprava Ministarstva [Directorate pravosudja of the zanimalo kada cebiti Gotovina), uhicen “Carla Del Ponte wants2000. to know Haag?), demonstracijeu uZagrebuNaletilica ‘preselile’ when willli Hague?” (Jesu Naletilic the to ‘transferred’ “Did inZagreb demonstrations the Gotovina be arrested”Slobodna Dalmacija, (Carlu more“’White book’- damage negokoristi?) than viseuse?” knjiga’-(‘Bijela stete del Ponte je 1998. se sDel Beogradu), Haag okrece razgovore Ponte, Belgrade” je spasiois Hagueto turning (Rracan with “Racan savedtalks Del Ponte, Republika, ili Hrvatska 13haaskih(Racan morau izolaciju.), tocaka ponovo potonuti od ce odstupiti give”Racan hasto uphis13points on CroatiaHague or isolation” willagaininto wither December 2000. Norac nije kriv [Norac is notguilty], Racanova vlada zaostrila je odnose sa Haagom i ostala potpuno sama), i ostala potpuno saHaagom je odnose zaostrila Racanova vlada svidjeti svima Hrvatskoj u se (Nastojeci alone” all remained and ICTY the with “Trying to satisfy everybody in Croatia Racan’s government put a strain on cooperation “Parliamentis judging the ICTY”(Sabor sudi Hagu), support“Croats theHague” (Haagupodrska Hrvata ), zlocni-relativan), (Ratni “War crime –relative” 21 May 1997. , 28February 1998. 12 January 2001 4March 1997. 4 September 1999. Novi list Slobodna Dalmacija, 284 (Jednostrani haskog suda), postupci (Jednostrani , 24 , May 2004. Obzor Slobodna Dalmacija Republika, Obzor, , 20November 1995. Obzor Slobodna Dalmacija, , 23January 1999. 25March 1996. 18 January 2001. 2 September 2001. Vecernji list , 8January 2004 Republika, , 14 March , 14 Slobodna 11 March Vecernji 15 CEU eTD Collection hrvatsku predizbornuhrvatsku kampanju), election tuziteljica campaign Croatia” (TuzeciHrvatskuUN-u, Arbourukljucuje seu of “By reportingis UNprosecutor Arbour Croatia tothe involvingherself into directly the 28 July 1999. prozivanjeje, asvrha predsjednika Tudjmana jepoliticki neosnovano pritisak) “The ICTY’scallingonTudjman is unfoundedaimis andthe political pressure”(Hasko s EU nakon sto RH zadovolji RH zadovolji sto s EUnakon uvjete), pregovori (Lipponen: thedemands” fulfils RepublicCroatia with EU after “Negotiations Haag ), u Hrvata slanja prestanak trazi Hague” (HVIDR-a to the Croats of transferring stoppage “Association of Croatian military invalids of the Homeland war is asking for the izvrsenje subpoene), izvrsenje suspendirano (Haag: suspended” been has subpoena of implementation the “Hague: “Strange demands from “Strange from demands Hague”,(Cudni the zahtjevi iz Haga), “Government, Ministers, the Hague” (Vlada, Ministri, Hag), “Why is the Hague important?”( suda je da poruka ratni nece ostati zlocini nekaznjeni), (Rad remain unpunished” will not war crimes is that amessage of court “Thethe work financed by andBandic Demo], was posters of printing i [HVIDRA: Demo financirali Bandic plakata Tiskanje HVIDRA: Haaskim sudom Haaskim sudom vise nisam nadlezan), sa (Granic:Zaposlove issues of ICTY” the the for longer Iam “Granic: no responsible “A court against a court” “A againstacourt” ( Sudom court protiv suda), Hrvata), protiv optuznica (Nema zapecacenih indictments againstCroats” nosecret “There are drugih), od nego vise setrazi “ from (Od Hrvatske than others from the Croatia is required “More 16 April 1998. keysfor “Dayton iErdut-kljucevi and Croatia” (Dayton ), Erdut Hrvatske September 1997. “After ‘Storm’ 4654 trials” (Nakon Oluje – 4654 sudska postupka “After ), 4654 trials” –4654sudskapostupka ‘Storm’ (Nakon Oluje Vjesnik Vecernji list, Vecernji list, , 30January 1999. Vjesnik 27April 1998 7 April 2000. , 1August1997. Vecernji list Vjesnik, Zasto nam Zasto nam je Hag?), vazan . Vjesnik Vecernji list, 13August 1999. 285 , 8June 2004 , 22July 1999. Vecernji list 18 October 2003. Vjesnik , 15January 2001 Vjesnik , 15November 1994. Vjesnik Vjesnik , 16April 1996. , 6July 1996. , 17 February , 17February 1997. Vecernji list Vecernji list, Vjesnik , 9 , CEU eTD Collection Vreme specijalcima), sanjegovim dobrovoljci (Moji forces” special his with volunteers “My inata), (Barometar Barometar” “Spite Vecernji list,5 June 2004. Dalmacija, Slobodna and Vjesnik list, Vecernji for Pont Del of interview Joint him] from jesmoSander njeg ispunio sve sto fulfilledod everything atrazili weasked [Sanader Vjesnik, impossible”nemoguceg), moguce odobjektivno (UsuradnjisaHaagom dijeliti treba isdivide “In ICTYit from between the objectively with cooperation neededto possible pravnik ucinaka), and za ICTY”(Josipovic: i nema the Sabora Odluka odnose Hrvatske Haaga nikakvih between Croatia relations the for legal consequences no has decision Sabor “Josipovic: 22 September2003. sudskom zbog sumnje procesu pocinili dasuuDomovinskom ratu ratni zlocin), crimescommitted during (UHrvatskoj Homeland je war” 3212ljudi podvrgnuto “In 3212people Croatia havebeenundercriminal suspicion proceedings under they that “Delay because of zbogGotovina?” (Odgoda Gotovine), December 2000. (Vladin naHaaskog suda pristanak diktat razorio bi vladajucu koaliciju), coalition” break ruling Hague would from the dictate the acceptance of “Government December 2000. pregovorima s Hrvatskom pitanjepregovorimane