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CODE OF H 3 3 2- 3 PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS €OUETS OF THIS STATE. EEFOUTED TO THB LEGISLATURE OF MIMESOTA, BY AARON GOODRICH, <ONE OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO REVISE THE LAVS. STATE SAINT PAUL: EAKLE S. GOODRICH, STATE PEINTER, PIONEER AND DEMOCRAT OFFICE. 3858. A JOINT RESOLUTION or THE SENATE A; D HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF THE STATE OE MINNESOTA, RELATIVE TO THE DOT [ES OF THE PODE COMMISSIONERS, AND THE PUBLI­ CATION OF THEIR REPORT ; PASSEIJ MARCH "r$, 1858. Resolved, By the House of Representatives of the State of Minnesota, (the Senate concurring,) that Aaron Goodrich, Moses Sherburne, and William Hol- linshead, heretofore appointed Commissioners to revise the laws of this State, be and are hereby instructed to enter upon their duties and compile the laws of this State, arranging them under suitable and appropriate Chapters, and to pre­ pare a system of pleadings and practice for the several Courts of this State, such system to conform as near as practicable to the present New York Code, and having reference to the brevity and legal intent of the pleadings; and that they ^ause the result of their labors to be printed and laid before the Legislature at the earliest day practicable. 59246 CODE OP PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE. AN ACT, To simplify and abridge the Pleadings and Practice in the Cowris of this State. Whereas, it is.deemed expedient that many of the present forms of actions and pleadings in the Courts of this State be abolished; that others less expensive and complicated— and better calculated to promote the ends of justice, be in­ stituted in their stead. Therefore, Be it enacted ly the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, as follows: GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS. SECTION 1. Divisions of Eemedies. 2. Definition of an Action. 3. Definition of a Special Proceeding. 4. Division of Actions. 5. Definition of a Criminal Action. 6. Definition of a Civil Action. 7. Civil and Criminal Eemedies. 8. Division of Act. 9. The Courts of Justice in this State. SECTION 1. Remedies.—Eemedies in the Courts of Justice ^^^°^ of are divided into— 1. Actions. 2. Special Proceedings. SEC. 2. Action.—An Action is an ordinary proceeding in Definition of a Court of Justice, by which one party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the re­ dress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a pub­ lic offence. ~ . ... Definition of SEC. 3. Special Proceeding.—Every other remedy is a Spe. a special pro- cial Proceeding. ceeding SEC. 4. Division of Actions.—Actions are of two kinds, Division of 1. Civil. > " . aotiona CODE OF [Title L 2. Criminal. D fiD'ti f ^EC. *>• Criminal Action.—A Criminal Action is prose- a criminal ac- cuted by the State as a party against a person charged with , a public offence, for the punishment thereof. a^unact°ionCf SEC. 6. Civil Action.—Every other is a Civil Action. SEC. 1. Remedies not merged.—Where the violation of a nal remedies right admits of both a Civil and Criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the other. Diviaion of act SEC. 8. Division of this Act.—This Act is divided into titles and sections. The first relates to the Courts of Justice and their juris­ diction. The residue relate to Civil Actions commenced in the Courts of this State, on and after the 10th day of De­ cember, 1858, except as otherwise provided therein, and are divided into titles and sections. TITLE I. OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE AND THEIR JURISDICTION. 1. Of the Courts in General. 2. Of the Supreme Court. 3. Of the District Courts. 4. Of the Courts of Probate. 5. Of Justices of the Peace. OF THE COURTS IN GENERAL. of Justice in SEC 9. The following are the Courts of Justice in this the State gtate . 1. The Court for the trial of Impeachments. (1) 2. The Supreme Court. 3. The District Courts. 4. The Courts of Probate. 5. The Courts of Justices of the Peace. THE SUPREME COURT. SECTION 10. When and where Court to he held. 11. Session continued from day to day, and adjournment • authorized. 12. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court. ' 13. The Supreme Court may issue Writs of Error, Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition, &c. • ' 14. Powers of Supreme Court. (1) See Constitution, Sec. 14, Art. i. Title I.~\ PLEADINGS AND HRACTICE 5 15. Court to give its opinions in writing, when—appoint- ' ment of Keporter authorized—reports to be pub­ lished. 16. Power of Judges in vacation. 17. Provisions in cases of absence of Judges on first day of term. 18. Clerk to adjourn if no Judge appears. 