www.ssoar.info

The next steps for EU counterterrorism policy: evolving threats of Jihadism, right-wing extremism, and transatlantic cooperation Bossong, Raphael

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Stellungnahme / comment

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Bossong, R. (2021). The next steps for EU counterterrorism policy: evolving threats of Jihadism, right-wing extremism, and transatlantic cooperation. (SWP Comment, 20/2021). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2021C20

Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-74016-3

NO. 20 MARCH 2021 Introduction

The Next Steps for EU Counterterrorism Policy Evolving Threats of Jihadism, Right-wing Extremism, and Transatlantic Cooperation Raphael Bossong

In the wake of the Corona pandemic and the storming of the Capitol, threat percep- tions with regard to right-wing extremists and conspiracy theories have increased markedly. The attacks in France and Austria last November showed that the threat from jihadist terrorism also remains acute. Against this background, the counter- terrorism agenda of the European Union (EU) was updated at the end of 2020 and covers a broad range of topics. However, it also testifies to the heterogeneity of the Union’s competences and the different interests of EU member states. On the one hand, the EU’s role remains limited when it comes to the rehabilitation of imprisoned terrorists and to the broad societal prevention of extremism. On the other hand, the EU is pushing forward with a set of regulations to remove illegal online content. This common legislative agenda is also part of a renewed transatlantic partnership. How- ever, proactive measures against right-wing terrorism will, for the time being, be advanced in flexible coalitions.

The dismantling of the territory of the An intelligence failure led to the Vienna “Islamic State” (IS) in 2019 and intensive attack in November 2020, which was per- efforts by intelligence and law enforcement petrated with a Kalashnikov. By contrast, agencies to pursue terrorists mean that those who attacked the Paris editorial serious attacks, which occurred repeatedly offices of Charlie Hebdo in 2015 used assault in Europe between 2014 and 2017, have rifles that could be legally acquired as become less likely. Neither the so-called dummies in Slovakia and made functional migration crisis of 2015 nor the return of again all too easily. In recent years, the EU foreign fighters from IS has resulted in an states have closed this and other regulatory uncontrollable threat to Europe so far, loopholes that could be exploited by terror- although irregular immigrants and rejected ists, for example in the area of financing. asylum seekers have repeatedly carried out Nevertheless, the Union is facing new risks or attempted attacks. These acts have also that are calling its relative successes in the shown that access to weapons and high- fight against terrorism into question. value targets has become more difficult.

The Continuing Threat from offenses, including material support (e.g., Jihadist-motivated Terror attempts to leave the country to join IS). Even a comparatively low recidivism rate of The Islamic State (IS, alternatively ISIL, ISIS, less than 5 percent – the estimate for or Daesh) may regroup in Syria and Iraq. European jihadists these days – represents Major suicide bombings in Baghdad this a considerable threat potential in view of January are signs of such a development. It the more than 1,400 persons currently in is likely that IS continues to have access to prison. Over the past two years, this threat substantial financial resources. Detained has materialized in terror attacks in Vien- fighters could benefit from regional unrest na, Dresden, and London. In the aftermath, and targeted operations to liberate them decision-makers have been under intense from prisons. EU states are still acting too pressure to explain why former criminals hesitantly and incoherently when it comes were able to strike again. However, terrorist to readmitting nationals who had joined IS. convicts cannot generally be locked up for- Orderly procedures for repatriation are ever without breaching fundamental prin- preferable, both for normative reasons and ciples of the rule of law. in light of the security risks that arise from a permanent denial of responsibility and lack of effective jurisdiction. Different Assessments of Trans- The Biden administration can help stabi- national Right-wing Extremism lize the situation on the ground, as it is seeking to renew its partnership with Kurd- The Corona crisis, meanwhile, has created a ish allies and apparently intends to keep huge resonance chamber for conspiracy US forces in the region. The appointment of theories. Violent actions by radical vaccina- Brett McGurk, the former Special Presiden- tion critics are conceivable. Already long tial Envoy for the Global Coalition to Coun- before the pandemic, right-wing extremist ter ISIL, as the National Security Council’s terrorism was markedly on the rise. When coordinator for the Middle East and Africa different forms of right-wing extremist hate is another indication of the continued crimes are included, one can discern a de- intensity and regional dimension of the crease in violent acts over the past 30 years threat. For example, groups and actors in Europe. Nevertheless, there is a qualita- affiliated with IS have been able to gain a tively new threat of interrelated terrorist foothold on the African continent – appar- attacks. ently leading to growing tensions with sup- The Christchurch 2019 attacker, by his porters of al-Qaeda there. European states own admission, was inspired by Anders must therefore continue to help stabilize Breivik’s deeds eight years earlier. Since fragile countries in its wider neighborhood, then, several copycats have appeared on the despite many setbacks. This applies first scene in the United States and Germany. and foremost to France, which faces a wide These perpetrators usually spread right- range of problems in the Sahel (SWP Com- wing extremist ideas that can be connected ment 5/2021). across different national and ideological At home the EU has to deal with indi- contexts. In particular, the belief in a “Great vidual jihadists and small cells that, with- Replacement,” according to which the out clear links to organized structures, white population is to be deliberately de- often act haphazardly, making them all the stroyed by immigration, serves as a unify- more unpredictable. In addition, new ideo- ing element. Online image boards, open logical developments must be kept in mind, and closed social media channels, and parts such as a violent Takfirism. of the gamer scene support a culture of A particular challenge is the growing glorification of violence. However, an inten- number of individuals who have been con- sified cross-border networking of right-wing victed in recent years for various terrorist extremist parties, organizations, and indi-