poteze sHrvatskom suradnjesaHaskimsudom), “Negotiations between EU and Croatia: ruralnog i zabuducnostHrvatske?),Haag: Borba urbanog EU is not raising the “Zagreb and The Hague: thefight issueof rural vs. urbanfor future the of Croatia?” i (Zagreb of the ICTY” (EU u agresije na Hrvatsku!), Croatia!”against (Bijelaknjigajei dokument ,ali povjest i dug premabrojinim zrtvama “White book is a iOluju), document,Bljesak za nadlezan nije tribuanl Haski RH: Storm” and (Vlada Flash operations over jurisdiction no history has ICTY the government: “Croatian but also a debt to numerous victims of aggression ICTY je nadlezan za eventualna kaznena djela Bljeska i Bljeska Oluje), je djela kaznena za ICTY nadlezan eventualna “USA: the ICTY has jurisdiction over possible crimes in Flash and Storm” “SAD: the , 8 August 1994,, 8August29. 6November 2003. 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eTD Collection http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/454/9.html http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/19/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=1 year] 19June 2004 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/09/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 and the HDZ], 6September 2004 for Sanader,the government support Vladei Pad popularnosti [Falling Sanadera, HDZ-a http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/08/30/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 Zabrinjava porast Euroskepticizma [Worrying Euroscepticism],August2004 30 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/07/30/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 documents]the 30July 2004 here are wewillinvestigate [Sanader: dokumente je cemo zadrzavao tko Sanader: Istrazit 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/07/02/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 u Norac Haagu 8. srpnja in [Norac Hagueon8 the July] 2July 2004 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/28/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 war criminal] 28June 2004 Neka se vlasti izjasne je li zlocinacNorac iliheroj Domovinskog[Is rata Norac hero of 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/19/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 and interest] 19June 2004 Clanstvo uEuropskoj nacionalniuniji interes i [EUprioritet membership national priority kandidat,Hrvatska pregovori po http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/06/04/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 Croatia under surveillance] 4June2004 Zbog Gotovine podprismotrom i i Haag [BecauseHrvatska of Gotovina The Hague and 5May December 2003(accessed 2009) http://www.vjesnik.hr/pdf/2003%5C12%5C23%5C04A4.PDF jakih, i Sanaderova vlada: pet nepoznatih government] pet [Sanader’s sredina Haski sud i Hrvatska [The ICTY and Croatia], Newspapers articles online þ etkom [Croatiagodine candidate:negotiations next 291 Vreme accessed November 2006 454,18September 1999 online issue of Vjesnik, 23 accessed November accessed 2006 accessed13May 2009 accessed13May 2009 accesedNovember 2006 November accessed November accessed November accessed accessedNovember CEU eTD Collection 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/02/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 and arrestof Gotovina ]2Feb2005 for the search ask [MesicandSAnader i Gotovine poteru uhicenje Mesic i traze Sanader http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/01/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=2 Gotovina isin 1February Croatia] 2005 Rehn tvrdi da je Gotovina u Hrvatskoj, Sanader iznenadjen, Mesic nije. [Rehn claims http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/01/20/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=1 Without positive form report The Hague nonegotiations, 20Jan 2005 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/12/18/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=1 Pregovori pocinju 17.Ozujka [Negotiations openon 17 March] 18December2004 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/11/24/Clanak.asp?r=van&c=1 obstacle leftfor full ICTY cooperation] 24November 2004 jedinaGotovina prepekazapunu Hrvatske sHaaskim saradnju sudom theonly [Gotovina 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/11/11/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 Blokada svih Gotovininih racuna [Gotovina’s accountsblocked] 11November 2006 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/10/22/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 2004 October moraHrvatska zamrznuti Gotovininuimovinu [Croatia tofreeze Gotovina’s 22 assets] 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/10/11/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=1 closer]get 11October 2004 Strah od Europe raste kako se bliže pregovori [The fear of EU growing as negotiations 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/09/24/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 U zadrupoceolov na Gotovinu [OpenhuntGotovina], on 24September 2004 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2004/09/23/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 