Anna Schreuer

Dealing with the diffusion challenges of grassroots innovations: the case of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany

DISSERTATION

submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doktorin der Philosophie

Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt | Wien Graz

Fakultät für Interdisziplinäre Forschung und Fortbildung

Supervisor Ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Berger Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt | Wien Graz Institute of Science, Technology and Society Studies

1st Evaluator Ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Berger Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt | Wien Graz Institute of Science, Technology and Society Studies

2nd Evaluator PD Dr. Michael Ornetzeder Austrian Academy of Sciences Institute of Technology Assessment

Graz, March 2015

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Affidavit

I hereby declare in lieu of an oath that

- the submitted thesis is entirely my own work and that no auxiliary materials have been used other than those indicated, - I have fully disclosed all assistance received from third parties during the process of writing the thesis, including any significant advice from supervisors, - any contents taken from the works of third parties or my own works that have been included either literally or in spirit have been appropriately marked and the respective source of the information has been clearly identified with precise bibliographical references, - to date, I have not submitted this thesis to an examining authority either in Austria or abroad and that - the digital version of the thesis submitted for the purpose of plagiarism assessment is fully consistent with the printed version.

I am aware that a declaration contrary to the facts will have legal consequences.

Graz, 3 March 2015

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Kurzfassung Die vorliegende Dissertation widmet sich der Entwicklung und Ausbreitung von Bürgerkraftwerken im Bereich der Windkraft und Photovoltaik in Deutschland und Österreich. Diese werden als eine ‚grassroots Innovation‘ verstanden. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Frage, wie diese Innovation entstehen und sich in der Folge weiter ausbreiten konnte. Darüber hinaus wird erkundet inwieweit die Verbreitung dieser Innovation einen Prozess der Ermächtigung darstellt und welche Konflikte mit der Ausbreitung von Bürgerkraftwerken einhergehen. Die Dissertation beruht auf 23 leitfadengestützten Expert*innen-Interviews mit Vertreter*innen von Bürgerkraftwerken und Unterstützungsorganisationen, sowie auf einer begleitenden Literaturrecherche. Grassroots Innovationen können als neue soziotechnische Konfigurationen interpretiert werden, die von zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren entwickelt werden. Um deren Entstehung zu erklären, wird auf die Theorie der Ressourcenmobilisierung aus dem Bereich der Theorie sozialer Bewegungen zurückgegriffen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass sechs Ressourcentypen für die Entwicklung von Pionierprojekten relevant waren. Unterschiede zwischen einzelnen Gruppierungen gibt es hingegen bezüglich ursprünglich verfügbarer Ressourcen und weiterführender Ressourcenmobilisierung. Die Ausbreitung von Bürgerkraftwerken nimmt verschiedenen Formen an, darunter Replikation, Wachstum einzelner Initiativen, Transfer in andere Länder und Technologiebereiche und das Aufgreifen durch etablierte Akteure. Jede dieser Ausbreitungsformen beruht auf einem anderen Zugang zur Nutzung von Ressourcen und deren Austausch zwischen Akteuren. Jedoch hängen alle Ausbreitungsformen von einer gewissen interpretativen Flexibilität hinsichtlich der Bedeutung von Bürgerkraftwerken ab. Darüber hinaus wird gezeigt, dass unterschiedliche Ausbreitungsformen auch unterschiedliche Varianten soziotechnischer Konfigurationen nach sich gezogen haben. Der Begriff der Macht wird hier als die Fähigkeit von Akteuren begriffen, auf Ressourcen zugreifen und diese für ihre Ziele einsetzen zu können. Obwohl Bürgerkraftwerksinitiativen in der Tat viele Ressourcen mobilisieren konnten, werden drei Probleme diskutiert, die die Interpretation der Ausbreitung von Bürgerkraftwerken als Ermächtigungsprozess einschränken: Fortwährende Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse, das Problem der Vereinnahmung, sowie die Ermächtigung bereits privilegierter Akteure. Schließlich werden drei Arten von Konflikten diskutiert, die mit der Verbreitung von Bürger- kraftwerken einhergehen: lokale Konflikte in Bezug auf einzelne Projekte, Konflikte zwischen etablierten Akteuren und Herausforderern im Energiesystem, sowie Konflikte hinsichtlich der definierenden Merkmale von Bürgerkraftwerken. Diese Konflikte können als Wettstreit um Ressourcen oder als Auseinandersetzung um deren Verwendungsweise verstanden werden. Im Gegensatz zu den meisten bisherigen Analysen von grassroots Innovationen wird hier nicht der Zugang des strategischen Nischenmanagements als Analyserahmen eingesetzt. Es wird argumentiert, dass der gewählte Zugang ein besseres Verständnis dafür erlaubt, wie zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure Platz für neue soziotechnische Konfigurationen schaffen, dass er mehr Raum für die Heterogenität soziotechnischer Konfigurationen und interpretative Flexibilität lässt und die konzeptuelle Anbindung der Analyse von Machtverhältnissen und Konflikten erleichtert.

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Abstract

This thesis looks the development of citizen power plants, collectively owned wind farms and PV plants, in Germany and Austria. It conceptualizes them as a grassroots innovation and asks how this innovation could develop and spread. In addition to that, the thesis explores whether the diffusion of citizen power plants can be interpreted as a process of empowerment, and what conflicts have gone along with the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants. The thesis is based on 23 semi- structured expert interviews with representatives of citizen power plant initiatives and support organizations. This has been accompanied by a literature review and further background research.

Grassroots innovations can be thought of as novel sociotechnical configurations developed by community groups and civil society initiatives. To explain the establishment of such new configurations, I draw on resource mobilization theory, a strand of social movement theory. My analysis shows that the development of pioneer projects required six broad types of resources. The cases, however, differ in terms of the resource endowments initiatives had available at the outset, and further resource mobilization efforts that were required.

The diffusion of citizen power plants takes different forms, including replication, scaling up of individual initiatives, transfer to another country or technology area and uptake by incumbents. Each of these forms of diffusion rests on a different approach to the way resources are used and exchanged between actors. However, all forms of diffusion depend on a certain degree of interpretative flexibility of citizen power plants. Finally, different forms of diffusion have produced different variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants. I identify the three types of configurations: community power, green shareholding and consumer participation.

To address power relations, I conceptualize power as an actors’ ability to access and use resources for a particular goal. Although bottom-up initiatives indeed succeeded in mobilizing a significant amount of resources, I discuss three qualifications to interpreting the diffusion of citizen power plants as a process of empowerment: The problem of continued dependency relations, the problem of co-optation, and the problem of empowering the empowered.

Finally, I identify three types of conflicts that go along with the diffusion of citizen power plants: local conflicts concerning individual projects, incumbent-challenger conflicts between established utilities and citizen power plant initiatives, and object conflicts over the defining criteria of citizen power plants. These conflicts can be understood as struggles over resources or disagreements over the goals to which they are put.

In contrast to most existing analyses of grassroots innovations, I have decided not to follow the approach of strategic niche management. I argue that the approach I have taken allows to better understand how spaces for grassroots innovations are created and maintained from the bottom up, allows for greater heterogeneity in terms of sociotechnical configurations and in terms of the meanings attached to them, and supports the incorporation of conceptual tools for the analysis of power and conflict.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables ...... 9 List of Abbreviations ...... 9 1 Introduction ...... 10 2 Existing research in the field ...... 14 2.1 Citizen power plants in Germany and Austria ...... 14 2.2 Citizen power plants and innovation ...... 19 3 Basic theoretical framework ...... 23 3.1 Sociotechnical configurations and sociotechnical regimes ...... 23 3.2 Grassroots innovations ...... 27 3.3 Summary and Outlook ...... 30 4 Introduction to country cases ...... 32 4.1 Germany ...... 32 4.2 Austria ...... 36 4.3 Citizen power plants as alternative sociotechnical configurations ...... 40 5 Methods ...... 44 5.1 Data collection ...... 44 5.2 Data analysis ...... 53 6 The emergence of citizen power plants ...... 59 6.1 Theoretical framework, extension 1: resource mobilization theory ...... 59 6.1.1 Social movement theory as a suitable perspective ...... 59 6.1.2 Resource mobilization theory ...... 62 6.2 Country case Germany ...... 66 6.2.1 Background: The German anti-nuclear movement ...... 66 6.2.2 The emergence of citizen wind farms ...... 68 6.2.3 Country case discussion ...... 73 6.3 Country case Austria ...... 75 6.3.1 Background: Energy policy becomes a field of contention ...... 75 6.3.2 The emergence of citizen wind farms ...... 76 6.3.3 Country case discussion ...... 80 6.4 Chapter conclusion ...... 81 7 The diffusion of citizen power plants ...... 85 7.1 Replication ...... 87 7.1.1 The replication of citizen wind farms in Austria and Germany ...... 88 6

7.1.2 The replication of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany...... 93 7.1.3 Discussion ...... 99 7.2 Scaling up ...... 103 7.2.1 Limited scaling up ...... 104 7.2.2 Continued scaling up ...... 109 7.2.3 Discussion ...... 116 7.3 Transfer ...... 122 7.3.1 Transfer to a new country ...... 122 7.3.2 Transfer to a new technology area ...... 125 7.3.3 Discussion ...... 131 7.4 Uptake by incumbents...... 135 7.4.1 Citizen power plants developed by utilities ...... 137 7.4.2 Discussion ...... 146 7.5 Chapter conclusion ...... 149 7.5.1 Critical issues for different forms of diffusion ...... 149 7.5.2 Structured heterogeneity...... 152 8 A process of empowerment? ...... 161 8.1 Theoretical framework, extension 2: Power and empowerment ...... 163 8.2 Increasing access to resources ...... 167 8.3 Old and new dependency relations ...... 169 8.4 Co-optation ...... 173 8.4.1 Assimilation ...... 174 8.4.2 Appropriation ...... 178 8.5 Disadvantaged or privileged actors? ...... 179 8.5.1 Individuals’ capacity to engage in citizen power plant initiatives ...... 180 8.5.2 Communities’ capacity to engage with citizen power plants ...... 182 8.6 Chapter conclusion ...... 184 9 Conflicts related to the diffusion of citizen power plants ...... 189 9.1 Local conflicts ...... 190 9.1.1 Local conflicts and sociotechnical configurations ...... 191 9.1.2 Local conflicts and previous tensions in the community ...... 195 9.1.3 Discussion ...... 196 9.2 Incumbent–challenger conflicts ...... 197 7

9.2.1 Incumbent-challenger conflicts in Germany ...... 198 9.2.2 Incumbent-challenger conflicts in Austria ...... 202 9.2.3 Comparison between Germany and Austria ...... 205 9.3 Object conflicts ...... 207 9.3.1 Object conflicts concerning renewable energy cooperatives ...... 209 9.3.2 Object conflicts concerning citizen wind farms ...... 211 9.3.3 Discussion ...... 212 9.4 Chapter conclusion ...... 213 10 Conclusion ...... 216 10.1 Summary of results ...... 217 10.2 Implications for the analysis of grassroots innovations ...... 226 Appendix: Verbatim interview quotes in German original ...... 232 6 The emergence of citizen power plants ...... 232 7 The diffusion of citizen power plants ...... 233 8 A process of empowerment? ...... 239 9 Conflicts in the diffusion of citizen power plants ...... 243 References ...... 248 Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………...…………264

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List of Tables

Table 1: Sociotechnical configurations of established systems and citizen power plants ...... 43 Table 2: List of interviews ...... 49 Table 3: Resource typology ...... 65 Table 4: Citizen wind farm companies in Lower Austria, December 2013 ...... 110 Table 5: Sociotechnical configurations community power and green shareholding ...... 121 Table 6: Overview of utility companies’ sale-and-lease-back models (Austria) ...... 140 Table 7: Overview of utility companies’ loan models (Austria) ...... 140 Table 8: Sociotechnical configurations community power and consumer participation ...... 148 Table 9a: Critical issues for replication ...... 150 Table 9b: Critical issues for scaling up ...... 151 Table 9c Critical issues for transfer………………………………………………………………..151 Table 9d Critical issues for uptake by incumbents…………………………………………………151 Table 10: Resource use rationales for different forms of diffusion ...... 153 Table 11: Variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants ...... 155 Table 12a: Understandings of citizen power plants from the strand opposition ...... 156 Table 12b Understandings from the strand responsibility and self-governance……………………..157 Table 12c Understandings from the strand ecological modernisation………………………………...157 Table 12d Understandings from the strand suasion and compliance…………………………………..158 Table 13: Forms of diffusion and heterogeneity along several dimensions ...... 159 Table 14: Established configurations, green shareholding and community power (Austria) ...... 175

List of Abbreviations

A/N author’s note

MLP multi-level perspective

NIMBY not in my backyard

PV photovoltaics

SNM strategic niche management

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1 Introduction On 9 June 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel gave a highly publicized speech in front of the Bundestag concerning the future of the German energy system (Merkel 2011). With reference to the Fukushima nuclear disaster three months earlier, Merkel announced the permanent shutdown of eight nuclear power plants, the phase-out of the remaining reactors until 2022, and affirmed that renewables were to become the central pillar of energy provision (ibid.). The speech was commonly received as the government’s proclamation of the Energiewende (energy turnaround) and Germany’s efforts to restructure its energy system have attracted a lot of attention since. Indeed, especially in the electricity sector, Germany is among the leading countries in terms of the installation of so-called ‘new renewables’ (renewables other than hydropower, see Fraunhofer ISE 2014, World Wind Energy Association 2014).

The concept of the Energiewende, however, dates back as far as 1980 when the term was first used in a study published by the Öko-Institut Freiburg (Krause, Bossel et al. 1980). Practical experiments with renewable energy technologies have a similarly long history, dating back to government-funded R&D programmes for wind power and PV plants in the late 1970s and the 1980s (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 261/262). However, efforts to shift the energy system to a renewable basis have not only been driven by actors from the domains of policy, research and business. Indeed, achievements in this area also owe a lot to social movement action and grassroots initiatives.

For one thing, the anti-nuclear and environmental movements strongly contributed towards bringing the issue of renewable energy technologies on the agenda from the 1970s onwards (Corbach 2006, Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 33-47). Beyond that, experimentation at the grassroots level has also included the establishment of citizen power plants – wind farms or photovoltaics plants jointly owned and operated by groups of citizens, often living in the town or region where the plant is located. Indeed, ownership patterns in the German renewables sector are perhaps just as remarkable as its leading role in terms of installed capacity. As of 2012, more than a third of installed renewable energy capacity in Germany was by majority owned by local or regional citizens (trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2013 p. 42).

Compared to the German case, efforts to transform the electricity sector in Austria have not received as much attention. Indeed, pressures to alter sources of electricity generation are much weaker to start with, seeing Austria’s electricity system is traditionally strongly based on hydropower. Nevertheless, from 1990s onwards, Austrian citizens’ initiatives started to experiment with new renewables. In particular, early wind power development in Austria in

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the second half of the 1990s was mainly pursued by bottom-up citizens’ initiatives that used collective ownership and loan models to finance the turbines (Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 10‑18). More recently, since around 2010, there has been revived interest in citizen owned renewables, focusing especially on photovoltaics.

This thesis looks at the development of citizen power plants in the area of wind power and photovoltaics in Germany and Austria. Citizen power plants can be understood as a grassroots innovation engaging with particular technologies and introducing new forms of socio-economic organization to the energy system. The concept of grassroots innovations was put forward by Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith and refers to novel solutions towards meeting societal needs developed by community groups and civil society actors (Seyfang and Smith 2007). Indeed, while the established form of energy provision usually involves highly centralized energy infrastructures, locally and cooperatively owned facilities for energy production constitute a substantially differing approach.

There are, however, several challenges related to the emergence and diffusion of grassroots innovations in energy systems. For one thing, complex sociotechnical arrangements such as energy systems are often resistant to change. Energy systems can be thought of as configurations of particular technologies and different actors, along with an elaborate institutional infrastructure of regulations, norms and guiding principles. These elements tend to reinforce each other, making it hard for innovative alternative arrangements to establish themselves (Geels 2002 p. 1258). Furthermore, Seyfang and Smith (2007 p. 595/596) have discussed several challenges specific to the diffusion of grassroots innovations, such as reliance on voluntary work, reliance on grant funding, lack of necessary skills required and tensions over the degree to which the innovation should be adapted to mainstream practices for the sake of greater diffusion.

Nevertheless, citizen power plants in Germany and Austria have reached a notable degree of diffusion. Against this background, this thesis seeks to investigate how the diffusion of citizen power plants, as a grassroots innovation, has unfolded so far. The first part of the analysis (chapters 6 and 7) therefore addresses the following research questions:

(1) How was it possible for bottom-up initiatives to develop the first citizen power plants in Germany and Austria? (2) How did citizen power plants spread further? What challenges did this involve and how could they be dealt with? (3) How were citizen power plants adapted over the course of the diffusion process?

The second part of the analysis (chapters 8 and 9) turns to power relations and conflicts related to the diffusion of citizen power plants. Considering the widespread diffusion of 11

citizen owned wind farms and PV plants in Germany and Austria one may easily jump to the conclusion that this constitutes an impressive process of empowerment. My analysis of the diffusion of citizen power plants, however, shows that this process also involves the development of dependency relations and adaptations to citizen power plants that not all actors approve of. Furthermore, citizen power plants of course constitute an intervention into established structures and practices, both at the local level of individual projects and at the level of energy systems. As such, their establishment is likely to be bound up with tensions. This has prompted me to take a closer look at power relations and conflicts. In chapters 8 and 9 I will therefore address the following research questions:

(4) To what extent can the diffusion of citizen power plants in Germany and Austria be interpreted as a process of empowerment? What qualifications need to be made to such an interpretation? (5) What types of conflicts go along with the diffusion of citizen power plants? Under what conditions are conflicts particularly salient?

I would like to make two further notes on terminology issues here. First, the term citizen power plant is closely related but not identical to the term community energy that is widely used in English speaking countries, especially in the UK. Although the meaning of the term ‘community energy’ is notoriously difficult to pinpoint (Walker, Hunter et al. 2007, Walker and Devine-Wright 2008), it is generally taken to include local initiatives that aim to contribute to more sustainable energy systems (Hielscher 2011 p. 11/12, Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014 p. 22). This encompasses a wide variety of different projects. For example, it includes locally owned renewable energy plants, but also extends to collective behaviour change programmes and refurbishment initiatives (Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014 p. 22). As Gill Seyfang and colleagues have noted, the term ‘community energy’ has not been imposed by them as researcher, but rather constitutes an actors’ category used by activists, practitioners and policy makers (ibid. p. 26). For my analysis I have chosen to use the term ‘citizen power plant’ rather than ‘community energy’ largely for the same reason. In Germany and Austria Bürgerkraftwerk (citizen power plant) is a widely used term, while the term ‘community energy’ does not have an immediate counterpart.

Admittedly, however, there are also differences within the German-speaking world. While the term Bürgerkraftwerk (citizen power plant) is commonly used in Germany, Austrian practitioners also make frequent use of the term Bürgerbeteiligungsanlage (citizen participation plant). In most cases the terms are used more or less synonymously, although the Austrian term arguably is more compatible with more commercially oriented approaches offering participation rather than being fully in the hands of a bottom-up initiative (see also my discussion of object conflicts in section 9.3.3). I have settled for the term ‘citizen power 12

plant’, the direct translation of ‘Bürgerkraftwerk’, as this term is commonly used in Germany but has increasingly also entered Austrian discourse.

The next chapter reviews existing research on citizen power plants in Germany and Austria. Furthermore it gives a brief overview of further literature on citizen power plants that conceptualizes them as an innovation. Chapter 3 then introduces the basis of my theoretical framework. The theoretical framework, however, will also be further extended in sections 6.1 and 8.1, as my analysis progresses. The basic theoretical framework is followed by an introduction of my empirical case. I will provide a brief overview of electricity systems in Germany and Austria, situating the development of citizen power plants in this context (chapter 4). Chapter 5 then describes and reflects on the methods used for collecting and analysing the empirical material.

The analysis of my material in relation to the research questions listed above is presented in chapters 6 to 9. Chapter 6 examines the emergence of the first citizen power plants in Germany and Austria, chapter 7 deals with different forms of their diffusion, chapter 8 addresses the issue of power relations, and chapter 9 explores conflicts related to the diffusion of citizen power plants. I have included a drawing at the beginning of each of these chapters that gives a graphical overview of the issues covered in the respective chapter. Furthermore, chapters 6 to 9 each end with an interim conclusion, summarizing and discussing results in relation to the research question or questions addressed there. Finally, chapter 10 provides an overall summary of results, reflects on the theoretical framework I have adopted and discusses implications for the analysis of grassroots innovations.

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2 Existing research in the field This chapter briefly reviews existing literature on citizen power plants in Germany and Austria (section 2.1) as well as further literature on citizen power plants that conceptualizes such initiatives as an innovation (section 2.2).1 Conceptualizations of citizen power plants as innovations have mainly been articulated in relation to wind energy cooperatives in Denmark in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as in relation to more recent initiatives in the somewhat broader field of community energy in the UK. The aim of this chapter is both to provide a first introduction to the field of citizen power plants in Germany and Austria, and to situate my thesis in the existing research literature.

Both of these aims, however, are not dealt with in this chapter alone. The introduction to the field of citizen power plants will be complemented in chapter 4 that provides a more extensive introduction to my empirical field. Furthermore, this chapter only serves to situate my thesis in relation to existing research on citizen power plants in Germany and Austria. As will become clear, existing research in this area has approached citizen power plants from a broad variety of different perspectives. Nevertheless, it has hardly looked towards the development of such initiatives from a perspective of sociotechnical change. Apart from striving to fill this gap, the thesis also aims to develop a conceptual framework that deals with some of the shortcomings of strategic niche management as an approach to analyse grassroots innovations. An elaboration on the way I relate to such existing approaches for the analysis of grassroots innovations will be provided in chapter 3.

2.1 Citizen power plants in Germany and Austria From the late 1980s and the 1990s onwards, citizen-led renewable energy installations have become very widespread in Germany. The provision of precise figures, however, is a challenging task, not least because it depends on the way citizen power plants are defined. Indeed, as I will show in section 9.3, the question what may legitimately be referred to as a citizen power plants is a contested issues. A recent study by the market research institute trend:research and the University of Lüneburg define citizen energy in the narrow sense (Bürgerenergie im engeren Sinn) as energy installations that are by majority owned and controlled by regional citizens (trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2013 p. 28). However, they note that both the criterion of majority ownership and the criterion of regionality can be relaxed, such that citizen energy in a broader sense (Bürgerenergie im weiteren Sinn) also includes plants that are only by minority owned by private individuals, not necessarily living in region where the plant is situated (ibid.). Using these definitions,

1 For a more extensive literature review on citizen power plants in general see the literature review I have put together with Daniela Weismeier-Sammer (Schreuer and Weismeier-Sammer 2010). 14

34.4% of installed renewable energy capacity in Germany in 2012 can be classified as citizen energy in the narrow sense; 46.6% can be classified as citizen energy in the broad sense (ibid. p. 42).

These definitions, however, include both individual and collective ownership of energy installations and cover both electricity and thermal energy. Citizen power plants can be understood as citizen energy in the electricity sector where ownership is collective. Citizen power plants are particularly relevant in the area of onshore wind power. In 2012, 20.4% of installed wind power capacity in Germany was made up of citizen power plants in the narrow sense, being by majority owned and controlled by a group of regional citizens. An additional 25.8% was made of citizen power plants in the broad sense, being at least partly owned by a group of private individuals (trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2013 p. 45). By contrast, in the area of photovoltaics, only 0.8% of installed capacity in 2012 were accounted for by citizen power plants in the narrow sense and an additional 1% were made up of citizen power plants in the broader sense (ibid. p. 44). Individual citizen ownership of PV plants, however, accounts for 46.3% of total installed capacity (ibid.). Nevertheless collective citizen ownership of PV plants has been on the rise in recent years, not least due to a sharp rise in the number of collectively owned PV plants organized as cooperatives (Holstenkamp and Müller 2013, Debor 2014).

Historically, the development of citizen power plants in Germany goes back to the late 1980s, when a broad range of renewable energy initiatives developed out of the environmental and anti-nuclear movements (Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 54/55). Most notably this included the development of the first citizen wind farms in Northern Germany. Andreas Byzio and colleagues (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 267-394) provide an extensive account of the establishment and further development of these citizen wind farms initiatives, focusing especially on Hamburg and Lower Saxony. In section 6.2 I will draw on their account to complement my own interview material on the emergence of the first German citizen wind farms.

Indeed, Germany has become something of a flagship country in the area of citizen power plants. It has repeatedly been used as a reference point and a best practice example when difficulties related to the development of citizen power plants in other countries are discussed (see e.g. Toke 2005, Nolden 2013). In this context researchers have asked what framework conditions have supported the high share of citizen power plants in Germany. Practically all analysts addressing this issue stress the importance of the German feed-in tariff system that provides guaranteed grid access and a high level of security of investment (Bolinger 2001, Enzensberger, Fichtner et al. 2003, Toke, Breukers et al. 2008). Further factors that have been identified include the availability of loan capital at preferential conditions (Bolinger 15

2001, Enzensberger, Fichtner et al. 2003, Nolden 2013), a tradition of local energy activism based on the anti-nuclear movement (Enzensberger, Fichtner et al. 2003, Toke, Breukers et al. 2008) and the fact that Germany is densely populated by people with sufficient financial possibilities to invest (Enzensberger, Fichtner et al. 2003).

Another strand of research on citizen power plants in Germany has concerned itself with the question whether ownership or co-ownership of renewable energy plants by local and regional citizens contributes to higher levels of acceptance of these installations (Schweizer- Ries, Rau et al. 2010, Musall and Kuik 2011). These studies indeed find positive effects of local ownership or co-ownership on the acceptance of renewable energy installations. However, the authors also note that local ownership is not a panacea for so-called acceptance problems. In particular, Petra Schweizer-Ries and colleagues (2010) point out that positive effects on acceptance rates also depend on citizens developing trust in the competence of the project developer and evaluating the participation process as fair.

In addition to that, Norbert Enzensberger and colleagues have discussed the implications of the legal form that is chosen for citizen power plants in relation to liability issues, tax issues or the administrative burden entailed (Enzensberger, Fichtner et al. 2003). Indeed, collective citizen ownership of green electricity plants has been developed using a variety of different legal forms. In the area of wind power the most widely used form is that of a limited partnership (GmbH & Co KG). This model is also used in the area of photovoltaics, but here cooperatives as well as companies constituted under civil law (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts, GbR) are also widespread. Furthermore there are also some forms of participation where citizens participate via a loan model or acquire participation rights (Yildiz 2014).

A surge in energy cooperatives in recent years has also been accompanied by research focusing specifically on this form of collective citizen ownership of energy installations. In particular, several recent studies have concerned themselves with demographic characteristics of the ‘population’ of energy cooperatives in Germany (Holstenkamp and Ulbrich 2010, DGRV 2013, Holstenkamp and Müller 2013, Debor 2014, Yildiz 2014). These studies show that energy cooperatives have been sharply on the rise since around 2006. By the end of 2012 there were more than 750 energy cooperatives registered in Germany, out of which around 670 had been set up between 2006 and 2012 (Holstenkamp and Müller 2013 p. 5/6, Debor 2014 p. 8). Indeed, the rise in energy cooperatives has revived the German cooperative sector that had previously stagnated (Stappel 2011).

Most of these cooperatives generate energy from renewable sources. Photovoltaics is the most widely used technology (431 cooperatives), followed by biomass (177 cooperatives) and wind power (49 cooperatives, Holstenkamp and Müller 2013 p. 12). By 2012, renewable

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energy cooperatives in Germany had a total of 136,000 members and their total installed capacity amounted to 417,000 kWp (DGRV 2013 p. 5/15). Jakob Müller and Lars Holstenkamp, however, point out that the rise in energy cooperatives has largely come to a halt in 2014 (Müller and Holstenkamp 2015). As possible explanations they refer to unfavourable amendments to the feed-in tariff system in 2012 and the introduction of stricter regulations concerning investment offers in 2013 (ibid p. 8). In section 7.1.2 I will discuss the hitherto sharp rise of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany as a case of the replication of citizen power plants and discuss what has enabled this process.

Apart from examining the demographic characteristics of renewable energy cooperatives, researchers have concerned themselves with economic analyses of this type of citizen power plant. For example, Lars Holstenkamp and Stefanie Ulbrich (2010) provide an analysis of the financial structure of PV cooperatives, assessing practices related to the acquisition and use of equity capital, subordinated loans and debt capital. Sarah Debor (2014) analyses the socio-economic power of energy cooperatives in terms of their membership numbers, their total capital, equity ratio, investment intensity and their return on investment. Furthermore Julian Sagebiel and colleagues (2014) examine the willingness to pay for electricity from cooperatives. They conclude that cooperatives selling electricity are attractive mainly for what they produce (energy from renewable sources) and only to a small extent for the organizational specificities of cooperatives (e.g. possibility for participation, democratic decision making structures). Finally, a number of authors have emphasised the potentials of energy cooperatives to contribute to regional value creation, to sustain livelihoods in rural areas, and to offer the most comprehensive form of citizen involvement and grassroots democracy in the development of renewable energy plants (George and Bonow 2009, Klemisch and Maron 2010, Flieger 2011).

Compared with the German case, only very little research has been conducted on citizen power plants in Austria. A few papers have examined rural biomass district heating systems, typically organized as farmers’ cooperatives (Rakos 2001, Weiss 2004, Madlener 2007). Furthermore Michael Ornetzeder and Harald Rohracher have explored the exceptionally wide diffusion of solar thermal collectors in Austria through do-it-yourself construction groups (Ornetzeder 2001, Rohracher and Ornetzeder 2007, Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2013). There is, however, hardly any research literature on Austrian citizen wind farms and PV plants. A study provided by the Austrian wind power lobbying organization IG Windkraft (Hantsch and Nährer 2006) examines the development of wind power in Austria, focusing especially on regional initiatives with collective forms of financing and ownership.

According to this study, more than 7,000 private individuals in Austria were financially involved in wind power at the end of 2005 (Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 19). Furthermore, 17

100 million Euro of equity capital had been raised from the local population for wind power development at that time, triggering an overall investment of 500 million Euro (ibid.). In addition to that, the study describes different possible legal forms for citizen wind farms, including silent partnerships, limited partnerships, stock companies and private loans (ibid. p. 11-14). It also provides some examples of citizen wind farms in Austria (ibid. p. 14-18) and reviews relevant legal framework conditions in Austria and Europe (ibid. p. 20-38). The authors emphasize the relevance of bottom-up initiatives for wind power development in Austria and note that during the early years of wind power development in Austria practically all successful projects came from grassroots initiatives, while top-down large- scale approaches did not succeed (ibid. p. 39).

The development of citizen PV plants in Austria is a more recent phenomenon that started from around 2010. Jasmine Bachmann and colleagues (2012) have put together a study reviewing different models of citizen participation in PV plants in Austria and provide some further examples from Germany. They distinguish two ideal-typical schemes depending on the main project rationale. According to this study the more common type in Austria emphasises active involvement of local citizens, often aiming to contribute to awareness rising on energy issues and building on local or regional personal ties. Another project type is built around an investment rationale. Individual projects may, however also be built around a combination of the two rationales, promising moderate financial returns but also relating the project to a local or regional identity (ibid. p. 31-34). In chapter 7 I will similarly distinguish between different types of citizen power plants. However, rather than focusing on different project rationales, my typology takes into account variation in the sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants more generally (see section 3.1 on the concept of sociotechnical configurations). This, however, also links up with different rationales attached to citizen power plants.

Taken together, the research literature on citizen power plants in Germany and Austria highlights the relevance of this phenomenon in terms of the share of installed renewable energy capacity and in terms of the number of people involved. This especially holds true for citizen wind farms, but the literature shows that collectively owned PV plants have been on the rise in recent years. Furthermore this brief review of the literature already points to considerable diversity in the field of citizen power plants, both in terms of participation models and legal forms that are used, and in terms of the meanings and rationales attached to such projects. Such meanings and rationales for example include the positioning of citizen power plants as a counter-model to nuclear power, interpreting them as an expression of a local or regional identity, seeing them as an investment option and looking towards them as 18

an approach to deal with so-called acceptance problems in relation to renewable energy installations. In addition to that, the literature makes clear that the development of citizen power plants is not only driven by bottom-up actors but shaped by a number of structural conditions such as the availability of feed-in tariffs , the availability of loan capital or a tradition of energy activism.

The development of citizen power plants in Austria has, however, hardly yet been studied. Furthermore, what is missing from the literature, is a procedural perspective on the development of citizen power plants that looks at their emergence and diffusion as a process of sociotechnical change. The existing literature does not provide a theoretically informed analysis of the process by which citizen power plants have emerged and established themselves in spite of self-reinforcing mechanisms of a differently structured regime. Such a perspective is all the more important in view of overall transformation processes energy systems are currently undergoing. The development of new forms of organization around renewable energy technologies constitutes part of this development and merits closer examination. Indeed, such a perspective has already been adopted in relation to Danish wind power cooperatives that developed in the 1970s and 1980s and the somewhat broader field of community energy in the UK. The next section briefly reviews this literature.

2.2 Citizen power plants and innovation Denmark is a particularly interesting country in relation to citizen power plants, especially in the area of wind power. Indeed, Denmark is the country that has contributed most strongly to the development of modern wind turbines and several authors have emphasized the role of local cooperatives as early owners and users in this technology development process (Danielsen 1995, Garud and Karnøe 2003, Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2013). Jørgensen and Karnøe (1995) point to the broad actor base that was necessary for the successful development of wind power in Denmark in the 1970s, including grassroots entrepreneurs and do-it-yourself builders, as well as idealistic buyers, engineers and various renewable energy interest organizations.

Along a similar line, Raghu Garud and Peter Karnøe (2003) show how various actor groups had an important role to play in this gradual innovation process in the 1970s and 1980s. One important actor group was made up of early owner-users of wind turbines, in particular farmers and cooperatives. Organized in the Association of Danish Wind Power Owners they provided important inputs for design improvements to manufacturers and negotiated a feed- in agreement with utilities (ibid. p. 288). The proximity of cooperative members to their wind turbines helped to detect malfunctioning of turbines and thus to develop knowledge on possible design improvements. Furthermore wind power cooperatives facilitated

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information exchange and political lobbying, and contributed to market development by increasing demand (Heymann 1998).

Drawing on a term introduced by Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith (2007), Michael Ornetzeder and Harald Rohracher (2013) have interpreted this as a grassroots innovation process – an innovation process strongly driven by bottom-up actors and community groups. In particular, it can be understood as a process by which early users of a technology, in this case wind power cooperatives, actively contributed to technology development. This occurred both in terms of contributing to design improvements and in terms of opening up a market for the technology and lobbying for supportive policy (ibid. p. 859/860).

In recent years researchers in the UK have also focused on the development of community energy projects as a grassroots innovation process (Jeong, Simcock et al. 2012, Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013, Hielscher, Seyfang et al. 2013, Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014). In contrast to the Danish case, however, framing such initiatives as an innovation is usually not intended to refer to contributions to technology development made by these initiatives. Rather, it pays reference to new forms of socio-economic organization in energy issues these initiatives have developed.

Indeed, Yonjoo Jeong and colleagues (2012) discuss and compare two case studies of collectively owned renewable energy installations – one of them a wind farm situated in the UK, the other a PV installation in South Korea. They refer to them as ‘grassroots social innovations’, thereby highlighting innovative characteristics of these projects in terms of their social and organizational arrangements. For example, this includes collective and democratic decision making processes as well as the restriction of ownership to local people. However, while the aspect of novelty is emphasized, the authors pay little attention to the way the innovation process unfolds in the case of community energy.

Other authors have specifically focused on this process dimension of community energy as an innovation. In particular, such an approach is adopted in publications from the project Community Innovation for Sustainable Energy (CISE) that analysed the community energy sector in the UK as a grassroots innovation (Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013, Hielscher, Seyfang et al. 2013, Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014). More specifically these authors adopt the approach of strategic niche management that posits that radically innovative sociotechnical arrangements are best facilitated by building protected niches where learning, networking and the development of shared expectations can occur. These niche building processes ultimately contribute to increasing the robustness of an innovation and support momentum building and diffusion (Schot and Geels 2008).

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Sabine Hielscher, Gill Seyfang and colleagues examine the extent to which niche-building processes for community energy in the UK can be observed and how successful they have been (Hielscher, Seyfang et al. 2013, Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014). They conclude that there is evidence of an emerging niche of community energy in the UK, but also find significant deficiencies that limit the robustness of the sector and restrain its potential in exerting influence. For example, they find a lack of shared expectations and they find that learning processes are largely limited to the individual project level rather than occurring at a more systemic level (Hielscher, Seyfang et al. 2013). Furthermore they diagnose a need for stronger and better resourced intermediary organizations to aggregate and consolidate learning (Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014).

Indeed, Tom Hargreaves and colleagues (Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013) have specifically analysed the role of intermediary organizations in the process of niche-building for community energy in the UK. Intermediary organizations are support actors in a sector that aggregate lessons from individual projects, establish an institutional infrastructure for knowledge exchange and frame and coordinate action on the ground (Geels and Deuten 2006). Overall Hargreaves and colleagues find little evidence that intermediaries have succeeded in building a coherent, robust and strategic community energy niche in the UK and even go as far as questioning whether building such a coherent niche can be achieved in view of the diversity of the sector (Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013 p. 878/879).

This brief literature review indicates that citizen owned energy installations have been analysed in relation to innovation processes in various ways. In the Danish wind power case, a number of analysts have shown how wind power cooperatives significantly contributed to technology development. In this case citizen power plant initiatives were part of a broader set of actors that successfully pushed the development of wind power technology forwards and opened up a market for this technology (Danielsen 1995, Garud and Karnøe 2003, Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2013). Other authors, especially in the UK, have analysed community energy initiatives not as an actor group contributing to technology development, but as an innovation in itself. Here the focus lies on the development of new forms of socio- economic organization in relation to particular energy technologies. Sometimes individual initiatives are understood as innovations in themselves (Jeong, Simcock et al. 2012), but attention has mostly focused on the development of the entire sector of community energy as an innovation (Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013, Hielscher, Seyfang et al. 2013, Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014).

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It is this latter approach, analysing the development the entire sector of community energy as an innovation process, which is most strongly related to my own approach. In this thesis I will analyse the development and diffusion of citizen power plants in Germany and Austria as a grassroots innovation in energy systems. I find a conceptualization of citizen power plants as an innovation useful, not least because it draws attention to their procedural dimension, the process by which they have emerged and spread. I thus want to add to the existing literature on citizen power plants in Germany and Austria by analysing their establishment as a process of sociotechnical change. I will, however, not draw on the approach of strategic niche management. Rather, I will develop a theoretical framework that allows for greater heterogeneity than the concept of a niche and that pays reference to the specific situation of grassroots innovators (see chapter 3 and section 6.1).

Citizen power plants in Germany and Austria constitute a particularly interesting case in terms of the development of a grassroots innovation, not least due to their considerable extent of diffusion. Furthermore, as I will show in chapter 7, they also constitute rich cases, as there are several different forms of diffusion that can be observed, facing quite different types of challenges. The next chapter deals with a specification of the concept of grassroots innovation, discusses some of the problems in the way grassroots innovations have been analysed so far, and provides a first introduction to the conceptual tools I will use to analyse citizen power plants as a grassroots innovation. The chapter thus leads on from here and further positions my thesis in relation to existing literature on grassroots innovation processes.

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3 Basic theoretical framework The aim of this chapter is to introduce the basis of my theoretical framework. More specifically, I will discuss the concept of grassroots innovations and explain why their emergence and diffusion merits further examination. The chapter, however, does not contain the entire theoretical framework. Rather, I have spread its specification across this introductory theory chapter as well as chapters 6 - 9 containing my analysis. Introducing the details of different elements of my theoretical framework immediately before they are used should help to connect the presentation of theory with its application more easily. Readers who prefer to look through the entire theoretical framework in one go may nevertheless read this chapter along with sections 6.1 and 8.1 before continuing with the rest of this thesis.

This distributed form of presenting my theoretical framework also reflects the way this framework has been developed. Rather than developing a fully-fledged theoretical framework at the outset, I started from basic notions of sociotechnical configurations, sociotechnical regimes and grassroots innovations that are introduced in this chapter. I further developed, adapted and refined the framework over the course of the analysis of the empirical material. This process was informed both by the empirical material and by theoretical concepts from social movement theory, institutional theory and the sustainability transitions literature. This is broadly in line with a reflexive use of a grounded theory approach. Such an approach strives to avoid forcing predefined categories on empirical material, but acknowledges that the interpretation of data is always theory laden and can benefit from drawing on existing theoretical concepts (Kelle 2010).

The first section in this chapter introduces the concepts of sociotechnical configurations and sociotechnical regimes. This lays the basis for discussing the concept of grassroots innovations in the following section. This second section also reviews strategic niche management as the main approach that has been used for the analysis of grassroots innovations to date and argues why I will nevertheless develop a different approach. I conclude this chapter a brief summary and an outlook on further details of my theoretical framework that will be introduced in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

3.1 Sociotechnical configurations and sociotechnical regimes

Sociotechnical configurations Studies of technology and innovation in the research tradition of science and technology studies are premised on the understanding that technologies cannot be separated from social relations, practices and rules they are embedded in. This is expressed by the notion of the sociotechnical. It intendeds to pay reference to the closely intertwined relationship between

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technical and social as well as institutional elements related to a particular technology. As Wiebe Bijker (1995 p. 274) has noted, the concept establishes a new unit of analysis that “mirror[s] the heterogeneity of this sociotechnical ‘stuff’ without just resorting to just ‘adding up’ the social and the technical.” Rather than explaining the social as the dependent variable through the technical as the independent variable, or vice versa, the new aim is to investigate stability and change of these heterogeneous configurations (ibid.). Different authors have used varying terms to refer to this ‘sociotechnical stuff’, carrying slightly different connotations: sociotechnical ensembles (Bijker 1995), sociotechnical configurations (Geels 2002), sociotechnical systems (Weber 2003, Geels 2004) or Thomas Hughes’ well-known metaphor of the ‘seamless web’ of social and technical elements (Hughes 1986).

I will use the term of sociotechnical configurations with its connotation that heterogeneous elements need to be aligned to each other to fulfill a particular function (Rip and Kemp 1998 p. 330, Geels 2002 p. 1258). This terms also reflects Arie Rip and René Kemp’s notion of technology as “configurations that work” (1998 p. 330). Furthermore Rip and Kemp argue that

“configurations that work cannot be demarcated from the rest of society in a simple and obvious way. Things and skills are part of routines, of patterns of behavior, of organizations. They work only because they are embedded in this way.” (Rip and Kemp 1998 p. 331) Referring to such configurations as sociotechnical further emphasizes the inseparable fabric of its social and technical elements (Geels 2002 p. 1260). Such configurations can of course be found at different levels of aggregation. For example they can be situated at the level of individual household appliances, at the level of techno-organizational units such as power plants or at the level of national energy systems. For my purpose, the analysis of the development of citizen power plants, I will conceive of sociotechnical configurations as techno-organizational units. They are made up not only of the technical hardware but also of actor constellations, the organizational structure and the rules and practices at the level of an organization.

Gordon Walker and Noel Cass (2007) use such a notion of sociotechnical configurations specifically in relation to renewable energy technologies.

“[W]e can conceive renewable energy technologies not simply as a series of engineered artefacts performing energy conversions, but as configurations of the social and the technical which have emerged contingently in particular contexts and which mirror wider social, economic and technical relations and processes.” (Walker and Cass 2007 p. 459)

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In particular, Walker and Cass analyse different roles for the public that are implicated in different possible configurations of renewable energy technologies. To do so they suggest looking towards five dimensions of sociotechnical configurations (Walker and Cass 2007 p. 459-460):

 The technological hardware: Type and size of renewable energy technology  Function and service: Types of services the generated energy is used for (warmth, comfort, mobility, etc.) and the physical and institutional distance between the points of production and consumption  Ownership and return: Ownership patterns, forms of organizing ownership and the ways benefits are returned on this basis  Management and operation: Distribution of control and management capacity, and the way management is regulated  Infrastructure and networking: Presence and scale of grid integration and the way in which the network is managed

I will pick up on these dimensions but with the following modifications that appear appropriate for my purpose: First of all, the dimension ‘function and service’ does not appear relevant for my analysis. Walker and Cass use it mainly to look at the type of energy that is produced (electricity / heat) and whether it is consumed locally or fed into the grid for distanced consumption (Walker and Cass 2007 p. 462). Since I am only looking at electricity provision to start with, the type of energy is a constant factor. The question whether electricity is consumed locally or fed into a regional or national grid is also implicated in the ‘infrastructure and networking’ dimension. Secondly, I find it helpful to introduce the additional dimension of market relations. This dimension is intended to capture whom the energy producer sells the energy to, if it is sold at all. The infrastructure and networking dimension only covers the physical aspect of what happens to the energy that is produced. The dimension of market relations additionally specifies the market relations involved, which may or may not be publicly regulated (e.g. via feed-in tariffs). Indeed, as will become clear, market access was one of the central challenges for early citizen power plant initiatives.

I will therefore use the following dimensions to describe and analyse sociotechnical configurations:

 The technological hardware: Type and size of renewable energy technology  Ownership and return: Ownership patterns, forms of organizing ownership and the ways benefits are returned on this basis

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 Management and operation: Distribution of control and management capacity, and the way management is regulated  Infrastructure and networking: Presence and scale of grid integration and the way in which the network is managed  Market relations: Ways in which the electricity is sold and the actors and regulatory mechanisms involved

I will use these dimensions of sociotechnical configurations to outline the innovative characteristics of citizen power plants in contrast to established configurations (section 4.3). In addition to that, these dimensions will be relevant for analyzing increasing variability within the set of citizen power plants over the course of their diffusion (chapter 7).

As mentioned before, my conception of sociotechnical configurations is situated at the level of techno-organizational units. Accordingly, the dimensions of sociotechnical configurations I use, as adapted from Walker and Cass (2007), concern the constellation of technological hardware as well as actor roles, rules and practices at this organizational level. There are of course also broader institutional environments that such sociotechnical configurations are embedded in that are not captured by this conception. To account for this, I will now turn to the concept of sociotechnical regimes. The notion of sociotechnical regimes will also help to understand why particular forms of sociotechnical configurations tend to dominate a particular sector such as the energy system.

From sociotechnical configurations to sociotechnical regimes In contrast to sociotechnical configurations, the notion of sociotechnical regimes emphasizes the broader institutional environment that technologies, actors and organizational practices are embedded in. Arie Rip and René Kemp first articulated the notion of a technological regime as

“the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining problems – all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures.” (Rip and Kemp 1998 p. 338) Rip and Kemp’s notion of technological regimes was later extended to sociotechnical regimes to account more explicitly for the way such regimes are co-constituted by technologies and social rules and practices (Geels 2002 p. 1260). Sociotechnical regimes are thus understood as “the semi-coherent set of rules carried by different social groups” (ibid.). Crucially, “[b]y providing orientation and co-ordination to the activities of relevant actor groups, sociotechnical regimes account for the stability of sociotechnical configurations” (ibid., emph. in original).

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The notion of sociotechnical regimes thus helps to understand the durability of sociotechnical configurations, and why the diversity of sociotechnical configurations in a sector such as the energy system tends to be rather low. Dominant sociotechnical configurations are those that are well aligned to a sociotechnical regime and are therefore stabilized by regime rules and practices. However, if actors perceive persistent problems within a regime and with the sociotechnical configurations it helps to stabilize, then some actors may begin to experiment with alternative sociotechnical configurations (Geels 2004 p. 912/913). This idea is part of the so-called multi-level perspective on sociotechnical change (MLP). The multi-level perspective situates the development of novelties in ‘niches’ that operate at a micro level, as compared to the meso-level of sociotechnical regimes and the macro-level of broader environments captured by the notion of sociotechnical landscapes (Geels 2002, 2004).

While I take some ideas from this perspective, in particular the notion of the stabilizing forces of sociotechnical regimes and the experimentation with novelty at the margins, I do not pick up on the specific MLP notion of a niche, for reasons discussed further below. The notion of sociotechnical regime, however, already lies at the basis of my research questions (see p. 11/12). The idea of a rule structure that accounts for the stability and a tendency towards uniformity of sociotechnical configurations under normal conditions opens up the question how alternative sociotechnical configurations may at times newly establish themselves. In this thesis I want to investigate how citizen power plants in Austria and Germany, as new sociotechnical configurations in the energy system, could develop and establish themselves. Crucially, this particular novel sociotechnical configuration is one that was developed by civil society actors. To attend to the specificities of this situation I will next review the concept of grassroots innovations.

3.2 Grassroots innovations Since the late 1990s, an important strand of the study of processes of sociotechnical change has concerned itself with transition processes oriented towards sustainability, a research line that has become known as ‘sustainability transitions’ (Markard, Raven et al. 2012). Within this literature, sustainability oriented civil society initiatives have recently attracted an increasing amount of attention. Initiatives that have been studied in this context include the transition towns network, complementary currencies, eco-housing, organic and locally grown food, car sharing, solar self-construction groups – and also community energy initiatives and citizen power plants (Seyfang 2009, 2010, Jeong, Simcock et al. 2012, Longhurst 2012, Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013, Hielscher, Seyfang et al. 2013, Kirwan, Ilbery et al. 2013, Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2013, Seyfang and Longhurst 2013, White and

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Stirling 2013, Feola and Nunes 2014). Many of these analyses have been informed by the notion of grassroots innovations, introduced by Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith (2007). They understand grassroots innovations as

“networks of activists and organizations generating novel bottom-up solutions for sustainable development; solutions that respond to the local situation and the interests and values of the communities involved.” (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 585) Such grassroots innovations “operate in civil society arenas and involve committed activists experimenting with social innovations as well as using greener technologies” (ibid.). In line with the concepts introduced above, this approach builds on a conception of innovation as sociotechnical. Innovation not only involves the introduction of new technologies but also a realignment of social relations and institutions (Seyfang and Smith 2007). In other words, grassroots innovations can be thought of as novel sociotechnical configurations developed by civil society actors.

The introduction of the notion of grassroots innovations has been critical for drawing attention to the innovation potential of civil society initiatives. Too often innovation is cast narrowly as being situated in engineering departments of universities and R&D departments of private sector firms, thus neglecting other sites of innovation. By contrast, the concept of grassroots innovation also frames civil society initiatives as sites of innovation where new and potentially more sustainable systems of provision are experimented with (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 585). Such innovations may focus more strongly on the development of new forms of organization and social practices, but they often also open up space for experimentation with particular technologies (ibid. p. 588).

In order to analyse grassroots innovations, Seyfang and Smith (2007) propose to draw on the multi-level perspective on sociotechnical change and, more specifically, on the literature on strategic niche management (SNM). In line with the multi-level perspective, strategic niche management situates radical innovation that go beyond incremental change in niches. These niches are understood as protected spaces where novelty can develop without immediately being exposed to the full pressure of a competitive market environment (Kemp, Schot et al. 1998 p. 186). Strategic niche managers facilitate the creation of such niches and manage internal niche processes that further the development of these radical innovations. According to SNM theory, three processes are critical for niche development: Learning, including second order learning that challenges initial problem frames; building actor networks; and developing shared expectations (Schot and Geels 2008 p. 540).

In fact early SNM literature has looked at the development of wind power technology in Denmark as one case study and has pointed to grassroots entrepreneurs, do-it-yourself builders and local cooperatives as an important actor group, among others (Kemp, Rip et al. 28

2001 p. 286). However, in this analysis, the emphasis is on a comparison of different ways in which policy actors can support technology development and the authors propose strategic niche management as a reflexive policy approach. Seyfang and Smith (2007) pick up on SNM concepts and use them specifically to study ways in which bottom-up initiatives develop innovative and potentially more sustainable systems of provision.

Thus, drawing on strategic niche management, grassroots innovations are conceived of as niches where learning, network building and the development of shared expectations need to be facilitated. Studying these processes in relation to grassroots innovations can help to analyse their robustness and to understand what difficulties such innovations face (see also section 2.2). However, in spite of the merits of this conceptual framework, it does not appear fully appropriate for the analysis of grassroots innovations. Indeed, some more recent results show that the development of grassroots innovations at times contradicts central tenets of strategic niche management. Such contradictions for example concern the flourishing of a grassroots innovation in spite of weak learning processes (Seyfang and Longhurst 2013 p. 888/889) and the increasing fragmentation of grassroots innovations instead of consolidation and standardization (Smith 2007 p. 441‑443, Seyfang and Longhurst 2013 p. 887/888). In particular, Gill Seyfang and Noel Longhurst (2013) identify significant shortcomings in the ability of strategic niche management to fully capture the way the grassroots innovation of community currencies has developed. The case

“does not entirely fit with the predictions of niche theory, and so problematizes a number of areas in the niche literature (…) which require further examination. Firstly, the field has developed despite relatively weak learning processes (…). Secondly, the straightforward alignment between innovative niches and regimes which theory seems to expect does not always exist. (…) Thirdly, the field as a whole has not developed in the way that niche theory predicts: instead of consolidation and coherence we witness a greater degree of fragmentation and variety.” (Seyfang and Longhurst 2013 p. 889) In another analysis Seyfang and Longhurst similarly note that “whilst some elements of the niche theories explain grassroots innovations’ diffusion quite well, other parts are less successful at dealing with these forms of innovation” (Seyfang and Longhurst 2014 p. 20).

Taking into account the origins of strategic niche management, the partial mismatch between SNM theory and empirical results on grassroots innovations may not appear all too surprising. Strategic niche management was developed not only as a theory of sociotechnical change, but also as a policy approach. It therefore adopts a managerial ‘outside’ perspective, a perspective that appears somewhat inadequate for understanding bottom-up innovation processes in civil society settings (Smith and Seyfang 2013 p. 829, White and Stirling 2013 p. 839/840). As Seyfang and colleagues note in relation to community energy, “what we see in this civil society context of grassroots innovations is that it comes from the bottom-up and 29

is neither strategic nor managed” (Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014 p. 41, emph. in original). Accordingly, grassroots innovations often are fragmented, displaying significant variability in the way they are configured in different settings (e.g. Smith 2007 p. 441-443 on organic food, Seyfang and Longhurst 2013 p. 889 on community currencies).

Furthermore, different actors can have different understandings about what makes a particular grassroots innovation meaningful and desirable (see e.g. Walker and Devine- Wright 2008 on different interpretations of community energy). Drawing on a term introduced in the context of the social construction of technology (SCOT), one could say that grassroots innovations may be subject to interpretative flexibility. Different actor groups can have different perspectives about what function a particular innovation fulfils (Pinch and Bijker 1984 p. 421-424). Rather than investigating such variety and fragmentation, however, strategic niche management concentrates on processes of convergence and analyses the extent to which alliances are forged and shared expectations develop. To be sure, this can help to uncover strengths and weaknesses of a grassroots innovation. However, it also means that the variability of a particular grassroots innovation as well as its interpretative flexibility and tensions between different actor groups are simply marked as barriers and not considered as an issue that merits further analysis in itself.

3.3 Summary and Outlook In view of the shortcomings of strategic niche management for the analysis of grassroots innovations, I consider it essential to develop and explore different, possibly complementary, approaches to explore the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants. As stated above, I understand grassroots innovations as novel sociotechnical configurations developed by civil society actors. Furthermore, for the analysis of citizen power plants, I will look at five dimensions of sociotechnical configurations: the technological hardware; ownership and return; management and operation; infrastructure and networking and market relations. As Walker and Cass (2007 p. 461) have already noted, the concept of sociotechnical configurations allows for greater simultaneous heterogeneity than the concept of a niche, as it is used in the multi-level perspective and strategic niche management.

In order to analyse how the grassroots innovation of citizen power plants could develop and spread, in spite of the self-reinforcing mechanisms of sociotechnical regimes, I will draw on resource mobilization theory, a strand of social movement theory. Indeed, some lead authors on grassroots innovations have already suggested that “a strategy for future research may be to draw both on theory about how social movements harness and mobilise resources to achieve their goals, while also within the same study drawing on transition theory” (Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012 p. 395). From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, access to

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particular resources is a crucial explanatory factor for the emergence and success of bottom- up collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 2001). Resources are understood broadly as ‘any social, political, economic asset or capacity that can contribute to collective action’ (Jenkins 2001 p. 14368). This approach allows following bottom-up actors as they develop a particular grassroots innovation and as they piece together the resource base needed for such an endeavour. The details of this will be spelled out in section 6.1, and will subsequently be applied to the emergence of the first citizen power plants in Germany and Austria.

Furthermore, in chapters 8 and 9 I will address issues of power and conflict in relation to the diffusion of citizen power plants. Paying attention to such issues has recently attracted increasing attention in the sustainability transitions literature, in the face of repeated criticism that the political dimensions of transition processes are underplayed in existing theoretical approaches (Markard et a. 2012 p. 962). To analyse power relations, I will link up resource mobilization theory with Flor Avelino’s conceptualization of power in transition processes as the ability of actors to access and use resources for a particular goal (Avelino 2011). This extension of my theoretical framework is presented in section 8.1. Furthermore my approach is informed by writings of David Hess who draws attention to different types of conflicts in relation to grassroots innovations. This includes both incumbent-challenger conflicts (Hess 2013) and conflicts over the defining criteria of a grassroots innovation. For the latter type of conflict, Hess (2004) has coined the notion of ‘object conflicts’. These concepts are briefly introduced at the beginnings of sections 9.2 and 9.3 respectively.

The next chapter, however, provides some background on energy systems in Germany and Austria, and applies the concept of sociotechnical configurations to contrast established structures with citizen power plants.

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4 Introduction to country cases Leading on from the literature review on citizen power plants in Germany and Austria (chapter 2) and building on my basic theoretical framework (chapter 3), this chapter serves to introduce my empirical field. The first two sections in this chapter give an overview of electricity systems in Germany (section 4.1) and Austria (section 4.2), situating the development of citizen power plants in this context. Each of these sections also includes an overview of the way policy support for renewables, especially wind power and PV, has developed. The chapter concludes with a comparison of established configurations in electricity systems with the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants along the dimensions introduced in the previous chapter. This serves to highlight the position of citizen power plants as a grassroots innovation – an alternative sociotechnical configuration developed by civil society actors (section 4.3).

4.1 Germany Up until the 1990s, the German electricity system, regulated by the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz), was organized as a quasi-state monopoly. The state, directly or indirectly, held the majority of all inter-regional providers of electricity (Mez 2003 p. 201). Due to its high turnovers and its links to public bodies at the municipal, regional and federal levels it constituted a highly influential sector of the German economy, both in economic and in political terms (Lauber and Mez 2004 p. 604). Over the 1970s, in the wake of the oil crises, coal and nuclear power were promoted and developed as the major energy sources in the German electricity system (Lauber and Mez 2004 p. 615, Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 261).

In 1998 the German electricity system was liberalized with the implementation of the Act on the Reorganization of Energy-Industry-Law (Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts, Kungl 2014 p. 12). This triggered a series of mergers among German utilities, resulting in four major companies (E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall and EnBW) as the dominant players on the German electricity market (ibid. p. 13). In 2003 these four utilities accounted for 82% of electricity production capacity in Germany and generated around 90% of electricity (ibid. p. 14). In particular, these utilities dominate coal- and nuclear-based electricity generation in Germany, the two main energy sources in Germany since the 1970s (Mez 2003 p. 199). Three of these major utilities (EON, RWE, EnBW) are majority-owned by private investors. The fourth major utility, the German Vattenfall GmbH, is a full subsidiary of the Swedish company Vattenfall AB, owned by the Swedish state.

Apart from liberalization, another important set of regulatory changes in the German electricity system in the 1990s and early 2000s concerned decisions over the phase-out of 32

nuclear power and increasing policy support for renewable energy technologies (Kungl 2014 p. 12-13). In the year 2000, the Social Democratic and Green Party coalition government negotiated an agreement with the major utilities, limiting the lifetime of nuclear power plants in Germany (Kungl 2014 p. 13). An amendment to this agreement put forward by the Conservative-Liberal government in 2010 once more extended the lifetime of nuclear reactors in Germany, but was itself repealed in 2011 after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Instead, eight German nuclear reactors were shut down immediately and the remaining nine are scheduled to shut down by 2022 (ibid.).

Policy support for renewables The first policy support schemes for renewables in Germany date back to the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s. Against the background of rising public concerns over nuclear power, the Ministry of Research and Technology provided significant R&D subsidies in the area of renewable energy technologies (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 261-263). Furthermore a number of renewable energy advocacy organizations formed during this time, that later had an important role to play in lobbying for further-reaching policy support for renewables (ibid. p. 263). The established electricity supply industry, however, remained hostile towards renewables and the Ministry of Economic Affairs was reluctant to promote their market introduction (ibid. p. 261/262).

Towards the end of the 1980s, the issue of climate change appeared on the policy agenda and around the same time public concerns over nuclear power were reinvigorated by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Against this background, the Ministry of Research launched the ‘100 MW Programme’ for wind power, later extended to a 250 MW programme. Under this programme, operators of wind farms were eligible to receive 0.04 € per kWh of electricity produced from wind turbines, or an investment subsidy of up to 60% (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 264, Ohlhorst 2009 p. 132). Crucially, this programme moved support from the R&D arena to the operators of wind turbines and rewarded the amount of electricity produced from turbines (Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 54, Ohlhorst 2009 p. 114). These operators were mainly small independent power producers, including several farmers and citizen wind farm initiatives. Furthermore, the programme also paved the way for a fully-fledged system of feed-in tariffs.

Such feed-in tariffs were introduced in 1991, following a parliamentary initiative by member of several different parties. The Electricity Feed-in Law obliged utilities to connect the power plants of independent power producers producing green electricity to the grid and to pay 90% of the average tariff for electricity charged to consumers to the plant operators (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 264). This feed-in tariff was sufficient to allow the profitable

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operation of wind turbines. Analysts unequivocally consider the Electricity Feed-in Law as the decisive turning point for the diffusion of wind power, including citizen power plants (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 272, Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 53, Ohlhorst 2009 p. 124). Staffan Jacobsson and Volkar Lauber (2006 p. 272) even characterize it as “the first sign of a breach into an old structure” which allowed wind power to move into a take-off phase.

Further support for wind power included loans at preferential conditions, the inclusion of wind turbines in the list of building projects with preferential treatment and an advantageous adaptation of tax rules making investment in wind turbines more attractive (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 314-315, Ohlhorst 2009 p. 133-135, 142). In addition to that, some federal states introduced additional support programmes for wind power, such as investment subsidies and further preferential loans programmes (Ohlhorst 2009 p. 114‑115 and 133‑134).

While the Electricity Feed-in Law in principle also applied to PV and other sources of green electricity, the tariff was far too low to allow the cost covering operation of PV plants. However, from 1989 onwards, the Ministry of Research provided investment subsidies for small-scale PV plants through the ‘1,000-roofs-programme’. This stimulated early diffusion of PV panels at the level of individual households in the 1990s (Bechberger and Reiche 2004 p. 50, Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 264). Furthermore, over the course of the 1990s, several municipal utilities started to offer cost-covering local feed-in tariffs for PV plants, not least because citizens petitioned their local governments to do so (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 266).

