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Descartes's Moral Theory: DRAFT 1 Descartes’s Moral Theory: DRAFT Despite once claiming that he “does not like writing on ethics” (Burman 16 April 1648, V:178/3:352) and insisting that “only sovereigns have the right to concern themselves with regulating the morals of other people” (To Chanut 20 Nov. 1647, V:87/3:326), Rene Descartes reflected on ethical themes from his earliest known writings to the closing days of his life. The first of his early Rules for the Direction of the Mind exhorts us to “seek the truth of things … in order [to] show [the] will what decision it ought to make in each of life’s contingencies” (X:361/1.10).i The morale par provision of the Discourse lays out “moral rules … derived from this method” (VI:1/1.111). Meditations is explicitly oriented towards “demonstrative proofs” of the “two truths” without which there can be “practically no moral virtue” (VII:1-2/2:3). And in the dedicatory letter to the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes describes a “most perfect morality” as the “the ultimate level of wisdom,” the “principle benefit of philosophy,” and the ultimate “fruit” of that tree whose “roots are metaphysics [and] trunk is physics” (IXB:14-15/1.186). Much of the correspondence of his later years, particularly with Princess Elizabeth, Hector-Pierre Chanut, and Queen Christina, focuses on ethical themes. And Passions of the Soul – Descartes’s final published work – describe both the “true generosity” by which one can “pursue virtue in a perfect manner” (XI:445-6/1.384) and the “chief use of wisdom” on which “alone all the good and evil of this life depends” (XI:488/1.404). Despite its importance, ethics was not Descartes’s major focus until relatively late in life (starting in 1645),ii and what he did write on ethics fared poorly in Descartes scholarship until recently, when a host of recent studies have investigated various aspects of it.iii In this essay, I consider four issues of central importance to Descartes’s ethics for which there are significant disagreements within the secondary literature: the status of the morale par provision of Descartes’s Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences; the relationship between virtue, happiness, and the “highest good” in Descartes’s ethics; the role of love in Descartes’s mature moral theory; and Descartes’s (shifting) approach to “first-order” moralizing. 1. Descartes’s “morale par provision” Descartes’s first clear articulation of moral principles comes in his Discourse on Method, where he presents what he calls a “morale par provision” (hereafter “morale”) consisting of “three or four maxims”: [F]irst … to obey the laws and customs of my country, and govern myself in all other matters according to the most moderate and least extreme opinions – the opinions commonly accepted in practice by the most sensible…. 2 [S]econd … to be as firm and decisive in my actions as I could, and to follow even the most doubtful opinions, once I had adopted them, with no less constancy than if I had been quite certain…. [T]hird … to try always to master myself rather than the world, and change my desires rather than the order of the world…. Finally, … [w]ithout wishing to say anything about the occupations of others, … [to] devote my whole life to cultivating my reason and advancing as far as I could in the knowledge of truth. (IV:23-7/1:122-4) The status of this morale is hotly debated amongst contemporary scholars of Cartesian ethics. Until recently, the dominant view was that it consisted of a set of temporary maxims useful to one engaging in the kind of scientific enterprise Descartes proposes in his Discourse, maxims that would be replaced if and when a final moral theory was worked out in accordance with strict principles of reason: “the first three maxims of the provisional moral code are just that – provisional moral rules that Descartes will follow while he carries out his search for certain knowledge” (Rutherford 2013: 7).iv This notion that the “morale par provision” was properly a provisional morality was challenged on two fronts, first by Michele LeDœuff’s 1989 study, in which she argued on historical grounds that “par provision “is a juridical term meaning ‘what a judgment awards in advance to a party’” where this provisional judgment “is not liable to be put in question by the final judgment” (Le Dœuff 1989:62; cf. e.g. Shapiro 2008:450); and second by John Marshall’s philosophical reconstruction of Descartes’s moral theory (Marshall 1994) that treats a “morale par provision” as any “morality seen as in some respects doubtful and imperfect” but not “provisional in a pejorative sense” (Marshall 1994:18, 53). Roughly speaking, commentators can be divided into three major ways of understanding the morale par provision. At