September 2004 Zbog Gotovine[Pressurevelik pritisakna Hrvatsku becauseon Croatia of 23 Gotovina] 292 accessed November accessed 2006 November accessed 2006 accessed November accessed November accessed November accessed November , accessed accessed November accessed accessed13May 2009. November accessed November accessed CEU eTD Collection http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/12/10/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=3 Homeland10 December war] 2005 2006 Znat 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/10/10/Clanak.asp?r=tem&c=2 Dobrodosli ! [Welcome 10Octoberu Europu toEurope] 2005 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/10/04/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 Hrvatskoj pregovori! [Negotiations for Croatia!] 4October 2005 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/04/29/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 Biscevic za coordinator Gotovinu[Biscevic 29 coordinator] April 2005 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/17/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 Pregovori odgodjeni 17Mar postponed] [Negotiations 2005 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/16/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 Mar 2005 Pristupni nece pregovori poceti 17.ozujka [Negotiations willnot start on 17 March] 16 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/09/ cooperating] 9Mar2005 is :Croatia not SHaagom [Del Ponte ne suradjuje presudila: Hrvatska Carla DelPonte 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/03/01/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=1 to surrender] 1Mar2005 GotovinuSanader pokazeuHaagu[SAnaderonGotovina pozvao da domoljublje called 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/08/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 Mesic8 Feb supports and Sanader] 2005 Britanska vladapodupire Mesicevui zajednickuizjavu [Britishgovernment Sanaderovu 2006 negotiations open]2Feb 2005 Gotovinamora uHaagprije pregovora. pocetka [Gotovina tothe Haguebefore http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/02/02/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=2 ü emo obraniti istinu oDomovinskom ratu [We know how to defend the truth of the accessedNovember 2006 293 accessed November accessed November accessed accessed November accessed November accessed November accessed November accessed November accessed November accessed accessed November accessed CEU eTD Collection 001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=03&mm=4&yyyy=2 American pressure] 3April 2001 linija konferencije-nova conference- pritiskalineamerickog new Donatorska [Donors’ of accessed January 2006 1 April 2001, B92 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=31&mm=3&yyyy=2001 31Marcha civil 2001 conflict] Kostunica, Milosevic nije vredangradjanskog sukoba, [Kostunica: Milosevic isworth not accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=30&mm=3&yyyy=2001 30 March 2001 001 http://www.b92.net/izbori2000/index-pre.phtml at: available coverage, from B92 special taken election Document last accessed 28January 2006, 1. at: available coverage special election ‘Election program of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia’ document taken from B92 &nav_category=418 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=01&dd=21&nav_id=228593 news Beta agency, 21January 2007 izbora), parlamentarnih (Hronologija elections parliamentary of Chronology 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/12/12/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=5 Slab odaziv u Zagrebu in [Low turnout Zagreb] 12Dec2005 2006 http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/2005/12/12/Clanak.asp?r=unu&c=4 Skupovi bezpotpore izgredawithout [Protest major problems ]12Dec 2005 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=23&mm=3&yyyy=2 23 March 2001 Djindjic: problem su senat i kongres [Djindji: the Senat and Congress are the problem], http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=01&mm=4&yyyy=2001 accessed January 2006 accessed January 2006 accessed 12May 2009 http://www.b92.net/izbori2000/index-pre.phtml 294 last accessed 28 January 2006 accessed November accessed November accessed , CEU eTD Collection accessed January accessed January 2006 29 May 2001 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=09&mm=5&yyyy=2001 indictees totheTribunal] 9May 2001 B92 zaisporucivanjaPovecan for pressure extraditingpritisak [Increased tribunalu optuzenih accessed January 2006 conference] 3May 2001 Jos bez definitivnog stava o donatorskoj konferenciji [Still no final position on donors’ accessed January 2006 conditioning help to the FRY on the cooperation with the ICTY] 1 May 2001 HRW sa trazi uslovljavanje RightsSRJ saradnjom pomoci WatchHagom asks [Human 001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=40&order=priority&dd=13&mm=4&yyyy=2 14 April 2001 001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=13&mm=4&yyyy=2 fornot vote thelaw on cooperation with 13 ICTY] April 2001 wewill [Bulatovic: sahaskim tribunalom saradnji o zakon za glasati necemo