The Social Democratic and Green Party coalition government that took office in 1998 eventually went even further in the provision of market formation programmes for PV. In 1999, the 1,000 Roofs Programme was followed by the 100,000 Roofs Programme providing loans at preferential conditions for the installation of PV panels. Initially demand for these loans remained low, but this rapidly changed in 2000 when the Electricity Feed-in Law was replaced by the Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, see Bechberger and Reiche 2004 p. 50, Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 267). Inspired by local feed-in tariffs, the Renewable Energy Act brought a more than six-fold increase in feed-in remuneration for PV (Bechberger and Reiche 2004 p. 50, Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 268). This was achieved by uncoupling remuneration for green electricity from the average tariff for electricity charged to consumers. Rather, different tariffs were defined for different renewable energy technologies, taking into account different cost structures. The tariffs are financed vthrough surcharge payments on electricity consumption for end users. Furthermore, the act introduced a Germany-wide burden-equalisation scheme for the costs incurred to grid operators (Bechberger and Reiche 2004 p. 52).

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The Renewable Energy Act remained controversial and was attacked by advocates of the coal and nuclear sectors (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 269), but has stayed in place to this date. Amendments in 2004 and 2009 moderately adjusted the height of feed-in tariffs, extended legislation to the area of heat from renewable sources and made some adjustments concerning the rights and duties of various actors involved. Furthermore, the 2009 amendment introduced a ‘breathing cap’ on feed-in tariffs for PV. This means that tariffs for new plants are reduced if installed PV capacity reaches a certain level (Federal Republic of Germany 2000, 2004, 2008).

More recently, however, the Renewable Energy Act has been more seriously challenged. Somewhat ironically, in spite of the German government’s definite renouncement of nuclear power in 2011, widely received as the announcement of the ‘Energiewende’, further amendments to the Renewable Energy Act in 2012 significantly cut back on feed-in tariffs (Federal Republic of Germany 2011, 2012). Following heated public discussions over high electricity prices resulting from the renewables surcharge (Tews 2014 p. 14), a further amendment in 2014 extended the breathing-cap-principle to all renewable energy sources. Furthermore, large-scale free-standing PV plants are no longer supported via the feed-in tariff, but via a tender system (Federal Republic of Germany 2014).

Citizen power plants and the rise of renewable energy technologies The major German utilities, generally referred to as ‘the Big Four’, constitute the most influential actors in the German electricity system. However, municipal utilities also have an important role to play (Mez 2003 p. 199). As they are at least partly owned by the respective municipalities, they are generally responsive to local and regional policy (Lauber and Mez 2004 p. 614). Indeed, in the 1990s several municipal utilities had a pioneering role to play in the provision of cost-covering feed-in tariffs for PV plants (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 266). Furthermore, decisions over the phase-out of nuclear power and the provision of support for renewable energy technologies have gone along with a diversification of the actor base of the German electricity system (Becker, Gailing et al. 2012). This includes a revival and strengthening of municipal utilities, as well as an increasing role for municipalities and regional planning authorities developing local or regional energy concepts. In addition to that new independent power producers, including citizen power plant initiatives, have entered the energy sector (Becker, Gailing et al. 2012, trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2013).

Indeed, while the share of electricity from renewables has risen from 4.7% in 1998 to 22.8% in 2012, the Big Four only accounted for 5% of total installed renewable energy capacity in 2012 (Kungl 2014 p. 15, Statista 2015). By contrast, individual citizens as well as citizen

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power plant initiatives have become important actors in the provision of electricity from renewable sources (trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2013). As already noted in section 2.1, 34.4% of installed renewable energy capacity in Germany in 2012 was owned and operated by regional citizens (trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2013 p. 42). Collective citizen ownership of renewable energy technologies is particularly widespread in the area of onshore wind power. In 2012 20.4% of installed wind power capacity in Germany was owned by groups of regional citizens and an additional 25.8% was at least partly owned by private individuals (ibid. p. 45).

Citizen wind farms mainly established themselves in the federal states of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony along the North Sea coast of Germany from the late 1980s onwards. The emergence of these early citizen wind farms will be analysed in section 6.2. In most cases the legal form of a limited partnership (GmbH & Co KG) has been used to set up citizen wind farms. In some cases initiatives also set up cooperatives or general partnerships (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts, GbR), but these are generally considered to be less favourable in terms of tax and liability issues. Citizen wind farms spread strongly in some regions via word of mouth and regional networks of exchange. This process of replication will be described in section 7.1.1. Some of these citizen wind farms also scaled up by installing additional wind turbines or replacing small turbines by larger ones after several years (see section 7.2.1). Furthermore, from 2000-2005 an attempt was made to transfer the model of a citizen wind farm to the area of offshore wind, but this project eventually failed (see section 7.3.2).

The largest share of citizen owned PV is made up of small-scale plants owned by individual citizens (trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2013 p. 44). However, collectively owned plants have also developed in the area of PV. In particular, since around 2006 there has been a strong rise in the number of citizen PV plants organized as cooperatives (Holstenkamp and Müller 2013, Debor 2014). This process of replication will be analysed in section 7.1.2.

4.2 Austria In Austria, the structure and organization of the electricity system for a long time was regulated by the Second Nationalization act of 1947. It stated that electricity supply is a public task and thus needs to be handled by public companies, apart from minor exceptions for very small utilities (Haas, Auer et al. 2003 p. 217). According to this law, the company Verbund, operating at the federal level, had the task of constructing as well as operating power plants, operating the high voltage transmission network and managing the import and export of electricity. Nine regional utilities, one for every federal state, were responsible for

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the provision of electricity to end-users within the respective federal state. Furthermore there were five municipal utility companies in some of the capitals of federal states. Long-term contracts between Verbund and the regional utilities set fixed prices for electricity (ibid. p. 218). Some power plants were also constructed and operated jointly by Verbund regional utility companies.

In the late 1990s, following an EU directive concerning the liberalization of the energy systems, the Austrian government developed plans for a comprehensive restructuring of the electricity sector. Eventually, however, the restructuration only brought about moderate changes. The Electricity Industry- and -Organization Act (Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und -organisationsgesetz, ElWOG), implemented in 1999, moved grid operation to a separate unit of Verbund, opened the market of electricity provision, and allowed consumers to freely choose their electricity provider. Furthermore the act regulated the conditions of access to the grid as well as transmission fees for utilities. The regulatory authority E-Control was set up to supervise competition, non-discriminatory access to the grid and the relationships between different market actors (Haas, Auer et al. 2003 p. 217 and 229‑233). However, the act did not strive for comprehensive privatization of the sector. Quite to the contrary, it stated that electricity supply was to remain a public task (ibid. p. 232). Hence, in spite of liberalization, the federal utility company Verbund as well as the regional utilities are still by majority publicly owned (ibid. p. 228).

Policy support for renewables While Germany introduced the first national feed-in law in 1991, Austria was much later to come up with a comparable system of support for green electricity. The ‘Green Electricity Act’ (Ökostromgesetz) that established uniform feed-in tariffs at the national level did not come into effect until 2003. However, some support programmes for renewables were introduced over the course of the 1990s, especially for wind power. Indeed, following the introduction of the German Electricity Feed-in Law in 1991, the Austrian Freedom Party put forward a proposal in parliament to establish a similar scheme in Austria (Hantsch 1998 p. 84). This eventually resulted in a modest support programme that applied to wind farms set up in the years 1994-1996. It involved a purchase obligation for utilities for electricity from wind turbines, and a feed-in tariff at twice the market price for the first three years a wind turbine was in operation (ibid. p. 85). Furthermore, a group of civil servants committed to the promotion of wind power in the Ministry of the Environment succeeded in establishing an additional subsidy scheme covering 30% of investment costs for turbines (ibid.). This allowed the first wind turbines to go into operation, including the first citizen wind farms (Hantsch and Nährer 2006).

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These forms of support however, expired in 1996 without the implementation of any follow-up programmes. Meanwhile operators of wind turbines, including several citizen power plant initiatives, had joined up in the IG Windkraft (Interest Group for Wind Power). They lobbied for the introduction of feed-in tariffs, but with hardly any success at the national level (Hantsch 1998 p. 86). Some federal states, however, continued to provide subsidy schemes, either as limited forms of feed-in tariffs or as investment subsidies (IG Windkraft 2015a). In 1999, the Electricity Industry- and -Organization Act gave a new legal basis to energy system organization in Austria (see above). It was mainly devised to comply with a European Directive concerning the liberalization of the energy sector. However, the Minister of the Environment also pushed through a new subsidy scheme for electricity from renewable sources, against the will of the Minister of Economic Affairs (Hantsch 1998 p. 87). The act obliged federal states to define feed-in tariffs for electricity from new renewables (Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 21). However, the regional feed-in systems introduced on this basis differed widely in terms of the tariffs that were provided (Cerveny and Veigl 2001 p. 6).

Eventually, in 2002, the Green Electricity Act was passed to comply with the European Directive 2001/77/EC that set targets concerning the share of renewables for each member state (Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 22, Fouquet and Johansson 2008 p. 4080). The act established a national feed-in tariff system that came into effect in 2003. In its original form, it provided quite an attractive incentive for investments in renewables. Similar to the German Renewable Energy Act, it guaranteed the provision of feed-in tariffs for thirteen years, financed through a surcharge on the electricity price for consumers. Different tariffs were defined for different technologies and the tariff for new plants is adjusted annually via a decree by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Bodenhöfer, Wohlgemuth et al. 2004 p. 5-6).

However, an amendment to the Green Electricity Act in 2006 shortened the support period and reduced the tariffs that were provided. Furthermore, the amendment set a cap of 17 million Euros on the total annual amount of funding provided for new plants and introduced quotas for different technology areas. Following this amendment the development of new green electricity plants almost came to a standstill (Umweltbundesamt 2014). Further amendments in 2009 and 2012 once again introduced more favourable conditions. The 2009 amendment extended the annually available budget for new plants to 21 million Euros and re-established the support period of thirteen years (E-Control 2014). The 2012 amendment further extended the annual budget for new plants to 50 million Euros in 2012, to be reduced annually by one million Euros over the next years. Furthermore, a one-off provision of additional funds served to handle the large backlog of support

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applications that had been put on a waiting list when the annual cap on funding had been reached (Federal Republic of Austria 2011).

In the area of photovoltaics, investment subsidies still play a role today, as PV plants below

5 kWp are not supported via the feed-in law. These small-scale installations are eligible for an investment subsidy instead. Following the 2012 amendment of Green Electricity Act, roof-mounted PV plants receiving the feed-in tariff also are eligible for an additional investment subsidy (Photovoltaic Austria 2014).

Renewable energy sources and the role of citizen power plants In terms of energy sources, Austria’s electricity system is traditionally strongly based on hydropower. In 1970 around 75% of domestic generation came from hydropower plants. The remaining 25% were largely accounted for by thermal plants powered by gas, brown coal and oil (Haas, Auer et al. 2003 p. 219-220). A nuclear power plant was constructed in the 1970s, but as nuclear power grew increasingly controversial, a referendum over the use of nuclear power was scheduled in 1978. By a narrow margin, the majority of voters opted against the use of nuclear power in this referendum. Shortly after, the Nuclear Energy Prohibition Act was passed, banning the operation of nuclear power plants (for further details on the controversy over nuclear power see section 6.3.1). Today fossil fuels still account for roughly a quarter of electricity generation in Austria. Hydropower accounts for 65% of domestic generation and another 10% come from biomass, wind power, PV and geothermal energy (BMLFUW 2013 p. 19).

According to expert estimates in interviews, around 40-50% of installed wind power capacity in Austria in 2010 was accounted for by citizen power plants in the broad sense, out of a total of around 1,000 MW. The remaining share of wind power capacity is mainly in the hands of the regional utility companies of the two federal states of Lower Austria and Burgenland and two privately held companies in these federal states (IG Windkraft 2014).

Apart from the significant share of installed wind power capacity in the form of citizen power plants, bottom-up initiatives were also decisive for introducing wind power technology to Austria in the second half of the 1990s. In these years pioneer groups of wind power enthusiasts developed the first wind turbines in Austria, often using schemes for broad local citizen involvement. This emergence of the first citizen wind farms in Austria will be analysed in section 6.3. In fact these Austrian wind power pioneers learned from existing initiatives in Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the Czech Republic. Therefore the emergence of citizen wind farms in Austria can also be understood as a transfer of this grassroots innovation to a new country and will be revisited as such in section 7.3.1. Furthermore, citizen wind farms spread in different ways within Austria. In Upper Austria, citizen wind 39

farms spread through a process of replication, leading to the development of ten citizen wind farms in the time from 1994 to 2005 (see section 7.1.1 on the replication of citizen wind farms). In Lower Austria, replication also had a role to play, but in addition to that three initiatives scaled up to medium-sized companies and are still continuing to expand. This process of continued scaling up will be analysed in section 7.2.2. Furthermore, one of these companies served as a role-model for an attempted transfer of the model to the area of biogas (see section 7.3.2 on transfer to a new technology area).

Compared to citizen wind farms, the establishment of citizen PV plants in Austria is a fairly recent development. To be sure, there were some attempts to collectively finance PV plants in the federal state of Vorarlberg as early as 1996 (Breiner 2002). Apart from that, however, hardly any citizen PV plants were set up before 2010, when feed-in tariffs and prices for panels had shifted in a favourable way. Citizen PV plants therefore still constitute a relatively recent phenomenon and patterns in the way citizen PV plants spread are only starting to emerge. One notable development, however, is that regional and major municipal utility companies have picked up on the idea of citizen involvement and have developed their own forms of citizen PV plants. In most such models utilities offer their customers to buy one or more PV panels and to lease it back to the utility company that constructs and operates the plant. More recently two regional utility companies have set up similar schemes for wind farms. This process of uptake by incumbents will be analysed in section 7.4.

4.3 Citizen power plants as alternative sociotechnical configurations As should have become clear, there are some marked differences between established electricity systems in Germany and Austria. For one thing, while the German electricity system has for several decades strongly relied on coal and nuclear power, Austria’s electricity system is largely based on the provision of electricity from hydropower plants. Furthermore, there are also remarkable differences in the way the liberalization of electricity systems has been governed and in the ownership structures this has produced. In Germany, the liberalization of the electricity system went along with far-reaching privatization and considerable market concentration, resulting in market dominance by four largely investor owned utilities. In Austria, the federal utility company Verbund and the nine regional utilities have remained in place and are still by majority publicly owned. Indeed, as I will argue in section 9.2, these differences between sociotechnical configurations in established energy systems in Germany and Austria have also resulted in different relationships between citizen power plant initiatives and established utility companies.

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However, in spite of the differences between electricity systems in Germany and Austria, there are also some similarities. Indeed, differences between established sociotechnical configurations on the one hand, and citizen power plants on the other, arguably are even more pronounced. The similarities between established configurations in Germany and Austria on the one hand, and differences to citizen power plants on the other can, be discussed along the five dimensions of sociotechnical configurations introduced in section 3.1: technological hardware, ownership and returns, management and operation, infrastructure and networking, and market relations (see also Table 1 on p. 43).

 Technological hardware: Both in Germany and in Austria the established electricity system is based on large- scale power plants, often situated at a considerable distance from points of consumption. In Germany coal- and nuclear-based generation dominates, while Austria strongly relies on large-scale hydropower. By contrast, citizen power plants usually involve small- to medium-scale generation units, in particular wind turbines and PV plants.  Ownership and returns: Before liberalization, most power plants in Germany and Austria were publicly owned. Since liberalization the electricity system is based on a mix of public and private ownership, the public component having remained stronger in Austria. In both cases, however, power plants are owned by large, distant investors. By contrast, citizen power plants are owned by groups of small private investors, often living in proximity to the plant.  Management and operation: Established configurations are of course based on professional management, traditionally in the form of hierarchical, top-down decision making. Citizen power plants, on the other hand, are often managed by non-professionals as a side job and usually involve a strong participative element in decision making. As with ownership, management often is in the hands of local people.  Infrastructure and networking: The dimension of infrastructure and networking is interesting, as some early conceptions of citizen power plants strived for radical changes along this dimension, but these were never realized. Advanced electricity systems, like those in Germany and Austria, are strongly integrated, relying on high voltage transmission networks and extensive distribution networks. Some early visions of citizen power plants in the 1970s and 1980s involved a disconnection from this grid-integrated system and strived for the establishment of independent, self-sufficient units (Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 41

p. 35-37). Nevertheless almost all citizen power plants eventually came to operate in a grid-integrated manner.  Market relations: Utilities in Germany and in Austria typically sell the electricity they produce directly to consumers or to smaller local and regional utilities. Furthermore they also engage in trading on the international market. Citizen power plants initially had considerable difficulties in market access and often needed to negotiate contracts with regional utilities on a case-by case basis (see chapter 6). The introduction of feed-in tariff systems, however, has provided them with grid access and a guaranteed purchase at fixed tariffs for up to 20 years. More recently some citizen power plant initiatives have also started to sell the electricity they produce directly to consumers (see section 7.2.2).

Taken together, citizen power plants arguably involve a decentralization along several dimensions: In terms of the technological hardware that is employed (several small- to medium-scaled power plants), in terms of ownership structures (many small, private investors in proximity to the plant), and in terms of management and operation (local management and participative decision-making, see also Toke 2011 p. 52‑55 on different notions of decentralization in energy systems). Table 1 provides an overview of the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants in contrast to established configurations in the German and Austrian electricity systems.

However, I would like to emphasize that the configuration of citizen power plants, as outlined in Table 1, is a preliminary simplification describing an ideal-typical case. In practice, the field of citizen power plants displays considerable diversity. Indeed, part of my results consist of a further differentiation of different types of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants that have developed over the course of their diffusion (see Table 11 on p. 155). This has also gone along with tensions over the question what may legitimately be referred to as a citizen power plant (see section 9.3). For the moment, however, this table serves to contrast established sociotechnical configurations in German and Austrian electricity systems with the ideal-typical configuration of citizen power plants.

Before I proceed to the analysis of the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants, the next chapter presents and reflects on the methods this is based on.

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Established electricity system in Established electricity system in Citizen power plants Germany Austria Technological hardware Large-scale power plants Small- to medium-scale generation units, in particular wind turbines and Mainly coal-fired and nuclear power Mainly large-scale hydropower PV plants plants plants Ownership and return Public or private large-scale, distant investors Private individuals as small investors, often local citizens Pre-liberalization: Power plants Most power plants owned by owned by large, publicly owned federal utility Verbund, some utilities power plants owned by regional Post-liberalization: Largely utilities, utilities are fully or by investor-owned corporations majority publicly owned

Management and Professional management, typically hierarchical, top-down decision Non-professional, local management; operation making, distant management participative decision-making

Infrastructure and Electricity fed-in to regional / national grid, in some cases vision of local networking High voltage transmission network and regional distribution network self-sufficiency, but hardly realized in practice Market relations Contracts negotiated with regional Electricity sold directly to consumers or to other utilities; international utility or purchase guarantee via feed- trading in tariff system

Table 1: Sociotechnical configurations of established systems and citizen power plants

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5 Methods This chapter will present and reflect on the methods I used to develop the analysis in the following chapters. It is divided into two sections, the first dealing with data collection, the second with data analysis. This division is only a way to structure the description and reflection of the methods employed. In practice, data collection and data analysis formed an interrelated process, overlapping in time and informing one another (Corbin and Strauss 1990). Indeed, as already noted in chapter 3, also the development of my theoretical framework went hand in hand with the process of data collection and analysis.

5.1 Data collection

Overview Seeing I am interested in a heavily context-dependent phenomenon – the development and diffusion of a particular grassroots innovation – I have adopted a qualitative approach. The main form of data collection consisted of semi-structured expert interviews. Overall I conducted 23 expert interviews for this thesis. As two interviews were conducted with two respondents, I interviewed 25 people in total. Fourteen interviews were conducted with Austrian interviewees, nine with German interviewees. A total of seventeen interviewees were centrally involved in the development of citizen power plants, for example as directors of citizen power plant initiatives, or in some cases as representatives of planning agencies working on a citizen power plant project. Nine interviewees worked for support organizations in the field.2 In Austria the emphasis was on people directly involved with the development of citizen power plants. In Germany a larger share of the interviews was conducted with members of organizations that provide support for the development of citizen power plants (see also Table 2 on p. 49 for an overview of interviews). Potential interviewees were identified on the basis of an internet search, a review of articles on citizen power plants and by snowballing.

I contacted potential interviewees by e-mail, giving a short description of the research interest, and called potential interviewees a few days later to arrange an interview date, if they agreed to the interview. The interviews with Austrian interviewees were conducted face-to-face. Out of the nine interviews with German interviewees, three were conducted face-to-face and six were conducted as telephone interviews (see reflection on specificities of telephone interviews below). All interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. Interviews typically took between 45 minutes and one hour.

2 One interviewee worked both for a support organization and was involved with a citizen power plant initiative. 44

Out of the 23 interviews, I conducted eighteen interviews (nine Austrian and nine German) as part of the project Energy cooperatives and local ownership in the field of renewable energy technologies as social innovation processes in the energy system (e-coop) funded by the Jubilee Fund of the Austrian National Bank. The Austrian interviews within this project took place between November 2010 and March 2011. The German interviews took place from May 2011 to March 2012. In addition to that, I conducted three interviews as part of the project Citizen Action for Sustainable Energy (BürgerInnen-Engagement für Nachhaltige Energie, BENE) funded by the Austrian Climate and Energy Fund within the programme ‘Neue Energien 2020’. This project looked at different forms of citizen engagement in energy issues and one case study focused on the nascent development of collectively owned PV plants in the Austrian federal state of Vorarlberg. These interviews took place in July 2010.

Furthermore, I conducted two additional interviews in Austria in February 2012 and April 2014 respectively, specifically for this thesis. One of them served to gain a better understanding of the development of citizen power plants in Austria in the area of photovoltaics. This interview provided me with an additional interesting perspective, because the establishment of photovoltaics citizen power plants in Austria had only started to develop from 2010 onwards. The second additional interview was conducted with a representative of a regional utility company that has developed a citizen participation model itself. Indeed, as will be described in section 7.4, several regional utility companies in Austria, as well as some local utility companies in urban centres, have started to develop their own form of citizen power plants. This interview therefore allowed me to capture an additional perspective on the development of citizen power plants that could be expected to differ from the perspective of bottom-up initiatives (cf. theoretical sampling, see below).

All interviews were based on an interview guide that detailed the issues to be addressed during the interview. The sequence of questions and the time devoted to each issue could be handled flexibly, however, depending on the way the interviewee related issues to each other and depending on his or her interest and preparedness to expand on particular issues. I used a similar interview guide for all interviews, but adapted it, depending on whether the interviewee was a lead actor of a citizen power plant initiative or a support organization. Furthermore, approaching data collection and data analysis as an interrelated process (Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 419) enabled me to include issues that came up in early interviews in the interview guide for later interviews. In addition to that, the interview guide was partly tailored to each interviewee on the basis of information that I could collect beforehand on the respective organization, mainly through its own website.

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The first part of the interview usually focused on the interviewee’s organization. In the case of interviewees engaged with specific citizen power plant projects, this part of the interview aimed to gain an understanding of these projects, including the way they had developed over time and the rationales for developing the projects the way they had (legal form, participation model, changes to organizational setup etc.). In the case of support organizations I asked about the ways in which the organization provided support. In both cases I also asked interviewees what made citizen power plants important and meaningful to them. In the second part of the interview, interviewees were asked for their appraisal of developments in the area of citizen power plants in the respective country more generally.

These interviews were accompanied by background research. In particular, as part of the project e-coop, I compiled a literature review on collective ownership of renewable energy technologies together with Daniela Weismeier-Sammer (see Schreuer and Weismeier- Sammer 2010). This literature review summarized existing research in relation to five country cases (Germany, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK). In addition to that, it summarized further research on citizen power plants along thematic strands, including institutional framework conditions, interactions at the micro level and public acceptance of renewable energy technologies. Apart from this literature review, I collected additional information from websites as well as brochures or reports issued by relevant initiatives and organizations in the field.

Expert interviews As mentioned before, the interviews conducted for this thesis constituted expert interviews. In this subsection I want to specify what I mean by the term ‘expert interview’ and how the expert status of my interviewees is constituted.

According to Michael Meuser and Ulrike Nagel (2005 p. 72-75), expert interviews address interviewees as representatives of a particular organization or institution. The interviewer is not so much interested in the everyday-life practices of the interviewee, but rather in the actions, problem framings and appraisals in relation to a particular organizational or institutional context (ibid.). Furthermore, Meuser and Nagel conceive of experts as involved experts in a particular field, not as knowledgeable distant observers: the interviewer is interested in them not only because of their detailed knowledge of the field, but because of their direct involvement in decision making and problem solving activities. In other words, the experts Meuser and Nagel have in mind are those that actively shape the field under investigation (ibid. p. 73, see also Bogner and Menz 2009 p. 72). In this sense, expert interviews are elite interviews with key actors in a particular field. Accordingly, expert interviews often serve to gain an understanding of bodies of knowledge and rationales for

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action that shape, promote or obstruct social change in a particular field (Christmann 2009 p. 198).

Indeed, in this thesis I focus on the development of citizen power plants as a form of sociotechnical change in the energy system. I was therefore interested in collecting data from which I could analyse the way this process is shaped, interpreted, promoted and potentially obstructed. This was achieved by conducting expert interviews with lead actors involved in citizen power plant initiatives and respective support organization, in the sense outlined by Meuser and Nagel. From these interviews, in combination with additional background research, I could gather data to analyse processes related to the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants.

A further note may be needed to reflect on the expert status of my interviewees. Expert interviews are sometimes thought of as interviews with a particular group of professionals such as doctors, teachers or human resource managers (Pfadenhauer 2009 p. 108). While interviews targeting such professions certainly constitute a common type of expert interviews, reducing the expert status to representatives of a particular profession produces an overly narrow understanding of experts (ibid. p. 109/110). In particular, Alexander Bogner and Wolfgang Menz (2009 p. 69) have noted that the narrow understanding of experts as professionals has been criticized for excluding expertise developed in civil society and social movement settings. Indeed, for my thesis a broader understanding of experts is appropriate, as some of my interviewees represent citizen power plant initiatives that do not rely on paid professionals.

Sampling I identified potential interviewees on the basis of an online search, on the basis of references to organizations in academic and nonacademic articles, and by asking interviewees for further references (snowballing). Furthermore I adopted the approach of theoretical sampling and tried to capture different perspectives in the field of citizen power plants (cf. Strauss 1994 p. 70/71). I therefore interviewed actors from citizen power plant initiatives in different technology areas (mainly wind power and photovoltaics), actors advocating different legal forms and participation models, and actors experienced with projects of different sizes. Furthermore, some of my interviewees were from small-scale local initiatives, while others worked for initiatives that had scaled up to medium sized companies or even for utility companies developing their own model of citizen power plants. Finally, I took into account the potential of people to assess overall developments in the field. I therefore gave preference to actors from longer standing initiatives over actors from younger or nascent ones.

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The problems I encountered with this sampling strategy were quite different for the Austrian and the German case. In Austria, citizen power plants in the area of photovoltaics only started to develop during the time I conducted my interviews Therefore it was difficult to find sufficient interviewees in this area who could reflect on experiences and assess overall developments in the field. Furthermore, there was another interesting development in the diffusion of citizen power plants in Austria that took place during and after my main interview phase. This concerns the development of citizen participation models by utility companies. As mentioned above, I dealt with this problem by conducting additional interviews at a later point in time.

By contrast, in the German case I encountered the problem that the large number of citizen power plants made it difficult to choose a starting point and to identify interviewees with a good overview of the field. I therefore decided to conduct the largest part of my interviews with actors from support organizations for citizen power plants. This decision was informed by the assumption that these actors have a good overview of developments in the field and are in a position to comment and reflect on the way the diffusion of citizen power plants is shaped, promoted and obstructed. In addition to that, three interviews were conducted with people from citizen power plant initiatives with longstanding experience.

Table 2 below provides an overview of interviews, listing the number assigned to the interview, the country the interview pertains to, the number of interviewees and when the interview took place. Furthermore, in the column ‘actor type’ I have distinguished between four broad types of organizations interviewees represent: citizen power plant initiatives, planning agencies involved in the development of citizen power plant projects, support organizations and utility companies. I have deliberately not included the technology area the interviewees are active in, as in one or two cases this, in combination with further information provided, would allow to identify individuals or organizations.

In the following, I will reference quotes from interviews in the form [n:k], where the number n indicates the number assigned to the interview (see Table 2) and k indicates the number of the quote in my coding procedure. As can be seen from Table 2, interview numbers 1 – 9 pertain to the German case, while numbers 10 – 23 pertain to the Austrian one. In some cases, descriptive accounts of individual initiatives inevitably allow identification of these initiatives. In these cases, references to interview quotes deliberately discloses the initiative’s name instead of providing the interview number. Thereby I avoid that other quotes pertaining to more sensitive and controversial issues can be assigned to the interviewee or to his or her organization.

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No. of Country Actor type Date iv.ees 1 Germany 1 support organization May 2011 2 Germany 1 citizen power plant initiative May 2011 3 Germany 1 support organization / citizen power plant May 2011 initiative 4 Germany 1 support organization May 2011 5 Germany 1 support organization October 2011 6 Germany 1 support organization October 2011 7 Germany 1 support organization February 2012 8 Germany 1 citizen power plant initiative February 2012 9 Germany 1 support organization March 2012 10 Austria 1 citizen power plant initiative November 2010 11 Austria 1 citizen power plant initiative November 2010 12 Austria 1 citizen power plant initiative November 2010 13 Austria 1 planning agency November 2010 14 Austria 1 citizen power plant initiative December 2010 15 Austria 1 citizen power plant initiative December 2010 16 Austria 1 citizen power plant initiative December 2010 17 Austria 1 citizen power plant initiative January 2010 18 Austria 1 support organization / planning agency July 2010 19 Austria 1 citizen power plant initiative July 2010 20 Austria 1 planning agency / citizen power plant initiative July 2010 21 Austria 2 support organization March 2011 22 Austria 2 planning agency February 2012 23 Austria 1 utility company April 2014 Table 2: List of interviews Access As noted above, I first contacted potential interviewees by e-mail and called a few days later by phone to ask for an interview date. Only in two cases I was not able to arrange interviews with people I had contacted. In one case, the person I contacted did not feel comfortable with an interview. She explained that she had made bad experiences with other interviewers who had in her view misrepresented what she had said. In the second case, it was not possible to get through to the potential interviewee by phone to arrange an interview date, even after several attempts.

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In almost all other cases, the people I contacted were readily prepared to give an interview. Only in one of the 23 cases, the person I contacted was initially highly reluctant to do so. He voiced concerns that I may use insights from the interview for commercial purposes, such as developing counselling services for other initiatives, something the respective initiative was planning to offer itself. After providing further background information on the aims of the study, the funding body and the research institute I worked for, he eventually agreed to the interview. However, more or less in accordance with the initial interaction in which I was positioned as a potential competitor, the interviewee remained rather reserved and only gave cursory responses. Interestingly there was also a case where my interview request elicited quite the opposite response. In this case, the person I contacted was surprised to have been identified as potential interviewee and noted that their initiative was ‘just an ordinary wind farm’. During the interview this person noted that he felt honoured that the initiative had been selected for an interview. This already indicates that there are different approaches towards sharing information and experiences in the area of citizen power plants, something which I will discuss further in relation to different forms of their diffusion (see chapter 7).

Thus, in the first case recounted above I was positioned in the role of a potential competitor; in the second case my interview request positioned the person I contacted, who previously had not thought of himself as possessing special expertise on the issue in question, in the role of the expert. These interactions that occurred in the preparatory phase of the interviews touch upon the issue of different roles that are constructed during the social interaction of interviews. Obviously, the largest part of this interaction takes place during the actual interview itself, and role construction shapes the way interviewees respond to questions. The next subsection therefore reflects on role constructions in the interviews I conducted.

Interaction during interviews The dependence of interviews on their interaction context is sometimes looked upon only as an interference factor that should be eliminated or controlled as far as possible. Bogner and Menz (2009 p. 75-77) argue against this ‘archeological conception’ of interviews that assumes the existence of ‘unpolluted’ attitudes and appraisals that are independent of the specific situation and should be retrieved in the purest possible form. Rather, Bogner and Menz argue, social interaction is constitutive of any form of data production. In their view interviewers should not strive to be quasi-invisible but reflect on different ways they may be perceived by interviewees (ibid.). Factors that may shape the role that is ascribed to the interviewer by the interviewee include the assumed or perceived competence of the interviewer, the assumed congruence of normative positions as well as assumed potential consequences of the interview or the research project as a whole (ibid. p. 88/89). All these

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factors are themselves shaped by issues of age, gender, formal qualification, institutional affiliation and sources of funding (Meuser and Nagel 2005 p. 79, Bogner and Menz 2009 p. 90).

With respect to the issue of competence, some authors argue that it is advantageous to display a high degree of competence on the issues in question (Meuser and Nagel 2005 p. 77/78, Christmann 2009 p. 203, Pfadenhauer 2009). In the ideal case, the interviewer should be perceived as a ‘quasi-expert’ – a person who is knowledgeable of the field, but not active in it as a practitioner (Pfadenhauer 2009 p. 106). In particular, Michaela Pfadenhauer argues that experts, when talking to non-experts, tend to resort to paternalistic or self-legitimizing patterns of communication. By contrast, conversations between experts allow for a discursive elucidation of various practices and underlying rationales (ibid. 2009 p. 104/105). The status as a quasi-expert, rather than that of an expert involved in the field as practitioner, brings the additional advantage that the interviewer is not perceived as a competitor and the interviewee can talk more freely (ibid. p. 106).

Other authors, however, also note that it can be advantageous to ask seemingly naïve questions, as this prompts the interviewee to be more explicit about his or her assumptions and normative positions (Bogner and Menz 2009 p. 77-89, Christmann 2009 p. 203). Indeed, Bogner and Menz (2009 p. 76-92) argue that there is not one ideal role for interviewer. Rather, different possible roles include the co-expert, quasi-expert, lay person, authority, accomplice and potential critic, and all have their advantages and disadvantages. They suggest to experiment creatively with different forms of self-presentation.

Nevertheless I found it most helpful to display high levels of competence in interview conversations. I supported this by reference to the respective funding body, the research institute I worked for, and above all through comprehensive preparation for interviews. In particular, the interviews I conducted within the e-coop-project were accompanied by an extensive literature review (see above). Furthermore, each interview was preceded by a detailed study of the respective organization’s website and further information, such as brochures, that was available in some cases. In addition to that, each interview of course also increased my knowledge of the field. To be sure, displaying competence was easier for me for interviews in Austria, as I am myself based in Austria and was more familiar with energy issues in Austria than in Germany at the outset. However, in the interviews concerning the German case, I was often positioned as having complementary expertise on the Austrian case.

It appears that by and large I succeeded in positioning myself in a quasi-expert role. However, in one case I was involuntarily positioned as a potential competitor, already during

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the preparatory phase of the interview (see above). In other words, I could not bring to bear the advantage of the quasi-expert role over the expert role.

In another case the way I used a particular term (citizen wind farm) was challenged by the interviewee. I used the term to include both local and geographically distributed forms of collective ownership. By contrast, the interviewee argued that the term ‘citizen wind farm’ should only be used for local ownership of wind farms. This happened roughly after the first half of the interview. In the second half of the interview, the interviewee appeared to have lost interest and only gave very brief responses to my questions. This irritation about the way I had used the term ‘citizen wind farm’ apparently made the interviewee question my competence and subsequently made him less interested in continuing the conversation. However, this particular interaction, although initially quite challenging and unpleasant, also had the advantage that I was alerted to different uses of the term ‘citizen wind farm’ and the politics involved in this. In subsequent interviews I asked interviewees about their understanding of citizen wind farms or citizen power plants more in general. The analysis of responses to this question, along with further statements from interviews, has informed section 9.3on object conflicts.

Telephone interviews as a special kind of interaction As noted above, six interviews concerning the German case were conducted as telephone interviews. Such interviews obviously bring with them very specific framework conditions for social interaction during interviews. Although increasingly used in practice, the methodological literature on telephone interviews is rather sparse (Christmann 2009 p. 204).

Gabriela Christmann (2009 p. 200) argues that telephone interviews are adequate where it can be expected that interviewees are able to articulate themselves well and where interviews do not aim for a reconstruction of everyday-life approaches and attitudes. Nevertheless she points to several challenges and disadvantages of telephone interviews, as compared to face- to-face interviews. Communication is reduced to verbal communication, which not only increases the challenge of interpreting the interviewee’s responses but also makes it more demanding to uphold a smooth and easily flowing conversation (ibid. p. 208). For example, the interviewer may need to signal orally that s/he is listening attentively because it is not possible to signal this through body language (ibid. p. 214-218). Furthermore, in telephone interviews the interviewer cannot tell if the interviewee is distracted by other issues (ibid. p. 214). Christmann concludes that telephone interviews are adequate for certain research purposes, but typically are more demanding and require higher levels of concentration (ibid. p. 217).

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The point that high levels of concentration are required for telephone interviews is in line with my own experiences. Nevertheless, the telephone interviews went quite smoothly. Indeed, I found that telephone interviews also have some advantages, other than pure efficiency considerations. The fact that one cannot communicate visually also provides one with some liberties. In particular, not being distracted by the need to control one’s visual performance and to maintain eye contact can in fact facilitate the higher level of concentration that is required. For example, this allowed me to tick off or highlight questions in my interview guide, or to take notes during the interview on issues I wanted to pick up on further, without fearing to irritate the interviewee. This helped me to keep a good overview of issues I still wanted to address, especially in cases when the sequence of issues discussed in the interview did not follow the sequence of my interview guide. Furthermore I conducted three face-to-face interviews in Germany before I started to conduct telephone interviews. Thereby the specific challenges of telephone interviews were not compounded with the challenge of developing the quasi-expert status, which is more difficult during the first interviews in a field (see above).

5.2 Data analysis

Interview transcripts, interview protocols and evaluation units As already noted above, all interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. In line with common standards for the transcription of expert interviews (Meuser and Nagel 2005 p. 83), transcription focused on the verbal articulations of interviewer and interviewee, leaving aside issues of intonation, dialect or the duration of pauses. This is considered admissible for expert interviews, as the analysis focuses on expert knowledge and appraisals, rather than on personal attitudes and the way interviewees relate emotionally to particular subjects (ibid.). To be sure, also for the analysis of expert interviews the mere transcription of verbal articulations can sometimes be misleading, for example if the interviewee uses irony or if the interviewee appears particularly open or reserved. Where necessary I therefore took notes on such issues directly after the interview and complemented this with a brief content-related summary of the interview.

I then proceeded to analyse interview transcripts using the software AtlasTi. To prepare this analysis I grouped all transcripts of expert interviews relating to a country case into one evaluation unit. The subsequent first coding procedure thus targeted the set of transcripts pertaining to a particular country. I thereby followed Meuser and Nagel (2005 p. 80/81) who argue that transcripts of expert interviews usually should not be analysed as individual cases. Rather, thematic units across several interviews should be identified and analysed jointly.

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First coding procedure and writing country case reports The coding process constituted an iterative process involving several rounds of running through and coding each interview transcript. I conducted the first rounds of coding as part of my work on the projects e-coop and BENE. Above all, this served to gain a well-structured overview of the field of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany. Developing coding categories was based on a combination of deductive and inductive reasoning (cf. Berg 1989 p. 111/112 and 115). I developed initial coding categories along the lines of my research questions and the main themes I was interested in. After I had identified the interview passages pertaining to these themes in my evaluation unit, I inductively developed more specific codes, based on the particular issues or positions articulated by my interviewees. For example, I initially coded passages where understandings and rationales in relation to citizen power plants were articulated. Later I further differentiated this material, developing codes that reflected the specific types of understandings and rationales voiced by the interviewees. Finally, I summarized the material for each category, sometimes combining it with additional information from background research and using selected literal quotes from interviews as illustration.

This produced country case reports for Austria and Germany respectively (see Schreuer 2012). These first reports included an overview of different legal forms and participation models of citizen power plants, an overview of the roles of different actors, institutional framework conditions relevant for the establishment of citizen power plants, and different rationales attached to citizen power plants.

Identification of further themes an renewed coding The country case reports were useful for gaining a well-structured overview of the field. However, they remained largely descriptive, summarizing selected interview passages along largely static categories, such as legal forms and types of actors. In order to develop a further- reaching analysis that took account of grassroots innovation as a process, I reviewed my material for core process-related themes that were explicitly or implicitly addressed (cf. Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 424 on selective coding). Apart from reviewing my interview material, the identification of such themes was also informed by existing literature on community energy, grassroots innovations more generally and concepts from social movement theory and institutional theory. The themes that emerged from this reconsideration of the material included (1) framing, interpretation and legitimation; (2) symbols, identity & visibility; (3) emergence and diffusion; (4) resources and support actors; (5) contentiousness, conflict and power; (6) social and technological innovation; and

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(7) actor roles and strategies. I considered each of these themes as potential sections of my analysis and put together brief texts outlining the issues at stake.

From this set of themes I decided to focus on ‘emergence and diffusion’ as well as ‘contentiousness, conflict and power’ as the structuring thematic units of this thesis and further subdivided each of these themes into two parts: emergence, diffusion, empowerment and conflict (cf. chapters 6 - 9 in this thesis). Most other themes remained cross-cutting issues or analytical categories, but were not used to thematically structure the further analysis. I then revisited the interview material, paying particular attention to these themes. For each of the following chapters (chapters 6 - 9) I engaged in further coding of the interview material. Again, I first coded the material along broad thematic strands and later inductively developed more specific coding categories.

This renewed coding was accompanied by a further review of relevant literature that served three different purposes. First of all, part of this literature served to provide relevant background information, for example on antinuclear movements or renewable energy policies in Austria and Germany. Secondly, in sections 6.2.2 and 7.2.1, I use the account Andreas Byzio and colleagues give of the development of citizen power plants in Germany to complement my own empirical material (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 267‑394). As they provide a very extensive and largely narrative account of the development of citizen wind farms in Germany, it was possible to integrate this with my primary data. Thirdly, I reviewed literature in the area of social movement theory, institutional theory and sustainability transitions. This served to develop and refine the theoretical framework in a way that was informed both by my empirical material and by existing literature on social and sociotechnical change (cf. Kelle 2010).

Writing Writing is often not explicated as a research method in academic work, and in handbooks on social science methods writing is usually discussed only as a way of presenting the results of an analysis that has previously been completed (e.g. Froschauer and Lueger 2003, Flick 2007). This is also mirrored in the use of the terms ‘writing up’ or ‘writing down’. Both of these terms seem to imply that the research process has already been completed beforehand and simply needs to be recorded and thereby made accessible to its audience. However, especially in the qualitative social sciences, writing is “not simply an act of recording the outcomes of the analysis but also an active construction and representation of the form and the nature of the phenomena being explored” (White, Woodfield et al. 2001 p. 287). Indeed, I developed a large part of the analysis presented in this thesis through different forms of writing.

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Writing served to develop, clarify and articulate the line of argument in each section. It was a non-linear, iterative process requiring different forms of writing at different points in time. For each section this typically involved reviewing the relevant material from interviews as well as relevant literature and taking notes from this material. Subsequently I developed a structure and line of argument for the respective section, often by means of hand written notes and hand drawn diagrams. This was followed by writing a first rough draft of the actual text. To uphold a good writing flow I forced myself not to immediately question each point and not to pay particular attention to issues of style (cf. Wolfsberger 2010 p. 133-140). I then made a first revision of this rough draft before asking for feedback from my supervisor as well as further mentors and peers. At a later point in time I revised the text once again, taking into consideration the feedback I had received.

Selective use of a comparative perspective As can be seen from the way the chapters in this thesis are structured (see table of contents), some parts of the analysis are organized as country case comparisons (chapter 6, section 9.2), while other parts are structured differently. It is important to note that for this thesis the country case comparison is not what I strive for as a result of the analysis. Rather, it constitutes a method of analysis that I use to gain a better understanding of the establishment of citizen power plants. This method appears more appropriate for some parts of the analysis than for others. I use it where a process I explore can be observed both in Germany and in Austria and where there are significant differences between the two countries. For other parts of the analysis I sometimes work along other divisions of my material, for example comparing regions, technology areas or legal forms.

For example, in section 7.1 on the replication of citizen power plants I first look at citizen wind farms in one Austrian and one German region, because this form of diffusion had a particularly important role to play there. In addition to that, I look at the replication of PV cooperatives in Germany, as they have been strongly on the rise in several German regions from around 2006 to 2013. In other sections, I focus mainly on a single country case. For example, section 7.4 on the uptake of citizen power plants by incumbents focuses mainly on Austria, as this process is less salient in Germany. I do, however, also reflect on the question why this development is stronger in Austria than it is in Germany. In chapter 8, where I explore the issue of empowerment, I take yet another route and organize the discussion around three problems cutting across both country cases. This means that for each section or chapter I decided which particular perspective served best to bring to the fore relevant aspects of the issue in focus.

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6 The emergence of citizen power plants

This chapter focuses on the emergence of the first citizen power plants in Austria and Germany in the 1980s and 1990s. More specifically, the chapter explores the question how it was possible to open up a space for citizen power plants as an alternative sociotechnical configuration in the energy system (see research question (1) on p. 11). As discussed in section 3.1, this question is motivated by an understanding of energy systems as sociotechnical regimes that tend to be self-stabilizing and thus resistant to change. I will focus especially on the development of the first citizen wind farms in Austria and Germany, as citizen power plants were first developed in this technology area in the late 1980s and the 1990s.

Existing research on grassroots innovation has so far focused mainly on the robustness and diffusion of existing initiatives and has paid little attention to the processes by which they were conceived of and developed in the first place (e.g. Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012, Kirwan, Ilbery et al. 2013, Seyfang and Longhurst 2013). The few existing analyses of the emergence of grassroots innovations have pointed to the importance of a counter-cultural scene dissatisfied with established practices, the availability of a sufficient number of committed volunteers, and diversity in the motives for engagement (Smith 2007, Longhurst 2012, Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2013 p. 862/863). In this chapter I want to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the emergence of a grassroots innovation for the case of citizen wind farms in Austria and Germany.

Adding to my basic theoretical framework presented in chapter 3, this chapter first introduces resource mobilization theory, a strand of social movement theory, as an approach to analyse the emergence of citizen power plants (section 6.1). The rest of this chapter is organized along country cases. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 analyse the emergence of citizen wind farms in Germany and Austria respectively. The final section summarizes the results and presents conclusions with respect to the questions addressed in this chapter.

6.1 Theoretical framework, extension 1: resource mobilization theory

6.1.1 Social movement theory as a suitable perspective So far I have conceptualized citizen power plants as a grassroots innovation, understood as a new sociotechnical configuration in the energy system developed by civil society initiatives (see chapter 3). How then to analyse the emergence of such sociotechnical configurations? I want to argue that social movement theory provides a suitable and fruitful approach for studying this process. Social movement theory involves a number of different

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conceptual approaches, but studies of social movements have often revolved around one central question: Why and how do movements emerge and build up momentum? To be sure, the task of setting up and operating a wind turbine differs from the typical action repertoire of social movements. While setting up a wind farm is very much an entrepreneurial project social movement action typically centres on discursive interventions such as voicing discontent with established practices and articulating demands for change.

Nevertheless the problem addressed here closely resembles the questions addressed in the study of social movements: Why did bottom-up citizens’ initiatives develop the idea of setting up collectively owned wind turbines and how did they succeed in following through with such projects? Posing the question this way is in line with the basic assumption that I take from the multi-level perspective on sociotechnical change, namely that established rule- systems (sociotechnical regimes) lead to stability within systems of provision such as the energy system. The emergence of new sociotechnical configurations therefore deserves special attention, especially if these are developed by actors that only have a marginal role to play in the established system.

Indeed, some scholars in the sustainability transitions community have already made attempts to integrate perspectives from social movement theory with the multi-level model of sociotechnical change. For example, Boelie Elzen and colleagues (Elzen, Geels et al. 2011) analyse how the articulation of animal welfare concerns influenced the development of pig husbandry in the Netherlands. They use social movement theory to investigate how animal welfare groups could build up normative pressure on the regime. Along a similar line, Adrian Smith (2012) suggests that social movement theory can be used to understand how civil society contributes to the unsettling of incumbent regimes in energy system transitions. In both cases, however, social movement theory is used only to analyse how the sociotechnical regime comes under pressure, and not to investigate how civil society actors themselves develop new sociotechnical configurations. To be sure, Smith (2012) also highlights the way civil society contributes to the emergence of novelty, but suggests to use strategic niche management rather than social movement theory for this purpose.

In this chapter and in the following one, I intend to draw on social movement theory to analyse the emergence and further diffusion of new sociotechnical configurations in the energy system, in particular citizen power plants in Germany and Austria. Social movements are generally understood as “collective attempts to bring about change in social institutions” (Jenkins 2001 p. 14368) that are protest-oriented and make frequent use of uninstitutionalized means (Chazel 2001 p. 14371). Initiatives to develop citizen power plants

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bear some resemblance to this, as they can be understood as a form of collective action challenging established sociotechnical regimes in the energy system.

Indeed, David Hess (2005), drawing both on the field of science and technology studies and on social movement theory, introduces the term ‘technology and product oriented movements’. These he understands as specific forms of social movements whose social change agenda is oriented towards “support for an alternative technology and/or product, as well as the policies with which they are associated” (Hess 2005 p. 516). As such “their mode of action involves less emphasis on the politics of protest and more on building and diffusing alternative forms of material culture” (ibid.). This is not to say that an individual initiative attempting to set up a collectively owned wind turbine or PV plant, nor necessarily the set of all such initiatives, in itself constitutes a social movement. Hess’ conception of technology and product oriented movements assumes a broader actor base, made up both of non-profit advocacy organizations and private sector entrepreneurs. However, citizen power plant initiatives can be thought of as agents within the technology and product oriented movement aiming at the promotion of renewable energy technologies.

Along a similar line Brayden King and Nicholas Pearce (2010) have highlighted the role of social movements as change agents in markets. They review different forms of social movement action in this arena, one of which is the creation of market alternatives and new organizational forms. This creation of market alternatives involves entrepreneurial action inspired by a social change agenda which is often supported and pushed forward by social movements. Furthermore they also argue that such entrepreneurial activity initially faces challenges similar to those of social movement organizations: mobilizing relevant resources, developing oppositional identities and creating a base of supporters.

“[B]ecause new organizational forms are often resisted by dominant incumbents (…) entrepreneurs must organize collectively and mobilize their shared resources to establish the rhetorical and material infrastructure of new organizational forms (…). The early years of an industry resemble a social movement as actors mobilize resources, develop oppositional identities that will sustain their commitment to the cause, break down old boundaries and beliefs, and begin creating a consumer audience (…).” (King and Pearce 2010 p. 258) To summarize, citizen power plant initiatives are not necessarily a social movement in themselves but can be seen as part of a larger ‘technology and product oriented movement’ (Hess 2005) advocating the use of renewable energy technologies. More importantly, however, the entrepreneurial activity these initiatives engage in confronts them with similar challenges that social movement organizations face. The main challenge emphasized by King and Pearce is the mobilization of resources. This implicitly pays reference to resource mobilization theory, a particular strand of social movement theory. Indeed, resource

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mobilization theory, as it has been put forwards by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977, 2001), adopts an entrepreneurial approach to movement formation. Social movement leaders are positioned as entrepreneurs that need to mobilize resources and develop social movement action strategies. This strand of social movement theory appears to be particularly well suited for analysing citizen power plant initiatives as setting up and operating a power plant also involves entrepreneurial action. The next subsection therefore introduces resource mobilization theory as an approach to analyse the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants.

6.1.2 Resource mobilization theory Resource mobilization theory was first articulated in the 1970s and has since been widely adopted, critiqued, refined and extended (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Jenkins 1983, 2001, McCarthy and Zald 2001, Edwards and McCarthy 2004). In contrast to earlier theoretical approaches to social movements, resource mobilization theory argued that the deprivation of particular social groups, also referred to as grievances, was not sufficient to explain the formation of social movements. Scholars pointed out that grievances were too ubiquitous to use them as the sole or main explanatory factor for movement formation and argued that social movement dynamics could be better explained by looking towards the availability of resources, the organizational structure of social movements and political opportunities for action (Jenkins 1983 p. 530).

According to this approach, the availability of resources is central both for explaining individual participation in social movements, and for explaining how social movement organizations define their agendas, mobilize adherents and push for their goals (McCarthy and Zald 2001). Initially this approach looked mainly towards time and money as the crucial resources, but meanwhile resources are understood more broadly as “any social, political, economic asset or capacity that can contribute to collective action” (Jenkins 2001 p. 14368). Resource mobilization theory further assumes that these resources not only stem from contributions made by potential beneficiaries of the social movement, but come from society at large – for example via donations, grants from foundations or the provision of legitimacy via the public endorsement of movement goals by well-known and well-respected individuals (McCarthy and Zald 2001 p. 535, Edwards and McCarthy 2004 p. 122/123). The term ‘resource mobilization’ is used to refer to the process by which social movements gain access to these resources.

In the remainder of this subsection I will discuss different resource types and will thereby develop a resource typology that appears suitable for my task (see Table 3 on p. 65). Quite remarkably, classificatory schemes distinguishing between different resource types have for

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a long time been absent from resource mobilization theory, or have not been given much attention. Analysts have been more concerned with how resources are accessed and used and less with the question which types of resources are relevant for social movements (McCarthy and Zald 2001 p. 544/545, Edwards and McCarthy 2004 p. 125). Overall, however, early uses of resource mobilization theory in the 1970s and 1980s paid a lot of attention to labour and to material resources such as money and physical equipment (Jenkins 1983 p. 533).

Apart from material resources, Charles Tilly also includes land as an additional resource category (Tilly 1978 p. 69). The resource category ‘land’, however, has not been adopted by most other analysts using resource mobilization theory, probably because for most social movements the acquisition of land hardly has a role to play. Setting up and operating renewable energy plants, however, critically depends on physical space with appropriate climatic conditions (e.g. wind, solar radiation). Thus, for my purpose it appears reasonable to explicitly take account of land or, put more generally, natural resources.

In addition to that, resource mobilization theory from the beginning strongly emphasized the importance of organizational structure for social movements (Jenkins 2001 p. 14369). Bob Edwards and John McCarthy (2004 p. 127) later recast this point by introducing social- organizational resources as a separate resource category. Essentially, these are forms of social organization that can be used to recruit participants, distribute information or to accomplish any other kind of organizational task (ibid.). For example, this includes social networks and formal organizations. In addition to that, I will also include labour in this resource category. While forms of organization constitute the social infrastructure for accomplishing organizational tasks, labour is critical for executing such tasks.

Since the 1990s more elaborate resource typologies have been put forward (in particular Cress and Snow 1996, Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Apart from striving to provide a more systematic account of different kinds of resources, these resource classifications have also started to pay more attention to intangible resources. For one thing, increasing attention has been given to different forms of knowledge. Daniel Cress and David Snow (1996 p. 1094‑1096), for example, introduce the category of ‘informational resources’. The label is somewhat misleading, however, as they do not only take this to include explicit forms of knowledge (information) but also tacit forms of knowledge (see e.g. Kastenkamp 2011 p. 58 for an overview of different types of knowledge). I therefore argue that it is better to refer to this resource type more generally as knowledge resources, keeping in mind that this encompasses both explicit and tacit forms of knowledge (see Table 3 below).

Furthermore, more recent articulations of resource mobilization theory have started to pay attention to cultural issues. For example, Bob Edwards and John McCarthy (2004 p. 126)

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introduce the category of cultural resources. From their perspective this includes cultural products such as music, literature, magazines and videos that help to recruit further movement adherents and to maintain preparedness for action. Along a similar line John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (2001 p. 558) have suggested to look towards symbolic resources. These they understand as cultural symbols and their meanings, including assumptions and rationales for particular actions that are drawn from the larger cultural environment of a social movement. Thus, rather than looking towards specific cultural products, McCarthy and Zald emphasize the interpretative frames that the cultural environment of a social movement has to offer.3 I find McCarthy and Zald’s concept more helpful, as it emphasizes the role of cultural expressions as sense making devices rather than the material form they take. I therefore will include symbolic resources in my resource typology and define them as collective understandings and interpretations that render something meaningful and desirable.

Indeed, drawing on resource mobilization theory, Elizabeth Bomberg and Nicola McEwen (2012) have recently demonstrated the importance of symbolic resources for community energy projects in Scotland. They find that community energy projects drew on understandings of these initiatives as an expression of a local identity and as a quest for autonomy and sustainability (Bomberg and McEwen 2012 p. 440-442). In addition to that, Bomberg and McEwen make another interesting contribution in terms of relevant resource types. Apart from the attention they give to symbolic resources, Bomberg and McEwen also emphasize the importance of structural resources, including support programmes such as investment subsidies or feed-in tariffs.4 Indeed, policy support, especially in the form of feed-in tariffs, has also proven crucial for citizen power plant initiatives in Germany and Austria (see especially chapter 6 and sections 7.1, 7.3 and 8.3). The issue is tricky, however, as it can easily be argued that policy support in fact constitutes an allocation mechanism for resources, in particular material resources, rather than constituting a separate resource in itself. In view of the high relevance of policy support for citizen power plants, I argue that it is nevertheless helpful to include formalized resource allocation mechanisms as a ‘meta-

3 In fact this constitutes an attempt to incorporate another more recent strand of social movement theory into resource mobilization theory that focuses on the construction of issue frames and identities (Benford and Snow 2000, Polletta and Jasper 2001). 4 In fact Bomberg and McEwen also include general political opportunity structures in their category of structural resources, such as the openness of the political system and access to policy-making systems. It remains questionable, however, if general structural conditions of a political system can simply be reinterpreted as a resource, as they are not an asset that can be owned, mobilized or employed, as the other resource types (cf. Avelino 2011 p. 70). I would argue that political opportunity structures may be better thought of as a context variable rather than as a resource in itself. 64

resource’ into a resource typology. This also pays reference to the interest of resource mobilization theory in the ways in which resources become available to social movements.

Table 3 summarizes the resource typology I have thereby arrived at:

Resource type specification

Material resources Money, equipment Natural resources Land, climatic conditions Social-organizational Forms of social organization (e.g. networks, organizations) and resources labour Knowledge resources Different forms of knowledge, including explicit knowledge as well as skills, know-how and expertise Symbolic resources Collective understandings and interpretations that render an action or initiative meaningful and desirable Structural resources Formalized resource allocation mechanisms, in particular policy support

Table 3: Resource typology I would like to stress that these resource categories should not be read as ontological categories but as analytical devices for my particular task. The choice of these categories is informed both by existing literature in resource mobilization theory and by reflections on my empirical case. For example, the inclusion of natural resources and structural resources is based on the observation that such resources have an important role to play for citizen power plants. In addition to that, I am striving for a reasonable level of analytical differentiation. This means avoiding to lump together too many things into one resource category, while at the same time keeping the number of resource categories manageable.

Let me make one further remark, specifically on the category of symbolic resources. As already mentioned in section 3.2, different actors may have different understandings about what purpose a grassroots innovation serves. Furthermore such understandings can also change over time. This is captured by the term interpretative flexibility, originally introduced in relation to the social construction of technology (Pinch and Bijker 1984 p. 421-424). In other words, different actors may draw on different symbolic resources in relation to a grassroots innovation – different understandings about what makes it meaningful and desirable. In terms of the resource typology presented above, interpretative flexibility can therefore be understood as variability in terms of the symbolic resources that are employed in relation to a grassroots innovation. Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker argue that different interpretations of a technology can differ ‘radically’, in the sense that they also result in

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different design variants (ibid. p. 423). As will become clear, different understandings of citizen power plants have similarly contributed to the development of different variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants (see chapter 7).

As stated above, this chapter intends to address the questions how it was possible for bottom-up initiatives to develop the first citizen power plants in Germany and Austria, focusing especially on citizen wind farms. With the concept of sociotechnical configurations and the approach of resource mobilization theory in mind, these questions can now also be reformulated: How can the emergence of citizen power plants as alternative sociotechnical configurations be explained on the basis of resource availability? Which resources had a particularly important role to play? How did citizens’ initiatives gain access to these resources? What similarities and differences between individual cases can be observed? The following sections explore these questions for the German and the Austrian case respectively.

6.2 Country case Germany

As already pointed out in section 2.1, Germany is often regarded as a flagship country, both in relation to the promotion of renewable energy technologies in general and in relation to the broad diffusion of citizen power plants. This section aims to go back to the origins of this phenomenon and to investigate how the first citizen wind farms could establish themselves in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a background to this analysis, the first subsection gives a brief introduction to the German anti-nuclear movement that had an important role to play in criticizing the established sociotechnical regime in the energy sector and developing visions of alternative configurations. Subsection 6.2.2 then presents the actual case study, made up of a discussion of two examples of early citizen wind farm initiatives. A final subsection draws conclusions concerning the way these initiatives mobilized resources for their projects.

6.2.1 Background: The German anti‐nuclear movement

Compared to other Western European countries such as France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK the German anti-nuclear movement was and indeed is particularly strong. Since the mid-1970s Germany has seen both mass protests with up to 100,000 participants as well as occupations of nuclear power plant construction sites and acts of sabotage by radical activists (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995, Corbach 2006). The anti- nuclear-movement also had ties to other social movements emerging at the same time such as the peace movement and the second wave of the women’s movement. As Karl-Werner

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Brand (1999 p. 42) notes, “in no other country did these movements interweave in such densely integrated ‘alternative milieux’ as in Germany, thereby giving them the character of an autonomous political formation”.

Furthermore, the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 had a particularly strong impact on public discourse concerning nuclear power in Germany and led to a massive increase in anti- nuclear protest. As Ruud Koopmans and Jan Willem Duyvendak (1995) argue, this was due to the fact that the accident happened when the German anti-nuclear movement was already in the middle of a massive campaign against the construction of a nuclear reprocessing plant. The movement was therefore well prepared to mobilize further around the issue, and the Chernobyl accident turned into a headword of the German anti-nuclear movement, epitomizing concerns over nuclear power more generally (Roose 2010 p. 82).

In terms of the emergence of citizen wind farms, the strength of the anti-nuclear movement had two important effects. First, it contributed to a shift in the position that political parties took on the issue of nuclear power. In particular, the Social Democratic Party started to turn away from nuclear power in the 1980s, thus breaking the former strong pro-nuclear consensus of the political establishment. At the same time the Green Party emerged onto the political landscape, with the exit from nuclear power figuring prominently in their political agenda (Uhlir 2011 p. 6). Heightened public concerns over nuclear power also went along with an increasing political endorsement of the provision of policy support for renewables (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 261-264).