SWP Comment 20 March 2021

2 viduals can also be observed offline, espe- latest joint EU Security Union Strategy, cially at sports and music events. published in summer 2020, addresses many Since 2019 at the latest, German politi- aspects of the fight against terrorism, espe- cians and security authorities have been cially in the area of early detection or “anti- stressing jointly that right-wing extremism cipation” – a new term in the EU’s dis- poses as serious a threat as militant jihad- course. However, according to this strategy, ism. The events on Capitol Hill in early the most important priorities for the future January further demonstrated the growing are “hybrid threats,” cybersecurity, the pro- scale and radical nature of conspiracy- tection of critical infrastructures, and deal- theory movements to a global public. None- ing with the impact of, as well as harness- theless, Western states do not share a full ing, new technologies for security authori- or comprehensive threat perception toward ties (especially artificial intelligence and this challenge. Right-wing populist forces encryption). Meanwhile, the Schengen zone have not marched from victory to victory in and the freedom of movement must be many democratic elections since 2017, as preserved as much as possible during the previously feared. In addition to the United ongoing pandemic. States and Germany, explicit right-wing ter- In view of these structural challenges rorism has so far mainly been concentrated and urgent crises, the EU’s recent commu- in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the United nications and declarations on the fight Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Greece – and against terrorism adopted by the Interior taken various forms in each case. Various Ministers, the Commission, and the Euro- Eastern European states have strong right- pean Council in November and December wing extremist organizations but have not 2020 are unlikely to provide a significant yet experienced attacks. impetus. Arguably, they served primarily as Overall, there is no uniform recording of a political signal in response to the attacks politically motivated acts of violence in the in France and Vienna that occurred shortly EU, despite Europol’s regular reports, which before, as well as the fifth anniversary of are supposed to include all types of terror- the Paris attacks (Bataclan). It should be ism. Hence, there is a discrepancy between noted, however, that the Council of EU the presumed threat potential from trans- Ministers of Interior explicitly welcomed a national right-wing terrorism and the ac- temporary expansion of internal border tual shared security priorities of many EU controls and wanted to intensify the ex- states. change of information on potentially vio- lent extremists (German “Gefährder”). This may influence the strategic debate on the The Recent EU Agenda future of the Schengen regime, which is to be held from autumn onwards, at the latest. The particularly serious attacks in Paris in Meanwhile, the intelligence exchange on November 2015 marked a turning point in dangerous extremists is to take place within European counterterrorism policy. Police the framework of a new “European police and intelligence cooperation has been sig- partnership.” This is probably the most im- nificantly intensified since then. In addi- portant initiative of the past German Coun- tion, the EU decided to strengthen controls cil Presidency in the area of internal secu- at its external borders and passed an ambi- rity. However, this partnership cannot be tious reform package on biometric data- understood as focusing primarily on the bases that can, among other things, help fight against terrorism because it covers a identify suspected terrorists. Many of these much broader field of police work, includ- measures have yet to be implemented on ing local cooperation in border regions. a technical level. In the current EU legislative period, how- ever, the political focus has shifted. The