Bulatovic: 001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=40&order=priority&dd=12&mm=4&yyyy=2 12 April 2001 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=11&mm=4&yyyy=2001 if isextradited]Milosevic not 11April 2001 Hag cetraziti nesankcije akoMilosevic budeizrucen Haguewill [The sanctions demand 001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=08&mm=4&yyyy=2 helpabout FRY] tothe 8April 2001 Savet ministara EU u ponedeljak o pomoci SRJ [Council of Ministers on Monday decides 001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=06&mm=4&yyyy=2 to FRY withoug conditions] 6April 2001 Ministri EU odlucice o pomoci SRJ bez uslovljvanja [EU Ministers to decide on the help http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=5&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=03&mm=5&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=01&mm=5&yyyy=2001 accessed January accessed2006 January accessed2006 January accessed January accessed2006 January accessed2006 January accessed January 2006 295 CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=16&mm=7&yyyy=2001 300millionapproved Euro of help FRY]the to 16July 2001 Savet ministara odobrio slanje 300 milion evra pomoci SRJ [Council of Ministers http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=291433 Vreme, 001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=20&order=priority&dd=02&mm=7&yyyy=2 2July 2001 SPS i radikali za krivicne prijave protiv [SPSandSRSDjindjica want tosueDjindjic] accessed2006 January donors’ conference]participation at 27June 2001 potvrdioVasington ucesce na donatorskoj confirmedkonferenciji [Washington 001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=20&order=priority&dd=25&mm=6&yyyy=2 25 June 2001 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=23&mm=6&yyyy=2001 on cooperationthe with 23 June ICTY] the 2001 Vlada SRJ usvojila uredbu o saradnji sa tribunalom001 [FRY governmenthttp://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=22&mm=6&yyyy=2 adopted a decree22 June 2001 conference] the for a condition not is extradition Commission: Milosevic/European excuses noextradition for of [No nije za konferenciju uslov komisija:izrucenje nemaSavet Evrope: nebude opravdanja da Milosevic izrucen/ evropska http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=290470 [Time] Magazine accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=18&mm=6&yyyy=2001 18 June 2001 Medjunarodna krizna grupa:usloviti zaSRJ [ICG: conditionpomoc help FRY]the to accessed January 2006 of lawthe oncooperation with ICTY]14Junethe 2001 Vladasradnji draft SRJ usvojilasa Hagom predlog zakonao governmentadopted [FRY http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=27&mm=6&yyyy=2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=14&mm=6&yyyy=2001 accessed January accessed2006 January accessed2006 January accessed2006 January 548,5July 2001 Vreme, 546,21June 2001 296 accessed January accessedJanuary 2006 accessed January accessedJanuary 2006 CEU eTD Collection http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/srpski/arhiva-index.html currently influence thecurrently morale of Army the 5DecemberYugoslavia] of 2001 uticu investigations trenutno namoral Lazarevic: haskeistrage [Lazarevic:ICTY VJ accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=11&yyyy=2001 Pavkovicmade thetopstate official 29Novemberworried] 2001 protivIstraga Pavkovica izazivadrzavnog zabrinutost vrha [Investigation against accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=25&mm=11&yyyy=2001 secrets] 25 Novemberstate 2001 Kostunica: SRJ ima pravoda zastiti drzavne tajne [Kostunica: FRY has a rightprotect to accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=17&mm=11&yyyy=2001 protest crvenihPrekinutberetki 17November protest] the [JSO stopped 2001 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=14&mm=11&yyyy=2001 public security]14 2001 November Djindjic: JSO u nadleznosti javne bezbednosti [Unitfor special forces under control of accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=12&mm=11&yyyy=2001 highway in Belgrade] 12November 2001 Pripadnici JSO blokirali autoput kod Centra Sava [Memebers of JSO blocked the accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=10&mm=11&yyyy=2001 extradition of JSO members is a lie] 10November 2001 Sef DB-a: pricaoizrucenjupripadnika jeJSO laz [Secretservice chief: story the about accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=09&mm=11&yyyy=2001 operations JSOis protesting] 9November 2001 Banovici u Hagu,protesti pripadnika JSO[Banovic arein Hague,the for Unit special 2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=08&mm=11&yyyy= 8 November Banovic bracaBanovic[Brothers Uhapsena 2001 arrested] Magazine accessed2006 January accessed January accessed2006 January Glas Javnosti [Voice of of [Voice people]the 28June 2001available at: 297 accessed January accessed January 2006 , CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=11&mm=4&yyyy=2002 11 April 2002 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=08&mm=4&yyyy=2002 8April 2002 002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=04&mm=1&yyyy=2 