Secondly, and just as importantly, the anti-nuclear movement also developed a critical perspective on the technical and organizational set-up of the energy system and linked this to a wider criticism of the state, the business sector and society at large. This broad and fundamental criticism included a rejection of technocratic decision-making, centralization, consumerism and environmental degradation. Opposition to nuclear power was not only articulated in terms of concerns over environmental and health-related threats. Discontent was also voiced with closed and elitist decision-making processes around nuclear power plants as well as the large scale of nuclear power plants that supported centralized planning and infrastructure development in the energy system. Furthermore, the justification of nuclear power plants with reference to rising demands for electricity was viewed critically as a reinforcement of a consumerist society. Thus, it was the entire sociotechnical regime which nuclear power was embedded in that came under attack. Conversely, it was nuclear power that came to epitomize the broad range of social, institutional and technological arrangements (technocratic decision-making, centralization etc.) that the anti-nuclear movement opposed. (Roose 2010 p. 96, Toke 2011 p. 52, Uhlir 2011 p. 5)

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The fundamental rejection of the sociotechnical regime around nuclear power went hand in hand with the development of visions of an alternative regime in the energy system. These were based on values embraced by the anti-nuclear movement, revolving around notions of decentralization, self-sufficiency, democratic and non-hierarchic decision-making structures and ecology. At the level of individual power plants, visions of sociotechnical configurations revolved around small, autonomous and democratically governed units generating electricity from renewable energy technologies for their own, local consumption (see e.g. Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 34-39). The idea of locally owned and controlled citizen wind farms clearly fitted well into this broad vision of an alternative energy system. Thus, the anti-nuclear movement developed ideas of an energy system transformation according to which citizen power plants, in particular citizen wind farms, became meaningful and desirable. In terms of my resource typology, the anti-nuclear movement therefore provided critical symbolic resources which bottom-up renewable energy initiatives could later draw on to develop citizen wind farms [1:3, 1:46, 4:3, 4:27, 8:16, 9:27].

6.2.2 The emergence of citizen wind farms

Apart from small-scale turbines set up by individuals – in particular farmers – in the 1970s and 1980s, citizen wind farms were among the first to set up wind farms in Germany (Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 36/37, Ohlhorst 2009 p. 237; [4:1]). Until the mid-1980s setting up wind turbines was still very much a fringe activity, even within the scene of the environmental movement. However, from the mid-1980s onwards an increasing number of initiatives started to become active in this area (Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 43-46, 55). Around the same time, policy support for renewables was starting to shift from the domain of R&D towards the provision of support for market introduction (structural resources). To be sure, these support mechanisms cannot be interpreted as a direct response to the needs of citizen power plant initiatives [1:25, 2:34, 8:38, 9:25]. At a more general level, however, rising public concerns over nuclear power as well as emerging concerns over climate change pushed the German government towards the introduction of support mechanisms for the operation of renewable energy plants (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 264). Most notably this included the 100 MW programme for wind power and the 1,000 Roofs Programme for PV introduced in 1989 and 1990 respectively. Furthermore, the Electricity Feed-in Law adopted by the German Parliament in 1990 proved to have a decisive role to play for citizen wind farms (see section 4.1).

Broadly speaking there were two different types of citizen wind farm initiatives that emerged during this time. Firstly initiatives with strong links to the anti-nuclear movement, which typically formed in urban settings and whose main motivation was to develop alternatives to

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nuclear power. Secondly, initiatives in rural areas in the coastal regions of Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Holstein, for which wind power constituted a potential additional source of income (Ohlhorst 2009 p. 115/116). In the following, two examples will be discussed in greater detail, each example representing one of these two types of initiatives. The cases presented here were both pioneers in the sense of having been the first or among the first of these respective types of initiatives. The case of UWW is based on secondary data from a study by Andreas Byzio and colleagues (2002) and information from the initiative’s website, while the case of the citizen wind farm Lübke-Koog is based on interview data.

The citizen wind farm UWW The initiative UWW (Umschalten Windstrom Wedel) belongs to the type of urban initiatives with strong links to the anti-nuclear movement. In 1986, a group of anti-nuclear activists in Hamburg initially founded the association ‘Umschalten’ (switchover). The goal was to collaboratively install and operate a wind turbine close to Hamburg. Their aspiration was to turn their opposition to nuclear power, which had just been reinvigorated by the nuclear fallout in Chernobyl, into a constructive project and to demonstrate that there were viable alternatives to nuclear power plants (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 273, 286).

Eventually a limited partnership (GmbH & Co KG) was set up to operate the wind farm, named Windstrom Wedel or, with reference to the original association, ‘Umschalten Windstrom Wedel’ (UWW). Their first turbine which had a capacity of 75 kW went into operation in 1989; three more turbines were set up from 1990 – 1992, with a capacity of 100 kW, 50 kW and 225 kW respectively. The turbines were purchased from early Dutch, German and Danish wind turbine manufacturers. UWW is still active today, with 340 people holding shares of the company. They operate three wind turbines, a hydroelectric plant and a combined heat and power station. One turbine they set up was later handed over to farmers (UWW 2014b).

For one thing, the initiative UWW was aware of the development of wind farms in Denmark that had already started there a few years earlier. Furthermore, an understanding of renewable energy as the alternative and, indeed, antithesis to nuclear power that had developed in the anti-nuclear scene provided an important starting point (symbolic resources). They interpreted wind turbines as a symbol for the availability of alternatives to nuclear power. This interpretation is also visible from the way the group still describes the site of the first turbine on their website today. The close proximity to the nuclear power plant of Brokdorf, which had been the focal point of many anti-nuclear protests in Germany, is given special significance:

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„Our wind turbine stands where more than 20 years ago courageous citizens tried to prevent the construction of the nuclear power plant Brokdorf. Following the Danish example we wanted to steer the controversy with the operators of nuclear power plants and their supporters into new directions.“ (UWW 2014a, translated from German original) Drawing on this interpretation of the prospective wind turbine remained important throughout the further development process of the project. For attracting further people to participate and to pool money for the project, the core group could draw on word of mouth within the anti-nuclear scene. Framing the project in terms of a demonstration of the alternatives to nuclear power certainly resonated well among this group of people (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 296). In this way the anti-nuclear movement also provided them with important social-organizational resources, as they could make use of its network for attracting further participants. This in turn helped to mobilize the required material resources (pooling of money).

Furthermore, as an urban group, the initiative UWW originally did not have a suitable piece of land available for setting up a wind turbine. Finding a suitable site was, however, aided by the shared understanding of wind power as the antithesis to nuclear power in the anti- nuclear scene, which also extended to farmers in the surrounding area of Hamburg. Eventually UWW had more site offers from farmers than they actually needed (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 299). It also helped that a suitable site for a wind turbine at that time was not yet considered to be a valuable asset as it is today, where commercial wind farm developers are prepared to pay high prices for them (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 299; [Lübke-Koog:34]).

In addition to a suitable site, setting up a wind turbine required various forms of expertise, such as technical know-how for choosing the right turbine, business skills as well as legal expertise for setting up a company and the participation model. In terms of these knowledge resources required for developing the project, the situation was mixed. On the one hand this was very much a pioneer project, so knowledge in all sorts of areas was lacking. Andreas Byzio and colleagues (2002 p. 317) go as far as referring to cluelessness (Ratlosigkeit) as the joint starting point of early citizen wind farm initiatives. On the other hand, several people with relevant specialized knowledge were part of the group and could contribute towards reducing this helplessness. Mechanical and electrical engineers contributed to information gathering and learning in terms of the technology involved and thereby helped to make the right technology choice. Furthermore, a freelancer with organizational and business skills strongly contributed to the overall organization of the project and towards constructing the legal-organizational model (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 291-304).

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Finally, in terms of policy support (structural resources), the situation was rather patchy, to say the least. UWW’s three wind turbines were all set up before the Electricity Feed-in Law came into effect, but the group succeeded in securing funds from different sources. Apart from the equity capital provided by the participating citizens, the federal state of Schleswig- Holstein provided them with an investment subsidy covering about 25% of the costs. In addition to that they were able to secure funding within the 100 MW programme at the national level. For the second turbine they also obtained feed-in remuneration via negotiations with the local utility, the municipality and the harbour operating company on whose premises the turbine was sited (UWW 2014a).

To sum up, the initiative UWW mainly started from symbolic resources and social- organizational resources provided by the anti-nuclear movement and gradually succeeded in mobilizing material, natural, knowledge and structural resources as they developed their projects. I now turn to the example of Lübke-Koog which displays a somewhat different pattern of resource mobilization.

The citizen wind farm Lübke-Koog The wind farm in Lübke-Koog was the first citizen wind farm to go into operation in the area of North Frisia, an area which later became a hotspot of citizen wind farm development. It is located in the small village of Friedrich-Wilhelm-Lübke-Koog, only a few kilometres from the Danish border. The project was triggered by a large commercial wind power development in the village, the Windpark Nordfriesland, that went into operation in 1990 (Rave and Richter 2008 p. 102; [Lübke-Koog:1]). This made several farmers in the village consider the possibility of setting up wind turbines on their land themselves and apply for planning permission at the municipal level. It was the municipality that then initiated a pooling of these individual efforts and suggested to engage in a collaborative project – setting up one large wind farm rather than having many individual turbines scattered across the landscape [Lübke-Koog:21].

Eventually the group of farmers developed plans for a large wind farms consisting of 32 turbines and opened up the option to participate in this project to all inhabitants of the village. Forty-four people, almost all of them from the village of Friedrich-Wilhelm-Lübke-Koog joined up for the project. The first 14 turbines, with a remarkable total capacity of 6.6 MW, went into operation in 1992 (Rave and Richter 2008 p. 108/109). The wind farm was later expanded, both in terms of installed capacity and in terms of the number of people involved (see section 7.2 for a discussion of the process of scaling up). Quite remarkably, today more than 95% of the adult population of the village Friedrich-Wilhelm-Lübke-Koog holds shares in the wind farms [Lübke-Koog:3].

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Thus, an important trigger for this initiative was that the commercial wind farm development in the village alerted farmers to a new way of exploiting the natural resources (agricultural land in a windy area) they had available and creating an additional source of income. This also means that, compared to UWW, there were quite different symbolic resources at work. What made the project meaningful to the project initiators in this case was an understanding of wind farms as a potential form of local value creation. However, an understanding of wind power as an alternative to nuclear power also had a role to play. Several people in Friedrich- Wilhelm-Lübke-Koog had participated in the demonstrations against the nuclear power plant in Brokdorf. So while opposition to nuclear power was not the dominant understanding attached to this project, the rejection of nuclear power and the understanding that wind power represented a positive alternative to it was also shared by several people in Friedrich- Wilhelm-Lübke-Koog and gave an additional boost to the project.

Well, I would say in 1990 the demonstrations at the nuclear power plants were still quite recent, definitely some [local people] had participated, were on board at Brokdorf, which along the Elbe was of course synonymous for resistance against nuclear power. Of course they were extremely happy that they could generate renewable energy right on their doorstep. [Lübke-Koog:16] A second crucial point was that the first feed-in tariff system had just been introduced in Germany. When the group in Friedrich-Wilhelm-Lübke-Koog decided to set up a company aimed at developing the wind farm project, the Electricity Feed-in Law had just been passed – a decisive factor for the group to go forward with this project [Lübke-Koog:4, Lübke- Koog:35].

It was certainly made easier (…) by the Electricity Feed-in Law, or now the Renewable Energy Act. Really important to get access to debt capital in the first place, because of course a bank explores (…) the probability of repayment. [Lübke-Koog:35] It must, however, be noted that even with the Electricity Feed-in Law in place, the economic viability was still quite uncertain. In particular, there was still hardly any experience with the economic performance of wind farms. Although a central factor for people to engage in this project may have been to harness the economic potential of wind power, it was still quite uncertain if this would indeed succeed [Lübke-Koog:13]. Apart from the risk of a loss of invested capital, the lack of experience with respect to the performance of wind farms therefore also made it difficult for the group to obtain bank loans.

Finally, in terms of knowledge resources required for the project, the situation was similar to that of the group UWW. The wind farm director also describes a situation of cluelessness in terms of various financial and technical issues [Lübke-Koog:7]. Some issues, in particular

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concerning the legal form and participation model, were resolved by consulting a tax advisor and a lawyer.

6.2.3 Country case discussion

I will now compare the two cases presented above with respect to the question how these early citizen power plants were able to establish themselves. In terms of my theoretical framework, I am interested in the types of resources that were relevant and in the way such resources were successfully mobilized. Both initiatives succeeded in establishing citizen wind farms by drawing on resources they had available and mobilizing additional ones as they developed their projects. In the following I will discuss some of the similarities and differences in terms of different types of resources the initiatives could draw on or were able to mobilize to carry their projects through.

In the case of UWW the project starting point was widespread opposition to nuclear power as well as a shared understanding that a wind turbine could be understood as a demonstration of the alternatives to nuclear power, including the broader sociotechnical regime this technology was embedded in. It was this shared understanding of the prospective wind farm (symbolic resources) and the network of the anti-nuclear movement (social-organizational resources) that enabled them to attract further participants willing to pool money (material resources) for the project. Furthermore, it helped to secure a suitable turbine site, as several farmers in the area were willing to offer a piece of land (natural resources) for this kind of project. The group UWW thus was able to draw on symbolic resources as well as the social- organizational resource developed by the anti-nuclear movement. They could use these resources to mobilize further resource types, in particular material and natural resources. In terms of knowledge resources, the initiative could draw on some available technical and business expertise within the group but had to develop further know-how as they went along. Finally, policy support was largely lacking at the outset, but the group managed to stitch together funding from various sources for their projects.

In the case of the citizen wind farm Lübke-Koog, the starting point was mainly a combination of three factors: A heightened awareness of the local farmers’ land as suitable natural resources for wind farm development, an understanding of wind power as a potential source of local value creation (symbolic resources) and the availability of a feed-in tariff (structural resources). This combination of natural resources, symbolic resources as well as structural resources was decisive for conceiving of the project as well as for carrying it through. Also relevant, albeit less pronounced than in the case of UWW, were an understanding and appreciation of wind power as a counter model to nuclear power. This example therefore also shows that there can be quite different understandings attached to a particular project, 73

which may be related to political ideals (opposition to nuclear power) as well as to more mundane considerations concerning local income generation. This is a first indication of the interpretative flexibility which may be attached to citizen power plants, which will be discussed more extensively elsewhere (see especially sections 7.5 and 9.3).

What was initially lacking, as in the case of UWW, was know-how for developing a citizen wind farm, ranging from legal and business issues to engineering (knowledge resources). Like UWW, the group succeeded in developing this know-how as they proceeded with the project, partly by consulting external experts. Furthermore, even though the Electricity Feed- in Law was already in place, the group still had to negotiate its way through conditions for the provision of bank loans and the permit procedure. Finally, in terms of social- organizational resources, the municipality had a central role to play in initiating a collaborative project. Apart from that, the initiative could of course also draw on the everyday local network of personal acquaintance.

In spite of the differences between the resources that these two groups could draw on at the outset, and the way they mobilized further resources to carry their respective projects through, all of the basic resource types from the resource typology developed in section 6.1.2 were in some way relevant for both groups. Natural resources, in particular a suitable piece of land for setting up a turbine, material resources in the form of money pooled by participants and additional loans provided by banks, knowledge resources for the projects in technical, legal and organizational terms, social-organizational resources in the form of networks in which people organized, structural resources, in particular financial support in the form of feed-in tariffs or investment subsidies, and symbolic resources that made the development of a jointly owned wind farm meaningful and desirable.

While the build-up and mobilization of these resources is generally a gradual process, there are also decisive events that suddenly spurred the development of citizen wind farms. Two such ‘resource shifts’ that were relevant for the emergence of citizen wind farms in Germany can be observed. Firstly, the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986 provided a memorable reference point for growing concerns over nuclear power. While the Chernobyl accident came to epitomize concerns over nuclear power, citizen wind farms were subsequently positioned as a counter-model to the sociotechnical configuration of nuclear power plants. In this way, public discourse over the Chernobyl disaster in Germany boosted the symbolic resources attached to citizen wind farms. Secondly, the introduction of the Electricity-Feed- in Law in 1990 was a decisive turning point. Although some initial uncertainties remained, it provided a much higher degree of security for wind power investors, in particular for bottom-up citizen groups, to embark on such a project.

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6.3 Country case Austria

This section looks at the development of the first citizen wind farms in Austria. Although the first pioneer groups interested in the use of wind power already formed in the late 1980s, around the same time as in Germany, it took until the second half of the 1990s until the first citizen wind farms were set up. As for the German, case I will first briefly turn to social movement action in opposition to the mainstream energy sector as a background. In Austria this included not only the anti-nuclear movement but also fierce opposition to the construction of a large hydropower plant in rare wetland areas. Subsection 6.3.2 then recounts the emergence of citizen wind farms in Austria and subsection 6.3.3 discusses the case in terms of resource mobilization.

6.3.1 Background: Energy policy becomes a field of contention

In Austria, in a similar way as in Germany, the anti-nuclear movement that developed in the 1970s served to bring energy issues on the public agenda and to sensitize the public to matters of energy policy. In particular, issues of energy saving measures, alternative energy sources and the social acceptability of large power plants appeared on the agenda at that time (Kok and Schaller 1986 p. 69/70). As Volkmar Lauber (1996 p. 202) notes, the anti-nuclear movement that formed in resistance to the construction of the nuclear power plant Zwentendorf “became the rallying ground for the nascent environmental movement”.

One notable difference to the German case, however, is that in view of protests against nuclear power that erupted during the time the first nuclear power plant was constructed, the government scheduled a referendum on nuclear power in 1978. In this referendum, albeit by a very narrow margin, a majority voted against the use of nuclear power (Preglau 1994 p. 58). Consequently, in December 1978 the Nuclear Energy Prohibition Act was passed, which prohibits the use of nuclear fission for electricity generation in Austria (see also section 4.2). The Chernobyl disaster in 1986 later discursively reinforced this legal situation, putting an end to continued public discussions over repealing the ban on nuclear power and creating a strong public consensus against nuclear power (Preglau 1994 p. 61).

The ban on nuclear power, however, did not put an end to contention and social movement mobilization over the development of the Austrian energy system. In the 1980s, plans for a hydropower plant in Hainburg became the second focal point of environmental protest. The power plant was heavily opposed because it would have destroyed rare wetland areas. Furthermore a report leaked that showed that, contrary to what the government argued, demand for electricity was not rising as strongly as had been suggested and rather than being justified on the basis of a security-of-supply-agenda there were in fact plans about how to

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market a surplus of electricity that was expected (Lauber 1996 p. 202). After large demonstrations and a site occupation by hundreds of activists resulting in clashes with the police, plans for the power plant were eventually abandoned.

Apart from a turn away from nuclear power and the abandonment of plans for the hydropower plant in Hainburg, these two conflicts also had the effect that new actors started to be involved in the energy sector. As Franz Kok and Christian Schaller (1986 p. 69-71) have pointed out, the conflict over nuclear power for the first time led to public participation in matters of energy policy. After the confrontations between the environmental movement and the state over the hydropower plant planned in Hainburg, participatory elements were introduced to decision making processes. Max Preglau (1994 p. 65) concludes that the anti- nuclear movement and the partly overlapping environmental movement contributed to a democratization of administration and a change in the prevailing policy style. In a similar vein, Hannes Wimmer, assessing the influence of the Austrian anti-nuclear movement, concludes that “they have significantly lowered the threshold for protest and thereby created a favourable climate for the emergence of grassroots initiatives” (Wimmer 1980 p. 64, translated from German original).

6.3.2 The emergence of citizen wind farms

One area in which grassroots initiatives arose following this phase of continued conflicts over energy issues was the field of wind power (Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 9; [17:16, 21:9]).

In the early 1990s, what was going on at that time? The Chernobyl disaster was not so many years away and still very dominant, also the nuclear power discussion in relation to Zwentendorf (…) At that time all those energy policy debates were still much closer than they are today. People simply were in that energy, and then there were many that said, ‘well, somehow just talking isn’t good either, let’s do something together’. [21:9] In Austria, even more so than in Germany, the early years of wind power development owe much to citizens’ groups and individuals from outside of the established energy sector, who set up wind farms via citizen participation models [10:61, 21:8, 21:59]. Apart from hobbyist constructors experimenting with small do-it yourself turbines in the 1980s, the first years of wind power development were dominated by initiatives setting up wind farms based on broad, collective citizen ownership or loan models involving a large number of citizens (Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 10/11). Several such initiatives formed in the early and mid- 1990s and set up turbines from 1995 onwards.

One of the main problems with getting wind power development off the ground in Austria was that in the 1980s and early 1990s several experts considered Austria to have too low

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wind speeds to make the operation of wind turbines viable. Data and estimates provided by the Central Institution for Meteorology and Geodynamics (Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie and Geodynamik, ZAMG) as well as by the aviation authorities suggested that wind power development would not be viable in Austria (Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 10; [10:6]).

The role of early support organizations Notwithstanding these claims from the traditional energy sector, and spurred by the emerging societal interest in alternative energy sources, a number of individuals across Austria wanted to push forward wind power development in Austria. Set up in 1986, the association Energiewerkstatt (energy workshop) played a pivotal role in the development of wind power in Austria. While they first considered engaging with turbine construction, they soon realized that turbines could also be purchased from Denmark and Germany. Instead, they identified the question whether suitable sites with sufficient wind speeds (natural resources) were available as the critical bottleneck for wind power development in Austria. Thus, they decided to engage in wind measurements providing more detailed information than the data that had been available until then. Based on know-how they acquired in Germany, they constructed specialized wind measurement instruments to search for suitable sites. Over the next years, the association succeeded in establishing that there were indeed very good wind speeds in some places in Austria, especially in the federal states of Lower Austria and Burgenland. Stefan Hantsch and Ursula Nährer (2006 p. 10) refer to the person most strongly engaged with wind measurements from the Energiewerkstatt as “the man who found the wind in Austria”.

The relevance of these early wind measurements went beyond establishing that suitable sites for wind turbines were indeed available in Austria. By operating a wind measurement programme, they alerted other individuals and groups in Austria that wind power development could be an option for them [17:59]. By organizing trips to citizen wind farms in Germany they further contributed towards acquainting interested people with the idea of wind power development (See also Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 10).

Then, with Energiewerkstatt, there was K. (…) who organized this excursion. (…) And so then we simply travelled up there. Then, during a second excursion, that was also in Germany, we travelled to another wind farm. Well, for the first excursion I went alone and for the second one we took along a number of people and so in that way it slowly developed. [17:6] Furthermore, by engaging in such activities, Energiewerkstatt developed into an early focal point of networking activities between different initiatives in the field. The association thus turned into an important social-organizational resource for mutual exchange. Most of the pioneers trying to set up citizen wind farms in the early and mid-1990s came across the

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Energiewerkstatt in some way or another, and thus contacts in the emerging wind scene formed. In 1993, together with other Austrian wind power pioneers, people from Energiewerkstatt set up the lobbying organization IG Windkraft (Interest Group for Wind Power) which then took over the role of a focal point of the Austrian wind power scene. Apart from the interest organization IG Windkraft individual initiatives also engaged in lobbying activities.

Around the same time, a parliamentary initiative had resulted in a modest feed-in tariff for wind power that was available from 1994 to 1996. In addition to that the Environmental Ministry had come forward with an additional investment subsidy programme for wind turbines (see section 4.2). Grassroots wind farm initiatives and the newly founded IG Windkraft lobbied for the continuation and further expansion of these support mechanisms (structural resources), in particular the provision of more favourable feed-in tariffs. Especially at the local and regional levels, political support can partly be traced back to their activities [16:25, 17:28]. However, directly linking the further development of Austrian feed-in regulation would overestimate the political leverage of these actors. Nevertheless these actors had a certain catalysing role in creating political momentum leading towards the introduction of feed-in regulation, for example by being particularly active in street rallies demanding a continuation and improvement of feed-in tariffs [10:6, 10:58].

From community of interest to community of locality The first citizen wind farm in Austria was eventually set up in the village of Michelbach in 1995 and consisted of a single 225 kW turbine. A group of seven people set up a company and offered financial participation to interested citizens via a loan model. By the time this citizen wind farm went into operation, several more similar projects were already being worked on and in the next few years several citizen power plants followed, e.g. in Eberschwang (1996), Wolkersdorf (1996), Laussa (1996), Simonsfeld (1998) and Schenkenfelden (1998).

In one aspect the first citizen wind farm in Michelbach, however, differs somewhat from most of the citizen wind farms that were set up soon after. While a small group of people from the local population of Michelbach became shareholders of the wind turbine, the initiators also advertised it via associations that had developed out of the environmental movement and it was via the member base of these environmental associations that the largest share of the required capital could be raised (Hantsch and Nährer 2006 p. 11/14; [WEB:1]). The first citizen wind farm thus relied heavily on the community of interest of renewable energy enthusiasts from across Austria that had come to look towards wind power

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as an alternative to nuclear power and large-scale hydropower (environmental movement as a social-organizational resource).

By contrast, the following early citizen wind farms in Austria were devised as local projects, with both the core group of project initiators and the largest share of further participants living in the village where the wind farm was set up. Thus, these projects were organized around a community of locality. They became meaningful not only as an embodiment of alternatives to the existing energy regime, but as a local project people could relate to, taking pride in them as a local innovative project, as a new local landmark or as an embodiment of personal ties in the local community. [10:8, 14:25]

It is something we are very, very proud of, so that one can say in [our town] the wind turbines are not only generators of alternative energy, but they have also established themselves as the town’s landmark. [14:25]

Know-how development – importing the basics and piecing together the details Some early knowledge resources for initiatives developing citizen wind farms in the 1990s in Austria came from visits to similar projects that had already been realized in other countries. As has already been noted above, Energiewerkstatt organized excursions to citizen wind farms in Germany. Some project developers organized their own site visits to citizen wind farms in Germany, Denmark and Sweden, or simply became familiar with the concept of a citizen wind farm while spending time in these countries for other reasons. [14:21, 16:5, 17:5, 17:26, 21:5, 21:18]

Wind turbines are a technology from Denmark, German-Danish, that is also very widely applied there in citizen participation companies. (…) My wife and I visited the region and got to know a lot of people, got to know institutions. (…) We then oriented ourselves by several models and said, OK we will try it with this loan model, we will set up a limited liability company as operator. [16:5] Thus, early citizen wind farm initiatives in Austria were drawing on experiences in other countries and importing the model to Austria. In a broader, international perspective, this process of transferring the citizen wind farm model to a new country context can in fact be interpreted as a form of diffusion of this innovation. I will therefore revisit the development of the first citizen wind farms in Austria in section 7.3.1 as a case of transfer of a grassroots innovation to a new country. Within the Austrian context, however, familiarity with citizen power plants in other countries served as a starting point for developing further, more context-specific know-how.

In a similar way to the first German citizen wind farm projects, Austrian initiatives had to develop the required detailed technical, organizational and legal know how as they went along.

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At that time nobody knew how to do something like that, or how it should be done, even the authorities themselves did not know how to handle it. (…)We simply did it together, just like that, we invited all the people, met in a hall, and asked, what do you think, how should we go about this? [15:15] Some initiatives could draw on participants with professional expertise in law, business or engineering for the process of setting up an appropriate business model and legal structure, choosing turbine models or setting up contracts about feed-in to the grid [14:3, 14:9, 14:16, 14:29, 14:30, 14:44, 15:16]. Furthermore, it helped that the groups had informal contacts to each other, so later initiatives could learn from earlier ones (see also section 7.1.1 on the replication of citizen wind farms).

6.3.3 Country case discussion

In the following I will summarize for the Austrian case how citizen wind farms could develop, focusing especially on the way different types of resources could be mobilized. In Austria, as in the German case, renewable energy, and in particular wind power, became meaningful as the alternative to nuclear power and other large-scale, centralized energy technologies such as hydropower (symbolic resources). Although Austria passed the Nuclear Energy Prohibition Act in 1978, nuclear power continued to be a controversial issue and was seen as a threat by many people. This was due on the one hand to attempts that were made to repeal the ban on nuclear power and, on the other hand, to an awareness of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries.

The organization Energiewerkstatt played an important role in pushing forward wind power development in Austria. By engaging with detailed wind measurements they could counter the claim that wind speeds in Austria were too low for wind power deployment. It was not until such detailed wind measurements had been conducted that land in particular regions of Austria was taken into account as a natural resource for operating turbines. Furthermore, it helped to alert further pioneers to the option of setting up wind farms.

Attracting a broader audience to participate in the projects developed by these pioneer individuals relied on different forms of social organization (social-organizational) resources and on different understandings (symbolic resources) of citizen wind farm projects. For the first citizen wind farm in Michelbach, the organizational basis of environmental associations that had developed out of the environmental movement served as an important resource to reach interested individuals. The shared understanding these people had of renewable energy, in particular wind power, as an environmentally benign form of energy generation made such a project meaningful to them. For other early citizen wind farm initiatives the interpretations of the projects that enabled mobilization were somewhat different,

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characterized by pride in local achievements or understanding the project as an embodiment of personal ties in the local community. Accordingly, these projects also drew on everyday local networks of personal acquaintance as means towards social organization.

Awareness of citizen wind farms in other European countries constituted another important asset for developing similar projects in Austria. Familiarity with such projects both contributed to making such ownership models an obvious choice for people striving to pioneer wind power development in Austria, and provided them with some basic know-how to start with (knowledge resources). Nevertheless, just as in the German examples, the largest part of the required know-how had to be pieced together as they proceeded with the development of the projects.

Policy support programmes in the form of investment subsidies and feed-in tariffs (structural resources) were available from the mid-1990s, but were initially short-lived, volatile and varied from one region to another. These support programmes were important for early citizen wind farm initiatives, but more as opportunities they seized upon as soon as they became available rather than as a factor that triggered their development. Apart from exploiting these windows of opportunity, wind power pioneers also lobbied for an expansion of policy support themselves, albeit with limited leverage.

6.4 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has attempted to explain how bottom-up initiatives succeeded in opening up a space for citizen wind farms as an alternative sociotechnical configuration in the energy system in the late 1980s and 1990s in Germany and Austria. For this purpose I have drawn on resource mobilization theory. From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, what is to be explained is how social movements build up and manage to place their claims. Initiatives developing citizen power plants may not constitute social movements in themselves, but as bottom-up initiatives pursuing an agenda of sociotechnical change similar questions apply: Why did actors engage in this task and how was it possible them for them to do so? For the German case I have based my analysis on two individual examples of early citizen wind farm projects representing two separate strands of such initiatives in Germany: One strand with strong links to the anti-nuclear movement, for whom the primary motive for engaging with wind power was to develop alternatives to nuclear power; and farmers-based initiatives along the North Sea coast of Germany, who looked towards wind power as a potential source of additional value creation. The two cases portrayed here were among the first of these respective types in Germany. For the Austrian case, where early citizen wind

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farm initiatives loosely linked up to become a small scene of wind power pioneers, I have taken the perspective of a country case study for my analysis. All the cases considered have indeed needed to mobilize all basic resource types from the resource typology developed in section 6.1.2: suitable turbine sites (natural resources), money (material resources), technical, legal and organizational knowledge (knowledge resources), networks through which further people could be attracted (social-organizational resources), policy support for wind turbine operation (structural resources) as well as understandings of citizen wind farms that made them meaningful and desirable (symbolic resources).

Initiatives, however, differ in the content of some of these resource types. For example, different initiatives used different symbolic resources in relation to their projects or gave them different weight. In several cases understanding citizen wind farms as a counter-model to nuclear power or large-scale hydropower had an important role to play. But for some initiatives it was more important to interpret the project as a potential source of local values creation or as an embodiment of a local identity. Also social-organizational resources took different forms, as some initiatives relied on organizations and networks related to the environmental and anti-nuclear movements, while others drew on local networks of personal acquaintance.

To further account for differences, both between individual initiatives and between country contexts, it seems helpful to distinguish between resource endowments – resources that initiatives had available to them when they embarked on their projects – and further resources that initiatives succeeded in mobilizing as they proceeded with their activities. When looked upon in this way, one can discern different patterns of such resource endowments and further resource mobilization. For example, the German initiative UWW initially mainly worked from the shared understanding of a collectively owned citizen wind farm as an embodiment of the alternatives to nuclear power and the network developed by the anti-nuclear movement. These symbolic and social-organizational resources both helped them in securing a site as well as attracting further people prepared to participate and to pool money. In addition to that, they had to engage in know-how development and negotiations for funding. In the case of the other German citizen wind farm Lübke-Koog, the group of farmers started from an awareness of their land as a natural resource for wind power development, an understanding of wind power as a potential source of additional income (symbolic resouces) and from the assurance provided by the Electricity Feed-in Law that had recently been passed (structural resouces). In Austria, wind power pioneers built on an understanding of wind power as an alternative to nuclear power and large-scale hydropower (symbolic resources) and also drew on a basic 82

familiarity with citizen wind farms in other countries (knowledge resources). However, the availability of natural resources (suitable sites for turbines) was yet uncertain and claims concerning too low wind speeds had to be countered through engaging in detailed wind measurements. More detailed accounts of the respective patterns of resource endowments and further resource mobilization have already been provided in the country case discussions. The important point here is that resource mobilization constituted an iterative process whereby available resources opened up a certain room for manoeuvre that could be used to further enlarge the resource base and eventually to set up the first citizen wind farms. Where citizen wind farm initiatives actively engaged in the mobilization of further resources, another distinction can be made that may further our understanding of ways in which a space for alternative sociotechnical configurations is created. In some cases the mobilization of further resources was focused on the project level, such as the negotiation of funding and support on a case-by-case basis, securing a suitable site for a particular project or the development of know-how that is not shared with actors beyond the project. In other cases, citizen wind farm initiatives and early support actors contributed towards shaping the overall opportunity structure for the development of citizen wind farms by making resources available to a larger group of actors. Examples of this meso/macro-level form of resource mobilization include the involvement of citizen wind farm initiatives in lobbying for policy support, the wind measurements conducted by Energiewerkstatt establishing the availability of suitable sites in Austria and the exchange of know-how between different initiatives.

Comparing developments in Germany to developments in Austria, one notable difference is that the establishment of citizen wind farms succeeded several years earlier in Germany (from the late 1980s onwards) than in Austria (from 1995 onwards). What might explain that the development of citizen wind farms proceeded more quickly in Germany than it did in Austria? For one thing, the development of citizen wind farms in Germany was spurred by two critical resource shifts. Firstly, the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and the way it was picked up by the strong German anti-nuclear movement greatly enhanced the value of the understanding of citizen wind farms as a counter-model to nuclear power. In principle this also holds true for the Austrian case, but the ban on the use of nuclear power in Austria reduced the salience of this issue, compared to Germany. Secondly, the introduction of policy support in the form of the Electricity Feed-in Law in Germany in 1991 gave a significant boost to citizen wind farms. By contrast, in Austria it was not until 2003 that a comprehensive feed-in system for electricity from renewables was achieved. In addition to that, an additional barrier that Austrian wind power pioneers faced was that wind speeds were assumed to be too low and they first needed to engage in detailed wind measurements.

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7 The diffusion of citizen power plants

In this chapter I will focus on the diffusion of citizen power plants. The chapter aims to understand how citizen power plants spread further and what challenges this diffusion faced (see research question (2) on p. 11). As will become clear, the diffusion of grassroots innovation often involves considerable adaptations to the sociotechnical configuration. As Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith (2007 p. 596) have argued, grassroots innovations “need reinterpreting and transposing for other scales”. Elizabeth Shove and Mika Pantzar (2005) even question the appropriateness of the term diffusion and argue that, in practice, innovations require a process of local reinvention. Therefore, another aim of this chapter is to explore how citizen power plants were adapted as they spread in Austria and Germany (see research question (3) on p. 11).

By analysing the emergence and the diffusion of citizen power plants in separate chapters, it may look like I approach them as clearly separable, consecutive processes. However, it would be quite arbitrary to define a point in time at which the process of emergence turns into a process of diffusion. My distinction between the two processes should thus be better thought of as a shift in analytical focus. The chapter on the emergence of the first citizen power plants looked at the processes by which individual initiatives succeeded in developing their pioneer projects. By contrast, this chapter will focus on the processes by which follow- up projects were developed and new actors picked up on the grassroots innovation.

A number of challenges related to the diffusion of grassroots innovations have already been identified in the literature. Indeed, Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith (2007 p. 596-598) in their paper introducing the concept of grassroots innovations devote a separate section to diffusion challenges. They note that grassroots innovations are often tailored to a particular local context and designed to be small-scale. This makes it difficult to replicate the project in another place or to scale it up. Secondly, some grassroots innovators work from an oppositional identity, deliberately setting their initiative apart from mainstream practices. This constitutes a barrier for outreach to larger groups. Thirdly, adapting a grassroots innovation to the mainstream may produce conflicts between actors who want to retain the innovation in its original form and more pragmatic system builders who accept alterations for the sake of greater diffusion. In addition to that, the diffusion of grassroots innovations depends on policy support that allows for experimentation and learning. Finally, grassroots innovators need to take advantage of windows of opportunity attached to particular funding programmes and policy agendas. In other papers, further challenges related to the diffusion of grassroots innovation have been noted, such as misalignment with established regulations and standards (Seyfang 2010 p. 7631 on eco-housing), the need to continually recruit

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committed volunteers (ibid.) and resistance to the diffusion of grassroots innovations from incumbent actors (Hess 2014).

Implicit in the articulation of these different types of challenges is that the diffusion of grassroots innovations can take different forms. As Gill Seyfang (2009 p. 173-180) points out, pioneer initiatives may be reproduced elsewhere (replication), they may expand (scaling up) or an adapted version of the innovation may be integrated into mainstream practices and actor structures (uptake by incumbents).5 Indeed, all three of these forms of diffusion had a role to play in the diffusion of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany. As replication, scaling up and uptake by incumbents markedly differ from one another, I will divide this chapter into sections, each dealing with one of these forms of diffusion. Apart from these three forms of diffusion, I have also observed attempts to transfer citizen power plants to other countries or technology areas. This chapter therefore also includes a section on transfer as a fourth form of diffusion. A final section summarizes the results and compares different forms of diffusion with respect to central actors involved, variants of sociotechnical configurations produced and dominant strands of meanings and interpretations attached to citizen power plants.

Building on the theoretical framework introduced so far, I will analyse different forms of diffusion in terms of resource requirements and the ways in which resources are used and exchanged between actor groups. In this way the chapter will show how different forms of diffusion rest on utilizing, stabilizing, modifying and extending the resource base in different ways. As will become clear, this also involves an expansion and diversification of the set of actors involved, including established initiatives and new entrants, support actors, incumbent actors and policy actors. Furthermore, I will discuss adaptations to citizen power plants in terms of the five dimensions of sociotechnical configurations introduced in section 3.1 (technological hardware, ownership and return, management and operation, infrastructure and networking, and market relations). Such adaptations are especially salient in the cases of scaling up (section 7.2) and uptake by incumbents (section 7.4).

5 In fact Gill Seyfang (2009 p. 176-180) uses the term ‘translation’ rather than ‘uptake by incumbents’. Building on the approach of Strategic Niche Management (see section 3.2), she understands translation as processes by which sociotechnical configurations and practices in niche and regime inform each other, for example niche practices becoming incorporated into the mainstream. 86

7.1 Replication The first form of diffusion of citizen power plants that I will discuss is replication of existing initiatives. Of course, no project can be a perfect copy of an existing one. Indeed, some authors have argued that one of the key benefits of community energy projects is that they are tailored to local contexts (Hielscher 2011 p. 34/35) and have thus questioned the idea of promoting the replication of best practice models. Others have suggested that innovations undergo a process of local reinvention in which the innovation is adapted to the new context (Shove and Pantzar 2005). Nevertheless, scholars studying grassroots innovations have identified several cases where new initiatives form that emulate core features of existing ones (Seyfang 2010, Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012, Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013). I use the term replication here to refer to a process by which new initiatives develop projects whose sociotechnical configuration is largely identical to the projects of existing initiatives.

A number of challenges for the replication of grassroots innovations have been discussed in the literature. These include the adaptation of such an innovation to a new setting with differing actor constellations, previous experiences with similar technologies or general cultural, political and economic settings (Walker 2008 p. 4403, Seyfang 2010 p. 7631). Furthermore, Gill Seyfang (2009 p. 174/175), discussing the replication of time banking schemes in the UK, has pointed to the limits of replication of initiatives reliant on external funding due to the overall limit of available funds. Additional replication challenges identified by Tom Hargreaves and colleagues (Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013), specifically in relation to community energy, include difficulties related to shifting policy contexts and the lack of confidence of community groups.

Analyses of successful cases of replication of grassroots innovations tend to highlight the importance of disseminating and exchanging information and know-how. For the case of sustainable housing, Gill Seyfang notes that initiatives have published guides of best practice and sometimes also formed training teams to spread their approach to further places (2009 p. 174). According to Seyfang, this approach has proved successful for the process of replication (Seyfang 2009 p. 174, 2010 p. 7631). Michael Ornetzeder’s (2001) has analysed the diffusion of solar water heaters in Austria via self construction groups and comes to similar conclusion. Two amateur inventors initially set up a self construction group. The good experiences they made in this group spread via word of mouth. In order to pass on their experiences, evening lectures were held and leaders of individual construction groups started to meet once a month for further exchange. Later, a guide was produced and training seminars were organized (ibid. p. 108-109). The self-construction movement was eventually institutionalized with the formation of the Association for Renewable Energy. This

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association developed a diffusion strategy for solar water heaters based on introductory lectures, visits to installations and further activities that ensured that know-how was passed on (ibid. p. 110-111).

The following two subsections explore how replication took place in the case of citizen wind farms in particular regions in Austria and Germany (section 7.1.1) and in the case of renewable energy cooperatives (mostly PV cooperatives) in Germany (section 7.1.2).6 As will become clear, my cases confirm that the spreading of information and know-how was and still is crucial for the process of replication, also in the case of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany. In addition to that, my analysis of replication processes will turn attention to different ways in which the spreading of such knowledge resources occurred and to different types of actors involved in this process. Furthermore, I will discuss the relevance of other resource types for the replication process.

7.1.1 The replication of citizen wind farms in Austria and Germany

In this section I will briefly look at one Austrian and one German region where citizen wind farms spread mainly through a process of replication: the federal state of Upper Austria in Austria and the district of North Frisia in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany.

Upper Austria In the federal state of Upper Austria a total installed wind power capacity of 41.4 MW is distributed across eleven wind farms. All but one of these wind farms went into operation in the years 1996 - 2005, while the eleventh wind farm went into operation in 2014. To be sure, this does not make Upper Austria a major wind power region in Austria, as these wind farms only account for around 2% of total installed wind power capacity (IG Windkraft 2014). Nevertheless it is an interesting region in terms of citizen wind farms, as all the wind farms in Upper Austria are locally or regionally owned. The ten wind farms that went into operation from 1996 – 2005 are all owned by local or regional groups of citizens, while the more recently installed wind farm is majority-owned by the municipality and minority-owned by a regional company (Sonnenzeitung 2013).

As has already been noted in chapter 6, the first citizen wind farm initiatives in Austria initially lacked know-how in a variety of fields and had to develop technical, organizational and legal expertise as they went along. In Upper Austria, replication of citizen wind farms

6 Seeing one of these forms of citizen power plants is primarily defined by its technological basis (wind power) and the other by its specific legal form (a cooperative), these are in principle overlapping categories. However, most citizen wind farms are organized as a limited partnership and most renewable energy cooperatives are, at least initially, active in the area of PV. I have therefore chosen to pick up on the discursively widely used terms ‘citizen wind farm’ and ‘renewable energy cooperative’ to organize my analysis. 88

was supported by the largely informal exchange that took place between initiatives that had already set up citizen wind farms and newly emerging initiatives. In particular know-how exchange included site visits, invited talks, regular regional meetings and external experts (e.g. tax adviser) working for more than one initiative [14:9, 14:29, 14:37,14:57, 17:30, 17:60, 17:62].

As an example one can look at the citizen wind farm Schenkenfelden. It went into operation in 1998 as the third citizen wind farm in Upper Austria. As such it both benefitted from learning from the two earlier initiatives that had developed locally owned wind farms and later also passed on the experiences they had made to further initiatives. Learning mainly occurred via site visits and informal exchange with people engaged in citizen wind farm projects that were already in place [Schenkendfelden:29]. They learnt that the two other citizen wind farms in the region had used the legal form of a limited liability company, which reassured them that this would be the best way to go forward with their project. Furthermore, they benefitted from the fact that the tax advisor they consulted had already worked for one of the previous citizen wind farm projects in the region. For example, he was able to settle their concerns that they may not be able to find enough people who would be interested to invest money in the project [Schenkenfelden:9]. They later passed on their experiences to initiators of another similar project in the region [Schenkendfelden:37]. Up to this day, the Schenkenfelden group is still in touch with similar groups operating citizen wind farms in the region, and they meet once a year for exchanging experiences [Schenkenfelden:57]. In other words, the group could draw on an informal regional network as a social-organizational resource for sharing knowledge resources.

This exchange of experiences between different initiatives rests on a non-competitive approach towards developing wind farms in the region [Schenkenfelden:36, 17:38].

We are a company and of course we are profit-oriented, no question of that, but I still see it as a hobby and as bit of philosophy of life. Every wind turbine or every alternative energy [plant] that is set up is a personal gain for me, no matter if it is set up by our company or another one. [14:36] While the environmental benefit of the first the citizen wind farms set up in this region was understood as the development of an alternative to nuclear power, later projects were more strongly interpreted as a contribution to climate change mitigation [17:16, 17:39].

Nevertheless, the replication of citizen wind farms in Upper Austria remained limited and did not result in large-scale take-off. On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that wind speeds are moderate in Upper Austria. Climatic conditions are better in other parts of Austria, in particular in Lower Austria and Burgenland. On the other hand, following a

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change of staffing, the regional government of Upper Austria turned against wind power around 2003 [21:42]. Seeing the regional government needs to approve the designation of areas for wind power use by the municipality, it can overturn local plans for wind power development with reference to the need for nature and landscape protection [14:53, 17:31, 17:33, 17:58, 21:7, 21:38]. This means replication was constrained due to a lack of natural and structural resources.

Finally, a more general barrier to the replication of citizen wind farms, not only in Upper Austria, must be taken into account. This concerns the increase of turbine sizes in the wind power sector and stricter regulations concerning the planning and permit procedure. This implies that much larger sums are necessary early on to pay for expert opinions, securing grid access and purchasing turbines. Thus, planning and managing a wind farm has become a considerable challenge for bottom-up community groups. Small citizen wind farm initiatives, however, lack the social-organizational and material resources to deal with this increasingly intricate and costly planning process of wind farm development. Indeed, replication of citizen wind farms has largely come to a halt in Austria since 2005, not least because small, non-professional initiatives cannot meet the rising resource requirements of wind power development. However, as I will describe in section 7.2.2, some citizen wind farm initiatives in Lower Austria have dealt with this problem by scaling up and professionalizing their activities. [10:59, 15:61, 16:24, 16:33, 17:35]

North Frisia North Frisia is a district of the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany in the northwestern-most part of Germany, at the border to Denmark and along the coast of the North Sea. With over 810 MW of installed wind power capacity and 165.000 inhabitants, the district of North Frisia has a very high per capita wind power capacity. What is more, 90% of wind farms in this district are owned by local citizen groups (windcomm 2010; [8:8, 9:7, 9:29]), typically organized ad a limited partnership (GmbH & Co KG). The citizen wind farm Lübke Koog I discussed in section 6.2.2 was the first locally owned wind farm that was set up in this region and wind farms continue to be developed in a similar form to this day.

Starting from the citizen wind farm Lübke-Koog that went into operation in 1992, the model spread rapidly through site visits, lectures and word of mouth [4:2, 8:8, 9:30]. Like in Upper Austria, replication depended on informal regional networks as a social organizational resource, which in turn served to share knowledge resources.

A lot of people had a look at this and even more asked us if possibly we were prepared to come to their village and simply to explain to the local council or to the citizens how we have done it, how we have organized it. (…) Indeed, this was something that we

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presented here in North Frisia in our district in many places and that surprisingly was picked up by extremely many imitators. [Lübke-Koog:8] The replication of citizen wind farms was further enhanced by long-term stable policy support at the national level (structural resources). The Electricity Feed-in Law introduced in 1990 guaranteed grid access and remuneration via feed-in tariffs and thereby provided the security of investment that was particularly important for citizen groups. The Renewable Energy Act that replaced the Electricity Feed-in Law in 2000 constituted a similarly favourable policy framework. [8:35, 9:31, 4:31]

The Renewable Energy Act ultimately included a certain guarantee. Not for the electricity yield, but for the purchase as such. I claim that without the Renewable Energy Act we certainly would not have this number of wind farms in the hands of citizens or in the hands of medium-sized companies, instead it would have landed somewhere with those that have other capital funds at their disposal.[8: 35] Furthermore, in North Frisia municipalities quickly realised that they could profit from citizen wind farms, as the business tax remains with the municipality if a wind farm is locally owned. Seeing the municipalities are co-responsible with regional governance levels for designating areas as suitable for wind power, they have considerable power to push for local ownership models. In North Frisia it therefore has become common practice that municipalities sign an agreement with land owners before designating land as suitable for wind power. In this agreement land owners commit themselves not to lease the land to an outside investor for wind farm development [9:6].

In a similar way to Austria, the administrative, financial and technical requirements for developing a wind farm have increased since the first citizen wind farms were set up. This, however, could be counterbalanced in North Frisia by making the expertise that had developed in the region available to new initiatives. This has involved a shift beyond informal exchange and word of mouth towards systematic provision of counselling and management services. Some individuals from early citizen wind farm projects turned the planning and management of citizen wind farms into their main profession and act as regional service providers [8:27, 9:18].

The demands certainly have increased. (…) There are service providers, like us and we are available to such initiatives with the entire know-how from setting up the company through to permits, financing and above all the rules of communication, of cooperation (…). [8:27] The availability of such regional planning agencies specialized in citizen wind farms compensates for the limited social-organizational resources that individual local initiatives can bring to a project. Thereby local ownership patterns can be retained in spite of pressures towards professionalization of planning and management.

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However, while citizen wind farms spread rapidly in North Frisia through word of mouth, the model hardly travelled beyond the boundaries of this district. More recently, the wind power energy agency windcomm of the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein has started to support further replication in other parts of the state by publishing and distributing a handbook on citizen wind farm development [windcomm:30]. This handbook covers feed- in tariff regulation, planning law, company law, an overview of the planning and building procedure, financing models and an introduction to the operational management of wind farms. Furthermore, it also includes an overview of the successful development of citizen wind farms in North Frisia (windcomm 2010). These handbooks were strategically distributed to municipalities that had recently applied to the regional government for the designation of new areas for wind power [windcomm:5]. By early 2012, around 3500 copies of the handbook had been distributed, mostly within Schleswig-Holstein [windcomm:30]. Furthermore, windcomm also organizes events at which the citizen wind farm model is presented to land owners and representatives of municipalities [windcomm:13].

In contrast to exchange in regional networks, this constitutes a systematic and actively coordinated attempt to spread knowledge resources and thereby to push replication. Crucially, this systematic attempt to replicate citizen wind farms beyond the region of North Frisia rests on a new interpretation of the rationale of citizen wind farms: an interpretation of local citizen ownership of wind farms as a means to deal with local opposition to wind farms. As a representative of the energy agency that published the guideline for citizen wind farms explains,

In North Frisia (…) 90% of wind farms are organized as citizen wind farms. So nine out of ten. If you just cross the [river] Eider, and that is the border to Dithmarschen, then only 15% [are citizen wind farms]. And we also noticed a difference in the acceptance among the population. In North Frisia it is very high and in Dithmarschen there is a much higher percentage of resistance. Then we (…) had the idea, why don’t we write down all our experiences in North Frisia with citizen wind farms and see to it that other people can read that as well. [windcomm:3] This reinterpretation of citizen wind farms as a way to increase acceptance for wind power has gained prominence over the last years in Germany, in line with rising opposition to wind farms (Bernhardt 2013 p. 23/24). Acknowledging that local opposition to wind farms questions who bears the burden and who reaps the benefits of wind farm development, project developers and policy makers alike are now looking towards local ownership or co- ownership as a way to reduce such conflicts [1:44, 2:7, 2:17, 4:28, 4:29, 8:19, 9: 8, 9:12, 9:28]. Apart from constituting a reframing of the value of citizen wind farms, this also entails a remarkable shift in actor constellations. While originally citizen wind farms were

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developed by bottom-up actors proactively pursuing their project, now meso-level actors attempt to activate local communities to set up locally owned wind farms.

In the next subsection I will turn to the case of citizen power plants organized as cooperatives that have experienced a veritable boom in Germany since around 2006 (see section 2.1) and have been especially active in the area of PV.

7.1.2 The replication of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany

While citizen wind farms started to spread in Germany in the 1990s, there were only very few collectively owned PV plants set up during these years. The Electricity Feed-in Law did, in theory, also apply to PV, but the tariff – set at a uniform rate across all technology areas – was not high enough to make the operation of PV plants financially viable (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 264). Investment subsidies for small-scale PV plants were, however, available via the ‘1000-roofs-programme’, stimulating early diffusion of PV panels at the level of individual households (see section 4.1). The situation changed in the year 2000 when the Electricity Feed-in Law was replaced by the Renewable Energy Act. This new feed-in tariff system provided an attractive feed-in tariff for photovoltaics. While individual households, farmers and small to medium-sized businesses continue to dominate the diffusion of PV plants, larger-scale, collectively owned citizen plants also started to spread (trend:research and Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 2013 p. 44).

In the beginning, such collectively owned PV plants were typically set up as private partnerships (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts, see Rutschmann 2009 p. 78). Recent years have seen a marked trend towards PV cooperatives (Holstenkamp and Müller 2013 p. 5/6, Debor 2014 p. 8). In fact, since around 2006 renewable energy cooperatives have been on the rise more generally and some cooperatives engage with other technologies other than PV. In the following I will therefore use the term ‘renewable energy cooperatives’ although in fact around 75% of these cooperatives are exclusively active in the field of PV (Volz 2011). By the end of 2012 there were more than 750 energy cooperatives registered in Germany, out of which around 670 had been set up between 2006 and 2012 (Holstenkamp and Müller 2013 p. 5/6, Debor 2014 p. 8). Most of these new cooperatives generate energy from renewable sources. The largest number of energy cooperatives, both in absolute terms and per capita, are located in the two Southern federal states Bavaria and Baden- Württemberg and in the federal state of Lower Saxony in the North-West of Germany (Holstenkamp and Müller 2013 p. 8).

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Favourable legislation As with citizen wind farms in North Frisia, one important factor supporting the rise in renewable energy cooperatives is the longstanding and relatively stable policy support (structural resources). Feed-in regulation provided by the Renewable Energy Act provides a stable and supportive framework for citizen groups to develop PV plants and other collectively owned renewable energy installations. On top of this, some framework conditions are particularly favourable for developing citizen power plants in the form of a cooperative. Two factors give it a comparative advantage over other legal forms. First, cooperatives are exempt from the prospectus requirement that applies to other forms of collectively owned renewable energy plants since 2005 (Holstenkamp and Ulbrich 2010 p. 10; [1:40, 3:7, 3:8; 3:47]). According to the prospectus requirement, advertising the possibility to financially participate in a citizen power plant constitutes an investment offer. Therefore, it requires the publication of a prospectus that provides details on the financial risks involved and complies with the terms set out by the financial supervisory authority. Secondly, compared to private partnerships, cooperatives are much better suited for setting up more than one jointly owned plant, as additional members can easily join at a later stage (Rutschmann 2009 p. 79; [1:40, 3:8, 7:48]).

In addition to that, some changes made to the cooperative law in 2006 made it easier to set up and run small cooperatives. In particular, the amendment reduced the number of people necessary to set up a cooperative and reduced audits for small cooperatives [1:40, 7:33]. Furthermore, discussions leading up to the amendment brought the issue of cooperatives on the agenda and made people aware of the potentials of this form of organization [3:55]. In the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, setting up renewable energy cooperatives has been further facilitated by a support package for new cooperatives offered by the regional government in cooperation with the regional cooperative auditing association in 2010. As part of their economic policy, the regional government funds 50% of the costs for setting up a cooperative and the cooperative auditing association reduces auditing costs during the first three years (Betz 2009, Schorr 2010; 5:10).

Understandings of renewable energy cooperatives Apart from policy support, the replication of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany has also benefitted from various interpretations that have made them meaningful and desirable (symbolic resources). To begin with, some of the interpretations developed by the anti- nuclear movement in the 1970s and 1980s have continued to play a role. In particular, this pertains to the understanding of citizen power plants as a counter model to large utility- owned nuclear power plants (see section 6.2). However, two slight modifications to this

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understanding are observable. For one thing, by the end of the 1990s a series of mergers of utility companies had resulted in increased market concentration with four large utilities dominating the electricity market (see section 4.1). This has given further salience specifically to the issue of centralized vs. decentralized ownership structures. Secondly, aside from the controversy over nuclear power, concerns over climate change have risen to prominence. Citizen power plants, including renewable energy cooperatives, are therefore increasingly also interpreted as a contribution to climate change mitigation. Taken together, a significant group of people has adopted an understanding of renewable energy cooperatives as a form of climate-friendly electricity generation in decentralized economic units – as opposed to large utility ownership of nuclear and fossil fuel powered plants (Holstenkamp and Ulbrich 2010 p. 10, Strunz 2014 p. 154; [2:7, 2:46, 2:48, 3:3, 7:18]).

Well, the first priority is climate protection. (…) That can happen in multifaceted ways. For me it is not renewable energies that are at the fore (…). There are wonderful technologies. Wind, PV, biomass in the broadest sense, also biogas if it’s suitable. And the core question is, if somebody says, how do we solve these problems, then the answer is not the technology, rather the answer is the structure. This [cooperative] structure fits well with the decentralized approach of renewable energies. [7:18] The understanding of renewable energy cooperatives as a counter-model to established economic structures is strengthened further by the fact that cooperatives allow for internal democratic decision-making structures. Cooperatives typically adhere to the principle of ‘one person, one vote’, and surveys show that this principle is highly valued among members of renewable energy cooperatives (Reiner 2011 p. 30, Volz 2011 p. 297).

Another understanding of renewable energy cooperatives that has made them meaningful to a broad range of people is related to the 2008 global financial crisis. Under the impression of plunging stock-market prices and discussions over the destabilizing effects of deregulated global financial markets, several people have started to look towards cooperatives as an attractive alternative form of economic activity. While some people feel attracted by the principles of regional value creation, democracy and solidarity, others simply look towards renewable energy cooperatives as a more secure form of placing their savings (Holstenkamp and Ulbrich 2010 p. 10; [1:30, 6:19, 7:32, 7:34]).

Well, right now cooperatives are springing up like mushrooms. And that surely has to do with things like the financial crisis and so on, that people say, I no longer want to anonymously invest my money somewhere, I want to know what happens with it and have a say in it. [1:30] The financial crisis [had an impact] to the effect that, two years ago [i.e. in 2009] we had a few cooperatives where that was a vigorous issue during the founding process. Where people said, yes, this is my savings account, better to have 2% return and to really get that than the promised 10% and then everything is down the drain. [6:19]

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However, energy cooperatives do not only have positive connotations. As Özgür Yildiz (2014 p. 7) notes, there are some regions in Eastern Germany where hardly any energy cooperatives have been set up. He points out that in these region cooperatives are likely to be associated with the experience of forced collectivization under the former socialist regime. According to Yildiz, this interpretation of cooperatives, together with lower levels of disposable income, may explain that renewable energy cooperatives are largely absent in these regions.

Support organizations Finally, another factor explaining widespread replication of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany is that specialized support for setting up and running such projects has become available. Over the last few years, a remarkably broad array of organizations has developed support services directed specifically at such cooperatives. In several cases, these organizations were set up with the specific goal to support renewable energy cooperatives, in other cases existing organizations in the cooperatives sector such as cooperative auditing associations developed specific support programmes for the energy sector. These support organizations mainly focus on the systematic spreading of information and know-how in order to enable individuals to set up and run energy cooperatives. In this way, support organizations provide the social-organizational infrastructure for spreading knowledge resources.

As in the case of citizen wind farms, one form of spreading knowledge resources is the distribution of handbooks and guidelines that provide information on how to set up and run energy cooperatives and point to successful examples. Quite remarkably, a broad range of different actors, both individuals and organizations, have been involved in developing such supportive material. A first booklet on renewable energy cooperatives was published collaboratively by the Agency for Renewable Energy (Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien e.V.) and the German Cooperative and Raiffeisen Federation (Deutscher Genossenschafts- und Raiffeisenverband, DGRV), a cooperative auditing association, in 2011 (DGRV and AEE 2011). In the same year, two books with detailed accounts of the development and management of renewable energy cooperatives were published by individual experts (George and Berg 2011, Staab 2011). Another cooperative auditing association, the Cooperative Union of Bavaria (Genossenschaftsverband Bayern) put forward a handbook for setting up renewable energy cooperatives in 2012 (Genossenschaftsverband Bayern 2012). More recently, the Ministry of Economics, Climate Protection, Energy and Regional Planning of the federal state of Rhineland-Palatinate also published a handbook for setting up a renewable energy cooperative (Rheinland-Pfalz 2013).

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Thus, the spectrum of actors supporting the development of renewable energy cooperatives through handbooks and guidelines ranges from organizations promoting renewable energy technologies and cooperative auditing associations to regional governments.

Another approach to spreading knowledge resources is training and counselling people for developing renewable energy cooperatives. This approach has the advantage that it can go beyond the provision of explicit, codifiable knowledge and also allows to share implicit forms of knowledge. Innova, an organization supporting the establishment of cooperatives in various sectors, together with the German Protestant Association for Further Education (Deutsche Evangelische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Erwachsenenbildung) has set up a specialized course, training people to become project developers of renewable energy cooperatives. Since its beginning in 2010, there have been seven instances of the training course, in which around 160 people have participated in total. The courses involve several days of training and additional online learning schemes for about 25 participants each. To date, 35 renewable energy cooperatives have been set up by people who had previously participated in the course (Netzwerk Energiewende Jetzt 2015). Further training courses directed primarily at municipal actors (mayors, employees of public institutions) are offered by the University of Applied Sciences Middle Hesse (Technische Hochschule Mittelhessen 2013).

A related form of spreading knowledge resources consists of providing ready-made concepts and templates that assist in setting up an energy cooperative. Agrokraft, a spin-off of the Bavarian Farmers’ Association (Bayerischer Bauernverband), has developed a package that, together with a half-day workshop, enables citizen groups to start-off an energy cooperative in their village. The package which is sold for 5,000 € consists of templates for various legal documents such as cooperative statutes and loan agreements, templates for information newsletters, the right to use predesigned graphic elements (e.g. for letter paper), a predesigned website and software to manage the cooperative [Agrokraft:48]. The cooperative auditing association Weser Ems (Genossenschaftsverband Weser-Ems) in the federal state of Lower Saxony provides a similar package (Holstenkamp and Ulbrich 2010 p. 11).

Data on the regional distribution of energy cooperatives in Germany substantiate the claim that training courses and support packages leads to wide replication of renewable energy cooperatives. As Lars Holstenkamp and Jakob R. Müller (2013 p. 8-12) point out, regional clusters of energy cooperatives can be identified in places where support services are offered. For example, in the federal state of Lower Saxony, half of the energy cooperatives are

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located in the district Weser-Ems, where the local cooperative auditing association promotes a support package for setting up an energy cooperative.

