ETLA Muistio • Brief 54 • 31.1.2017 1 Muistio • Brief 54 • 31.1.2017

ISSN-L 2323-2463, ISSN 2323-2463

ETLA Muistiot tarjoavat ajankohtaista tutkimustietoa ETLA Briefs provide timely research-based information polttavista yhteiskunnallisista kysymyksistä. on pressing societal issues. www.etla.fi » julkaisut » muistiot www.etla.fi » publications » briefs ETLA • Elinkeinoelämän tutkimuslaitos ETLA • The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy Joins a Mobile Internet Giant: Fitting into ’s Overall Business Strategy

Kai Jia, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China ([email protected]). Martin Kenney, Community and Regional Development University of , Davis ([email protected]). Timo Seppälä, ETLA – The Research Institute of Finnish Economy and Aalto University ([email protected]).

This paper has been drafted as a part of the BRIE-ETLA research collaboration of 2015–2018 and it has also been published simultaneously in Talouselämä 27.1.2017, No. 3, pages 69–70; http://www.talouselama.fi/tebatti/mita-kiinalaiset-supercellista-haluavat-6618954 Suggested citation: Jia, Kai, Kenney, Martin & Seppälä, Timo (31.1.2017). “Supercell Joins a Mobile Internet Giant: Fitting into Tencent’s Overall Business Strategy”. ETLA Brief No 54. http://pub.etla.fi/ETLA-Muistio-Brief-54.pdf

Chinese PBG Strategy in On June 21, 2016, Tencent, the Chinese mobile in- Mobile Internet Era ternet giant spent $8.6 billion to purchase 84.3% Business groups are firms linked to one anoth- stock of Supercell, the wildly profitable Finnish firm er by ownership and equity ties that mutually behind hit games , , Boom reinforce each other through various forms of Beach and . This was Tencent’s largest preferential treatment. The typical Silicon Val- oversea deal ever. While it has bought other gaming ley firms have rarely developed business group firms including the one in 2015 e.g. Riot, the mak- models. The western firms instead try to cre- er of the online battle game “,” ate dependent ecosystems with complemen- this acquisition is far larger. As most analysts have tarities, as is illustrated by the operation of the assumed, given Tencent’s long-standing depen- app stores, YouTube, Facebook, etc. To illus- dence on game revenue in PC era, at one level, this trate, despite Google’s various offerings includ- deal indicates the continuing importance of games ing Search, Gmail, Drive, YouTube, etc., the key to Tencent strategy. However, this misses the im- synergies for Google are assembling a more portant fact that in Chinese market, Tencent’s true complete profile of its users. The data from customer acquisition strategy is centralized around these different user profiles, across multiple QQ, which is its PC chat platform, and WeChat, platforms, can be sold to advertisers. Further- the smartphone chat platform, and its increasing- more, Google leverages an enormous data cen- ly important e-payment system. Tencent today is no ter capacity. Their products and services are, in longer a game company and not even a simple chat- fact, relatively loosely coupled. To illustrate if based social network. you want to embed a map in Gmail, it need not We suggest that Tencent is developing a “platform be from Google Maps. Google’s business mod- business group” (PBG) model based strategy as ma- el leverages its core source of revenue, search/ ny other Chinese firms. The PBG model exploits advertising through the wide variety of prop- synergies created by linking the constituent busi- erties/platforms that provide data collection nesses to cross-market services. To demonstrate, we synergies. While Google has expanded to oth- briefly explain its PBG model, and Tencent’s trans- er sectors, the multiple platforms have not re- formation from an online gaming company into a sulted in a variety of revenue models. The most PBG. In addition, we explore the reasons why Ten- important exception is the Android OS, which cent bought Supercell and explain their possible when certified requires preloading of vari- scenarios for future business strategies. ous Google functions and, of course, has di- rect synergies with store. In China, 2 ETLA Muistio • Brief 54 • 31.1.2017 the Android OS’s developed by Chinese firms vertisements, and games distribution. In 2015, are not certified and do not preload other Goo- WeChat reached 549 million monthly active us- gle functions. Due to the pressure from compe- ers. With the success of WeChat, Tencent in- tition authorities, Google’s search/advertising tegrated functions that initially were comple- and Android/App Store have been required to mentary, for example, WeChat Payment func- remain relatively independent from each oth- tion. Tencent not only leveraged the huge mass er. Most of the other US Internet firms have ad- of users of WeChat to promote its payment ser- opted a similar strategy, and have organized vice. Moreover, it aggressively expanded and their business models into vertical silos with a acquired stakes in or launched other business single revenue model. Of course, as we can see, platforms such as coupons (Groupon), reviews this business model has been enormously suc- (Yelp), JD (a competitor to Alibaba), etc. to cessful. speed adoption and extend the walled garden.