19. Special terms authorized. SEC. 10. The several Judges of the Supreme Court of When and this State are hereby required to meet at the Supreme Court where court to room, at the Capitol, and hold a session of the Supreme Court once in each year,—that is to say : On the second Monday of January. SEC. 11. Any session of the Supreme Court shall be con­ tinued from day to day until the business of the Court shall gession con. be disposed of, unless otherwise ordered by the Court; but tinned from the Court may be adjourned from time to time, for the hearing c or decision of any matters or questions, or transaction of other business, as convenience or necessity may require. SEC 12. The Supreme Court of-this State shall have and Appellate ju exercise appellate jurisdiction only, except as otherwise pro-risdictionofan vided by law, which shall extend to all matters of appeal, from the decisions, judgments, or decrees, of any of the Dis­ trict Courts, in all matters of law or equity, and may also extend to all questions of law arising in any of the said Dis­ trict Courts : > 1. Upon a motion for a new trial in arrest of- judgment, or in cases reserved by said Court: 2.' In a final judgment in the District Courts, in any action commenced therein or brought there from another Court, and upon appeal from that judgment to review any interlocutory order, involving the merits, and necessarily affecting the judgment: 3. In a judgment or decision of any District Court in a. criminal action. SEC. 13. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue Writs of Error, Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition, and all Powers of so­ other writs and process, not especially provided for by law to all Courts of inferior jurisdiction, to corporations and to individuals, that shall be necessary ,t,o the furtherance of justice and th,e execution of the laws ; but no Writ of Error shall operate as a stay of proceedings or execution, unless so ordered by the Court, upon motion, or by one of the Judges thereof in vacation, except in cases otherwise provided by law. 6 CODE OF [Title I. SEC. 14. The Supreme Court shall be vested with full power and authority necessary for carrying into complete Powers of sn. execution all the judgments, decrees and determinations in preme court the matter aforesaid, and for the exercise of its jurisdiction as the supreme judicial tribunal of the State ; and may by order, from time to time, make and prescribe such general rules of practice and regulations for the said Supreme Court, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, as it may deem proper. SEC. 15. The said Court shall in all cases decided by it, oDkSon°ingwri- &*ve ^s °Pmi°n iQ writing, at the term when such cases are ting&c argued, which shall be filed with the Clerk of said Court, with the other papers in the case, and the said Court shall appoint some proper person to report its doings in all causes decided ; which reports shall be published from time to time according to law. SEC. 16. Any one of the Judges of the Supreme Court _ .shall have power in vacation to issue any of the writs or pro- jndgeainvaca-cess, which the said Court is allowed by law to issue. on SEC. IT. If any two Judges of the Supreme Court shall not attend on the first or any other day of the term, the Provision in Clerk shall enter such fact on record, and the Judge present case of ab- shall adjourn the Court to the next day, and so on from day first day of tie to day for six days, if neither of the absent Judges appear ; term at the end of which period, all matters pending in said Court shall stand continued until the next regular or special term of said Court. SEC. 18. If neither of the Judges appear, the Clerk of journ in case said Court may adjourn from day to day, as provided in the udge ap J°arg " preceding section. SEC. 19. Whenever, from any 'cause, it shall appear to Special terms *ne J^ges °f tne sa'^ Court, or any two of them, that the authorized public interest requires that a special term of the said Court be held, the said Judges, or any two of them, shall have authority to appoint a special term of said Court, giving thirty days previous notice thereof, by advertisement publish­ ed in a newspaper, at the seat of government of the State. OF THE DISTRICT COURTS. SECTION 20. The State divided into Judicial Districts. 21. Times and places of holding the District Courts. 22. Jurisdiction of District Courts. 23. Equitable jurisdiction of the District Courts. Title 1.] PLEADINGS AND PBAOTICE. 7 SEC. 20. The State shall be divided into Judicial Districts .
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