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Country Report Zambia January 2019

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_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Country Report Zambia Generated on February 6th 2019 Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square London E14 4QW United Kingdom _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For 60 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square The Economist Group London 750 Third Avenue E14 4QW 5th Floor United Kingdom New York, NY 10017, US Tel: +44 (0) 20 7576 8181 Tel: +1 212 541 0500 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7576 8476 Fax: +1 212 586 0248 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Hong Kong Geneva The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 1301 Cityplaza Four Rue de l’Athénée 32 12 Taikoo Wan Road 1206 Geneva Taikoo Shing Switzerland Hong Kong Tel: +852 2585 3888 Tel: +41 22 566 24 70 Fax: +852 2802 7638 Fax: +41 22 346 93 47 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] This report can be accessed electronically as soon as it is published by visiting store.eiu.com or by contacting a local sales representative. The whole report may be viewed in PDF format, or can be navigated section-by-section by using the HTML links. In addition, the full archive of previous reports can be accessed in HTML or PDF format, and our search engine can be used to find content of interest quickly. Our automatic alerting service will send a notification via e-mail when new reports become available. Copyright © 2019 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All information in this report is verified to the best of the author's and the publisher's ability. However, the Economist Intelligence Unit does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it. ISSN 2047-6612 Symbols for tables "0 or 0.0" means nil or negligible;"n/a" means not available; "-" means not applicable Zambia 1 Zambia Summary 2 Briefing sheet Outlook for 2019-23 4 Political stability 4 Election watch 5 International relations 5 Policy trends 6 Fiscal policy 6 Monetary policy 6 International assumptions 7 Economic growth 7 Inflation 8 Exchange rates 8 External sector 8 Forecast summary Data and charts 9 Annual data and forecast 10 Quarterly data 11 Monthly data 12 Annual trends charts 13 Monthly trends charts 14 Comparative economic indicators Summary 14 Basic data 16 Political structure Recent analysis Politics 18 Forecast updates 18 Analysis Economy 21 Forecast updates 23 Analysis Country Report January 2019 www.eiu.com © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2019 Zambia 2 Briefing sheet Editor: Benedict Craven Forecast Closing Date: January 9, 2019 Political and economic outlook The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the ruling Patriotic Front, led by the president, Edgar Lungu, to remain in power. However, the government will become increasingly unpopular as a result of economic mismanagement and deep recurrent spending cuts. Heavy public borrowing plans mean that an IMF loan deal is not expected to materialise in the medium term, at least. Economic policy will be erratic, with sudden changes to the regulatory environment as the government attempts to cover spending needs. Fiscal policy will be lax up to 2021 as the government pursues a debt-financed infrastructure programme. Revenue will rise as a result of tax increases, but the fiscal deficit will remain large. From 2022 we expect deep spending cuts to begin. Monetary policy will be tighter in 2019 to control rising price pressures linked to currency depreciation. With the kwacha and inflation both more stable from 2020, the central bank will begin to reduce the policy rate in a bid to bring down high commercial lending rates. Real GDP growth will average 3.5% a year in 2019-23. Detrimental changes to the tax regime will keep mining growth far below potential, especially in the early part of the forecast period, but the effects will be masked partially by government capital spending. The current account will remain in deficit in 2019-21 as a result of high government capital spending and debt-servicing. As global copper prices continue to climb and the government embarks on austerity, the account will then move into surplus in 2022. Key indicators 2018a 2019b 2020b 2021b 2022b 2023b Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.7 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 7.5 8.3 6.0 7.6 6.8 6.7 Government balance (% of GDP) -7.9 -8.7 -7.4 -7.1 -3.3 -2.5 Current-account balance (% of GDP) -5.1 -3.9 -3.3 -2.1 0.7 1.8 Money market rate (av; %) 16.3 19.2 20.5 21.1 19.6 15.9 Exchange rate ZK:US$ (av) 10.46 12.29 12.35 12.54 12.40 12.27 a Economist Intelligence Unit estimates. b Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts. Country Report January 2019 www.eiu.com © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2019 Zambia 3 Key changes since November 30th Real GDP growth in the third quarter of 2018 came in at 5% year on year, which was above expectations. With growth momentum unlikely to fall away dramatically in the last quarter, we have revised our annual growth estimate for the year up from 3% to 4.2%. Softer inflation dynamics in late 2018 have caused a small downward revision to our 2019 annual average inflation forecast, from 8.6% to 8.3%. However, we have left our forecast for monetary tightening in that year unchanged. The month ahead February 21st—Monetary policy committee meeting: The Bank of Zambia (the central bank) may decide to hike its policy rate as early as February to counter inflationary pressures, stem depreciation of the kwacha and safeguard diminishing reserves. Whatever happens in February, we expect a rate hike at some point in 2019. Major risks to our forecast Scenarios, Q4 2018 Probability Impact Intensity A bail-out package with the IMF does not materialise High High 16 A shortage of skilled labour affects business operations High Moderate 12 Power shortages disrupt operations High Moderate 12 Government policy towards the mining sector again becomes punitive Moderate High 12 enough to force mines to scale back operations The government is forced to impose convertibility restrictions on foreign- Moderate High 12 exchange transactions Note. Scenarios and scores are taken from our Risk Briefing product. Risk scenarios are potential developments that might substantially change the business operating environment over the coming two years. Risk intensity is a product of probability and impact, on a 25-point scale. Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report January 2019 www.eiu.com © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2019 Zambia 4 Outlook for 2019-23 Political stability Although the ruling Patriotic Front (PF), led by the president, Edgar Lungu, is expected to retain power, Zambia will face substantial threats to underlying political stability in 2019-23. Popular public frustration could develop into violence at any time given the widespread perception of worsening corruption, combined with the prospect of poor employment opportunities, fragile public-sector finances and fears of creeping authoritarianism. The run-up to the 2021 election will be an especially unstable period, during which the government will narrow the political space aggressively; crackdowns will escalate any time that Mr Lungu feels that his position is vulnerable. Another layer of risk emanates from the growing influence of China in state affairs. For instance, there were riots in the city of Kitwe in November over the suspected sale of a state timber firm to Chinese buyers. As public distrust of the government grows, open dissatisfaction and the administration's intolerance of criticism will represent a volatile mix. Protests could turn violent and, if disorder becomes widespread, extra security powers could come into force, as they did in 2017. On the one hand, this would act as a mechanism for bolstering overall stability; on the other, it would reinforce perceptions that Zambia is staggering towards autocracy and exacerbate underlying social tensions. In the run-up to the election in 2021, internal power struggles will take place within the PF. As Mr Lungu's overarching ambition appears to be securing the presidency in 2021, potential rivals will be purged from the cabinet and possibly the party before PF nominations in 2020. In a public address after a ruling by the Constitutional Court declaring that he was eligible to stand for another term (his critics claim that he has already served the maximum of two), Mr Lungu hinted that some senior members in the party had been manoeuvring to seek the candidacy if he had been barred from standing. Election watch The next presidential and legislative elections are due in August 2021, and Mr Lungu's support from most of the Central Committee will help him to secure the PF nomination. By the time of the election in 2021, public fears of Zambia being caught in a debt trap—characterised by a loss of economic sovereignty to creditors—will be a legitimate concern among voters and one that the PF will have to answer for.
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