Finally, two organizations have been set up in recent years to support networking and exchange between energy cooperatives. These platforms are intended to facilitate peer-to- peer exchange between representatives of renewable energy cooperatives. At the national level, the ARGE Energiegenossenschaften (Working Group of Energy Cooperatives) formed in 2010, mainly for facilitating networking, exchange and mutual empowerment [ARGE:1, ARGE:5]. At the regional level, the Association of Energy Cooperatives in Baden Württemberg (Verband der BürgerEnergiegenossenschaften Baden-Württemberg, VBEBW) was established in 2009. This association aims to serve as a platform for exchange, for developing joint projects (e.g. larger installations such as wind farms) and for organizing further training. Furthermore, the association cooperates with the utility company EnBW, one of the four major utility companies in Germany. In particular, EnBW provides counselling services and some financial support for initiatives to set up local energy cooperatives [VBEBW:1, VBEBW:3].

Other support actors in the area of renewable energy cooperatives, however, are critical of the collaboration with EnBW. They see it primarily as an image campaign designed to commit mayors to the utility company, and question whether the resulting cooperatives will survive in the long term [1:8, 1:10, 3:27, 7:28]. Quite obviously, dependence on a large utility company is at odds with widespread understandings of renewable energy cooperatives as the counter-model to centralized ownership structures. For many renewable energy enthusiasts the major utility companies, with their large-scale technology approach and their long-term commitment to nuclear power and fossil fuels, epitomize what they have always resented. In other words, for several actors the symbolic resources attached to renewable energy cooperatives conflict with the use of material, social-organizational and knowledge resources provided by a major utility company.

Two interviewees raised similar concerns in relation to banks from the cooperative sector that have started to support the development of renewable energy cooperatives. They draw a line between civil society-based energy cooperatives and energy cooperatives that are set up by banks (see also section 9.3 where the issue of drawing boundaries between different forms of citizen power plants will be discussed in greater detail). Energy cooperatives set up by banks tend to adopt a more profit-oriented approach [3:36, 7:51]. The critics argue that too much control is placed in the hands of the bank and that the cooperative mainly serves the commercial interest of the bank.

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They set up a cooperative, the bank’s chairman at the same time acts as chairman of the supervisory board of the energy cooperative or as the chairman of the cooperative and then the indoor-business gets going. In other words, we plan a project and the financing is handled by our bank and insurance. Well, that is the completely wrong strategy. [7:51] Thus, while the involvement of incumbent actors such as banks and utilities provides initiatives with access to additional material resources, knowledge resources and social- organizational resources, it also creates new dependency relations (see also section 8.3 where the issue of dependency relations will be discussed in greater detail).

7.1.3 Discussion

This section has presented three replication processes in the area of citizen power plants, two concerning citizen wind farms (one Austrian region, one German one) and one concerning renewable energy cooperatives throughout Germany. I have explored these cases in order to understand how replication of citizen power plants could succeed and what challenges it confronted. In line with previous analyses (Ornetzeder 2001, Seyfang 2009, 2010), my cases show that the spreading of knowledge resources was a decisive factor for replication to succeed. This also requires the availability of appropriate social-organizational resources (regional networks, support organizations) as an infrastructure for collecting and sharing knowledge. Furthermore, replication has worked particularly well where initiatives could rely on stable and favourable policy support (structural resources). Finally, the cases also show that replication has often benefitted from flexibility in the symbolic resources attached to citizen power plants. In other words, the interpretative flexibility of citizen power plants has worked to their advantage for replication. In the following I will discuss each of these issues in turn. I conclude with some additional comments on shifting actor constellations and dependency relations.

Stable and favourable policy support The cases presented here highlight the importance of a stable and favourable legislative framework for the successful and widespread replication of citizen power plants. In Upper Austria, the replication of citizen wind farms progressed moderately, but came to a halt when the regional government withdrew political support for wind power and denied approval of further sites for wind farm development. In North Frisia, however, replication of wind farms benefitted both from long-standing favourable feed-in tariff support at the national level and from municipalities actively supporting the development of citizen wind farms. Not only did municipalities approve of dedicating land to wind power development – several municipalities also obliged farmers to use this land only for locally owned projects. Also, in the case of PV the Renewable Energy Act provided attractive feed-in tariffs from the year 99

2000 onwards. To this one may add improvements that were made to the cooperative law that made it easier and more attractive to set up renewable energy cooperatives and the exemption of cooperatives from the prospectus requirement.

Spreading knowledge resources As noted above, the cases of replication I have explored highlight the importance of spreading knowledge resources for the process of replication. Two broad types of spreading knowledge resources can be identified: On the one hand informal know-how exchange via personal contacts and site visits, and on the other hand more systematic forms of spreading knowledge coordinated by support actors and formalised networks. The first type is related to a gradual process of one-by-one replication, by which each new initiative gathers and pieces together knowledge from existing projects. It builds on largely informal regional networks as the social infrastructure (social-organizational resources) to organize knowledge exchange.

The second type of spreading knowledge resources has the potential to speed up the process by developing channels for systematically spreading knowledge resources to large numbers of interested groups. Here specialized support actors act as a social-organizational resource as they systematically aggregate lessons learnt by several initiatives and make them available to new audiences (cf. Geels and Deuten 2006, Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013). This kind of knowledge transfer can support a kind of mass replication, as currently experienced in the area of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany. Especially in the case of renewable energy cooperatives, a very broad range of actors is striving to push for replication in this way. The approaches for making knowledge resources available to new initiatives also vary widely, from the provision of handbooks to specialized training courses with face-to-face interaction in small groups.

However, the replication of citizen power plants does not depend on the spreading of knowledge resources alone. Simple knowledge-to-action models have been heavily criticised, not least in the context of energy related practices (Owens and Driffill 2008). For one thing, it is conducive to replication if the provision of codifiable, explicit knowledge is accompanied by an exchange of implicit forms of knowledge via face-to-face contacts. Knowledge exchange via informal regional networks appear highly valuable in this respect, as do workshops and training courses offered by support organizations and platforms that facilitate peer-to peer exchange. Furthermore, for replication to succeed, setting up a citizen power plant also needs to be meaningful to people to engage in such a demanding task at all. I will turn to this issue next.

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Interpretative flexibility In chapter 6 I showed that the first citizen power plants in the late 1980s and early 1990s were often understood as the antithesis to nuclear power – both in terms of environmental and health-related impacts, and in terms of centralized vs. decentralized ownership and decision-making structures. Especially in Germany the harsh and long-lasting conflict over nuclear power has kept this issue alive on the long term. However, emphases have shifted and new symbolic resources have been added to this over time. In particular, following privatisation and market concentration in the German electricity sector in the 1990s, the understanding of citizen power plants as a way to counteract market concentration in the electricity sector gained further salience. Around the same time, public awareness both in Germany and in Austria increasingly turned to the issue of climate change. Citizen power plants were subsequently also interpreted as a contribution towards climate change mitigation. Furthermore, in view of the 2008 global financial crisis, renewable energy cooperatives have been positioned both as a financially more stable and socially more desirable form of investing one’s own savings, as compared to other forms of investments offered by banks.

Replication was thus also enabled by the ability to link up citizen power plants with newly emerging public concerns such as climate change and the global financial crisis. Flexibly reinterpreting the value of citizen power plants has kept new initiatives forming and has allowed attracting new audiences. Indeed, Adrian Smith (2007) has pointed to a similar phenomenon in relation to organic food, where grassroots activists variably pointed to its benefits in terms of pesticide avoidance, biodiversity, reduction of food miles or avoiding risks associated with genetically modified food. He notes that “[a]s public agendas shifted, so organic activists exploited this by campaigning to imbue their niche with new positive meanings. Each shift tested the interpretative and practical flexibility of the niche, and sought wider actor enrolment” (ibid. p. 441/442).

Apart from interpretations of citizen power plants that make them meaningful and desirable to bottom-up initiatives, policy actors and commercial project developers have also taken an interest in citizen ownership or co-ownership of renewable energy plants. Especially in the area of wind power co-ownership of local citizens is regarded as a means to reduce local siting conflicts. In addition to that, municipalities interested in profiting from the business tax they receive in the case of local ownership are another case in point. In the case of renewable energy cooperatives, cooperative auditing associations striving to expand their member base have turned towards renewable energy as a sector where they provide targeted support. Furthermore, cooperative banks have turned towards energy cooperatives as a new

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business area, and even one of Germany’s major utility companies started to support renewable energy cooperatives.

Shifting actor constellations and dependency relations Especially in the area of renewable energy cooperatives, the fact that more established and in many respects more resourceful actors have found an interest in citizen power plants has allowed bottom-up initiatives access to additional resources. This, for example, includes counselling services and financial support provided by the utility EnBW or building on the social-organizational resources of banks for setting up a renewable energy cooperative. Making use of resources of these established actors has, however, also proved contentious. Especially support provided by the utility company EnBW is eyed with suspicion by several promoters of energy cooperatives. Drawing on the resources they provide brings up the question whether dependence on these resources places too much power in their hands. This is one reason why I will take a closer look at issues of power and empowerment related to the diffusion of citizen power plants in chapter 8.

Apart from the issue of power, the development of a support infrastructure for the development of citizen power plants also entails another subtle shift in the relationship between bottom-up initiatives and more institutionalized actors. Increasingly, support actors are not only providing support to initiatives that come to them for help, but actively push for replication. The publication of the handbook for the development of citizen wind farms by windcomm and the strategic dissemination in municipalities that had recently allocated additional land to wind power development is a case in point. Most other forms of support, including publications, training courses and ready-made concepts, can be similarly understood as targeted impulses for replication. Thus citizen power plants are no longer only developed as a result of bottom-up groups pushing to make space for their project, but also by more established support actors pulling groups into the space that has become available

The space that has become available, however, is also changing in a way that actually requires dedicated support from external actors. Especially in the field of wind power, the requirements of the planning process have strongly increased, making it difficult to handle for bottom-up initiatives that lack professional staff. Indeed, in Austria the pressure towards professionalization is one factor that has hampered the further replication of local, non- professional initiatives setting up collectively owned wind farms. The case of North Frisia, however, shows that such obstacles can be dealt with by specialized support. In this particular case, some individuals who were involved in early citizen wind farm projects have turned their engagement with renewable energy technologies into their full-time profession and offer project planning and management services to new citizen wind farm initiatives.

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7.2 Scaling up

In the previous section I dealt with replication as one form of the diffusion of citizen power plants and found that spreading knowledge resources, stable and favourable policy support and a certain degree of interpretative flexibility were critical to this form of diffusion. In this section I will turn to another way in which citizen power plants have spread further, the scaling up of existing initiatives. I thereby build on Gill Seyfang’s work (2009 p. 173-180), who identified scaling up of individual initiatives as an alternative to replication. In fact, Seyfang picks up on terminology already used within the framework of strategic niche management, but with a subtle shift in its meaning. Within strategic niche management scaling up refers to any form of expansion of niche activity, including, for example, also the replication of successful projects (Kemp, Schot et al. 1998 p. 187/188). By contrast, Seyfang (2009) uses the term specifically to refer to the expansion of individual initiatives. It is this narrower sense of the term that I will also adopt here.

Grassroots innovation initiatives can scale up in different ways. The process usually involves an extension of the volume or scope of their activities. This can also involve an expansion of the member base of the initiative or an expansion of the geographic scope of its activities. For the specific case of citizen power plants I understand scaling up as the process by which an initiative develops further renewable energy plants or extends existing ones. In many cases this goes along with the recruitment of additional participants. It may or may not involve an expansion of the geographical scope of activities beyond the local or regional scale. Indeed, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, the scaling up of citizen power plant initiatives ranges from initiatives setting up a second local project to initiatives transforming into medium-sized companies and expanding their range of activities right up to the international level.

I have thereby defined scaling up only in terms of quantitative changes (more projects, more participants, etc.). However, one point I will make in this section is that scaling up to a considerable extent also goes along with significant qualitative changes in the sociotechnical configuration involved. Indeed, Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 596) have already noted that grassroots innovations are often specifically designed to be small-scale and are tailored to local needs and requirements. For scaling up they therefore need to be reinterpreted and adapted, which may constitute a serious challenge for this form of diffusion (ibid.). A second challenge that has been identified in relation to the scaling up of grassroots innovations concerns difficulties to attract participants beyond the group of committed environmentalists. This has been found both in relation to case studies on

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transition town initiatives and in relation to complementary currencies (Seyfang 2009 p. 175/176, Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012 p. 389).

However, despite some references to the challenges of scaling up grassroots innovations, there are hardly any in-depth case studies of such processes. One exception is Bernhard Truffer’s (Truffer 2003) analysis of the development of car sharing in Switzerland. Truffer traces the growth and eventual merger of two car sharing cooperatives in the 1980s and 1990s. This merger proved difficult, not least because one of the cooperatives felt committed to a decentralized approach and gradual organic growth, while the second cooperative pursued a more business-oriented approach and pursued a strategy of active and centrally coordinated expansion (ibid. p. 149). The case thereby points to different approaches that may be adopted towards scaling up and to the tensions that may arise between actors with diverging commitments.

This section specifically focuses on the scaling up of citizen wind farms. In my empirical data I have found the process of scaling up to be most pronounced in this technology area. Scaling up is also particularly interesting in the case of wind power, because the growth of initiatives also went along with a scaling up of the technical hardware involved. The first subsection covers initiatives that only scaled up within narrow limits, using examples from Germany and Austria. The second subsection specifically turns to the case of three initiatives in Lower Austria that formed in the 1990s. These initiatives have grown into medium-sized companies and still continue to expand. The analysis aims to explore how initiatives managed to scale up and what challenges they confronted. Furthermore I will also pay attention to changes in the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants that went along with this form of diffusion, especially in the case of continued scaling up.

7.2.1 Limited scaling up

The following exploration of citizen wind farms that scaled up to a limited extent is based both on secondary data and on my own empirical material. The first part of this subsection reviews the account Andreas Byzio and colleagues (2002) give of the scaling up of citizen wind farm initiatives rooted in the anti-nuclear movement. In the second part I complement this with cases from North Frisia and Upper Austria based on my interview data.

German wind farm initiatives rooted in the anti-nuclear movement (Hamburg and Lower Saxony) First of all, let me briefly review what Andreas Byzio and colleagues (2002) have written about the scaling up of citizen wind farms in Germany over the course of the 1990s. Their focus is mainly on the strand of citizen wind farms that emerged from the German anti-

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nuclear movement in the 1980s and early 1990s in Hamburg and the federal state of Lower Saxony. In particular, the set of initiatives they study includes the case of UWW that I have already reviewed in section 6.2.2. Most of these initiatives just aimed to install a single wind turbine and thereby wanted to demonstrate that wind power is a viable alternative to nuclear power. However, as Byzio and colleagues note, all six initiatives in their sample eventually went beyond the development of a single wind turbine (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 328).7 Five of them set up between two and five turbines and one scaled up to a medium-sized company.

Byzio and colleagues (2002 p. 328) name three main reasons why the initiatives engaged in follow-up projects after they had achieved their initial goal of installing a single turbine. First of all, their efforts to raise money (material resources) for the first turbine turned out to be surprisingly successful and encouraged them to go further. Secondly, during the process of developing their first wind turbine project, each initiative had gathered considerable know-how which they felt would be wasted if they did not put it to further projects (knowledge resources). Finally, technology development in wind power was progressing, making larger and more cost efficient turbines available to the initiatives. It therefore appeared both ecologically and economically reasonable to them to develop additional and larger projects.

Why, then, did most initiatives only expand to a moderate extent? What was different in the case of the single initiative that scaled up much further? According to Byzio and colleagues (2002 p. 337-340), a crucial factor concerns the way the initiatives positioned themselves towards the issue of professionalization. Scaling up went along with strong pressures towards abandoning the principle of voluntary labour and relying on paid staff instead. For one thing, planning and managing the operation of wind turbines is a time consuming task and it tended to be concentrated on a few individuals within the initiative. Setting up additional turbines of course also meant a further increase of this workload. Furthermore, as the sums that went into individual projects increased, it also appeared somewhat irresponsible to have them handled by volunteers (ibid.).

Nevertheless, most initiatives were reluctant to give up on their reliance on voluntary work. Centrally involved individuals often were not prepared to give up on their existing jobs and they feared loss of control if they were to employ professionals from outside of the initiative. Furthermore, the financial means of early wind farm initiatives were limited. Finally, for some individuals a commitment to the principle of egalitarianism and grassroots democracy

7 In fact they studied seven initiatives, but I am leaving aside one of them because this one was set up as commercial business from the start. 105

was not reconcilable with workplace structures such as a boss-employee relationship (Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 343-346). Thus, Byzio and colleagues conclude, for most initiatives the commitment to voluntary work or their lacking means to pay for professional staff constituted a significant barrier for further expansion (ibid., p. 346).

In the case of the single initiative in their sample that scaled up very far, two factors were different. First of all, when their attempt to raise money for developing their first wind farm was unexpectedly successful, two people from this group were prepared to take the risk of quitting their current job and committing themselves entirely to the project. Byzio and colleagues note that among the five initiators these two were the only people who were not married, suggesting that this made it easier for them to take the risk (2002 p. 342). Secondly, the group formed in 1993/1994, a few years later than most other initiatives they studied. As turbine development was progressing rapidly, this meant that the first turbines this initiative installed were more cost-efficient than the first turbines installed by earlier initiatives. The resulting financial returns provided a good starting point for professionalization and large- scale expansion (ibid. p. 350).

North Frisia and Upper Austria I will now turn to the regions that I have already explored in relation to replication of wind farms, namely North Frisia in Germany and Upper Austria in Germany. I will briefly look at some cases from these regions that demonstrate that there were also some attempts to scale up. For various reasons, however, scaling up of these initiatives remained strongly limited. Let me first turn to North Frisia and once again to the case of the citizen wind farm Lübke- Koog, the first citizen wind farm in this region (see also section 6.2.2 on the emergence of this initiative). While this initiative did not develop wind farms in other villages, they repeatedly extended the wind farm in Friedrich-Wilhelm-Lübke-Koog. They realized from the start that the site they had available would allow for a large wind farm and planned to set up 22 turbines with 470 kW each. However, due to limited material resources they initially only installed 14 turbines –which still added up to an impressive 6.6 MW of installed capacity [Lübke-Koog:1].

Over the following years they gradually extended the wind farm, reinvesting financial returns in additional turbines [Lübke-Koog:1]. Furthermore, in 2004, five years after the wind farm had been developed to its full size, they decided to replace the initial turbines with larger ones. Thereby they once again extended the total installed capacity to an overall 43 MW. At this point the initiative also issued another participation offer to the local population and several new people joined in. The number of involved citizens rose from 44 to 160, thereby including 95% of the local adult population (Rave and Richter 2008 p. 109;

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[Lübke-Koog:2]). Thus, over the years the initiative scaled up both in terms of total installed capacity and in terms of the number of people involved. However, for this initiative scaling up is something they only wish to pursue locally – both in terms of turbine sites and in terms of the people involved. [8:19, 8:2]

It never occurred to our citizen wind farm [initiative] to approach land owners in some neighbouring or more distant communities and to conclude contracts with them in order to develop wind turbines there. There we say point-blank, we don’t want that at all, after all the whole thing is premised on the acceptance of local citizens that participate in the turbines, which they then look at and also hear to a certain extent. And this system would be reduced to absurdity if the investors ultimately come from some other place, even if it then is a citizen wind farm. [Lübke-Koog:19] For this initiative citizen wind farms only makes sense as a local project. Instead of expanding to other places, the group preferred to share their know-how with other initiatives in the region that could then develop their own projects (see section 7.1.1 on the replication of citizen wind farms).

In Upper Austria I will briefly explore two cases. In the village of Schenkenfelden a local initiative set up a wind farm with two 600 kW turbines in 1998. The project attracted interest in the region and some people approached them, offering further sites for additional wind farms. This initiative was not principally opposed towards the idea of installing further turbines in nearby villages. However, they were not strongly committed to the idea of expanding either and felt that they could very well leave suitable sites in other places to respective local groups. Furthermore the director voices his reluctance to develop any projects beyond the regional level. [Schenkenfelden:37]

Of course people showed up and said, I also have such a site. Then we had a look at that (…), but then you could see there are five houses right next to it, they won’t be too thankful, or the electricity line was too far away, so it would not have been economically viable (…). So yes, we considered it, we are also always prepared to take on another site. But one thing also is clear: Wherever we can set up a wind turbine others can do it as well. Because here it also worked that way, we said, of course we will set up a wind turbine. (…) Then at one time it was discussed [to realise a project] in the Czech Republic, but that was already ten years ago, (…). As long as I am the managing director I can’t imagine to set up a wind turbine somewhere at a greater distance. [Schenkenfelden:37] The initiative also developed plans to expand locally and obtained planning permits for installing a third turbine in Schenkenfelden. These plans, however, were eventually shelved as the site only has moderate wind speeds and it turned out the turbine would not be economically viable under the available feed-in tariff [Schenkenfelden:13, Schenkenfelden:33].

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As a second case I will turn to the initiative Windkraft Innviertel. This initiative set up their first wind farm consisting of two 500 kW wind turbines in Eberschwang in 1996. The same initiative set up another 1.8 MW turbine in the nearby village Schernham in 2003. They had plans to develop a third wind farm in another village in the region, but there was considerable opposition towards the project from local citizens, so the project was eventually abandoned [WK-Innviertel:37]. In principle, the director of the initiative is still interested in developing further wind farm projects in the region. He does, however, not intend to turn his engagement with wind power into his main profession and points to the limits this sets.

I do this as a side-job, not because I earn money from it, but because I enjoy doing it. I don’t do it for free, but (…) for me it is a side-job. And [if we expand far], then it would need to turn into a main job and right now, I don’t see a possibility to do that. [WK- Innviertel:46] Thus, while this initiative does not rely completely on voluntary work and the managing director receives some remuneration, the director is reluctant to turn wind power development into his main job. As in the other cases considered so far, this sets limits to the scaling up of the initiative. Furthermore, like in the case of Schenkenfelden, the director has strong reservations towards scaling up beyond regional boundaries. Activities at a greater distance do not make sense to him because he sees his engagement with citizen wind farms as a way to shape his own immediate living environment [17:38].

I will stay, [well] I do not want to go abroad, simply because I want to keep the quality of life here in my environment. And I don’t think it’s good to plunk down something in some other place, I want to do something locally. [WK-Innviertel:38] To summarize, all the citizen wind farm initiatives considered in this subsection pursued further wind power projects after their first turbine(s) had gone into operation, or at least developed plans to do so. In several cases, the availability of resources they could put to follow-up projects made initiatives consider the possibility to expand. In particular, this pertains to the ease of collecting money (material resources), knowledge resources that seemed wasted if not put follow-up projects, and additional sites (natural resources) that initiatives had available. However, an unwillingness or inability to build up appropriate professional structures (social-organizational resources) kept most of these initiatives from scaling up further. What is more, in the North Frisian and Upper Austrian cases a commitment to the principle of localism also kept initiatives from scaling up beyond the local or regional level. Apart from being deterred by the practical difficulties of setting up wind farms other places, citizen wind farms only make sense to these initiatives as local or regional projects. In other words, for these initiatives the symbolic resources attached to citizen wind farms are at odds with the idea of scaling up beyond the local or regional scale. This commitment to the principle of localism is strongest in the case of the initiative Lübke- 108

Koog, which would not even consider setting up turbines in a neighbouring village. In the Upper Austrian cases, projects in nearby villages were considered and partly realised, but interviewees see no sense in developing projects beyond their own living environment.

By contrast, in the next subsection I will examine a process of continued scaling up that has also involved a significant expansion of the geographical scope of activities. The case concerns three Austrian citizen wind farm initiatives that set up their first projects in the 1990s and gradually scaled up to medium-sized companies.

7.2.2 Continued scaling up

Case introduction Out of the initiatives that set up citizen wind farms in Austria from 1995 onwards, three initiatives engaged in a process of continued scaling up and eventually grew into medium- sized companies.8 At the end of 2013 they together accounted for just under 400 MW of installed wind power capacity, almost 25% of total installed wind power capacity in Austria (IG Windkraft 2014, see also table below). All three of these companies are based in the federal state of Lower Austria, a state with particularly high wind speeds in some areas. They have developed wind farms in several places across Lower Austria and to a lesser extent also in other federal states. In addition to that, they have also set up wind farms abroad. While wind power has remained their main area of activity, they also operate a small number of other renewable energy plants. Table 4 on p. 110 gives an overview of their respective starting points and key figures describing their status at the end of 2013.

Among these three companies, W.E.B. scaled up furthest, both in terms of installed capacity and in terms of the number of people involved. They started to develop wind farms abroad from quite early on and have by now become firmly established at the international level. Furthermore, they soon found that the legal form of limited partnerships set administrative limits to their expansion and therefore transformed to a privately held stock company in 1999 (see further details in the case analysis below). Windkraft Simonsfeld followed a similar path to W.E.B., but scaling up has been a little slower and more modest in some respects. In particular, they have only set up a single wind farm abroad, and it was not until 2009 that they also transformed into a privately held stock company. Finally, Ökoenergie for a long time restricted itself to wind power development in the Weinviertel region in Lower Austria. In 2012 and 2013, however, they also set up two wind farms abroad. Contrary to the other

8 According to the European Commission, small and medium-sized companies have less than 250 employees and an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million Euro or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding 43 million Euro. If their annual number of employees is below 50 and their annual turnover (or annual balance sheet total) does not exceed 10 million Euro they qualify as small companies (European Commission 2014). 109

two companies, Ökoenergie still uses limited partnerships as a legal form for their wind power projects. In spite of these differences, the three citizen wind farm companies developed in similar ways in many respects. In the following I will therefore jointly analyse their process of scaling up.

W.E.B. Windkraft Ökoenergie Simonsfeld First citizen wind 1995, one 225 kW 1998, two 600 kW 1996, one 500 kW farm turbine, approx. 100 turbines, 112 turbine, shareholders shareholders 232 shareholders Installed wind 158.5 MW 133.7 MW 105.9 MW power capacity in Austria Installed wind 119.7 MW 4 MW 36.8 MW power capacity abroad Number of Approx. 3400 Approx. 1600 Approx. 500 shareholders Annual turnover 48.1 million € 26.07 million Euro [data not available] (2013)

Table 4: Citizen wind farm companies in Lower Austria, December 2013 (Sources: IG Windkraft 2014, WEB Windenergie 2014, Windkraft Simonsfeld 2014, Ökoenergie Management GmbH 2015b, a, WEB Windenergie 2015a) Before I proceed to the analysis of these cases, two remarks on wording are needed. First of all, I have so far used the term ‘citizen wind farm initiative’. In order to install a wind farm, these initiatives must formally organize as a companies. This usually takes the form of a limited partnership (GmbH & Co KG) or a limited liability company (GmbH). As I will show in this section, the process of scaling up increasingly foregrounds their status as business agents. Therefore it will often be more appropriate to use the term ‘citizen wind farm company’ in this section. Secondly, I have so far referred to people who become co- owners of a citizen wind farm as participants of such initiatives. This carries the connotation that their involvement is qualitatively different from mere financial participation. However, as I will argue in this section, continued scaling up has meant that participants increasingly look towards their participation as a form of investment. Therefore I will also make use of the term shareholder where appropriate.

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Beyond the local scale The three citizen wind farm companies considered here all started out as small bottom-up initiatives of wind power enthusiasts in the 1990s. The first wind farms they developed consisted of one or two turbines each and went into operation between 1995 and 1998. Among them is the first Austrian citizen wind farm that was set up in Michelbach in 1995. Several renewable energy enthusiasts from across Austria participated in financing this project. In the other two cases, the initial wind farm was devised as a local project (see also section 6.3.2 on the emergence of the first citizen wind farms in Austria). The turbines were set up in the village of the project initiators and most participants were residents of the village as well [10:66, 15:7]. Interviewees report that setting up their first wind farm received a lot of attention. This served as a starting point for the process of scaling up, as landowners and mayors in other places offered additional sites to them [16:10, 10:88].

Then another mayor approached us and one offered further sites, among them a village, not far away. One had a look at the ridge, measurements started and in that way the history of the company was continued. [10:88] Contrary to the Schenkenfelden case (see section 7.2.1 on limited scaling up above), these initiatives were eager to pick up on such site offers. The first follow-up projects were developed in nearby villages in the respective region, but the initiatives gradually started to expand the geographical range of their activities. Indeed, W.E.B. took a particularly pragmatic position in terms of the sites where they developed further wind farms. When policy support for wind power temporarily came to a halt in Austria towards the end of the 1990s, they decided to pursue a project in Germany, where they could receive support via the German Electricity Feed-in Law [WEB:11].

In 98 there was a time when you couldn’t set up anything in Austria because policy support was not available. Then we said, what would we need to do to invest in Germany? Germany is a stable wind power market. Then we constructed a model, where a limited partnership participates in a German limited liability company. [WEB:11] In order to scale up, the company developed its new projects in places where suitable sites and feed-in tariffs were available. In other words, they flexibly expanded their geographical range and followed the availability of natural and structural resources. From quite early on they moved beyond the local, regional and even the national level in terms of the sites where they developed further wind farms.

Apart from extending their geographical range in terms of turbine sites, participation in wind farm projects also shifted from local involvement to a more geographically dispersed participation structure. As mentioned above, two citizen wind farm companies started with

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a project for which almost the entire equity capital was raised locally. One interviewee notes that they already found it harder to raise sufficient capital from local people in their second project and that the level of local identification with the project was a lot lower. In his view, personal acquaintance with the project initiator had an important role to play in their first project and was lacking in the second one [10:20, 10:88].

One could already observe a change there, [for the first wind farm] people maybe also participated because L. was well regarded as someone whose word could be trusted and someone who, so to speak, was realising his dream, (…) so that were more emotional reasons. (…) And then one found out that already [in this second village], well, this offer to the population, ‘participate in this, profit from it, also learn to live with it, because it is an intervention to the visual landscape’ – that no longer worked out that well (…). So then one broadened the scope for sourcing capital. [10:88] Therefore, when these companies started to develop additional wind farms in other places, they extended participation to people in the larger region. Initially they relied on a few public presentations and word of mouth in the region, but two companies eventually started to work with big marketing campaigns. These campaigns target people across Austria with an interest in investing in renewable energy. [10:66, 15:7, 15:30, 16:19, 16:36].

Indeed, after wind power had proved viable in Austria, these companies also attracted people with a stronger investment orientation. The first citizen wind farms of these companies were understood in terms of their environmental benefits or as local pioneer projects people could immediately relate to. In financial terms these projects aimed for little more than to break even. These days, people who participate in one of these companies increasingly see their participation as a financial investment and expect reasonable financial returns [10:30, 15:58, 15:4, 16:11, 16:13, 16:18].

Nowadays it is, well, not a standard, but fairly well known. And a lot of people see it more kind of as an investment, instead of buying shares, then instead I invest in wind power and know what happens with [the money]. [15:4] Of course, with the [high number of] shareholders we have today, the class of investors has also changed. What initially used to be the idealistic investor now is the professional investor for whom two things are important: Ecology, like before, I do not want to say that that has strongly diminished. It is also the ecologically minded investor who knows what happens with his money. But who of course also expects professional structures, like he is used to them in other areas. [16:13] Insofar as these citizen wind farm companies still attract local people in places where new wind farms are developed, the role of such local involvement has changed. The companies increasingly look towards local participation as a way to reduce siting conflicts over wind farms [10:20, 15:60].

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Meanwhile it has changed to a certain extent. (…) [Local participation in a new wind farm], to be honest, that amounts to a figure between half a dozen and a dozen people that really sign shares. (…) Yes, but these six to twelve people are very welcome to us and of course a spearhead in all our communication measures in a community. [10:20] Indeed, wind power developers increasingly face local concerns over the negative impacts of wind farms, such as landscape intrusion and wildlife disturbance [10:17, 10:45, 16:29, 16:41]. As already mentioned in section 7.1.1, project developers and policy makers alike have therefore started to look towards local ownership or co-ownership as a way to reduce such conflicts. This also holds true for these citizen wind farm companies, all the more as the development of wind farms in several different places means that they confront the local population as external project developers rather than as a local initiative.

Technological hardware and company structure Apart from an expansion in terms of the geographical range of the three citizen wind farm companies, another important change concerns the technological hardware itself. As the wind power sector matured, standard turbine sizes increased. The advantage of larger turbines is that they allow for more cost-efficient electricity generation and for producing larger amounts of electricity at a given site. Further economies of scale in the wind power sector could be achieved by installing a large number of turbines per site. These, of course, are developments that concern the wind power sector at large, not specifically citizen wind farm companies. However, they had special implications for these companies.

The three citizen wind farm companies considered here where eager to expand and went along with these broader developments in the wind power sector. While the first wind farms installed by these citizen wind farm companies consisted of one or two turbines with a capacity of 225 to 600 kW, some of their recent wind farms include 10 – 15 turbines with a capacity of 2 MW each. However, as wind farms developed from local projects with one or two small turbines into multi-Megawatt plants, they were also subjected to stricter siting regulations. This means that the planning process for wind farms has become much more demanding. Numerous expert opinions concerning appropriate siting need to be provided and wind farms beyond 20 MW of installed capacity need to undergo the process of environmental impact assessment (10 MW in areas classified of being worthy of environmental protection, see Bundeskanzleramt Rechtsinformationssystem 2015).

Austrian citizen wind farm companies therefore felt the need to professionalize their activities. Centrally involved people turned their engagement with wind power into their main profession and additional professional staff was employed.

I would say until around [the year] 2000, everything was within small, personal limits (…). That I, we all had our jobs and did this without payment in the evening. Then, when 113

we managed to connect a wind turbine to the grid, we met up at a mulled wine stall [Gluehwein-stall] and celebrated. But that already changed when the projects got bigger, that happened around 2000. (…) At that time we had the first employees that worked part-time, because the projects themselves required much more effort. (…) So it is much more difficult and it doesn’t work anymore with volunteers as a side-job. That’s also why I have now been doing this for almost ten years as my main job. [15:61] The three citizen wind farm companies therefore built up professional company structures and over the years employed an increasing amount of people. These company structures served as social-organizational resources to deal with the increasingly demanding process of planning and managing the operation of wind farms.

The professional involvement of central individuals is one side of the development towards a core-periphery structure. Of course, some people were much more strongly involved in developing the first wind farm projects than others from the start. During scaling up, such differences in the degree of involvement grew even more pronounced. While centrally involved people who professionalized their activities got much further involved, more peripherally involved people in fact became more detached. In particular, participation in company events, such as the annual general assembly, construction site visits or other meetings has markedly dropped over the years [10:26, 15:8].

We also always had our annual assemblies and in the beginning very many people attended, especially in the pioneer phase, because after all we were the first [wind power] plant in the region. But that dwindled very quickly, then not even 10% of the people attended, even though we very much promoted it. Because they said, well, now the wheel is turning, what should I have a say in now. I can’t decide if the wind is blowing or not. [15:8] One interviewee notes that some informal communication channels also disappeared, so that even individuals who are interested in engaging more actively do not always find the chance to do so. For example, the company director sometimes used to sit down in the pub with interested shareholders and discuss new developments with them. Meanwhile the director has a very high workload and hardly finds the time to do so [10:26].

Furthermore, two citizen wind farm companies have also changed their legal form and participation model. They started out as limited partnership or as a company group of limited partnerships. This, however, caused some administrative problems, especially when they wanted to raise additional capital to set up another wind farm.

In the end of 98 [we] realised that is was getting very complicated in structural terms. At the same time we already (…) considered the fourth increase in capital for one of our limited partnerships. (…) And each time these increases in capital were a huge procedure. Entries to the commercial registry and so forth. (…) It’s still in my mind’s eye today how our auditor told us at that time, well, how do you want to continue this

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once you have 500, 1000 partners? You won’t be able to handle that any longer, that will become structurally too difficult for you. [WEB:11] W.E.B. therefore eventually transformed into a stock company (Aktiengesellschaft) in 1999 and Windkraft Simonsfeld eventually did the same ten years later [10:1, 10:22, 15:59, 16:11].

This transformation from a limited partnership into a stock company has a pragmatic and a symbolic dimension to it. As already noted above, the transformation to a stock company made it easier for the companies to expand further and to include new shareholders. For individual shareholders tax issues became easier to handle and furthermore they could now more easily sell shares or sign them over to another person. On the other hand, the transformation to a stock company also caused some tensions. Several shareholders, especially those who had joined at an early stage, were initially very critical of this conversion. They felt they would not be able to identify with a company taking such a legal form, as they thought of a stock companies as purely profit seeking companies without any regional ties or environmental values. [10:1, 16:13, 16:47, 21:1, 21:28]

You can say with the ecologically minded people (…) there was a certain scepticism towards the form of a stock company. It was the name that was the problem, not the content. (…) I also needed half a year to be convinced that this could be the right thing. (…) Methodically it was clear that the stock company share had a lot of advantages, people can hand on their share in clean wind power generation as a present, as an inheritance or they can sell it without having to go through the complex procedure of the commercial registry or whatever. But there is still the question, how is such a share handled, do you still feel personally connected to the company or is it just a commercial paper and I’m not interested in it [any further]. [16:13] Some also feared that a large investor could simply buy up the largest part of shares. However, the companies did not get listed at the stock exchange, thereby avoiding the risk of takeover [10:83, 16:17]. In addition to direct co-ownership, all three citizen wind farm companies meanwhile also offer participation via the provision of loans to the company.

Finally, two companies have also started to sell electricity to end users. The company Ökoenergie sells electricity to end users in collaboration with a green electricity provider. Since 2013, the company W.E.B. also sells electricity directly to end users. In particular, Ökoenergie and W.E.B. use these sales channels to market the electricity from early wind farms that no longer receive the feed-in tariff (WEB Windenergie 2015b; [Ökoenergie:13, Ökoenergie:19]).

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7.2.3 Discussion

This section has explored the question how citizen power plant initiatives succeeded in scaling up and what challenges they confronted. Furthermore I was interested in the question how citizen wind farms were adapted during the process of scaling up. To answer these questions, I have looked both at cases where scaling up of citizen power plant initiatives occurred within narrow limits and at cases of continued scaling up, where initiatives scaled up to professionally managed medium-sized companies. The analysis of limited scaling up included a literature-based review of early German citizen wind farm initiatives in Hamburg and Lower Saxony (based on Byzio, Heine et al. 2002) as well as a discussion of cases in North Frisia and Upper Austria based on my interviews. The analysis of continued scaling up focused on three initiatives from Lower Austria that scaled up to medium-sized companies.

As in the case of car sharing cooperatives in Switzerland analysed by Bernhard Truffer (2003), I have observed markedly different approaches towards scaling up. Some citizen wind farm initiatives scaled up only within very narrow limits, not least due to a commitment to a principle of localism. Others actively pursued a strategy of sustained expansion. To answer the question how initiatives succeeded to scale up it is therefore important to keep in mind that success can mean quite different things to different initiatives. Indeed, some initiatives may not want to scale up at all (cf. Seyfang 2009 p. 175). Even if initiatives are interested in developing follow-up projects, scaling up as far as possible is not necessarily what they aim for.

Those initiatives that were eager to grow had to find ways to adapt their participation model, their decision making structures, their legal form and the way they positioned citizen wind farms vis á vis potential shareholders. Adapting grassroots innovations to fit a larger scale is precisely what Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith (2007 p. 596) have identified as a major challenge for scaling up. The three citizen wind farm companies considered in section 7.2.2 have in fact been quite successful in doing so. The cases, however, also show that scaling up and adapting the grassroots innovation involves a continuous process of reviewing possible options and negotiating acceptable ways of adaptation. For example, the transformation of two citizen wind farm companies to a stock company had clear administrative advantages but initially appeared irreconcilable with the idea of citizen wind farms to several people involved.

In the rest of this section I will review the different approaches to scaling up and discuss them in terms of my theoretical framework. I will argue that in several cases an initial impulse for scaling up came from a resource surplus initiatives found themselves with after

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they had set up their first wind farm. Initiatives that narrowly restricted their process of scaling up, however, were unwilling or unable to build up appropriate social-organizational resources to handle a large number of follow-up projects. Furthermore, their understanding of citizen wind farms as local or regional projects was at odds with the idea of large-scale expansion. By contrast, initiatives that scaled up to medium-sized companies actively extended their resource base in several respects and developed new understandings of citizen wind farms. I conclude this section by summarizing the considerable changes that were made to the sociotechnical configuration of citizen wind farms during the process of continued scaling up.

Resource surplus as an impulse for scaling up Byzio and colleagues (2002 p. 328) name three main factors why the initiatives they studied pursued follow-up projects, which they had not originally intended to do: first of all the surprising success in raising money, secondly not wanting to waste the considerable know- how they had accumulated during their first project, and thirdly the availability of increasingly cost-efficient turbines, that made it all the more appealing to engage with follow-up projects. In other words, after having installed their first turbine, these initiatives found that they had considerable material resources and knowledge resources available to them and felt these resources would be wasted if they did not continue to use them. In Austria, several initiatives attracted a lot of attention in the region when they developed their first citizen wind farm. As a consequence, mayors and land owners from other villages approached them and offered sites for follow-up projects. For some initiatives these additional natural resources provided a welcome starting point for scaling up. Thus, in several cases developing a first wind farm left initiatives with a certain resource surplus and it appeared reasonable to put these resources towards additional projects.

Setting limits to scaling up However, not all initiatives picked up on further site offers. In the case of the Schenkenfelden initiative, the sites proved unsuitable for setting up wind turbines, but the initiative was also quite content with leaving good sites to respective local initiatives. Like the other initiatives considered in section 7.2.1, they felt a commitment to the principle of localism. This means they understand citizen wind farms as local or regional projects and therefore hardly have any ambition to set up further wind farms in distant places. Commitment to the principle of localism appears strongest in the case of the citizen wind farm Lübke Koog, where strictly local ownership is favoured. The initiatives I studied in Upper Austria adhere to a weaker version of this principle and want to restrict potential further projects to their immediate regional environment. A second reason why some initiatives only scaled up to a moderate

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extent is that they were not willing or able to professionalize. Instead, they continue to rely on volunteer work or on people working for the initiative as a small side-job.

Thus, for initiatives that scaled up only moderately, the symbolic resources of localism was at odds with large-scale expansion. In addition to that, they were not willing or able to build up social-organizational resources for handling a larger number of projects.

Expanding the resource base for continued scaling up I will now turn to the case of the three citizen wind farm initiatives in Lower Austria that scaled up to medium-sized companies. How did they approach this process? As already noted, the development of their respective first wind farm often left these initiatives with surplus resources which they could put towards follow-up projects. In addition to that, these initiatives also actively worked to further enlarge their resource base. Broadly speaking, more and larger wind farms also meant that more resources were necessary. For one thing, they took a rather pragmatic stance towards wind farm sites, moving their new projects to locations where natural resources (suitable sites) and structural resources (feed-in tariffs) were available. Furthermore, they built up social-organizational resources by using returns from wind farms to pay for professional staff. This was necessary to deal with the workload of the rising number of projects and the increasingly demanding planning process for wind farms.

Another factor that bolstered the scaling up of these initiatives was the proven profitability of wind power projects. For citizen wind farm companies this was critical for dealing with the challenge of reaching out beyond the group of committed environmentalists. Once it became clear that wind power was viable in Austria, citizen wind farm companies were able to target a broader group of people. Early citizen wind farms in Austria had mainly been understood in terms of their environmental benefits or as local pioneer projects people could immediately relate to. Now that wind farms also proved viable and, indeed, profitable, citizen wind farm companies could also attract people who mainly view their participation as a form of investment. This enables them to raise large sums (material resources), in some cases by using broad marketing campaigns.

This once again points to the interpretative flexibility of citizen power plants. As in the case of replication, the process of scaling up went along with the development of new understandings of citizen power plants. To be sure, many shareholders still understand their participation as a contribution to a more environmentally sound energy system. However, they also expect reasonable returns on the money they put into wind farm projects. Thus, participation is increasingly understood as a form of investment with an environmental added value. This, however, also created tensions over the question of just how far this 118

investment orientation should go. Especially people who had joined at an early point in time had concerns that participation in the company may turn into a mere product on the financial market. This shows that the challenge of reaching out to more mainstream audiences goes along with the challenge of not putting off earlier participants with distinct ideological commitments.

Changes to sociotechnical configurations As noted before, grassroots innovations need to be adapted if they are scaled up (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 596, Seyfang 2010 p. 7624). Scaling up therefore not only involves quantitative but also qualitative changes. Indeed, the initiatives that scaled up to medium- sized companies made several major changes to their sociotechnical configuration. In the following, I will summarize the ways in which sociotechnical configurations changed during the continued scaling up of the three citizen wind farm companies analysed in section 7.2.2. For each change I will also note the dimension of the sociotechnical configuration it pertains to (see p. 25 on dimensions of sociotechnical configurations). These changes are also summarized in Table 5 on page 121.

 Increasing size of turbines (dimension of technological hardware): The first citizen wind farms consisted of one or two turbines with a capacity of a few hundred kilowatt each. By contrast, the citizen wind farm companies today operate several wind farms in different locations. Recent wind farms often include around a dozen turbines, each with a capacity of 2 Megawatt or more.  From voluntary work to professional staff (dimension of management and operation): Citizen power plant companies employed professional staff to deal with increasing demands related to planning and operating wind turbines.  Broadening of geographical participations structure (dimension of ownership and returns): Participation in citizen wind farm companies shifted from local involvement to a more geographically dispersed participation structure. This was a way of dealing with the reduced interest of the respective local population at turbine sites and furthermore enabled citizen wind farm companies to raise larger sums.  Reduced participation in company assemblies (dimension of management and operation): While the core group turned their engagement with wind farm planning into their main occupation, the involvement of regular participants decreased. This can be interpreted as a consequence of a loss of the pioneer status and geographically more dispersed ownership structures.

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 Changes in legal form (dimension of ownership and returns): Two initiatives decided to change their participation model from one or more limited partnerships to a stock company. This was a pragmatic move to make organizational and tax issues easier to handle, but also caused some tensions.  Non-local management (dimension of management and operation): Developing wind farms in several different places meant that the citizen wind farm companies were now positioned as external project developers rather than as a local initiative. The planning and management of wind farms no longer happens locally.  Selling electricity to end users (dimension of market relations): Initially electricity was sold via purchase agreements with utilities negotiated on a case-by-case basis or via regional feed-in tariff systems. Later a feed-in tariff was introduced at the national level (see section 4.2). Two citizen wind farm companies have meanwhile also started to sell some of their electricity directly to end users.

The following table summarizes the changes to sociotechnical configurations by contrasting the typical sociotechnical configurations of early citizen wind farms in Austria with the configuration of the three citizen wind farm companies today. I have named these different types of configurations ‘community power’ and ‘green shareholding’ respectively.

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Community power Green shareholding

Technological Small number of small to Several large wind farms in hardware medium-scale wind turbines in different locations a single location

Ownership and Plant(s) owned by members of Geographically dispersed returns the local community, usually citizens as owners, company via limited partnership or shareholding rather than co- limited liability company ownership of specific plants, limited partnerships or stock company

Management and Non-professional, local Professional, non-local operation management; participative management; partly decision making participative decision-making

Infrastructure Electricity fed-in to national / Electricity fed-in to national / and networking regional grid regional grid

Market relations Feed-in tariffs, direct selling to Feed-in tariff system, direct utility companies selling to utility companies, selling to end users

Table 5: Sociotechnical configurations community power and green shareholding

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7.3 Transfer Apart from replication and scaling up, another way citizen power plants have spread is via transfer of the sociotechnical configuration to new contexts, in particular other technology areas within renewable energy, and other countries. As has already been noted concerning the replication of citizen power plants, no new project can be a perfect copy of an existing one. The mere fact that it is set up in a different place or at a different point in time means that it must be adjusted to a new context. Thus, any form of replication could, in principle, be considered as a form of transfer. In view of the critical role of national legislation for citizen power plants, I will use the term transfer for cases where an attempt at replication across national borders is made. Furthermore, feed-in regulations, cost structures, land use patterns and symbolic understandings vary strongly between different renewable energy technologies, so that the term transfer also appears to be justified when citizen power plants are brought to a new technology area within the field of renewables.

Contrary to the processes of replication, scaling up and uptake by incumbents, the process of transfer has so far not been discussed as a specific form of diffusion of grassroots innovations. In the following I will first explore transfer to a new country and then transfer to a new technology area as forms of diffusion of citizen power plants. For the case of transfer to a new country I will revisit the case of the first citizen wind farms in Austria and discuss how this can also be interpreted as part of the diffusion process of citizen wind farms, in this case a country transfer. To avoid too much repetition I will, however, be rather brief on this case. For the case of transfer to new technology areas I will look at two different cases. The first concerns an attempt in Germany to transfer the concept of citizen wind farms to the area of offshore wind, the second concerns an attempt in Austria to transfer the configuration of green shareholding (see Table 5 on p. 121) from wind power to biogas.

7.3.1 Transfer to a new country

As has already been noted in section 6.3.2, encounters with citizen wind farms in other countries, especially Germany and Denmark, gave wind power pioneers in Austria a basic familiarity with this sociotechnical configuration and made it conceivable as an option in Austria. The association Energiewerkstatt organized excursion to citizen wind farms in Germany and the Czech Republic. Some initiatives also visited projects in Germany and Denmark on their own behalf. The wind farms they encountered there served as reference points for developing their own projects. [14:21, 16:5, 17:5, 17:26, 17:61, 21:5, 21:18]

Well, for us it was, we had a look, how are they organized in Germany, what did they do, there are certainly different model, but we actually did not explore all that many other things.

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[Interviewer: So you also saw in Germany that it is done that way?] Yes, we actually said, OK, they do it with citizen participation, that also makes sense for us. [17:26] Well, the idea of citizen involvement and also the purchase model, this electricity feed- in law, was already realised in Germany and also in Denmark. It comes from there. People really brought that with them. They were there, had a look at that, [and said] we’ll also do that, we’ll really also try to do it like that. [21:18] In this way they acquired some basic knowledge resources, in particular concerning ways in which to set up a participation model (e.g. as loan model, limited partnership).

Bringing the sociotechnical configuration to Austria, however, posed a number of challenges related to the new context. In terms of the resource mobilization perspective, this challenge can be interpreted as an initial lack of resources in Austria which, by that time, were already available in other countries such as Germany. For one thing, this concerned structural resources, in particular policy support in the form of feed-in tariffs. By the early 1990s, the German Electricity Feed-in Law provided a dependable support mechanism for the operation of wind farms. At the same time there was not yet any policy support for wind power in place in Austria. Furthermore, several experts argued there were no suitable sites in Austria with sufficient wind speeds for the operation of wind turbines (see section 6.3.2). By contrast, the availability of natural resources for wind power development was hardly contested in Germany, especially in the coastal areas along the North Sea.

The need to mobilize these resources anew is, of course, a source of potential failure of a transfer to a new country. In spite of these challenges, the transfer of citizen wind farms to Austria can, by and large, be counted as a success. The ways in which early Austrian citizen wind farm initiatives succeeded in mobilizing resources for establishing this alternative socio-technical configuration has already been described in section 6.3.2. What should be highlighted from the perspective of transfer is that part of this mobilization process in fact rested on a transfer of resources from pioneer countries such as Germany and Denmark to Austria.

For one thing, this concerns the transfer of some basic knowledge resources on the basis of site visits, familiarizing Austrian wind power pioneers with the technology and the organizational model of citizen wind farms. Furthermore, the gradual development of policy support for wind power in the 1990s in Austria can also be interpreted as a policy transfer from Germany.

As Per-Olof Busch (2003) has noted, several European countries introduced feed-in tariffs in the 1990s. He demonstrates that this policy convergence rested on direct information exchange between national governments and that the introduction of feed-in tariffs in

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Germany in 1991 served as an explicit point of reference for several other European countries. In particular, the introduction of the German Electricity Feed-in Law sparked a parliamentary proposal to implement a comparable national feed-in system in Austria. This eventually led to the first modest feed-in tariff for wind power that was available from 1994 to 1996 (Hantsch 1998 p. 84/85). Furthermore, before introducing feed-in tariffs at the regional level in 1998, the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Environment commissioned a study in which feed-in tariff systems in different European countries were compared (Busch 2003 p. 6). In parliamentary debates leading up to the Electricity Industry and Organization Act (ElWOG) that included this regional feed-in tariff system, supporters of this regulation repeatedly made reference to the German feed-in tariff system (Busch 2003 p. 6). Wind farm pioneers in Austria benefitted from the fact that policy makers were looking towards Germany for guidance on the matter of how to support renewable energy technologies, around the same time when they were attempting to bring citizen wind farms to Austria.

This is not to say that a transfer of citizen wind farms to Austria occurred simultaneously with the transfer of feed-in tariffs, the crucial policy support mechanism for such projects. After all, a full feed-in tariff system at the national level was not put in place in Austria until 2003. However, the first policy support mechanisms for green electricity that were established in Austria in the 1990s were informed by feed-in systems in other countries, in particular Germany. These support mechanisms opened a window of opportunity for wind power pioneers to develop the first citizen power plants in the second half of the 1990s [10:49, 10:64].

As I have already discussed in section 6.3.2, citizen wind farm initiatives themselves, along with early support organizations, actively lobbied for the provision of policy support in the form of feed-in tariffs. Although their political leverage was limited, they had a catalyzing role in creating political momentum for the introduction of a feed-in tariff system in Austria.

I don’t think that one mainly reacted to citizen participation companies with the Green Electricity Act. But I think citizen participation companies were especially active (…). Well, during the time before the Green Electricity Act was passed, there were a few small demonstrations at the Ballhausplatz [square in the centre of Vienna, A/N] and who went there with their employees, who called their shareholders and who was disproportionately present there? That were citizen participation companies like us. [10:49] Apart from the transfer of knowledge resources and structural resources, transferring citizen power plants to Austria could also build on the fact that similar meanings were attached to such projects in Germany and Austria. Both in Germany and in Austria, early citizen wind farm projects had links to the environmental and antinuclear movements, and many of the people involved interpreted wind farm development as a demonstration of the alternatives 124

to nuclear power and other large-scale centralized energy technologies (see chapter 6). To be sure, by the time the first citizen wind farms were developed in Austria, the nuclear issue was positioned differently in Austria and Germany. In Germany, several nuclear power plants were in operation and contributing significantly to domestic electricity generation. In Austria, however, a referendum on nuclear power in 1978 had resulted in the Nuclear Energy Prohibition Act. Nevertheless the controversy over nuclear power continued and the 1984 conflict over plans for a large hydropower plant in the wetland areas around Hainburg opened up a new debate over the environmental impacts of large-scale energy technologies (see section 6.3.1). Wind turbines subsequently were understood as alternatives to large- scale and environmentally harmful energy technologies and closed forms of decision making, both in Germany and in Austria.

7.3.2 Transfer to a new technology area

Both in Germany and in Austria, citizen power plants were first developed in the area of wind power. Several years later, collective citizen ownership of green electricity plants also spread in other technology areas, in particular in the area of PV. Interestingly, however, my interviewees involved in the development of citizen PV plants hardly made any reference to citizen wind farms as sources of inspiration for their activities. Further research would be needed to assess the extent to which the grassroots innovation of citizen power plants was in fact actively transferred from the area of wind power to the area of PV. However, among the initiatives studied for this thesis are two cases where citizen wind farms acted as reference points for an attempted transfer to other technology areas. This includes an attempted transfer of the concept of citizen wind farms to offshore wind in Germany and an attempt to transfer the configuration of green shareholding (see Table 5 on p. 121) from wind power to biogas.

In the following I will describe these attempts of transfer. Both of these projects turned out to be extremely challenging. While the attempt at developing an offshore citizen wind farm in Germany failed in the planning stage, the initiative to develop collectively owned biogas plants in Austria succeeded in implementing four such plants but eventually had to file for bankruptcy.

Attempted transfer from onshore to offshore wind power – the case of Butendiek (Germany) I will first discuss the attempted transfer of citizen power plants from the onshore to the offshore wind sector. Of course, these two forms of wind power are based on the same core technology and one could question whether this should be considered as a case of transfer at

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all. However, offshore wind power has some characteristics that set it apart from its onshore counterpart (Markard and Petersen 2009 p. 3547-3548). For one thing, turbine siting far off at sea comes with considerable challenges related to the construction of turbine bases, grid connection and accessibility for maintenance (ibid. p. 3547-3548). Furthermore, offshore wind farms need to undergo a different kind of permit procedure and the complexity of setting up offshore wind farms requires increased coordination of different actors along the value chain (ibid. p. 3548). In addition to that, for citizen-owned projects, it is also the mere distance between the turbines and the community of owners that sets it markedly apart from the sociotechnical configuration of many onshore citizen wind farms.

An initiative to transfer collective citizen ownership from onshore to offshore wind started off in North Frisia, the region in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein with a particular high density of locally-owned citizen wind farms. In the year 2000, a group of people from that area, all of whom were experienced with onshore citizen wind farms, developed plans to set up an offshore citizen wind farm. The German federal government had expressed an interest in offshore wind power (Ohlhorst 2009 p. 215; [Butendiek:30]). Furthermore in the year 2000, the Danish citizen wind farm Middelgrunden had just been set up off the coast of Copenhagen. This wind farm served as an example that citizen ownership of wind farms could in principle also be achieved in the offshore sector. The initiators of the German project, termed Butendiek, aimed to build on the know-how and positive experiences they had made with onshore citizen wind farms.

[The positive experiences with citizen wind farms] of course encouraged us to think a bit about where one could expand. At that time offshore suddenly was an issue (…). Yes, and then nine people simply joined up and said, maybe we have to explore if it wouldn’t be possible, here in North Frisia, where meanwhile so many people are knowledgeable in this area, (…) to get enough capital pooled so that we can or may really also think about planning an offshore wind farm. [Butendiek:30] In view of the considerable challenges of offshore wind farm development, such as high costs and very demanding planning and construction processes, the project Butendiek came quite far. The group succeeded in raising five million Euros from around 8,500 people, mainly from the region but also beyond. In this way they both successfully expanded the typical volume of equity capital and flexibly adapted the geographical participation structure. Onshore citizen wind farms in North Frisia had been developed with capital provided by the respective local population. By contrast, this larger project drew on the financial resources of a geographically further dispersed group of people. The core group also proceeded successfully in technical planning, receiving permits, negotiations with turbine producers and negotiating a financial plan with banks [Butendiek:30, Butendiek:31]. This was very much pioneering work in the German offshore sector, as Butendiek was only 126

the second German offshore wind farm project that received a building permit (Jensen 2010 p. 107).

After a few years, however, experiences from offshore wind farms in Denmark showed that maintenance costs for offshore wind farms were higher than expected. After a failed attempt to receive financial risk backing from the state, they were faced with the option of either raising further risk capital or giving up on the idea of a citizen owned offshore wind farm. Eventually, in 2005, the group decided to sell the project to a commercial investor. [Butendiek:30].

This can be interpreted as a failure of mobilizing sufficient resources in the new technology area for pushing through the project. One of the main resources the initiators could bring to this transfer was experience concerning the development of onshore citizen wind farms. However, the case suggests that the availability of know-how from the onshore sector was too weak a starting point for carrying through the development of an offshore wind farm. This is in line with the assessment of Markard and Petersen that “experiences and learning effects from onshore wind power may not be fully exploitable for offshore applications” and that “specialized skills and experiences have to be developed (e.g. with regard to licensing or project management)” (2009 p. 3548-3549). Apart from the lack of appropriate of knowledge resources, the group’s limited ability to marshal material resources, in particular extremely large amounts of risk capital, was a decisive factor leading to the abandonment of the project.

Of course it’s difficult in the offshore sector, the investments are considerably higher, the planning periods are longer, and so on. And there appear to be certain advantages for larger investors, for larger providers of capital. That in turn also has to do with structures of equity capital and debt capital and so on. [4:19] Finally, in terms of policy support (structural resources), the Butendiek project suffered from being an early mover. In 2000, when the project started, the German federal government had expressed an interest in offshore wind power (Ohlhorst 2009 p. 215; [Butendiek:30]). However, policy support was only slowly starting to take shape. The Renewable Energy Act of 2000 and its amended version of 2004 did provide slightly higher support for offshore than for onshore wind farms, e.g. via slower degression of feed-in tariffs. But it was not until 2009 that feed-in tariffs for offshore wind were significantly heightened (Ohlhorst 2009 p. 196).9 More recently this form of policy support has been supplemented by a loan programme for offshore wind farms set up via the state-owned development bank KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, see Hautmann 2011). However, when the Butendiek

9 This amendment set the initial feed-in tariff at 15 ct/kWh for turbines installed until 2015, and at 13 ct/kWh for turbines installed from 2016 onwards, instead of previously 9.1 ct/kWh. 127

project was being developed, these support mechanisms were not yet available. Indeed, one of the directors of the project noted that the lack of appropriate feed-in tariffs as of 2005 was an important factor for eventually abandoning the project (ibid. p.45).

The failure of the Butendiek project brings up the question whether citizen power plants can be realised in the offshore wind sector and, if so, what adaptations to the sociotechnical configuration are required. Indeed, large utility companies, multinationals and, to some extent, medium-sized companies are establishing themselves as the main players in the area of offshore wind in Germany (Markard and Petersen 2009 p. 3553/3554, Ohlhorst 2009 p. 223). In particular, even though the major German utility companies hardly have any experiences with onshore wind power (Stenzel and Frenzel 2008 p. 2650), they play an important role in the emerging German offshore sector. This suggests that for the development of offshore wind farms, experience with onshore wind is less important than the considerable amount of material and social-organizational resources that major utilities can draw on.

Apart from the advantage large utilities have in terms of these resources, the siting approach arguably also works to their advantage. Indeed, offshore wind farms, as large-scale power plants located in remote places, can be interpreted as a technology well in line with traditional siting approaches in the energy sector. For one thing, large-scale power plants are well adjusted to the technical and organizational structures of big utility companies. Furthermore, offshore wind farms have been promoted as a way to deal with local opposition to turbine siting that onshore wind farm developments increasingly face (Ohlhorst 2009 p. 215). Moving turbines out of sight, however, does not necessarily benefit projects based on collective citizen ownership. In fact the visibility and tangibility of turbines can be part of what makes a wind farm meaningful and desirable to local citizens (cf. section 6.3.2 and see also Maruyama, Nishikido et al. 2007, Warren and McFadyen 2010).

Nevertheless, as already briefly noted, the wind farm Middelgrunden off the coast of Copenhagen stands as an example that citizen-owned offshore projects are in principle feasible. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss this case in any depth, but some factors can be noted that may account for the success of this project while the Butendiek project failed. First of all, Middelgrunden is not exclusively owned by a group of citizens but rather is based on a co-operation between the local utility company Energi E2 and a cooperative with around 8.500 members (Larsen, Sørensen et al. 2005). Secondly, the turbines of the Middelgrunden wind farm are sited only 3.5 kilometres away from the coast of Copenhagen (ibid.). This contrasts with the German situation where the largest part of near-shore waters is classified as nature reserves and therefore is not available for wind

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power development. Most offshore wind farms in Germany therefore need to be within the so-called exclusive economic zone at a minimum distance of 12 nautical miles (approximately 22 kilometres) off the coast (Markard and Petersen 2009). Finally, one interviewee suggested that mobilizing large amounts of capital from citizens (approximately 23 million Euros in the case of Middelgrunden, see Larsen et al. 2005 p. 4) is easier in a metropolitan region such as Copenhagen than in a rural area such as Schleswig-Holstein [4:19].