SWP Comment 20 March 2021

3 The Controversial Scope of Court again formulated strict conditions EU Counterterrorism Policy for the proportionality of mandatory data retention. Ascribing various security policy initiatives to the field of counterterrorism has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one Structural Gaps and Limits of hand, such a move may accelerate and EU Prevention Policy facilitate political decision-making. On the other hand, comprehensive counterterror- The central task of a revitalized EU counter- ism packages create coordination and im- terrorism policy is to contain the aforemen- plementation problems. Above all, one tioned structural threat potentials posed by needs to avoid distorted assessments about jihadist and right-wing extremists. In the the necessity and proportionality of new field of terrorism prevention, the EU has security laws in the aftermath of atrocities. been trying to take on a coordinating role In the early 2000s, for example, the intro- since the mid-2000s. In particular, the duction of the European Arrest Warrant Commission launched the Radicalisation and many more measures in the Area of Awareness Network (RAN), which now has Freedom, Security and Justice were justified more than 3,200 members from academia, on the grounds of combating terrorism. government, and civil society. The net- However, rapid progress in integration sub- work’s mission is to promote pilot projects sequently entailed numerous legal chal- and best practices across borders and to lenges and repeated amendments. disseminate new research findings. In 2019, The EU’s recent counterterrorism agenda an additional steering board was set up to appears comparatively more mature. For advise member states on their prevention example, the European Commission has policies. taken up issues that a special committee of The concrete effects are unclear. This is the European Parliament highlighted in a exemplified by the correctional system. EU comprehensive evaluation of EU counter- member states have inconsistent and un- terrorism policy during the last legislative coordinated approaches when it comes to period. Among other things, victims of dealing with terrorist convicts. Lacking terrorism are to be entitled to more rights prison chaplaincy and underfunded reha- and compensation, while the protection of bilitation programs still often characterize public spaces should be improved. In con- practices on the ground. The EU supports a trast, the European Council’s renewed call professional association of correctional for mandatory data retention must be seen authorities that provides data on prison as a rather problematic priority for the next conditions, among other things. A recent stage of the EU’s fight against terrorism. RAN manual on the rehabilitation of ter- This also applies to the comprehensive rorist offenders could serve as a reference reform of Europol’s mandate currently work. However, typical European gover- under negotiation, which aims to boost the nance instruments, such as mutual periodic technical capacities of European police evaluations, have not been introduced to authorities and to forge closer cooperation date. A recommendation by the EU Council with the private sector. Some aspects of of Ministers in 2019 has not yet resulted in these legislative proposals are suitable for any noticeable consequences. aiding the prevention and prosecution of Regardless of this, the member states serious crimes. However, if the emphasis in each bear responsibility for a prevention the political debate is placed on combating and integration policy for society as a terrorism, there is a renewed risk of dis- whole. Actions in this field require a strong torted legal provisions, which could lead to civil society and democratic legitimacy. This further actions for annulment before the has been demonstrated once again in recent European Court of Justice. Recently, the months in the debates on “political Islam”