1 April 2002 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=3&yyyy=2002 21March arefulfilled] decide2002 conditions whether Montgomeri: Pauel ce proceniti da li uslovi su ispunjeni [Montgomery: Powell will 002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=23&mm=2&yyyy=2 23 February 2002 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=2&yyyy=2002 Solana uBeogradu [Solana in Belgrade] 21February 2002 002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=07&mm=2&yyyy=2 diplomacy of USandthe EUtowardsMontenegro]7 the February 2002 Razlicita tumacenja diplomatije SAD i EU prema Crnoj Gori [Differentinterpretations of accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=28&mm=1&yyyy=2002 of the EU for better cooperation with the ICTY] 28 January 2002 demands the about [Djindjic sa tribunalom za boljom zahtevimasaradnjom EU o Djindjic accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=12&yyyy=2001 regarding cooperation with ICTY]21Decemberthe 2001 saradnje Belgrade oko to ultimatum saHagom [American Beogradu Americki ultimatum 2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=17&mm=12&yyyy= be 17December 2001 extradited] will officers active no [Mihajlovic: Hagu policajaca aktivnih izrucenja nema Mihjalovic: 2001 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=05&mm=12&yyyy= accessed January 2006 accessed2006 January accessed2006 January accessed January accessed2006 January accessed2006 January 298 CEU eTD Collection on on Serbia’a non cooperaiton] Haguereport the about suda[UNtoday prijavu razmatra bezbednosti Haskog Savetdanas accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=10&yyyy=2002 2002 21 October brought newindictments] two [Del Ponte donela dve noveoptuznice Karla del Ponte &yyyy=2002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&nav_category=64&dd=12&mm=9 cooperation of Belgrade] 12September 2002 is [Prosecution saradnjom Tuzilastvo nezadovoljno notsatisfied with Beograda the accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=26&mm=8&yyyy=2002 26 August 2002 Union Charter] adopted [Governments Ustavne Povelje tekst Vlade usvojile accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=03&mm=7&yyyy=2002 Kris Paten u Beogradu [Chrisin Patten Belgrade] 3July 2002 accessed, January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=25&mm=6&yyyy=2002 form Kostunica] 25June 2002 [Government of objasnjenje Kostunice Serbia asks explanation Vlada od zatrazila Srbije accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=5&yyyy=2002 Pauel sertifikacijupotpisao [Powell certified the help] 21May 2002 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=17&mm=5&yyyy=2002 Dobrovoljne predaje optuznih [Voluntary surrenders of indictees]the 17May 2002 002 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=26&mm=4&yyyy=2 26 April 2002 EU dodelila 1,5 milliona pomoci SRJ [EU gave 1.5 millions Euros to the FRY as help] accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=20&mm=4&yyyy=2002 20 April 2002 Usvojen zakon o saranji s Hagom [Law on cooperation with the ICTY adopted] accessed January 2006 accessed January accessed2006 January accessed January accessed January 2006 299 CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=9&yyyy=2003 September 2003, Predsednik parlamenta uposeti Evropskog Cox [Pat Beogradu in Belgrade] 29 003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=30&order=priority&dd=01&mm=7&yyyy=2 Usvojen zakon o ratnim zlocinima [Law on war crimes adopted] 003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=02&mm=6&yyyy=2 Simatovic: ne osecamse krivim Idonot[Simatovic: feel guilty] 2June 2003 Scheveningen]going to 17May 2003 Potvrdjen odlazak Miroslava Radica uSeveningen [ConfirmedMiroslav that Radic is 003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=07&mm=5&yyyy=2 7 May 2003 Stigle haske optuzniceprotiv i indicted]Stanisica [StanisicandSimatovica Simatovic 003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=20&order=priority&dd=25&mm=3&yyyy=2 Vojislav Seselj: Nisam kriv [Vojislav Seselj: Iam not guilty] 25 March 2003 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=1&yyyy=2003 21January extradition] 2003 for Mladic’s 31March deadline [Prosper: martrok zaizrucenje Mladica 31. Prosper: accessed January 2006 19 January 2003 accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=09&mm=1&yyyy=2003 relations between EUandthe FRY] 9January 2003 Ustav i trziste uslov za vezu SRJ-EU [Constitution and market are conditions for the 003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=10&order=priority&dd=01&mm=1&yyyy=2 visiting Belgrade]1January 2003 warcrimes for [USambassador Beogradu zaratnezlocine uposeti Americki ambassador accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=10&yyyy=2002 2002 29 October http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/europe/3035781 last accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&dd=19&mm=1&yyyy=2003 accessed January accessed2006 January , last accessed , last January 2003 accessed2006 January accessed January 2006 accessed2006 January 1 300 1 July 2003 CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=6&mm=2&yyyy=2004 