Transfer from wind power to biogas – the case of BEB (Austria) I now turn to a case of attempted transfer to another technology area in Austria. Together with Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark Austria is among the pioneer states in the area of biogas technology. As of 2012, about 350 biogas plants were in operation in Austria (Wirth, Markard et al. 2013 p. 28). The introduction of the Green Electricity Act in 2003 boosted the construction of biogas plants across Austria (Puchas 2007 p. 66, Hahn, Rutz et al. 2010 p.11, Wirth, Markard et al. 2013 p. 28). The act provided feed-in tariffs for electricity from biogas plants and also included a bonus for combined heat and power generation. The sharp rise in the number of biogas plants, however, came to an end around 2006, due to volatile feedstock prices and the introduction of a cap on the overall volume of funding provided via the Green Electricity Act (Puchas 2007 p. 65-67, Hahn et al. 2010 p. 11-12).

Most biogas plants in Austria are operated by individual farmers. In addition to these, there are also some plants operated by small groups of farmers or larger cooperatives (Puchas 2007 p. 67, Wirth, Markard et al. 2013 p. 29). This form of collective ownership, however, is not the focus here. Rather, I will concentrate on an initiative that took a citizen wind farm company as a model for setting up a similar company in the area of biogas. In other words, they tried to transfer the sociotechnical configuration of green shareholding (see Table 5 on p. 121) from wind power to the area of biogas.

In the midst of the biogas boom period following the introduction of the Green Electricity Act, the company BEB (BioEnenergie-Beteiligung) was set up to develop biogas plants based on citizen participation. It was modelled after the citizen wind farm company W.E.B. that had started as a bottom-up initiative and had meanwhile grown into a medium-sized company (see section 7.2.2). Both the director and the tax advisors of W.E.B. were among the founding members of BEB, thus bringing their experiences with participation models in the area of renewables to the new company. In particular, like the citizen wind farm company W.E.B., BEB offered participation by issuing shares in a privately held stock company. There had even been some discussions about developing a new branch for biogas plants

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within a citizen wind farm company, but eventually the group decided to set up BEB as an independent company [BEB:2]. However, one difference to the citizen wind farm companies analysed in section 7.2.2 is that these companies had gradually developed from a grassroots initiatives to a professionally led medium-sized companies. By contrast, BEB took a more business-oriented approach from the outset.

As has been mentioned above, biogas plants are typically set up and operated by farmers. The rationale behind setting up the company BEB was to enable the development of biogas plants where there was potential for a biogas plant in terms natural resources, but no local farmer or group of farmers was interested in developing such a project. The group included people with various forms of experience in the field of renewable energy, for example as spatial planners, tax advisors or project developers in the area of wind power [BEB:2].

Eventually BEB set up four biogas plants in Lower Austria that went into operation between January 2006 and December 2007. Each of them originally had a capacity of 500 kW and was later extended to 625 kW. In three cases the company BEB initiated the project, in the fourth case a local group of farmers set out to develop a biogas plant but ran into difficulties when it came to pre-finance it. The group turned to BEB and the project was adapted and integrated into the company [BEB:11]. Plans for two further plants eventually had to be abandoned due to delays in the permit procedure. By the time the permits were granted, the cost structure had shifted in a way that the plants would not have been economically viable.

BEB was owned by about 150 shareholders, mostly private individuals. Among them were a small group of farmers providing feedstock, but only around 20% of farmers providing feedstock to the plants opted to become shareholders of BEB [BEB:15]. BEB developed two different participation models, one of which involved holding shares in the entire company, the other involving co-ownership of a specific biogas plant. The latter model was intended to allow people living in one of the places where a biogas plant was built to become a co- owner of this specific plant. However, they could only attract a small number of people in the villages and towns where the biogas plants were built as shareholders [BEB:9]. This is all the more remarkable as an agricultural biogas plant depends on feedstock provided by farmers and therefore needs to link up with everyday practices in a region, much more than a wind farm.

Although mobilization of participants remained difficult, BEB was more successful with attracting people with an interest in environmental issues, in particular green electricity. The participation structure thus ended up being geographically dispersed and more strongly based on a community of interest than on a community of locality [BEB:9]. Due to the

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advantage of greater risk distribution, all participants eventually opted to become shareholders of the entire company [BEB:6].

One reason for the difficulties in mobilizing participants suggested in interviews was that BEB was competing over participants with citizen wind farm companies. BEB was set up in 2003, a few months after the Green Electricity Act had become effective. At the same time, citizen wind farm companies were already well established and still expanding further. Thus, while BEB was still struggling to get organizational, legal and technical issues resolved, citizen wind farm companies were attracting the larger share of people prepared to participate financially in renewable energy projects [BEB:17, BEB:29].

On a more speculative note and as an issue for further research, I would like to add that biogas plants may have lacked the iconic qualities of wind turbines as a mobilizing force. While wind turbines are a visual landmark and thus readily serve as a symbol for an ecological transformation of the energy system, biogas plants may have lacked this appeal among supporters of renewable energy. The marked visual presence of wind turbines of course also is a source of controversy over this technology, as can be seen by numerous and harsh controversies over turbine siting in recent years. The point here, however, is that among renewable energy enthusiasts wind turbines may, more than other technologies, visually represent the envisioned shift towards energy systems based on renewables.

The problem of attracting participants was further aggravated by economic difficulties. Due to a rise in feedstock prices and high maintenance expenses, costs were higher than expected. The feed-in tariffs provided by the Green Electricity Act therefore did not suffice to operate plants in a cost-covering manner. Policy decisions to grant surplus payments from 2007 onwards brought some relief, but could not fully counterbalance the rise in feedstock prices. Furthermore, delays in the granting procedure of these surplus payments left BEB struggling to survive in the meantime [BEB:10]. Eventually, in September 2012, the company BEB declared itself insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.

7.3.3 Discussion

In the following I want to discuss the factors that supported and inhibited the transfer of citizen power plants to another country and to other technology areas in the cases I explored. My material suggests that transfer to another country depended on a concurrent transfer of resources. The attempts to transfer citizen power plants to other technology areas, however, failed. Three critical issues can be identified: firstly, differing resource requirements in the new technology area, secondly, competition over resources between technology areas and finally, the limited transferability of some resources.

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Transfer of resources Let me first turn to the transfer of citizen wind farms to Austria. This case points to resource transfer as an important factor for the transfer of citizen power plants to a new country. This aspect is most salient in relation to the provision of structural resources in the form of feed- in tariffs. As has been noted above, one crucial factor for the success in transferring citizen wind farms from Germany and other countries to Austria was that policy actors were turning towards the Danish-German model of feed-in tariffs around the same time as Austrian wind power pioneers worked towards bringing the model of citizen wind farms to Austria. In this way a support structure for wind farms, including citizen wind farms, started to take shape around the same time. Admittedly, this support was initially quite patchy but eventually developed into a viable support system. This policy transfer was actively promoted by citizen wind farm initiatives, but by no means can be attributed to their lobbying activities alone.

Grassroots initiatives themselves, however, were responsible for another form of resource transfer, namely the transfer of knowledge resources. Through site visits to initiatives in other countries, Austrian wind power pioneers gained a basic familiarity with citizen wind farms and learned about possible participation models. Furthermore, the transfer of citizen wind farms from Germany and other European countries to Austria could build on similar understandings of the relevance of such projects. Both in Germany and in Austria, early citizen wind farm initiatives had links to the environmental and anti-nuclear movements and understood their projects as counter-models to nuclear power and other large-scale, centralized energy technologies. In other words, the symbolic resources that could be drawn on were in alignment across national borders.

Differing resource requirements The cases of transfer to a new technology area presented in this section worked out less well. To be sure, these attempts at a transfer of citizen power plants could also benefit from a concurrent transfer of resources. In particular this pertains to knowledge resources, such as knowledge on how to set up a citizen participation model in organizational and legal terms. However, other types of resources could not be mobilized to a sufficient extent. For one thing, in both cases costs for setting up and operating power plants in the new technology area were underestimated. Therefore, available feed-in tariffs proved to be insufficient. In the case of offshore wind in Germany, higher feed-in tariffs were introduced at a later point in time and accompanied by the provision of a loan programme. By that time the Butendiek project had, however, already been sold to a large commercial investor. BEB started off when policy support appeared quite favourable for the development of biogas plants, but

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feedstock prices and maintenance costs soon proved higher than expected. This made it difficult to operate plants in a cost-covering manner.

Competition over resources Raising the level of policy support for offshore wind in Germany and for biogas in Austria not only proved insufficient, it also proved contentious. In both cases increasing the level of financial support for these renewable energy sources has been criticized for channelling too large a share of available funds towards the respective technology areas at the cost of reducing support for other renewable energy technologies. The issue is particularly politicized in the case of offshore wind in Germany, due to the differing actor structures in onshore and offshore wind. There are plausible concerns that devoting a larger share of funds towards offshore wind power entails a redistribution of resources to the benefit of utilities and other large investors dominating the offshore sector. This may come at the cost of reducing support for small and medium-sized companies, including community enterprises in the onshore wind sector [1:23, 2:9]. In Austria the Chamber of Labour heavily criticized the surplus payments for biogas plants, arguing this would channel a disproportionate amount of available funds for green electricity to the agricultural sector (e.g. Wirtschaftsblatt 2010).

Thus, when the total available amount of a particular resource is bounded, attempts to transfer resources to a new technology area come with the risk of creating competition between the two areas. Apart from competition over funding, the case of BEB also shows that citizen power plant initiatives in different technology areas can find themselves competing over project participants. The risk of creating competition over resources appears to be less salient in the case of a transfer of citizen power plants to a new country. In this case the mobilization of bounded resources tends to target a separate resource base: public funds come from different constituencies and there is hardly any overlap in the set of potential participants and potential sites where a plant can be constructed.

Limited transferability of resources Some resource types typically are not bounded and can therefore be shared more easily without effecting immediate competition. In particular, this pertains to knowledge resources and symbolic resources. However, while immediate competition is less of a problem in relation to these resource types, the cases discussed here show that there can be limits to the transferability of these resources. In other words, what constitutes a valuable resource for developing citizen power plants in one technology area may prove of little value in the other. In particular, in the case of Butendiek, the know-how that the initiators brought to the project from their experiences in the onshore wind sector only had a limited use-value for offshore

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wind farm development. Furthermore, the attempted transfer from onshore to offshore wind power may have suffered from a loss of symbolic resources, as the siting of turbines far away from the group of owners may have reduced identification with the project. In the case of the biogas plants developed by BEB, one can similarly speculate that they lacked the iconic qualities of wind turbines and were therefore not as strongly associated with the idea of a transition to a more sustainable energy system.

The material presented in this section also points to a strategy that bottom-up initiatives can use for dealing with their inability to meet the resource requirements in a new technology area. Citizen power plant initiatives can engage in strategic cooperation with actors that have those types of resources available that they themselves are lacking (e.g. large amounts of risk capital or the social-organizational basis for developing large-scale projects). The Middelgrunden offshore wind farm in Denmark is a case in point, as it is jointly owned by a cooperative and the local utility company. Nevertheless, as in the case of replication, cooperation with established actors, especially utilities and other large commercial companies, can be controversial and brings up the question whether this puts too much power in the hands of these actors.

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7.4 Uptake by incumbents The previous sections have discussed replication, scaling up and transfer to new countries or technology areas as different forms of the diffusion of citizen power plants. The last form of diffusion I want to discuss in this chapter is the uptake of the grassroots innovation by incumbents. By definition a grassroots innovation is an innovation developed not by incumbent actors but by civil society actors. However, as previous analyses of sustainability oriented grassroots innovation have shown, grassroots innovations are sometimes picked up upon by incumbent actors in the respective regime. Previous cases that have been investigated include the incorporation of organic food into the assortment of supermarkets (Smith 2007, Seyfang 2009) and the development of sustainable housing which were pioneered by green building activists by mainstream building developers (Lovell 2004). Along a similar line Michael Lounsbury and colleagues (Lounsbury, Ventresca et al. 2003), using a combination of social movement theory and field theory, have demonstrated how non-profit recyclers in the US eventually enabled the development of a for-profit recycling industry.

What then defines uptake by incumbents in the context of grassroots innovations? I will understand it as a process by which incumbent actors in a particular regime incorporate elements of the novel sociotechnical configuration developed by grassroots innovators into their structures and practices. This means that uptake by incumbents of a particular grassroots innovation can take quite different forms, depending on which elements are picked up and how they are incorporated into established approaches.10

Indeed, in the case of citizen power plants, uptake by incumbents can mean quite different things. At the most basic level it can refer to utilities starting to engage with renewable energy technologies that were first experimented with by citizens’ initiatives. As has been mentioned in chapter 6, citizen initiatives were among the first wind farm operators, both in Germany and in Austria. This form of uptake by incumbents is limited to the adoption of the technical hardware of the sociotechnical configuration of citizen wind farms. Uptake by incumbents, however, can also mean that utilities set up wind farms or PV plants involving a citizen participation model. Indeed, in Austria seven regional and three local utility companies in urban centres have developed PV plants or wind farms in conjunction with a

10 My definition of uptake by incumbents is closely related, but not identical, to what Adrian Smith (Smith 2007) and Gill Seyfang (Seyfang 2009 p. 176-180) have termed translations between niches and regimes, using the approach of strategic niche management. Their understanding of translation refers more generally to different processes by which sociotechnical configurations and practices in niche and regime inform each other. This can occur either by the niche adapting its practices to fit better with the regime, by ‘intermediate projects’ bringing together niche and regime actors or by regime actors picking up on elements of grassroots innovations. It is only this latter form of translation that corresponds to my definition of uptake by incumbents. 135

citizen ownership or citizen loan model. It is this more comprehensive form of uptake by incumbents that I want to discuss in this section.

Several challenges have been noted in the literature in relation to this form of diffusion. Seyfang (2009 p. 176) identifies oppositional framing of a grassroots innovation as the main challenge for uptake by incumbents. Indeed, as Adrian Smith (2007 p. 436, 443/446) has pointed out, grassroots innovations are typically constructed in opposition to incumbent regimes in order to deal with perceived sustainability problems in the regime. Thus, a central challenge is that “[w]hilst the creation of green alternatives requires a reformulation of socio- technical configurations, so their subsequent influence is dependent upon an ability to articulate with incumbent regime dimensions” (Smith 2007 p. 446). Oppositional framing in fact acts as a two-way barrier: Grassroots innovators may not want to give up on their oppositional identity, defining themselves as ‘other’ to the mainstream (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 597). On the other hand, regime actors have little incentive to engage in practices that are positioned in opposition to theirs.

Furthermore, uptake by incumbents does not leave the grassroots innovation unchanged and may in fact result in quite profound modifications. According to Smith (2007 p. 446), the uptake of elements of grassroots innovations by regime actors typically amounts to a ‘slotting-in’ or ‘adding-on’ of selected easily transferable elements to established structures, while leaving aside more deep-seated changes with higher potentials for regime transformation. While uptake by incumbents brings the potential of widespread diffusion of ideas developed by grassroots innovators, this can come at the cost of diminishing the sustainability potentials aspired to (ibid., Seyfang 2009 p. 180). One example discussed by Smith (2007) is the integration of organic food into the array of products offered by supermarkets.

“Organic equivalents of highly processes conventional food products appeared on supermarket shelves, e.g. frozen ready-meals, fizzy drinks. Organic food was not transforming the regime it was simply a new, high-value ingredient threading its way into conventional food socio-technical practices.” (p. 442) The modifications that may occur with the uptake of grassroots innovations by regime actors goes along with the risk of an alienation of pioneer actors (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 597, Seyfang 2009 p. 176). Activists committed to more comprehensive changes in sociotechnical configuration may see the integration of selected elements into the structures and practices of incumbents as a sellout of their ideas to commercial interests (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 597). This can lead to pioneer actors exiting the field, but it can also contribute to a revival of more radical alternatives (Smith 2007 p. 442-443). Furthermore, where grassroots innovators strive to remain active alongside incumbent actors who pick up on their ideas,

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they risk being pushed aside by incumbents (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 597). In particular, they may find themselves competing with incumbents on terms they had previously not prioritised, such as professionalism or convenience (Seyfang 2009 p. 178).

In the rest of this section I will explore the development of citizen power plants by Austrian utilities. In particular, I want to address the question how the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants has been adapted to fit into their structures and practices. Furthermore, I will explore why utilities have started to engage with citizen power plants and why this form of diffusion has succeeded in Austria, much more so than in Germany. I must note, however, that this discussion is not based on comprehensive interview data with representatives from utilities. The first citizen power plant projects by Austrian utilities were launched in 2011, after I had conducted the largest part of my interviews for this thesis. This section therefore builds on online research concerning these citizen power plant projects and a late additional interview with a representative of a regional utility company that has developed a citizen power plant project (cf. section 5.1 on data collection). The following section therefore should be read as a first explorative account of the phenomenon.

7.4.1 Citizen power plants developed by utilities As has been mentioned above, since 2011 several regional and major local utility companies in Austria have developed green electricity plants in conjunction with a citizen participation model. More recently, the four major utility companies in Germany have also started to develop green electricity projects involving citizen participation. In particular, in 2012 the utility company EnBW set up the subsidiary BürgerEnergie AG that offers co-ownership of wind farms to local cooperatives. Furthermore, in 2013 RWE initiated an energy cooperative that it supports in the development of wind farms and PV plants (BürgerEnergie AG 2015, Die BürgerEnergie eG 2015). However, among German utilities these still appear to be rather isolated projects. By contrast, in Austria citizen power plant projects developed by utilities have become quite common over the last five years.

The first citizen power plant project by one of the major Austrian utility companies was launched in 2011 by the local utility company in Linz (Linz AG), the capital of the federal state of Upper Austria. Meanwhile the utility company has planned and installed several such PV plants. Individual citizens can buy between ½ and 10 PV panels in these plants and lease them back to the utility company. The annual returns people receive from leasing their panels back to the utility company amount to a fixed annual interest rate of 3.33% (Linz AG 2015). This ‘sale-and-lease-back’ model has since been adopted by seven more regional and local utility companies, mostly with only minor modifications (Energie AG 2013, Zahner 2013, Energie Burgenland 2015a, Energie Graz 2015, Energie Steiermark 2015, Salzburg

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AG 2015, Wien Energie 2015). The contracts related to these projects run between 10 and 25 years, with the possibility of terminating it earlier (e.g. after a minimum of 5 years). At the end of the term time, the utility company buys back the PV module at the original price. Apart from two exceptions (Salzburg AG and Energie Burgendland AG), people who buy shares of a plant in such projects need to be or become customers of the respective utility company. In one case, they are specifically required to buy the green electricity package offered by the respective utility.

Interestingly, regional utility companies that offer such citizen ownership models do not give preferential treatment to the respective local population where the plant is located. This suggests that the rationale behind these citizen ownership models is not about reducing local conflicts concerning the siting of renewable energy plants. Indeed, an interviewee argues that it would be counterproductive in terms of conflict avoidance to give preferential treatment to the local population as this may create unrest among other customers.

We don’t privilege anyone. Well, we did not say it is produced [there], also with all other customers, because in principle it should not matter where renewable energy is (…), because then we can start off and say, OK [the plant in] K. is only for [the area there], wind power is only for the district A. That’s something we want to avoid. [Interviewer: So did you arrange information events specifically in the municipality or did you specifically advertise it there?] In mailings, yes, but broadly, not specifically for citizens of A., not that way. No, that is out of question. That would immediately bring us into disrepute. [23:10] Up until 2013, all sale-and-lease-back citizen ownership projects developed by utilities were PV plants. Individuals acquire specific identifiable panels and can locate these panels on a map of the plant provided by utilities.

More recently, however, the utility companies in the federal states of Burgenland and Styria have launched sale-and-lease-back models in the area of wind power. In Burgenland the project involves a single 3 MW turbine sold to citizens in small shares of 500 € each (Energie Burgenland 2015a). In Styria, the project involves a wind farm consisting of three wind turbines with a capacity of 2 MW each. The utility company sells parts of this wind farm in small shares to their customers and retains ownership over the rest of the wind farm itself. Thus, in this case participants no longer own an identifiable and separable piece of hardware of the plant, but a certain percentage of a wind turbine. Another difference to previous sale- and-lease-back projects developed by utilities is that it is no longer the entire plant that is sold to individuals. Rather, people co-own the wind farm with the regional utility company (Energie Steiermark 2015).

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In the Western part of Austria, one regional and one local utility company have implemented citizen participation projects that differ from the sale-and lease back model described above. Indeed, in their model participation is not based on co-ownership by their customers but on a loan individuals give to the company. Participants provide money to co-fund the construction of a PV plant. The plant is operated and owned by the respective utility company. In the following 20 years, participants receive a discount on their electricity bill that depends on the size of their loan and the amount of electricity produced by the plant. This discount pays back the interest of this loan; the original investment is returned after the 20 year period. The amount that is discounted can vary, depending on the electricity yield of the PV plant during that year (Innsbrucker Kommunalbetriebe 2015, Vorarlberger Kraftwerke AG 2015). For an overview of citizen power plants developed by Austrian utilities see Table 6 and Table 7 on p. 140.

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Year of first Annual Utility company Technology Installed capacity project launch interest Min shareMax share

Linz AG PV 0,36 MWp 2011 3.33% € 300 € 6,000

Energie AG Oberösterreich PV 1,2 MWp 2012 3.30% € 700 € 2,800

Wien Energie GmbH PV 4,8 MWp 2012 3.10% € 950 € 9,500

EVN AG PV 0,75 MWp 2012 3.33% € 300 € 4,800

Salzburg AG PV 0,363 MWp 2012 3% € 1,200 € 4,800 Energie Graz PV [data not available] 2013 3.30% € 650 € 6,500 Energie Burgenland AG wind power 3 MW 2013 3.2% € 500 € 2,500 Energie Steiermark AG wind power 2 MW 2014 3.30% € 500 € 3,000 Table 6: Overview of utility companies’ sale-and-lease-back models (Austria) (Sources: Energie AG 2013, Zahner 2013, Energie Burgenland 2015a, Energie Graz 2015, Energie Steiermark 2015, Linz AG 2015, Salzburg AG 2015, Wien Energie 2015)

Year of first Annual Utility company Technology Installed capacity project launch interest Min loan Max loan Min 450 kWh per

Vorarlberger Kraftwerke AG PV 1,4 MWp 2012 1,400 € loan € 1,400 € 14,000 Min Innsbrucker 200 kWh per

Kommunalbetriebe AG PV 1 MWp 2012 480 € loan € 480 € 6,720 Table 7: Overview of utility companies’ loan models (Austria) (Sources: Innsbrucker Kommunalbetriebe 2015, Vorarlberger Kraftwerke AG 2015)

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Changes to sociotechnical configurations Obviously, the sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants described above markedly differ from citizen power plants developed by bottom-up actors. In the following I will discuss the main differences along various dimensions of sociotechnical configurations. I will first focus on differences between citizen power plants developed by bottom-up initiatives and the sale-and-lease-back models developed by utilities and then add some comments on further differences in the case of the loan models.

 Citizen power plants managed by incumbents (dimensions of ownership & return and management & operation) Possibly the most profound difference between bottom-up citizen power plants and the models offered by utilities is that the latter are operated by incumbent actors in the energy system. This means that these citizen power plants do not constitute independent economic enterprises and do not involve the creation of decentralized economic units in the energy system.  Ownership strictly separated from management and operation / no participation in decision making (dimensions of ownership & return and management & operation) In the sale-and-lease-back models offered by utilities, participation is limited to ownership and foresees no participation in decision-making processes related to the planning and management of the plants. In other words, this model strictly separates ownership of a plant (participatory and distributed) from its management and operation (non-participatory and centralized). To be sure, a trend towards separation between the group of owners of a wind farm or PV plant and its management is not specific to the sale-and-lease back models offered by utilities. In fact, even the replication of citizen power plants rests on an increasing involvement of support actors and external service providers in the planning and management of citizen power plants (see section 7.1.3). This means that the owners of a citizen power plant entrust others with part of its management and operation. Furthermore, the scaling up of initiatives to medium-sized companies has gone along with reduced participation in company assemblies. This has increased the separation between ownership on the one hand and professional management on the other (see section 7.2.3). What is specific to the sale-and lease-back model developed by utilities, however, is that co-owners of the plant have no opportunity whatsoever to participate in company decisions.

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 Ownership tied to buying electricity from the company managing and operating the plant (dimensions of ownership & returns and market relations) In most sale-and-lease-back projects offered by utility companies, a precondition for participation is being or becoming a customer of the respective utility company. Thus, while ownership of the plant is separated from its management and operation, it is at the same time tied to a seller-buyer relation between the company who operates the plant and the prospective co-owner.  Regional or local-urban participation structure (dimension of ownership and returns) The participation models offered by regional utility companies mainly target the population in the respective federal state. This means that their projects are ‘middle range’ in terms of their geographic participation structure: Participation is not mainly focused on local residents, as in many bottom-up projects. On the other hand, participation hardly extends beyond the respective federal state. In the case of major local utilities, the participation structure can be expected to be mainly local. However, local participation in an urban area where most participants do not know each other may mean that participants relate to the project in different ways than in the case of local participation in a small village.  Large-scale technical hardware (dimension of technical hardware) Most sale-and-lease-back citizen power plants developed by Austrian utilities either involve large-scale PV plants or Megawatt wind turbines. This large-scale approach is in line with traditional sociotechnical configuration of power plants operated by utility companies.

Most of the characteristics of sale-and-lease-back models listed above in a similar way also pertain to the loan model offered by two Austrian utilities. The loan model, however, also implies that participants no longer are co-owners of the plant. Therefore it also does not make sense to talk about a separation between ownership and management, as in the second point above. Rather, in this case the utility company both owns and operates the plant. As in the sale-and-lease-back model, participants are not involved in company decisions.

Rationales for uptake by incumbents I will now turn to the question how the engagement of utility companies with citizen power plants can be explained. The hope to reduce local siting conflicts by offering co-ownership to the local population where a plant is situated apparently does not play an important role. As mentioned above, the projects developed by Austrian utilities generally do not provide preferential participation offers to the local participation. Furthermore, most projects concern photovoltaics – a technology where siting issues are generally much less contentious

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than in the case of wind power or biogas. There are, however, a number of further rationales that can make it reasonable for utilities to develop such projects. Firstly, in view of widespread environmental concerns, utilities may wish to position themselves as an environmentally responsible company. Secondly, participation models where co-ownership is conditioned upon buying electricity from the utility company operating the plant can serve as means of customer retention. Finally, co-financing by citizens also reduces the equity capital utilities need to put into the development of the respective power plants, and small private investors usually have comparatively modest expectations concerning return on investment.

An interviewee from a regional utility company offering a sale-and-lease-back participation model mainly emphasizes the rationale of positioning themselves as a ‘green company’ and the rationale of customer retention. Furthermore, the interviewee interprets the project as an experiment to test the reactions of customers towards renewable energy projects.

Well, what has priority? I think it’s that we want to position ourselves as a green company and also exemplify it through our own action, so that has priority. So, really to explore, how are projects, renewable [energy] projects received by our customers? How can they be implemented? Do you also encounter resistance? That is first priority, of course, and, if it is well received, it also produces a particular image and that image brings along customer loyalty, in the end I would grade it that way. [23:9] This means the utility company draws on an understanding of renewable energy technologies as desirable in terms of their environmental benefits. In fact, this is something they have in common with several early bottom-up initiatives that developed citizen power plants in the 1990s out of a concern over the negative environmental impacts of established energy technologies. However, for these pioneer initiatives, such understandings made citizen power plants intrinsically desirable to them. Therefore they were sometimes prepared to put up with significant uncertainty in terms of the projects’ economic viability (see chapter 6). By contrast, for the utility company it is not only the environmental benefits in themselves that make the project meaningful. Rather, by engaging with renewable energy technologies and by offering a participation model they also want to position themselves in a particular way vis-à-vis their customers. In other words, the utility draws on similar symbolic resources as many bottom-up pioneer initiatives, but they use these resources in a different way. By developing citizen power plants they strive to position themselves in alignment with the meanwhile widespread notion of the desirability of renewable energy technologies.

Interestingly, however, although the interviewee emphasizes the rationale of positioning themselves as an environmentally responsible company, he does not consider environmental

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issues to be particular salient in individuals’ decision to participate in the project. Rather, he considers financial returns to be the most important aspect [23:5, 23:13].

For people it’s about the financial return. Well, a lot of them say they want to do good, but most say, OK, what do I get from it? [A little over 3%], that’s still better than putting it on a saving’s account, or bringing it to a bank. (…) Now, this pure eco-idea, that is not really present, the idea that people say, I’ll give 300 Euro and I don’t get anything for it, we’re very far away from that. [23:5] It may appear somewhat contradictory that the representative of the utility company sees the project as a way to position themselves as an environmentally responsible company but at the same time does not see environmental concerns as a central motive for people to participate. However, even if individual decisions to participate are strongly informed by financial considerations, people may still appreciate the eco-friendliness of the project as an added value and evaluate the company’s efforts favourably in these terms.

Incumbents putting their resources to use The successful development of citizen power plants by Austrian utilities of course also rests on the resource base these actors can draw on. Compared to bottom-up initiatives, utility companies have considerable material, social-organizational and knowledge resources at their disposal. This includes funds they can invest in the development of new power plants, an organizational structure and labour force as well as economic, legal and organizational expertise. Furthermore, they can put their material resources to use for hiring additional professional staff with specialized know-how that may be required to develop participative projects.

Indeed, the ability to draw on a considerable resource base is also emphasized as a special asset by the representative of a regional utility company interviewed for this thesis. He argues that smaller bottom-up projects do well to have them as partners. [23:23]

We believe that also [bottom-up] citizen participation projects need us. Because you don’t have an expert sitting there in every project, who has the know-how and also backs it up with capital (…) with small citizen participation projects. [23:23] Another interviewee involved in planning an independent local citizen power plant project also highlights the considerable resource base that utilities can put to their citizen power plant projects. His point, however, is that he considers it somewhat unfair that utilities can draw on this considerable resource base, while smaller initiatives that do not cooperate with utilities may struggle to survive. In particular, he sees utilities at an advantage when it comes to developing watertight legal forms for citizen power plants that comply with the prospectus requirement and the banking law. [22:7]

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Well, what’s nasty is that the monopolists, the utilities, for them it is easier. With the sale and lease back [approach]. As a utility company it is easily manageable, they’re not really queuing up for the money, that’s more a public relations issue and it’s about publicity and that’s quite easy. They have the capability, they have the logistics to back it up, they have the accounting facilities to back it up, and the legal assistance to back it up, because every utility company has a legal department. That way it’s fairly easily manageable for a big organization. For small ones it is difficult, because you’re always a bit in a [legal] grey area. [22:7] Utilities may, however, also lack resources that are more easily available to bottom-up initiatives. In particular, this may concern knowledge over specific local circumstances and particular forms of symbolic resources. In particular, as I have discussed in previous sections (see 6.3.3 and 7.1.2), citizen power plants are sometimes understood as counter-models to utility-owned plants and centralized structures in the energy system. Attempts of utilities to offer their own citizen participation models may therefore be met with suspicion. In particular, the major utilities in Germany are often seen as commercial companies exploiting their quasi-monopolistic status, mainly engaging with environmentally harmful technologies such as nuclear power and coal-fired power plants [1:22, 2:8, 2:46, 6:4]. Several proponents of independent citizen power plants therefore interpret the attempts of German utilities to promote citizen participation as a way to bribe the local population into giving consent to the siting of wind farms, or as a way of retaining control in the electricity sector [1:10, 3:27, 7:28, 9:10]

Very embarrassing for me, here in Baden-Württemberg there is [the utility company] EnBW, they have set up an association that supports the development of these energy cooperatives with the goal of committing the mayors to EnBW and to keep the concession contracts [for grid operation]. [3:27] These critics understand citizen power plants as a way to oppose the market dominance of the major utilities and to build up decentralized economic structures in the energy system (see also section 7.1.2 on the replication of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany). This may be one reason why German utilities have so far been much less active in the development of citizen power plants. In other words, in some cases the symbolic resources attached to citizen power plants are at odds with the idea of such plants being operated by utility companies. In Austria, where market concentration in the electricity sector is less pronounced and where utilities are not tied up in a conflict over nuclear power, such a lack of credibility hardly appears to be a problem [23:22].

Yes, [the utilities in Germany] are really giants, we don’t have that in Austria, well, those are energy giants with old structures (…). We never had that problem. Austria doesn’t have that problem, because here there aren’t any nuclear power plants. The companies, even if we are a regional utility with 400,000 end customers, we don’t have

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that enormous problem, well, we don’t have the nimbus that we’re producing nuclear power and we can also act flexibly on the market. [23:22] Finally, let me turn to the issue of structural resources, in particular different support systems for renewable energy technologies. It is important to note that support mechanisms for renewable energy technologies can have different effects for different types of actors. For new entrants to the electricity system such as bottom-up citizen power plant initiatives, the feed-in tariff system provides a number of important advantages. This includes long-term security on their investment, guaranteed grid access and a manageable administrative burden. Other support mechanisms such as renewables quotas along with tradable green certificates, or competitive bidding processes for a fixed capacity of renewable electricity are less accessible for new entrants to the electricity system. They generally incur a high administrative burden and expose green electricity generators to high market risks that are difficult to assess for new entrants (Verbruggen and Lauber 2012 p. 639-640). By contrast, utilities are better positioned to handle the administrative complexities and the market risks associated with renewables quotas or bidding processes (ibid.; 4:23, 21:22, 23:16).

[The Renewable Energy Act is of special importance for citizen wind farms] because [that way] we have a clear legal framework that says that you can feed-in, that you have a purchase obligation, that you need to get paid a fixed price. That provides these companies with a high level of security, that you need. That is different with large utilities that can take on the risk or that can partly also trade via a marketing system or something similar. [4:23] This means the citizen power plants developed by utilities are likely to be more resilient to changes in the policy framework for green electricity.

7.4.2 Discussion This section has explored how utilities have picked up on the grassroots innovation of citizen power plants, how they have adapted it to fit into their structures and practices and what understandings of citizen power plants has made such a move meaningful to them. As has been discussed in this section, uptake by incumbents rests on utility companies putting their existing resources to use for the development of citizen power plants. In particular, this form of diffusion taps the considerable material, social-organizational and knowledge resources of utility companies. They have funds they can put into renewable energy projects, as well as the expertise and organizational structure to professionally develop and operate them. Furthermore, they are less dependent on specific forms of structural resources (feed-in tariffs) than bottom-up initiatives are.

However, for utilities to engage with citizen power plants in the first place, they also need to see the benefits of it. As I have noted in the introduction to this section, grassroots

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innovations are often understood as oppositional to established practices so that incumbent actors may have little incentive to engage with them. However, for utility companies, offering citizen participation in renewable energy plants can be a way to ensure customer loyalty and to position themselves as an environmentally responsible company. Such a rationale draws on an understanding of wind farms and PV plants as desirable in terms of their environmental benefits. However, contrary to early bottom-up initiatives that drew on similar understandings, it is not only the environmental aspects in themselves that are relevant to utilities. Rather, developing renewable energy plants and offering citizens to participate in them, allows the utilities to position themselves in alignment with the widespread societal norm of environmentally responsible conduct.

However, this requires that utilities’ engagement with citizen power plants must be evaluated as credible and legitimate by their target audience. If utilities themselves have already acquired a public image that is at odds with the way citizen power plants are understood, then their offers may be evaluated quite negatively. This can be observed in relation to the four major utility companies in Germany, where interviewees heavily criticize these utilities’ nascent attempts to develop or support citizen power plants. By contrast, in Austria, uptake of citizen power plants by utilities has hardly sparked any controversy. This difference between Austria and Germany appears to be related to different levels of market concentration in the electricity sector and different ways in which the conflict over nuclear power has played out in the two countries. (For a similar point see also section 9.2 on incumbent challenger conflicts in Germany and Austria.)

Finally, let me turn to the question how the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants has been adapted to fit into the structures and practices of utility companies. Indeed, uptake of this grassroots innovation by utilities has gone along with quite profound modifications. The development of citizen power plants by utility companies in Austria was achieved by a re-alignment of the various dimensions of sociotechnical configurations. In most cases ownership (by citizens) has largely been separated from management and operation (by utilities), while at the same time ownership is dependent on a seller-buyer relation between the utility managing the plant and the individuals owning the plant. The separation between ownership and management also means that decision making is not participatory. Rather, participation is restricted to financial participation. Overall this amounts to a sociotechnical configuration that can be termed ‘consumer participation’. The following table summarizes the differences in sociotechnical configurations between typical bottom-up citizen power plant initiatives and the models developed by Austrian utility companies.

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Community power Consumer participation Technological Small number of small to Large PV plants, sometimes hardware medium-scale PV plants or also wind farms wind turbines in a single location Ownership and Plant(s) owned by members of Customers of local or returns the local community or a regional utility companies as community of interest with owners, ownership separated shared values (e.g. from management and environmentalism) operation Management and Non-professional, local Management by utility operation management; participative companies, top-down decision making decision making Infrastructure Electricity fed-in to national / Electricity fed-in to national / and networking regional grid regional grid Market relations Feed-in tariffs, direct selling to Feed-in tariffs; utility companies Buying electricity from utility company operating the plant as precondition for co- ownership

Table 8: Sociotechnical configurations community power and consumer participation

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7.5 Chapter conclusion In this chapter I have investigated how citizen power plants, as a grassroots innovation, were able to spread. The chapter has been divided into four sections, each exploring a particular form of diffusion of citizen power plants. This concluding section first recapitulates critical issues related to different forms of diffusion (subsection 7.5.1). A second subsection (7.5.2) draws attention to several forms of heterogeneity in the diffusion of this grassroots innovation. In particular, it relates different forms of diffusion to different actor types, variants of sociotechnical configurations, resource use rationales and understandings of citizen power plants.

7.5.1 Critical issues for different forms of diffusion Previous research has identified three possible forms of diffusion of grassroots innovations (Seyfang and Smith 2007, Seyfang 2009): replication, scaling up and uptake by incumbents (also referred to as translation by these authors). Perhaps quite remarkably, all three of these forms of diffusion had an important role to play in the diffusion of citizen power plants in Germany and Austria. However, the relative importance of different forms of diffusion has varied over time and differences can also be found between the two countries I examined. While replication has been stronger in Germany, scaling up and uptake by incumbents has had a stronger role to play in Austria. Furthermore, as far as citizen wind farms in Austria are concerned, replication lost importance over time and eventually stalled due to increasing start-up costs and higher complexities in the planning procedure. Uptake by incumbents of citizen power plants is a fairly recent development. In Austria it started in 2011 and has gained considerable ground since, while in Germany it is only a marginal phenomenon. In addition to replication, scaling up and uptake by incumbents, I identified transfer to another country or technology area as fourth form of diffusion that has played a role for the diffusion of citizen power plants, both in Germany and in Austria.

For each of these forms of diffusion I have examined how they could unfold and what challenges were involved. Summaries of these issues have already been provided in the respective section discussions. Table 9a - Table 9d recapitulate the critical issues I identified for each form of diffusion in a condensed form. For each issue I have also briefly listed examples from my material that affected these issues in a positive or negative way (marked with + / –). I would like to emphasise that marking particular aspects as positive or negative only indicates whether they promoted or inhibited a particular form of diffusion. This does not amount to a normative judgement whether such developments should be welcomed or opposed.

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For example, utility companies adapting citizen power plants to fit into their established structures has supported the diffusion of this grassroots innovation, but in a way that some pioneers view with suspicion. Indeed, the diffusion of citizen power plants brings with it a number of value-laden questions concerning the desirability of different variants of sociotechnical configurations and different actors’ ability to shape the diffusion process. These issues will be addressed more extensively in the following two chapters, which analyse to what extent the diffusion of citizen power plants can be understood as a process of empowerment (chapter 8) and explore conflicts related to the diffusion of citizen power plants (chapter 9).

Critical issues for replication Examples from my material Stable and favourable policy support + Long-term stable feed-in tariff system in (structural resources) Germany – Regional government withdrew support for wind power development in Upper Austria Making knowledge resources available to + Know-how shared via informal regional new initiatives networks in North Frisia and Upper Austria Availability of appropriate social- + Support organizations systematically collect organizational resources do so and distribute know-how on renewable energy cooperatives in Germany

Flexibly reinterpreting citizen power plants + Citizen power plants linked up to broad (adding new symbolic resources) societal concerns such as climate change and the 2008 financial crisis + Citizen power plants reinterpreted as a way to reduce siting conflicts over wind farms Dealing with increasingly demanding + Specialized service providers for citizen wind planning process for wind farms farms in North Frisia – Remained a barrier to further citizen wind farm development in Austria

Table 9a: Critical issues for replication

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Critical issues for scaling up Examples from my material Further extending resource base + Returns from wind farms used to hire professional staff (social-organizational resources) + Targeting broader audiences to raise larger sums (material resources) + Following the availability of suitable sites (natural resources) and feed-in tariffs (structural resources) – Not all initiatives willing or able to professionalize or to give up on principle of localism Flexibly reinterpreting citizen wind farms + Citizen wind farms reinterpreted as investment (changes in symbolic resources) opportunity + Citizen power plants reinterpreted as a way to reduce siting conflicts over wind farms Adapting sociotechnical configuration to fit a + Shift to dispersed geographic participation larger scale structure, professional management, changes in legal form, etc. – Tensions over appropriate forms of adaptation

Table 9b: Critical issues for scaling up

Critical issues for transfer Examples from my material Transferring resources to other country or + Policy transfer of feed-in tariff system from technology area Germany to Austria + Transfer of knowledge resources on citizen wind farms through site visits of Austrian wind farm pioneers in other countries – Differing resource requirements in different technology areas, e.g. costs prove higher than expected – Limited transferability of resources, e.g. know-how is specific to a particular technology area – Competition over policy support between different technology areas

Table 9c: Critical issues for transfer

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Critical issues for uptake by incumbents Examples from my material Putting existing resources to use for citizen + Several Austrian utility companies put their power plants resources to use for citizen power plant projects Flexibly reinterpreting citizen wind farms + Citizen power plants seen as a way to position (different use of symbolic resources) oneself as an environmentally responsible company and as a way of securing customer loyalty – Utilities’ engagement with citizen power plants not evaluated as credible and legitimate by some proponents of citizen power plants in Germany Adapting sociotechnical configuration to fit + With sale-and-lease-back model and loan with established structures and practices of models utilities allow consumers to participate utility companies financially but retain control over project management

Table 9d: Critical issues for uptake by incumbents

7.5.2 Structured heterogeneity The approach I have taken in this chapter has involved looking at the way various actors have employed particular resources, have engaged in resource exchange relationships and have thus produced and spread different variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants. This has made visible a large amount of heterogeneity in the diffusion of this grassroots innovation. This includes not only a distinction between different forms of diffusion and variability of sociotechnical configurations, but also a variety of actors involved and a broad range of different understandings attached to citizen power plants. This subsection attempts to come to grips with this heterogeneity and to relate particular forms of diffusion to particular actor groups, variants of sociotechnical configurations and understandings of citizen power plants.

Resource use rationales Part of the heterogeneity that I have observed in the diffusion of citizen power plant has already informed the way I have structured this chapter along different forms of diffusion. Replication, scaling up, transfer to new countries or technology areas and uptake by incumbents represent quite different ways in which the grassroots innovation ‘citizen power plant’ has spread. Each of these forms of diffusion itself rests on a typical resource use rationale.

For example, replication rests on passing on know-how from established to new initiatives and the development of support organizations as an infrastructure for collecting and sharing knowledge (social-organizational resources). Furthermore, suitable sites for wind turbine 152

development are left to respective local initiatives. Broadly speaking this may be termed a ‘collect and share’ approach to the use of resources. By contrast, citizen wind farm initiatives that scaled up to a significant extent used the expertise they had developed during their pioneer phase within their organization. Furthermore, they strived to secure further sites, raise larger amounts of money and built up their own organizational base to handle increasingly demanding planning processes. In other words, scaling up relies mostly on using accumulated resources and further extending them within an initiative. Thirdly, transfer of citizen wind farms from Germany to Austria benefitted from a concurrent transfer of knowledge resources and structural resources. Finally, uptake by incumbents rests on utility companies putting their material, social-organizational and knowledge resources to use for citizen power plant projects.

The following table summarizes these different resource use rationales. This is not to say that all resources are used or exchanged in this way. In particular, symbolic resources do not easily fit into this scheme (see below for a discussion of different understandings of citizen power plants). However, the rationales listed below are an attempt to articulate characteristic forms in which resources are handled for each form of diffusion.

Resource use rationale Replication Collect and share resources In particular knowledge resources, social-organizational resources and natural resources Scaling up Utilize and expand resource base In particular knowledge resources, social-organizational resources, material resources, natural resources Transfer Transfer resources In particular knowledge resources and structural resources Uptake by Put existing resources to new use incumbents In particular knowledge resources, social-organizational resources and material resources

Table 10: Resource use rationales for different forms of diffusion Actors Apart from being based on different resource use rationales, different forms of diffusion are pursued by different types of actors. For the replication of citizen power plants it is mainly established and new bottom-up initiatives along with various support organizations that push the process forward; in the case of continued scaling up the process is driven by bottom-up initiatives that turn into medium-sized companies; and in the case of uptake by incumbents

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it is utilities that take the lead. This is not to say that these are the only relevant actors for the respective form of diffusion. However, they are the lead actors in moving a particular form of diffusion forward. It is more difficult to associate the transfer of citizen power plants to a new country or technology with a particular group of actors, as I encountered quite different actor constellations in different cases. In the cases of transfer to another technology area that I looked at, some individuals who were already experienced with onshore citizen wind farms attempted to transfer the model to offshore wind and to biogas. In the case of transfer of citizen wind farms from Germany and other countries to Austria, it was Austrian bottom-up initiatives that ‘imported’ the model they had encountered abroad.

Sociotechnical configurations Apart from resource use rationales and types of actors, different forms of diffusion are related to different variants of sociotechnical configurations. Replication, by definition of the term, hardly involves any changes in sociotechnical configurations. I have termed the sociotechnical configuration that is reproduced in this case ‘community power’. By contrast, continued scaling up and uptake by incumbents have gone along with significant modifications. I have labelled the resulting variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants ‘green shareholding’ and ‘consumer participation’ respectively (see sections 7.2.3 and 7.4.2). Table 11 on page 155 gives an overview of these different variants of sociotechnical configurations I have identified. Of course, these are to some degree simplified ideal types and empirically diversity can be found within these strands. The typology, however, serves to accentuate different strands of development. Again, for the case of transfer of citizen power plants to another country or technology area, there is no unifying picture that emerges. The cases I considered already differed with respect to the initial configurations actors strived to transfer and furthermore the cases of transfer to another technology area eventually failed.

In Table 11, ‘infrastructure and networking’ stands out in that there is no variation between the different sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants along this dimension. The only variation in this dimension is between the early vision of some renewable energy enthusiasts of small, self-sufficient units and the grid-integrated manner in which citizen power plants were eventually realized (cf. section 4.3 and see also section 8.3 on dependency relations for a further discussion of this point).

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Replication: Community power Scaling up: Green shareholding Uptake by incumbents: Consumer participation

Technological hardware Small number of small to medium- Several large wind farms or PV Large PV plants or wind farms scale PV plant or wind turbines in a plants in different locations single location

Ownership and returns Plant(s) owned by members of the Geographically dispersed citizens as Customers of local or regional local community or a community of owners, company shareholding utility companies as owners, interest with shared values (e.g. rather than co-ownership of specific ownership separated from environmentalism) plants management and operation

Management and operation Non-professional, local Professional, non-local Management by utility companies, management; participative decision management; partly participative top-down decision making making decision-making

Infrastructure and Electricity fed-in to national / Electricity fed-in to national / Electricity fed-in to national / networking regional grid regional grid regional grid

Market relations Feed-in tariffs, direct selling to Feed-in tariffs, direct selling to Feed-in tariffs; utility companies utility companies, selling to end Buying electricity from utility users company operating the plant as precondition for co-ownership

Table 11: Variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants

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Interpretative flexibility Finally, heterogeneity is also visible in the multiple ways in which citizen power plants are interpreted as meaningful and desirable (symbolic resources). As has been noted before, this is captured by the term interpretative flexibility, originally introduced in relation to the social construction of technology (Pinch and Bijker 1984 p. 421-424). Indeed, this perhaps is where the largest degree of diversity can be found. I have clustered the broad array of understandings of citizen power plants I have found in my material into four strands: opposition, responsibility & self-governance, ecological modernisation and suasion & compliance. Table 12a - Table 12d list the different understandings that can be subsumed under these four headings and provide an illustrative quote for each of them.

These different understandings of citizen power plants cannot straightforwardly be assigned to different forms of diffusion. Rather, they have often been flexibly extended and adapted within particular forms of diffusion. Sometimes multiple or even contradictory understandings exist in relation to single projects. In Table 13, which summarizes this section, I have, however, listed the most relevant strands of understandings for each form of diffusion (see p. 159).

Opposition: Citizen power plants as opposition to established sociotechnical configurations Developing The regional advantage here [in the region around Freiburg] alternatives to nuclear certainly is the resistance against the nuclear power plant Wyhl that power we had here in the late 70ies, early 80ies that strongly influenced the region and that also resulted in a significant preparedness to invest in alternative energy. In other words, people really said, OK, I’ll risk the capital and if it’s gone it’s gone. But basically everybody believed it could work. [1:2] Opposing market We want structural change, we want to crush the dependency on dominance of large monopolies and to this end such medium-sized companies that are utilities emerging (…) are a very appropriate means in order to keep economic flows within the region (…) and to politically disempower the large corporations to some extent. [2:8]

Table 12a: Understandings of citizen power plants from the strand opposition

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Responsibility and self-governance: Citizen power plants as an expression of responsibility and local self-governance Environmental After all we’re completely destroying our living environment and protection therefore I think we are asked and even obliged, also in the interest of our descendants, to become active in this area and simply to support renewable energy. That is the basic idea. [19:1] Regional value Meanwhile what has absolute priority is (…) the issue of the creation & sustaining development of rural areas. Here rural areas finally can score and livelihoods the question is, do we need to do it like with African gold mines? No African owns the gold mine. Or must we say, we will really manage to help people to secure their potential in order to realise it within a structure they own themselves? [7:18] Taking pride in local It is something we are very, very proud of, so that one can say in achievements [our town] the wind turbines are not only generators of alternative energy, but they have also established themselves as the town’s landmark. [14:25] Well I do think it would be a deep hit for the local people, if suddenly the word is that [the turbines have been sold to an external company]. (…) Because, to put it harshly, it would not be worth a betrayal of our homeland. [14:38]

Table 12b: Understandings of citizen power plants from the strand responsibility and self-governance

Ecological modernisation: Citizen power plants as a green business opportunity Investing, with an You invest in [the company] to be part of clean electricity environmental added generation on the long term and [because of] the black figures. value [16:16] For people it’s about the financial return. Well, a lot of them say they want to do good, but most say, OK, what do I get from it? [A little over 3%], that’s still better than putting it on a saving’s account, or bringing it to a bank. [23:5] Positioning oneself as Well, what has priority? I think it’s that we want to position an environmentally ourselves as green company and also exemplify it through our own responsible company action, so that has priority. So, really to explore, how are projects, renewable [energy] projects received by our customers? How can they be implemented? Do you also encounter resistance? That is first priority. [23:9]

Table 12c: Understandings of citizen power plants from the strand ecological modernisation

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Suasion and compliance: Citizen power plants as a means of securing compliance with policies or business strategies Reducing siting Well, the NIMBY effect, a very important point that often weighs conflicts against the construction of new wind turbines. The turbines are getting higher, they can be seen from further afield, in other words you need greater acceptance and you can only achieve that by involving citizens locally. [4:29] Securing customer If [the project] it is well received, it also produces a particular loyalty image and that image brings along customer loyalty. [23:9]

Table 12d: Understandings of citizen power plants from the strand suasion and compliance

The following table sums up what I have said about heterogeneity along several dimensions and about the way different forms of diffusion can be related to them. The different forms of diffusion as well as the various resource use rationales, sociotechnical configurations and understandings of citizen power plants I relate to them should all be understood as analytical categories. That is to say, they are grounded in my empirical material, but not as pre-existing entities. Rather, they are typifications that result from my analysis of the empirical field. For scaling up, the factors listed in this table specifically pertain to the process of continued scaling up (see section 7.2.2). Where scaling up remained within narrow limits (see section 7.2.1), resource use rationales, central actors, sociotechnical configuration and dominant understandings have remained close to the case of replication.

This heterogeneity along several dimensions is not only interesting as an analytical differentiation of the field, it also helps to understand how citizen power plants could spread in Germany and Austria. Different forms of diffusion were pursued by different actors for different reasons. The interpretative flexibility of citizen wind farms and the fragmentation of the field into different variants of sociotechnical configurations in fact contributed to the success of the diffusion of citizen power plants. Along a similar line, Gordon Walker and colleagues have argued that the diversity of ways in which the term ‘community energy’ has been applied in the UK has supported the development of many different types of local renewable energy activities (Walker, Hunter et al. 2007 p. 78).

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Resource Central actors Sociotechnical Dominant use rationale configuration understandings Replication Collect and Established and Community power Opposition, share new bottom-up responsibility & resources initiatives, self-governance support

organizations Scaling up Exploit and Bottom-up Green shareholding Responsibility & expand initiatives self-governance, resource base turning into ecological medium-sized modernisation, companies suasion & compliance Transfer Transfer [variable] [variable] [variable] resources Uptake by Put existing Utility Consumer Ecological incumbents resources to companies participation modernisation, new use suasion & compliance

Table 13: Forms of diffusion and heterogeneity along several dimensions

On the other hand, Walker and colleagues also alert us to the fact that it is problematic if the term ‘community energy’ is stretched too far (Walker, Hunter et al. 2007 p. 76-78). Similarly, in the case of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany one may also ask which variants of the sociotechnical configuration may still legitimately be referred to as citizen power plants. Indeed, the flexibility in understandings of citizen power plants and the considerable heterogeneity in sociotechnical configurations not only contribute to widescale diffusion but can also cause tensions. For example, the entry of utilities brings new resources to the field but also reshapes the sociotechnical configuration in ways that not all actors approve of. Seen this way, it becomes difficult to apply the notion of ‘success’ in relation to the diffusion of a grassroots innovation. As Adrian Smith and Rob Raven have pointed out, “[t]he more an innovation spreads, the greater variety of advocates will argue for their particular version of it” (Smith and Raven 2012 p. 1026). What is more, the ability of different actors to engage in such advocacy may of course differ. This highlights the need to take a closer look at power relations and conflicts in relation to the diffusion of citizen power plants, something which will be dealt with in the following two chapters.

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8 A process of empowerment?

In my analysis of the diffusion of citizen power plants in chapter 7 I have already pointed to some power issues that are related to particular forms of the diffusion of citizen power plants. In particular this pertains to the issue of dependency relations that was raised in the context of replication and transfer (see section discussions 7.1.3 and 7.3.3). I have noted that, especially in Germany, support for citizen power plant initiatives has become available from a variety of different established actors such as regional governments, cooperative auditing associations, banks and even utility companies. This has promoted replication, but at the same time brings up the question whether too much control is placed in the hands of these actors. Furthermore I have noted that the challenges related to the transfer of citizen power plants to another technology area may be dealt with through strategic cooperation with more resourceful actors such as utility companies. This brings up similar questions about dependency on more established actors. This chapter intends to provide a more systematic exploration of power issues related to the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany.

Paying attention to issues of power is important in the face of repeated criticism that power relations are often underplayed in the study of sustainability transitions, such as transformation processes in the energy system towards sustainability (Shove and Walker 2007, 2008, Scrase and Smith 2009, Avelino 2011). Only recently have power relations started to form a line of enquiry in the sustainability transitions literature (Avelino 2011, Geels 2014, Hess 2014). In the case of grassroots innovations, issues of power can be expected to be particularly salient, as it constitutes a particular challenge for civil society- based initiatives to establish themselves against more powerful actors with potentially opposing interests (cf. Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 597, 599/600, Hess 2013 p. 2).

I will first take a brief a look at the way issues of power and empowerment have so far been addressed in the existing literature on grassroots innovations. Although, to my knowledge, power relations have not yet systematically been investigated or theorized in this context, two contrasting perspectives have been offered that can be seen as two sides of the same coin: grassroots innovations as innovations of comparatively powerless actors (emphasizing limitations) and grassroots innovations as a form of empowerment (emphasizing potentials).

Thus, on the one hand, it has been repeatedly noted that the power of grassroots innovators is quite limited. Indeed, grassroots innovations, as innovations developed by community groups and civil society actors, are almost by definition innovations of comparatively powerless actors. As bottom-up actors developing alternative sociotechnical configurations, they are in a much weaker position than actors with vested interests in established structures 161

(Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 599/600, Seyfang 2009 p. 180). Hess (2013) has argued that initiatives developing grassroots innovations, such as distributed solar energy, often find themselves marginalized and blocked by incumbent actors such as utilities. If their new approaches do eventually establish themselves, it is usually via adaptation and incorporation of their approach by incumbent actors, while the original grassroots innovators get pushed aside (Hess 2013, similarly Smith 2007). For example, the incorporation of organic food into the mainstream food supply system went along with a narrowing down of the sustainability practices propagated by grassroots innovators in this area (Smith 2007 p. 442).

On the other hand, grassroots innovations have also been described as a means of empowerment. In particular, Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith (2007) have argued that grassroots innovations have the potential to empower individuals by offering a platform for collective action. Many grassroots innovations serve to channel the interests of a large group of people, thus enabling interventions in established systems of provision that would be beyond the reach of each individual. As Seyfang and Smith put it,

[Grassroots innovations] “help overcome the principal problem with an individualised approach to greening the market, namely, that acting individually, consumers are powerless to change the rules of the game, they are stuck within current socio- technological regimes” (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 595). Along a similar line, Eva Heiskanen and colleagues (2010) have argued that collective action in low-carbon communities can help overcome social dilemmas and feelings of helplessness encountered in the context of individual behaviour change aiming at lower carbon emissions. For example, joining up in food-cooperatives allows individuals to buy regional, organic products and to ensure that the largest part of value creation remains with the farmers. Collectively setting up a PV plant on the roof of a school or community centre allows individuals who do not have a roof or the financial means for their own PV installation to pool their resources and put them towards a shared goal.

However, the question remains how grassroots innovators can manage to establish themselves in spite of unequal power relations referred to above. Furthermore one may ask whether or under what conditions their establishment can be understood as a process of empowerment – not only of individual actors, but also of community groups as collective actors. In this chapter I want to explore this question in relation to the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany. Does the success of such initiatives, in particular in Germany, mean that their emergence and diffusion can be understood as a process of empowerment? (See research question (4) on p. 12.)

The following section provides another extension of my theoretical framework that allows me to capture power issues in relation to the diffusion of citizen power plants. For this 162

purpose I will mainly draw on Flor Avelino’s (2011) conceptualization of power in transition processes. Section 8.2 then presents a perspective from which the diffusion of citizen power plants can, in principle, be interpreted as a process of empowerment. However, in sections 8.3 to 8.5 I will discuss a number of problems and paradoxes this involves. Finally, section 8.6 summarizes the main points made in this chapter.

8.1 Theoretical framework, extension 2: Power and empowerment

Power concepts and the analysis of grassroots innovations The two contrasting perspectives on power issues in relation to grassroots innovations referred to above in fact mirror some longstanding themes in the conceptualization of power. Thinking of grassroots innovations as a means of empowerment reflects concepts of power that emphasize the productiveness of power. Power is what allows actors to do something and thereby to make a difference in the world ('power to', see e.g. Avelino 2011 p. 57).11 Furthermore, thinking of grassroots innovations as a means to exercise power implicitly understands power as distributed: Power is not only held by a small elite but resides with each individual. It becomes particularly effective if several people with shared interests join forces. (On different perspectives on the situatedness of power see Allen 2004 p. 20-24, Avelino 2011 p. 58)

Conversely, looking towards grassroots innovators as comparatively powerless actors vis-à- vis incumbents points towards power as an obstructive, constraining and potentially even oppressive force. The power of incumbent actors sets barriers to the agency of others (‘power over’). Looking at grassroots innovators in this way also suggests seeing power as concentrated, as residing with a limited number of ‘powerholders’. Alternatively, adopting the systemic conception, emphasizing the powerlessness of grassroots innovators may also understand power as diffused in the sense of not residing with actors but within the regime (Allen 2004 p. 20-24, Avelino 2011 p. 58).12

Some aspects of these seemingly contradictory perspectives on power can be reconciled when conceptualizations of power are understood as a tool to guide empirical analysis rather than as ontological commitments. Concerning the question of where power resides I consider it helpful to think of power as at least potentially distributed, albeit not necessarily evenly distributed. The question to what extent power is concentrated in the hands of few or distributed among many actors can then be treated as an empirical question (Avelino 2011

11 Conceptualizing power as productive is particularly salient in Hannah Arendt’s understanding of power. Arendt relates power to the interactions of a plurality of individuals (Arendt 1970). 12 This, for example is part of Foucault’s ([1975] 1991) conception of power. In his view, power does not reside with actors but rather is constituted by structures through which agents act. 163

p. 81). Secondly, the productive and obstructive side of power can be understood as two sides of the same coin: While power may produce particular forms of action, it can at the same time disable other forms of action. From this perspective power is always productive, but it may be exercised as re-productive power or as transformative power. Reproductive power continues to produce established forms of action while potentially constraining others. Transformative power produces new forms of action while potentially disabling established ones (Avelino 2011 p. 72/73).

A resource-based understanding of power Among the many conceptions of power that exist in the literature, one strand attempts to understand power in terms of resources that actors have at their disposal. Such resource- based conceptions of power both allow to understand power in the ways just described and offer an obvious entry point for linking up an analysis of power relations with resource mobilization theory. I will closely follow Flor Avelino’s conceptualization of power, who understands it as “the capacity of actors to mobilize resources to realize a certain goal” (Avelino 2011 p. 69). This implies a conceptualization of power as distributed, albeit potentially unevenly distributed: Any actor may have the capacity to mobilize certain resources, but not all actors will be able to mobilize the same amount or the same type of resources. Furthermore resources are something that is put to use to achieve a certain goal. This highlights the productiveness of power which may, however, be re-productive (reinforcive power) or transformative (transformative power) (ibid. p. 72/73).

Furthermore, as Flor Avelino points out, this conception of power avoids a static image of power that is implicit in other resource-based understandings that define power as the distribution of resources among actors at a fixed moment in time (ibid. p. 62). Such static conceptions result in a bias towards stability, since they fail to take account of efforts towards redistributing resources or creating new ones. By contrast, Avelino’s approach also takes into account the process of resource mobilization. Again, the idea behind her conceptualization is not to instead privilege change over stability, but rather to treat the question whether power is used to stabilize existing structures and practices or to introduce new ones as an empirical question (ibid. p. 61).