SWP Comment 20 March 2021

4 in Austria and France. It would not make this crisis protocol is coordinated by Euro- sense to decide at the EU level to what ex- pol. tent the work of religious associations may In view of the dynamic growth of extrem- be monitored or in how far their political ist online content and the large number of participation could be deemed appropriate. platforms that do not yet participate in The idea – raised briefly by President of such partnerships, the EU Commission and the European Council Charles Michel – of Council have been pursuing a legislative establishing an EU training center for initiative for the mandatory deletion of imams is equally unrealistic, as long as terrorist online content since 2018. In con- education policy remains predominantly a trast, the European Parliament and repre- national or subnational competence. In this sentatives of industry and civil society most- respect, it is logical that the European ly warned against disproportionate censor- Council at the end of 2020 condemned ship and the structural disadvantage of attacks on freedom of expression and smaller online platforms that do not have religion only in very general terms and the resources to review content and regu- urged harmony between religious educa- larly cooperate with security authorities. tion and fundamental European values. In the wake of the murder of the teacher Samuel Paty in France, which could clearly be traced back to incitement on social Mandatory Deletion of Terrorist media, a political compromise could now Content Online be found: In the upcoming EU regulation, the strict deadline for deleting marked In turn, the EU is focusing its efforts on terrorist content within one hour is to be controlling the online space, where it can maintained, although certain exceptions exercise strong regulatory powers based on apply for small providers. Similarly, the the Single Market. So far, only a few Euro- rule that deletions can be ordered across pean countries, including Germany, have borders is maintained within the Single adopted new legal regulations for the rapid Market, with only a few ex-post review pos- deletion of extremist or (popularly) inflam- sibilities for the state in which the online matory online content. In recent years, service concerned is located. On the other security authorities have entered into hand, the obligation to take “active mea- voluntary partnerships with operators of sures,” i.e., to check online content before major online platforms (including social it is uploaded, has been deleted. The use of media), with Europol taking a leading role possible terrorist content for research and with its Internet Referral Unit and the EU Inter- educational purposes is also to remain per- net Forum, which includes representatives of mitted. key companies (YouTube/Google, Facebook, Critics nevertheless see the danger of Microsoft, Twitter). In coordination with illegitimate and unbalanced content con- the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, trols, as different standards could be applied which links the same private-sector actors to cross-border deletion requests, depending and the EU with 29 other states and the on the national political and legal system. United Nations, jihadist propaganda has In addition, extremist users could migrate been reduced significantly. The main tool is to communication channels and providers a hashtag database that captures identified outside of Europe that are difficult to con- terrorist material and enables cross-plat- trol, such as Telegram. form blocking. In October 2019, after the Experience to date in Germany with the terrorist attack in Christchurch, state and Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) suggests private actors added a so-called crisis proto- that at least the risks of unjustified deletion col, which should ensure the swift –and, if of legal content or the ineffective transfer possible, worldwide – blocking of filmed of illegal content to unregulated platforms terrorist acts. In the EU, the application of are relatively low. The disadvantage of the

SWP Comment 20 March 2021

5 partial migration “into the dark” is likely the DSA, two particular challenges arise: outweighed by the more limited reach of First, many actors from the online milieu those alternative communication channels. of the “new right” use coded language that The following points are more problematic: hides extremist content in innuendo and the ability of users to find and effectively is difficult to detect using automated pro- use mechanisms to flag illegal content, the cedures. Second, right-wing extremist legal verifiability of deletion requests, and speech is assessed differently across EU the tracking of offenders, since the police member states. In 2008, the Union adopted and judiciary have too few qualified person- a framework decision on combating racism nel. A corresponding reform of the NetzDG, and xenophobia, according to which mem- which also should massively increase the ber states should penalize such statements. role of the German Federal Criminal Police This weakly binding legal act from before Office in the prosecution of online hate the Lisbon Treaty has had little effect. crimes, is nearing completion – but it faces Consideration is therefore being given several legal and practical hurdles. In light within the Commission to extending the of this example, the upcoming EU regula- areas of crime identified in Article 83 (1) tion on deleting terrorist content will not TFEU – for which the EU can perform a be easily implemented effectively and in a harmonization function – to include hate proportionate manner in other member crimes and hate speech. However, such a states either. decision would have to be unanimous in the Council. This is not likely, at least as long as tensions continue between member Further EU Regulation in the Area states over issues of the rule of law and the of Digital Policy interpretation of the Union’s fundamental liberal values. The decision by Twitter and The debate on the regulation of the Internet Facebook to ban US President Donald or Internet-based business models is devel- Trump from their platforms, for example, oping rapidly. The EU Digital Services Act has prompted a reaction from the Polish (DSA), presented at the end of 2020, devel- government to plan a national law prohib- ops a comprehensive concept of responsi- iting such “censorship” within its sphere of bility and accountability of large online influence. platforms and social media. Among other Unilateral action by the major online things, uniform mechanisms for reporting platforms, taking advantage of their quasi- suspected illegal content are to be estab- monopoly positions, can be critically ques- lished. The dissemination of extremist or tioned with good reason. However, individ- deliberately misleading content is to be ual member states are making it more dif- countered by regulating recommendation ficult to arrive at a pan-European approach algorithms. Larger platforms would have to through new legal acts on the limits of ex- provide significant transparency of their pression on the Internet. This is also true content control and moderation systems. for France, which plans to finalize the DSA The DSA, however, is not intended to create in 2022 as part of its next EU presidency, new rules to criminalize specific forms of but it is already pushing national laws in content. this area. In the area of jihadist terrorism, as men- tioned, some voluntary mechanisms and the forthcoming EU regulation on deleting Transatlantic Dimension designated terrorist online content should already provide a reasonably effective set of The events at the Capitol have triggered a tools. However, in the area of right-wing change of heart among many Democrats extremism and so-called hate speech, which and also some Republicans when it comes could also fall under the regulatory scope of to the traditionally very high value placed