Accessed January Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=03&dd=01&nav_id=134054 1March 2004 Beta, sastav KostunicinogPoznat [Kostunica’scabinetformed] kabineta Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=02&dd=24&nav_id=133599 Haguecan the towards forbefatal Serbia] 24February 2004 Tadic: Kostunicin stav Hagu o moze biti poSrbijupoguban [Tadic:Kostunica’s attitude Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=02&dd=11&nav_id=132489 EUprotivIzvor: aranzmana saSPS[EUagainstinvolving11 SPS] February 2004 Accessed January 2006 bring parties form only past, the poverty wouldfollow] UN: bivse stranke uvlasti nedopustiva uslediobi i pad siromastvo [UN unacceptable to Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=02&dd=04&nav_id=131872 form 4Februarygovernment] Beta, 2004 stranke uSrbiji EU demokratske democratic Vladuda oforme [EU: parties in to Serbia 2006 http://www.b92.net/specijal/izbori2003/istorijat.php?nav_id=127265 Elections on at: B92, Special 2003available report 2003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?start=20&order=priority&dd=11&mm=10&yyyy= and Mladicis a priority] 11October 2003 Karadzic saidarrestof [Powell prioritet i Karadzica Mladica da jehapsenje Pauel porucio &yyyy=2003 http://www.b92.net/news/indexs.php?order=priority&nav_category=64&dd=10&mm=10 cooperation] 10October2003 non accusedSerbia of [Del Ponte saradnju nedovoljnu SCGza del optuzila Karla Ponte accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=21&mm=2&yyyy=2004 21February four Beta, generals] extradite 2004 novaKostunica: vladanece izruciti cetiri new [Kostunica: generala will government not Accessed January 2006 accessed January accessed2006 January accessed January accessed January 2006 301 Beta , 6February 2004 last accessed March accessed last , CEU eTD Collection Accessed January Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=07&dd=16&nav_id=145977 Ljajic saveta [Ljajic predsednik Haskog president of Council]the 16July 2004 Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=07&dd=02&nav_id=144962 2July 2004 Kostunica: Savetodlucujeizrucenju o [Kostunica: Council decides on extraditions] Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=07&dd=01&nav_id=144885 indictments to SPS court/ the threatens to stop supporting government]1July the 2004 SMIP proslediohaske Vladi optuznice ceuskratiti sudu/ podrsku SPS forwarded [MFA Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=05&dd=08&nav_id=140222 Davinic: poziv generalima jos vazi are generals [Davinic: still invited] 8May 2004 Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=04&dd=23&nav_id=138986 policyour ICTY]23Aprilto the 2004 Jocic: moramo biti dosledni u saradnji sa Hagom [Jocic: We have to be persistent with Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=03&dd=31&nav_id=136938 31March2004 and Montenegro] Predstavljen izvestaj komisijeEvropske oSCG[EU commission issued report on Serbia Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=31&mm=3&yyyy=2004 SAD zamrzle pomoc Srbiji froze help [SAD toSerbia] 31March 2004 Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=5&mm=3&yyyy=2004 with the ICTY] 5 March 2004 Jocic: Smena Lukica nema veze s Hagom [Jocic: the removal of Lukic has nothing todo Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=03&dd=04&nav_id=134383 4 March 2004 izruciti wewillnot extradite generals]Marsicanin: [Marsicanin: Necemo generale Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=3&mm=3&yyyy=2004 Srbija dobila novuvladu [Serbia has new government]3 March 2004 302 CEU eTD Collection Accessed Janary Accessed Janary 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=11&dd=08&nav_id=155289 Analiticari: Uslov je Hag [Analysts: ICTY is the condition] 8 November 2004 Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=10&dd=19&nav_id=153607 2004 19 October generals]arrest wewill not [Stojkovic: hapsiti necemogenerale Stojkovic: Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=10&dd=13&nav_id=153122 2004 13 October izruciti indictees] [Council extradite Savet Ministara Ministers: optuzene of accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=9&mm=10&yyyy=2004 October 2004 surrendered]9 seBearaPredao [Beara Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=10&dd=01&nav_id=152237 ICTY] 1October 2004, Poziv za konkretnu saradnju sa Hagom [Invitation for aconcrete cooperation with the Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=09&dd=30&nav_id=152188 30 September2004 LukicSreten indictment]Lukic received primioHasku optuznicu the [Sreten Accessed January 2006 22 September2004, resigned] members Council [Montenegrin iz Gore Crne Saveta Clanova Ostavke Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=08&dd=31&nav_id=149904 31 August 2004 Pola Srbijeprotiv izrucenaj Hagu[Half of Serbia extraditionsagainst tothe ICTY] Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=08&dd=20&nav_id=148885 2004 catastrophe] 20August Tadic: Nesaradnja sa Hagom katastrofa [Tadic: non cooperation with the ICTY is a Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=16&mm=8&yyyy=2004 integration] 16August 2004 U SCG bez volje