As already noted, this conceptualization of power links up closely with my use of resource mobilization theory. Indeed, resource mobilization theory looks at ways in which civil society actors succeed or fail to access and use resources for a particular goal, usually related to a social change agenda. The activities of actors involved in a social movement can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to exercise transformative power. Furthermore, as in my use of resource mobilization theory (see section 6.1.2), Avelino adopts a broad

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understanding of resources, including human, mental, monetary, artifactual and natural resources (2011 p. 69). These resource categories are similar to mine, differing mainly in some accentuations. For the sake of consistency I will stick to the resource classification I have developed in section 6.1.2.

Nevertheless I risk a certain paradox if I directly adopt Avelino’s definition of power as the capacity of actors to mobilize resources to achieve a particular goal and combine it with the perspective I have taken so far. In the cases I consider, it is possible to say in retrospect that early citizen power plant initiatives were eventually able to mobilize sufficient resources to set up collectively owned wind farms and PV plants. Thus, using the conceptualization of power introduced above, one could argue that they were powerful actors to start with – they were capable of mobilizing considerable resources and achieving the goal they had set themselves. However, this does not seem to appropriately capture general understandings of power. After all, it was initially highly uncertain whether these initiatives would eventually succeed. Taken this way, all actors who eventually obtain access to resources that allow them to achieve their goal would, in retrospect, have to be defined as powerful. Indeed, it would hardly be possible to classify actors as powerful or powerless because it is impossible to know whether they will eventually be able to mobilize resources for their goals in the future.

This is mainly a problem of terminology – the question is what exactly is meant by ‘resource mobilization’. In line with the literature on resource mobilization theory, I have in previous chapters used this term in the sense of a long-term and open-ended process. The emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany extended over long periods of time, spanning several decades. At the beginning of this process it was impossible to say whether early initiatives would succeed. Resource mobilization can, however, also be understood as a more short-term, temporally bounded process of accessing and using resources in which the principal availability of a resource to an actor is hardly in question. The latter understanding appears to be more appropriate to analyse power for my purpose. Thus, in order to avoid confusion, I will define power as the capacity of actors to access and use resources for a particular goal. Furthermore, I will continue to use the term ‘resource mobilization’ for the open-ended and potentially long-term process by which actors attempt to enlarge their resource base. Resource mobilization thus can be thought of as a process by which actors attempt to extend their power. My use of the term ‘actor’ in these conceptualizations can refer both to individual and collective actors.

This should not be misunderstood as an abandonment of the main point of Avelino’s conceptualization of power, namely her introduction of a time dimension instead of simply looking at the distribution of resources at a given point in time. However, I am merely

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distinguishing between the power actors have at a certain point in time (capacity to access and use resources) and the process by which actors attempt to enlarge their resource base, thus potentially changing the distribution of power. Furthermore, it is still possible to analyse whether resources are used to reinforce existing structures or to develop new ones.

Power relations and empowerment Leading on from this conceptualization of power, power relations between actors can be characterized along three different dimensions. For one thing, power relations between actors are characterized by the comparative volume of resources they can access and use. Secondly there is the issue of resource dependencies. Indeed, as John Edwards and John D. McCarthy (2004 p. 131) have noted in their reflections on resource mobilization theory, resources typically come with strings attached. In this context, the authors point to debates on the intents of foundations that provide funds for social movements and point to claims that these foundations may be trying to moderate movement goals and tactics (ibid. p. 123). More generally, in terms of their channels of resource access, two actors may be independent from one another, or there may be a one-sided or a mutual dependency relation. Thirdly, the goals to which two actors strive to put resources may be in alignment, may conflict with one another or may be independent from one another (Avelino 2011 p. 75-76).

Based on these dimensions of power relations, I would argue that it is possible to outline what puts actors in privileged or disadvantaged positions: Actors are in a privileged position in terms of power relations if they have access to a comparatively large amount of resources and they are not dependent on other actors for resource access, especially not unilaterally dependent. Actors are in a disadvantaged position in terms of power relations if they have access to comparatively few resources and if they strongly and unilaterally depend on others for resource access, especially if those actors have goals that are in conflict with theirs.

Based on these conceptions of power and power relations, empowerment can be understood as the increase of an actor’s capacity to access and use resources for his or her goals (cf. Avelino 2011 p. 76-78). Furthermore, I would argue that actors who are empowered should be understood to be initially in a disadvantaged position in terms of power relations. Thus I will think of empowerment as the strengthening of disadvantaged actors in their power relations. This includes an extension of the resources they have access to, an increase of their ability to make use of those resources to reach their goals and a reduction of unilateral dependency relations, in particular on actors with conflicting goals. As Avelino has noted, actors can increase their capacity to access and use resources by themselves (self- empowerment) or others actor can help them to do so (ibid. p. 77). In this context, critical

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theorists have pointed to a paradox of empowerment, namely that empowering another actor creates a new dependency relationship which is inherently disempowering (ibid. p. 67).

Against this background the question I address in this chapter can be articulated in the following ways: To what extent has the capacity of community groups and civil society actors to access and use resources for the development of citizen power plants increased? Were dependency relations reduced? Did citizen power plant initiatives and the individuals engaged therein actually constitute disadvantaged actors to start with? The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. The next section briefly recapitulates the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany as a process in which citizen power plant initiatives extended their resource base and thus increased the leverage they had. I will argue that in terms of increasing access to resources, the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants can indeed be interpreted as a process of empowerment. However, in the following three sections I will provide further perspectives that qualify this proposition.

First, I will question to what extent unilateral dependency on actors with conflicting goals could be reduced (section 8.3). I will argue that while some dependencies could indeed be removed, others in fact newly emerged. Secondly I will recall that widescale diffusion could often only be achieved at the cost of profound changes to the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants (section 8.4). In other words, the goals to which resources were put during the course of diffusion did not remain unchanged. Finally, I will turn to the question whether citizen power plant initiatives and the individuals engaged therein constituted disadvantaged actors to start with (section 8.5). I will argue that this is a matter of perspective. While they indeed constituted disadvantaged actors compared to incumbent actors in the energy system, they are in fact often privileged compared to other communities or individuals.

8.2 Increasing access to resources

As has already been noted, grassroots innovations can create leverage for more sustainable systems of provision because they serve as a platform for pooling resources and for collectively mobilizing additional ones (cf. Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 595). This can also be argued for the case of the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants [7:1, 15:40, 16:51, 12:48, 18:26]

Here people can create impact with us, with every Euro of invested capital I know that at the end of the year so and so many kilowatts of clean electricity have been produced.

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(…) With us a wind farm is constructed and I am immediately part of it, I support it, I participate. [16:51] Most people say ‘well, what should I do about this?’ In fact that is what we most of all have to struggle against and have struggled against. Explaining a little the orders of magnitude to people and giving people a chance [to say] ‘yes, in fact I can do something after all’. [15:40] In other words, citizen power plant initiatives can open up new opportunities for people interested in contributing to the diffusion of renewable energy technologies but who may feel helpless as individuals. For example, people who do not have enough money to install a PV panel or who, living in a flat, do not have the opportunity to do so, can instead become a co-owner of a larger PV plant. In the early citizen wind farm initiatives I described in chapter 6, the individuals involved pooled a broad variety of resources, including equity capital, different kinds of expertise and land for setting up the turbines. In this way, citizen power plant initiatives created leverage that went beyond the individual leverage of all the people involved.

Beyond the empowerment of individuals, citizen power plant initiatives, as collective actors, extended their access to resources and their ability to use them for a certain goal. They collectively mobilized additional resources, for example by extending their know-how on technical and organizational issues, developing shared understandings about why such projects are meaningful, or by negotiating remuneration for feeding electricity into the grid. In chapter 6 I have already discussed this process extensively. In particular, I showed that early citizen wind farm initiatives needed a variety of different resources: structural resources (in particular investment subsidies or feed-in tariffs), natural resources (suitable turbine sites), knowledge resources (technical, legal, organizational expertise), material resources (equity capital), social-organizational resources (networks through which further people could be attracted) as well as symbolic resources (e.g. wind farm as symbol of alternatives to nuclear power or as a local landmark). Different initiatives started with different resource endowments, but all of them needed to mobilize further resources to push through with their projects. In this way, bottom-up initiatives managed to set up collectively owned wind farms largely against the will of incumbent actors. The following quote, in a condensed way, may help to recall this process of resource mobilization of early citizen power plant initiatives.

L., the pioneer and founder of the company, already for a long time had the desire not to let the wind sweep over the hilltops in this area untapped [natural resources as starting point, A/N], but to transform it into electricity instead. He concerned himself with wind power, but Austria, on the basis of data measured by the Central Institute for Meteorology and Geodynamics but also data and assessments by the flight authorities, was for a long time regarded as an unsuitable middle European region [need to 168

mobilize knowledge resources on wind speeds, A/N]. But the pioneers did not give up and through political pressure eventually achieved that one obtained framework conditions making it (…) economically reasonable to operate wind turbines [mobilization of structural resources, A/N]. In 1998, a window of opportunity opened up and L. as initiator installed these two wind turbines (…) with a few fellow promoters. (…) It was like that, the equity capital had to be raised jointly, because the initiators were not able to come up with this sum [mobilization of material resources, A/N]. [10:4] Early citizen wind farm initiatives mobilized many resources by themselves, largely without the help of more established actors. For example, early citizen wind farm initiatives developed know-how on technical, organizational and legal issues, pooled money or searched for a suitable piece of land to set up a wind farm. This can be interpreted as a process of self-empowerment, as the initiatives themselves worked to enlarge their resource base. For other resources, such as the provision of feed-in tariffs, they also strongly depended on external actors.

Meanwhile support actors have emerged that specifically try to channel resources towards citizen power plant initiatives. For example, they collect and share knowledge resources, lobby for structural resources and sometimes even provide financial support (see section 7.1). In addition to that, citizen power plant initiatives that scaled up continued to extend their resource base. They built up social-organizational resources by hiring professional staff, further expanded their knowledge resources, acquired further sites for wind power development and used marketing campaigns to raise large sums. Finally, the engagement of utilities with citizen power plants has meant that considerable material resources, knowledge resources and social-organizational resources have been put to the development of citizen power plants.

This means an increasing amount of resources has become available for the development of citizen power plants. It is therefore possible to argue that citizen power plant initiatives have been empowered, as their capacity to access and use resources for their goals has increased. However, for access to several of these resources, citizen power plant initiatives unilaterally depend on various support actors, policy actors and utility companies. The next section therefore turns to the issue of dependency relations.

8.3 Old and new dependency relations

As noted in section 8.1, actors depending on others for resource access are in a particularly difficult position if this dependency is unilateral and if the actors they depend on have goals that are in full or partial conflict to their own goals. In the following, I will explore this issue in relation to citizen power plant initiatives in Austria and Germany. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to perform a full analysis of resource dependencies involved in their emergence

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and diffusion. However, I will pick up on the most salient issues that were articulated in interviews and thereby point so some general problems and dilemmas.

To start with, citizen-owned energy installations are sometimes associated with notions of independence and self-sufficiency. Indeed, Rüdiger Mautz and colleagues note that early visions of citizen power plants in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Germany involved the concept of independent, self-sufficient units (Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 35-37).

„The vision of energy supply on the basis of renewable energies (…) not only amounted to a future pluralistic structure of energy producers. Rather, as a last consequence, it aimed at a radical alternative to the established electricity system, namely the disconnection from the traditional integrated grid of the big utility companies to the furthest possible extent and thereby ultimately at decentralized self-supply.” (Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 37, translated from German original) So far, however, almost all citizen power plants in Germany and Austria operate in a grid- integrated manner. Under given conditions, directly distributing the electricity generated by a collectively owned wind farm or PV plant to a few dozen owners would involve considerable technical and economic difficulties. Therefore, citizen power plants, in the way they were eventually realised, do not make the people involved less dependent on the established grid infrastructure and the companies operating the grids.

Of course, if, for example, you have your own PV panel at home, then that really is your electricity, so to say, that gives you the feeling of independence. But if I only feed energy into the grid of a [regional utility company] (…), then I find it difficult to see an additional personal advantage for me in terms of [energy] security. Because if [the utility company] doesn’t like me, then they’ll simply disconnect me, that’s the idea. [15:37] In fact, rather than becoming independent from grid-supplied electricity as consumers, citizen power plant initiatives also became dependent on grid operators permitting them to feed the electricity they produced into the grid. Indeed, one of the most salient dependency relations early citizen power plant initiatives faced concerned grid access and prices paid for the electricity produced. Both in Germany, before the introduction of the Electricity Feed-in Law in 1991, and in Austria, before the introduction of regional feed-in tariffs, citizen power plant initiatives were highly and unilaterally dependent on regional utility companies in this respect. The terms and conditions for being connected to the grid and the payments received for electricity fed in to the grid were not regulated in any way. Citizen wind farm initiatives therefore had to negotiate these issues on a case by case basis and it was unclear whether utilities would thwart their plans altogether. [1:13, 2:21, 10:17, 15:20, 17:32]

We once were in touch with the [regional utility company]. All the land-residents were there with (…) and [the utility company] would have paid us a considerable sum if we

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had abandoned the project. (…) In fact they wanted to buy the project from us and draw the curtain over it. [17:32] Yes, [prior to the feed-in tariffs] we had direct purchase contracts, remuneration was abysmal and dependency was high. (…) Well, the Renewable Energy Act was central, because after all we have a complete imbalance on the electricity market. We have large powerful players (…). They would have had all sorts of chances to thwart the medium- sized companies, and because of the Renewable Energy Act that no longer was possible. [2:21] The Electricity Feed-in Law introduced in Germany in 1991 largely eliminated this problem for citizen wind farms. Following the reorganization of the German feed-in system in 2000 by the Renewable Energy Act, the same applied to citizen PV plants. In Austria, feed-in tariffs were introduced in 1999 at the regional level and harmonised at the national level with the introduction of the Green Electricity Law in 2003 (see also sections 4.1 and 4.2 on policy support for wind power and PV).

These regulations ensure grid connection and set fixed rates that producers of green electricity, such as citizen power plant initiatives, receive. As noted before, this was particularly important for citizen power plant initiatives, because the security it provides is particularly important for small, non-professional investors (see section 7.4.1). Therefore, the introduction of feed-in tariff systems constituted an important part of the empowerment process. [4:23, 8:35, 9:25, 21:22].

I contend that without the Renewable Energy Act we certainly would not have this number of wind farms in the hands of citizens or in the hands of medium-sized companies. Instead it would have ended up with those who have other financial resources. [8:35] Somewhat ironically, however, the introduction of feed-in tariffs also created new dependency relations. The state that provides a feed-in tariff system and thereby supports citizen power plant initiatives also makes them dependent on this kind of support. This constitutes a case of the paradox of empowerment that has been noted by critical theorists (see section 8.1). The notion of one actor empowering another through the provision of particular resources is inherently paradoxical, as this makes him or her newly dependent on this channel of resource access.

In the case of feed-in tariffs, this problem comes to the fore whenever the continuity of the feed-in tariff system is at risk. Especially in Austria there have been severe problems with stop and go policies in relation to the Green Electricity Act. For several years there was high uncertainty with respect to the conditions of support, due to frequent amendments or suggestions for amendments that were circulated but never realized. [13:39, 15:36, 17:54, 21:54]

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That’s a basic problem here in Austria, that all support schemes always are very complex and short-lived. The door is open for a short time, then it is closed again and if you’re unlucky you get squeezed in the middle, that also happens time and again. [15:36] Recent amendments to the German Renewable Energy Act along with stricter regulations concerning public investment offers have also dampened the prospects of citizen power plants in Germany (Müller and Holstenkamp 2015 p. 8). This is not to say that feed-in tariffs or other systems of public support for citizen power plants are undesirable or that citizen power plant initiatives should necessarily strive to be independent from public support. Resources always come from somewhere, and striving to remove all interdependencies between actors would mean to strive for dissolving any social relations whatsoever. It does, however, illustrate the dilemmas tied up with the process of empowerment through the provision of resources by one actor to another.

This dilemma also presents itself in cases where non-state actors provide support for the development of citizen power plants. This issue has already been discussed in relation to support provided for the replication of citizen power plant initiatives, especially for the case of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany (see section 7.1.2). Support from outside actors becomes especially controversial when the goals of the organization providing support are seen to diverge from the goals of citizen power plant initiatives. By providing particular resources, support actors may be able to influence the direction in which activities develop. In Germany, the case viewed most critically in this respect is support provided by the utility company EnBW for renewable energy cooperatives in the federal state of Baden- Württemberg. Several interviewees voiced concerns that the cooperatives supported by EnBW were too small to survive in the long term. They would thus remain dependent on EnBW, and the goal of empowering bottom-up initiatives and developing decentralized structures in the energy system would be counteracted [1:8, 1:10, 3:27, 7:28].

These small cooperatives, they are called citizen-solar-cooperatives, meanwhile there are more than 50 of them in Baden-Württemberg, which are mainly active in small villages. That is to say, the mayor addresses the issues, I also want to do that. Then EnBW helps a lot (…). Then they have a roof with a 10 Kilowatt plant and a bit of equity capital. Well, my personal appraisal is (…) these cooperatives won’t survive for a long time. The operating costs are so high, you can’t do much there. [1:8] In relation to the transfer of citizen power plants to other technology areas I have already touched upon the option for citizen power plant initiatives to cooperate with more resourceful actors (see section 7.3.3). The directors of the Butendiek project had strived to set up Germany’s first citizen owned offshore wind farm, but failed to realize their plans. In retrospect, it appears that cooperation with a financially more resourceful actor such as a

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utility company may have improved the project’s chances to succeed. For example, the offshore wind farm Middelgrunden in Denmark is based on a co-operation between a cooperative and the local utility company. Nevertheless such co-operations also come with trade-offs. Collaborating with more resourceful actors opens up new opportunities to citizen power plant initiatives, but it also requires them to give up full control over project outcomes.

Patrick G. Coy and Timothy Hedeen discuss how problematic co-operations between grassroots innovators and incumbent actors can be in the context of the institutionalization of community mediation as an alternative practice for dispute resolution. They argue that collaboration between actors marked by strong power imbalances is hardly distinguishable from co-optation (Coy and Hedeen 2005 p. 428). In other words, collaboration with other, more resourceful actors brings the risk that the goals to which resources are put are modulated according to the interests of these actors. The next section further explores this problem of co-optation.

8.4 Co‐optation

When examining the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants in Austria and Germany with respect to its qualities as a process of empowerment, one point that needs to be kept in mind is that the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants has varied during the process of diffusion. In chapter 7, I distinguished between three different sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants (see especially Table 11 on p. 155).The initial community power configuration involves citizen power plants largely developed, owned and managed by local citizens. Scaling up and uptake by incumbents of citizen power plants has brought about modified configurations which I have termed green shareholding and consumer participation. Especially in Austria, where scaling up and uptake by incumbents have had a strong role to play in the diffusion of citizen power plants, the latter two configurations make up the largest share of collectively owned green electricity plants.

Not only are these configurations different from the community power configuration, they are also closer to established configurations in the energy system. This especially holds true for citizen power plant models developed by utility companies that involve comparatively large units that are fully integrated into the planning and management structures of utilities (see section 7.4). But the citizen wind farm initiatives in Lower Austria that have grown into medium-sized companies have also become more similar to established configurations. They draw on a professional workforce and develop large-scale power plants in several different locations. Two of the companies also sell the electricity they produce directly to end users (see section 7.2.2).

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In the literature on the outcome of social movements, the process by which challengers are incorporated and assimilated into established structures and practices has been referred to as co-optation (Giugni 1998, Coy and Hedeen 2005). According to Patrick Coy and Timothy Hedeen, co-optation manifest itself in different ways: It can mean that moderate challengers gain inclusion at the expense of more radical challengers, or that state funding strictures or other external forces transform the mandates of movement activities. Furthermore, co-optation can involve appropriation and redefinition of movement discourse, and established institutions appropriating the form but not the substance of challenger practices (Coy and Hedeen 2005 p. 407). Broadly speaking, these forms of co-optation amount either to the assimilation of challengers or the appropriation of their activities and discourses by established actors.

Indeed, for the diffusion of citizen power plants I have observed these two broad types of co-optation as well:  Assimilation: Citizen power plant initiatives adapt their socio-technical configuration to more mainstream structures  Appropriation: This includes discursive appropriation and redefinition of the term citizen power plant by incumbent actors. These actors then also develop new types of citizen participation in renewable energy projects. In the following subsections I will discuss these two forms of co-optation in turn.

8.4.1 Assimilation Assimilation is most strongly evident in the cases of citizen power plant initiatives that engaged in a process of continued scaling up (see section 7.2.2). The cases I observed in this area concern Austrian citizen wind farm initiatives that grew into medium-sized companies. As already discussed in section 7.2.3, this went along with a number of changes in their sociotechnical configuration, and I have labelled the resulting configuration ‘green shareholding’. The increasing scale of their projects and the weakening of participatory decision making due to reduced participation in company assemblies have moved them closer to established configurations in the Austrian electricity system. Furthermore, selling electricity directly to end users and relying on professional staff that plans and manages projects in sites distant to the company’s location has put them in a position similar to that of utility companies vis-à-vis energy consumers. Table 14 juxtaposes established configurations in the Austrian electricity system with the configurations of community power and green shareholding. Apart from growing more similar to established configurations in the electricity system, the broadening of the geographic participation structure and the transformation of two citizen wind farm companies to stock companies has assimilated participation in these companies to investment options. 174

Established electricity system in Green shareholding Community power Austria Technological hardware Mainly large-scale hydropower Several large wind farms in different Small number of small to medium- plants locations scale wind farms and PV plants

Ownership and return Public or private large-scale, Geographically dispersed citizens as Plants owned by members of the local distant investors owners; company shareholding rather community as small investors than co-ownership of a specific plant Management and Professional management, Professional, non-local management; Non-professional, local management; operation typically hierarchical, top-down partly participative decision-making participative decision-making decision-making, distant management Infrastructure and Electricity fed in to national / Electricity fed in to national / regional Electricity fed in to regional / national networking regional grid grid grid

Market relations Electricity sold directly to Feed-in tariff system, direct selling to Feed-in tariffs, direct selling to consumers or to other utilities as utility companies, direct selling to utilities well as international trading end-users

Table 14: Established configurations, green shareholding and community power (Austria)

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Patrick G. Coy and Timothy Hedeen (Coy and Hedeen 2005 p. 409) make similar observations concerning the assimilation of grassroots innovations to established organizational forms. They relate this to the concept of coercive isomorphism from institutional theory that highlights the role of external institutions shaping and reproducing established organizational structures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). They argue that such an adaptation of organizational structures can be observed in relation to neighbourhood food banks, health centres and community mediation centres in the United States over the course of the 1990s. In particular, they attribute this process of assimilation to increased co-operation with established political institutions (Coy and Hedeen 2005 p. 409).

Representatives of the Austrian citizen wind farm companies that underwent a process of scaling up also refer to particular necessities or external forces pushing them to adapt their sociotechnical configurations in the ways described above. This particularly holds true for the move away from voluntary labour and the professionalization of management and communication practices. In the following quotes I have emphasized expressions of necessity or the reference to external forces pushing them towards assimilation. For one thing, the interviewees point to stricter regulation of wind farm development as an outside force pushing them towards professional business structures. Apart from that, targeting broader audiences had the effect that management and communication practices have been shaped by the expectations of new target groups.

When the projects got bigger, that happened around 2000, (…) at that time we had the first employees that worked part-time, because the projects themselves required much more effort. You had to compile expert assessments, that means you had to provide documents, you had to pay for the expert assessments and that means the pressure was high that this really also materialises (…). So it is much more difficult and it doesn’t work anymore with volunteers as a side-job. That’s also why I have now been doing this for almost ten years as my main job. [15:61] The company (…) very quickly had to professionalize its line of communication, like the big companies also do it. (…) What initially used to be the idealistic investor meanwhile is the professional investor for whom two things are important: Ecology, like before, I do not want to say that that has strongly diminished. It is also the ecologically minded investor who knows what happens with his money. But who of course also expects professional structures, like he is used to them in other areas. [16:13] Of course with the new breadth of our clientele we are increasingly entering a market that is similar to the financial market, where you are compared to the company shares of Verbund [federal utility company, A/N] or to bonds issued by a German company (…). [10:30] However, it appears that the directors of these citizen wind farm companies by and large are content with the organizational changes that came along with scaling up. As one of them

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emphasizes, “we don’t regret a single step today, rather, we are very happy to have taken this path” [16:13]. Also one of the German interviewees, although generally critical of tendencies towards commercialization, notes that a certain degree of assimilation is to be expected if citizen power plants establish themselves in the energy system.

If citizen participation in the energy sector stabilizes it will always go along with a certain degree of commercialization, that’s a bit like with the Green party (…). The Green party increasingly bears the features of an entirely normal, established party and that with energy cooperatives it will also be that way. The larger and more successful they are, the more they will be led by professional management and the more participation will be controlled so to speak and coordinated and packed into certain committees. [3:52] This brings up the question whether assimilation of grassroots innovations to established practices and structures is an inevitable development. Coy and Hedeen adopt a more optimistic perspective. In relation to social movements they argue that

The social dynamics of co-optation are not made up of some inexorable force progressing toward a preordained and complete co-opting of challenging movements. (…) [E]ven in the face of substantial degrees of overall movement co-optation there will remain practical exemplars of the values and ideals that originally drove a challenger movement. (Coy and Hedeen 2005 p. 426) Apart from such practical exemplars of original values and ideals, grassroots innovators, even if they feel pressure to assimilate, may still retain a certain room for manoeuvre. Indeed, in the cases of the Austrian citizen wind farm initiatives that scaled up to medium-sized companies, some steps were taken to guard against excessive assimilation. In particular they took care to avoid a takeover by large investors and to uphold a certain degree of democratic decision-making structures. For example, the two citizen wind farm companies that transformed to privately held stock companies limit the voting power of any single shareholder to a maximum of 5% of the vote, even if s/he may hold a larger amount of company shares. Furthermore, in one case the supervisory board can veto the selling of shares to interested investors, and therefore can avoid concentration of shares in the hands of a single large investor. This cautioning against takeover is also visible from the clear rejection of the idea of getting listed at the stock exchange. [10:48, 10:83, 16:22]

That isn’t an issue for us. (…) There are different reasons for that (…) Well, these ups and downs, these external effects, the large impact this has on the company, the danger of being taken over, well certainly, a company in our size would be well portioned for a large investor at the stock market who buys himself into a company. And we have the opposite arrangement. We have limits on voting power in our statutes, so no matter how many shares somebody holds, he cannot exercise more than 5% of voting power in the shareholders’ meeting (…). [10:83]

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8.4.2 Appropriation As has been discussed in section 7.4, utility companies have meanwhile developed their own citizen power plant models for wind farms and PV plants, especially in Austria. While the engagement of utilities with wind power and PV as well as the development of participatory ownership models is welcomed by some citizen power plant pioneers [6:4, 17:51], others interpreted it as an unwelcome form of appropriation [1:8, 1:10, 3:27, 3:36, 7:28, 7:51]. Two interrelated forms of appropriation are at stake here:

 Economic appropriation: This includes the incorporation of wind power and PV in general, and citizen power plants in particular into established structures. This also involves abandoning a number of core features of the community power configuration and potentially crowding out bottom-up pioneer actors  Discursive appropriation: This refers to the appropriation and redefinition of the term ‘citizen power plant’ to a new business area of utilities.

For one thing, economic appropriation can refer to utilities entering the sector of wind power and photovoltaics, regardless of the ownership models employed, and thereby potentially crowding out smaller pioneer actors. Some interviewees voice concerns that the hitherto rather diverse renewable energy sector may soon be dominated by utilities and other large commercial actors, especially if the feed-in tariff system is abandoned [1:5, 1:29, 2:42, 2:46, 2:52, 3:30, 7:36; 8:34, 10:63, 12:51, 16:32, 17:50, 21:22, 21:60, 22:7].

The classical utilities are large companies with considerable financial resources, (…) compared to them the [citizen wind farm companies] are dwarfs. If something would happen with the feed-in tariff system there’s a clear answer. Then all these plants that newly entered the market of electricity production will be concentrated, the new structures, will be absorbed in the traditional electricity industry, that would happen immediately. [21:22] What’s hurting us most right now are activities of the project development companies that take away the people’s potential. And with that I’m referring to Enercon setting up a wind farm, but I’m also referring to E.ON setting up a biogas plant. [7:36] Furthermore, the citizen participation models offered by utilities can be interpreted as a more specific form of economic appropriation. These models allow individuals to co-own and financially benefit from a renewable energy plant. However, some important features are absent from these models, such as the possibility to take part in decision making or the establishment of decentralized economic units in the energy system.

This development is closely related to discursive appropriation, the redefinition of the term ‘citizen power plant’. This is something that is problematized especially by German interviewees.

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I know, in North Rhine-Westphalia there are also so-called citizen wind farms, municipal utilities set up a wind farm there and one out of the ten turbines is the citizen plant. In my eyes that isn’t a citizen wind farm, that’s a big wind farm with a small citizen participation. [9:10] Such tensions about what constitutes a ‘real’ citizen power plant can also be interpreted as a form of boundary drawing and will be analysed as such in section 9.4.

8.5 Disadvantaged or privileged actors?

One of the assumptions underlying an interpretation of the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants as a process of empowerment is that citizen power plant initiatives are understood as initially disadvantaged actors that eventually pushed through their goals against more powerful actors in the energy system. However, scholars in the UK have highlighted the importance of critically assessing issues of equity in relation to community energy projects (Park 2012, Johnson and Hall 2014). They point out that the means to engage with such projects may be unevenly distributed, both among individuals and between communities in different places.

Along a similar line, I would like to critically reflect on the status of citizen power plant initiatives and the individuals involved therein as being initially disadvantaged. Indeed, I will argue the following: While these actors can be viewed as initially disadvantaged actors when compared to incumbent actors in the energy system, they are often at the same time privileged when compared to other civil society actors. This argument falls into two parts: First I will look at the individuals involved in citizen power plant initiatives and point to the requirements for participation. This part questions to what extent such initiatives are indeed open to all. Secondly I will discuss to what extent some communities may be privileged over others in their capacity to develop a citizen power plant.

Indeed, this argument sits well with the approach of resource mobilization theory which I have drawn on to analyse the emergence and diffusion of citizen power plants. As noted in section 6.1.2, resource mobilization theory starts from the premise that social grievances are not sufficient to explain social movement formation, individual participation in social movements and the success or failure of movements. Rather, resource mobilization theory argues that the emergence and strength of social movements depends on access to resources and the ability to mobilize further resources (Jenkins 1983). Crucially, access to resources and the ability to mobilize further resources are not evenly distributed. As Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy (2004 p. 118) note, “the presence of resources and thereby their potential to be mobilized by specific social movement constituencies varies over space, through time and across constituency”. Therefore, “currently mobilized social movements in any society

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are more likely to reflect the social change preferences of its better-resourced constituencies than its less well endowed ones” (ibid. p. 120).13

Throughout the section, however, I will also point to attempts to balance out unequal opportunities, both at the level of individuals and at the level of communities.

8.5.1 Individuals’ capacity to engage in citizen power plant initiatives At the level of individuals one may question to what extent people have equal opportunities to participate in a citizen power plant initiative. Some representatives of citizen power plant initiatives or citizen wind farm companies in fact take pride in the diversity of people involved [2:10, 9:23, 14:28, 17:21].

Well, it is very broad. In fact it is outstanding that participation is from all classes and that there are also people that (…) take a bit of their money from the little they have. Others have quite a lot and also participate several times, so there is a difference there. But in terms of age and social class I find it quite heterogeneous. [2:10] Indeed, Rüdiger Mautz and colleagues (Mautz, Byzio et al. 2008 p. 102) note that citizen PV plants attempt to open up participation in the operation of renewable energy plants to broader segments of the population. While individually owned PV plants require ownership of a private home and an investment of several thousand Euros, citizen PV plants allow for the involvement of people with more constrained financial means. However, Özgür Yildiz and colleagues (Yildiz, Rommel et al. 2015 p. 64) have recently explored socio-economic characteristics of members of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany. Their survey results indicate that higher income groups are overrepresented. More than two thirds have a monthly gross income exceeding 2,500 Euros. Furthermore, just over half of the members of renewable energy cooperatives are university graduates and 80% of them are male. Finally, 88% of cooperative members are 35 years old or older.

None of the citizen power plant initiatives or companies interviewed for this thesis had made any systematic evaluation of their participation structure. Several Austrian interviewees, however, have made observations that are broadly in line with the findings of Yildiz and colleagues. They note that the age group of 35-55 year-olds is most strongly represented and attribute this to the financial means available to this age group. Also, in several cases there are more men than women who participate. Again, this is attributed to larger financial means of men and a higher interest in technology-related projects. Others suggest that if a

13 The uneven distribution of resources is related to the claim made by scholars in the area of the so-called ‘new social movements’ about the middle class having become the main bearer of social movements in Europe from the 1960s onwards, rather than more deprived socio-economic groups (see e.g. Edwards et al. 2004, p. 120). 180

heterosexual couple decides to participate in a citizen power plant, it is usually the man who signs the contract [10:51, 14:28, 16:21, 21:50].

Well, I would say that in terms of capital the strongest group are the 40 – 50 year olds, then the 30 to 40 year olds, in terms of age groups. (…) Maybe that has to do with a politicization, that this was a big issue ten years ago, [and I would say] that it has to do with the fact that at an advanced age, after you have, say, built your home somewhere and maybe have started a family, have progressed in your career, that you have more capital at your disposal. And there are significantly more men than women, I would say two thirds to one third. It’s difficult to say why it is that way, to a certain extent maybe it’s a technological issue and energy policy by tendency is more of an issue for men than for women. Maybe men are more the ones making investment decisions and maybe men (…) still are the ones (…) that are better off in financial terms and thus probably tend to have more money at their disposal to invest than women. [10:51] Some directors of citizen power plant companies actually discourage people from participating in such projects if they know that their savings are limited. They feel it would be irresponsible to take money from people who may need it more urgently for other expenses, or who may even take up a loan and get into debt to participate in the project [2:10, 14:28].

Most citizen power plant initiatives are aware of the problem that disposing over sufficient capital is a crucial requirement for participation and that their projects therefore run the risk of being inaccessible to a significant group of people. Some react to this by setting the minimum amount required for participation at a low level [17:8]. For example, in 2004 the Austrian citizen wind farm company W.E.B. conducted a share split. At that time their shares had reached a value of about 1,000 Euros. Each share was split into ten new shares, such that the minimum amount required for participation was lowered to around € 100 [WEB:21]. Nevertheless, a lack of financial means will of course always constitute an entry barrier for a certain group of people.

In Austria this problem is further exacerbated by particular details of the financial market regulation. In most cases, if the opportunity to buy shares in a citizen power plant is publicly advertised, a prospectus detailing the risk of the investment is required. Such a prospectus is quite costly to produce, and especially for small to medium-sized projects it may not be affordable. There are exceptions to the prospectus requirement, however. In particular, it does not apply if less than 100 individuals are involved and if all of them are small, non- professional investors (Land Steiermark 2012; [22:8]). Thus, if project directors make use of this exception, it means that they have to be careful about setting the minimum threshold for participation too low because they need to raise the equity capital from less than 100 people. This was the case in an Austrian project developing a large citizen-owned PV plant.

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400,000 Euros of equity capital needed to be raised and in order to avoid the costly obligation of putting forward a prospectus that complied with the requirements of the financial supervisory authority they decided to restrict participation to less than 100 non-professional investors. [22:5]

Well, we need to make do with 99 [participants], it won’t work another way. So (…), how much do we have? 400,000 [Euros, that makes around] 4,000 [per person], it won’t work another way anyway. We can’t get smaller, if we get smaller then again somebody else needs to take the double or triple package, so that the other person can take less. [22:5] Apart from attempts to lower the financial threshold for participation, some citizen power plant initiatives also deliberately decouple voting power from the height of participants’ financial contribution. In particular, some German interviewees emphasize that organizing citizen power plants as cooperatives enables such an egalitarian approach [5:12, 7:10].

So that is simply possible with a cooperative, to give people their place, so to speak. Depending on their neediness but also for example depending on their financial capabilities. We can take 10,000 from one person and only 50 from the other, nevertheless we can give them the same voting power if we think that is a good idea. [5:12] Some citizen power plants that are not organized as cooperatives have taken steps that should at least weaken large discrepancies of voting power. As mentioned before, the two Austrian citizen wind farm companies that transformed to privately held stock companies limit the voting power of any single shareholder to a maximum of 5% of the vote (see section 8.4.1). In other cases, initiatives set an upper limit to the amount of money which any individual is allowed to invest into a project [14:19, 17:12].

8.5.2 Communities’ capacity to engage with citizen power plants Apart from unequal opportunities for individuals to participate in citizen power plants, different communities may also have differing capacities to develop such projects. Jin Park (2012) has discussed this issue with respect to community energy projects in the UK and questions how equitable opportunities to engage with renewable energy technologies are distributed. In particular, she argues that considerable amounts of time, money and expertise are required in order to obtain grants for community energy projects. Therefore, grants tend to be channelled towards those communities who are already well equipped with such resources.

Concerning the emergence of the first citizen wind farms in Austria and Germany, I have already argued that different initiatives started with different resource endowments. Therefore, the resources that yet needed to be mobilized also differed from case to case (see

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chapter 6). For example, while the initiative UWW mainly started from an understanding of citizen wind farms as a symbol of the alternatives to nuclear power (symbolic resources), the starting point for the initiative in the village Friedrich-Wilhelm-Lübke-Koog was the availability of suitable land (natural resources) and the feed-in tariff that had just become available (structural resources). While these two communities succeeded in mobilizing sufficient resources for developing a citizen wind farm starting from different initial resource endowments, other communities may have lacked resources from which to start altogether.

In Austria, several representatives of early citizen wind farm initiatives point out that they were lucky because they had people in their group with relevant technical or legal expertise or with close contacts to such people [14:16, 15:15, 17:14]. Furthermore, in one case, the initiator of a wind farm project had the financial means to cover the costs of exploratory wind measurements, before the actual planning of the wind farm had begun [14:58]. It is clear that not all community groups who may wish to develop a collectively owned wind farm or PV plant will have the same level of relevant expertise or risk capital available to them.

The point that opportunities to engage with citizen power plants are unevenly distributed across different communities is particularly salient in relation to some of the projects developed by Austrian citizen wind farm companies in other countries. As I have already mentioned, the three Austrian citizen wind farm initiatives that scaled up to medium-sized companies have also set up wind farms abroad. Nevertheless, they still raise the equity capital required for these projects almost entirely from Austrian citizens. One interviewee notes that the local population in some of the sites abroad hardly is in a position to become a shareholder of such a project. This pertains to wind farms that are situated in periphery regions of the Czech Republic, Eastern Germany and Bulgaria. These regions struggle with widespread poverty, high rates of unemployment and the outward migration of young and well-educated parts of the population. In some cases participation offers were made, but hardly met any response. In other cases, participation was not offered to the local population – not least due to the assessment that local people would hardly be in a position to participate [10:40, 10:42, 10:56, 10:70].

The population in our village is very, very poor, is overaged (…). If I explain to them that they can now participate in our company, I think then I would be explaining to them how big the differences are between our level of affluence and theirs. [10:40] A similar point is made by a German interviewee with respect to citizen wind farms in Eastern Germany. He notes that hardly any local or regional people participate in these projects due to economic difficulties in the region, leaving people with little capital to invest [4:9]. These cases show that in places where the local population lacks the means to develop 183

renewable energy installations, citizen owned wind farms are nevertheless set up, but it is mostly people at a far distance from the plant who benefit from the returns.

Apart from opportunities for developing citizen power plants being unevenly distributed across space, opportunities may also vary over time. In Austria, several interviewees pointed out that it would hardly be possible to develop a locally owned wind farm today, in the same way as in the second half of the 1990s. This is due the more demanding planning process for wind farms and higher upfront investment costs [10:59, 15:26, 16:33, 22:7].

[The rules and regulations] all are very complex and complicated (…) so that you in fact hardly have a chance to implement something if you have not already been active in this area for several years. (…) So, you try to implement smaller projects with two or three turbines, but even in that requires a [considerable] investment, so a few people would really have to be very motivated and pool money to make it work. [15:26] As I have noted in section 7.1.1, in the German region of North Frisia this problem could be alleviated by the provision of professional support for citizen wind farm initiatives. Several people who were engaged in early citizen wind farm projects turned the planning and management of wind farms into their main occupation and now offer special support services for new bottom-up initiatives [8:27].

8.6 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has discussed the question whether the diffusion of citizen power plants can be interpreted as a process of empowerment. Rather than providing an unequivocal answer to this question, I have pointed to a number of problems and paradoxes related to the process of empowerment. While bottom-up initiatives could indeed significantly increase the resource base available for the development of citizen power plants, I have identified three problems accompanying this process:

 The problem of continued dependency relations  The problem of shifting ends to which resources are put  The problem of empowering the empowered

I will discuss each of these issues in turn and relate it to my theoretical framework.

The problem of continued dependency relations As discussed in section 8.3, citizen power plant initiatives originally faced severe dependency relations, in particular concerning grid access and remuneration for the electricity produced. While feed-in tariff systems largely eliminated this dependency, they – somewhat ironically – made initiatives newly dependent on this sometimes volatile policy regime. Furthermore, various support actors provide resources for the replication of citizen

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power plants. While this promotes replication, it also makes initiatives dependent on these actors. This problem can be understood as an instance of the more general problem, noted by critical theorists, of creating new dependency relations if one actor strives to empower another (Avelino 2011 p. 67). In other words, resources tend to come with strings attached.

Within resource mobilization theory, this problem is referred to as the issue of ‘source constraints’ attached to particular resources. However, in a reflection on resource mobilization theory, Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy have argued that the debate over such source constraints should not be cast too narrowly. They point out that most social movements acquire their resources from a number of different sources (Edwards and McCarthy 2004 p. 135). As long as bottom-up actors have several channels of resource access, dependency problems can be kept at bay. Source constraints, however, become problematic if initiatives indeed depend on a single channel for access to a particular resource. As the debate over the support for energy cooperatives provided by one of the major German utilities shows, the problem is further exacerbated when the alignment of goals between the actor providing and the actors receiving resources is questionable.

While there is no easy solution to deal with this problem, remaining sensitive to and reflexive of this paradox should constitute an important part of any organization striving to support grassroots innovators. A similar issue has already received widespread attention in relation to the provision of development aid. Here the paradigm of ‘capacity building’ that intends to provide support without creating new dependency relations has become influential over the last 20 years (Eade 1997). Nevertheless, this approach easily runs into difficulties and paradoxes in practice as well (Eade 2007). This further emphasizes the need for support actors to be reflexive of their roles and the degree to which they may be imposing their agenda on others.

The problem of shifting ends to which resources are put As I have discussed in sections 8.2 and 8.4, the diffusion of citizen power plants was enabled through an increasing access to resources, but also went hand in hand with changes in sociotechnical configurations. In other words, the ends to which resources were put shifted over time. Previous analyses of other grassroots innovations such as car sharing, organic food and sustainable housing have similarly found that they are adapted and mainstreamed over the course of their diffusion (Truffer 2003, Smith 2007, Seyfang 2010). Above I have discussed two ways in which such a shift has taken place, namely assimilation and appropriation.

In terms of power relations, this can be understood as the outcome of an interplay between the exercise of transformative power and reinforcive power. The main difference between 185

these two forms of power lies in the ends to which resources are put: the reinforcement of established sociotechnical configurations or the transformation of these structures. Grassroots innovators usually have goals related to change. Therefore the empowerment of grassroots innovators amounts to building up transformative power by increasing grassroots innovators’ access to resources. However, the new practices and sociotechnical configurations they develop cannot spread far without interacting with established actors and the sociotechnical regime, who mainly exercise reinforcive power. The transformative power built up through the empowerment of grassroots innovators therefore unfolds only in an interplay with reinforcive power.

There can be different outcomes of the interplay between reinforcive and transformative power. One of them may win over, there may be continued struggle or it may result in some sort of compromise. Compromise means that the ends to which certain resources are put change, but not as radically as first envisioned by grassroots innovators. With these analytical categories, assimilation can be understood as a process by which grassroots innovators who have built up transformative power adapt the ends to which they put their resources in the face of reinforcive power. Appropriation can be understood as a process by which incumbent actors react to transformative power and adapt the ends to which they put their resources.

I have deliberately used the term ‘ends’ rather than ‘goals’ here, because the term goals implies an actor’s interest or desire to pursue this particular end. In some cases, the ends to which resources are put may indeed reflect an actor’s self-defined interests. Such goals may also change over time. In other cases, an actor may give way to external forces and more or less reluctantly adapt the ends to which s/he puts his or her resources.

The problem of empowering the empowered The third problem I have identified concerns the question whether citizen power plant initiatives and the individuals engaged therein constitute disadvantaged actors to start with. As I have argued above, this is a matter of perspective. It depends on what other actors they are compared to. In relation to incumbent actors in the energy system, bottom-up initiatives arguably constitute disadvantaged actors. However, many of the individuals engaged in these initiatives are advantaged as compared to other individuals. Furthermore, several communities in which citizen power plants were developed are advantaged over other communities.

Put simply, enlarging one’s resource base tends to be easier for those who already dispose over certain resources. As in the case of continued dependency relations discussed above, there is no easy way of dealing with this issue. One the one hand it is important to remain 186

sensitive to the issue. For example, project developers and support actors can search for ways to set up projects in a way that ensures that they do not become too elitist. In the cases I examined this was sometimes done by setting the minimum amount of money required for participation at a low level or by limiting the voting power of larger investors. On the other hand, expecting grassroots innovations to always work to the immediate benefit of the most disadvantaged actors in society may be a mark that is difficult to meet. While keeping a critical eye on equity issues is important, it is also vital to maintain realistic expectations concerning a grassroots innovations’ potential to tackle multiple societal goals related to sustainable development at the same time.

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9 Conflicts related to the diffusion of citizen power plants

So far I have analysed the emergence of citizen power plants, different forms of diffusion, and I have investigated to what extent the diffusion of citizen power plants in Germany and Austria can be interpreted as a process of empowerment. This chapter focuses on different types of conflicts that go along with the diffusion of citizen power plants. Conflicts in relation to grassroots innovations may easily be neglected for a number of reasons. For one thing, grassroots innovations in general and community energy projects in particular are often associated with images of cooperation, cohesion and the ‘warm feel’ of community. Both advocates and analysts of grassroots innovations thus may easily fail to take into account conflicts that go along with their diffusion. Furthermore, the sustainability transitions literature, to which the concept of grassroots innovations is related, traditionally has emphasized consensus and the ‘management’ of transitions and has paid little attention to conflict and contention. Admittedly, however, this is starting to change and a number of authors have started to focus on such issues (see e.g. Shove and Walker 2007, Hess 2014).

Indeed, as I have argued in chapter 6, the conflict over nuclear power contributed strongly to the emergence of the first citizen power plants, both in Germany and in Austria. In other words, the very starting point of this grassroots innovation was strongly informed by a harsh societal conflict. In this chapter, however, I do not want to revisit the antinuclear conflict itself. Rather, my objective is to identify and examine a broader range of conflicts that went along with the diffusion of citizen power plants. More specifically, I aim to explore what kind of conflicts can be observed in relation to the diffusion of citizen power plants and under which conditions conflicts are particularly salient (see research question (5) on p. 12).

The chapter is organized around three types of conflicts I have identified in my empirical material:

 Local conflicts over individual citizen power plant projects  Incumbent – challenger conflicts between citizen power plant initiatives and large utilities  Object conflicts (Hess 2004) over the defining criteria of citizen power plants

Each of these types of conflicts is loosely related to one of the critical issues I discussed in relation to empowerment in the previous chapter. Local conflicts are related to the question how inclusive such initiatives are and whether the individuals involved in citizen power plant initiatives constitute advantaged or disadvantaged actors to begin with. For example, local tensions may arise if people feel excluded from participation due to limited financial means. Secondly, incumbent-challenger conflicts are related to the issue of dependency relations, as

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the initial dependence of citizen power plant initiatives, as challengers, on grid operators, as incumbents, caused severe tensions. Finally, in object conflicts actors draw boundaries between different variants of sociotechnical configurations. This is related to the issue of co- optation, as the assimilation and appropriation of citizen power plants prompts the question what may legitimately be referred to as a citizen power plant.

In the following sections I will explore each of these arenas of contention. My goal is to arrive at an understanding of the issues at stake in each of these conflicts and to explain why in some cases conflicts are more salient than in others.

9.1 Local conflicts

As mentioned before, both in Germany and in Austria it was the controversy over nuclear power that provided a decisive impulse for the development of citizen power plants. Activists advocated the development of renewables as an alternative to nuclear power and other large-scale, centralized energy technologies and started to experiment with these technologies themselves (see chapter 6). Somewhat ironically, however, renewable energy installations, in particular wind farms, have meanwhile themselves become the focal point of fierce siting conflicts.

“With the increasing commercialization [of wind power] in the second half of the 1990s, resistance emerged from the population against the operators of wind turbines – also against those that formerly had not acted in a profit oriented way. Now the use of wind power was no longer only regarded as a positive counter model to the use of coal and nuclear power, but as a problem in itself.“ (Bernhardt 2013 p. 23/24, translated from German original) Citizen power plants have an interesting position in relation to such conflicts. On the one hand, ownership by groups of local citizens has been reinterpreted and promoted as a means to avoid or alleviate local siting conflicts over renewable energy installations (see sections 7.1.1 p. 92 in the context of replication and 7.2.2 p. 112 in the context of scaling up).

Indeed, there is some evidence to support the claim that renewable energy projects based on local ownership are evaluated more favourably by the local population than those owned and operated by commercial companies external to the community (Olesen, Maegaard et al. 2004, Devine-Wright 2005, Barry and Chapman 2009, Warren and McFadyen 2010). On the other hand, citizen power plants themselves are by no means immune to local conflicts. A small number of case studies on micro-level processes of negotiation and conflict around individual citizen power plant projects have been conducted, and have critically examined the role of trust between local citizens (Rakos 2001, Walker, Devine-Wright et al. 2010).

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In this section I my aim is to explore the way local conflicts over citizen power plants are referred to by my interviewees and examine which factors may heighten or reduce the salience of such conflicts. Of course, based on the data I have available I cannot provide an in-depth analysis of local conflicts related to any specific project. In most cases I only interviewed a single person in relation to a particular citizen power plant project, usually the managing director (see description of methods in chapter 5). Furthermore, representatives of the initiatives and companies that I interviewed were generally keen on emphasizing low levels of conflict and tended to avoid elaborating on local conflicts and opposition. Indeed, where reference to local opposition is made, it is frequently portrayed as irrational and NIMBYist [10:45, 12:13, 16:29, 16:41]. Furthermore, some interviewees portray opposition to citizen wind farms as activities of a small albeit outspoken minority [2:16, 15:12, 17:29]. Nevertheless, several references to actual or potential local conflicts were made, which provide a valuable basis for reflections on this type of conflict.

Explanatory factors for the salience of conflicts that I identified fall broadly into two categories: For one thing, the salience of conflicts can be explained in terms of specific characteristics of the sociotechnical configuration of a citizen power plant project. Secondly, some interviewees also emphasize that conflicts over citizen power plant projects are shaped by previous tensions and conflicts in the community. The following two subsections deal with these two types of explanatory factors concerning the salience of local conflicts in relation to citizen power plants.

9.1.1 Local conflicts and sociotechnical configurations

As noted above, interviewees are likely to have an interest in emphasizing low levels of local conflict and in downplaying tensions. Indeed, several interviewees were keen to emphasize that there were very low levels of local conflict or no conflicts at all in relation to their citizen power plant project or projects. In fact citizen ownership of renewable energy plants, in particular local ownership, is often highlighted as a way to mitigate local conflicts concerning renewable energy installations, in particular wind power. [4:30, 8:36, 9:30, 9:31, 17:64, 21:59, 21:69]

In fact those have always been the projects where acceptance has been highest, the flagship projects where you could illustrate how it works in a positive way, where the inclusion and acceptance by the population works out. (…) Wolkersdorf is a good example. There have never been any problems there and there are 44 wind turbines standing about there. (…) That is a well-integrated company, they have a few hundred participants, they have heat supply for the village, they have all that included. In those cases, certain acceptance issues, like you have them with other projects, don’t come up in the first place. [21:59, 21:69]

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Nevertheless it cannot be assumed across all types of projects that local conflicts can be avoided simply by setting up collective ownership schemes. Some interviewees make more specific claims about how conflicts around citizen power plant projects could be avoided. In particular, these claims pertain to the dimensions of (1) management and operation, (2) ownership and returns and (3) the technological hardware. I will take each of these in turn.

Management and operation For one thing, low levels of conflict are typically emphasized in relation to projects that are based on a local initiative rather than being initiated by professional companies that develop a number of projects in different places. Conversely, where references to conflicts are made, these almost always pertain to cases where the project was not initiated by a local group or individual [10:45, 12:13, 17:39, 17:44]. In other words, lower levels of conflicts appear more likely where the dimension ‘management and operation’ of the sociotechnical configuration of a citizen power plant involves local management.

Secondly and relatedly, low levels of conflict are typically attributed to personal trust in the project initiator as well as open and transparent communication within the community. [10:8, 11:16, 14:12, 14:27, 20:24, 20:25]

You have to take your time; time must not be an issue. Always disclose any associated information, if somewhere there’s the feeling, there is still something to be said. (…) The most important thing is, let me say it again, openness, information, also if something goes wrong. Not to say, I won’t tell people, but rather say, something has gone wrong and that’s the way it is. [14:27] Some interviewees make a causal link between local management of the initiative and good communication as well as sound management. They point out that the project team, being composed of local residents, has an interest in upholding good neighbourly relations.

Yes, a lot of people asked about the implications. Legitimately so. We conducted a lot of information events, also among neighbours, we informed them what lies ahead of them. We have good neighbourly relations and we mutually make an effort not to disturb these neighbourly relations but rather to develop them in an improved way. [11:16] People, in fact, they trust [us], because one knows people that really are from the village. If I would line my own pocket, I probably would no longer be able to cross the street, because somebody would get hold of me. [17:64] Along a similar line, some interviewees from local initiatives point out that they designed the participation model in a way that avoids local tensions. This pertains not only to good communication. Particular care was also taken to ensure sound financial management and to use low-risk participation models, as the core group does not want to be responsible for financial losses of their neighbours. [15:32, 17:64]

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Where management of a project is not local, open and transparent communication is of course also critical for project developers in order to avoid widespread opposition that may eventually thwart the project. However, project developers in this case are not as strongly personally involved in tensions that may erupt. The relevance of good communication practices that help to avoid conflicts therefore presents itself in in a different way for project initiators. While the aspect of personal relations to neighbours is lost, the aspect of strategic action in getting a project through moves to the fore. This is evident in the following quote from the director of a company developing collectively owned biogas projects in various places.

Well, the difficulty is, if you publicize this project too early and there are opponents, people opposed to the site that is, then they will mobilize against it beforehand. That’s the problem. We have not yet found the appropriate means, when to inform the population, when it’s the right time to keep the opponents at bay, but still to provide information. We always try to see how it should work, but it’s not easy. Certainly a lot of mistakes were made and there are still a lot of mistakes with respect to public relations. [12:13] This quote also suggests that communication, where it is conceived as a strategic means to receive planning permission, is not a straightforward task. Finding appropriate times and channels of communication can be a considerable challenge.

Ownership and returns Apart from local management and open communication, some interviewees emphasize the importance of an inclusive approach with respect to opportunities for participation. In order to avoid tensions and envy among community members, projects should be open to everyone, including people with limited financial means (see also section 8.5.1 on individuals’ capacity to engage in citizen power plant projects) [7:3, 14:19, 17:9].

That shouldn’t be the objective that people with money, well, not that money is a shame, but it wouldn’t have been good, if (…) the 20 people [acting as company partners, A/N] had done it on their own, that certainly would have been bad. Then the word would have been, here there are a few people who have enormous financial assets and they don’t know where to put them. [14:19] However, one interviewee, who at the time of the interview was in the process of developing a collectively owned large PV plant, sees this differently for his project. In order to avoid the prospectus requirement for this project, there have to be less than a hundred participants and therefore the minimum amount for participation is comparatively high (see also section 8.5.1). The project developer is optimistic that this will not cause tensions.

To have a plant up there, well, I think that in terms of participation certainly there won’t be any discord arising if not everyone can participate with two-, three hundred Euros,

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certainly not. We will handle it that way, and of course that’s always an issue of marketing, we will handle it in a way that everybody feels accommodated, wherever they stand. We’ll manage all right. [22:13] One possible explanation for these diverging opinions is that wind farms tend to be more controversial than PV plants. Therefore developers of citizen wind farms may feel the need to take particular care to construct the participation model in an inclusive way. In the case of PV this may be considered less important. This directly leads on to the dimension of the technological hardware.

Technological hardware Indeed, the obtrusiveness or unobtrusiveness of the technology involved may also account for different levels of conflict around citizen power plant projects. Along this line, some interviewees note that PV plants are less prone to provoke conflict than biogas plants or wind farms. Whereas wind farms have significant visual impacts and biogas plants meet with opposition due to concerns over noise and bad smells, PV plants are usually not considered to be obtrusive in any way. [2:16, 10:45, 12:13, 17:39, 19:18].

However, obtrusiveness cannot be taken as an inherent property of a particular technology. For example, in the early years of wind farm development, landscape protection was not of much concern in relation to wind turbines. Indeed, some Austrian interviewees note that the first wind farms were considered as a regional attraction rather than an unwelcome intrusion to the local landscape. Wind turbines attracted a lot of visitors and hardly anybody objected to their visual impact. [10:17, 16:29]

Well, it wasn’t that way, it was an attraction and not a problem. The fears or discussions one partly had at that time, were more at the level of will that eventually pay off or will the EVN [regional utility, A/N] eventually shut it off? Will they effectively wear you down economically or technically? So more along those lines and not the way things mainly proceed today, a disfiguring intrusion into the landscape. I think that’s the main debate today. [10:17] It would require further research to investigate how the obtrusiveness or unobtrusiveness of a particular technology is constructed and, more specifically, to explain how wind turbines increasingly came to be seen as visually obtrusive. Here it can only be conjectured that the rise of debates over the visual impact of wind turbines is related to their increasing size. Furthermore, large numbers of wind farms in particular regions can give people the feeling that it is ‘getting too much’. However, David Toke and colleagues have also argued that concerns over landscape protection depend on cultural traditions and values (Toke, Breukers et al. 2008 p. 1136/1137). In particular, they point out that England has a strong tradition of landscape protection, which has translated into considerable opposition to wind power

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development. By contrast, concerns over landscape protection are much weaker in Spain (ibid.).

One Austrian interviewee also points out, that the first wind farms were developed in places where such projects did not meet with local opposition. Other places may have been explored but were left aside in the face of actual or potential conflicts. By now there are fewer places left that are suitable for wind power development in Austria. Therefore local conflicts are on the rise in recent years, simply because project developers meanwhile need to consider places where wind turbines are seen more critically, at least by parts of the local population. [21:59]

9.1.2 Local conflicts and previous tensions in the community

While particular features of the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants play a prominent role in explaining the salience of conflicts around citizen power plants, this is not the only type of argument that is made in interviews. Another set of explanatory factors for the salience of conflicts concerns previous tensions and conflicts within the community. Such pre-existing conflicts can shape discussions and interactions around citizen power plants. These conflicts occur both at the level of local party politics and at the level of interpersonal relations between individual community members.

The endorsement of a citizen power plant project by the municipality is mentioned as an important factor by several interviewees [1:18, 8:1, 9:6, 10:44, 11:18, 12:12, 16:28, 17:27]. In Austria the municipality plays an important role because it is responsible for designating an area for a particular use, such as wind power development [21:39, 21:41]. Some interviewees point out that the endorsement of a citizen power plant project by the local council can become tied up in local party politics.

With political parties it is even more difficult, if it wasn’t their idea, then already in principle they have to say no, even if it’s a great idea. [20:24] [Interviewer: So then is there the danger that it turns into a project of the Social Democratic or Conservative Party?] Yes, that’s what [we] have. [One of the two says] yes, the [others] want it and that’s why we are against it. That is still very strong and for an engineer that is completely gruesome, in fact all want it but it won’t pass just out of spite (…). That’s always very difficult in that case. [15:62] As is visible from these quotes, interviewees argue that political conflicts over citizen power plants tend to be more about local parties trying to set themselves apart from their competitors than about the project itself. In particular, controversies between political parties over citizen power plants are portrayed as irrational substitute conflicts and as being at odds with the supposedly objective stance of an engineer. 195

Apart from conflicts between local political parties, a number of interviewees note that conflicts over citizen power plants can also be shaped by previous conflicts between individual community members. Also in this context some interviewees position such conflicts as irrational substitute conflicts having nothing to do with the issue at hand [15:12, 17:29, 20:24].

Conflicts emerge there, which don’t have anything to do with the issue at hand, but rather are typical neighbourhood conflicts. One guy has a piece of land and already has a pile of money and now he receives extra money because there’s a wind turbine standing there. (…) Others are divorced or whatever, they are somehow…, I don’t want to generalize, but often with people that otherwise don’t get involved, [it feels like] (…) there are other issues at play. [17:29] Such conflicts at the individual level may occur in different kinds of actor constellations in relation to citizen power plants. Typically local conflicts will be between people centrally involved in a citizen power plant project and people who oppose it. Another possible constellation, however, are conflicts between two or more land owners who would need to cooperate in order to develop a citizen wind farm because the projected site stretches across their respective land. Two German interviewees point to the difficulties involved in cooperative projects between farmers, due to the prevalence of previous tensions and conflicts over land use [4:7, 8:26, 8:46].

I don’t know how familiar you are with rural areas and the customs of the land-lease market in agriculture, but if somebody has snatched away the lease of a stretch of land from somebody else 20 years ago and he hasn’t forgotten about it, then these are issues you of course cannot make undone, but somehow these things aren’t forgotten. That’s a bit difficult. [8:46] [Some say] rather grant something to an external company from Hamburg than to your own neighbour. That’s a very difficult situation (…). [8:26] Furthermore, as Özgür Yildiz and colleagues have pointed out, conflicts can also occur among members of renewable energy cooperatives (Yildiz, Rommel et al. 2015 p. 68/69).

9.1.3 Discussion

To summarize, while interviewees tend to emphasize low levels of conflict in relation to their projects, they also point to particular conditions where conflicts are more likely. They often do this implicitly by explaining why there were hardly any conflicts in the local community in relation to their specific project. In particular, low levels of conflict are attributed to projects based on a local initiative (dimension of management and operation), projects offering an inclusive approach with respect to opportunities for participation (dimension of ownership and returns) and projects where the technical hardware is perceived as unobtrusive (dimension of technological hardware). These conditions are broadly in line

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with the community power variant of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants (see Table 11 on p. 155 on different variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants).

