CEU eTD Collection Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree forthe oftherequirement fulfillment in partial submitted Dissertation Cooperation thewith International Criminal Tribunal EU Political Conditionality andDomestic Politics: for the Former inCroatia and Department of International Relations and European Studies of in of Doctor ofPhilosophy Science Political Supervisor: Dr Ulrich Sedelmeier Ulrich Dr Supervisor: Central European University European Central Word count: Word count: 79,142 Jelena Stojanovic Budapest, 2009 By 1 CEU eTD Collection ------Stojanovic Jelena ideas authors. material or from other unreferenced contains thesis does a nor the Tomy degree. knowledge from CEU towards different I hereby declare that no parts of the thesis have been submitted to no other institution DECLARATION 2 CEU eTD Collection fulfilled. principles on which its governingthe policy, party makes conditions then the are fundamental against not are and position government endanger not do they if and sovereignty that arenational to issues related certain are there demonstrated Serbia and Croatia As both not easily sidelined.sufficient Therefore,to tip off the balance in favor of fulfillment of the conditions for membership.when domestic conditions are of heldbasis in elections years. the lasttwelve the ripe and size and timing of EU rewards. The two countries are divided intoseven cases, on the governments towards ICTYandthe EU,partisan players, veto institutional veto points attitudelosing of power, government incumbent arethreatof arena. Thefactors how they react to externalexplained. pressures The research in useslightrecord rationalistbetweencompliance the of of variation their the how and arguments, interestsconditionality the political wherewith compliance actorsinstates the are domesticstudied in termsand political of hamperfacilitate factors of Themain iswhich question formerYugoslavia (ICTY). withinthe for Tribunal Criminal International the the with cooperation the especially conditions, same statesmembership EU specific the of fulfillment the influence that factors main the identifies during different thesis The statesCroatia andSerbia. candidate andpotential focusing on candidate time by literature of toexpandthescope thethesisattempts memberin states conditions periods can be Summary The conclusions can be summarized as follows: EU rewards arenecessary but not EUon domestic the influence of analyzes the that literature from the Starting 3 CEU eTD Collection encouragement helpedmetokeeponworking onmyresearch. emotional andmaterialsupport overmy education,andwhose theyears of especially whowithMy deepestgratitudegoestomyfamily, father, me provided services andtediousprocessrenewing of temporaryresidence permit. necessary documentstohelp mewith thebureaucratic issues atHungarianImmigration alwaysI amindebtedtoJuliaSzelivanov lettingmeuseher providing andfor for flat solutions. theright always finding and for all theproblemsthatcameupduringprogram the PhDbut mostlyforbeingthere program andotherorganizationalissues, tolisten wouldI administrative liketothankJuliaParaizs support for andIren relatedVarga to Croatia would nothavebeencomplete. necessary freeofcharge. materials Withoutthese essential materials thechapterson Documentation center forallowingme tousein Zagreb, theirarchives copy all and VjesnikMy specialthanks managerofthe Newspaper go toMrZeljko Hodonjproject Without hisguidance andassistance this research would nothavebeenfinished. supporting meandbelieving inmyresearch, more sometimes than Ibelievedinitmyself. Firstsupervisor andforemost,Iwouldliketo DrUlrich for thank my Sedelmeier Acknowledgements 4 CEU eTD Collection Table 10: Croatia-summary of factors and outcome of cooperationwith the ICTY….....265 Table 9: Serbia-summary of factors and outcome of cooperation with the ICTY……....264 Table 8: Institutional structure forcooperation with ICTY …………………………….221 Table 7: Powers of the president of Croatia before and after 2000……………………..220 Table 6: The left right position of Croatian parties 1990-2000………………………....219 Table 5: Changes in electoral support forparty blocs 1990-2000……………………...218 Table 4:Types of government, veto players and how it influences decision making….. 40 of government………………….40 system the on based players of veto Number 3: Table Table 2: Heads of state/government in Serbia and Croatia 1993-2000…………………38 Table 1: Factors that influence compliance……………………………………………..27 List of tables List of 5 CEU eTD Collection Chapter 3 -Serbia 2000-2003 3-Serbia Chapter Chapter 5 - Serbia2008present 5 Chapter 2003-08 4- Serbia Chapter 1993-2000 2-Serbia Chapter 1-Introduction Chapter Chapter 6- Croatia 1993-1999 Croatia 6- Chapter Chapter 7- Croatia 2000-2003 Croatia 7- Chapter Chapter 8- Croatia 2003-05 Croatia 8- Chapter . ocuin...... 86 2.6 Conclusion...... 2.5 External 79 pressures and ...... incentives 70 2.4 Partisan Veto ...... Players 2.3 Institutional 67 veto points...... 2.2 Actors: general positions 64 and powercosts...... 61 2.1 Introduction ...... ocuin...... 124 3.6 Conclusion...... 3.5 External pressure 100 and incentives...... 97 3.4 Partisan ...... veto players 3.3 Institutional 94 veto points...... 3.2 Actors: general positions 90 and powercosts...... 89 3.1 Introduction ...... 1.7 Summary 52 of findings...... 1.6 48 Brief overview ...... of chapters 1.5 Case selection 41 and methodology...... 1.4 Explanatory 34 framework...... 