za pristupanje EU [No political will in Serbia to continue EU http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=22&mm=9&yyyy=2004 303 CEU eTD Collection Accessed Jan 2006 5 Beta, April 2005, in improvementHag: ostvarennapredak achieved usaradnji cooperation] [Hague: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=4&mm=4&yyyy=2005 Lukic u Hagu[Lukic in Hague]the 4April 2005 Accessed Jan 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=03&dd=30&nav_id=165392 I dalje bezpomoci SAD zbogHaga[Still without helpfrom US]30 the March 2005 Accessed Jan 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=03&dd=15&nav_id=164291 15 March 2005 suda[PresidentPredsednik haskos in uBeogradu of the ICTY Belgrade] http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=2&mm=3&yyyy=2005 Perisic ide uHag[Perisic is going Hague] 3 the to March 2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=02&dd=02&nav_id=161313 B92, 2February 2005 Nov proizvod: Vlast-Crkva-Hag government-church- [Newproduct: Hague Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=28&mm=1&yyyy=2005 da sepreda[LazarevicLazarevic odlucio28 January decidedtosurrender] 2005 Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=24&mm=1&yyyy=2005 Ren: Nema precica kaEU[Rehn:short no cuts to the24 January EU] 2005 14 January 2005 SAD delimicne sankcije [US:partial Beogradu sanctions toBelgrade] accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=01&dd=13&nav_id=159916 13 January 2005 HRW:Martovsko nasilje otkrilo slabosti [HRW: March violence reviled weaknesses] Accessed January 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2004&mm=11&dd=22&nav_id=156352 22 November 2004 Uslov za Pomoc SAD: Mladic [Mladic is condition for the help from the US] http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=14&mm=1&yyyy=2005 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=5&mm=4&yyyy=2005 304 accessed Jan accessed2006 Jan CEU eTD Collection id=188508&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=13&nav_ Ren: Karla del nezadovoljnaPonte [Rehn:Del dissatisfied]Ponte 13February 2006 id=187121&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=01&nav_ 1 February 2006 Brisel gubi strpljenje zbogHaga[Bussels is losing over patience ICTY] the =2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=1&mm=2&yyyy 1Februarysecret] 2006 Izvestaj VSO o Hagu Drzavna tajna [Report by supreme Defense Council is a state id=186730&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=01&dd=28&nav_ 28 January 2006 of Mladic] director formersecurity [Arrsted Mladica ex-sef obezbedjenja Uhapsen &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=01&dd=20&nav_id=185816 20 January 2006, B92 Del Ponte: Pritisak EU na Beograd [Del Ponte: pritisak EU na Beograd] Accessed Jan 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=19&nav_id=178757 2005 19 October Dve gradjana zaulazakuEU[Two trecine forthirds entering of EU] citizens Accessed Jan 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=22&mm=4&yyyy=2005 Pavkovic: Idem u Hag[Pavkovic: Iam tothegoing ICTY]22April 2005 Accessed Jan 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=14&mm=4&yyyy=2005 B92, 14April 2005, Nemacka Srbiji miliona35 Evra for [Germany Serbia 35million Euro] Accessed Jan 2006 12 April 2005 SCG dobila studijuizvodljivosti o [Serbia andMontenegroFeasibilitgot Study] Accessed Jan 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=6&mm=4&yyyy=2005 6April flatPavkovicu pretresen searched] stan [Pavkovic’s 2005 September 2008 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=12&mm=4&yyyy=2005 accessed Sep 2008 September 2008 2008 accessedSeptember 2008 accessedSeptember 305 CEU eTD Collection http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=01&dd=15&nav_id=227709 15 January 2007 Bilt: politika EU zavisi od izbora [EU politics will depend on election results] &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=02&nav_id=301548 2 June 2008,Tanjug &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=05&dd=29&nav_id=301038 EU ne priznaje not drzave[EUdoes recognize states]29May 2008 accessed September 2008 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=15&mm=5&yyyy=2008 15 May 2008 vladu Ocekujemo weexpectpro European government] Manter: [Munter: proevropsku Accessed September 2008 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=12&mm=5&yyyy=2008 RIK:ZES osvojio102 mandata [Election ZEScommittee: got102seats] 12 May 2008 &nav_category=11 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=04&dd=16&nav_id=242155 16 April 2007 naRen pozvao formiranje vlade for creating [Rehn called ] &nav_category=11&order=priority =2006 y=2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=31&mm=3&yyy Sa EUoviznom rezimu [With EUabout the visaregime]the 31March 2006 id=189859&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=27&nav_ EU zovei upozorava SCG[EUwarns FRY]the 27February 2006 id=188747&order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=02&dd=16&nav_ 16 February 2006, B92 EU uBeogradu: kako ceBeograd u EU [EU in how willBelgrade: Belgrade gotoEU] 22 January 2007 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=3&mm=5&yyyy