In addition to that, interviewees point out that discussions and interactions over citizen power plants are shaped by previous tensions and conflicts in the community. This pertains both to the level of local party politics and to the level of individual relationships between community members. The influence of previous tensions and conflicts within the community seriously qualifies the point that a local initiative tends to be evaluated more favourably than a project developed by an external project developer. On the one hand, people may have a particularly trustful relationship to local project managers, especially if they are widely respected members of the local community. On the other hand, local project managers can also be burdened by previous conflicts in the community they were involved in.

The points made by interviewees concerning conflict salience are broadly in line with previous research by Gordon Walker, Patrick Devine-Wright and colleagues (2010). These authors critically analysed the role of trust and emphasize that trust and low levels of conflict between local residents in relation to a community energy project cannot be assumed as given. Rather, it depends on factors such as the inclusiveness of the project, the distribution of profits within the community, the obtrusiveness of the technology involved, but also on previous tensions and conflicts within the community.

Where previous tensions in the community contribute to conflicts over citizen power plant projects, interviewees tend to portray opponents as irrational and as disregarding objective facts concerning the project. Such a position, however, can itself be contested as a premature dismissal of differing perspectives on a project. Further research could look at the way local conflicts are related to different understandings of a citizen power plant project, and to different understandings about the way it reflects and interferes with local social structures and practices.

9.2 Incumbent–challenger conflicts

After having looked at local conflicts concerning individual projects, I will now turn to conflicts at the meso/macro level. Citizen power plants not only constitute an intervention at the local level, but also challenge established structures and practices in energy systems. As noted by David Hess (2013 p. 848/849), the diffusion of grassroots innovations may go along with significant levels of conflict between incumbents and the proponents of a grassroots innovation, as challengers. In particular, this can be expected when proponents of a

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grassroots innovation not only want to develop complementary ways of satisfying a particular need, but advocate a radically different form of organization of the entire sector.

Hess thereby picks up on field sociology, in particular the theory of strategic action fields. This approach looks at contention between incumbents and challengers in order to understand stability and change in societal subsystems, referred to as fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2011). Field processes are described as being, at their core, struggles about “who gets what” (ibid. p. 3). Similarly, in my theoretical framework, incumbent-challenger conflicts can be understood as conflicts over the distribution and redistribution of resources between established actors and new entrants.

In the following subsections I will look at incumbent-challenger conflicts in relation to citizen power plants in Germany and Austria. The major established utility companies constitute the main incumbent actors in this conflict. Based on my interview data, I want to examine how advocates of bottom-up citizen power plants position themselves vis-à-vis these utilities. As will become clear, incumbent-challenger conflicts have developed quite differently in Germany and Austria. In particular, in Germany the level of conflict is much higher than in Austria. I will therefore discuss incumbent-challenger conflicts separately for Germany (subsection 9.2.1) and Austria (subsection 9.2.2). The discussion of this section provides a comparison between the two country cases and attempts to explain these different levels of conflict (subsection 9.2.3).

9.2.1 Incumbent‐challenger conflicts in Germany Future sociotechnical configurations of the energy system and policies shaping them are highly contested in Germany. One interview even argues that no other issue provokes as much public contention as developments in the energy sector [1:23].

Here in Germany, that certainly is an exception compared to other countries, energy supply is one of the largest economic fields of conflict, [the largest] field of conflict quite generally. (…) No other field can trigger such conflicts like energy supply. [1:23] Representatives and advocates of citizen power plants largely take an oppositional stance towards utilities. Some interviewees explicitly describe the development of citizen power plants as a way of reducing the influence, pushing aside or breaking the power of the major utilities in Germany [2:8, 3:3, 7:36, 8:12]. This must be understood against the background of the strong market dominance by the four major utility companies and the fact that these major utility companies for a long time hardly engaged with renewables (see section 4.1). Accordingly, citizen power plants are often positioned as the counter-model to large-scale utility owned power plants. One interviewee in fact refers to citizen power plants as

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‘Gegenkraftwerke’ (counter-power plants), positioning them as oppositional acts and as the antithesis to established configurations in the energy system [1:44].

We want structural change, we want to crush the dependency on monopolies and to this end such medium-sized companies that are emerging (…) are a very appropriate means in order to keep economic flows within the region (…) and to politically disempower the large corporations to some extent. [2:8] The citizen participation model (…) is a very successful model if you want to sensitize people politically and implement counter-power plants. [1:44] The ways in which citizen power plants are positioned as counter-models to utility owned power plants has, however, changed over time. For one thing, the conflict over nuclear power has strongly shaped discussions over the future composition of the energy system in Germany. Early on, in the 1980s and 1990s, the juxtaposition of citizen power plants to utility owned plants was directly tied up with the conflict over nuclear power. In this context renewable energy technologies, along with decentralized ownership structures, were promoted as the alternative to nuclear power (see section 6.2. on the emergence of citizen power plants in Germany).

Indeed, one strand of early initiatives developing citizen wind farms in the 1980s and 1990s in Germany had strong ties to the antinuclear movement. The wind turbines set up by these groups were developed as counter-models to nuclear power plants and were intended to highlight the alternatives that were available (see section 6.2 and Byzio, Heine et al. 2002 p. 273, 286). Some interviewees point out that a particular density of citizen power plants in particular German regions can be linked to hotspots of the antinuclear and environmental movements. [1:3, 1:46, 8:16]

The regional advantage here [in the regional around Freiburg] certainly is the resistance against the nuclear power plant Wyhl that we had here in the late 70ies, early 80ies that strongly influenced the region and that also resulted in a significant preparedness to invest in alternative energy. [1:3] The conflict over nuclear power is also tied up with conflict over support systems for renewable energy technologies. The introduction of feed-in tariffs in 1991 enabled independent power producers in the area of wind power to establish themselves and thus opened up space for radically different sociotechnical configurations in the energy system. Crucially, this first feed-in tariff was designed in a way that utilities could not make use of it themselves. Instead, it required utilities to connect independent producers, such as citizen power plants, to the grid and to pay them 90% of the average electricity price paid by consumers (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 264, see also section 4.1).

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This met with resolute albeit unsuccessful efforts on the side of utilities to repeal feed-in regulation (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 265). Utilities challenged the law in front of the Federal Constitutional Court. A separate case was also brought to the European Court of Justice. However, in both cases the court ruled that minimum pricing schemes, as provided by the Electricity Feed-in Law, do not constitute a violation of state-aid rules (German Law Journal 2001, Lauber and Mez 2004, Stenzel and Frenzel 2008 p. 2650). In addition to these court cases, VDEW, the main utility industry association in Germany, lodged a complaint with DG Competition in 1996. This challenge of the law proved more success full, as the European Commission eventually demanded amendments to the feed-in law (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 265, Hirschl 2008 p. 136).

However, a revision of the law drawn up by the German Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1997 failed in Parliament – not least due to massive demonstrations against the reduction of feed-in rates (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 265). Citizen power plant initiatives thereby strongly benefitted from shared interests with groups of MPs who established, defended and improved the feed-in tariff system. An increasing coalition of interests of further actors promoting renewable energy technologies has also worked to their interest, among them environmental associations, industry associations, metalworkers and farmer groups (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 265).

Increasingly, however, what is contested is not if but rather how renewable energy should be supported and what sociotechnical configurations are desirable within the renewables sector. The major utilities have started to acknowledge the central role that renewables will have to play in Germany’s electricity system. Since the late 1990s most of them have developed sub- divisions for renewables, in particular exploring potentials in the area of offshore wind power (Stenzel and Frenzel 2008 p. 2650, Toke 2011 p. 134/135). The utilities’ position towards support structure has shifted accordingly, from wholesale opposition to policy support for renewables, towards abandonment of the feed-in tariff system in favour of a European wide tradable green electricity market (Stenzel and Frenzel 2008 p. 2650). Such a shift is expected to work to the advantage of utility companies and to the disadvantage of new entrants to the electricity sector (Verbruggen and Lauber 2012 p. 639/640).

As the big utilities, along with other large commercial actors, have started to enter the renewables sector, representatives of citizen power plants articulate the need to defend themselves against a takeover of the sector by these actors. In other words, there are serious concerns over appropriation of the renewables sector by utilities and other large investors (see also section 8.4 on co-optation). Several interviewees refer to an ongoing struggle over future sociotechnical configurations in the energy system within the renewables sector. This

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is often described as a struggle between parties advocating centralized versus those advocating decentralized forms of energy provision. [1:5, 1:23, 2:8, 2:46, 2:48, 7:36, 8:34]

I would say here in North Frisia in the first half of the 1990s citizen wind farms were unrivalled (…). The large renewable energy players, namely the utility companies but also the companies you probably know, they did not yet exist as competitors. At that time by comparison we lived in a promised land (…). Now of course you have large companies active at the international and national level, they have the know-how, the have the capital, all they need is a piece of land to implement their plans, so the only chance they have is to lure [owners] with high lease payments. [8:34] There’s a battle currently being fought about where the energy market will play out, will the decentralized character of renewables win through, that are increasingly penetrating the market, or will the monopoly structures persist and manage to integrate renewables in some way? [1:23] Thus, citizen power plants continue to be juxtaposed to utility owned power plants, but the form this juxtaposition takes has started to change. While citizen power plants used to be positioned as the antithesis to nuclear power plants, they are now increasingly positioned as the counter-model to large-scale utility owned renewables.

Accordingly, advocates of citizen power plants have started to engage in campaigns promoting a transition to an energy system largely based on citizen owned renewables. For example, in the wake of the 2013 federal election campaigns in Germany, an initiative called ‘Die Wende – Energie in Bürgerhand’ (The Transition – Energy in the Hand of Citizens) formed, promoting an energy transition which should be implemented by bottom-up actors (Weiger 2013 p. 19). Another example is the network ‘Energieblogger.net’ that also formed in 2013 and joins up the activities of several online journalists and other bloggers that promote a transition to an energy system based on citizen owned renewables (Energieblogger 2014, Zimmermann 2014).

To summarize, in the context of citizen power plants, incumbent-challenger conflicts constitute struggles over different sociotechnical configurations in the energy system and over the resources that can be used to implement such configurations. In Germany, nuclear power plants operated by major utilities and small-scale citizen owned renewable energy plants initially were constructed as the two opposing poles in this conflict (see Table 1 on p. 43 on established sociotechnical configurations in the Germany energy system and citizen power plants as alternative sociotechnical configurations). Since the major utilities have become more active in the renewables sector themselves, citizen power plants are increasingly positioned as the counter-model to large-scale renewables owned by utilities. This amounts to a new juxtaposition of sociotechnical configurations. On the one side are citizen power plants that are broadly in line with the community power configuration. On the

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other side are established configurations in the German energy system, where only changes have been made to the dimension of the technical hardware (large-scale renewables instead of coal-fired and nuclear power plants).

These conflicts over different sociotechnical configurations have often played out as struggles over symbolic and structural resources. For one thing, advocates of citizen power plants have benefitted from widespread understandings of the desirability of renewable energy technologies among a variety of different interest groups. Furthermore, they have themselves actively promoted citizen owned renewables as an alternative to nuclear power and monopolistic structures in the energy system (symbolic resources). Secondly, there have been fierce struggles over the provision and specific design of policy support for renewables (structural resources). Overall, while the major utilities continue to be central players in the energy system, advocates of citizen power plants have managed to redirect a significant amount of resources to their advantage. More recently, however, advocates of citizen power plants have faced setbacks in this conflict. The feed-in tariff system has been blamed for driving electricity prices to unacceptably high levels (Tews 2014 p. 14) and recent amendments to the Renewable Energy Act constrain opportunities for independent power producers (see section 4.1).

9.2.2 Incumbent‐challenger conflicts in Austria Like in Germany, the conflict over nuclear power provided an impulse for the development of citizen power plants (see section 6.3). However, the conflict played out differently in Austria. As a consequence, citizen power plants are also positioned differently in relation to established configurations in the domestic electricity system. In Germany, nuclear power plants were kept in operation and were for a long time backed by powerful actors such as the major utilities, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Conservative and Liberal parties (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). By contrast, the Austrian conflict over nuclear power resulted in the Nuclear Energy Prohibition Act in 1978. Originally highly contested, a strong national consensus against the use of nuclear power formed in the 1980s under the impression of the Chernobyl disaster (Preglau 1994 p. 61). Utilities therefore never came to operate nuclear power plants in Austria. Therefore, as far as citizen power plant initiatives were driven by the desire to develop alternatives to nuclear power, they were not directly pitted against power plants operated by domestic utilities. [21:72]

In Germany this has been pursued in a much more conflictual way because of the anti- nuclear debate, you have to acknowledge that. (…) [The nuclear power discussion] in Germany of course is much more harsh and much more direct because I have nuclear power in the country. In Austria it is always indirect this anti-nuclear discussion. (…) But it is obvious, if I have a nuclear power plant in the country and if I have political

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decisions over changing their life span or shutting it down, what happened in Germany over the last years, then wind farms are the counter-model. Of course that also promotes it. And also the polarization classical big business and operating company that is thereby more polarized there. [21:72] Nevertheless the relationship between citizen power plant initiatives and utilities was initially fraught with considerable tensions. Utilities wanted to defend their quasi-monopoly status and tried to prevent the emergence of independent power producers such as citizen wind farms [10:17, 10:61, 14:45, 15:18, 17:32]. Citizen wind farm initiatives, for their part, depended on utilities for grid access and payment for the electricity they produced (see also section 8.3 on dependency relations).

We were not really supported by the established energy industry, rather to the contrary, there were concerns that a lot of decentralized, small energy providers could emerge (…). So it was not welcome news that suddenly there would be small operators of power plants in the area of wind power. [10:61] In these early years of wind power development in the second half of the 1990s, citizen wind farms accounted for the largest share of installed wind power capacity in Austria [16:32]. At the same time utilities themselves still took a rather sceptical and passively observant position towards wind power [10:36, 10:61, 14:3, 21:4].

This, however, changed around the year 2000. Around this time the regional utilities of Lower Austria and Burgenland, the two federal states with the largest wind power potential in Austria, entered the wind sector themselves (Energie Burgenland 2015b, EVN Naturkraft 2015, IG Windkraft 2015b). In 2009 the federal power plant operator Verbund also started to engage with wind power (Verbund 2015). By this time wind power was a proven technology in Austria and wind turbines had reached Megawatt dimensions, thus fitting in mores easily with the portfolio of utilities than the smaller turbines of earlier years. Together with the feed-in tariff that was available from 2003 onwards, this allowed the profitable operation of wind turbines. The entry of utilities into the Austrian wind power sector has meant that the share of installed wind power capacity collectively owned by citizens has been reduced to less than one third by the end of 2013 (IG Windkraft 2014; 16:32, 21:8).

However, far from perceiving this as a threat, one director of a citizen wind farm company describes the entry of utilities in the wind power sector as a decisive turning point in their relationship, resulting in shared interests and leading to productive forms of cooperation.

We [initially] tried to negotiate with [the regional utility company], but they were still different at that time, they worked very much against wind power, in fact they slowed things down wherever they could and partly they did some foul things. But then, after they themselves got into the issue of wind power, [they] made a U-turn and in fact they became active in wind power themselves. [15:18]

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Although we had to suffer a lot from [the regional utility company] we now don’t have any problems with each other and have good relations and also have joint projects. So that has changed a lot (…). [15:46] Similarly, other interviewees take a pragmatic but in some respects more ambivalent approach towards utility engagement in wind power. They admit that they would have preferred to see wind power remaining largely in the hands of companies based on collective citizen ownership. Nevertheless they generally welcome the fact that utilities have become active in the wind power sector. They admit that the entry of utilities significantly contributes to the diffusion of wind power or renewables more generally – something they highlight as their main mission. [10:36, 16:32, 17:51]

Had we sat here for an interview 10 years ago, maybe afterwards a business journalist would have said ‘wow, here is a new industry that for the most part is organized completely differently from classical industries’, because indeed at that time I think 70, 80% of installed capacity was organized through citizen participation companies in some way or another. The remaining part was [owned by] a few entrepreneurs and private individuals. And then the utility companies entered the scene, then the usual players entered the scene. And seen that way, the up-side is that wind power in Austria continues to dynamically develop market shares, that’s good. The down-side certainly is that we could not keep up the idea of citizen participation models to the same extent as in the early phase. [16:32] We don’t have the time to argue whether commercial companies should do this or not (…). Our main concern is to generate as much renewable energy as possible and commercial companies are often quicker. Of course it would be nice if there were a lot of participatory projects, because it is much more robust and also because a larger part of value creation remains in the locality. But I don’t think we have the time for that. Previously we always demanded that utility companies should do something and now that they finally (…) get themselves to do it, I don’t think one should oppose that. [17:51] Interviewees in the area of photovoltaics and biogas are somewhat more critical of utilities and do not necessarily welcome the entry of utilities [11:23, 12:49, 22:16]. Indeed, one interviewee refers to the situation in Germany and sees it as a deficit in Austria that the diffusion of renewable energy technologies is not accompanied by a vision of new ownership structures and economically more decentralized units of provision. [11:10, 12:49, 22:16]

One wanted to avoid, or one still wants to avoid, that this sector simply is absorbed by the large companies and that it disappears there like many other technologies. [12:49] What do we want? Do we want monopolists? The [regional utility company] will set up a thousand projects, no question of that, as soon as it reaches the rate of return of 5% they will build it. But then you have the monopolists again. That can’t be what we want. That’s just the thing where I say that’s contrary to what the Germans are doing. Returning to small units, municipal utilities, that hasn’t arrived here yet. [22:16] Overall, however, sociotechnical configurations in the energy system are not as contested as in Germany. Even the interviewees quoted above acknowledge that they hold a minority 204

position and in fact they complain that the idea of reducing market dominance by large utilities has not taken root in Austria [12:39, 12:49, 22:16]. Although several interviewees express a preference for bottom-up, citizen-owned power plants, their overall commitment to the further diffusion of renewable energy technologies is voiced more strongly.

9.2.3 Comparison between Germany and Austria Looking back at the analysis of incumbent-challenger conflicts in Germany and in Austria, the most striking difference lies in the salience of open conflict. In Germany citizen power plants are positioned as the counter-model to power plants operated by major utilities. This is an open and fierce conflict in which utilities try to defend their dominant position in the field against citizen power plant initiatives and other independent power producers. For their part, several promoters of citizen power plants are not content with adopting a complementary role in the energy system, but rather articulate the goal of displacing incumbents altogether. In Austria there have also been severe tensions between utilities and citizen power plant initiatives. However, at least in the wind power sector, a largely cooperative approach focusing on shared interests has emerged since utilities entered the wind power sector themselves. The question what ownership structures renewable energy technologies should be based on is considered less important than working towards the establishment and maintenance of favourable framework conditions for renewable energy technologies in general.

In the following, I a going to discuss explanatory factors for this striking difference. First, the degree of contrast between citizen power plants and established sociotechnical configurations in the respective electricity systems, and secondly specific design features of the feed-in tariff systems in Germany and Austria.

Degree of contrast of sociotechnical configurations As I have already discussed in the beginning of section 9.2.2, the conflict over nuclear power played out quite differently in Germany and in Austria. In Austria the conflict over nuclear power had the effect that utilities never became operators of nuclear power plants. Instead, Austrian utilities mainly operate hydropower plants so a large share of the electricity they produce comes from renewable sources (see section 4.24.2). The sociotechnical configuration of large-scale hydropower plants operated by utility companies is of course still in considerable contrast to small-scale bottom-up initiatives setting up wind turbines and PV plants. However, the contrast is much more pronounced in Germany where the large utilities traditionally rely on coal-fired and nuclear power plants (see section 4.1).

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The contrast is all the more prominent, as renewable energy technologies have been positioned as the alternative or even antithesis to nuclear power. Many representatives and advocates of citizen power plants in Germany have therefore come to view the large utilities as their enemies. This means that from the beginning in Germany citizen power plants have often been conceptualized as oppositional acts or as ‘counter power plants’ to power plants operated by the large utilities.

Apart from the four major German utilities being opposed as the operators of nuclear power plants, their dominant position in the electricity market has also spurred opposition. Furthermore, apart from Vattenfall which is owned by the Swedish state, these large utilities are by majority investor-owned (see section 4.1). There are some indications that promoters of citizen power plants evaluate majority public ownership of utilities more favourably, as is the case in Austria [17:42, 21:62].

Design of feed-in tariff systems A second aspect that can explain different levels of conflict concerns specific design features of the feed-in tariff systems. In Germany the first feed-in tariff system at the national level could have hardly been welcomed by utilities. The Electricity Feed-in Law of 1990 required utilities, as grid operators, to connect independent producers of green electricity to the grid and to pay them 90% of the average electricity price for final customers. This means utilities were not eligible to receive feed-in tariffs themselves. Instead they were required to remunerate independent producers, wherever wind farms or other green electricity plants were installed (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 264). Furthermore there was no mechanism to ensure that the resulting costs were fairly balanced between different grid operators (ibid.). It is hardly surprising that utilities regarded this as a direct attack they had to fight back.

The design of the German feed-in tariff system was modified when the Electricity Feed-in Law was replaced by the Renewable Energy Act in 2000. From then on surcharge payments made by energy consumers for each kilowatt hour of consumed electricity supplied the funds for the provision of feed-in tariffs. Such tariffs also became available for all operators of renewable energy plants, including utilities. Indeed, seeing the new feed-in tariff system equalized the burden between different utilities, one of the large utilities spoke out in support of the Renewable Energy Act (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 p. 267). However, the Electricity Feed-in Law may have set the stage for utilities largely positioning themselves against a feed-in tariff system.

In Austria, the Green Electricity Act that introduced feed-in tariff system at the national level did not come into effect until 2003. This support mechanism was designed in a way similar to the new German feed-in system. It was based on surplus payments on consumed electricity 206

for energy consumers and open to all operators, including utilities. Indeed, the regional utilities of the two federal states with the highest wind power potentials soon made extensive use of the feed-in tariff system themselves. Furthermore, since 2006 the Austrian Green Electricity Act involves a cap on the overall amount of funds available for new plants every year (see section 4.2). For utilities this means that they do not have to fear a tremendous and unpredictable increase of green electricity plants operated by independent power producers. The Austrian feed-in tariff system therefore never constituted as serious a threat to utilities as the Electricity Feed-in Law and later the Renewable Energy Act did in Germany.

In addition to the issues discussed above, different pre-existing traditions of open contention in policy-making and public discourse might constitute another factor contributing to different levels of incumbent-challenger conflicts. Indeed, Austria is often portrayed as a country dominated by corporatist forms of policy making, consensus orientation and conflict avoidance (see e.g. Lauber 2004 p. 58, Dolezal and Hutter 2007). One interviewee argues that this consensus orientation and conflict avoidance has also shaped renewable energy policy. In his view, this has led to inconsistent policy decisions, but also to a greater preparedness for cooperation among different actors [15:46, 15:47]. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate in greater depth if and how different traditions of contention or consensus orientation in Austria and Germany have shaped incumbent- challenger conflicts in relation to citizen power plants.

9.3 Object conflicts

In the previous section I have argued that the degree of contrast between established sociotechnical configurations in energy systems with the sociotechnical configurations of bottom-up citizen power plants is an explanatory factor for the level of incumbent-challenger conflict. In this section I will re-focus on variability of sociotechnical configurations within the set of citizen power plants. I want to show that this variability can lead to tensions over what may legitimately be referred to as a citizen power plant and to actors drawing boundaries between different variants of collective citizen ownership.

As will become clear below, it is mainly actors committed to the community power sociotechnical configuration who feel the need to mark differences between this type of citizen power plant, and projects more in line with the green shareholding or consumer participation configurations (see Table 11 on p. 155 on different variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants). This may not come as a surprise, since such boundary drawing can be understood as a discursive defence against the problem of co-

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optation associated with the configurations of green shareholding and consumer participation (see section 8.4 on co-optation).

Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith have already pointed out in their paper introducing the concept of grassroots innovations that conflicts can be expected when such an innovation is adapted during the diffusion process (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 597). More specific to my case, Gordon Walker and colleagues (Walker, Hunter et al. 2007 p. 76-78) have pointed to tensions over the concept of community energy, in the face of different ways in which the term ‘community’ is understood and operationalized in various projects across the UK. David Hess (2004, 2005, 2007) has developed the notion of object conflicts to analyse conflicts that arise when innovations developed by fringe actors are incorporated into the mainstream and transformed during this process.

“Object conflicts are understood here as a specific type of politics of artefacts that emerges from the incorporation and transformation process. (…) As the incorporation and transformation process develops, the conflicts shift from alternative versus existing technologies/products to choices among various types of alternative or complementary technologies and products that are developed as the alternatives become mainstreamed.” (Hess 2004 p. 496) In his analysis of the organic food and agriculture movement, Hess identifies three types of such object conflicts, namely conflicts over research agendas, conflicts over consumption decisions and conflicts over standards set by private-sector or governmental bodies (Hess 2004 p. 503-506).

In the following I want to explore object conflicts in relation to citizen power plants. The basis for this analysis are not documented public debates but rather statements made by interviewees that draw lines between different variants of collectively owned wind farms and PV plants. This is not only a methodological issue, but also reflects the fact that, to my knowledge, such tensions are largely hidden and have not erupted into a public debate. I will reflect on the significance of this in my concluding comments in subsection 9.3.3. Furthermore, these tensions are only visible in my German interview data. Object conflicts appear to be largely absent in Austria so far, which is something I will also reflect on in my concluding remarks below. The following two subsections thus only explore boundary drawing in the German case.

I will divide my analysis into two parts: one deals with boundary drawing in relation to renewable energy cooperatives, the other deals with boundary drawing in relation to citizen wind farms. Seeing one of these forms of citizen power plants is primarily defined by its technological basis (wind power) and the other by its specific legal form (a cooperative), these are in principle overlapping categories. However, as has been mentioned before, most

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citizen wind farms are organized as a limited partnership and most renewable energy cooperatives are active in the area of PV. I have therefore chosen to apply the discursively widely used terms ‘citizen wind farm’ and ‘renewable energy cooperative’ to organize my analysis. In fact this discursive separation in itself already constitutes an interesting point in terms of the ways boundaries are defined.

9.3.1 Object conflicts concerning renewable energy cooperatives There are two way in which advocates of renewable energy cooperatives draw boundaries between citizen power plants. On the one hand, boundaries are drawn between renewable energy cooperatives and citizen power plants taking a different legal form. On the other hand, some advocates of renewable energy cooperatives also draw boundaries between different types of renewable energy cooperatives.

With respect to the differentiation between cooperatives and other legal forms, one interviewee argues that cooperatives contribute particularly strongly to regional value creation. In general, however, interviewees mainly emphasize the democratic decision making structures that are usually implemented in cooperatives, based on the principle of ‘one person one vote’. They contrast this with other legal forms, where voting power is often dependent on the volume of an individual’s investment or where decisions are taken by an executive board without consulting all shareholders. They argue that cooperatives therefore allow for more comprehensive forms of citizen involvement. [1:41, 3:4, 3:29, 5:12, 5:17, 7:10]

Citizen participation in the form of limited liability companies and limited partnerships or silent partnerships, there you don’t have a real influence, rather participation is reduced to financial participation without any further influence. Energy cooperatives much more bring the opportunity, so to say, that participation really goes in the direction of concept development, implementation of energy efficiency measures, expansion of business areas and things like that. (…) Energy cooperatives much more come with actual potentials for what I would call real citizen participation (…). [3:29] Another interviewee, however, questions whether grassroots democracy, as practiced within cooperatives, is a practical approach for setting up citizen power plants. In his view the limited partnership (GmbH & Co KG) still allows participants to be involved in important strategic decisions, but does not burden them with minor issues in the day to day management of a citizen power plant [2:3, 2:38].

This legal form [of a limited partnership] combines that the investor on the one hand participates in renewable energy, but does not have to take care of the plant him- or herself. Most participants also approve of that, they don’t have the peace of mind to really take care of things themselves. So this works very well and also with the operating companies there aren’t so many things that require participative decision making. If

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you have a say in deciding whether the nail is knocked in on the left or right side, that doesn’t benefit people in any way. [2:3] This shows that the boundary between energy cooperatives on the one side, and citizen power plants taking another legal form on the other, is in fact drawn from both sides.

As far as differences within the set of renewable energy cooperatives are concerned, interviewees mostly problematize more commercially oriented approaches. Thus, boundary drawing within the set of cooperatives marks some cooperatives as more investment oriented – much in the same way as citizen power plants that are not organized as cooperatives are described. In particular, some interviewees are critical of energy cooperatives initiated by banks [3:35, 7:40, 7:51, 7:53, see also section 7.1.2]

Another reason [for the diffusion of energy cooperatives] is that banks suddenly started to set up cooperatives. For me that is to be treated with caution. The background behind this is that they set up a cooperative, the chairman of the bank also acts as chairman of the supervisory board of the energy cooperative or chairman of the cooperative, and then the internal dealings get going. That is to say, we’ll plan a project and the funding is handled via our bank and insurance. Well, that’s totally the wrong strategy. [7:51] Both drawing lines between cooperatives and other legal forms, and drawing lines between different forms of cooperatives, focuses on the dimension of management and operation of the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants. What interviewees mostly refer to are forms of decision making (grassroots democracy vs. delegated or hierarchical decision making) and the question of who initiates and manages a citizen power plant (local citizens as volunteers vs. bank managers). This is broadly in line with the way I have distinguished forms of management and operation in the community power configuration on the one hand and the green shareholding configuration on the other (non-professional, local management and participative decision making vs. professional, non-local management and only partly participative decision-making).

Furthermore, boundary drawing by advocates of renewable energy cooperatives also makes references to different interpretations of citizen power plants and different motivations to participate. [3:35]

Meanwhile there are these big, professional solar funds, there people sometimes don’t even know which individual PV plants are behind them, because several plants are bundled into one fund. And without any doubt (…) the financial return has a relatively important role to play there. But all these citizen community plants that developed in the early phase and that still develop today, around a school, around a church roof, a fire brigade building or whatever, they are related to very distinctive ecological, civil- society based motivations. [3:35] In terms of the different strands of understandings related to citizen power plants that I have identified (see Table 12a - Table 12d on p. 156-158), it is mainly understandings from the 210

strand ‘responsibility and self-governance’ that are juxtaposed to understandings from the strand ‘ecological modernisation’.

9.3.2 Object conflicts concerning citizen wind farms Boundary drawing in the case of citizen wind farms differs a little from the case of energy cooperatives in that there is no legal form that sets citizen wind farms apart from other types of citizen power plants. Indeed, one interviewee problematizes that there is no clear definition of what constitutes a citizen wind farm. [4:11, 4:15, 4:32]

Citizen wind farm [Bürgerwindpark] is the term that has established itself in Germany. Maybe that’s the crux with it (…). Everybody uses this word citizen wind farm, but I think if you would inquire further, everybody also has a different notion of it. [4:15] Boundary drawing in this case is not about comparing citizen wind farms with other types of initiatives. Rather, the question is what form of collective citizen ownership of wind turbines may legitimately be referred to as a citizen wind farm (Bürgerwindpark). In my interviews three types of criteria were articulated:

 A citizen wind farm is owned exclusively by local citizens or, in a weaker version of the criterion, a majority of the owners is local [2:1, 4:15, 9:9]

For me and for us a citizen wind farm is a wind farm where more than 50% of participants (…) are from the municipality. [9:9]  Secondly, a citizen wind farm not only is predominantly owned by local citizens but also initiated and managed by local citizens. [4:15, 8:17]

I would not only define that by the form of participation but also, in the ideal case, the initiative comes from the [local] citizens. [8:17]  Finally, one interviewee contends that a citizen wind farm needs to operate as an independent enterprise, not as a project attached to a larger company [8:19]

If you ask me, a citizen wind farm usually also is characterised by constituting an independent economic enterprise, usually in the form of a limited partnership, that is active in its town. [8:19] The latter criterion reinforces the boundary between wind farms that are locally owned and managed, and projects in which utilities or other large commercial companies offer co- ownership of a wind farm to local citizens. [7:53, 8:17, 9:9, 9:10]

Well, meanwhile that is indeed also abused. There are large investors that effectively have no interest in citizen participation, because they want to do it themselves or partly want to sell it to large municipal utilities or other utility companies. In that case often the village is offered one turbine, but then, I would say in my experience often at conditions that cannot be compared to those had the citizens themselves taken charge of it. [8:17]

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I know, in North Rhine-Westphalia there are also so-called citizen wind farms, municipal utilities set up a wind farm there and one out of the ten turbines is the citizen plant. In my eyes that isn’t a citizen wind farm, that’s a big wind farm with a small citizen participation. [9:10] As in the case of energy cooperatives, boundaries are mainly drawn between the community power sociotechnical configuration of citizen wind farms and other variants. The interviewees both position the variant green shareholding and consumer participation as outside of the boundary. Here attention is paid both to the dimension of management and operation (local management, independent from larger enterprise) as well as ownership and returns (local ownership, full citizen ownership rather than co-ownership with large commercial player).

9.3.3 Discussion To summarize, both in the case of renewable energy cooperatives and in the case of citizen wind farms, the boundaries that are drawn by German interviewees mainly serve to defend the community power sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants from other variants. More specifically, this boundary drawing mainly focuses on the dimensions of management and operation, as well as ownership and returns. Against the background of the problem of co-optation explored in section 8.4, this can be interpreted as a discursive defence of grassroots actors against co-optation by actors pursuing different interests and goals.

However, this does not mean that there is consensus over the way boundaries should be defined. For example, one interviewee defends an approach to management and operation that is closer to the green shareholding model. But also those who broadly share the ideal of a community power approach differ in the criteria they consider important. For example, some specifically advocate the legal form of a cooperative, while others do not find this essential and are content with the limited partnership or other legal forms. Furthermore actors weigh criteria differently (e.g. local ownership / local management).

Finally, I would like to comment on the arena of the object conflicts I have observed. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, Hess (2004 p. 503-506) distinguishes three types of object conflicts: those related to the funding of research agendas, those related to consumption decisions and those related to the setting of standards. I understand these types as different public arenas where diverging positions over what should define an ‘object’ are debated. To my knowledge, in the case of citizen power plants, public debates over their defining criteria have not yet erupted. The arena I have analysed here is a hidden one and, indeed, one that I produced myself: the interviews I conducted with representatives of citizen power plants and support actors in the field (see section 5.1 on the selection of interviewees).

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I assume that the absence of public debates has to do with the fact that hardly any policy support specifically targets citizen power plants. Furthermore, most citizen power plant initiatives do not sell the electricity they produce directly to end users and therefore have no need to introduce ‘electricity from citizen power plants’ as a premium market category. Therefore the stakes in defining what should and what should not be referred to as a citizen power plant are rather low. Arguably this may change, for example if a policy were introduced giving preferential treatment to citizen power plants over other renewable energy projects.

In Austria, boundary drawing was not so much hidden in but almost completely absent from my interview data. Apart from reference to a few tensions during the process of scaling up (see section 7.2.2), hardly any normative criteria for citizen power plants were articulated. Indeed, in this context it should be noted that in Austria the term Bürgerbeteiligungsanlage (citizen participation plant) is frequently used. This already carries a different connotation than Bürgerkraftwerk (citizen power plant). The term Bürgerbeteiligungsanlage is more compatible with the notion of a centralized, possibly commercially oriented, management entity that develops a renewable energy plant involving some form of citizen participation, which may only be financial. By contrast, Bürgerkraftwerk more strongly carries the notion of a project fully in the hands of a bottom-up initiative. This means that the terminology used in Austria already suggests an understanding of citizen power plants that readily accommodates projects developed in a top-down fashion.

Furthermore I conducted the largest part of my Austrian interviews before utilities started to develop and promote their version of citizen power plants (see section 7.4.1 on citizen power plants developed by Austrian utilities). It is possible that some representatives of bottom-up citizen power plants would meanwhile express reservation towards these projects or at least towards grouping them together with projects broadly in line with the community power sociotechnical configuration.

9.4 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has looked at conflicts related to the diffusion of citizen power plants. Such conflicts take place in a number of different arenas. There are conflicts at the micro level over individual projects and at the meso/macro level of energy system reorganization. Some conflicts – in particular incumbent-challenger conflicts in Germany – take place in the public domain and are highly visible. Other conflicts, in particular the object conflicts I explored, are largely hidden tensions.

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Broadly speaking, both local conflicts and incumbent-challenger conflicts are conflicts that result from interventions into established systems and practices. At the local level, citizen power plants go along with a new way of using land, including the visual impact this brings along. Furthermore it can go along with new ways of organizing locally and with new financial flows in the local community. At the level of energy systems, citizen power plants, together with the emergence of other independent power producers, mean that new actors take on the role of energy producers. This has also gone along with new support systems and new rules governing market access. Such interventions of course easily provoke opposition and dissent from other actors who want to uphold the status quo or intervene in different ways. Thus, local conflicts and incumbent challenger conflicts are essentially both conflicts over the introduction of new and potentially disruptive practices into established systems.

Object conflicts can be interpreted in different ways. One possible perspective is to see them as internal tensions within the set of actors developing and advocating citizen power plants. Within this set of actors, different groups have different views about what may legitimately be referred to as a citizen power plant, or which variants are preferable to others. In particular, actors in favour of a community power configuration feel the need to demarcate this variant from other forms of collective citizen ownership of wind farms and PV plants. Object conflicts can, however, also be interpreted as an extension of incumbent-challenger conflicts. Within incumbent-challenger conflicts one possible move by incumbents is to incorporate the challenger’s innovation into their practices and thereby to maintain control over it (Fligstein and McAdam 2011 p. 14/15, Hess 2013 p. 849). This may result in object conflicts, as some grassroots innovators try to defend the innovation against this move by drawing boundaries between different variants of the innovation.

In terms of my theoretical framework, all of these conflicts constitute struggles over resources or disagreements over the goals to which they are put. This is most visible in the case of incumbent-challenger conflicts. Here utilities, citizen power plant initiatives along with other independent power producers, as well as their respective allies in the policy domain, struggle over support systems and rules governing market access (structural resources). Furthermore, incumbent-challenger conflicts in Germany also are about symbolic resources. Advocates of citizen power plants position citizen owned renewables as an alternative to nuclear power and monopolistic structures in the energy system, as well as a way to directly engage in climate change mitigation (symbolic resources).

Local conflicts often constitute disagreements over the uses to which local natural and material resources (land, money) are put. In addition to that, local conflicts can also be tied to different interpretations of such projects (symbolic resources). For example, a citizen wind

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farm can be understood both as a way of taking local action against climate change, and as an intrusion to the local landscape. Finally, object conflicts constitute conflicts over the goals to which resources should be put. The goals in this case are different variants of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants. Such conflicts could intensify if special policy support (structural resources) were made available specifically for citizen power plants. This would raise the question which criteria need to be fulfilled to qualify for such support.

For all types of conflicts, conflict salience is in some way related to the variance of sociotechnical configurations – albeit in different ways. The analysis of local conflicts suggests that the community power variant of citizen power plants is less prone to conflict than others. The salience of incumbent-challenger conflicts partly depends on the degree of contrast between established sociotechnical configurations in the energy system and sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants. Finally, the analysis of object conflicts shows that also the variability of sociotechnical configurations within the set of citizen power plants causes tensions.

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10 Conclusion

In this thesis I have addressed the questions how it was possible for bottom-up actors to develop the grassroots innovation of citizen power plants and how it was possible for this innovation to spread. I was also interested in the ways different forms of diffusion impact back on the innovation itself. In addition to that, I have asked to what extent the diffusion of citizen power plants can be interpreted as a process of empowerment and have examined which conflicts go along with the diffusion of this grassroots innovation. I also strived to develop a theoretical framework that allows me to address these questions and that may be more suited to the analysis of grassroots innovations than existing approaches.

I have picked up on the concept of grassroots innovations, as introduced by Gill Seyfang and Adrian Smith (2007). This concept highlights the innovation potential of civil society actors and their potential to contribute towards transition processes towards more sustainable systems of provision. In a similar way to Seyfang and Smith, I think of grassroots innovations as novel sociotechnical configurations developed by community groups and civil society initiatives. To explain the establishment of such new sociotechnical configurations by civil society actors, in spite of the self-stabilising mechanisms of an established regime, I have drawn on an adapted version of resource mobilization theory, a strand of social movement theory. This has meant looking at the ways actors mobilize, use and exchange different types of resources to develop citizen power plants.

The components of my theoretical framework include different types of actors, resources and sociotechnical configurations. The four chapters in which I have presented my analysis (chapters 6 - 9) can be interpreted as different takes on the interplay between these elements. First I looked at the way bottom-up initiatives gained access to resources in order to develop new sociotechnical configurations. This was followed by an analysis of different ways by which new sociotechnical configurations spread and thereby also changed, by means of different forms of resource use and resource exchange between actors. I then examined the question to what extent the diffusion of this grassroots innovation can be interpreted as a process of empowerment. To deal with this question, I conceptualized empowerment as increasing disadvantaged actors’ ability to access and use resources for a particular goal. Finally, I explored different types of conflicts that go along with the diffusion of citizen power plants. In my framework such conflicts can be understood as competition over resources or disagreement over the goals to which they are put.

The results in relation to my research questions have already been discussed in the respective chapter conclusions, but I will summarize the most important points below. Following this

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summary of my case study results, I will reflect on the added value of the theoretical framework I have developed for the analysis of grassroots innovations.

10.1 Summary of results Opening up space for citizen power plants The first question I dealt with was how an initial space could be opened up for bottom-up initiatives to develop citizen power plants as an alternative sociotechnical configuration in the energy system. I have focused specifically on wind power, not least because in Germany and Austria the first citizen power plants mainly developed in this area. Drawing on resource mobilization theory, I focused on the resources that needed to be mobilized to develop these pioneer projects. My analysis has shown that six broad types of resources were relevant across all cases:

 Material resources (money),  Natural resources (suitable sites for wind power development),  Social-organizational resources (labour and forms of social organization),  Knowledge resources (technical, legal and organizational knowledge and know- how),  Symbolic resources (understandings that make citizen wind farms meaningful and desirable), and finally  Structural resources (policy support, e.g. feed-in tariffs).

The cases I looked at, however, differed in terms of the resource endowments initiatives had available at the outset, and further resource mobilization efforts that were required. In Germany, two broad strands of early citizen wind farms initiatives can be identified. One strand had close links to the anti-nuclear movement and understood citizen wind farms as a demonstration of the alternatives to nuclear power. Starting from and building on this symbolic resource they succeeded in mobilizing further resources by searching for suitable sites, collecting sufficient money, developing relevant know-how and securing subsidies. A second strand of early citizen wind farm initiatives in Germany consisted of farmers along the coast of the North Sea. They started from an awareness of their land as a natural resource for wind power development, the introduction of the first feed-in tariff system as a structural resource and an understanding of wind power as a potential source of local value creation (symbolic resource).

In Austria wind farm pioneers coalesced into a small scene, most of which worked with collective ownership approaches. They started from an understanding of wind power as an alternative to nuclear power and large-scale hydropower (symbolic resources) along with

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some basic knowledge resources they acquired through site visits to citizen wind farms in other countries. In the Austrian case a great deal of effort had to be put into establishing that suitable sites with sufficient wind speeds were available in a land-locked country such as Austria (establishing the availability of natural resources).

Resource mobilization for these early initiatives was generally a bricolage process of gradually piecing together the resources to develop these projects. In some cases this bricolage mobilization of resources occurred at the micro-level of individual projects (e.g. securing a particular site or negotiating a feed-in tariff with a regional energy utility on a case-by-case basis). In other cases, resources could be made more broadly available to a larger set of initiatives, e.g. a wind measurement programme establishing the availability of suitable sites in some Austrian regions. Only rarely radical resource shifts can be observed. In particular this pertains to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 that, as it was received by the anti-nuclear and environmental movements in Austria and Germany, boosted the symbolic resources attached to citizen wind farms. The introduction of the first national feed-in tariff system in Germany in 1991 can be interpreted as another such radical resource shift.

The diffusion of citizen power plants After focusing on the way these pioneer initiatives succeeded in opening up a space for citizen power plants, I shifted my focus to examine the actual diffusion of this grassroots innovation. How was it possible for citizen power plants to spread further? What diffusion challenges were there and how could they be dealt with?

Previous research had already identified replication, scaling up and uptake by incumbents (also referred to as translation), as different forms of diffusion of grassroots innovations (Seyfang and Smith 2007, Seyfang 2009). Interestingly, all three of these forms of diffusion had an important role in the diffusion of citizen power plants in Germany and Austria. Furthermore, I identified transfer to a new country or technology area as another way in which citizen power plants had spread. My analysis of the diffusion of citizen power plants was therefore organized around four different forms of diffusion:

 Replication,  Scaling up,  Transfer to a new country or technology area, and  Uptake by incumbents.

Each of these forms of diffusion involves a particular actor base driving the diffusion process, a particular way resources are used and exchanged between actors, has implications

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for the sociotechnical configurations that are produced and involves different strands of how citizen power plants are understood (see Table 13 on p. 159).

For my analysis of replication I looked at one Austrian and one German region where citizen wind farms had spread in the 1990s. Furthermore I looked at the more recent boom of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany that are mostly active in PV and that started around 2007. In line with previous research, my analysis of replication processes highlights the importance of the transfer of knowledge resources to newly emerging initiatives. In this context the main challenge is not only to provide codifiable, technical knowledge to new initiatives, but also to spread skills and know-how. Replication can take place as a gradual one-by one process based on know-how exchange between established initiatives and a newly emerging one. The case of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany, however, shows how the systematic spreading of knowledge resources by support organizations via guidelines, ready-made templates, counselling services and training courses can speed-up the process further, leading to a kind of mass-replication.

In addition to spreading knowledge resources, replication in the cases considered here also depended on stable and favourable policy support (structural resources) and on the flexible reinterpretation of the meaning of citizen power plants. For example, citizen power plants were reinterpreted as a way to mitigate climate change or as a sensible way of dealing with one’s savings in the light of the financial crisis. By definition of the term, replication does not involve any ‘hard’ changes to the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants. However, in the German cases a shift in the process by which citizen power plants are developed could be observed, from bottom-up initiatives pushing to make space for their project, to support organizations increasingly pulling initiatives into the space that has become available.

For my analysis of scaling up I first briefly reviewed some cases of scaling up citizen wind farms within narrow limits. Then I focused on continued scaling up of three Austrian citizen wind farm initiatives to medium-sized companies. These companies today account for the largest share of collectively owned wind farms in Austria. Both for limited and for continued scaling up an important trigger for initiatives to expand their activities was a resource surplus they were left with after they had successfully established their first citizen power plant: know how that seemed wasted if it was not put to follow-up projects (knowledge resources), a surprising success in raising money (material resources) and additional turbine sites that were offered to initiatives in the wake of media attention that their pioneer projects attracted (natural resources). It is, however, a commitment to the principle of localism and an unwillingness or inability to give up on the principle of voluntary work that distinguishes

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initiatives that only scaled up within narrow limits from initiatives that engaged in continued scaling up.

Apart from exploiting the resource surplus they were left with, initiatives that engaged in continued scaling up actively worked on further enlarging their resource base to deal with the larger volume and increasing complexity of projects. They further extended their knowledge resources by hiring professional staff, moved their projects to locations where suitable sites and policy support (natural & structural resources) were available and used professional marketing campaigns to raise large sums (material resources).

Continued scaling up, however, not only meant that available resources were exploited within existing initiatives and that the resource base was expanded further. It also went along with considerable changes to the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants. Most notably this included a shift from voluntary work to professional staff as well as to non-local management, the broadening of the geographical participation structure, and changes in the legal form. Indeed, a central challenge of continued scaling up consist of negotiating acceptable ways of adaptation and not putting off early participants with ideological commitments when reaching out to more mainstream audiences. Overall the changes resulted in a configuration I have termed ‘green shareholding’, in contrast to the earlier ‘community power’ model (see Table 5 on p. 121). This shift has gone along with an increased understanding of citizen power plants as a form of investment with an environmental added value.

For my analysis of transfer to a new country I revisited the case of the establishment of the first citizen wind farms in Austria. From a country case perspective these were pioneer projects, but from a global perspective they can also be understood as a form of diffusion of citizen wind farms via transfer of the concept to a new country. I found that this transfer depended on a simultaneous transfer of resources. First of all, site visits to citizen wind farms in other countries, especially Germany and Denmark, helped Austrian wind power pioneers to acquire some basic knowledge resources on technical and organizational issues. Around the same time, Austrian policy makers turned towards the Danish-German model of feed-in tariffs and slowly started to provide similar forms of support in Austria (transfer of structural resources). In addition to that, the transfer of the concept of citizen wind farms was supported by similar understandings of wind turbines as the antithesis to nuclear power in Germany and in Austria (symbolic resources). Of course additional resources still had to be mobilized anew, in particular establishing the availability of suitable sites (natural resources).

My analysis of transfer to a new technology area was based on two individual cases, both of which proved extremely challenging and eventually failed. One case concerned the

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attempted transfer of a collective citizen ownership model from wind power to biogas in Austria; the other concerned an attempted transfer of the concept of citizen wind farms from onshore to offshore wind power in Germany. These initiatives in new technology areas also benefitted from the ability to transfer some knowledge resources from established initiatives, in particular concerning legal and organizational issues. However, in relation to other types of resources they ran into a number of difficulties. At a generalized level, this included the need to adapt resources to different requirements in the new technology area (e.g. different cost structure), competition over resources between technology areas (feed-in tariffs, participants) and the limited transferability of some types of resources (e.g. symbolic resources and some types of knowledge resources).

My analysis of uptake my incumbents focused on Austria, where seven out of nine regional utility companies and an additional three local utility companies in urban centres have put forward their own citizen ownership models since 2011. These projects either use a sale- and-lease-back-model, whereby individuals buy part of the power plant (e.g. a PV panel) and lease it back to the utility company. Alternatively, some utilities offer participation via loans that are paid back via discounts on participants’ electricity bills. One reason why uptake by incumbents has proved quite effective and has gained ground quickly is that utility companies can put their considerable resources to the development of such projects. It is, however, of course their particular version of this grassroots innovation that they put their resources to. Like in the case of scaling up, and arguably even more so, this new sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants differs significantly from the community power configuration (see Table 8 on p. 148). Most notably it means that these power plants are managed and operated by incumbent actors in the energy system. Ownership, by citizens, is separated from management, by utilities, and at the same time tied to purchasing electricity from the utility company managing the plant.

Another point that is interesting in relation to the citizen power plant projects developed by utility companies is the different way in which symbolic resources are used, a kind of reversal of their direction of force. For utilities, citizen power plant projects offer a way to strategically position themselves as an environmentally responsible company. Therefore, citizen power plants themselves become a symbolic resource for utilities and can improve their public perception. However, utilities may also fail to exploit these symbolic resources if they have already acquired a public image radically diverging from that of an environmentally responsible company that encourages public participation. This explains why uptake by incumbents has had a far smaller role to play in Germany than it has in Austria.

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Quite generally, the relevance of different forms of diffusion varied over time and between the two countries I examined. Replication has had a strong role to play in Germany, both for citizen wind farms and PV cooperatives. By contrast, the diffusion of citizen power plants in Austria has been more strongly driven by the scaling up of citizen wind farm companies and, more recently, uptake by incumbents. As far as citizen wind farms in Austria are concerned, replication lost importance over time and eventually stalled due to increasing start-up costs and higher complexities in the planning procedure.

As should have become clear, each of these forms of diffusion involved quite different challenges. For replication, these challenges mainly consisted in making knowledge resources available to new initiatives, having stable and favourable policy support available and allowing for the flexible reinterpretation of the meaning of citizen power plants. For scaling up, critical issues involved further extending the resource base, adapting the sociotechnical configuration to fit a larger scale and, in doing so, giving up on principles of localism and voluntary work. Transfer of the concept of citizen power plants to a new country or technology area presented the challenge of a simultaneous transfer of resources, along with the need to adapt these resources to the new context. Finally, uptake by incumbents, like scaling up, involves the challenge of adapting the grassroots innovation to fit a larger scale and a different management structure, and may also fail due to a mismatch of symbolic resources. For a more detailed description of the challenges related to different forms of diffusion and ways in which they could be overcome or avoided see Table 9a – Table 9d in section 7.5.

Furthermore, different forms of diffusion have produced different variants of the sociotechnical configuration of citizen power plants. I identified three ideal-typical configurations:

 Community power,  Green shareholding, and  Consumer participation.

The community power configuration is based on non-professional and local management, local ownership, and typically includes a small number of PV plants or wind turbines in a single location. This is the configuration that has mainly spread through replication. By contrast, continued scaling up of citizen power plant initiatives has resulted in a configuration I have labelled green shareholding. This configuration involves several wind farms or PV plants in a number of different locations, ownership by geographically dispersed

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individuals as company shareholders, as well as professional, non-local management. Finally, for the configuration that has been produced through uptake by incumbents I use the term consumer participation. It typically involves large-scale PV plants and the strict separation of ownership from management of the plant. The plant is managed by a utility company and owned by a set of customers of this utility company. For the case of transfer it has not been possible to determine a typical sociotechnical configuration, not least because the cases I considered already differed in the configurations they strived to transfer to start with. For further details on variants of sociotechnical configurations see Table 11 on p. 155.

A process of empowerment? One thing the analysis of different forms of diffusion of citizen power plants showed is that different kinds of actors with different interests promote different variants of this grassroots innovation. This points to the need of taking a closer look at issues of power and conflict in relation to the diffusion of citizen power plants. First of all I asked to what extent the diffusion of citizen power plants can be interpreted as a process of empowerment. To deal with this question I conceptualized empowerment as increasing disadvantaged actors’ ability to access and use resources for a particular goal. Although bottom-up initiatives indeed succeeded in mobilizing a significant resource base for the development of citizen power plants, I identified three problems that qualify the extent to which the diffusion of citizen power plants can be understood as a process of empowerment:

 The problem of continued dependency relations,  The problem of shifting ends to which resources are put, and  The problem of empowering the empowered.

The problem of dependency relations initially presented itself in the form of dependence on utilities for grid connection. Feed-in tariff systems largely eliminated this problem, but somewhat ironically made initiative newly dependent on this sometimes volatile policy regime. Similarly, while the provision of resources from various support organizations has contributed to the diffusion of citizen power plants, this also created new dependency relations. This problem constitutes an instance of the more general paradox, noted by critical theorists, of creating new dependency relations if one actor strives to empower another (Avelino 2011 p. 67). Dependency relations are particularly problematic where the alignment of interests of the actor providing resources and the actor receiving resources is questionable and where this resource dependency is unilateral.

The problem of shifting ends to which resources are put is related to the changes to sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants that went along with scaling up and

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uptake by incumbents. Broadly speaking, the transformative power of grassroots innovators has unfolded in interplay with the reinforcive power of regime actors. Therefore configurations of citizen power plants have tended to move closer to established configurations in the energy system. This can be interpreted as a case of assimilation to established structures, in the case of scaling up, or appropriation into existing structures, in the case of uptake by incumbents. Thus, especially in Austria, a significant amount of the resources that have been mobilized for the establishment of citizen power plants have gone to sociotechnical configurations that differ in significant respects from the way this innovation was first conceived of.

Finally, I have questioned the extent to which bottom-up citizen power plant initiatives constituted disadvantaged actors from the very beginning. I have argued that this is very much a matter of perspective and depends on what other actors these initiatives are compared to. Arguably they constituted disadvantaged actors compared to established actors in the energy system such as utilities. However, the individuals involved in these initiatives may be quite privileged in terms of their socio-economic status. Furthermore, the communities where such initiatives form may be more privileged than others in terms of the natural resources, the knowledge resources and the material resources of its residents. Seen this way, the mobilization of resources for the development of citizen power plants also brings up the problem of empowering the empowered.

Thus, while the diffusion of citizen power plants shifted some power relations in favour of bottom-up initiatives, the three problems discussed above qualify the extent to which this can be understood as a process of empowerment.

Conflicts related to the diffusion of citizen power plants Finally, I examined what types of conflict go along with the diffusion of citizen power plants and explored factors that contribute to the salience of these conflicts. In my analytical framework, conflicts can be understood as struggles over resources or disagreements over the goals to which they are put. I identified three types of conflicts:

 Local conflicts concerning individual projects,  Incumbent-challenger conflicts between large utilities and independent power producers, including citizen power plants, and finally  Object conflicts over what may legitimately be referred to as a citizen power plant.

At the local level, citizen power plants constitute an intervention into the way land is used and may bring along new ways of organizing locally as well as new kinds of financial flows within the community. Local conflicts can therefore be understood as disagreements over

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the uses to which these local natural and material resources are put. In addition to that, local conflicts may also revolve around different interpretations related to a citizen power plant project (symbolic resources). In line with previous research, my exploration of local conflicts suggests that such conflicts are less salient when management of a project is local, when participation is open to all members of the community (e.g. low financial threshold) and when the technical hardware is perceived as unobtrusive. However, previous tensions in the community, both between individuals or at the level of local party politics, may also shape interactions around a citizen power plant project and result in conflicts.

Like local conflicts, incumbent-challenger conflicts also pertain to interventions into established systems and practices, in this case at the level of energy systems. Here independent power producers, utility companies and their respective allies in the policy domain contend over support systems and rules governing market access (structural resources). Furthermore, incumbent challenger conflicts in Germany also revolve around the positioning of citizen power plants as the antithesis to large-scale nuclear or coal fired power plants operated by utilities (symbolic resources ). Indeed, the most striking aspect of my exploration of incumbent-challenger conflicts was the significantly higher salience of this type of conflict in Germany, compared to Austria. It appears that this is related to a higher degree of contrast between established configurations in the energy system and sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants in Germany (high market concentration in Germany and large utilities mainly relying on coal and nuclear). In addition to that, the first German feed-in tariff system was designed in a way that pitted the interests of the large utilities as grid operators against the interests of independent power producers. Under the Electricity Feed-in Law, grid operators were not eligible for the tariff themselves, but had to pay independent power producers for their electricity. Finally, a more strongly established practice of open contention in Germany and a stronger consensus orientation and tendency to avoid open conflict in Austria, may have further contributed to diverging levels of incumbent-challenger conflicts.

Object conflicts (Hess 2004) revolve around the question what may legitimately be referred to as a citizen power plant. As such, object conflicts involve the drawing of boundaries between different variants of citizen power plants. Therefore, like the problem of shifting ends to which resources are put (see above), this type of conflict is tied up with the variety of sociotechnical configurations of citizen power plants that has developed during the diffusion process. Interviewees draw different kinds of boundaries, but boundaries usually amount to a distinction between a particular ideal type of a community power configuration and other variants (see Table 11 on p. 155). Like incumbent-challenger conflicts, object

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conflicts are much more salient in Germany than they are in Austria. My interviews show that the need to defend the community power configuration against assimilation and appropriation is felt more strongly in Germany than it is in Austria. This can in fact be linked to the higher salience of incumbent-challenger conflicts in Germany. As a result of such conflicts, many advocates of citizen power plants in Germany wish to draw a clear line between established structures and their alternative configurations.

10.2 Implications for the analysis of grassroots innovations In terms of the questions I have asked, my analysis has been informed by the literature on sustainability transitions and, more specifically, the literature on grassroots innovations (Seyfang and Smith 2007). As suggested by the literature on sustainability transitions (Markard, Raven et al. 2012), I have started from the assumption that systems of provision, such as the energy system, stabilize in dominant regimes that tend to preclude alternative and potentially more sustainable sociotechnical configurations. This makes it interesting to explore how experiments with new technologies, practices and forms of social organization nevertheless develop, in particular if such experiments come from the rather uninstitutionalized sphere of civil society. However, in contrast to most existing analyses of grassroots innovations, I have departed from established approaches in the sustainability transitions literature. In particular, I have decided not to follow the approach of strategic niche management (SNM), the analytical lens through which grassroots innovations have in most cases been approached so far (Seyfang and Smith 2007, Smith 2007, Seyfang 2010, Longhurst 2012, Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012, Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013, Hielscher, Seyfang et al. 2013, Kirwan, Ilbery et al. 2013, Seyfang and Longhurst 2013, Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014). I have done this for a number of reasons: first, to better understand how spaces for new sociotechnical configurations are created and maintained from the bottom up; second, to allow for greater heterogeneity both in terms of sociotechnical configurations and in terms of the meanings and understandings attached to them; and third, to develop conceptual tools that allow for the analysis of issues of power and conflict in relation to grassroots innovations.

In the following I will discuss each of these issues in turn, reflecting if and how my framework has proved effective and what it has allowed me to do that cannot be achieved with alternative approaches.

Understanding better how spaces for an innovation are created and sustained from the bottom up One problem with the approach of strategic niche management for the analysis of grassroots innovations is that it tends to assume that niches for pioneer projects are strategically put in 226

place and attended to by outside niche managers. As other authors have already pointed out, such a managerial perspective is especially inadequate for grassroots innovations that often involve quite disparate sets of actors and projects that may only be rather loosely linked to each other (Smith and Seyfang 2013 p. 829, White and Stirling 2013 p. 839/840). Nevertheless, many previous analyses of grassroots innovations have used an SNM approach (Seyfang and Smith 2007, Smith 2007, Seyfang 2010, Longhurst 2012, Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012, Hargreaves, Hielscher et al. 2013, Hielscher, Seyfang et al. 2013, Kirwan, Ilbery et al. 2013, Seyfang and Longhurst 2013, Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014). Following the basic tenets of strategic niche management, these analyses have focused especially on learning processes, networking activities and the development of shared expectations. To be sure, this perspective contributed a great deal to understanding how robust grassroots innovations are, what barriers they confront and how they may wield greater influence (see e.g. section 2.2 reviewing literature on analyses of community energy projects in the UK as a grassroots innovation). However, these case studies generally have not concerned themselves with the question how spaces for experimentation came in place; they were just assumed to be there.

By focusing on resource mobilization, I was also able to explore how bottom-up actors gradually developed the capacity to set up pioneer projects in the first place. As already discussed above, resource mobilization typically is a bricolage process by which bottom-up initiatives piece together the resources required for a particular project. In some cases, the availability of particular resources at the outset, or newly interpreting something as a resource, can also act as a trigger to engage in a project to start with. Furthermore, resource mobilization usually is an iterative process in which available resources are used to mobilize further resources that are needed. Looking at resource requirements for particular projects, at the resource endowments initiatives have available at the outset, and at specific ways that actors mobilize and use resources, has helped me to understand why and how such initiatives could emerge and successfully develop their projects.

Allowing for heterogeneity in terms of sociotechnical configurations Another problem I see with the application of strategic niche management to grassroots innovation is the high degree of homogeneity of an innovation that the niche concept suggests. Indeed, also lead authors on grassroots innovations have acknowledged the problem of “simplif[ying] a complex plurality of socio-technical configurations (i.e. community-led initiatives) into unrealistically homogenous niches working against a similarly problematic conceptualisation of an homogenous regime” (Seyfang, Hielscher et al. 2014 p. 24). In fact, Gill Seyfang and Noel Longhurst (2013), in an exploration of

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community currencies, note that in contradiction to niche theory, this grassroots innovation exhibits high degrees of fragmentation and variety instead of consolidation and standardisation. They suggest this may be a specific characteristic of community currencies or, indeed, of grassroots innovations in general (ibid. p. 889).

