Circling the Earth United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942–1948
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Circling the Earth United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942–1948 ELLIOTT V. CONVERSE III Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama August 2005 Air University Library Cataloging Data Converse, Elliott Vanveltner. Circling the earth : United States plans for a postwar overseas military base sys- tem, 1942–1948. / Elliott V. Converse III. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58566-141-4 1. Military bases, American—Planning—History. 2. United States. Dept. of Defense—History. 3. Military planning—United States—History. 4. United States— Armed Forces—Foreign countries—History. I. Title. 355.709––dc22 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. Air University Press 131 West Shumacher Avenue Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6615 http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix PREFACE . xi INTRODUCTION . xiii Notes . xvii 1 THE FIRST PLANS, 1942–1943 . 1 Notes . 40 2 BASE PLANNING, 1943–1945 . 51 Notes . 90 3 BASE PLANNING TAKES SHAPE, 1945 . 101 Notes . 138 4 POSTWAR ADJUSTMENTS, 1946–1948 . 151 Notes . 184 5 CONCLUSION . 199 Notes . 211 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . 215 INDEX . 227 iii Foreword Much has been written about the collapse of World War II’s Grand Alliance into a sharply divided postwar world, the onset of the Cold War, and the somewhat reluctant assumption of Western leadership by the United States. Plans for an exten- sive postwar overseas military basing structure and the nexus of political, military, and commercial interests which drove that planning are important parts of the story that have gone largely unexplored. In many ways, the evolution of planning for overseas bases from 1942 through 1948 reflected the growing sophistication and political maturation of American foreign and military policy. In spite of the dismal failure of the League of Nations, early plan- ning focused on basing requirements for an envisioned postwar international police force. The unabashed idealism expressed in this notion and the breathtaking assumptions required to make it feasible appear exceptionally naive to the contempo- rary observer, but only in the crisp focus of hindsight. Many believed that a sweeping victory by the Grand Alliance could make all things possible, even a successful international police force to keep the peace and bring order out of postwar chaos. Meanwhile, national security concepts based on hemispheric defense continued to dominate much of the thinking about post- war basing requirements well into 1945. These were very tra- ditional ideas with roots reaching back over 100 years to the Monroe Doctrine. In the two decades just before World War II, these traditional concepts had taken on physical substance in hemispheric defense plans, exercises, and operations, with many centered on the protection of the Panama Canal and the shipping lanes leading to and from the canal. Other prewar plans expanded the hemispheric defense idea across the Pacific to the US territories such as the Hawaiian and Philippine Islands. In sum, the notion of hemispheric defense, with its expansion across the Pacific, was deeply rooted in the American psyche, which otherwise had strong isolationist tendencies. However, the idea of an expanded hemispheric defense would be dwarfed by the demands of the postwar world. v As World War II entered its final phases, friction with the Soviet Union grew, and it became quite clear that American national security had to be considered from a global perspective. The per- ceived threat of a hostile Soviet Union (determined to spread its control and influence) was the principal driver behind the globalization basing plans. A second was the obvious truth that for the foreseeable future, only the United States had the wherewithal to effectively oppose the Soviets. Great Britain was virtually bankrupt, and its people were exhausted from the strain of the war. France was in tatters both physically and politically. Germany was prostrate in its own rubble and divided between East and West. Moreover, to a great many victims of German aggression, the thought of a rearmed West Germany, even as a bulwark against the Soviet menace, was anathema. A third driver of overseas base planning was the rise of so- called atomic airpower, widely assumed to be the lead military element used to deter Soviet aggression. Airpower required bases within reasonable range of the Soviet Union, particularly in the age of propeller-driven B-29 and B-50 bombers. Only the con- troversial B-36 bomber, which would not begin entering the active inventory of the US Air Force until the summer of 1948, had true intercontinental range while carrying a nuclear pay- load. The day of the all-jet heavy-bomber and a range-extending aerial tanker force was even further in the future. As a result, bases and basing rights around the periphery of the Soviet Union became a critically important objective. At least two other factors also shaped the overseas base plan- ning process. One was the desire on the part of civilian interests to further the development of American commercial aviation, the disparate requirements of which did not always mesh well with perceived military necessities. Interservice rivalries, now exacerbated by the addition of the newly independent US Air Force to the fray and sharp reductions in postwar defense budgets, also shaped the planning process. Bitter squabbles erupted over postwar service roles and missions as each service attempted to carve out or protect its niche in a nuclear world they only vaguely understood. These internecine struggles had deleterious effects on the planning process. vi The overseas base planning process reflected the evolution and growing sophistication of American strategic thinking during the tumultuous period from 1942 through 1948. The results of the planning shaped, in many ways, the East-West struggle for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Elliott Converse has performed a great and remarkable service by cap- turing the often confusing and chaotic essence of the base plan- ning effort during this turbulent period. His exhaustive research brings the issues, attitudes, and personalities involved into clear focus. This is a seminal work. DENNIS M. DREW Colonel, USAF, Retired Professor and Associate Dean School of Advanced Air and Space Studies vii About the Author Elliott V. Converse III is a retired Air Force colonel with a doc- torate in history from Princeton University. His career included assignments as a faculty member at the US Air Force Academy and the Air War College, as an air intelligence officer in South- east Asia, as a strategic planner with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as commander of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB. After retiring from the Air Force, Dr. Converse taught history at Reinhardt College, Waleska, Georgia, and again at the Air Force Academy. He is currently the lead historian on a project sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military services to write a history of the acquisition of major weapon systems by the armed forces since World War II. His vol- ume in the series will cover the years 1945–1958. Dr. Converse is also the principal author of The Exclusion of Black Soldiers from the Medal of Honor in World War II (1997) and editor of Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World (1998). ix Preface My interest in post–World War II overseas military base plan- ning began in a research seminar on the History of American Foreign Relations at the University of Wisconsin in 1971. I resumed my study of the subject at Princeton University in 1975 and completed my dissertation, “United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942–1948,” in 1984. This book is an adaptation of that dissertation. I found the topic both interesting and significant because of the conjuncture between force and diplomacy that overseas base selection rep- resented and because of its ties to the study of strategic plan- ning, the nature of American civil-military relationships, the con- troversial questions of the origins of the Cold War, and the character of American foreign policy. I was, as were many stu- dents during these years, much influenced by “New Left” or “revi- sionist” historiography. My research and conclusions did not, in the end, reinforce that general interpretation, but the interpreta- tion substantially enlarged my understanding of history. Many people contributed to my graduate education and to the preparation of the dissertation. Among them are the teachers who introduced me to the serious study of history: Professors Pierce C. Mullen, Alton B. Oviatt, and Richard B. Roeder of Montana State University; University of Wisconsin professors Edward M. Coffman and John A. DeNovo, who began my gradu- ate education in military and diplomatic history; and Princeton University professors Cyril E. Black, Richard D. Challener, Robert Darnton, Arno J. Mayer, and Carl E. Schorske, each of whom played an important role in my doctoral program. A spe- cial thank you goes to Dr. John M. Thompson who, during the year he served as a distinguished visiting professor at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), provided sugges- tions and assistance at a critical stage. Numerous skilled archivists cheerfully assisted my research. I especially want to mention Mrs. Priscilla Sutcliffe of the Special Collections Division of the Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson University; Mr. Edward J. Boone Jr. of the MacArthur Memorial Archives; Mr. William H. Cunliffe and Mr. Charles A. Shaughnessy of the Modern Military Branch staff at the National xi Archives; Dr.