SWP Comment 20 March 2021

6 on freedom of expression. Since then, there Conclusion and has been an intense debate in the United Recommendations States about the responsibilities of large online platforms. Given European market Despite years of effort, the EU has reached power and the dominance of US companies, structural limits with regard to broad, all- it would be highly advisable for Brussels of-society efforts to curb extremism and and Washington to agree upon a coordi- prevent terrorist violence. Within the EU, nated approach. Broadly speaking, the member states should not drag each other following guideline could apply on both into internal debates about the role of sides of the Atlantic: The right to freedom religion and integration in their respective of expression is to be largely preserved, but societies. Rather, more targeted efforts can there should be no “right to amplify.” This be made at the EU level to create reform would allow for curbing the dissemination incentives in specific areas, such as preven- of certain online content. tion and rehabilitation in national correc- Joe Biden addressed the danger posed by tional systems. Even without a competence right-wing extremism and racism several for legal harmonization, the EU can do times in his inaugural speech, not least to more than promote best practices. distance himself from the presumed tolera- At the top of the agenda, however, is tion or even support of such groups (e.g., how to reach a shared understanding on the Proud Boys) under Donald Trump. the limits freedom of expression and on the However, US authorities already banned a legal responsibilities of online platforms right-wing extremist organization, the so- and service providers. EU member states called Russian Imperial Movement, as a must continue to work in the long term on foreign terrorist association for the first approximating their criminal laws on hate time in 2020. It is all the more surprising speech. First, the implementation of the that there is still no federal legislation to upcoming regulation on deleting terrorist prosecute domestic terrorist groups, as content online must be closely monitored. such. If this gap were to be closed under the To avoid a disproportionate use of the ter- Biden administration, global cooperation rorism charges in cross-border contexts, it against right-wing extremist and potential would be helpful to expand the legal bases terrorist actors could gain substance. for combating hate speech and hate crime. In view of the different threat situations In the medium term, the DSA will create and perceptions of right-wing terrorism in pressure to act in this direction, as cross- various European states, however, flexible border notifications and deletion orders are bilateral or mini-lateral initiatives are to likely to increase sharply. The consequences be expected for the time being, especially of the DSA will extend far beyond counter- when it comes to operational cooperation terrorism and beyond EU borders. There- between criminal justice authorities and fore, the converging perception of right- intelligence agencies. Germany, in partic- wing extremism being a threat in the United ular, has an important European leadership States must be used now as an opportunity role to play. It is particularly affected by for a transatlantic regulatory framework. right-wing extremism and right-wing terror- Yet all these steps to regulate the online ism and also has developed special compe- space can only indirectly impact on differ- tencies in this area. It should draw on this ent types of religious and political extrem- profile to revitalize transatlantic relations. ism. Most research studies on radicalization This also applies to the future security rela- processes and terrorist acts show that on- tionship with the United Kingdom, which line communications play an important already classified domestic right-wing ex- and growing role, but that personal, social, tremism as a strategic threat several years and political factors remain at least as ago. crucial.

SWP Comment 20 March 2021

7 Since right-wing terrorism has so far only been experienced as a priority threat in a minority of Western states, flexible formats should be used to move operational coop- eration forward. This applies, for example, to intelligence exchanges on right-wing ex- tremists or to concrete measures that may have cross-border aspects, such as bans on associations and investigative procedures. A comparable pattern of counterterrorism © Stiftung Wissenschaft cooperation among “most affected member und Politik, 2021 states” was already used in the early 2010s All rights reserved against the phenomenon of IS foreign fighters – and could later be transformed This Comment reflects into common European approaches. Now the author’s views. again, the EU can benefit from committed The online version of member states such as Germany and third this publication contains countries such as the United Kingdom and functioning links to other the United States to advance with tangible SWP texts and other relevant counterterrorism measures. sources.

SWP Comments are subject to internal peer review, fact- checking and copy-editing. For further information on our quality control pro- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ quality-management-for- swp-publications/

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 doi: 10.18449/2021C20

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 22/2021)

Dr. Raphael Bossong is an Associate in the EU / Europe Research Division.

SWP Comment 20 March 2021

8