By using the more general notion of sociotechnical configurations, I have been able to show how different forms of diffusion (replication, scaling up, uptake by incumbents) result in different variants of sociotechnical configurations of a grassroots innovation: the community power, green shareholding and consumer participation configurations. There is an interesting way in which this harks back to SNM theory. More recent articulations of strategic niche management have identified shielding, nurturing and empowerment as the three ‘functions’ a niche serves for the development of an innovation (Smith and Raven 2012). Translating such considerations to my framework, the mobilization and use of resources can be thought of as the nurturing of an innovation. From this perspective my analysis has demonstrated that an innovation can be subjected to different forms of nutrition and this affects not only the extent but also the specific way in which the innovation grows. Future analyses could explore if the different forms of the diffusion of grassroots innovations (replication, scaling up, uptake by incumbents) tend to lead to variants of sociotechnical configurations that are similar to the variants I have identified for the case of citizen power plants.

Allowing for heterogeneity in terms of understandings attached to sociotechnical configurations Apart from allowing for heterogeneity in terms of sociotechnical configurations, the approach I have taken has also allowed me to take account of a broad variety of interpretations and understandings of the grassroots innovation in focus. With my analysis I have tried to acknowledge the diversity of understandings of citizen power plants that make them meaningful to different actors, without stipulating at the outset whether this diversity is conducive or detrimental to their diffusion. In my theoretical framework these different understandings of citizen power plants have been referred to as symbolic resources. More than for any other resource types, the specific content of symbolic resources is highly variable and has consequences for the type of sociotechnical configuration that is produced.

My analysis shows that different understandings of citizen power plants range from interpreting them as a form of resistance to established structures in the energy system to viewing them as a way to secure customer loyalty for established utility companies. In section 7.5, I organized the multiple ways in which citizen power plants are understood into four strands:

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 Opposition,  Responsibility and self-governance,  Ecological modernization and  Suasion & compliance (see Table 12a - Table 12d on p. 156-158).

Drawing on a term that was introduced by Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker (1984) to analyse the social construction of technologies, one can say that citizen power plants exhibit a significant degree of interpretative flexibility. A similar situation has already been observed in relation to organic food, complementary currencies and community energy projects in the UK (Smith 2006 p. 454/455, Walker and Devine-Wright 2008, Longhurst 2012 p. 174). In particular, Gordon Walker and Patrick Devine-Wright found that representatives of different community energy initiatives interpreted the term community in rather different ways, for example in legal terms, in terms of public buildings being involved, or in terms of the financial involvement of local people (Walker and Devine-Wright 2008 p. 497/498). Similarly, “the various support programs [for community energy] were defining the meaning of community in flexible and divergent ways” (Walker, Hunter et al. 2007 p. 75).

This interpretative flexibility in the understandings of citizen power plants has an up- and a downside. Indeed, in relation to community energy in the UK, Gordon Walker and colleagues note that a broad array of different understandings “has (…) proved capable of accommodating a necessary diversity in the scale, type and purpose of small scale renewable energy project development, and, (…) has provided opportunities for experimentation with different models of project management, ownership and distribution of benefits” (Walker, Hunter et al. 2007 p. 78). They do, however also acknowledge that it is important to guard against rendering the concept devoid of any meaning if it is stretched too far (ibid.).

Also for citizen power plants in Germany and Austria, interpretative flexibility has meant that a broad range of actors has engaged with such projects and has thus promoted the diffusion of citizen power plants. On the other hand, the broad range of different and indeed contradictory interpretations can also provoke tensions. In particular, the current variety of understandings may also be an indication of a gradual shift from more grassroots-oriented understandings (emphasizing the strands opposition and responsibility and self-governance) to more business-oriented understandings (emphasizing the strands ecological modernization and suasion and compliance). Such a development could alienate pioneer initiatives and other actors committed to a grassroots approach.

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Developing conceptual tools to analyse issues of power and conflict Previous analyses of grassroots innovations have already noted that power issues deserve particular attention in the case of grassroots innovations. On the one hand they have pointed to the limited power of grassroots innovators when confronted with vested interests in established systems, on the other hand they have pointed to the potential of civil society initiatives to empower individuals through collective action (Seyfang and Smith 2007, Smith 2007, Seyfang 2009, Heiskanen, Johnson et al. 2010, Hess 2013, Smith and Seyfang 2013). I have drawn on resource based notions of power, in particular on Flor Avelino’s conceptualization of power specifically developed to analyse power issues in transition processes (Avelino 2011). This linked up well with my use of resource mobilization theory and has therefore allowed me to address power issues in a more systematic way. Furthermore, I have interpreted conflicts as competition over resources or disagreements over the goals to which they are put.

In addition to the diffusion challenges I identified and discussed in chapter 7, my reflections on issues of power and conflicts have made visible a number of further problems and dilemmas that go along with the diffusion of grassroots innovations. Indeed, from my analysis I would argue that there are two types of challenges that go along with the diffusion of grassroots innovations: the first type of challenge relates to the goal of achieving a greater extent of diffusion (see Table 9a - Table 9d in section 7.5 for an overview of these challenges). The second type of challenge is dealing with the dilemmas concerning how diffusion should be pursued and what compromises need to be made. These are the more wicked types of problems (Rittel and Webber 1973), as they are deeply value-laden and therefore cannot be easily resolved.

For one thing, different proponents of a grassroots innovation have different positions about how far it should be assimilated and incorporated into existing structures for the sake of greater diffusion (Seyfang and Smith 2007 p. 597). Furthermore, as other authors have already pointed out, pioneer actors do not have full control over this process and may be pushed aside by later entrants that develop more mainstreamed version of a grassroots innovation (Seyfang and Smith 2007, Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2013, Smith, Fressoli et al. 2013, Smith and Seyfang 2013, White and Stirling 2013). In addition to that, my analysis highlights that grassroots innovators themselves need to remain self-reflexive of the extent to which their projects favour the interests of already relatively well-resourced socio- economic groups in society. Reflexivity is also required on the side of actors providing support to grassroots innovators, concerning new dependency relations they may create through their support. All this highlights once again that the diffusion of a grassroots

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innovation inevitably goes along with a number of conflicts between actors who evaluate these issues differently.

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Appendix: Verbatim interview quotes in German original

6 The emergence of citizen power plants 6.2 County case Germany

6.2.2 The emergence of citizen wind farms

Ja, ich sage mal 1990 waren die Demos an den Kernkraftwerken noch nicht so lange her gewesen, durchaus sind einige dabei gewesen, die mit an Bord waren an Brokdorf, das ist hier an der Elbe natürlich auch ein Synonym für den Widerstand gegen die Atomenergie gewesen. Die haben sich natürlich wahnsinnig darüber gefreut, dass man vor der eigenen Haustür erneuerbare Energien erzeugen konnte. [Lübke Koog:16] Erleichtert wurde es sicher (…) [durch] das Stromeinspeisegesetz, oder jetzt das erneuerbare Energien Gesetz. Ganz wichtig um überhaupt an die Fremdfinanzierungsmittel zu kommen, weil eine Bank natürlich auslotet wie hoch die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Rückzahlung ist. [Lübke-Koog:35] 6.3 Country case Austria

6.3.2 The emergence of citizen wind farms

Anfang der 90er Jahre, was war da? Da war Tschernobyl Katastrophe nicht so viele Jahre weg und sehr dominant noch, [auch] die ganze Atomdiskussion von Zwentendorf (…). Da waren die ganzen energiepolitischen Debatten auch noch näher als heute. Die Leute waren einfach in dieser Energie, und da sind halt viele gewesen die gesagt haben, naja irgendwie nur reden ist auch nicht gut, machen wir gemeinsam was. [21:9] Wir sind dann mit der Energiewerkstatt, da hat der K. (…) so eine Exkursion organisiert. (…) Und da sind wir halt da hinauf gefahren. Wir haben dann bei einer zweiten Exkursion, die war auch in Deutschland, da sind wir zu einem anderen Windpark gefahren. Also bei der ersten war ich alleine mit und bei der zweiten da haben wir dann mehrere Personen mitgenommen und dann ist das so langsam entstanden. [17:6] [Es ist etwas]wo wir ganz, ganz stolz sind, dass man sagt, in [unserer Gemeinde] sind die Windräder nicht nur Alternativenergieerzeuger sondern haben sich mittlerweile als Wahrzeichen etabliert. [14:25] [Windkraftanlagen sind] eine Technologie aus Dänemark, deutsch-dänisch, die dort sehr verbreitet auch in Bürgerbeteiligungsgesellschaften Anwendung fand. (…)Meine Frau und ich haben die Region besucht und haben dann sehr viele Leute kennengelernt, Institutionen kennen gelernt. (…)Wir haben uns dann an verschiedenen Modellen orientiert und selber gesagt, ok, wir probieren das mit diesem Darlehensmodell, wir gründen eine Träger-GmbH. [16:5] Es wusste damals noch keiner wie man sowas macht oder machen sollte, auch die Behörden selber nicht, wie das abzuwickeln ist. (…) Wir haben das einfach so gemacht gemeinsam, wir haben die Leute alle eingeladen, haben uns in einem Saal getroffen und gesagt, was glaubt ihr, wie sollen wir das machen? [15:15]

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7 The diffusion of citizen power plants 7.1 Replication

7.1.1 The replication of citizen wind farms in Austria and Germany

Wir sind eine Firma und sind natürlich gewinnorientiert, keine Frage, aber ich sehe es trotzdem als Hobby und als ein bisschen Lebensphilosophie. Jedes Windrad oder jede Alternativenergie[anlage], die gemacht wird ist für mich ein persönlicher Gewinn, ob das jetzt unsere Firma baut oder eine andere. [14:36] Viele haben sich das angeschaut und noch mehr haben uns gefragt in wie weit unter Umständen wir mal bereit wären in deren Gemeinde zu kommen und der Gemeindevertretung oder den Bürgern einfach mal zu erklären wie wir es gemacht haben, wie wir es aufgezogen haben. (…) Das war in der Tat etwas, was wir hier in Nordfriesland in unserem Kreis an vielen Stellen vorgestellt haben und was erstaunlicherweise in unserem Kreis unheimlich viele Nachahmer gefunden hat. [Lübke-Koog:8] Das EEG hat letztendlich eine gewisse Garantie beinhaltet. Nicht für den Stromertrag, aber für die Abnahme als solches. Ich behaupte ohne das EEG hätten wir mit Sicherheit die Zahl der Windenergieanlagen nicht in dieser Bürgerhand oder auch nicht in der mittelständischen Hand sondern dann wäre es irgendwo bei denen gelandet, die über andere Kapitalmittel verfügen. [8:35] Die Anforderungen sind sicherlich gestiegen. (…) Es gibt Dienstleister, so wie wir das mittlerweile auch sind (…) und wir stehen dann solchen Initiativen zur Verfügung mit dem gesamten Know-how von Gründung von Gesellschaften über Genehmigungen, Finanzierung und vor allen Dingen auch über die Spielregeln der Kommunikation, der Kooperation (…). [8:27] In Nordfriesland (…) sind 90% der Windparks als (…) Bürgerwindparks organisiert. D.h. 9 von 10. Wenn man nur über die Eider geht und das ist die Grenze zu Dithmarschen, dann sind es 15%. Und wir haben auch festgestellt, dass es einen Unterschied in der Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung gibt. In Nordfriesland ist die sehr hoch und in Dithmarschen gibt es prozentual viel mehr Widerstände. Wir haben dann (…) die Idee gehabt, warum schreiben wir nicht mal alles auf, was wir in Nordfriesland an Erfahrungen mit Bürgerwindparks haben und sehen zu, dass das andere Leute auch lesen können(…). [windcomm:3] 7.1.2 The replication of renewable energy cooperatives in Germany

Also an vorderster Stelle steht Klimaschutz. (…) Das kann auf vielseitige Art und Weise passieren. Für mich sind nicht die erneuerbaren Energien im Vordergrund (…) Es gibt wunderbare Technologien. Wind, PV, Biomasse im weitesten Sinne, auch Biogas wenn es passt. Und die Kernfrage ist wenn jemand sagt, wie lösen wir diese Probleme, dass dann die Antwort nicht ist, das ist die Technologie, sondern, dass die Antwort ist, das ist die Struktur. Diese Struktur [der Genossenschaft] passt zu dem dezentralen Ansatz der erneuerbaren Energien. [7:18] Also Genossenschaften schießen grad aus dem Boden wie die Pilze. Und das hat sicherlich mit so Geschichten wie der Finanzkrise usw. zu tun, dass die Leute sagen, ich

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will mein Geld nicht mehr anonym irgendwo investieren, ich will wissen, was damit passiert und Mitspracherecht haben. [1:30] Die Finanzkrise [hatte] dahingehend [einen Einfluss], wir hatten vor 2 Jahren [i.e. in 2009] ein paar [Genossenschafts-]Gründungen wo das ganz offensiv ein Thema war. Wo Menschen sagten, ja, da ist mein Sparbuch, lieber 2% Rendite und die habe ich als die versprochenen 10 und alles ist futsch. [6:19] Die gründen eine Genossenschaft, der Vorstand von der Bank ist gleichzeitig Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender von der Energiegenossenschaft oder Vorstand der Genossenschaft und dann gehen die Indoorgeschäfte los. Das heißt wir planen ein Projekt und die Finanzierung erfolgt durch unsere Bank und Versicherung. Also das ist die völlig falsche Strategie. [7:51] 7.2 Scaling up

7.2.1 Limited scaling up

Unser Bürgerwindpark ist noch nie auf die Idee gekommen in irgendwelchen Nachbar- oder weitergelegenen Gemeinden an Landeigentümer heranzutreten und mit denen Verträge abzuschließen um dann dort Windenergieanlagen zu bauen. Da sagen wir ganz klipp und klar, das wollen wir gar nicht, das ganze lebt ja von der Akzeptanz der BürgerInnen vor Ort, die daran beteiligt sind und zwar auf den Mühlen, auf die sie dann mehr oder weniger auch schauen und jedenfalls auch ein Stück weit hören. Und dieses System würde ja ad absurdum geführt werden wenn letztendlich die Investoren von irgendwo anders herkommen, auch wenn es dann ein Bürgerwindpark ist. [Lübke- Koog:19] Es sind natürlich Leute kommen die gesagt haben, ich habe auch so einen Standort. Dann haben wir uns das (…) angeschaut (…), aber dann hat man gesehen, da sind gleich fünf Häuser dran, die werden sich schön bedanken, oder dann war wieder die Leitung so weit weg, dass die Wirtschaftlichkeit nicht gegeben wäre (…). Also wir haben es in Betracht gezogen, sind auch immer bereit einen anderen Standort zu nehmen. Aber eines ist auch klar, wo wir ein Windrad bauen können es andere auch. Weil bei uns war es auch so, [wir haben gesagt] selbstverständlich bauen wir ein Windrad. (…) Dann war auch mal die Diskussion in Tschechien [ein Projekt zu realisieren] aber das war schon vor 10 Jahren, (…). Solange ich Geschäftsführer bin kann ich mir nicht vorstellen, dass wir im größeren Distanzbereich irgendwo ein Windrad bauen. [Schenkenfelden:37] Ich mache das (…) nebenbei, nicht weil ich so viel Geld verdiene, sondern weil es mir Spaß macht. Ich mache es nicht umsonst, aber (…) für mich ist das eine Nebentätigkeit. Und wenn [wir groß expandieren], dann müsste das zu einer Haupttätigkeit werden und da ist im Augenblick, da sehe ich keine Möglichkeit. [WK-Innviertel:46] Ich bleibe, also ich möchte nicht ins Ausland gehen, aus dem einfachen Grund, weil ich einfach bei mir in meiner Umgebung die Lebensqualität behalten will. Und ich bin, ich halte nichts davon, wenn ich irgendwoanders was hinknalle, ich möchte vor Ort was machen. [WK-Innviertel:38]

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7.2.2 Continued scaling up

Es ist dann ein anderer Bürgermeister gekommen, man hat andere Standorte angeboten, unter anderem eine nicht weit entfernte Gemeinde (…). Man hat sich den Höhenrücken angeschaut, Messungen begonnen und damit hat die Firmengeschichte ihre Fortsetzung gefunden. [10:88] Da gab’s 98 mal eine Phase wo man in Österreich nichts bauen konnte weil die Förderbedingungen nicht vorhanden waren. Dann haben wir gesagt, was müsste man machen um in Deutschland zu investieren? Deutschland ist ein stabiler Windenergiemarkt. Dann haben wir ein Modell konstruiert, wo sich wieder eine KG an einer deutschen GmbH beteiligt hat. [WEB:11] Man hat dabei aber schon eine Veränderung gesehen, [beim ersten Windpark] hat [man] sich halt vielleicht auch beteiligt, weil der L. sehr viel gegolten hat mit Handschlagqualität und jemand, der eben sozusagen seinen Traum umsetzt, (…) also mehrere emotionale Gründe. (…) Und man hat dann entdeckt, dass es schon in [dieser zweiten Gemeinde], also dieses Angebot an die Bevölkerung, beteiligt euch, macht euch diese Windkraftanlagen zu euren Anlagen, profitiert davon, lernt damit auch zu leben, weil es ist ein Eingriff in das Landschaftsbild. Das ist nicht mehr so fruchtbar aufgegangen (…). Man ist damit halt, beim Aufstellen des Kapitals in die Breite gegangen. [10:88] Heutzutage ist es schon mehr, also nicht Standard, aber doch etwas bekanntes. Und es sehen viele eher so als Investition anstelle von Aktienkauf, da investiere ich das halt stattdessen in die Windkraft und weiß, was [mit dem Geld] passiert. [15:4] Freilich hat sich die, bei [der hohen Zahl an] Aktionären, die Anlegerschicht auch geändert. Was am Anfang eher der ideelle Anleger war ist mittlerweile der professionelle Anleger geworden dem zwei Dinge wichtig sind: Ökologie nach wie vor, das will ich gar nicht sagen, dass sich das großartig abgeschwächt hat. Es ist auch der ökologisch orientierte Anleger, der weiß, was mit seinem Geld passiert. Aber der professionelle Strukturen natürlich auch erwartet, wie er es gewohnt ist in anderen Bereichen. [16:13] Mittlerweile hat es sich ein Stück weit gewandelt. (…) [Die lokale Beteiligung bei einem neuen Windpark], das beläuft sich dann, das sage ich ehrlich, im Bereich zwischen einem halben Dutzend und einem Dutzend Personen, die dann wirklich zeichnen. (…) Ja, aber diese 6 bis 12 Personen sind uns sehr willkommen und natürlich ein Fels in der Brandung in all unseren Kommunikationsmaßnahmen in einer Gemeinde. [10:20] Ich würde mal sagen so bis [zum Jahr] 2000 ca. war das alles sehr im kleinen, persönlichen Rahmen (…). Das heißt wir haben alle unsere Arbeit gehabt und haben das unentgeltlich am Abend gemacht. Wie wir dann ein Windrad ans Netz bekommen haben, haben wir uns quasi zu einem Glühweinstand zusammengestellt und uns gefreut. (…) Das hat sich dann aber schon geändert, als die Projekte größer geworden sind, das ist so um 2000 herum passiert. (…) [D]a haben wir dann die ersten Mitarbeiter gehabt die Teilzeitmäßig angestellt waren, weil die Projekte selbe sehr viel aufwendiger waren. (…) Das ist also sehr viel schwieriger und es geht nicht mehr mit Freiwilligen im nebenberuflichen Bereich. Deswegen mache ich das auch seit fast 10 Jahren jetzt schon hauptberuflich. [15:61]

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Wir haben auch unsere Jahresversammlungen immer gehabt und am Anfang sind sehr viele Leute gekommen, grad in der Pionierphase, weil wir ja doch die erste [Windkraft]Anlage waren da in der Gegend. Aber das hat sich sehr schnell verflacht, es sind dann nicht mal mehr 10% der Leute gekommen, trotzdem, dass wir eigentlich sehr beworben haben. Weil sie gesagt haben, naja, jetzt läuft das Rad, was soll ich da noch mitentscheiden. Ob der Wind weht oder nicht kann ich nicht entscheiden. [15:8] Ende 98 [haben wir] gemerkt, dass das strukturell ganz schön kompliziert wird. Im selben Atemzug haben wir bei einer Kommanditgesellschaft (…) bereits die vierte Kapitalerhöhung angedacht. (…) Und jedes Mal dieser Kapitalerhöhungen war bei den Kommanditgesellschaften ein Mords Prozedere. Firmenbucheingaben usw. (…) [I]ch sehe das heute noch, wie unser Wirtschaftsprüfer damals gesagt hat, ja wie wollen Sie das weitermachen wenn Sie mal 500, 1000 Gesellschafter haben? Das schaffen Sie nicht mehr, das wird Ihnen strukturell zu schwierig. [WEB:11] Man kann so sagen, bei den ökologisch orientierten Menschen, (…) da war eine gewisse Skepsis mit der Form AG. Das war der Name, der das Problem war, nicht der Inhalt. (…) Ich habe auch selber ein halbes Jahr benötigt um selbst überzeugt zu sein, dass das das richtige sein kann. (…) [M]ethodisch war klar, dass die Aktie sehr viele Vorteile hatte, Leute können ihren Anteil an der sauberen Windstromproduktion verschenken, vererben, verkaufen und brauchen nicht einen komplexen Weg übers Firmenbuch oder was auch immer gehen. Aber es stellt sich noch immer die Frage wie wird so ein Anteilsschein gehandhabt, ist man ideell am Unternehmen noch wirklich beteiligt oder sagt man es ist nur ein Wertpapier und es interessiert mich nicht [weiter]. [16:13] 7.3 Transfer

7.3.1 Transfer to a new country

Es war eigentlich für uns, wir haben geschaut, wie sind die in Deutschland organsiert, was haben die gemacht, da gibt’s sicher verschiedenste Formen, aber recht viel anders haben wir das uns gar nicht überlegt eigentlich. [Interviewerin: Also Sie haben auch in Deutschland gesehen, dass es so gemacht wird?] Ja, wir haben eigentlich gesagt ok, die machen Bürgerbeteiligungen, das ist für uns auch vernünftig. [17:26] Also die Idee der Beteiligung und auch für das Modell der Abnahme, also dieses Stromeinspeisegesetz gab es in Deutschland und auch in Dänemark. Das kommt daher. Das haben wirklich die Leute mitgebracht. Die waren dort, haben sich das angeschaut, [und haben gesagt] das machen wir auch, wir versuchen das wirklich auch so zu machen wie dort. [21:18] Ich glaube nicht, dass man mit dem Ökostromgesetz jetzt vor allem auf Bürgerbeteiligungsunternehmen reagiert hat. Aber Bürgerbeteiligungsunternehmen sind glaube ich besonders aktiv gewesen (…).Also in der Zeit bevor das Ökostromgesetz gekommen ist hat es auch so kleine Protestkundgebungen am Ballhausplatz gegeben und wer ist mit den Mitarbeitern hingefahren, wer hat Aktionäre angerufen, wer ist dort überproportional vertreten gewesen? Das waren so Bürgerbeteiligungsgesellschaften wie wir. [10:49]

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7.3.2 Transfer to a new technology area

[Die positiven Erfahrungen mit Bürgerwindparks haben] uns natürlich ermutigt ein bisschen drüber nachzudenken wo man expandieren könnte. Zu dem Zeitpunkt war Offshore plötzlich ein Thema (…). Ja und dann haben sich schlicht und ergreifend neun Personen (…) zusammengetan und gesagt, vielleicht müssen wir mal schauen ob sich nicht hier in Nordfriesland, wo mittlerweile so viele Leute sich in diesem Bereich, ja, auskennen, (…) so viel Kapital zusammen bekommen, dass wir tatsächlich auch an die Planung eines Offshore Windparks denken können (…). [Butendiek:30] Das ist natürlich schwierig im offshore Bereich, die Investitionen sind wesentlich höher, die Planungszeiträume sind länger und, und, und. Und da scheint es gewisse Vorteile für größere Investoren zu geben, für größere Kapitalgeber zu geben. Das hängt dann wieder auch von Eigenkapital und Fremdkapitalstrukturen ab, und, und, und. Ich glaube es ist schwierig den Gedanken in einen offshore Windpark reinzutragen, aber es kann funktionieren. [4:19] 7.4 Uptake by incumbents

7.4.1 Citizen power plants developed by utilities

Wir haben keine Bevorzugung. Also wir haben jetzt nicht gesagt, dass das [dort] erzeugt wird auch bei allen anderen Kunden, weil prinzipiell soll es ja egal sein, wo (…) erneuerbare Energie ist, weil dann können wir loslegen und sagen O.K. [die Anlage in] K. ist nur für [die Gegend dort] , Wind ist nur für A. Das wollen wir vermeiden. [Interviewerin: Das heißt haben Sie irgendwelche Informationsveranstaltungen speziell in der Gemeinde gemacht oder haben Sie dort auch speziell geworben?] In Aussendungen, ja, aber allgemein, nicht jetzt so speziell für (…) Bürger in A. , das nicht. Nein, das kommt nicht in Frage. Da kommen wir sofort in Verruf. [23:10] Ja, was steht im Vordergrund? Ich meine, weil wir uns als Green Company positionieren und das auch leben wollen, steht das einmal im Vordergrund. Also wirklich zu schauen, wie kommen Projekte, erneuerbare [Energie] Projekte beim Kunden an? Wie kann man das umsetzen? Stößt man da auch Gegenwehr? Das ist einmal da Prior[ität] eins, klar, und dadurch ergibt sich dann auch, wenn es ankommt, ergibt sich dadurch auch ein Image, aus dem Image heraus eine Kundenbindung, also ich würde das so im Endeffekt abstufen.. [23:9] Den Leuten geht es da um die Rendite. Also viele die sagen sie wollen was Gutes tun, aber die meisten sagen, O.K. was kriege ich wirklich davon raus? [Gut 3%] ist immer noch besser als auf ein Sparbuch zu legen oder auf eine Bank zu bringen. (…) [J]etzt dieser reine Ökogedanke, der ist eigentlich nicht vorhanden, also die Leute sagen O.K. ich lege 300 Euro rein, ich kriege nichts dafür, davon sind wir sehr weit weg. [23:5] Das glauben wir, dass dann auch [bottom-up] Bürger Beteiligungen [uns] auch brauchen. Weil du hast nicht dann bei jedem einen Experten dann drinnen sitzen, der das Know-how und auch das Kapital dahinter hat (…) bei kleinen Bürgerbeteiligungen. [23:23] Ja, das Gemeine, was wieder mal sehr gemein ist, die Monopolisten, die EVUs, tun sich leichter. Mit dem Sale und Lease back [Modell]. Als EVU ist das leicht machbar, die stehen nicht wirklich an aufs Geld, das ist mehr so Öffentlichkeitsgeschichte und gute

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Publicity und das geht relativ einfach. Die haben das Potential, die haben die Logistik im Hintergrund, die haben die Verrechnungsmöglichkeit im Hintergrund und den juristischen Beistand im Hintergrund, weil ein jedes EVU verfügt ja über eine eigene juristische Abteilung. Damit ist das relativ leicht machbar für eine große Organisation. Für so Kleine ist es schwer, weil du dich irgendwo immer ein bisschen im [rechtlichen] Graubereich bewegst. [22:7] Sehr peinlich für mich, hier in Baden-Württemberg gibt es die [den Energieversorger] EnBW die haben einen eigenen Verband gegründet, der solche Energiegenossenschaftsgründungen unterstützt mit dem Ziel die Bürgermeister an die EnBW zu binden und die auslaufenden Konzessionsverträge [für den Netzbetrieb] möglichst bei EnBW zu belassen. [3:27] Ja, ja, ja [die Energieversorger in Deutschland] das sind ja auch Riesen, die wir in Österreich nicht haben, also das sind ja auch Energieriesen mit alten Strukturen (…). Das Problem hatten wir nie. Das Problem hat Österreich nicht, weil es hier eben keine Atomkraftwerke gibt, die Unternehmen auch wenn wir jetzt ein Landesversorger sind mit vierhundert tausend Endkunden haben nicht das Riesenproblem, also wir haben jetzt ja nicht den Nimbus, dass wir jetzt wo Atomkraft erzeugen und wir können sehr flexibel auch am Markt agieren.[23:22] [Das EEG ist für Bürgerwindparks von besonderer Bedeutung] Weil die [dadurch] einen klaren rechtlichen Rahmen haben der besagt, dass sie einspeisen können, dass sie eine Abnahmeverpflichtung haben, dass sie einen festen Preis bezahlt bekommen müssen. Das bietet diesen Gesellschaften ein hohes Maß an Sicherheit, dass sie benötigen. Das ist anders bei großen Energieversorgern, die das Risiko eingehen können oder zum Teil auch selber handeln können jetzt über ein Vermarktungssystem oder ähnliches zu gehen. [4:23] 7.5 Chapter conclusion

7.5.2 Structured heterogeneity

Der regionale Vorteil hier ist sicherlich der Widerstand gegen das Atomkraftwerk in Wyhl, den wir hier hatten Ende der 70er/Anfang der 80er Jahre (…) und [der] dazu geführt hat, dass hier auch eine große Bereitschaft vorhanden war in alternative Energien zu investieren. Das heißt die Menschen haben auch wirklich gesagt, ok, ich riskiere das Kapital und wenn es weg ist, dann ist es weg. Aber im Prinzip haben alle dran geglaubt, dass es funktionieren kann. [1:2] Wir wollen den Strukturwandel, wir wollen die Abhängigkeit von Monopolen brechen und da sind solche mittelständischen Unternehmen, die da entstehen (…) die sind dafür ein sehr geeignetes Mittel um eben auch die Wirtschaftsströme in der Region zu lassen (…) und politisch die Großkonzerne ein Stück weit zu entmachten. [2:8] Wir machen ja unseren Lebensraum total zunichte und kaputt und darum meine ich sind wir gefordert und sogar verpflichtet auch schon im Interesse von unserer Nachkommenschaft, in diesem Bereich einfach aktiv zu werden und erneuerbare Energie zu fördern. Das ist einmal der Grundgedanke. [19:1] Mittlerweile ganz im Vordergrund ist (…) der Punkt, Entwicklung ländlicher Räume. Hier können die ländlichen Räume endlich punkten und die Frage ist, müssen wir es

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machen wie bei den afrikanischen Goldminen? Keinem Afrikaner gehört die Goldmine, oder müssen wir es so machen, dass wir sagen, wir schaffen es tatsächlich, dass wir den Menschen helfen ihr Potenzial zu sichern um es in einer ihnen gehörenden Struktur umzusetzen? [7:18] [Es ist etwas] wo wir ganz, ganz stolz sind, dass man sagt, in [unserer Gemeinde] sind die Windräder nicht nur Alternativenergieerzeuger sondern haben sich mittlerweile als Wahrzeichen etabliert. [14:25] Also ich glaube das wäre schon für die [lokalen Bürger] ein Tiefschlag, wenn es auf einmal heißen würde, dass [die Anlagen an eine externe Firma verkauft werden]. (…) Weil ganz brutal gesagt, einen Heimatverrat wäre es nicht wert. [14:38] Man investiert in die [Firma] um langfristig an sauberer Stromproduktion dabei zu sein und [wegen] der schwarzen Zahlen. [16:16] Den Leuten geht es da um die Rendite. Also viele die sagen sie wollen was Gutes tun, aber die meisten sagen, O.K. was kriege ich wirklich davon raus? [Gut 3%] ist immer noch besser als auf ein Sparbuch zu legen oder auf eine Bank zu bringen. [23:5] Ja, was steht im Vordergrund? Ich meine, weil wir uns als Green Company positionieren und das auch leben wollen, steht das einmal im Vordergrund. Also wirklich zu schauen, wie kommen Projekte, erneuerbare [Energie] Projekte beim Kunden an? Wie kann man das umsetzen? Stößt man da auch Gegenwehr? Das ist einmal da Prior[ität] eins. [23:9] Als Stichwort Florianieffekt, ganz wichtiger Punkt, der bei dem Bau neuer Windenergie- anlagen oftmals dagegen spricht. Die Anlagen werden höher, sind weiter sichtbar, das heißt sie brauchen eine höhere Akzeptanz und die kriegen Sie dadurch, indem Sie die Bürger vor Ort beteiligen. [4:29] [Durch das Projekt] ergibt sich dann auch, wenn es ankommt, ergibt sich dadurch auch ein Image, aus dem Image heraus eine Kundenbindung. [23:9]

8 A process of empowerment? 8.2 Increasing access to resources

Da können die Leute bei uns auch mit etwas bewegen, mit jedem Euro investiertem Kapital weiß ich am Ende des Jahres wurde so und so viel Kilowatt sauberer Strom erzeugt. (…) Bei uns wird ein Windpark gebaut und ich bin direkt dabei, ich unterstütze das, ich partizipiere.“ [16:51] Die meisten Leute sagen, ja, was soll ich da machen? (…) Das ist eigentlich das, wogegen wir am meisten ankämpfen müssen und angekämpft haben. Dass man den Leuten die Größenordnung ein bisschen klar macht und, dass man den Leuten die Chance gibt [zu sagen], ich kann ja eigentlich doch was machen. [15:40] Der L., der Pionier und Gründer des Unternehmens hat schon sehr lange den Wunsch gehegt, den Wind nicht mehr ungenutzt über die Kuppen dieser (…) Gegend streichen zu lassen, sondern in Strom zu verwandeln. Er hat sich mit Windenergie beschäftigt, in Österreich hat das aber lange Zeit aufgrund von Messdaten der Zentralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geodynamik aber auch der Messdaten und Einschätzungen der Windmessungen von Flugbehörden, galt Österreich für Windstromproduktion als

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ungeeignete mitteleuropäische Region. Die Pioniere haben aber nicht locker gelassen und über Druck dann politisch irgendwann durchgesetzt, dass man doch Rahmenbedingungen erhalten hat, mit denen es (…) wirtschaftlich vernünftig ist Windstromanlagen zu betreiben. 1998 hat sich so ein Fenster aufgetan und der L. hat als Initiator mit ein paar Mitstreitern diese zwei Windkraftanlagen (…) installiert. (…) Es war so, das Eigenkapital musste gemeinsam aufgebracht werden, weil die Initiatoren nicht in der Lage waren diese Summe aufzustellen. [10:4] 8.3 Old and new dependency relations

Natürlich wenn man zu Hause selber, z.B. eine Photovoltaikanlage hat, das ist wirklich mein Strom sozusagen, das gibt einem das Gefühl der Unabhängigkeit. Aber wenn ich über das Netz eines [EVUs] (…) Energie quasi nur einliefere in ein Netz, dann tu ich mich schon schwer einen zusätzlichen, persönlichen Vorteil für die Sicherheit zu sehen. Weil wenn mich [das EVU] nicht mag, dann klemmt sie mich ab, so nach dem Motto. [15:37] Mit [dem regionalen EVU], mit dem hatten wir mal Kontakt. Da waren die ganzen Grundanrainer und wir dort (…), die hätte uns nicht wenig Geld gegeben, wenn wir das nicht gemacht hätten. (…) Sie wollten uns eigentlich das Projekt abkaufen und sterben lassen. [17:32] Ja, [vor der Einspeiseregelung] das waren Direktabnahmeverträge, die Vergütung war miserabel und die Abhängigkeit war groß. (…) Also das EEG war das Zentrale, weil wir ja am Strom[markt] völlige Ungleichgewichte haben. Wir haben große mächtige Player (…). Die hätten jede Menge Möglichkeiten gehabt die mittelständischen Unternehmen auszubremsen, und durch das EEG war diese Möglichkeit nicht mehr gegeben. [2:21] Ich behaupte ohne das EEG hätten wir mit Sicherheit die Zahl der Windenergieanlagen nicht in dieser Bürgerhand oder auch nicht in der mittelständischen Hand sondern dann wäre es irgendwo bei denen gelandet, die über andere Kapitalmittel verfügen. [8:35] Das ist aber ein Grundsatzproblem, dass alle Fördermodelle immer, bei uns in Österreich überhaupt, sehr komplex und von sehr kurzer Dauer sind. Kurz ist die Tür offen, dann wieder zu, wenn du Pech hast, bist du eingezwickt, das passiert auch immer wieder. [15:36] Diese kleinen Genossenschaften heißen Bürger-Solar-Genossenschaften, da gibt es über 50 inzwischen in Baden-Württemberg, die vor allem in kleinen Gemeinden aktiv sind. Das heißt der Bürgermeister spricht das an, das will ich auch machen. Die EnBW hilft da dann ganz viel (…). Da haben die dann nachher ein Dach mit einer 10 KW Anlage drauf und ein bisschen Eigenkapital. Ich, also meine persönliche Einschätzung ist (…) die Genossenschaften werden sich nicht lange halten können. Die laufenden Kosten sind noch so hoch, dass man da nicht viel machen kann. [1:8] 8.4 Co‐optation

8.4.1 Assimilation

Als die Projekte größer geworden sind, das ist so um 2000 herum passiert. (…) [D]a haben wir dann die ersten Mitarbeiter gehabt die Teilzeitmäßig angestellt waren, weil

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die Projekte selber sehr viel aufwendiger waren. Man musste ja Gutachten erstellen, das heißt man musste Unterlagen überhaupt zur Verfügung stellen, man musste die Gutachten zahlen und das heißt, das war ein großer Druck da, dass das wirklich auch zustande kommt (…). Das ist also sehr viel schwieriger und es geht nicht mehr mit Freiwilligen im nebenberuflichen Bereich. Deswegen mache ich das auch seit fast 10 Jahren jetzt schon hauptberuflich. [15:61] Das Unternehmen (…) musste sehr schnell ihre Kommunikationslinie professionalisieren, wie das auch die großen Firmen machen. (…) Was am Anfang eher der ideelle Anleger war ist mittlerweile der professionelle Anleger geworden dem zwei Dinge wichtig sind: Ökologie nach wie vor, das will ich gar nicht sagen, dass sich das großartig abgeschwächt hat. Es ist auch der ökologisch orientierte Anleger der weiß, was mit seinem Geld passiert. Aber der professionelle Strukturen natürlich auch erwartet wie er es gewohnt ist in anderen Bereichen. [16:13] Wir treten natürlich mit der veränderten Breite des Publikums auch mehr in einen Markt, der ähnlich dem Finanzmarkt ist, wo man halt auch gemessen wird an der Verbundaktie oder an einer Anleihe von einem deutschen Unternehmen (…). [10:30] Wir bereuen heute keinen Schritt sondern sind sehr froh diesen Schritt [Weg] gegangen zu sein. [16:13] Wenn [Bürgerbeteiligung im Energiebereich] sich stabilisiert wird das immer mit einer Kommerzialisierung einhergehen, das ist so ein bisschen wie mit den Grünen (…). Die Grünen haben zunehmende die Züge einer ganz normalen etablierten Partei und so wird das auch mit den Energiegenossenschaften sein, dass umso größer und erfolgreicher sie sind umso stärker werden sie vom professionellen Management geleitet und die Mitsprache wird stärker sozusagen gelenkt und koordiniert und in bestimmte Gremien eingepackt.“ [3:52] Für uns steht das nicht zur Debatte. (…) Das hat verschiedene Gründe (…). Also diese ups and downs, diese externen Effekte, die große Auswirkungen auf das Unternehmen haben, die Übernahmegefahr, die Gefahr des taking over, aber sicherlich ein Unternehmen unserer Größe wäre schön portioniert für einen großen Investor an der Börse, der sich einkauft. Und bei uns ist das Gegenteil der Fall. Wir haben in den Statuten Stimmrechtsbegrenzungen drinnen, das heißt egal wie viele Aktien jemand hält, mehr als 5% der Stimmrechte darf er an einer Hauptversammlung nicht ausüben (…). [10:83] 8.4.2 Appropriation

Die klassischen EVUs sind kapitalkräftige, große Unternehmen, (…) da [sind] die [Windkraft Bürgerbeteiligungsgesellschaften] dagegen Zwerge. Würde irgendwas bei dem Ökostromregime passieren gibt’s eine klare Antwort. Dann kommt es zur Konzentration aller dieser Anlagen die neu in den Stromproduktionsmarkt getreten sind, die neuen Strukturen wieder in die klassische E-Wirtschaft, das passiert sofort. [21:22] Das was uns momentan am meisten wehtut ist das Engagement der Projektentwicklungs-gesellschaften die den Leuten ihr Potential rausreißen. Und damit meine ich Enercon die den Windpark bauen, damit mein ich aber auch E.ON die eine Biogasanlage bauen. [7:36]

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Ich weiß in Nordrhein-Westfalen gibt es auch sogenannte Bürgerwindparks, da haben dann Stadtwerke einen Windpark gebaut und eine von 10 Anlagen war dann die Bürgeranlage. Das ist kein Bürgerwindpark in meinen Augen. Das ist ein großer Windpark mit einer kleinen Bürgerbeteiligung.“ [9:10] 8.5 Disadvantaged or privileged actors?

8.5.1 Individuals’ capacity to engage in citizen power plant initiatives

Also es ist sehr weit gestreut. Es ist herausragend eigentlich, dass es aus allen Schichten ist und, dass auch welche dabei sind, (…) die halt von dem bisschen Geld, was sie haben da eben dann einen Teil abzweigen. Andere haben sehr viel und beteiligen sich auch ganz oft. Das ist also schon unterschiedlich. Aber vom Alter und von der Sozialstruktur her finde ich, ist das heterogen. [2:10] Also ich würde sagen die vom Kapital her am stärksten vertreten sind die 40 - 50 Jährigen, dann kommen die 30 - 40 Jährigen vom Alter her. (…) Was vielleicht auch mit einer Politisierung zu tun hat, dass das vor 10 Jahren ein großes Thema war, [und ich würde sagen] dass es damit zu tun hat, dass man in einem fortgerückten Alter, nachdem man, ich weiß nicht, irgendwo sein Haus und Hof gebaut hat und vielleicht Familie gegründet hat, beruflich avanciert ist, dass man eher in der Situation ist, dass man über Vermögen verfügen kann. Und es sind deutlich mehr Männer als Frauen, ich würde sagen es sind 2/3 zu 1/3. Warum das so ist, ist schwer zu sagen, ein Stück weit vielleicht eine technische Sache, Energiepolitik tendenziell eher Männerthema als Frauenthema. Vielleicht treffen Männer eher die Entscheidungen Geld zu investieren und vielleicht sind Männer, (…) immer noch diejenigen (…), die finanziell besser gestellt sind als Frauen und somit tendenziell wahrscheinlich auch mehr Geld zur Verfügung haben als Frauen um zu investieren. [10:51] Naja wir müssen mit 99 [Beteiligten] auskommen, anders geht es nicht. Das heißt (…) wie viel haben wir? 400.000 [Euro, das macht ungefähr], 4000 [pro Person], anders geht’s eh nicht. (…) Kleiner können wir nicht werden, wenn wir kleiner werden, dann muss einer wieder das doppelte oder dreifache Paket nehmen damit für den anderen wieder weniger sein kann. [22:5] Das ist halt einfach mit einer Genossenschaft möglich, [dass] man den Leuten so ein bisschen jeweils ihren Platz gibt. Je nach Bedürftigkeit in dem Rahmen aber auch nach z.B. finanzieller Möglichkeit. Wir können ja von einem 10.000 nehmen und vom anderen nur 50, trotzdem können wir dem, wenn wir das für klug halten, dieselbe Stimme geben. [5:12] 8.5.2 Communities’ capacity to engage with citizen power plants

Die Bevölkerung in unserem Dorf ist sehr, sehr arm, ist überaltert, (…). Wenn ich denen erkläre, dass sie sich jetzt bei uns beteiligen können, ich glaube, dann erkläre ich ihnen damit wie groß die Unterschiede zwischen unserem Wohlstandsniveau und ihrem Wohlstandsniveau sind. [10:40] [Die Vorschriften und Regelungen] die sind alle sehr komplex und kompliziert (…) dass man eigentlich, wenn man nicht schon jahrelang in dem Bereich ist, gar keine Chance mehr hat das umzusetzen. (…) Also man könnte versuchen kleinere Projekte mit zwei, drei Anlagen umzusetzen, aber selbst da ist es, man braucht dann [beträchtliche]

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Investitionen, also da müssen ein paar Leute schon sehr motiviert sein und zusammenlegen, dass sich das ausgeht. [15:26]

9 Conflicts in the diffusion of citizen power plants 9.1 Local conflicts

9.1.1 Local conflicts and sociotechnical configurations

Das sind bisher eigentlich immer die Projekte gewesen wo die Akzeptanz am höchsten ist, die Vorzeigebeispiele wo man darstellen kann wie es positiv läuft, wo die Integration und die Akzeptanz der Bevölkerung funktioniert. (…) Wolkersdorf ist ein gutes Beispiel. Da hat es nie Probleme gegeben, da stehen 44 Windräder rundherum. (…) Das ist ein integriertes Unternehmen, die haben ein paar 100 Beteiligte, die haben die Wärmeversorgung für die Ortschaft, das haben sie alles dabei. Da stellen sich gewisse Akzeptanzfragen, wie woanders bei Projekten, überhaupt nicht. [21:59, 21:69] Man muss sich Zeit nehmen, also Zeit darf keine Rolle spielen. Jede entsprechende Information immer öffnen, wenn irgendwo das Gefühl ist, da gibt’s noch was. (…) Das wichtigste ist, ich sage es noch mal, Offenheit, Information und auch wenn was schief geht. Nicht sagen, das sag ich nicht, sondern sagen, da ist was schief gegangen und so ist es. [14:27] Ja, es haben viele gefragt, wie die Auswirkungen sind. Berechtigterweise. Wir haben viele Informationsveranstaltungen gemacht, auch unter den Nachbarn, haben die informiert, was auf die zukommt. Wir haben ein gutes nachbarschaftliches Verhältnis und sind gegenseitig bemüht dieses nachbarschaftliche Verhältnis nicht zu stören, sondern besser auszubauen (…). [11:16] Die Leute sind eigentlich, die haben das Vertrauen, weil man die Leute kennt, die wirklich vom Ort her sind. Wenn ich da jetzt was in die eigene Tasche wirtschaften würde, ich dürfte wahrscheinlich nicht mehr über die Straße gehen, weil irgendwer hätte mich. [17:64] Naja die Problematik ist, wenn man zu früh mit dem Projekt rausgeht und es gibt Gegner, also Standortgegner, dann machen die mobil im Vorfeld schon. Das ist das Problem. Wir haben noch nicht das richtige Mittel gefunden, wann wir die Bevölkerung informieren sollen, wann der richtige Zeitpunkt ist um die Gegner in Schach zu halten, aber trotzdem Informationen zu geben. Wir versuchen das immer zu schauen wie es geht, aber es ist nicht einfach das zu machen. Da sind sicher viele Fehler passiert und da sind nach wie vor viele Fehler, was die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit anbelangt. [12:13] Das soll ja nicht Ziel sein, dass da Leute mit Geld, also Geld ist natürlich keine Schande, aber es ist ja nicht gut, wenn (…) die 20 Leute [die als Gesellschafter fungieren] das allein gemacht hätten, wäre das sicher schlechter gewesen. Da hätte es geheißen, da sind ein paar Leute, die haben ein riesiges Finanzvermögen und wissen nicht wohin damit. [14:19] Da oben eine Anlage zu haben, (…) ich glaube, also von der Beteiligung kommt sicher nicht eine Missstimmung auf wenn nicht jeder sich mit zwei, dreihundert Euro beteiligen kann, sicher nicht. Wir werden das so anstellen, und das ist natürlich immer eine Frage

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vom Marketing, wir werden das so anstellen, dass sich ein jeder dort abgeholt fühlt, wo er ist. Das schaffen wir schon. [22:13] Also es war nicht so, es war so eine Attraktion und kein Problem. Die Ängste oder Diskussionen, die man zum Teil damals hatte, sind eher auf der Ebene gegangen, wird sich das rechnen oder dreht euch die EVN das irgendwann mal ab, machen die euch quasi wirtschaftlich oder technisch fertig? (…) Also eher in die Richtung und nicht, so wie es heute hauptsächlich abläuft, ein verunzierender Eingriff ins Landschaftsbild. Das ist glaube ich heute die Hauptdebatte. [10:17] 9.1.2 Local conflicts and previous tensions in the community

Bei Parteien ist es noch viele schwieriger, wenn die Idee nicht von ihnen war, dann müssen sie einmal schon ganz generell nein sagen, auch wenn die Idee super ist. [20:24] [Interviewerin: Ist das dann die Gefahr, dass es ein Projekt der SPÖ oder der ÖVP wird?] Ja, das haben [wir. Da sagen die einen] ja die [anderen] wollen und deswegen sind wir dagegen. Das ist leider immer noch sehr stark und für einen Techniker ist das ganz grauslich, eigentlich wollen alle aber justament geht es nicht (…). Das ist dann immer schwierig. [15:62] Da kommen Konflikte raus, die nicht unbedingt mit der Sache was zu tun haben, sondern das sind typische Nachbarschaftskonflikte. Der eine hat dort ein Grundstück, hat eh einen Haufen Geld und kriegt jetzt zusätzliches Geld, weil dort das Windrad draufsteht. (…) [D]ie anderen sind geschieden oder irgendwas anderes, die sind irgendwie, ich will das nicht verallgemeinern, aber häufig hat man bei den Leuten, die sich sonst nicht einbringen [das Gefühl] (…) da spielen irgendwelche anderen Sachen eine Rolle. [17:29] Ich weiß nicht wie weit Sie mit dem ländlichen Raum und den Gepflogenheiten des Pachtmarktes innerhalb der Landwirtschaft vertraut sind, aber wenn irgendwer dem anderen vor 20 Jahren mal eine Fläche weggepachtet hat und der das nun nicht vergessen hat, dann sind das Themen, die können Sie natürlich nicht rückgängig machen, aber die sind irgendwie auch nicht vergessen. Das ist ein bisschen schwierig. [8:46] [Manche sagen] lieber einem fremden Unternehmen aus Hamburg was gönnen als dem eigenen Nachbarn. Das ist eine ganz schwierige Situation (…). [8:26] 9.2 Incumbent‐challenger conflicts

9.2.1 Incumbent‐challenger conflicts in Germany

Hier in Deutschland das ist sicher eine Ausnahme im internationalen Vergleich, da ist die Energieversorgung eines der größten wirtschaftlichen Konfliktpotentiale, [das größte] Konfliktfeld überhaupt. (…) Kein anderes Feld kann solche Konflikte hervorrufen wie die Energieversorgung. [1:23] Wir wollen den Strukturwandel, wir wollen die Abhängigkeit von Monopolen brechen und da sind solche mittelständischen Unternehmen, die da entstehen (…) die sind dafür ein sehr geeignetes Mittel um eben auch die Wirtschaftsströme in der Region zu lassen (…) und politisch die Großkonzerne ein Stück weit zu entmachten. [2:8]

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Das Modell der Bürgerbeteiligungsanlage (…) ist ein sehr erfolgreiches Modell wenn man eben politisch sensibilisieren und eben Gegenkraftwerke umsetzen will. [1:44] Der regionale Vorteil hier [in der Region um Freiburg] ist sicherlich der Widerstand gegen das Atomkraftwerk in Wyhl, den wir hier hatten Ende der 70er, Anfang der 80er Jahre, der die Region sehr geprägt hat und dazu geführt hat, dass hier auch eine große Bereitschaft vorhanden war in alternative Energien zu investieren. [1:3] Ich würde mal sagen hier in Nordfriesland war[en Bürgerwindparks] in der ersten Hälfte der 90er Jahre noch konkurrenzlos (….) Die großen erneuerbaren Energieplayer, nämlich die EVUs aber die Ihnen wahrscheinlich auch bekannten Firmen, die gab es noch gar nicht als Konkurrenten. Da lebten wir vergleichsweise in einem gelobten Land (…). Jetzt hat man natürlich große international und national agierende Firmen, die haben das Know-how, die haben das Kapital, alles was ihnen fehlt ist das Grundstück um diese Planung umzusetzen, da bleibt ihnen nur eine Möglichkeit um an diese Flächen zu kommen, nämlich mit hohen Pachtzahlungen zu locken. [8:34] Es gibt grad einen Kampf, der derzeit ausgetragen wird, wo sich der Energiemarkt [ab]spielt, setzt sich der dezentrale Charakter der Erneuerbaren durch, die stärker in den Markt eindringen oder bleiben die Monopolstrukturen bestehen und können die Erneuerbaren irgendwie integrieren? [1:23] 9.2.2 Incumbent‐challenger conflicts in Austria

In Deutschland ist das noch viel konfliktärer getrieben wurden durch die Anti-Atom- Debatte, das muss man schon sehen. (…) [Die Atomdiskussion], die habe ich in Deutschland natürlich härter und viel direkter weil ich sie im Land habe. In Österreich ist es immer so indirekt diese Anti-Atom-Diskussion. (…) Aber es ist natürlich klar wenn ich ein Atomkraftwerk im Land habe und da politische Entscheidungen für die Laufzeitveränderungen oder Einstellung oder nicht habe, was die ganzen letzten Jahren in Deutschland war, dann sind die Windkraftanlagen die Gegenthese dazu. Das unterstützt natürlich das auch stärker. Und auch die Polarisierung klassische Großwirtschaft und Betreibergesellschaft, das ist dadurch polarisierter. [21:72] Wir sind von der etablierten Energiewirtschaft nicht wirklich unterstützt worden, sondern eher im Gegenteil, da war eher die Befürchtung, dass es sehr viele dezentrale kleinere Energieversorgungsunternehmen da entstehen könnten (…). Also das war keine gern gesehene Nachricht, dass es in dem Windbereich jetzt auf einmal weitere Kleinkraftwerksbetreiber geben wird. [10:61] Wir haben [anfangs] versucht mit [dem regionalen EVU] zu verhandeln, aber die waren damals noch anders, die haben also sehr gegen die Windkraft gearbeitet, haben eigentlich gebremst wo es nur gegangen ist und haben teilweise sehr unschöne Dinge gemacht. [Sie h]aben dann aber, nachdem sie sich selbst damit auseinandergesetzt haben, eine Kehrtwende gemacht und das ist eigentlich so, dass die dann selber in dem Bereich tätig waren. [15:18] Obwohl wir früher von [dem regionalen EVU] sehr viel erleiden mussten haben wir jetzt keine Probleme miteinander und kommen gut aus und machen auch Projekte gemeinsam. Also das hat sich sehr verändert (…). [15:46]

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Wenn wir jetzt vor 10 Jahren [für ein Interview] hier gesessen wären hätte nachher vielleicht ein Wissenschaftsjournalist gesagt Wahnsinn, jetzt steht eine junge Branche, die wird großteils völlig anders organisiert als klassische Branchen, weil damals durchaus, ich glaube 70, 80% der Kapazität mit Bürgerbeteiligungsgesellschaften verschiedenster Form organisiert wurden, der Rest waren einige Unternehmer und Private. Und dann kamen die EVUs, dann kamen die üblichen Player und von daher ist das lachende Auge, dass Windenergie in Österreich weiterhin sehr dynamisch Marktanteile umsetzt, das ist gut. Das weinende Auge ist sicher, dass wir die Idee der [Bürgerbeteiligungsmodelle der] Anfangsphase nicht im selben Ausmaß fortsetzen konnten. [16:32] Wir haben gar nicht die Zeit, dass wir da jetzt herum streiten ob das jetzt private [kommerzielle Unternehmen] machen oder nicht (…). Unsere erste Sorge ist, dass wir möglichst viel erneuerbare Energien machen und da sind Private oft schneller. Es wäre natürlich schön, wenn es viele Beteiligungen gäbe, weil das einfach wesentlich besser abgesichert ist und weil auch die Wertschöpfung viel mehr vor Ort bleibt. Aber ich glaube die Zeit haben wir nicht. Wir haben früher immer gefordert, dass die Energieversorger was machen sollten und wenn sie sich dann endlich (…) dazu durchraffen, dass sie es machen, ich glaube dann sollte man auch nicht dagegen sein. [17:51] Man wollte vermeiden oder will immer noch vermeiden, dass dieser Bereich einfach von Großen geschluckt wird und dort verschwindet, wie viele andere Technologien. [12:49] Was wollen wir? Wollen wir Monopolisten? [Das regionale EVU] baut 1000 Sachen, das ist schon klar, sobald es die Rendite von 5% erfüllt bauen die das. Nur da hast wieder nur Monopolisten. Das kann es ja nicht sein. Das ist genau das, wo ich sage, das widerspricht sich mit dem, was die Deutschen machen. Wieder zurück in die kleinen Einheiten, Stadtwerke, das ist bei uns noch nicht angekommen. [22:16] 9.3 Object conflicts

9.3.1 Object conflicts concerning renewable energy cooperatives

Bürgerbeteiligung in Form von GmbH und Co KGs oder stillen Beteiligungen, da ist nicht mehr eine wirkliche Einflussnahme, sondern da reduziert sich diese Beteiligung auf eine finanzielle Beteiligung ohne weitere Einflussnahme. Die Energiegenossenschaften erhalten viel stärker die Chance sozusagen, dass Beteiligung tatsächlich Richtung Konzeptentwicklung, Umsetzung der Energieeffizienz, Erweiterung der Geschäftsfelder und solche Sachen geht. (…) In den Energiegenossenschaften stecken mehrere reale Potenziale, was ich als echte Bürgerbeteiligung bezeichnen würde (…). [3:29] Diese Rechtsform [GmbH & Co KG] verbindet das, dass sich der Anleger zwar an erneuerbare Energien beteiligt, sich aber nicht um die Anlagen selber kümmern muss. Die meisten Beteiligten finden das auch gut, haben aber keine Ruhe um sich tatsächlich zu kümmern. Das ist da sehr gut und es gibt auch bei den Gesellschaften im laufenden Betrieb nicht so viele Dinge, die einer Mitbestimmung bedürfen, oder die einen zusätzlichen Nutzen hätten. Wenn man da mitbestimmt ob der Nagel links oder rechts eingeschlagen wird, das bringt den Leuten nichts. [2:3]

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Ein weiterer Grund (für die Ausbreitung von Energiegenossenschaften) ist, dass Banken plötzlich Genossenschaften gegründet haben. Das ist für mich sehr vorsichtig zu genießen. Hintergrund ist, die gründen eine Genossenschaft, der Vorstand von der Bank ist gleichzeitig Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender von der Energiegenossenschaft oder Vorstand der Genossenschaft und dann gehen die Indoorgeschäfte los. D.h. wir planen ein Projekt und die Finanzierung erfolgt durch unsere Bank und Versicherung. Also das ist die völlig falsche Strategie. [7:51] Es gibt ja mittlerweile diese großen professionellen Solarfonds, da wissen die Leute manchmal gar nicht welche einzelnen Solaranlagen dahinter stecken, weil da werden mehrere in einen Fond gepackt. Und da ist eindeutig (…) da spielt die Rendite schon eine relativ hohe Rolle. Aber diese vielen Bürgergemeinschaftsanlagen die in der Frühphase entstanden sind und die auch heute noch mal entstehen, um eine Schule herum, um ein Kirchendach, um ein Feuerwehrhaus oder sonstwas, da sind immer sehr stark, sehr ausgeprägte ökologisch bürgerschaftliche Motivationen mit verbunden. [3:35] 9.3.2 Object conflicts concerning citizen wind farms

Bürgerwindpark ist der Ausdruck in Deutschland, der sich dafür etabliert hat. Das ist vielleicht auch die Krux dran (…). Jeder nennt dieses Wort Bürgerwindpark, aber ich glaube, wenn Sie mal nachfragen würden, hat jeder auch eine andere Vorstellung davon. [4:15] Für mich und für uns ist ein Bürgerwindpark ein Windpark bei dem mehr als 50% der Beteiligten (…) aus der Gemeinde sind. [9:9] Ich würde das nicht nur an der Form der Beteiligung an der Stelle festmachen, sondern auch an idealerweise ich sag mal kommt die Initiative aus der Bürgerschaft (…). [8:17] Wenn Sie mich fragen zeichnet einen Bürgerwindpark auch in der Regel das aus, dass er ein eigenständiges wirtschaftliches Unternehmen ist, meistens in der Form einer GmbH & Co KG, die in seinem Ort tätig ist. [8:19] Also das wird durchaus inzwischen natürlich missbräuchlich verwendet. Es gibt große Investoren, die da quasi nicht wirklich sich für die Beteiligung der BürgerInnen interessieren, weil sie es selbst machen möchten sondern es teilweise an große Stadtwerke oder auch EVUs verkaufen wollen, in dem Fall wird dann häufig eine Windenergieanlage dem Dorf angeboten aber das sind dann, ich sag mal erfahrungsgemäß häufig auch Konditionen die überhaupt gar nicht mit denen zu vergleichen sind als wenn die Bürger das selbst in die Hand genommen hätten. [8:17] Ich weiß in Nordrhein-Westfalen gibt es auch sogenannte Bürgerwindparks, da haben dann Stadtwerke einen Windpark gebaut und eine von 10 Anlagen war dann die Bürgeranlage. Das ist kein Bürgerwindpark in meinen Augen. Das ist ein großer Windpark mit einer kleinen Bürgerbeteiligung. [9:10]

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank several people for sharing their ideas with me as well as for providing support and valuable feedback on earlier drafts of thesis chapters.

First of all I want to thank my supervisor Wilhelm Berger for his encouraging feedback. In particular, I am thankful to him for alerting me to the issue of conflicts in relation to citizen power plants and for his encouragement to adopt an inductive approach.

Further mentors have also supported me during my work on this thesis. Thanks to Bernhard Wieser for his thorough reading and his detailed and encouraging feedback on a number of chapters. Thanks to Harald Rohracher for feedback on early chapters and for reading the chapter on the diffusion of citizen power plants when it was still an awkward mess. Further thanks go to Verena Winiwarter and to Daniel Barben for their comments on my work in doctoral classes.

I also hugely profited from peer exchange with fellow doctoral students. Great thanks go to Stefanie Egger and Steffen Wirth for innumerable mutual feedback sessions. I would also like to thank Thomas Berger, Birgit Hofstätter, Veronika Riemer and Nils Matzner for their comments on my work in our doctoral classes. Furthermore I am grateful to Andreas Exner for turning my attention to citizen power plants in the first place. I would further like to thank Gerald Aiken, Claudia Schwarz, Nichole Dusyk and Franziska Mey for interesting exchanges.

While I worked on this thesis, I was lucky enough to spend two months at SPRU at the University of Sussex. I am thankful to people at SPRU for a warm welcome, for sharing their ideas with me, and for providing feedback on my thesis plans –especially Adrian Smith, Sabine Hielscher, Jake Barnes, Florian Kern, Jin Park, Rebecca White, Rachael Durrant and Cian O’Donovan.

I am also very grateful to my colleagues at IFZ and the Institute of Science, Technology and Society Studies at Alpen-Adria Universität Klagenfurt | Wien Graz for the opportunity to work on this thesis and for an enjoyable working atmosphere.

Last but not least I would like to thank my interview partners for their time and for their preparedness to provide accounts of their experiences.

Needless to say, any shortcomings in this thesis are entirely my responsibility.

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