1.3 Review 17 of literature...... 1.2 Evolution of EU relations with former Yugoslav 11 republics...... 10 1.1 Research ...... Question . ocuin...... 157 4.6 Conclusion...... 4.5 External 141 pressures and ...... incentives 137 4.4 Partisan ...... veto players 4.3 Institutional 132 veto points...... 4.2 Actors: general positions 127 and powercosts...... 126 4.1 Introduction ...... ocuin...... 189 5.6 Conclusion...... 5.5 External 180 pressures ...... and incentives 167 5.4 Partisan ...... veto players 5.3 Institutional 165 veto points...... 5.2 Actors: general positions 160 and powercosts...... 159 5.1 Introduction ...... ocuin...... 219 6.5 Conclusion...... 6.4 External 205 pressures and ...... incentives 6.3 Institutional veto points 202 and partisanveto ...... players 6.2 Actors: general positions 195 and powercosts...... 193 6.1 Introduction ...... nrdcin...... 246 8.1 Introduction ...... 243 7.5 Conclusion...... 7.4 External 230 pressures and ...... incentives 7.3 Institutional veto points 226 and partisanveto ...... players 7.2 Actors: main 223 positions and ...... powercosts 222 7.1 Introduction ...... 3.5.2 New indictments, the protests of the Special Forces and assassination 112 of the Prime3.5.1 Minister.. Arrest and extradition of Milosevic and the law on cooperation 101 with the ICTY...... 6.4.2 Debates about law on cooperation with the ICTY and 211 responses to ...... indictments 6.4.1 Attitudes towards establishment of the ICTY and the beginning 209 of its work...... 7.4.1 Domestic debates concerning indictments of the generals of 233 the Homeland war...... 8 ...... 126 ...... 246 ...... 61 ...... 89 ...... 193 ...... 222 ...... 159 ...... 6 CEU eTD Collection References Conclusion 9- Chapter . ocuin...... 267 8.5 Conclusion...... 8.4 International pressures 252 and incentives...... 8.3 Institutional veto points 250 and partisanveto ...... players 8.2 Actors: general positions 247 and powercosts...... 8.4.2 The pressures forGotovina's 257 arrest...... 8.4.1 Cases of Norac and Blaskic in domestic 253 debates...... 279 ...... 268 ...... 7 CEU eTD Collection 3, (2006):6. [Online article]: cited [<10 Nov 2006>], 3 etc. 2 Systems”, 1 topic. research agrowing currently andis toinvestigate seems important andpotential candidates equally candidates membership EUinstitutions onEU states andthe Thisimpactof applicant countries. as isan impact understood Europeanization of EU on a numberthe issues of inmember of thepurposes notdeal research will of thiswith For paper, Europeanization. definitions There havebeen some contesting opinions regarding thisbody literature; however,of this asEuropeanization. commonly known literature growing in aseparate, been studied domestic arena.” is the European them; the to “how levelin policy delegation outcomes another the affects of one just is sovereignty delegating while processes, two comprises integration Still, bodies. supranational give to competence agreeto states why reasons tothe been related main andits actors and have the questions processesof the development, evolution. The its theinterests and ideasof creation factors, andimpeding its integration: accelerating has of focusing been on primarily The study process the Union (EU) European of the - Introduction 1 Chapter fast-growing research area.” research fast-growing Europeanization of new members and states isapplicant a “still comparatively small, but research of the that, concludes and Index Citation Science Social of the search key word Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in new member and candidate states”, candidate and member innew “Europeanisation Sedelmeier, Ulrich Some of the authors include Milada Ana Vachudova, Frank Schimmelfennig, Judith Kelly, Jan Kubicek, Klaus H. Goetz and SimonHix (eds.), “Europeanised Politics, European Integration and National Political The influence of the EU institutions, rules and principles on member states, has West European Politics 1 3 , Special Issue, 23, no. 4 (October2000): 3. 2 As Ulrich Sedelmeier summarizes the results of a 8 http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2006-3 Living Rev. . Gov ., 1, no. CEU eTD Collection European Politics, 4 EU. the with relations institutional the of improvement the to lead they how and systems explain national howthese are transformedintoconditions political compliance through to necessary is more research accordingly, politics; domestic with the engagement of the impact the with EUdeals topic the on conducted membershipresearch the of most though Even countries. conditionality and accession candidate on analysis EUinfluence of the for abetter been used has the EU conditions for membership are fulfilled, onthe body of literature on conditionalitydomesticwith the EU institutions, politics, and as the institutionalin relationship the is inferior countries candidate the of position the as used. However, relations there move to a higher levelimpactis only stillif of the EU onnot domestic asan generally taken literature, background. Europeanization using theoretical one enough political systemsmembers of ofa member/applicantthe ‘return to Europe’ countrymakes it difficultcan be Europeanization. than rather as‘EU-ization’ some to frame the research differenton and seems to bethe mostly driven by the desire to jointopic the EU, thus being termed by been EUinfluence which tothe member has isresponse their why countries arenot states particular These states. applicant influences EU the how is question additional The abideby. needto now they rules that in creating part were nottaking that new- comers and EU, influenceof the EUon the the makingof in process the decision participate the its members,which EUon of the between influence the incircumstances differences the Jan Zielonka and Peter Mair (eds.), :The Enlarged European Union: Diversity and Adaptation”, and Diversity Union: European Enlarged :The (eds.), Mair Peter and Zielonka Jan The main dilemma in this fast growing research area has been how to account for account to how been has area research growing fast in this dilemma main The This specific circumstance of many of the new EU members and potential new Special Issue, 25, no.2, (April 2002): 102. 