In addition to WeChat and Payment, the Platform Business Group of Tencent Games Platform was ported from the PC The Chinese mobile internet leaders, in contrast and was integrated into the business group to Western firms such as Google and Facebook, cross-traffic strategy. On one hand, traffic on have created multiple platforms that operate Tencent’s dominant social network was guid- with different business and revenue models. ed to Games Platform to strengthen its posi- These models are predicated upon cross-plat- tion. On the other hand, Tencent’s games plat- form traffic feeding and often use cross-subsi- form was organized to feed traffic to its oth- dization to penetrate markets. Rather than in- er platforms, like MyApp, the largest Android dependent platforms and respective assets cul- in China owned by Tencent. To illus- tivating in different markets, these platforms trate, some very popular Tencent games are on- cross-feed one another to develop synergies, ly available on MyApp, thereby building the and build complicated networks in the hopes market share of the app store. of excluding challengers and providing users a wide variety of services within the walled gar- Effectively, Tencent created a business group den/ecosystem. In the PC era, the two most im- consisting of social network, payments, and portant Tencent services were instant messag- games, each using a different revenue mod- ing, QQ, and its game platform, Tencent Game. el. Despite the fact that currently games still Most of these games were developed and pro- make-up a relatively large share of total reve- duced by Tencent. By leveraging its huge user nues (48% at 2016Q2) for the entire group, ad on QQ, Tencent Game became a powerful dis- revenue based on WeChat social network has tribution channel and games became its main increased to 10.4% and is growing twice as fast revenue source. as gaming. While Tencent does not disclose the precise volume of transaction fees collected The mobile Internet, which in China has grown through WeChat payments, it already garners to 700 million users, created challenges and op- 20% of all mobile payments in China – trailing portunities. First, in contrast to PC game world, only Alibaba’s Alipay. The remaining revenues the application store became the new distri- come from its various PC-oriented businesses. bution channel for mobile games. With Goo- gle Play blocked in Mainland China, there was While Tencent has had great success in China, space for an Android OS app stores. The smart- its sites have not been successful globally. Ten- phone manufacturer, Xiaomi, was one of the cent and WeChat have not been successful in first movers when it introduced Mi-Talk – a di- displacing Line (in ), Kakao Talk (in Ko- rect threat to the dominant position of QQ. rea), and Whatsapp, Snapchat and iMessage (in In 2011, Tencent introduced WeChat, which the rest of world). While China is an enormous was immediately successful and allowed it market, Tencent has had little success in the in- to retain its leadership in instant messaging. ternational market. Further, Tencent is always WeChat rapidly evolved into a platform pro- threatened with the possibility that competi- viding an ever-wider variety of services includ- tors may develop disruptive games that could ing payments, social network, e-commerce, ad- be used to encroach upon its dominant gaming market share. ETLA Muistio • Brief 54 • 31.1.2017 3

Why Acquire Supercell tionality. Such a move would be in keeping The acquisition was an enormous commitment with Tencent’s Chinese business group strategy of capital and thus is a significant risk for Ten- where the goal is to create cross-platform syn- cent. The obvious reasons for the acquisition ergies. have already been discussed such as the fact Third, after the Tencent acquisition, Supercell that Supercell is currently enormously profit- announced that it planned to open game de- able, for example, an EBIT of 40% in 2015. Due sign studios in other European nations and in- to their tremendous EBIT Supercell has be- vest in other Finnish gaming companies. This th come the 9 most important company for Fin- may assist Tencent in finding new games that it land national economy with a share of 0.5% of can market in China, while also assisting in its gross domestic product in 2015. To il- growth of income outside of China. lustrate, the significance of Supercell, in 2015 Nokia’s share of Finnish gross domestic prod- uct was 1,3%. Conclusion This acquisition is not without risks to both Su- For Tencent, there were two other strategic in- percell and Tencent. Despite the possibilities, centives, which are linked to its evolution in- Tencent is making a large wager given the un- to a PBG: certainties.