Prekinuti pregovori sa EU[EUsuspended negotiations] 3May 2006 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=22&mm=1&yyyy=2007 accessedSeptember 2008 accessed September 2008 accessed accessedSeptember 2008 accessed September 2008 accessed accessed September 2008 accessedSeptember accessedSep2008 accessed September 2008 accessedSeptember 306 CEU eTD Collection &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=309595 Cvetkovic poziva napredaju calls for [Cvetkovic surrenders] 22July 2008 Accessed2009 March http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=21&mm=7&yyyy=2008 Uhapsen Radovan Karadzic [Radovan 21 Karadzic arrested] July 2008 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=20&nav_id=309335 Ljajic:ne znamogde su begunci donotknow[We wherefugitives are] 20July 2008 accessed March 2009 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=18&mm=7&yyyy=2008 ICTY] 18July 2008 Sefa BIA cekaju Hag i reforme [Director of Secret service to deal with reforms and the accessed March 2009 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=17&mm=7&yyyy=2008 BIA dobila novogdirektora [Secret service has a new boss] 17July 2008 endangered] of citizens interests minister: [Prime interesi gradjana ugrozeni Premijer: accessed March 2009 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=7&mm=7&yyyy=2008 Izabrana vladaSrbije[Government of 7JulySerbia formed] 2008 accessed January 2009 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index/php?order=priority&dd=26&mm=6&yyy=2008 26 June DSS] against the Propaganda protiv DSSa[Propaganda 2006 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=16&nav_id=303886 EU: rasprava ozapadnom discussionbalkanu, [EU: on Western Balkan] 16June 2008 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=12&nav_id=303342 12 June2008 nikogaVodsvort: ne I pritiskam am [Wordsworth: not pressurising anyone] &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=05&nav_id=302128 9 June 2008,B92 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=06&dd=05&nav_id=302128 EU: SSPpravno validan legally [EU valid] 5June 2008 accessed March accessedMarch 2009 accessed March 2009 accessedJanuary 2009 accessedJanuary 2009 accessedJanuary 2009 307 CEU eTD Collection 26 July 2008 of Brammertz] report positive am for the [I waiting izvestaj Bramerca Cekam pozitivan &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=25&nav_id=310152 MUP:zastiticemonovinare [MUP:wewill journalists] the 25July protect 2008 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=25&nav_id=310084 izrucenjaPola-pola oko [Fifty-fifty 25 July on extraditions] 2008 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=24&mm=7&yyyy=2008 24 July 2008 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=24&nav_id=309912 24 July 2008 napadnutNa protestu snimatelj B92 cameramanB92 [Attacked during protests] &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=23&nav_id=309744 Holandija: Stav Bramerca pa SSP [Brammertz’s report and then SAA] 23 July 2008 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=23&nav_id=309878 naZavrsen protest trgu[Protestended] 23July 2008 accessed March 2009 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=22&mm=7&yyyy=2008 22 July 2008 [Agreement to enter force] Sporazum da stupi na snagu &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=309599 22 July 2008 Pozitivne reakcije SAD I NATO [Positive reactions from the US and NATO] &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=309661 22 July 2009 helpers]Mladicevim Saznanja [New evidenceaboutMladic’s o pomagacima &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=22&nav_id=309596 Analiticari: vest dobra [Analysts: news] 22July good 2008 accessed March accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 308 CEU eTD Collection http://www.blic.rs/politika.php?id=61402 2008 19 October Oprecni stavovi between viewson pomirenjureconciliation [Differing DSando SPS] sporazum http://www.kurir-info.rs/clanak/politika/kurir-10-09-2008/ratifikovan-ssp-i-gasni- Skupstina ratifikovala ratifiedSSP [Parliament SAA] 10September 2008 accessed March 2009 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?order=priority&dd=29&mm=7&yyyy=2008 29 July 2009 countries] to EU returning uEU[Government ambassadors vracaVlada ambasadore &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=29&nav_id=310601 Sukobi huligana i by [Policepolicije attacked hooligans]29 July 2008 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=28&nav_id=310505 Kada ce Karadzic u Hag[When is Karadzic goingto The Hague] 28July 2008 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=27&nav_id=310402 27 July 2008 nephew] the follow authorities [Why the sluzbedidn’t nisu pratile sinovca Zasto &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=26&nav_id=310277 Bilt: SSP na snazi nakon Mladica [Bilt: SAA in power only after Mladic] 26 July 2008 &order=priority http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=26&nav_id=310266 accessed March2009 accessed accessed March accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessedMarch 2009 accessed March 2009 accessed 309