9 4 West CEU eTD Collection and conditionality innew democracies towards atheoretical integration”Grugel in Jean(ed.), 6 University Press: 2004), 10. explained. The research will use rationalist arguments, where actors will be studied in bestudied will actors where arguments, userationalist will research The explained. record betweencompliance the of variation the how and conditionality the political with compliance states and hamper factors is of The main facilitate of fulfillmentwhich conditions. question within the ordebilitate of andhowthey process facilitate the the specific membershipcondition, same states during different former be Yugoslavia will thefocus. timemembership specifically and cooperationInternational with forwith Criminal Tribunal periods canextent potential EU members Serbia andbe Croatia comply with political conditions for political conditionality within national political systems. Tothis end, the question whatto background of conditionality, this research will look into domestic implications of the EU 1.1 Research Question players. domestic and conditions international of interplay the into research continue to essential 5 democratization,itis important tounderstand more precisely how they work.” of to process the contribute crucially factors international “Since countries. certain democratize to in attempts tool policy aforeign as particularly research topic important is more research innecessary.” conditionality particular, political and general in conditionality of implications domestic practical the understand “To Hans PeterSchmitz and KatrinSell, “International factors inprocesses of political democratization: Judith G. Kelley, The thesis will try identifyto the main factors that influence the fulfillment of this andnew membersagainstthe applicants Withinof theEuropeanization of context Conditionality has been used as a diplomatic tool has been for decades.It has tool beenusedasadiplomatic Conditionality Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power ofNorms andIncentives , (London: Routledge, 1999), 33. 10 Democracy without borders:transnationalization 5 , (Princeton: Princeton , (Princeton: 6 It seems It CEU eTD Collection 9 8 SPS, no. 97/7, 10. Department, Sciences Social and Political Institute, University European Effective?”, 7 beto used in 1989, conditionality seenwas not as a legalinstrument. 1.2 Evolution ofEU relations with former Yugoslav republics political arena. terms of how they react to external pressures in light of their interests in the domestic UN sanctions have been imposed. have been UN sanctions suspended explicitly on groundsthe ofhuman although inrights, framework the of the been has external agreement No for theEU. be difficult seems to conditionality, negative former Soviet republics contain this clause. respected.” not are principles democratic and rights if human agreement the of suspension permitting the countries “aclause with third ininclude agreements the decidedto inin Councilofficially However, 1992,the the region. stability long-term establish ensure European the reformin hoped to Community countriesinorderto (EC) these countriesEastern Europe in(CEEC) period. post-1990 the By applying conditionality, conditionalitycooperation developed agreements first and wereto the used highest to promote extent human in relationrights. Smithwith Centralemphasizes and that projects is rare. Humanitarian aid and aid for non-governmental foris projects non-governmental and rare.Humanitarian not areusually aid aidprojects consultations are before organized taking Completesuspension anyaction. of ongoing Ibid., 29. Ibid., 14. Karen E. Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How The EU started using conditionality after the end of the cold war. When it began it When war. cold the of end the after conditionality using started EU The Breaking off relations that have already been established, which is a form of 8 All agreements with the CEEC and the partnership agreements with the with agreements partnership the and CEEC the with agreements All 9 Usually, agreement is Usually, upheld possiblewhenever agreement and 11 EUI Working Papers Working EUI 7 Trade and CEU eTD Collection 15 140. 14 1999), 29. EU quickly reached agreements with the countries of Central Europe. ofCentral countries with the agreements EU quickly reached As said above, after the disintegration EUthanifthe continued. support the of the Soviet Union,fragile destabilized reforms,democracies and initiated leading thus more to problems for the countries of Furthermore, in case feared CEECitof the the was thatcutting helpmighthave the influence bytheEU. there canbeno with astate norelations are there if because 13