one extreme lies the traditional view of the morale as genuinely provisional, a view that remains widely defended.v At the other extreme is the view of Shapiro (2008) and Cimakasky and Polansky (2012), all of whom defend the view that the morale is “permanent and universal” (Cimakasky and Polansky 2012:353; see Shapiro 2008:450-3; Le Dœuff 1989:62). The views of John Marshall and, in a different way, Noa Naaman-Zauderer, lie in between these. Marshall sees the morale as “revisable,” but his conception of its relationship to a final moral theory is one of gradual revision and improvement, rather than temporary place-holding before eventual displacement. And Naaman-Zauderer sees the morale as a whole as needed for an “interim period” (160) but adds that “some of the morale maxims [are] a source for ‘true and certain’ reasons for action” that will remain part of any eventual moral theory (161).vi Without entering into all of the complicated arguments in support of each commentator’s position, I here lay out what I consider to be the major lines of support for each position before briefly defending my own view (which is somewhere between Rutherford and Naaman-Zauderer). The primary textual arguments for seeing the morale as more than merely provisionary are threefold. First, Descartes claims in his précis of the Discourse that in the third part, one will find “some of the moral rules … derived from [tirée de] this method” (VI:1/1:111), a claim reiterated (albeit obliquely) elsewhere in the Discourse (IV:21-2, 29, 61/1:121-2, 125, 142; see Cimakasky and Polansky 3 2012:354-5). Second, the rules are, as Shapiro points out, “framed as general rules, applicable in all circumstances” and not limited to rules that would be needed during scientific investigation (Shapiro 2008:451; see too Cimakasky and Polansky 2012; Marshall 1998). And third, Descartes bases his second rule on the “most certain truth that when it is not in our power to discern the truest opinions, we must follow the most probable” and the third in part on the fact, which “is certain,” that “if we consider all external goods as beyond our power, we shall not regret” their absence and thus can become “perfectly convinced” of the importance of self-mastery (IV:25/1:123-4).vii This language suggests that, for these maxims at least, Descartes thinks that he has the “evident knowledge of truth” (xxx) required to accept claims without any possibility of doubt. Beyond these specifically textual arguments, John Marshall defends the revisable but non-provisional status of the morale on the grounds that “Descartes decided to embrace this morale long before he decided to … rid himself of his former opinions” (Marshall 2008:12) and that there is no coherent way to apply the morale without implicitly accepting, as justified albeit revisable, one’s existing first-order moral commitments. Despite these reasons for thinking that the morale is more than merely provisional, the traditional reading also has strong textual (and philosophical) grounds. For one thing, the language of par provision, while it could refer to technical legal term, can equally well be used as an expression synonymous with provisoire (provisional), and Descartes regularly uses it conjunction with other language that makes it sound temporary, such as his claim to use the morale par provision because he has “not yet” found a better one (IXB:15/1:186) or his explicit explanation identification of “par provision” with “intending to change … as soon as I find better” (to Reneri for Pollot, 1638, II:35/3:97). More importantly, this traditional reading is grounded on the two main metaphors Descartes uses to discuss this morale.viii In the Discourse, he introduces it as follows: Before starting to rebuild your house, it is not enough simply to pull it down, to make provision [Fr: provision] for materials and architects …, and to have carefully drawn up the plans; you must also provide yourself with some other place where you can live comfortably while building is in progress. Likewise, lest I should remain indecisive in my actions while reason obliged me to be so in my judgments, and in order to live as happily as I could during this time, I formed for myself a provisional moral code [morale par provision]. (IV:22/1:122, emphasis added) Descartes’s description of the morale is suffused with language of temporariness, and his language of “provision” in describing the morale echoes his early language about providing “materials and architects” for the building. Just as one would not continue to employ architects or live in the temporary dwelling erected during construction, likewise we should not expect this morale to retain its action-guiding force once Descartes’s whole philosophical edifice is constructed.
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