First, with the acquisition, Tencent cemented its The first uncertainty is obvious. Namely, can dominant position in the Chinese game market, Supercell maintain its creativity and continue while also strengthening its global presence. to produce popular games? It has repeatedly The Chinese market is, of course, all important been the case that developers have declined af- for Tencent. Prior to the acquisition, Supercell’s ter being acquired by other firms or undertak- games were published by Kunlun and distrib- ing an IPO. If Supercell fails to sustain its abili- th uted by 360, which is the 5 largest domestic ty to create hits, any synergies Tencent hopes to Internet firm. Clash of Clans was so popular in create will not occur. China that it allowed 360 to challenge Tencent. The acquisition was a decisive response to this Second, the ability of Tencent to balance the challenge. Moreover, when Supercell’s sales are tradeoff between WeChat and Supercell is un- included, Tencent will control 13% of the $100 certain. As we stated, Tencent might be able to billion global games market cementing its glob- integrate some custom-tailored functions into al leadership in online games. Supercell games to promote WeChat. Howev- er, this tactic could harm user experience if not Second, the Tencent transition to a business carefully designed and implemented. group strategy, driven by the fact that ads and transaction fees are much larger markets means Third, because of the nature of Tencent’s exist- that Supercell can reinforce these growth ar- ing games, we doubt that the Supercell’s glob- eas. Tencent has already begun serving tar- al distribution network will provide significant geted ads on WeChat and collecting transac- leverage for distributing Chinese games. This tion fees from the payment platform. The prob- may change in the future if Tencent can devel- lem is that, so far, WeChat has failed to gain op or find original games in the Chinese eco- traction in the global market. One question is system that have global appeal, but this seems whether Supercell could be used to promote unlikely at this time. WeChat in Western markets. To speculate, if users can only download “Clash of Clans” on Fourth, there may be opportunities for techno- WeChat, or if some functions of “Clash Royale” logical cooperation as Supercell has developed are custom-tailored for WeChat, such as shar- some interesting technologies. Perhaps, Ten- ing a game gift with WeChat friends, then there cent’s global-class chat technologies will con- might be a way to convince game users in other tribute to further improvement of Supercell’s countries to, at least experiment with WeChat. existing in-game communication technologies. While this might be difficult, there can be little Fifth, it might be possible for the two firms to doubt that WeChat has world-class chat func- develop combinations of real-life data and vir- 4 ETLA Muistio • Brief 54 • 31.1.2017 tual games. Given their complementary assets, References by integrating Supercell’s games into its plat- Jia, K. and Kenney, M. (2016). Mobile Internet form business group Tencent is certain to gen- Business Models in China: Vertical Hierarchies, erate profitable synergies in the Chinese mar- Horizontal Conglomerates, or Business Groups?, ket. It is less certain that Supercell can assist BRIE Working Paper 2016-6. Tencent in increasing its presence in the global Pon, B., Seppälä, T. and Kenney, M. (2014). Android market beyond the mere addition to its existing and the Demise of Operating System-Based Power: income streams. The true measure of success Firm Strategy and Platform Control in the Post-PC for Tencent will be whether it can use Supercell World. Telecommunications Policy 38(11), pp. 979– to further its global ambitions. 991.

Finally, to speculate even further, the competi- Seppälä, T. and Kenney, M. (2012). Building on tion authorities in western nations are likely to Complementary Assets in a Unified TCP/IP World, prohibit bundling of specific services and dis- BRIE Working Paper No. 204. criminate against other similar services, as has been the case with the litigation against An- droid/Google in . This makes it unlike- ly that Tencent’s PBG model is viable in west- ern economies. However, given the unresolved anti-trust problem surrounding multi-sided platforms, as well as the relative small market share of Tencent in the EU and the US, it might still be possible to see Tencent leverage its Su- percell acquisition. What is certain is that the acquisition will give Tencent synergies in Chi- na and provides it with an important position in the international game market.